[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 35 (Tuesday, February 23, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 8869-8876]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-4393]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-315 and 50-316]


Indiana Michigan Power Company, Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, 
Units 1 and 2; Issuance of Director's Decision Under 2.206

    Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation has issued a Director's Decision with regard to a Petition 
dated October 9, 1997, and an Addendum to the Petition dated January 
12, 1998, filed by Mr. David Lochbaum on behalf of the Union of 
Concerned Scientists, hereafter referred to as the ``Petitioner.'' The 
Petition pertains to the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 
(D. C. Cook).
    The Petitioner requested that the operating licenses for D. C. Cook 
be modified, revoked, or suspended to prevent operation of the units 
until there is reasonable assurance that significant non-compliances 
have been identified and corrected so that systems are in conformance 
with their design-basis and licensing-basis requirements. The Petition 
also requested that a public hearing into this matter be held in the 
Washington, D.C. area before the first unit at D. C. Cook is authorized 
to restart. As the basis for these requests, the Petitioner stated that 
the NRC completed an architect/engineering (AE) design inspection at D. 
C. Cook (NRC Inspection Report (IR) No. 50-315, 50-316/97201) on 
November 26, 1997. Findings by the NRC during the AE inspection led to 
the Licensee having to declare the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) 
inoperable at both units at D. C. Cook. As a result, the Licensee shut 
down both units in accordance with its Technical Specifications (TS). 
The systems reviewed during the AE inspection were the same systems 
that the Licensee had previously reviewed as part of its design-basis 
documentation reconstitution program, and the program did not identify 
any deficiencies concerning system operability. Therefore, the 
Petitioner asserted that the Licensee's design-basis documentation 
reconstitution programs lacked the necessary rigor and focus to 
identify potential design-related operability issues. The Petitioner 
further asserted that deficiencies in the Licensee's design control 
programs may also be responsible for similar issues in safety systems 
that have not been examined by the NRC. On the basis of this potential, 
the Petitioner also requested that the NRC increase the inspection 
scope at D. C. Cook. By letter dated January 12, 1998, the Petitioner 
issued an Addendum to the Petition.
    The following six specific concerns were raised in the Addendum:
    (1) ice condenser concerns.
    (2) 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation process.
    (3) engineering calculations.
    (4) net positive suction head (NPSH) calculations.
    (5) licensee's response to the CAL.
    (6) NRC inspection process.
    The Addendum also raised concerns about the 10 CFR 2.206 process, 
the NRC inspection process, and generic concerns with ice condenser 
containments. On February 23, 1998, the NRC acknowledged receipt of the 
additional information and informed the Petitioner that all specific 
concerns related to the D. C. Cook plant and the Petition would be 
considered in the Director's Decision. Further, the NRC informed the 
Petitioner that the concerns not directly applicable to the request in 
the Petition would be evaluated and transmitted to the Petitioner in 
separate correspondence. By letters dated July 10 and December 28, 
1998, the NRC sent the Petitioner the status of the review of these 
issues.
    On August 19, 1998, an informal public hearing was held at the NRC 
headquarters in Rockville, Maryland. Both the Petitioner and the 
Licensee made presentations during the hearing. The hearing gave the 
Petitioner an opportunity to clarify the issues raised in the Petition 
and the Addendum.
    The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has 
determined that the request to prevent operation of the units at D. C. 
Cook until there is reasonable assurance that significant non-
compliances have been identified and corrected so that systems are in 
conformance with their design-basis and licensing-basis requirements 
has been satisfied. The regulatory oversight actions being taken by the 
NRC will provide reasonable assurance that systems at D. C. Cook will 
be in conformance with their design bases and licensing bases, thus 
meeting the request made in the Petition and eliminates the need to 
modify, suspend or revoke the licenses at D. C. Cook. The reasons for 
this decision are explained in the Director's Decision Pursuant to 10 
CFR 2.206 (DD-99-03), the complete text of which follows this notice 
and is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public 
Document Room, Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, D. C., 
and at the local public document room located at Maud Preston Palenske 
Memorial Library, 500 Market Street, St. Joseph, MI 49085.
    A copy of the Director's Decision will be filed with the Secretary 
of the Commission for the Commission's review in accordance with 10 CFR 
2.206 of the Commission's regulations. As provided for by this 
regulation, the Decision will constitute the final action of the 
Commission 25 days after the date of issuance, unless the Commission on 
its own motion institutes a review of the Decision in that time.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day of February 1999.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Collins,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[DD-99-03]

Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206

I. Introduction

    On October 9, 1997, Mr. David A. Lochbaum submitted a Petition to 
the Executive Director for Operations of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) pursuant to Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations (10 CFR 2.206). The Petition was submitted on 
behalf of the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS or Petitioner) and 
requested that the operating licenses for the Donald C. Cook Nuclear 
Plant, Units 1 and 2 (D. C. Cook) be modified, revoked, or suspended to 
prevent operation of the units until there is reasonable assurance that 
significant non-compliances have been

