[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 35 (Tuesday, February 23, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 8869-8876]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-4393]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-315 and 50-316]
Indiana Michigan Power Company, Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant,
Units 1 and 2; Issuance of Director's Decision Under 2.206
Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation has issued a Director's Decision with regard to a Petition
dated October 9, 1997, and an Addendum to the Petition dated January
12, 1998, filed by Mr. David Lochbaum on behalf of the Union of
Concerned Scientists, hereafter referred to as the ``Petitioner.'' The
Petition pertains to the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2
(D. C. Cook).
The Petitioner requested that the operating licenses for D. C. Cook
be modified, revoked, or suspended to prevent operation of the units
until there is reasonable assurance that significant non-compliances
have been identified and corrected so that systems are in conformance
with their design-basis and licensing-basis requirements. The Petition
also requested that a public hearing into this matter be held in the
Washington, D.C. area before the first unit at D. C. Cook is authorized
to restart. As the basis for these requests, the Petitioner stated that
the NRC completed an architect/engineering (AE) design inspection at D.
C. Cook (NRC Inspection Report (IR) No. 50-315, 50-316/97201) on
November 26, 1997. Findings by the NRC during the AE inspection led to
the Licensee having to declare the emergency core cooling system (ECCS)
inoperable at both units at D. C. Cook. As a result, the Licensee shut
down both units in accordance with its Technical Specifications (TS).
The systems reviewed during the AE inspection were the same systems
that the Licensee had previously reviewed as part of its design-basis
documentation reconstitution program, and the program did not identify
any deficiencies concerning system operability. Therefore, the
Petitioner asserted that the Licensee's design-basis documentation
reconstitution programs lacked the necessary rigor and focus to
identify potential design-related operability issues. The Petitioner
further asserted that deficiencies in the Licensee's design control
programs may also be responsible for similar issues in safety systems
that have not been examined by the NRC. On the basis of this potential,
the Petitioner also requested that the NRC increase the inspection
scope at D. C. Cook. By letter dated January 12, 1998, the Petitioner
issued an Addendum to the Petition.
The following six specific concerns were raised in the Addendum:
(1) ice condenser concerns.
(2) 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation process.
(3) engineering calculations.
(4) net positive suction head (NPSH) calculations.
(5) licensee's response to the CAL.
(6) NRC inspection process.
The Addendum also raised concerns about the 10 CFR 2.206 process,
the NRC inspection process, and generic concerns with ice condenser
containments. On February 23, 1998, the NRC acknowledged receipt of the
additional information and informed the Petitioner that all specific
concerns related to the D. C. Cook plant and the Petition would be
considered in the Director's Decision. Further, the NRC informed the
Petitioner that the concerns not directly applicable to the request in
the Petition would be evaluated and transmitted to the Petitioner in
separate correspondence. By letters dated July 10 and December 28,
1998, the NRC sent the Petitioner the status of the review of these
issues.
On August 19, 1998, an informal public hearing was held at the NRC
headquarters in Rockville, Maryland. Both the Petitioner and the
Licensee made presentations during the hearing. The hearing gave the
Petitioner an opportunity to clarify the issues raised in the Petition
and the Addendum.
The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has
determined that the request to prevent operation of the units at D. C.
Cook until there is reasonable assurance that significant non-
compliances have been identified and corrected so that systems are in
conformance with their design-basis and licensing-basis requirements
has been satisfied. The regulatory oversight actions being taken by the
NRC will provide reasonable assurance that systems at D. C. Cook will
be in conformance with their design bases and licensing bases, thus
meeting the request made in the Petition and eliminates the need to
modify, suspend or revoke the licenses at D. C. Cook. The reasons for
this decision are explained in the Director's Decision Pursuant to 10
CFR 2.206 (DD-99-03), the complete text of which follows this notice
and is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public
Document Room, Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, D. C.,
and at the local public document room located at Maud Preston Palenske
Memorial Library, 500 Market Street, St. Joseph, MI 49085.
A copy of the Director's Decision will be filed with the Secretary
of the Commission for the Commission's review in accordance with 10 CFR
2.206 of the Commission's regulations. As provided for by this
regulation, the Decision will constitute the final action of the
Commission 25 days after the date of issuance, unless the Commission on
its own motion institutes a review of the Decision in that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day of February 1999.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Collins,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[DD-99-03]
Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206
I. Introduction
On October 9, 1997, Mr. David A. Lochbaum submitted a Petition to
the Executive Director for Operations of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) pursuant to Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (10 CFR 2.206). The Petition was submitted on
behalf of the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS or Petitioner) and
requested that the operating licenses for the Donald C. Cook Nuclear
Plant, Units 1 and 2 (D. C. Cook) be modified, revoked, or suspended to
prevent operation of the units until there is reasonable assurance that
significant non-compliances have been
[[Page 8870]]
identified and corrected so that systems are in conformance with their
design-basis and licensing-basis requirements. The Petitioner also
requested that a public hearing into this matter be held in the
Washington, D.C. area before the first unit at D. C. Cook is authorized
to restart. The Petitioner indicated that the basis for his request was
derived from a completed NRC architect/engineering 1 (AE)
design inspection at D. C. Cook. Findings by the NRC during the AE
inspection led to the Licensee declaring the emergency core cooling
system (ECCS) inoperable at both units at D. C. Cook. As a result, the
Licensee shut down both units in accordance with their Technical
Specifications (TS). As stated in the Petition, the systems reviewed
during the AE inspection were the same systems that the Licensee had
reviewed earlier as part of its design-basis documentation
reconstitution program. This review did not identify any deficiencies
concerning equipment operability. Therefore, the Petitioner asserted
that the D. C. Cook design-basis documentation reconstitution programs
lacked the necessary rigor and focus to identify potential design-
related operability issues. The Petitioner further asserted that
deficiencies in the Licensee's design control programs may also be
responsible for similar issues in safety systems that have not been
examined by the NRC. On the basis of this potential, the Petitioner
also requested that the NRC increase the inspection scope at D. C.
