[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 27 (Wednesday, February 10, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 6677-6678]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-3228]


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DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Minerals Management Service


Modifications to the Bid Adequacy Procedures

AGENCY: Minerals Management Service (MMS), Interior.

ACTION: Notification of procedural changes.

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SUMMARY: The Minerals Management Service (MMS) is modifying one element 
of its existing bid adequacy procedures for ensuring receipt of fair 
market value on Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) oil and gas leases. The 
modification establishes a new criterion for acceptance under the 
number of bids rule for selected tracts in Phase 1. Specifically, for 
viable confirmed and wildcat (C&W) tracts receiving three or more 
qualified bids, where the third largest bid is within 50 percent of the 
high bid, acceptance under the number of bids rule will apply only to 
those viable C&W tracts having high bids that are in the top 75 percent 
of high bids on a per acre basis for all three-or-more-bid C&W tracts 
within designated water depth categories. Unless stated otherwise, 
usually in the final notice of sale, the designated categories in the 
Gulf of Mexico are: water depths of less than 800 meters and water 
depths of 800 meters or more.
    This change has been made following a review of bidding activity in 
recent OCS sales. The new criterion for the number of bids rule was 
developed in part because in these sales a disproportionately large 
number of the three-bid confirmed and wildcat tracts with relatively 
low high bids were accepted in Phase 1, while tracts of this type with 
much larger high bids tended to be passed to Phase 2 in the evaluation 
process. Yet, in sales held without a number of bids rule for Phase 1 
acceptance, it was found that of the set of tracts receiving three or 
more bids, the ones that tended to get rejected were those receiving 
relatively small high bids. Thus, this new criterion will allow the MMS 
to better ensure receipt of fair market value through more efficient 
targeting of its tract evaluation resources.
    Another reason for the change is that the previous three-bid rule 
provided an incentive to submit lower bids. By doing so, a bidder could 
raise the chance that if it was the high bidder, the third largest bid 
would fall within the required 50 percent of its high bid. Under the 
proposed change, bidders would be discouraged from adopting this 
strategy because attempts to implement it would likely cause the 
potential high bid to fall below the new requirement that an acceptable 
high bid in Phase 1 must be in the top 75 percent of all high bids in 
the tract's class. Indeed, the 75 percent parameter was chosen, in 
part, because in recent sales, there were no cases in which a high 
bidder could have successfully implemented this strategy with the 
proposed change in the rule in place.

DATES: This modification is effective February 4, 1999.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. Marshall Rose, Chief, Economics 
Division, at (703) 787-1536.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The following set of bid adequacy procedures 
incorporates the most recent changes. During the bid review process, 
MMS conducts evaluations in a two-phased process for bid adequacy 
determination. We also review the bid for legal sufficiency \1\ and 
anomalies \2\ to establish the set of qualified bids \3\ to be 
evaluated.
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    \1\ Legal bids are those bids which comply with MMS regulations 
(30 CFR 256) and the Notice of Sale. Any illegal high bid will be 
returned to the bidder.
    \2\ Anomalous bids include all but the highest bid submitted for 
a tract by the same company, parent or subsidiary (bidding alone or 
jointly). Such bids are excluded when applying the number of bids 
rule or any bid adequacy measure.
    \3\ Qualified bids are those bids which are legal and not 
anomalous.
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Phase 1

    The tracts receiving bids are partitioned into four general 
categories:

--Those tracts where competitive market forces can be relied upon to 
assure fair market value;
--Those tracts which the MMS identifies as being nonviable \4\ based on 
adequate data and maps;
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    \4\ Nonviable tracts or prospects are those geographic or 
geologic configurations of hydrocarbons whose risk weighted most 
probable resource size is below the minimum economic field size for 
the relevant cost regime and anticipated future prices. The risk 
used is below the lowest level anticipated for any tract or prospect 
in the same cost regime.
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--Those tracts where the Government has the most detailed and reliable 
data;
--Those tracts where opportunities are greatest for strategic 
underbidding, information asymmetry, collusion, and other 
noncompetitive practices.