[[Page 8870]]

identified and corrected so that systems are in conformance with their 
design-basis and licensing-basis requirements. The Petitioner also 
requested that a public hearing into this matter be held in the 
Washington, D.C. area before the first unit at D. C. Cook is authorized 
to restart. The Petitioner indicated that the basis for his request was 
derived from a completed NRC architect/engineering 1 (AE) 
design inspection at D. C. Cook. Findings by the NRC during the AE 
inspection led to the Licensee declaring the emergency core cooling 
system (ECCS) inoperable at both units at D. C. Cook. As a result, the 
Licensee shut down both units in accordance with their Technical 
Specifications (TS). As stated in the Petition, the systems reviewed 
during the AE inspection were the same systems that the Licensee had 
reviewed earlier as part of its design-basis documentation 
reconstitution program. This review did not identify any deficiencies 
concerning equipment operability. Therefore, the Petitioner asserted 
that the D. C. Cook design-basis documentation reconstitution programs 
lacked the necessary rigor and focus to identify potential design-
related operability issues. The Petitioner further asserted that 
deficiencies in the Licensee's design control programs may also be 
responsible for similar issues in safety systems that have not been 
examined by the NRC. On the basis of this potential, the Petitioner 
also requested that the NRC increase the inspection scope at D. C. 
Cook.
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    \1\ NRC Inspection Report (IR) No. 50-315, 50-316/97201, 
November 26, 1997.
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    On December 9, 1997, the NRC acknowledged receipt of the Petition 
and informed the Petitioner that the Petition had been assigned to the 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) to prepare a response and 
that action on the specific concerns raised in the Petition would be 
taken within a reasonable time.
    By letter dated January 12, 1998, the Petitioner submitted an 
Addendum to the Petition. The Addendum raised additional issues 
concerning D. C. Cook and provided additional information concerning 
the Petition. In addition, the Addendum raised concerns dealing with 
the 10 CFR 2.206 process, the NRC inspection process, and generic 
concerns with ice condenser containments. On February 23, 1998, the NRC 
acknowledged receipt of the additional information and informed the 
Petitioner that the specific concerns related to the D. C. Cook plant 
and the Petition would be considered in the Director's Decision. 
Further, the NRC informed the Petitioner that the concerns not directly 
applicable to the requests in the Petition would be evaluated and 
transmitted in separate correspondence. By letters dated July 10 and 
December 28, 1998, the NRC sent the Petitioner the status of the review 
of these issues not related to D. C. Cook or the Petition.

II. Discussion

A. Request To Modify, Revoke, or Suspend the Operating Licenses for D. 
C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2

    The Petitioner based his request on the fact that the NRC had 
recently completed an AE design inspection at D. C. Cook and the 
inspection identified a number of issues concerning design and 
procedural controls, safety evaluations, use of engineering judgment, 
adequacy of operability determinations, temporary modifications, and 
consistency between the updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) 
and the TS. The Petitioner asserted that the Licensee's design control 
programs were inadequate and there was the potential that similar 
issues could exist in other safety-related systems that the NRC had not 
inspected. The Petitioner requested that the units at D. C. Cook be 
prevented from operating until such time that there is reasonable 
assurance that significant non-compliances have been identified and 
corrected. The Petitioner stated in the Petition that the system 
certification process used at the Salem Nuclear Generating Station and 
the Millstone Nuclear Power Station would provide such reasonable 
assurance.
    On September 8 and 9, 1997, the Licensee shut down both Unit 1 and 
Unit 2, respectively, because of inspection findings made by the NRC 
during the AE inspection. These findings led the Licensee to question 
the operability of the ECCS. Upon further investigation, the Licensee 
determined that the ECCSs in both units were inoperable and, in 
accordance with the TS, the Licensee shut down both units. By letter 
dated September 18, 1997, the Licensee identified several issues and 
corrective actions it would take preceding restart of either unit at D. 
C. Cook. By letter dated September 19, 1997, the NRC issued a 
confirmatory action letter (CAL) confirming that nine specific issues 
from the Licensee's September 18, 1997, letter would be addressed by 
the Licensee before a unit at D. C. Cook would be restarted. In 
addition, the NRC recognized that the AE inspection was a limited-scope 
inspection and that the inspection findings were substantial. For this 
reason, the NRC confirmed that the Licensee, before restart of a unit 
at D. C. Cook, would perform an assessment to determine whether the 
type of inspection findings discovered during the AE inspection existed 
in other safety-related systems and whether they affected system 
operability.
    By letters dated December 2, December 24, and December 31, 1997, 
the Licensee responded to the CAL. In these letters, the Licensee 
described the corrective actions, the root-cause analysis, and the 
reasons why the units at D. C. Cook were ready to restart. The NRC held 
public meetings with the Licensee on December 10 and December 22, 1997, 
and January 8, 1998, to discuss the Licensee's CAL responses.
    The Petition raised concerns involving the Licensee's design 
control program and requested that a public hearing be held in the 
Washington, D.C. area before restarting either unit at D. C. Cook. The 
NRC staff reviewed the Petition thoroughly and determined that no new 
information was provided concerning D. C. Cook. The NRC staff came to 
this conclusion because the Petitioner based his concerns on the 
Licensee's design control program deficiencies that were identified in 
the NRC AE inspection. A CAL had been issued which confirmed that the 
Licensee would bound the problems discovered by the AE inspection and 
implement adequate corrective actions before restarting either unit at 
D. C. Cook. Therefore, following the guidelines contained in NRC 
Management Directive (MD) 8.11, ``Review Process for 10 CFR 2.206 
Petitions,'' the NRC staff came to the conclusion that new information 
was not provided and a hearing was not warranted.
    In a telephone conversation on January 5, 1998, the NRC Petition 
Manager informed the Petitioner that new information was not provided 
in the Petition and, in accordance with MD 8.11, a public hearing would 
not be granted. By letter dated January 6, 1998, the Petitioner 
protested the NRC's decision not to hold a public hearing concerning 
the Petition. In that letter, the Petitioner stated that information 
concerning ice condenser issues was presented to the NRC Inspector 
General's Office and since D. C. Cook's containment operability relies 
on an ice condenser system this constituted new information. The 
Petitioner also stated that the Petition was developed and submitted in 
haste because NRC Region III officials indicated that the Licensee was 
planning to restart a unit at D. C. Cook in mid-October 1997 and the 
Petitioner wanted to submit the Petition before the first unit at D. C. 
Cook was restarted. For this reason, the Petition