Cook.
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\1\ NRC Inspection Report (IR) No. 50-315, 50-316/97201,
November 26, 1997.
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On December 9, 1997, the NRC acknowledged receipt of the Petition
and informed the Petitioner that the Petition had been assigned to the
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) to prepare a response and
that action on the specific concerns raised in the Petition would be
taken within a reasonable time.
By letter dated January 12, 1998, the Petitioner submitted an
Addendum to the Petition. The Addendum raised additional issues
concerning D. C. Cook and provided additional information concerning
the Petition. In addition, the Addendum raised concerns dealing with
the 10 CFR 2.206 process, the NRC inspection process, and generic
concerns with ice condenser containments. On February 23, 1998, the NRC
acknowledged receipt of the additional information and informed the
Petitioner that the specific concerns related to the D. C. Cook plant
and the Petition would be considered in the Director's Decision.
Further, the NRC informed the Petitioner that the concerns not directly
applicable to the requests in the Petition would be evaluated and
transmitted in separate correspondence. By letters dated July 10 and
December 28, 1998, the NRC sent the Petitioner the status of the review
of these issues not related to D. C. Cook or the Petition.
II. Discussion
A. Request To Modify, Revoke, or Suspend the Operating Licenses for D.
C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2
The Petitioner based his request on the fact that the NRC had
recently completed an AE design inspection at D. C. Cook and the
inspection identified a number of issues concerning design and
procedural controls, safety evaluations, use of engineering judgment,
adequacy of operability determinations, temporary modifications, and
consistency between the updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)
and the TS. The Petitioner asserted that the Licensee's design control
programs were inadequate and there was the potential that similar
issues could exist in other safety-related systems that the NRC had not
inspected. The Petitioner requested that the units at D. C. Cook be
prevented from operating until such time that there is reasonable
assurance that significant non-compliances have been identified and
corrected. The Petitioner stated in the Petition that the system
certification process used at the Salem Nuclear Generating Station and
the Millstone Nuclear Power Station would provide such reasonable
assurance.
On September 8 and 9, 1997, the Licensee shut down both Unit 1 and
Unit 2, respectively, because of inspection findings made by the NRC
during the AE inspection. These findings led the Licensee to question
the operability of the ECCS. Upon further investigation, the Licensee
determined that the ECCSs in both units were inoperable and, in
accordance with the TS, the Licensee shut down both units. By letter
dated September 18, 1997, the Licensee identified several issues and
corrective actions it would take preceding restart of either unit at D.
C. Cook. By letter dated September 19, 1997, the NRC issued a
confirmatory action letter (CAL) confirming that nine specific issues
from the Licensee's September 18, 1997, letter would be addressed by
the Licensee before a unit at D. C. Cook would be restarted. In
addition, the NRC recognized that the AE inspection was a limited-scope
inspection and that the inspection findings were substantial. For this
reason, the NRC confirmed that the Licensee, before restart of a unit
at D. C. Cook, would perform an assessment to determine whether the
type of inspection findings discovered during the AE inspection existed
in other safety-related systems and whether they affected system
operability.
By letters dated December 2, December 24, and December 31, 1997,
the Licensee responded to the CAL. In these letters, the Licensee
described the corrective actions, the root-cause analysis, and the
reasons why the units at D. C. Cook were ready to restart. The NRC held
public meetings with the Licensee on December 10 and December 22, 1997,
and January 8, 1998, to discuss the Licensee's CAL responses.
The Petition raised concerns involving the Licensee's design
control program and requested that a public hearing be held in the
Washington, D.C. area before restarting either unit at D. C. Cook. The
NRC staff reviewed the Petition thoroughly and determined that no new
information was provided concerning D. C. Cook. The NRC staff came to
this conclusion because the Petitioner based his concerns on the
Licensee's design control program deficiencies that were identified in
the NRC AE inspection. A CAL had been issued which confirmed that the
Licensee would bound the problems discovered by the AE inspection and
implement adequate corrective actions before restarting either unit at
D. C. Cook. Therefore, following the guidelines contained in NRC
Management Directive (MD) 8.11, ``Review Process for 10 CFR 2.206
Petitions,'' the NRC staff came to the conclusion that new information
was not provided and a hearing was not warranted.
In a telephone conversation on January 5, 1998, the NRC Petition
Manager informed the Petitioner that new information was not provided
in the Petition and, in accordance with MD 8.11, a public hearing would
not be granted. By letter dated January 6, 1998, the Petitioner
protested the NRC's decision not to hold a public hearing concerning
the Petition. In that letter, the Petitioner stated that information
concerning ice condenser issues was presented to the NRC Inspector
General's Office and since D. C. Cook's containment operability relies
on an ice condenser system this constituted new information. The
Petitioner also stated that the Petition was developed and submitted in
haste because NRC Region III officials indicated that the Licensee was
planning to restart a unit at D. C. Cook in mid-October 1997 and the
Petitioner wanted to submit the Petition before the first unit at D. C.