    Based on these categories, six Phase 1 rules are applied to all 
tracts receiving bids:

--Accept the highest qualified bid on viable confirmed and wildcat 
tracts receiving three or more qualified bids where the third largest 
such bid on the tract is at least 50 percent of the highest qualified 
bid and where the high bid per acre ranks in the top 75 percent of high 
bids for all three-or-more-bid confirmed and wildcat tracts that reside 
within a specified water depth category.\5\
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    \5\ The water depth categories usually will be specified in the 
final notice of sale.
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--Accept the highest qualified bid on confirmed and wildcat tracts 
determined to be nonviable.
--Pass to Phase 2 all tracts that require additional information to 
make a determination on viability or tract type.
--Pass to Phase 2 all viable confirmed and wildcat tracts receiving one 
or two qualified bids.
--Pass to Phase 2 all viable confirmed and wildcat tracts receiving 
three or more qualified bids where either the third largest such bid is 
less than 50 percent of the highest qualified bid or where the high bid 
per acre ranks in the lowest 25 percent of high bids for all three-or-
more-bid confirmed and wildcat tracts in the specified water depth 
category.
--Pass to Phase 2 all drainage and development tracts.

    The percentile ranking of a tract's high bid is calculated by 
multiplying 100 times the ratio of the numerical ordering of the three-
or-more-bid confirmed and wildcat tract's high bid to the total number 
of all viable and nonviable three-or-more-bid confirmed and wildcat 
tracts in the designated water depth. For example, suppose there are 21 
total confirmed and wildcat tracts identified in Phase 1 as receiving 
three-or-more-bids in the designated water depth category of at least 
800 meters. All viable tracts in this set having a high bid among the 
top 15 high bids would satisfy the 75% requirement; the 15th ranked 
high bid would represent the 71st percentile.
    In ensuring the integrity of the bidding process, the Regional 
Director (RD) may identify an unusual bidding pattern \6\ at any time 
during the bid

[[Page 6678]]

review process, but before a tract is accepted. If the finding is 
documented, the RD has discretionary authority, after consultation with 
the Solicitor, to pass those tracts so identified to Phase 2 for 
further analysis. The RD may eliminate all but the largest of the 
unusual bids from consideration when applying any bid adequacy rule, 
may choose not to apply a bid adequacy rule, or may reject the tract's 
highest qualified bid.
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    \6\ Within the context of our bid adequacy procedures, the term 
``unusual bidding patterns'' typically refers to a situation in 
which there is an excessive amount of coincident bidding by 
different companies on a set of tracts in a sale. Other forms of 
unusual bidding patterns exist as well, and generally involve anti-
competitive practices, e.g., when there is an uncommon absence of 
competition among companies active in a sale on a set of prospective 
tracts.
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    All of these procedures are generally completed within 3 weeks of 
the bid opening, and the results are announced simultaneously at the 
end of this period.

Phase 2

    The Phase 2 bid adequacy determinations are normally completed 
sequentially over a period ranging between 21 and 90 days after the 
sale. The total evaluation period can be extended, if needed, at the 
RD's discretion (61 FR 34730, July 3, 1996).
    Activities designed to resolve bid adequacy assessments are 
undertaken by analyzing, partitioning, and evaluating tracts in two 
steps:

--Further mapping and/or analysis is done to review, modify, and 
finalize viability determinations and tract classifications.
--Tracts identified as being viable must undergo an evaluation to 
determine if fair market value has been received.

    After completing these two steps, a series of rules and procedures 
are followed.