[[Page 8871]]

had not been fully developed and additional information would be 
forthcoming. On the basis of concerns that the Petitioner raised in the 
January 6, 1998, letter, and the assertion that the Petitioner 
potentially had new information, the NRC held a public meeting with the 
Petitioner on January 12, 1998. During the meeting, the Petitioner 
raised general concerns about the 10 CFR 2.206 process and addressed 
the following six specific concerns covering a broad range of issues:
    (1) ice condenser concerns.
    (2) 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation process.
    (3) engineering calculations.
    (4) net positive suction head (NPSH) calculations.
    (5) licensee's response to the CAL.
    (6) NRC inspection process.
    By letter dated January 12, 1998, the Petitioner issued an Addendum 
to the Petition documenting the issues discussed during the January 12, 
1998, public meeting. By letter dated February 23, 1998, the NRC 
acknowledged the receipt of the Addendum. Issues 1 through 5, as they 
relate to D. C. Cook and the Petition, are discussed individually in 
Sections II.B through II.F of this Director's Decision. As stated 
above, all issues raised in the Addendum not related to D. C. Cook or 
the Petition are being evaluated and will be addressed independent of 
the 10 CFR 2.206 process in separate correspondence.
    The NRC staff reviewed the new information provided in the Addendum 
according to the guidelines of MD 8.11 and concluded that the 
additional information presented in the January 12, 1998, Addendum met 
the criteria for holding an informal public hearing. As a result, the 
NRC granted the Petitioner's request for an informal public hearing. On 
August 19, 1998, an informal public hearing was held at NRC 
headquarters in Rockville, Maryland. Both the Petitioner and the 
Licensee made presentations at the hearing. The hearing gave the 
Petitioner an opportunity to clarify the issues raised in the Petition 
and the Addendum. During the hearing, the Petitioner reported being 
pleased with the NRC oversight activities at D. C. Cook. Further, the 
Petitioner indicated he would like to see a Millstone scale civil 
penalty issued to the Licensee to ensure that the Licensee will 
maintain the proper safety culture in the future. During the hearing, 
the Petitioner also requested that the NRC investigate the potential 
that the Licensee's December 2, 1997, letter contained material false 
statements concerning the readiness of a unit at D. C. Cook to restart. 
This issue has been referred to the NRC Region III office for 
resolution and the results will be forwarded to the Petitioner under a 
separate cover.
    In an effort to assess the effectiveness of the Licensee's 
corrective actions and the readiness of the units at D. C. Cook to 
restart, NRC performed an inspection of the CAL issues. The results of 
the inspection are documented in NRC Inspection Report (IR) No. 50-315, 
50-316/98004. The team of inspectors reviewed the nine specific issues 
identified in the CAL and considered them adequately addressed. The 
inspection team concluded that the short term assessment items were 
appropriate and bounded the AE inspection concerns. However, as 
described in the NRC July 30, 1998, letter to the Licensee, the CAL 
remains open pending the resolution of concerns involving the adequacy 
of the Licensee's assessment to determine whether the type of issues 
discovered during the AE inspection existed in other safety-related 
systems. By letter dated January 15, 1998, the Petitioner requested a 
copy of the inspection report, even if it was a preliminary version 
subject to revision, at least 1 business day before closing the CAL. In 
the NRC's February 23, 1998, letter, the request to release the draft 
inspection report was denied. As stated in the February 23, 1998, 
letter, it is not NRC policy to release draft predecisional 
information. This policy is intended to prevent improper influences and 
assure that predecisional information, or contemplated enforcement 
actions, are not compromised by a premature release. In accordance with 
MD 8.11, once the Petition was received, the Petitioner was placed on 
distribution for correspondence between the NRC and D. C. Cook. The 
Petitioner has subsequently received a copy of the IR.
    The NRC expanded the scope of inspections of the D. C. Cook 
facility based on findings of the resident inspector staff, concerns 
that came to the NRC's attention regarding the ice condenser issues 
emanating from the AE inspection, and information brought to our 
attention by the Petitioner. This expanded scope of inspection 
satisfied the request in the Petition. From November 1997 until April 
1998, the NRC performed inspections of the containment (IR No. 50-315, 
50-316/97017), ice condenser (IR No. 50-315, 50-316/98005), hydrogen 
mitigation systems (IR No. 50-315, 50-316/98009), and the design-basis 
(IR No. 50-315, 50-316/98004). The inspections identified that NRC 
requirements had been violated. The apparent violations were discussed 
at a public predecisional enforcement conference held at the NRC Region 
III office on May 20, 1998, with video viewing by the NRC headquarters 
staff, the Petitioner, and other members of the public in the NRC 
headquarters offices located in Rockville, Maryland.
    During the predecisional enforcement conference, the Licensee 
admitted to all the apparent violations that formed the basis for the 
conference, described its assessment of the root causes, and presented 
its proposed corrective actions to address these issues. The Licensee 
stated that a root cause for many of these apparent violations was the 
failure to establish and communicate adequate performance standards.
    As documented in the IRs, extensive degradation of the design of 
each unit's ECCS, ice condenser, refueling water storage tanks (RWSTs), 
and containment sumps, impaired the ability of the barriers (fuel 
cladding and containment) to prevent fission product release to the 
environment in the event of a design-basis loss-of-coolant accident 
(LOCA). With regard to the fuel cladding barrier, deficiencies were 
identified involving (1) a large quantity of fibrous materials within 
containment which would likely have clogged the ECCS sump screens in 
the recirculation mode, (2) a single-failure ECCS vulnerability, and 
(3) the insufficient amount of water available in the ECCS sump which 
represents a challenge to cool the fuel post LOCA. With regard to the 
containment barrier, the effects on the degraded ice condenser from 
blocked ice bed flow passages, missing ice segments, and ice basket 
damage represented a serious challenge to the ability of the ice 
condenser to perform its intended function to condense steam and 
suppress containment pressure. These conditions seriously impaired the 
safety function of the ECCS and the containment. Further, beyond the 
specific systems addressed by this enforcement action, two additional 
systems related to the containment, the hydrogen ignition and 
containment spray systems, were also degraded during the same period 
and, following analysis, the Licensee declared these systems 
inoperable.
    During the informal public hearing, the Petitioner requested that 
the NRC issue a ``Millstone'' scale 2 civil penalty for the 
violations of NRC requirements at D. C. Cook. The violations were 
collectively categorized in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy

[[Page 8872]]

(NUREG-1600) as a Severity Level II violation. This severity level was 
warranted for the breadth and number of the violations that, taken in 
total, resulted in a lack of reasonable assurance that following a 
design-basis accident, the ECCS and containment would have performed 
their intended functions.
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    \2\ On December 10, 1997, the NRC issued Enforcement Action EA 
96-34 to Northeast Utilities which included Severity Level II 
violations and $2.1 million civil penalty.
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    On October 13, 1998, the NRC issued the Notice of Violation and 
associated proposed civil penalty to the Licensee. Accordingly, after 
considering the information obtained during the informal public hearing 
and predecisional enforcement conference, and after consultation with 
the Commission, the NRC staff chose to exercise discretion pursuant to 
Section VII.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy and assessed a penalty in 
the amount of $500,000. Specifically, the escalated civil penalty 
reflected the consideration of the poor performance by the Licensee, 
the duration of the problems, the adverse impact on the ECCS and the 
containment, and the NRC's concerns regarding the violations. The 
purpose of the enforcement action was to emphasize the need for (1) 
taking timely and effective corrective actions for identified 
deficiencies, (2) effective surveillance testing and for plant 
personnel to challenge and investigate discrepancies identified during 
surveillance activities, (3) rigorous safety evaluations to determine 
whether changes to the plant or procedures constitute unreviewed safety 
questions, (4) maintaining the plant's design and licensing bases, and 
(5) a strong self-assessment program. The NRC staff would have proposed 
a larger civil penalty had it not been for the Licensee's decision to 
take comprehensive corrective actions and a commitment to keep the 
facility shut down until these problems are resolved.
    Compliance with regulations, license conditions, and TS, and 
operation of a facility in accordance with the licensing basis is 
mandatory. However, the NRC also recognizes that plants will not 
operate trouble-free.3 This is clearly articulated in 
Criterion XVI, Appendix B, Part 50, ``Quality Assurance Criteria for 
Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants.'' Criterion XVI 
states that ``measures shall be established to assure that conditions 
adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, 
deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are 
promptly identified and corrected.'' The appropriate response to an 
identified deficiency can and should vary, depending on the safety 
significance of the deficiency.
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    \3\ The NRC's regulations for protection of public health and 
safety embrace the philosophy of defense-in-depth, which supports 
the identification and correction of degraded or nonconforming 
conditions previously discussed. Briefly stated, this philosophy (1) 
requires the application of conservative codes and standards to 
establish substantial safety margins in the design of nuclear 
plants; (2) requires high quality in the design, construction, and 
operation of nuclear plants to reduce the likelihood of 
malfunctions, and promotes the use of automatic safety system 
actuation features; (3) recognizes that equipment can fail and 
operators can make mistakes, and therefore, requires redundancy in 
safety systems and components to reduce the chances that 
malfunctions or mistakes will lead to accidents that release fission 
products from the fuel; and (4) recognizes that, in spite of these 
precautions, serious fuel damage accidents can happen and, 
therefore, requires containment structures and safety features to 
mitigate the release of fission products. In the unlikely event of 
an offsite fission product release, emergency plans are in place to 
provide reasonable assurance that protective actions can and will be 
taken to protect the population around nuclear power plants. These 
emergency plans are coordinated with local and State officials and 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
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    The conduct of NRC regulatory oversight at the D. C. Cook site is 
based on the recognition that it is the Licensee's responsibility to 
comply with its license and safety requirements and to take corrective 
actions when deficiencies are identified. Thus, the Licensee must 
determine that a unit is in conformance with applicable NRC 
regulations, its license conditions, its UFSAR, and that applicable 
licensing commitments have been met before a unit is ready to restart. 
The Licensee's conformance with NRC regulations, license conditions, 
and licensing commitments is fundamental to the NRC's confidence in the 
safety of licensed activities. In short, the Licensee has the primary 
responsibility for the safe operation of its facilities.
    By letter dated March 7, 1998, the Licensee docketed the D. C. Cook 
Nuclear Plant Restart Plan (Restart Plan). The Restart Plan is the 
principal program to provide reasonable assurance that weaknesses at 
the D. C. Cook units are identified and appropriate corrective actions 
are implemented. The Restart Plan includes efforts to understand and 
correct the licensing- and design-bases issues that, in part, led to 
the Licensee shutting down both units at D. C. Cook and the NRC taking 
escalated enforcement action. Revision 4 of the Restart Plan was 
submitted by the Licensee on December 16, 1998. The Licensee's Restart 
Plan included system readiness reviews for the most risk-significant 
systems at D. C. Cook. The reviews included evaluation of the UFSAR and 
TS design requirements, surveillance tests for the system, a review of 
design modifications, and a review of temporary modifications.
    The NRC, in an effort to assess the effectiveness of the system 
readiness reviews, scheduled a safety system functional inspection 
(SSFI) on the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system. The Licensee requested 
permission to conduct and subsequently conducted the SSFI, using 
independent contractors. The NRC provided oversight of the Licensee's 
SSFI through an inspection team. The NRC IR No. 50-315, 50-316/98017 
associated with the oversight of the Licensee's SSFI was issued on 
January 28, 1999. In a public meeting on October 22, 1998, the Licensee 
presented the preliminary findings from the SSFI. The SSFI identified a 
number of issues, including findings that questioned the operability of 
the AFW system under certain accident conditions. These findings had 
not been identified by the Licensee's AFW system readiness review. In a 
public meeting on December 22, 1998, the Licensee stated that 
enhancements would be made to the system readiness review process and a 
more thorough review of the most risk-significant systems would be 
performed before restart of a unit at D. C. Cook. These changes will be 
incorporated into the Licensee's Restart Plan.
    Through the implementation of the Restart Plan, the Licensee has 
documented a large number of deficiencies that vary in scope and safety 
significance for each unit. The Licensee has identified deficiencies 
that must be corrected before restart. In its continuing review of the 
Licensee's corrective actions, the NRC will determine whether the 
Licensee has appropriately scheduled safety-significant items for 
completion before restart and whether the decision to defer selected 
corrective actions until after restart is appropriate for each unit. 
The results of these efforts will be documented in NRC IRs.
    The NRC has developed a comprehensive and multifaceted oversight 
process to provide reasonable assurance that the Licensee has 
identified necessary issues and implemented required corrective 
actions. Because of the extent of issues discovered at D. C. Cook, the 
NRC has chosen to use the guidelines contained in NRC Inspection Manual 
Chapter (MC) 0350, ``Staff Guidelines for Restart Approval'' to conduct 
the oversight of the Licensee's corrective actions. MC 0350 establishes 
the guidelines for approving the restart of a nuclear power plant after 
a shutdown resulting from a significant event, a complex hardware 
problem, or serious management