Cook was restarted. For this reason, the Petition
[[Page 8871]]
had not been fully developed and additional information would be
forthcoming. On the basis of concerns that the Petitioner raised in the
January 6, 1998, letter, and the assertion that the Petitioner
potentially had new information, the NRC held a public meeting with the
Petitioner on January 12, 1998. During the meeting, the Petitioner
raised general concerns about the 10 CFR 2.206 process and addressed
the following six specific concerns covering a broad range of issues:
(1) ice condenser concerns.
(2) 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation process.
(3) engineering calculations.
(4) net positive suction head (NPSH) calculations.
(5) licensee's response to the CAL.
(6) NRC inspection process.
By letter dated January 12, 1998, the Petitioner issued an Addendum
to the Petition documenting the issues discussed during the January 12,
1998, public meeting. By letter dated February 23, 1998, the NRC
acknowledged the receipt of the Addendum. Issues 1 through 5, as they
relate to D. C. Cook and the Petition, are discussed individually in
Sections II.B through II.F of this Director's Decision. As stated
above, all issues raised in the Addendum not related to D. C. Cook or
the Petition are being evaluated and will be addressed independent of
the 10 CFR 2.206 process in separate correspondence.
The NRC staff reviewed the new information provided in the Addendum
according to the guidelines of MD 8.11 and concluded that the
additional information presented in the January 12, 1998, Addendum met
the criteria for holding an informal public hearing. As a result, the
NRC granted the Petitioner's request for an informal public hearing. On
August 19, 1998, an informal public hearing was held at NRC
headquarters in Rockville, Maryland. Both the Petitioner and the
Licensee made presentations at the hearing. The hearing gave the
Petitioner an opportunity to clarify the issues raised in the Petition
and the Addendum. During the hearing, the Petitioner reported being
pleased with the NRC oversight activities at D. C. Cook. Further, the
Petitioner indicated he would like to see a Millstone scale civil
penalty issued to the Licensee to ensure that the Licensee will
maintain the proper safety culture in the future. During the hearing,
the Petitioner also requested that the NRC investigate the potential
that the Licensee's December 2, 1997, letter contained material false
statements concerning the readiness of a unit at D. C. Cook to restart.
This issue has been referred to the NRC Region III office for
resolution and the results will be forwarded to the Petitioner under a
separate cover.
In an effort to assess the effectiveness of the Licensee's
corrective actions and the readiness of the units at D. C. Cook to
restart, NRC performed an inspection of the CAL issues. The results of
the inspection are documented in NRC Inspection Report (IR) No. 50-315,
50-316/98004. The team of inspectors reviewed the nine specific issues
identified in the CAL and considered them adequately addressed. The
inspection team concluded that the short term assessment items were
appropriate and bounded the AE inspection concerns. However, as
described in the NRC July 30, 1998, letter to the Licensee, the CAL
remains open pending the resolution of concerns involving the adequacy
of the Licensee's assessment to determine whether the type of issues
discovered during the AE inspection existed in other safety-related
systems. By letter dated January 15, 1998, the Petitioner requested a
copy of the inspection report, even if it was a preliminary version
subject to revision, at least 1 business day before closing the CAL. In
the NRC's February 23, 1998, letter, the request to release the draft
inspection report was denied. As stated in the February 23, 1998,
letter, it is not NRC policy to release draft predecisional
information. This policy is intended to prevent improper influences and
assure that predecisional information, or contemplated enforcement
actions, are not compromised by a premature release. In accordance with
MD 8.11, once the Petition was received, the Petitioner was placed on
distribution for correspondence between the NRC and D. C. Cook. The
Petitioner has subsequently received a copy of the IR.
The NRC expanded the scope of inspections of the D. C. Cook
facility based on findings of the resident inspector staff, concerns
that came to the NRC's attention regarding the ice condenser issues
emanating from the AE inspection, and information brought to our
attention by the Petitioner. This expanded scope of inspection
satisfied the request in the Petition. From November 1997 until April
1998, the NRC performed inspections of the containment (IR No. 50-315,
50-316/97017), ice condenser (IR No. 50-315, 50-316/98005), hydrogen
mitigation systems (IR No. 50-315, 50-316/98009), and the design-basis
(IR No. 50-315, 50-316/98004). The inspections identified that NRC
requirements had been violated. The apparent violations were discussed
at a public predecisional enforcement conference held at the NRC Region
III office on May 20, 1998, with video viewing by the NRC headquarters
staff, the Petitioner, and other members of the public in the NRC
headquarters offices located in Rockville, Maryland.
During the predecisional enforcement conference, the Licensee
admitted to all the apparent violations that formed the basis for the
conference, described its assessment of the root causes, and presented
its proposed corrective actions to address these issues. The Licensee
stated that a root cause for many of these apparent violations was the
failure to establish and communicate adequate performance standards.
As documented in the IRs, extensive degradation of the design of
each unit's ECCS, ice condenser, refueling water storage tanks (RWSTs),
and containment sumps, impaired the ability of the barriers (fuel
cladding and containment) to prevent fission product release to the
environment in the event of a design-basis loss-of-coolant accident
(LOCA). With regard to the fuel cladding barrier, deficiencies were
identified involving (1) a large quantity of fibrous materials within
containment which would likely have clogged the ECCS sump screens in
the recirculation mode, (2) a single-failure ECCS vulnerability, and
(3) the insufficient amount of water available in the ECCS sump which
represents a challenge to cool the fuel post LOCA. With regard to the
containment barrier, the effects on the degraded ice condenser from
blocked ice bed flow passages, missing ice segments, and ice basket
damage represented a serious challenge to the ability of the ice
condenser to perform its intended function to condense steam and
suppress containment pressure. These conditions seriously impaired the
safety function of the ECCS and the containment. Further, beyond the
specific systems addressed by this enforcement action, two additional
systems related to the containment, the hydrogen ignition and
containment spray systems, were also degraded during the same period
and, following analysis, the Licensee declared these systems
inoperable.
