[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 11 (Tuesday, January 19, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 2921-2924]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-1086]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-213]


Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co., Haddam Neck Plant; Issuance 
of Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206

    Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation, has issued a Director's Decision concerning a petition 
dated September 11, 1998, filed by Ms. Rosemary Bassilakis, pursuant to 
Title

[[Page 2922]]

10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Sec. 2.206, (10 CFR 2.206), on 
behalf of the Citizens Awareness Network (Petitioner). The petition 
requests that (1) the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
immediately revoke or suspend the Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power 
Company's (CYAPCO's) operating license for the Haddam Neck Plant (HNP), 
(2) an informal public hearing on the petition be held in the vicinity 
of the site, and (3) the NRC consider requiring CYAPCO to conduct 
decommissioning activities under 10 CFR part 72.
    The Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, has determined 
that the Petition should be denied in part and granted in part for the 
reasons stated in the ``Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206'' (DD-
99-01). The complete text that follows this notice is available for 
public inspection and copying in the Commission's Public Document Room, 
the Gelman Building, 2210 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the 
Local Public Document Room for HNP at the Russell Library, 123 Broad 
Street, Middletown, Connecticut.
    A copy of this decision has been filed with the Secretary of the 
Commission for the Commission's review. As provided for by 10 CFR 
2.206(c), the decision will constitute the final action of the 
Commission 25 days after issuance, unless the Commission, on its own 
motion, institutes a review of the decision within that time.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 12th day of January 1999.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Collins,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

I. Introduction

    On September 11, 1998, Ms. Rosemary Bassilakis submitted a petition 
pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Sec. 2.206 (10 
CFR 2.206), on behalf of the Citizens Awareness Network requesting (1) 
that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) immediately revoke or 
suspend the Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company's (CYAPCO's) 
operating license for the Haddam Neck Plant (HNP), (2) an informal 
public hearing on the petition be held in the vicinity of the site, and 
(3) that the NRC consider requiring CYAPCO to conduct decommissioning 
activities under 10 CFR part 72.
    In support of their requests, the petitioners state that (1) CYAPCO 
demonstrates incompetence in creating and maintaining a safe work 
environment and an effective, well-trained staff; (2) CYAPCO is not 
conducting its decommissioning activities in accordance with its post-
shutdown decommissioning activities report (PSDAR) and, therefore, 
poses an undue risk to public health; (3) the problems encountered at 
the plant during the summer of 1998 might not have occurred if the 
requirements under 10 CFR Part 72 had been applied; and (4) the spent 
fuel stored onsite in the spent fuel pool (SFP) is the primary risk to 
public health and safety.