[[Page 8873]]

deficiencies. The primary objective of the guidelines in MC 0350 is to 
ensure that NRC's restart review efforts are appropriate for the 
individual circumstances, are reviewed and approved by the appropriate 
NRC management levels, and provide objective measures of restart 
readiness. In accordance with MC 0350, a restart panel has been 
established. Members include senior managers from both NRC Region III 
and the NRR offices. The NRR project manager and the senior resident 
inspector are also on the panel. The panel meets internally to discuss 
restart issues on a weekly basis, and holds meetings approximately 
monthly with the Licensee to discuss the Licensee's corrective actions 
and schedules. The monthly meetings with the licensee are noticed and 
are open to the public.
    By letters dated July 30 and October 13, 1998, the NRC forwarded to 
the Licensee the Case Specific Checklist for D. C. Cook in accordance 
with the MC 0350 guidelines. The checklist specified the activities the 
NRC considers necessary to be addressed before the restart of a unit at 
D. C. Cook. The items on the list were derived from the NRC's review of 
inspection activities, the CAL, and the Licensee's Restart Plan. As new 
issues emerge the Case Specific Checklist will be changed, and new 
issues necessary to be addressed before restart will be added to the 
list.

B. Ice Condenser Concerns

    In the Addendum, the Petitioner identified problems in the 
configuration and testing of the ice condenser at the Watts Bar Nuclear 
Power Plant. The Addendum specifically identified problems with the 
inlet bay doors, floor upheaval, and ice basket components. The 
Addendum also stated that those problems were known, but were not 
properly reported by the Watts Bar Licensee (the Tennessee Valley 
Authority), the D. C. Cook Licensee (Indiana Michigan Power Company), 
the McGuire Licensee (Duke Power), and the vendor (Westinghouse). The 
Petitioner questioned if the Watts Bar ice condenser problems were 
valid and if they applied to the D. C. Cook facility. In the NRC's 
February 23, 1998, acknowledgment letter, the Petitioner was informed 
that the specific concerns regarding ice condenser issues at D. C. Cook 
would be addressed in the Director's Decision. All other issues 
concerning ice condensers at other facilities and the vendor will be 
reported on in separate correspondence. By letters dated July 10 and 
December 28, 1998, the Petitioner was informed of the review status of 
these issues.
    As a result of concerns with the ice condensers at the D. C. Cook 
facility, the NRC Region III office initiated an inspection of the ice 
condensers. The Petitioner's concerns raised in the Addendum were 
incorporated into that inspection. In addition to the concerns raised 
in the Addendum, the inspection also reviewed activities associated 
with the surveillance test program of the ice condensers, the 
corrective actions performed on the ice condensers, and how the 
Licensee maintained the design-basis documentation concerning the ice 
condensers. The findings of the inspection were documented in NRC IR 
No. 50-315, 50-316/98005.
    The inspectors determined that the overall material condition of 
the ice condensers was poor and some of the concerns raised by the 
Petitioner were confirmed. The issues raised in the Addendum concerning 
the inlet bay doors and the floor upheaval were not substantiated. The 
team inspected the doors of the ice condensers and found them to be 
functional but in poor material condition. In addition, the team 
identified deficiencies in the design-basis testing of the inlet bay 
doors. The team also inspected the ice condenser floor sections, which 
have the potential to heave and prevent the bay doors from operating 
properly. No signs of floor upheaval or degradation were detected. 
Concerning the issue of deficiencies of ice basket components, the team 
identified defective and damaged ice baskets. Examples include the 
following: (1) dented and buckled ice basket webbing, (2) missing sheet 
metal screws used to couple the ice baskets together, (3) loose and 
missing U-bolt nuts on lower ice basket assemblies, (4) separated ice 
baskets, and (5) failed fillet welds at the ice basket bottom hold-down 
bar. The team inspection identified 29 apparent violations of NRC 
requirements. As stated in Section II.A. of the Director's Decision, 
these violations were part of the overall enforcement action taken by 
the NRC.
    In the Addendum, the Petitioner raised the concern that the 
Licensee was aware of the deficiencies with the ice condenser and did 
not properly report the deficiencies. While the Licensee's staff had 
knowledge of some of the inspection issues, it was not apparent that 
the Licensee was aware of the significance of those issues until they 
were discovered by the NRC and followed up by the Licensee during the 
inspection. Contributing to the Licensee's failure to recognize the 
significance of those issues was the breakdown of the corrective action 
program. As stated in Section II.A these issues were a part of the 
overall enforcement action. Therefore, the problems the Licensee's 
staff identified with the ice condenser were not properly resolved or 
reported by the Licensee. Following the inspection, the Licensee has 
submitted several LERs reporting on the deficiencies identified with 
the ice condenser in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73. In addition, on July 
30, 1998, the Licensee issued a report in accordance with 10 CFR Part 
21 informing the NRC of potential defects with failed fillet welds at 
the ice basket hold down bar.
    In March 1998, the Licensee decided to completely melt out the ice 
condensers of both units to allow thorough inspections and 
comprehensive repairs of the ice condensers. Following the meltout of 
the ice condensers, the Licensee discovered foreign material in the ice 
baskets. Some material appeared to be from the original construction. 
Also, the Licensee identified damage to the ice baskets and other ice 
condenser components. The restoration of the ice condenser has been 
incorporated into the Licensee's Restart Plan. The Licensee chose to 
repair damaged components and reinspect the ice condensers to assure 
that corrective actions have been adequately implemented and the 
material condition of the ice condensers has been returned to its 
original design-basis. In addition to the physical repairs to the ice 
condenser, the Licensee has reviewed the ice condenser surveillance 
program and intends to complete revised ice condenser surveillance 
tests to ensure that the ice condensers are operable and will perform 
their intended function.
    Resolution of the ice condenser problems is an item on the MC 0350 
Case Specific Checklist and the Licensee's corrective actions are 
monitored by the MC 0350 restart panel. Corrective actions implemented 
by the Licensee will be inspected before the restart of a unit at D. C. 
Cook.