During the informal public hearing, the Petitioner requested that
the NRC issue a ``Millstone'' scale 2 civil penalty for the
violations of NRC requirements at D. C. Cook. The violations were
collectively categorized in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy
[[Page 8872]]
(NUREG-1600) as a Severity Level II violation. This severity level was
warranted for the breadth and number of the violations that, taken in
total, resulted in a lack of reasonable assurance that following a
design-basis accident, the ECCS and containment would have performed
their intended functions.
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\2\ On December 10, 1997, the NRC issued Enforcement Action EA
96-34 to Northeast Utilities which included Severity Level II
violations and $2.1 million civil penalty.
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On October 13, 1998, the NRC issued the Notice of Violation and
associated proposed civil penalty to the Licensee. Accordingly, after
considering the information obtained during the informal public hearing
and predecisional enforcement conference, and after consultation with
the Commission, the NRC staff chose to exercise discretion pursuant to
Section VII.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy and assessed a penalty in
the amount of $500,000. Specifically, the escalated civil penalty
reflected the consideration of the poor performance by the Licensee,
the duration of the problems, the adverse impact on the ECCS and the
containment, and the NRC's concerns regarding the violations. The
purpose of the enforcement action was to emphasize the need for (1)
taking timely and effective corrective actions for identified
deficiencies, (2) effective surveillance testing and for plant
personnel to challenge and investigate discrepancies identified during
surveillance activities, (3) rigorous safety evaluations to determine
whether changes to the plant or procedures constitute unreviewed safety
questions, (4) maintaining the plant's design and licensing bases, and
(5) a strong self-assessment program. The NRC staff would have proposed
a larger civil penalty had it not been for the Licensee's decision to
take comprehensive corrective actions and a commitment to keep the
facility shut down until these problems are resolved.
Compliance with regulations, license conditions, and TS, and
operation of a facility in accordance with the licensing basis is
mandatory. However, the NRC also recognizes that plants will not
operate trouble-free.3 This is clearly articulated in
Criterion XVI, Appendix B, Part 50, ``Quality Assurance Criteria for
Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants.'' Criterion XVI
states that ``measures shall be established to assure that conditions
adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies,
deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are
promptly identified and corrected.'' The appropriate response to an
identified deficiency can and should vary, depending on the safety
significance of the deficiency.
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\3\ The NRC's regulations for protection of public health and
safety embrace the philosophy of defense-in-depth, which supports
the identification and correction of degraded or nonconforming
conditions previously discussed. Briefly stated, this philosophy (1)
requires the application of conservative codes and standards to
establish substantial safety margins in the design of nuclear
plants; (2) requires high quality in the design, construction, and
operation of nuclear plants to reduce the likelihood of
malfunctions, and promotes the use of automatic safety system
actuation features; (3) recognizes that equipment can fail and
operators can make mistakes, and therefore, requires redundancy in
safety systems and components to reduce the chances that
malfunctions or mistakes will lead to accidents that release fission
products from the fuel; and (4) recognizes that, in spite of these
precautions, serious fuel damage accidents can happen and,
therefore, requires containment structures and safety features to
mitigate the release of fission products. In the unlikely event of
an offsite fission product release, emergency plans are in place to
provide reasonable assurance that protective actions can and will be
taken to protect the population around nuclear power plants. These
emergency plans are coordinated with local and State officials and
the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
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The conduct of NRC regulatory oversight at the D. C. Cook site is
based on the recognition that it is the Licensee's responsibility to
comply with its license and safety requirements and to take corrective
actions when deficiencies are identified. Thus, the Licensee must
determine that a unit is in conformance with applicable NRC
regulations, its license conditions, its UFSAR, and that applicable
licensing commitments have been met before a unit is ready to restart.
The Licensee's conformance with NRC regulations, license conditions,
and licensing commitments is fundamental to the NRC's confidence in the
safety of licensed activities. In short, the Licensee has the primary
responsibility for the safe operation of its facilities.
By letter dated March 7, 1998, the Licensee docketed the D. C. Cook
Nuclear Plant Restart Plan (Restart Plan). The Restart Plan is the
principal program to provide reasonable assurance that weaknesses at
the D. C. Cook units are identified and appropriate corrective actions
are implemented. The Restart Plan includes efforts to understand and
correct the licensing- and design-bases issues that, in part, led to
the Licensee shutting down both units at D. C. Cook and the NRC taking
escalated enforcement action. Revision 4 of the Restart Plan was
submitted by the Licensee on December 16, 1998. The Licensee's Restart
Plan included system readiness reviews for the most risk-significant
systems at D. C. Cook. The reviews included evaluation of the UFSAR and
TS design requirements, surveillance tests for the system, a review of
design modifications, and a review of temporary modifications.