II. Background

    CYAPCO submitted written certifications of permanent cessation of 
operations of HNP and permanent removal of fuel from the HNP reactor 
vessel on December 5, 1996. Upon the docketing of these documents, in 
accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2), CYAPCO was no longer authorized to 
operate the reactor or to place fuel into the reactor vessel. CYAPCO 
submitted its PSDAR on August 22, 1997, which, among other items, 
described its schedule and commitments for decommissioning HNP. The 
licensee chose the DECON option for the plant.
    The licensee plans to keep its spent fuel stored in the SFP until 
such time as the Department of Energy takes possession of it. Systems 
supporting the SFP are being modified to operate independently of the 
rest of the site so that decommissioning activities will have no impact 
on the SFP.
    On March 4, 1997, the NRC issued a confirmatory action letter to 
document the licensee's commitments to improve its radiological 
controls program. Subsequently, on May 5, 1998, the NRC determined that 
CYAPCO had met its commitments to make those improvements.
    The petitioners state that since May 5, 1998, a series of incidents 
that occurred at HNP raises questions regarding the ability of CYAPCO 
to protect worker and public health and safety and the environment. The 
incidents noted by the petitioners and a brief statement of NRC's 
enforcement actions taken to date are listed below:
    1. On June 20, 1998, 800 gallons of radioactive liquid, containing 
approximately 2,200 microcuries total activity (excluding tritium and 
noble gases), were inadvertently released into the Connecticut River 
from the HNP waste test tank (WTT). The licensee did not report the 
release for 2 days.
    This event is discussed in Inspection Report 50-213/98-03, which 
was issued on August 21, 1998. The release was within regulatory 
limits. However, the event resulted in a Severity Level IV violation 
because of the licensee's failure to declare an Unusual Event for an 
unplanned liquid discharge in which the total activity exceeds 1,000 
microcuries (excluding tritium and noble gases). The event also 
contributed to a Severity Level IV violation for inadequate 
configuration control in that a valve required to be closed was open.
    2. On July 7, 1998, 350 gallons of demineralized water were 
inadvertently spilled, spraying workers in the spent fuel building.
    This event is discussed in Inspection Report 50-213/98-03, which 
was issued on August 21, 1998. The workers involved were neither 
contaminated nor injured. However, the event contributed to a Severity 
Level IV violation for inadequate configuration control in that valves 
red-tagged shut and verified as closed were found open.
    3. On July 27, 1998, approximately 1,000 gallons of reactor coolant 
system (RCS) decontamination solution were spilled inside the plant.
    This event is mentioned in Inspection Report 50-213/98-03, which 
was issued on August 21, 1998, as an example of inadequate 
configuration control in that a valve required to be full open was 
found less than full open, which contributed to pressure transients and 
vibrations that resulted in the spill. The partially closed valve 
contributed to a Severity Level IV violation for inadequate 
configuration control.
    The event is discussed in detail in Inspection Report 50-213/98-04, 
which was issued on October 29, 1998. There was no release of 
radioactive water to the environment. However, the report found that 
the licensee did not perform walkdown inspections or visual leak checks 
in the plant's pipe trenches during leak testing of the systems in 
preparation for the RCS decontamination. In addition, the report found 
that the licensee failed to adequately address potential transient 
conditions in the letdown system equipment. The NRC identified these 
deficiencies as apparent violations in that corrective actions to 
address weaknesses in configuration control were inadequate. The need 
for enforcement action related to this event is being evaluated by the 
NRC.
    4. On August 11, 1998, the SFP demineralizer retention element and 
filter failed, allowing contaminated resin beads to enter plant piping.
    This event is discussed in Inspection Report 50-213/98-04, which 
was issued on October 29, 1998. The failures were caused by a 
combination of increased flow and corrosion due to operating conditions 
created by the RCS decontamination procedure. The contaminated resin 
beads increased

[[Page 2923]]

radiation levels in the pipe trench and containment, areas not readily 
accessible to workers. The NRC identified this event as an apparent 
violation in that the licensee's technical evaluations and procedural 
controls failed to ensure that contaminated resin remained inside the 
demineralizer tank.
    The final disposition of the apparent violations identified in 
items 3 and 4 above will be taken in accordance with the NRC's 
enforcement policy. The NRC is currently evaluating the events and the 
need for enforcement action. The results of the evaluation will be made 
available to the public.
    The series of events during the summer of 1998 prompted the NRC to 
conduct a number of conference calls and management meetings with the 
licensee. Conference calls were made to licensee management on July 8 
and 15, 1998. During the calls, the licensee described the results of 
its preliminary root cause analyses of the events of June 20 and July 
7, 1998, and presented the corrective actions it took to ensure that no 
similar events would occur during the RCS decontamination procedure. 
The licensee documented the commitments it made during those calls in a 
letter dated July 16, 1998. As a result of the July 27 event, a 
management meeting was held at the plant site on August 3, 1998, to 
discuss additional corrective actions taken by the licensee. These 
commitments were documented by the licensee in a letter dated August 
12, 1998. The Regional Administrator for NRC Region I met with licensee 
management on August 20, 1998, to discuss concerns raised by the 
licensee's performance. On September 3-4, 1998, Region I and 
Headquarters personnel conducted interviews at the site with 30 
licensee managers, supervisors, and workers to obtain information on 
organizational and management issues associated with the events during 
the RCS decontamination.
    The petitioners state that CYAPCO never finished its root cause 
analysis for the incident on June 20, 1998, before commencing similar 
work. By letter dated July 16, 1998, CYAPCO committed to completing a 
root cause analysis by July 27, 1998, but did not commit to limit or 
prohibit similar work until the analysis was completed. Inspection 
Report 50-213/98-03 stated that the licensee's preliminary analysis of 
the June 20 event found that the root cause was accidental bumping of a 
cross-connect valve, which allowed partial discharge of the ``A'' WTT 
while the ``B'' WTT was being discharged. Both tanks had been properly 
prepared for release; however, they were intended to be released one at 
a time. The licensee suspended WTT discharges until a number of 
corrective actions, such as installation of a locking device on the 
cross-connect valve, were taken to prevent recurrence of a similar 
event. After the preliminary corrective actions were taken, the 
licensee removed the prohibition on WTT discharges. The final root 
cause analysis was issued by CYAPCO as an internal document and was 
approved by the HNP Unit Director on July 29, 1998. However, there was 
no requirement to place the analysis on the docket.
    The petitioners also state that, as of the time of their September 
11, 1998 petition, they had not received a response to their letter 
dated July 7, 1998, to NRC Chairman Jackson, in which they requested 
that NRC delay the start of the RCS chemical decontamination. The NRC 
staff issued a response to the petitioners in a letter dated August 31, 
1998. The response was docketed on September 8, 1998, under accession 
number 9809080105.