C. 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation Process

    During the AE inspection, the NRC inspectors identified problems 
with the 10 CFR 50.59 process at D. C. Cook. In the Addendum, the 
Petitioner raised a concern that the Licensee's 10 CFR 50.59 safety 
evaluation preparation process was ``bad'' and that a thorough enough 
review of old 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations had not been performed. 
Further, the Petitioner questioned if safety evaluations prepared using 
the ``bad'' 10 CFR 50.59 process potentially could mean that 
unidentified safety problems remain at D. C. Cook.

[[Page 8874]]

    Following the AE inspection, the Licensee initiated corrective 
actions to address the 10 CFR 50.59 issues identified during the AE 
inspection. The Licensee assessed the 10 CFR 50.59 process in December 
1997. The Licensee reviewed 10 CFR 50.59 screenings and unreviewed 
safety question determinations performed between January 1996 and 
September 1997. The Licensee identified several administrative or 
procedural problems. The Licensee's assessment did not identify issues 
that would have an impact on the technical conclusions reached in any 
safety evaluation prepared in accordance with the 10 CFR 50.59 process.
    To evaluate the corrective actions taken by the Licensee following 
the AE inspection, the NRC performed an inspection of the 10 CFR 50.59 
process at D. C. Cook. The inspectors reviewed procedure and design 
change safety evaluations. The team did not identify any safety 
evaluations performed by the Licensee using the ``old'' 10 CFR 50.59 
process that resulted in a safety system operability concern, or where 
the change would have resulted in an unreviewed safety question 
determination. The inspection did, however, identify apparent 
violations of 10 CFR 50.59 concerning the failure to perform safety 
evaluations for proposed changes to the plant design basis. The 
violations resulted from the Licensee's failure to recognize that 
implemented changes constituted a change to the plant's design basis as 
described in the UFSAR. Violations were also identified pertaining to 
the adequacy of safety evaluations. The inspection made it evident that 
weakness still existed in the Licensee's 10 CFR 50.59 program and 
substantiated the concerns raised in the Addendum with the Licensee's 
10 CFR 50.59 process. The specific details of the findings are 
contained in the IR No. 50-315, 50-316/98004.
    As a result of the inspection findings from both the AE inspection 
and IR No. 50-315, 50-316/98004, the Licensee has performed three 
additional self-assessments of the effectiveness of its 10 CFR 50.59 
program. The Licensee's review sample was selected from a population of 
50.59 safety evaluations beginning in the 1980s. As a result of the 
deficiencies identified through these self-assessments, the Licensee 
committed to implement a number of programmatic changes to improve the 
10 CFR 50.59 process at D. C. Cook. Further, the Licensee has committed 
to perform enhanced system readiness reviews as stated above. These 
commitments have been incorporated into the Licensee's Restart Plan and 
will be implemented before restart of a unit at D. C. Cook.
    Inspections to date of the Licensee's 10 CFR 50.59 process have not 
identified any safety evaluations performed by the Licensee that 
resulted in safety system operability concerns. However, the Licensee's 
enhanced system readiness reviews may discover 10 CFR 50.59 safety 
evaluations that are inadequate and that may result in safety system 
operability concerns. Because of the nature and number of 10 CFR 50.59 
violations, the NRC placed the 10 CFR 50.59 process on the MC 0350 Case 
Specific Checklist. Corrective actions taken by the Licensee will be 
inspected by the NRC staff before restart of a unit at D. C. Cook to 
assure that the 10 CFR 50.59 program implementation at D. C. Cook 
provides adequate assurance of safety.