The NRC, in an effort to assess the effectiveness of the system
readiness reviews, scheduled a safety system functional inspection
(SSFI) on the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system. The Licensee requested
permission to conduct and subsequently conducted the SSFI, using
independent contractors. The NRC provided oversight of the Licensee's
SSFI through an inspection team. The NRC IR No. 50-315, 50-316/98017
associated with the oversight of the Licensee's SSFI was issued on
January 28, 1999. In a public meeting on October 22, 1998, the Licensee
presented the preliminary findings from the SSFI. The SSFI identified a
number of issues, including findings that questioned the operability of
the AFW system under certain accident conditions. These findings had
not been identified by the Licensee's AFW system readiness review. In a
public meeting on December 22, 1998, the Licensee stated that
enhancements would be made to the system readiness review process and a
more thorough review of the most risk-significant systems would be
performed before restart of a unit at D. C. Cook. These changes will be
incorporated into the Licensee's Restart Plan.
Through the implementation of the Restart Plan, the Licensee has
documented a large number of deficiencies that vary in scope and safety
significance for each unit. The Licensee has identified deficiencies
that must be corrected before restart. In its continuing review of the
Licensee's corrective actions, the NRC will determine whether the
Licensee has appropriately scheduled safety-significant items for
completion before restart and whether the decision to defer selected
corrective actions until after restart is appropriate for each unit.
The results of these efforts will be documented in NRC IRs.
The NRC has developed a comprehensive and multifaceted oversight
process to provide reasonable assurance that the Licensee has
identified necessary issues and implemented required corrective
actions. Because of the extent of issues discovered at D. C. Cook, the
NRC has chosen to use the guidelines contained in NRC Inspection Manual
Chapter (MC) 0350, ``Staff Guidelines for Restart Approval'' to conduct
the oversight of the Licensee's corrective actions. MC 0350 establishes
the guidelines for approving the restart of a nuclear power plant after
a shutdown resulting from a significant event, a complex hardware
problem, or serious management
[[Page 8873]]
deficiencies. The primary objective of the guidelines in MC 0350 is to
ensure that NRC's restart review efforts are appropriate for the
individual circumstances, are reviewed and approved by the appropriate
NRC management levels, and provide objective measures of restart
readiness. In accordance with MC 0350, a restart panel has been
established. Members include senior managers from both NRC Region III
and the NRR offices. The NRR project manager and the senior resident
inspector are also on the panel. The panel meets internally to discuss
restart issues on a weekly basis, and holds meetings approximately
monthly with the Licensee to discuss the Licensee's corrective actions
and schedules. The monthly meetings with the licensee are noticed and
are open to the public.
By letters dated July 30 and October 13, 1998, the NRC forwarded to
the Licensee the Case Specific Checklist for D. C. Cook in accordance
with the MC 0350 guidelines. The checklist specified the activities the
NRC considers necessary to be addressed before the restart of a unit at
D. C. Cook. The items on the list were derived from the NRC's review of
inspection activities, the CAL, and the Licensee's Restart Plan. As new
issues emerge the Case Specific Checklist will be changed, and new
issues necessary to be addressed before restart will be added to the
list.
B. Ice Condenser Concerns
In the Addendum, the Petitioner identified problems in the
configuration and testing of the ice condenser at the Watts Bar Nuclear
Power Plant. The Addendum specifically identified problems with the
inlet bay doors, floor upheaval, and ice basket components. The
Addendum also stated that those problems were known, but were not
properly reported by the Watts Bar Licensee (the Tennessee Valley
Authority), the D. C. Cook Licensee (Indiana Michigan Power Company),
the McGuire Licensee (Duke Power), and the vendor (Westinghouse). The
Petitioner questioned if the Watts Bar ice condenser problems were
valid and if they applied to the D. C. Cook facility. In the NRC's
February 23, 1998, acknowledgment letter, the Petitioner was informed
that the specific concerns regarding ice condenser issues at D. C. Cook
would be addressed in the Director's Decision. All other issues
concerning ice condensers at other facilities and the vendor will be
reported on in separate correspondence. By letters dated July 10 and
December 28, 1998, the Petitioner was informed of the review status of
these issues.
As a result of concerns with the ice condensers at the D. C. Cook
facility, the NRC Region III office initiated an inspection of the ice
condensers. The Petitioner's concerns raised in the Addendum were
incorporated into that inspection. In addition to the concerns raised
in the Addendum, the inspection also reviewed activities associated
with the surveillance test program of the ice condensers, the
corrective actions performed on the ice condensers, and how the
Licensee maintained the design-basis documentation concerning the ice
condensers. The findings of the inspection were documented in NRC IR
No. 50-315, 50-316/98005.
The inspectors determined that the overall material condition of
the ice condensers was poor and some of the concerns raised by the
Petitioner were confirmed. The issues raised in the Addendum concerning
the inlet bay doors and the floor upheaval were not substantiated. The
team inspected the doors of the ice condensers and found them to be
functional but in poor material condition. In addition, the team
identified deficiencies in the design-basis testing of the inlet bay
doors. The team also inspected the ice condenser floor sections, which
have the potential to heave and prevent the bay doors from operating
properly. No signs of floor upheaval or degradation were detected.
Concerning the issue of deficiencies of ice basket components, the team
identified defective and damaged ice baskets. Examples include the
following: (1) dented and buckled ice basket webbing, (2) missing sheet
metal screws used to couple the ice baskets together, (3) loose and
missing U-bolt nuts on lower ice basket assemblies, (4) separated ice
baskets, and (5) failed fillet welds at the ice basket bottom hold-down
bar. The team inspection identified 29 apparent violations of NRC
requirements. As stated in Section II.A. of the Director's Decision,
these violations were part of the overall enforcement action taken by
the NRC.