--Accept newly classified confirmed and wildcat tracts having three or 
more qualified bids if the third largest such bid is at least 50 
percent of the highest qualified bid.
--Accept the highest qualified bid on all tracts determined to be 
nonviable.
--Determine whether any categorical fair market evaluation technique(s) 
will be used. If so:
--Evaluate, define, and identify the appropriate threshold measure(s).
--Accept all tracts whose individual measures of bid adequacy satisfy 
the threshold categorical requirements.
--Conduct a full-scale evaluation, which could include the use of 
MONTCAR,\7\ on all remaining tracts \8\ passed to Phase 2 and still 
awaiting an acceptance or rejection decision.
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    \7\ MONTCAR is a probabilistic, cash flow computer simulation 
model designed to conduct a resource-economic evaluation that 
results in an estimate of the expected net present value of a tract 
(or prospect) along with other measures.
    \8\ These include tracts not accepted by a categorical rule that 
are classified as drainage and development tracts and those 
classified as confirmed and wildcat tracts that are viable and 
received (a) one or two qualified bids, or (b) three or more 
qualified bids where either the third largest such bid is less than 
50 percent of the highest qualified bid or the high bid is in the 
bottom quartile of all three-or-more-bid confirmed and wildcat 
tracts for a designated water depth category.
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    -Compare the highest qualified bid on each of these remaining 
tracts to two measures of bid adequacy: the Mean Range of Values (MROV) 
\9\ and the Adjusted Delayed Value (ADV) \10\.
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    \9\ The MROV is a dollar measure of a tract's expected net 
present private value, given that the tract is leased in the current 
sale, allowing for exploration and economic risk, and including tax 
consequences including depletion of the cash bonus.
    \10\ The ADV is the minimum of the MROV and the Delayed MROV 
(DMROV). The DMROV is a measure used to determine the size of the 
high bid needed in the current sale to equalize it with the 
discounted sum of the bonus and royalties expected in the next sale, 
less the foregone royalties from the current sale. The bonus for the 
next sale is computed as the MROV associated with the delay in 
leasing under the projected economic, engineering, and geological 
leasing receipts conditions, including drainage. If the high bid 
exceeds the DMROV, then the leasing receipts from the current sale 
are expected to be greater than those from the next sale, even in 
cases where the MROV exceeds the high bid.
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    -Accept the highest qualified bid for those tracts where such a bid 
equals or exceeds the tract's ADV.
    -Reject the highest qualified bid on drainage and development 
tracts receiving three or more qualified bids where such a bid is less 
than one-sixth of the tract's MROV.
    -Reject the highest qualified bid on drainage and development 
tracts receiving one or two qualified bids and on confirmed and wildcat 
tracts receiving only one qualified bid where the high bid is less than 
the tract's ADV.
    At this stage of the process, the outstanding tracts consist of 
those having a highest qualified bid that is less than the MROV of the 
ADV, and are either (a) drainage or development tracts receiving three 
or more qualified bids with the highest such bid exceeding one-sixth of 
the tract's MROV, or (b) viable confirmed and wildcat tracts that 
receive two or more qualified bids.
    From these outstanding tracts, MMS selects the following ones:
    -Drainage and development tracts having three or more qualified 
bids with the third largest such bid being at least 25 percent of the 
highest qualified bid;
    -Confirmed and wildcat tracts having two or more qualified bids 
with the second largest such bid being at least 25 percent of the 
highest qualified bid.
    The MMS then compares the highest qualified bid on each of these 
selected, outstanding tracts to the tract's Revised Arithmetic Average 
Measure (RAM).\11\ For all these tracts:
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    \11\ The RAM is the arithmetic average of the MROV and all 
qualified bids on the tract that are equal to at least 25 percent of 
the high bid.
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    -Accept the highest qualified bid where such a bid equals or 
exceeds the tract's RAM.
    -Reject the highest qualified bid where such a bid is less than the 
tract's RAM.
    Finally, the MMS identifies those tracts that were in the 
``outstanding'' set above but not selected for comparison to the RAM.
    -Reject the high bid on all of these leftover tracts.

    Dated: February 4, 1999.
Thomas A. Readinger,
Acting Associate Director for Offshore Minerals Management.
[FR Doc. 99-3228 Filed 2-9-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4310-MR-M