D. Engineering Calculations

    In the Addendum, the Petitioner identified concerns involving 
engineering calculations at D. C. Cook. The Petitioner questioned 
whether the population of calculations, reviewed by the Licensee as 
part of the corrective actions taken in response to inspection findings 
from the AE inspection, was a representative sample. In addition, the 
Petitioner questioned whether the NRC was satisfied with corrective 
actions taken by the Licensee in response to the calculation weaknesses 
identified by the NRC during the AE inspection.
    The NRC inspected the corrective actions taken by the Licensee in 
this area. The NRC inspection findings were documented in NRC IR No. 
50-315, 50-316/98004. The inspection concluded that the older 
calculations (early 1970 vintage) appeared to satisfy their intended 
purpose; however, problems still existed with calculations at D. C. 
Cook and the initial corrective actions implemented by the licensee had 
been unsuccessful in bounding the problem.
    On the basis of the inspection findings, the Licensee chose to 
expand the scope of engineering calculations to be reviewed to 
determine the quality, level of detail, completeness and accuracy of 
the calculations before restart of a unit. The Licensee expanded its 
review to include a significant sample of the calculations for the most 
risk significant systems. The Licensee's expanded review identified a 
number of deficiencies in engineering calculations. As a result of 
these deficiencies, the Licensee has committed to corrective actions to 
change the calculation preparation procedure and to train all 
calculation preparers, verifiers, and approvers on the new procedures.
    In summary, because of the extent of the problems with engineering 
calculations and design control at D. C. Cook, the MC 0350 restart 
panel incorporated this issue into the Case Specific Checklist. Before 
restart of a unit at D. C. Cook, the NRC will evaluate corrective 
actions taken by the Licensee to assess whether the Licensee has been 
successful in correcting the weakness in the engineering calculation 
program at D. C. Cook and that the calculation adequacy provides 
reasonable assurance of safety.

E. Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH) Calculations

    In the Addendum, the Petitioner stated that from the time the 
Petition was submitted on October 9, 1997, until the time the Licensee 
responded to the CAL on December 2, 1997, the Petitioner received 
concerns from an individual at D. C. Cook indicating problems with NPSH 
calculations. The alleged problems involved both missing and inaccurate 
calculations. The Petitioner questioned if safety-related pumps at D. 
C. Cook have adequate NPSH as shown by quality calculations.
    In response to the concerns raised in the Addendum, the NRC staff 
requested by letter dated June 8, 1998, that the Licensee provide (1) 
the NPSH calculations for all safety-related pumps, (2) a description 
of the calculation technique, and (3) all assumptions used in the 
calculations. By letters dated July 22, July 31, and August 5, 1998, 
the Licensee provided the requested information.
    The NRC staff reviewed the NPSH calculations for each safety-
related pump at D. C. Cook. With the exception of the containment spray 
(CTS) and the residual heat removal (RHR) systems, the NRC found that 
the calculations submitted by the Licensee supported adequate NPSH for 
the safety related pumps. For the CTS and RHR systems the values used 
for the pump run out flows in the UFSAR did not match the values used 
in the NPSH calculations. Because of the inconsistencies in the values 
used for the pump run-out flows, the NRC was unable to determine 
whether the NPSH calculations of record for the CTS and RHR systems 
demonstrated adequate NPSH for the pumps in these systems. By letter 
dated January 7, 1999, the NRC informed the Licensee of the 
inconsistencies discovered during the review of the NPSH calculations. 
Further, the letter requested the Licensee to provide revised NPSH 
calculations addressing the inconsistencies in the CTS and RHR systems 
NPSH calculations, and show that adequate NPSH is available for the

[[Page 8875]]

safety-related pumps in these systems. In addition, the issue of 
adequate NPSH for safety-related pumps will be monitored by the MC 0350 
restart panel. The Licensee's resolution of the issue will be reviewed 
and evaluated by the NRC.
    In summary, the Petitioner stated that there were missing and 
inaccurate NPSH calculations for safety-related pumps at D. C. Cook. 
Upon request, the Licensee provided the NPSH calculation for all 
safety-related pumps at D. C. Cook. The Licensee's response 
demonstrated that there were NPSH calculations for all safety-related 
pumps at D. C. Cook. When the calculations were reviewed by the NRC, 
inconsistencies were discovered in values documented in the UFSAR and 
those used in the NPSH calculations. These concerns have been 
identified and transmitted to the Licensee. The Licensee's corrective 
actions will be monitored through the MC 0350 process to ensure 
appropriate actions are taken.

F. Licensee's Response to the CAL

    In the Addendum, the Petitioner raised a concern about the 
credibility of the Licensee's response to the CAL. The Petitioner 
stated that since the Licensee's February 6, 1997, response to the 
NRC's October 9, 1996, 10 CFR 50.54(f) request for design-basis 
information was not accurate, based on the AE inspection finding, he 
could not see how the Licensee's response to the CAL could be accurate.
    Following the Licensee's response to the CAL, the NRC performed 
additional inspections at D. C. Cook, documented in IR Nos. 50-315, 50-
316/98004; 50-315, 50-316/98005; and 50-315, 50-316/98009. The findings 
of these inspections clearly showed that the Licensee's actions to 
bound the scope of engineering problems in response to the CAL were too 
narrowly focused and were not sufficient to address the broad array of 
problems concerning the design-basis and licensing-basis issues that 
existed at D. C. Cook.
    The Petitioner's concern in the Addendum (that the Licensee's 
response to the CAL failed to assure the NRC that corrective actions 
were adequate) has been substantiated. The inspection findings from 
early 1998 indicated that the CAL response did not bound the design-
basis and licensing-basis issues at D. C. Cook. As indicated in Section 
II.A of the Director's Decision, the NRC took escalated enforcement 
action against the Licensee. In response to the violations and various 
programmatic breakdowns at D. C. Cook, the Licensee made a decision in 
early 1998 to perform a comprehensive assessment to provide reasonable 
assurance of plant system readiness, programmatic readiness, functional 
area readiness, and containment readiness before restart of either 
unit. The Licensee's primary mechanism to implement each of the plant 
assessment programs is the D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant Restart Plan. The 
Restart Plan was submitted in March 1998, and Revision 4 of the Restart 
Plan was docketed on December 16, 1998. As stated above, the NRC is 
using the guidelines in MC 0350 to oversee the Licensee's corrective 
actions and the readiness of a unit to restart. As additional problems 
or concerns are identified during the implementation of the Restart 
Plan, appropriate adjustments will be made to the Restart Plan and the 
Case Specific Checklist.