In the Addendum, the Petitioner raised the concern that the
Licensee was aware of the deficiencies with the ice condenser and did
not properly report the deficiencies. While the Licensee's staff had
knowledge of some of the inspection issues, it was not apparent that
the Licensee was aware of the significance of those issues until they
were discovered by the NRC and followed up by the Licensee during the
inspection. Contributing to the Licensee's failure to recognize the
significance of those issues was the breakdown of the corrective action
program. As stated in Section II.A these issues were a part of the
overall enforcement action. Therefore, the problems the Licensee's
staff identified with the ice condenser were not properly resolved or
reported by the Licensee. Following the inspection, the Licensee has
submitted several LERs reporting on the deficiencies identified with
the ice condenser in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73. In addition, on July
30, 1998, the Licensee issued a report in accordance with 10 CFR Part
21 informing the NRC of potential defects with failed fillet welds at
the ice basket hold down bar.
In March 1998, the Licensee decided to completely melt out the ice
condensers of both units to allow thorough inspections and
comprehensive repairs of the ice condensers. Following the meltout of
the ice condensers, the Licensee discovered foreign material in the ice
baskets. Some material appeared to be from the original construction.
Also, the Licensee identified damage to the ice baskets and other ice
condenser components. The restoration of the ice condenser has been
incorporated into the Licensee's Restart Plan. The Licensee chose to
repair damaged components and reinspect the ice condensers to assure
that corrective actions have been adequately implemented and the
material condition of the ice condensers has been returned to its
original design-basis. In addition to the physical repairs to the ice
condenser, the Licensee has reviewed the ice condenser surveillance
program and intends to complete revised ice condenser surveillance
tests to ensure that the ice condensers are operable and will perform
their intended function.
Resolution of the ice condenser problems is an item on the MC 0350
Case Specific Checklist and the Licensee's corrective actions are
monitored by the MC 0350 restart panel. Corrective actions implemented
by the Licensee will be inspected before the restart of a unit at D. C.
Cook.
C. 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation Process
During the AE inspection, the NRC inspectors identified problems
with the 10 CFR 50.59 process at D. C. Cook. In the Addendum, the
Petitioner raised a concern that the Licensee's 10 CFR 50.59 safety
evaluation preparation process was ``bad'' and that a thorough enough
review of old 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations had not been performed.
Further, the Petitioner questioned if safety evaluations prepared using
the ``bad'' 10 CFR 50.59 process potentially could mean that
unidentified safety problems remain at D. C. Cook.
[[Page 8874]]
Following the AE inspection, the Licensee initiated corrective
actions to address the 10 CFR 50.59 issues identified during the AE
inspection. The Licensee assessed the 10 CFR 50.59 process in December
1997. The Licensee reviewed 10 CFR 50.59 screenings and unreviewed
safety question determinations performed between January 1996 and
September 1997. The Licensee identified several administrative or
procedural problems. The Licensee's assessment did not identify issues
that would have an impact on the technical conclusions reached in any
safety evaluation prepared in accordance with the 10 CFR 50.59 process.
To evaluate the corrective actions taken by the Licensee following
the AE inspection, the NRC performed an inspection of the 10 CFR 50.59
process at D. C. Cook. The inspectors reviewed procedure and design
change safety evaluations. The team did not identify any safety
evaluations performed by the Licensee using the ``old'' 10 CFR 50.59
process that resulted in a safety system operability concern, or where
the change would have resulted in an unreviewed safety question
determination. The inspection did, however, identify apparent
violations of 10 CFR 50.59 concerning the failure to perform safety
evaluations for proposed changes to the plant design basis. The
violations resulted from the Licensee's failure to recognize that
implemented changes constituted a change to the plant's design basis as
described in the UFSAR. Violations were also identified pertaining to
the adequacy of safety evaluations. The inspection made it evident that
weakness still existed in the Licensee's 10 CFR 50.59 program and
substantiated the concerns raised in the Addendum with the Licensee's
10 CFR 50.59 process. The specific details of the findings are
contained in the IR No. 50-315, 50-316/98004.
As a result of the inspection findings from both the AE inspection
and IR No. 50-315, 50-316/98004, the Licensee has performed three
additional self-assessments of the effectiveness of its 10 CFR 50.59
program. The Licensee's review sample was selected from a population of
50.59 safety evaluations beginning in the 1980s. As a result of the
deficiencies identified through these self-assessments, the Licensee
committed to implement a number of programmatic changes to improve the
10 CFR 50.59 process at D. C. Cook. Further, the Licensee has committed
to perform enhanced system readiness reviews as stated above. These
commitments have been incorporated into the Licensee's Restart Plan and
will be implemented before restart of a unit at D. C. Cook.
Inspections to date of the Licensee's 10 CFR 50.59 process have not
identified any safety evaluations performed by the Licensee that
resulted in safety system operability concerns. However, the Licensee's
enhanced system readiness reviews may discover 10 CFR 50.59 safety
evaluations that are inadequate and that may result in safety system
operability concerns. Because of the nature and number of 10 CFR 50.59
violations, the NRC placed the 10 CFR 50.59 process on the MC 0350 Case
Specific Checklist. Corrective actions taken by the Licensee will be
inspected by the NRC staff before restart of a unit at D. C. Cook to
assure that the 10 CFR 50.59 program implementation at D. C. Cook
provides adequate assurance of safety.
