[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 244 (Monday, December 21, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 70437-70438]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-33717]



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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-220]


Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, (Nine Mile Point Nuclear 
Station, Unit No. 1); Exemption

I

    Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (the licensee) is the holder of 
Facility Operating License No. DPR-63, which authorizes operation of 
the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1 (NMP1). The license 
provides that the licensee is subject to all rules, regulations, and 
orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the NRC or 
Commission) now or hereafter in effect.
    The facility consists of two boiling-water reactors at the 
licensee's site located in Oswego County, New York. This exemption 
applies only to NMP1.

II

    The Code of Federal Regulations, 10 CFR 70.24, ``Criticality 
Accident Requirements,'' requires that each licensee authorized to 
possess special nuclear material shall maintain a criticality accident 
monitoring system in each area where such material is handled, used, or 
stored. Subsection (a)(1) and (a)(2) of 10 CFR 70.24 specifies 
detection and sensitivity requirements that these monitors must meet. 
Subsection (a)(1) also specifies that all areas subject to criticality 
accident monitoring must be covered by two detectors. Subsection (a)(3) 
of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to maintain emergency procedures for 
each area in which this licensed special nuclear material is handled, 
used, or stored and provides (1) that the procedures ensure that all 
personnel withdraw to an area of safety upon the sounding of a 
criticality accident monitor alarm, (2) that the procedures must 
include drills to familiarize personnel with the evacuation plan, and 
(3) that the procedures designate responsible individuals for 
determining the cause of the alarm and placement of radiation survey 
instruments in accessible locations for use in such an emergency. 
Subsection (b)(1) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to have a means to 
identify quickly personnel who have received a dose of 10 rads or more. 
Subsection (b)(2) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to maintain 
personnel decontamination facilities, to maintain arrangements for a 
physician and other medical personnel qualified to handle radiation 
emergencies, and to maintain arrangements for the transportation of 
contaminated individuals to treatment facilities outside the site 
boundary. Paragraph (c) of 10 CFR 70.24 exempts part 50 licensees from 
the requirements of paragraph (b) of 10 CFR 70.24 for special nuclear 
material used or to be used in the reactor. Paragraph (d) of 10 CFR 
70.24 states that any licensee who believes that there is good cause 
why it should be granted an exemption from all or part of 10 CFR 70.24 
may apply to the Commission for such an exemption and shall specify the 
reasons for the relief requested. Paragraph (a) of 10 CFR 70.14 states 
that the Commission may, upon application of any interested person or 
upon its own initiative, grant such exemption from 10 CFR part 70 as it 
determines are authorized by law and will not endanger life or property 
or the common defense and security and are otherwise in the public 
interest.

III

    The special nuclear material that could be assembled into a 
critical mass at NMP1 is in the form of nuclear fuel, the quantity of 
special nuclear material other than fuel that is stored on site is 
small enough to preclude achieving a critical mass. The NRC staff has 
evaluated the possibility of an inadvertent criticality of the nuclear 
fuel at NMP1 and has determined that such an accident cannot occur if 
the licensee meets the following seven criteria.
    1. Plant procedures do not permit more than 3 new assemblies to be 
in transit between the associated shipping cask and dry storage rack at 
one time.
    2. The k-effective of the fresh fuel storage racks filled with fuel 
of the maximum permissible Uranium (U)-235 enrichment and flooded with 
pure water does not exceed 0.95 at a 95% probability with a 95% 
confidence level.
    3. If optimum moderation of fuel in the fresh fuel storage racks 
occurs when the fresh fuel storage racks are not flooded, the k-
effective corresponding to this optimum moderation does not exceed 0.98 
at a 95% probability with a 95% confidence level.
    4. The k-effective does not exceed 0.95 at a 95% probability with a 
95% confidence level in the event that the spent fuel storage racks are 
filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and 
flooded with pure water.
    5. The quantity of forms of special nuclear material, other than 
nuclear fuel, that are stored on site in any given area is less than 
the quantity necessary for a critical mass.
    6. Radiation monitors, as required by General Design Criterion 
(GDC) 63 of Appendix A to 10 CFR part 50, are provided in fuel storage 
and handling areas to detect excessive radiation levels and to initiate 
appropriate safety actions.
    7. The maximum nominal U-235 enrichment is limited 5 to 5 weight 
percent.
    By letter dated November 6, 1998, the licensee requested an 
exemption from 10 CFR 70.24. In this exemption request, the licensee 
addressed the seven criteria given above and indicated how each 
criterion is satisfied at NMP1. The licensee stated that it does not 
analyze for the optimum moderation condition as addressed in Criterion 
3 above, but has used a standard industry practice by implementing 
administrative and physical controls in accordance with General 
Electric's Service Information Letter 152, ``Criticality Margins for 
the Storage of New Fuel,'' dated March 31, 1976. To preclude the 
existence of an optimum moderation condition in the new fuel vault 
area, the licensee uses the following controls or design features: the 
new fuel vault is equipped with a drain to prevent flooding; the pre-
fire plans will be revised before any more new fuel is received to 
ensure that fire fighting foam or water will not be directed towards 
the new fuel vault during dry storage of new fuel; and only one new 
fuel vault (non-combustible) cover is removed at a time and, if the 
vault is left unattended, either the new fuel vault cover will be 
reinstalled or a solid fireproof cover installed. The NRC staff has 
found these practices and features acceptable.
    Regarding Criterion 4 above, the licensee states that there are two 
types of spent fuel storage racks in the NMP1 spent fuel storage pool--
those of the poison type incorporating a neutron absorbing material and 
those of a non-poison type without special neutron absorbers. Both 
types are designed to maintain k-effective less than or equal to 0.95 
under all storage conditions. As required by NMP1 Technical 
Specification (TS) 5.5, fuel assemblies stored in the spent fuel 
storage locations of the non-poison flux trap design are limited to 3.0 
weight percent of U-235 per axial centimeters of assembly. Since all 
fuel assemblies used at NMP1 since the 1980's exceed 3.0 weight percent 
of U-235, the non-poison racks are not used for unirradiated fuel. 
Spent fuel storage racks of the poison type incorporating a neutron 
absorber are analyzed and designed consistent with Criterion 4. Thus, 
the NRC staff concludes that the storage of new fuel in spent fuel 
racks at NMP1 is consistent with Criterion 4 above.
    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's submittal and has 
determined

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that NMP1 meets the criteria for prevention of inadvertent criticality; 
therefore, the NRC staff has determined that there is no credible way 
in which an inadvertent criticality could occur in special nuclear 
materials handling or storage areas at NMP1.
    The purpose of the criticality monitors required by 10 CFR 70.24 is 
to ensure that if a criticality were to occur during the handling of 
special nuclear material, personnel would be alerted to that fact and 
would take appropriate action. The NRC staff has determined that there 
is no credible way in which such an accident could occur. The licensee 
has radiation monitors consistent with GDC 63 in fuel storage and 
handling areas. These monitors would alert personnel to excessive 
radiation levels and allow them to initiate appropriate safety actions. 
The low probability of an inadvertent criticality, together with the 
licensee's adherence to GDC 63, constitute good cause for granting an 
exemption to the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24.

IV

    The Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 70.14(a), 
this exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or property 
or the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public 
interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants the licensee an 
exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24 for NMP1.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the 
granting of this exemption will have no significant impact on the 
quality of the human environment [63 FR 67944].
    This exemption is effective upon issuance.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 10th day of December 1998.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Collins,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 98-33717 Filed 12-18-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-M