III. Discussion of Petitioners' Requests

    The petitioners' first request is to revoke or suspend the HNP 
operating license. The petitioners' basis for the request is that 
CYAPCO continues to demonstrate incompetence in creating and 
maintaining a safe work environment and an effective, well-trained 
staff.
    The petitioners present the series of events outlined in Section 
II, ``Background'' as evidence to support their basis.
    The NRC considers the series of events that occurred during the 
summer of 1998 to have been challenges to the licensee's ability to 
maintain a safe work environment. As noted in Section II, NRC has taken 
enforcement action in response to the events. The enforcement actions 
are based on the Commission's regulations, which place certain 
requirements on a licensee. To place a licensee under the authority of 
the regulations, the Commission issues a license with appropriate 
conditions. As a result, the facility operating license becomes a 
mechanism through which the Commission holds a licensee to its 
regulatory responsibilities. Revoking or suspending the HNP license 
would not relieve the licensee of its responsibilities but could impede 
the NRC's ability to enforce regulatory requirements.
    The events previously outlined did not result in a radiological 
release to the environment above regulatory limits, did not cause 
radiation exposure above regulatory limits, and did not cause injury to 
workers or the public. In addition, the permanently shutdown and 
defueled condition of the plant substantially reduces the risk to 
public health and safety. In light of these facts, the NRC believes 
that revoking or suspending the HNP license is not necessary or 
appropriate. The NRC's enforcement policy provides objective criteria 
for responding to licensee actions and is adequate to require CYAPCO to 
take appropriate corrective actions in response to the events outlined. 
Therefore, the request to revoke or suspend the HNP operating license 
is denied.
    The petitioners' second request is to hold an informal public 
hearing in the vicinity of the site. The petitioners' basis for the 
request is that CYAPCO is not conducting its decommissioning activities 
in accordance with its PSDAR and, therefore, poses an undue risk to the 
public.
    With regard to the petitioners' request for an informal public 
hearing, the staff reviewed the PSDAR and found that CYAPCO has 
followed the sequence of activities included in the PSDAR as Figure 1, 
``CY Decommissioning Schedule.'' Additionally, in its PSDAR, CYAPCO 
committed to controlling radiation exposure to offsite individuals to 
levels less than both the Environmental Protection Agency's Protective 
Action Guidelines and NRC's regulations. Both radiation exposures to 
individuals and effluents to the environment due to decommissioning 
activities have been within regulatory limits. On the basis of these 
facts, the staff finds that there is no undue risk to public health and 
safety. The staff also determined that the petitioners neither provided 
new information that raised the potential for a significant safety 
issue (SSI) nor presented a new SSI or new information on a previously 
evaluated SSI. Therefore, the criteria for an informal public hearing 
on a petition submitted under the provisions of 10 CFR 2.206, contained 
in Part III (c) of Management Directive 8.11, are not satisfied and the 
petitioners' request for an informal public hearing has been denied.
    The petitioners' third request is for the NRC staff to consider 
applying the requirements of 10 CFR part 72, ``Licensing Requirements 
for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level 
Radioactive Waste,'' to decommissioning activities at HNP. The 
petitioners present two bases for this request. First, the problems 
encountered during the decommissioning activities in the summer of 1998 
might not have occurred if 10 CFR part 72 had been applied at HNP. 
Second, the spent fuel