D. Engineering Calculations
In the Addendum, the Petitioner identified concerns involving
engineering calculations at D. C. Cook. The Petitioner questioned
whether the population of calculations, reviewed by the Licensee as
part of the corrective actions taken in response to inspection findings
from the AE inspection, was a representative sample. In addition, the
Petitioner questioned whether the NRC was satisfied with corrective
actions taken by the Licensee in response to the calculation weaknesses
identified by the NRC during the AE inspection.
The NRC inspected the corrective actions taken by the Licensee in
this area. The NRC inspection findings were documented in NRC IR No.
50-315, 50-316/98004. The inspection concluded that the older
calculations (early 1970 vintage) appeared to satisfy their intended
purpose; however, problems still existed with calculations at D. C.
Cook and the initial corrective actions implemented by the licensee had
been unsuccessful in bounding the problem.
On the basis of the inspection findings, the Licensee chose to
expand the scope of engineering calculations to be reviewed to
determine the quality, level of detail, completeness and accuracy of
the calculations before restart of a unit. The Licensee expanded its
review to include a significant sample of the calculations for the most
risk significant systems. The Licensee's expanded review identified a
number of deficiencies in engineering calculations. As a result of
these deficiencies, the Licensee has committed to corrective actions to
change the calculation preparation procedure and to train all
calculation preparers, verifiers, and approvers on the new procedures.
In summary, because of the extent of the problems with engineering
calculations and design control at D. C. Cook, the MC 0350 restart
panel incorporated this issue into the Case Specific Checklist. Before
restart of a unit at D. C. Cook, the NRC will evaluate corrective
actions taken by the Licensee to assess whether the Licensee has been
successful in correcting the weakness in the engineering calculation
program at D. C. Cook and that the calculation adequacy provides
reasonable assurance of safety.
E. Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH) Calculations
In the Addendum, the Petitioner stated that from the time the
Petition was submitted on October 9, 1997, until the time the Licensee
responded to the CAL on December 2, 1997, the Petitioner received
concerns from an individual at D. C. Cook indicating problems with NPSH
calculations. The alleged problems involved both missing and inaccurate
calculations. The Petitioner questioned if safety-related pumps at D.
C. Cook have adequate NPSH as shown by quality calculations.
In response to the concerns raised in the Addendum, the NRC staff
requested by letter dated June 8, 1998, that the Licensee provide (1)
the NPSH calculations for all safety-related pumps, (2) a description
of the calculation technique, and (3) all assumptions used in the
calculations. By letters dated July 22, July 31, and August 5, 1998,
the Licensee provided the requested information.
The NRC staff reviewed the NPSH calculations for each safety-
related pump at D. C. Cook. With the exception of the containment spray
(CTS) and the residual heat removal (RHR) systems, the NRC found that
the calculations submitted by the Licensee supported adequate NPSH for
the safety related pumps. For the CTS and RHR systems the values used
for the pump run out flows in the UFSAR did not match the values used
in the NPSH calculations. Because of the inconsistencies in the values
used for the pump run-out flows, the NRC was unable to determine
whether the NPSH calculations of record for the CTS and RHR systems
demonstrated adequate NPSH for the pumps in these systems. By letter
dated January 7, 1999, the NRC informed the Licensee of the
inconsistencies discovered during the review of the NPSH calculations.
Further, the letter requested the Licensee to provide revised NPSH
calculations addressing the inconsistencies in the CTS and RHR systems
NPSH calculations, and show that adequate NPSH is available for the
[[Page 8875]]
safety-related pumps in these systems. In addition, the issue of
adequate NPSH for safety-related pumps will be monitored by the MC 0350
restart panel. The Licensee's resolution of the issue will be reviewed
and evaluated by the NRC.
In summary, the Petitioner stated that there were missing and
inaccurate NPSH calculations for safety-related pumps at D. C. Cook.
Upon request, the Licensee provided the NPSH calculation for all
safety-related pumps at D. C. Cook. The Licensee's response
demonstrated that there were NPSH calculations for all safety-related
pumps at D. C. Cook. When the calculations were reviewed by the NRC,
inconsistencies were discovered in values documented in the UFSAR and
those used in the NPSH calculations. These concerns have been
identified and transmitted to the Licensee. The Licensee's corrective
actions will be monitored through the MC 0350 process to ensure
appropriate actions are taken.
F. Licensee's Response to the CAL
In the Addendum, the Petitioner raised a concern about the
credibility of the Licensee's response to the CAL. The Petitioner
stated that since the Licensee's February 6, 1997, response to the
NRC's October 9, 1996, 10 CFR 50.54(f) request for design-basis
information was not accurate, based on the AE inspection finding, he
could not see how the Licensee's response to the CAL could be accurate.
Following the Licensee's response to the CAL, the NRC performed
additional inspections at D. C. Cook, documented in IR Nos. 50-315, 50-
316/98004; 50-315, 50-316/98005; and 50-315, 50-316/98009. The findings
of these inspections clearly showed that the Licensee's actions to
bound the scope of engineering problems in response to the CAL were too
narrowly focused and were not sufficient to address the broad array of
problems concerning the design-basis and licensing-basis issues that
existed at D. C. Cook.