III. NRC Response to Requested Action

A. Request To Modify, Revoke, or Suspend the Operating Licenses for D. 
C. Cook, Units 1 and 2

    The Petitioner requested that the operating licenses for D. C. 
Cook, Units 1 and 2 be modified, revoked, or suspended to prevent 
operation of the units until there is reasonable assurance that 
significant non-compliances have been identified and corrected so that 
systems are in conformance with their design-basis and licensing-basis 
requirements. In addition, the Petition requested that the NRC broaden 
the inspection scope at D. C. Cook following the AE inspection. The 
NRC's regulatory oversight actions taken thus far at D. C. Cook, in 
part, fulfill the actions requested in the Petition. The regulatory 
oversight actions at D. C. Cook are broad and comprehensive and will 
ensure that there is reasonable assurance of safety prior to restart of 
either unit.
    Inspection findings at D. C. Cook following the AE inspection 
verified that the corrective actions implemented by the Licensee as 
described in the CAL response were too narrowly focused and did not 
fully address the design-basis and licensing-basis issues. The NRC 
increased inspections at D. C. Cook identified a number of violations 
of NRC requirements, and as a result, took appropriate enforcement 
action against the Licensee as stated above. While the enforcement 
action did not modify, suspend, or revoke the operating licenses of the 
D. C. Cook facilities, it did emphasize the serious nature of the 
violations, the duration of the problems, and the Licensee's poor 
performance.
    The Licensee has developed an integrated Restart Plan. The plan 
provides the frame-work to be used by the Licensee to identify, 
evaluate, and correct issues. The NRC regulatory oversight at D. C. 
Cook is following the guidelines of MC 0350 as discussed above. This 
approach focuses the correct level of management attention as well as 
resources on significant issues to be verified before restart of a unit 
at D. C. Cook. In addition, this approach allows the NRC the 
flexibility to change the focus of the oversight as different 
significant issues emerge. In the Licensee's effort to identify and 
correct issues, new issues will continue to emerge. As a result, the 
Licensee will be expected to modify the Restart Plan to ensure that 
corrective actions, to resolve the emergent issues, are implemented in 
a timely manner. The MC 0350 restart panel will review these changes to 
the Restart Plan to ensure that the Licensee has taken appropriate 
corrective actions.
    The Petitioner's request to suspend, modify, or revoke the licenses 
at D. C. Cook, Units 1 and 2 has not been granted at this time. The 
current regulatory oversight at D. C. Cook is sufficient, and provides 
reasonable assurance that before restart of a unit at D. C. Cook the 
Licensee will have identified and corrected issues so that the safety 
systems at D. C. Cook will be in compliance with their design-basis and 
licensing-basis requirements.

B. Request To Hold a Public Hearing on the Issues Raised in the 
Petition Before Restart of a Unit at D. C. Cook

    The Petitioner requested that a public hearing into the issues 
raised in the Petition be held in the Washington, D.C. area before the 
first unit at D. C. Cook is authorized to restart. As discussed above, 
this request was granted. On August 19, 1998, an informal public 
hearing was held at the NRC headquarters in Rockville, Maryland. Both 
the Petitioner and the Licensee made presentations during the hearing. 
The hearing gave the Petitioner an opportunity to clarify the issues 
raised in the Petition and the Addendum.

C. Issues Raised in the Addendum

    As discussed in Sections II. B. through II. E. of this Director's 
Decision, each of the actions requested by the Petitioner in the 
Addendum has been granted in that the Licensee is taking additional 
corrective actions to ensure that each issue raised in the Addendum 
will be resolved before restart of a unit at D. C. Cook, and the NRC 
will verify that the Licensee's corrective actions have been effective. 
Each of the issues raised in the Addendum will be reported on in a 
future inspection report.

[[Page 8876]]

IV. Conclusion

    The NRC has determined, for the reasons given in the preceding 
discussion, that the request to prevent operation of the units at D. C. 
Cook until there is reasonable assurance that significant non-
compliances have been identified and corrected so that systems are in 
conformance with their design-basis and licensing-basis requirements 
has been satisfied. The regulatory oversight actions being taken by the 
NRC as stated above will provide reasonable assurance that systems at 
D. C. Cook will be in conformance with their design-basis and 
licensing-bases, thus meeting the request made in the Petition and 
eliminates the need to modify, suspend, or revoke the licenses at D. C. 
Cook. The request to hold a public hearing into the issues raised in 
the Petition and Addendum in the Washington, D.C. area before the first 
unit at D. C. Cook is authorized to restart has been granted. Action 
has been taken on each concern identified in the Addendum, as stated 
above.
    As provided for in 10 CFR 2.206(c), a copy of this Decision will be 
filed with the Secretary of the Commission for the Commission's review. 
This Decision will constitute the final action of the Commission 25 
days after issuance unless the Commission, on its own motion, 
institutes review of the Decision at that time.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 11th day of February 1999.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Collins,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 99-4393 Filed 2-22-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P