[[Page 2924]]

stored in the SFP is the primary risk to public health and safety.
    The problems encountered by the licensee during the summer of 1998 
have been examined by the NRC. As illustrated in Section II, the 
problems were not due to a lack of regulatory requirements. Therefore, 
the staff believes that the requirements of 10 CFR part 72, which 
address activities associated with an independent spent fuel storage 
installation (ISFSI), would not have been applicable to the 
decommissioning activities underway at HNP during the summer of 1998.
    The second basis for the request concerns the safe storage of spent 
fuel at HNP. The staff's consideration of applying the requirements of 
10 CFR part 72 at HNP is presented in Section IV, below. Therefore, the 
third request is granted.

IV. Application of 10 CFR Part 72 at HNP

    The staff reviewed the requirements of 10 CFR part 72 and compared 
them with the requirements of 10 CFR part 50, ``Domestic Licensing of 
Production and Utilization Facilities,'' which currently apply to HNP. 
The scope of part 72, as stated in 10 CFR 72.2, is limited to the 
receipt, transfer, packaging, and possession of power reactor spent 
fuel and other radioactive materials associated with spent fuel 
storage. As a result, decommissioning activities under part 72 would 
apply only to the portion of the 10 CFR part 50 site licensed as an 
ISFSI. However, the licensee has not applied for a part 72 license to 
establish the SFP as an ISFSI. Furthermore, the licensee does not 
intend to decommission the SFP until after the Department of Energy 
takes possession of the spent fuel. In light of these facts, part 72 
does not apply to HNP and, even if CYAPCO held a part 72 license, the 
decommissioning provisions of that part would not apply to the 
decommissioning activities currently underway at the facility. Because 
the HNP facility consists of contaminated and activated structures, 
systems, and components associated with a permanently defueled reactor 
as well as the SFP, the limited scope of part 72 is not sufficient to 
cover the full range of decommissioning activities at a power reactor 
facility such as HNP.
    In contrast, the scope of 10 CFR part 50 applies to HNP and covers 
all the structures, systems, and components of a power reactor 
facility, including the SFP. Part 50 contains specific provisions for 
decommissioning power reactors in Sec. 50.82, as well as other 
applicable sections. It follows that the decommissioning of HNP must 
proceed under 10 CFR part 50, at least until such time as the 
decommissioning activities at HNP fall completely within the scope of 
10 CFR part 72 and the licensee applies for and obtains a part 72 
license. As of now, the activities at HNP extend beyond the scope of 
part 72, and part 50 would continue to apply even if a licensed ISFSI 
were established at the site.
    After considering the applicability of the regulations noted above, 
the staff concludes that 10 CFR part 72 does not apply to HNP at this 
time because the licensee does not possess an ISFSI licensed under part 
72 and many of the decommissioning activities to be performed cannot be 
accommodated within the scope of part 72.

V. Decision

    For the reasons stated herein, the petition is denied in part and 
granted in part. The requests to revoke or suspend the HNP operating 
license and to hold an informal public hearing in the vicinity of the 
site are denied. The request to consider application of the 
requirements of 10 CFR part 72 to HNP is granted. The staff's 
evaluation of the applicability of 10 CFR part 72 at HNP is presented 
in Section IV; however, the staff finds that part 72 does not apply to 
the decommissioning activities now underway at the plant.
    The decision and the documents cited in the decision are available 
for public inspection in the Commission's Public Document Room, the 
Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, D.C., and at the Local 
Public Document Room for HNP at the Russell Library, 123 Broad Street, 
Middletown, Connecticut.
    In accordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c), a copy of this decision will be 
filed with the Secretary of the Commission for the Commission's review. 
As provided for by this regulation, the decision will constitute the 
final action of the Commission 25 days after issuance, unless the 
Commission, on its own motion, institutes a review of the decision 
within that time.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 12th day of January 1999.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Collins,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 99-1086 Filed 1-15-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P