The Petitioner's concern in the Addendum (that the Licensee's
response to the CAL failed to assure the NRC that corrective actions
were adequate) has been substantiated. The inspection findings from
early 1998 indicated that the CAL response did not bound the design-
basis and licensing-basis issues at D. C. Cook. As indicated in Section
II.A of the Director's Decision, the NRC took escalated enforcement
action against the Licensee. In response to the violations and various
programmatic breakdowns at D. C. Cook, the Licensee made a decision in
early 1998 to perform a comprehensive assessment to provide reasonable
assurance of plant system readiness, programmatic readiness, functional
area readiness, and containment readiness before restart of either
unit. The Licensee's primary mechanism to implement each of the plant
assessment programs is the D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant Restart Plan. The
Restart Plan was submitted in March 1998, and Revision 4 of the Restart
Plan was docketed on December 16, 1998. As stated above, the NRC is
using the guidelines in MC 0350 to oversee the Licensee's corrective
actions and the readiness of a unit to restart. As additional problems
or concerns are identified during the implementation of the Restart
Plan, appropriate adjustments will be made to the Restart Plan and the
Case Specific Checklist.
III. NRC Response to Requested Action
A. Request To Modify, Revoke, or Suspend the Operating Licenses for D.
C. Cook, Units 1 and 2
The Petitioner requested that the operating licenses for D. C.
Cook, Units 1 and 2 be modified, revoked, or suspended to prevent
operation of the units until there is reasonable assurance that
significant non-compliances have been identified and corrected so that
systems are in conformance with their design-basis and licensing-basis
requirements. In addition, the Petition requested that the NRC broaden
the inspection scope at D. C. Cook following the AE inspection. The
NRC's regulatory oversight actions taken thus far at D. C. Cook, in
part, fulfill the actions requested in the Petition. The regulatory
oversight actions at D. C. Cook are broad and comprehensive and will
ensure that there is reasonable assurance of safety prior to restart of
either unit.
Inspection findings at D. C. Cook following the AE inspection
verified that the corrective actions implemented by the Licensee as
described in the CAL response were too narrowly focused and did not
fully address the design-basis and licensing-basis issues. The NRC
increased inspections at D. C. Cook identified a number of violations
of NRC requirements, and as a result, took appropriate enforcement
action against the Licensee as stated above. While the enforcement
action did not modify, suspend, or revoke the operating licenses of the
D. C. Cook facilities, it did emphasize the serious nature of the
violations, the duration of the problems, and the Licensee's poor
performance.
The Licensee has developed an integrated Restart Plan. The plan
provides the frame-work to be used by the Licensee to identify,
evaluate, and correct issues. The NRC regulatory oversight at D. C.
Cook is following the guidelines of MC 0350 as discussed above. This
approach focuses the correct level of management attention as well as
resources on significant issues to be verified before restart of a unit
at D. C. Cook. In addition, this approach allows the NRC the
flexibility to change the focus of the oversight as different
significant issues emerge. In the Licensee's effort to identify and
correct issues, new issues will continue to emerge. As a result, the
Licensee will be expected to modify the Restart Plan to ensure that
corrective actions, to resolve the emergent issues, are implemented in
a timely manner. The MC 0350 restart panel will review these changes to
the Restart Plan to ensure that the Licensee has taken appropriate
corrective actions.
The Petitioner's request to suspend, modify, or revoke the licenses
at D. C. Cook, Units 1 and 2 has not been granted at this time. The
current regulatory oversight at D. C. Cook is sufficient, and provides
reasonable assurance that before restart of a unit at D. C. Cook the
Licensee will have identified and corrected issues so that the safety
systems at D. C. Cook will be in compliance with their design-basis and
licensing-basis requirements.
B. Request To Hold a Public Hearing on the Issues Raised in the
Petition Before Restart of a Unit at D. C. Cook
The Petitioner requested that a public hearing into the issues
raised in the Petition be held in the Washington, D.C. area before the
first unit at D. C. Cook is authorized to restart. As discussed above,
this request was granted. On August 19, 1998, an informal public
hearing was held at the NRC headquarters in Rockville, Maryland. Both
the Petitioner and the Licensee made presentations during the hearing.
The hearing gave the Petitioner an opportunity to clarify the issues
raised in the Petition and the Addendum.
C. Issues Raised in the Addendum
As discussed in Sections II. B. through II. E. of this Director's
Decision, each of the actions requested by the Petitioner in the
Addendum has been granted in that the Licensee is taking additional
corrective actions to ensure that each issue raised in the Addendum
will be resolved before restart of a unit at D. C. Cook, and the NRC
will verify that the Licensee's corrective actions have been effective.
Each of the issues raised in the Addendum will be reported on in a
future inspection report.
[[Page 8876]]
IV. Conclusion
The NRC has determined, for the reasons given in the preceding
discussion, that the request to prevent operation of the units at D. C.
Cook until there is reasonable assurance that significant non-
compliances have been identified and corrected so that systems are in
conformance with their design-basis and licensing-basis requirements
has been satisfied. The regulatory oversight actions being taken by the
NRC as stated above will provide reasonable assurance that systems at
D. C. Cook will be in conformance with their design-basis and
licensing-bases, thus meeting the request made in the Petition and
eliminates the need to modify, suspend, or revoke the licenses at D. C.
Cook. The request to hold a public hearing into the issues raised in
the Petition and Addendum in the Washington, D.C. area before the first
unit at D. C. Cook is authorized to restart has been granted. Action
has been taken on each concern identified in the Addendum, as stated
above.
As provided for in 10 CFR 2.206(c), a copy of this Decision will be
filed with the Secretary of the Commission for the Commission's review.
This Decision will constitute the final action of the Commission 25
days after issuance unless the Commission, on its own motion,
institutes review of the Decision at that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 11th day of February 1999.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Collins,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 99-4393 Filed 2-22-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P