[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 239 (Monday, December 14, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 68800-68801]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-33111]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Entergy Gulf States, Inc. and Entergy Operations, Inc. (River 
Bend Station, Unit 1); Exemption

[Docket No. 50-458]

I

    Entergy Operations, Incorporated 1 (the Licensee), is 
the holder of Facility Operating License No. NPF-47, which authorizes 
operation of the River Bend Station, Unit 1 (RBS) (the facility). The 
license provides, among other things, that the facility is subject to 
all the rules, regulations, and orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission now or hereafter in effect.
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    \1\ Entergy Operations, Incorporated is authorized to act as 
agent for Entergy Gulf States, Inc. and has exclusive responsibility 
and control over the physical construction, operation and 
maintenance of the facility.
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    The RBS, is a boiling-water nuclear reactor located approximately 2 
miles east of the Mississippi River in West Feliciana Parish, 
Louisiana, approximately 2.7 miles southeast of St. Francisville, 
Louisiana and approximately 18 miles northwest of the city limits of 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

II

    Section 70.24 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 
``Criticality Accident Requirements,'' requires that each licensee 
authorized to possess special nuclear material (SNM) shall maintain a 
criticality accident monitoring system in each area where such material 
is handled, used, or stored. Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of 10 CFR 
70.24 specify detection and sensitivity requirements that these 
monitors must meet. Subsection (a)(3) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires 
licensees to maintain emergency procedures for each area in which this 
licensed SNM is handled, used, or stored and provides that (1) the 
procedures ensure that all personnel withdraw to an area of safety upon 
the sounding of a criticality accident monitor alarm, (2) the 
procedures must include drills to familiarize personnel with the 
evacuation plan, and (3) the procedures designate responsible 
individuals for determining the cause of the alarm and placement of 
radiation survey instruments in accessible locations for use in such an 
emergency. Subsection (b)(1) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to have 
a means to identify quickly personnel who have received a dose of 10 
rads or more. Subsection (b)(2) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to 
maintain personnel decontamination

[[Page 68801]]

facilities, to maintain arrangements for a physician and other medical 
personnel qualified to handle radiation emergencies, and to maintain 
arrangements for the transportation of contaminated individuals to 
treatment facilities outside the site boundary. Paragraph (c) of 10 CFR 
70.24 exempts Part 50 licensees from the requirements of paragraph (b) 
of 10 CFR 70.24 for SNM used or to be used in the reactor. Paragraph 
(d) of 10 CFR 70.24 states that any licensee who believes that there is 
good cause why he should be granted an exemption from all or part of 10 
CFR 70.24 may apply to the Commission for such an exemption and shall 
specify the reasons for the relief requested.

III

    The Commission's technical staff has evaluated the possibility of 
an inadvertent criticality of the nuclear fuel at River Bend Station 
(RBS), and has determined that it is extremely unlikely for such an 
accident to occur if the licensee meets the following seven criteria:
    1. Plant procedures do not permit more than 3 BWR fuel assemblies 
to be in storage or in transit between their associated shipping cask 
and dry storage rack at one time.
    2. The k-effective of the fresh fuel storage racks filled with fuel 
of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and flooded with pure water 
does not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level.
    3. If optimum moderation of fuel in the fresh fuel storage racks 
occurs when the fresh fuel storage racks are not flooded, the k-
effective corresponding to this optimum moderation does not exceed 
0.98, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level.
    4. The k-effective of spent fuel storage racks filled with fuel of 
the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and flooded with pure water 
does not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level.
    5. The quantity of forms of special nuclear material, other than 
nuclear fuel, that are stored on site in any given area is less than 
the quantity necessary for a critical mass.
    6. Radiation monitors, as required by General Design Criterion 63, 
are provided in fuel storage and handling areas to detect excessive 
radiation levels and to initiate appropriate safety actions.
    7. The maximum nominal U-235 enrichment is limited to 5.0 weight 
percent.
    By letter dated May 15, 1997, Entergy Operations, Inc. (EOI) 
requested an exemption from the requirements of section 70.24(a) of 
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, ``Criticality Accident 
Requirements,'' for the River Bend Station (RBS). On June 11, 1997, the 
NRC requested that RBS address the seven criteria published in 
Information Notice 97-77, ``Exemptions from the Requirements of Section 
70.24 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations' in order to 
continue with the exemption process.
    On August 12, 1998, EOI superseded its original May 15, 1997, 
letter and requested an exemption from the criticality accident 
monitoring requirements stipulated in 10 CFR 70.24(a) specifically for 
the areas containing incore detectors (which are not in use) and 
unirradiated fuel while it is handled, used, or stored on site.
    In this request the licensee addressed the seven criteria given 
above. The Commission's technical staff has reviewed the licensee's 
submittal and has determined that, except for Criteria 1 and 3 
discussed below, RBS meets the applicable criteria.
    RBS does not restrict fuel movement and storage of fuel assemblies 
that are out of their associated shipping cask to 3 assemblies. 
However, based on the elevation and configuration of the area where the 
assemblies are placed before storage into the new or spent fuel racks, 
the possibility of flooding is highly improbable. In addition, 
administrative controls are provided to restrict the fire-fighting 
practices employed in the fuel building to prevent low-density optimum 
moderation conditions. Fire-fighting foam is not permitted in the area 
and hose stations are equipped with straight-stream nozzles while 
handling fuel in the fuel building or storing fuel in the new fuel 
vault so that the array will not be covered with mist. Therefore, the 
staff concludes that any array of fuel assemblies in storage or in 
transit while outside of their associated shipping cask will be safely 
subcritical under the most adverse moderation conditions feasible, and 
the exception to Criterion 1 is acceptable.
    Although the RBS new fuel racks are designed to maintain k-
effective less than 0.95 when either dry or completely flooded with 
water, the new fuel racks cannot meet the 0.98 k-effective limit under 
accident conditions of low-density optimum moderation (e.g., foam or 
mist). Therefore, solid, noncombustible, gasketed covers are provided 
over the new fuel vault to preclude the entrance of optimum moderation 
media. When these covers are removed for fuel handling, the fuel is 
covered by a fire retardant material to ensure that the storage array 
is not moderated by low-density moderation. As previously mentioned, 
administrative controls are also provided to prevent optimum moderation 
conditions in the new fuel vault so that the array will not be covered 
with mist. Therefore, the staff concludes that a k-effective greater 
than 0.98 will not be attained in the new fuel storage racks and the 
exception to Criterion 3 is acceptable.
    The purpose of the criticality monitors required by 10 CFR 70.24 is 
to ensure that if a criticality were to occur during the handling of 
SNM personnel would be alerted to that fact and would take appropriate 
action. The staff has determined that it is extremely unlikely that 
such an accident could occur. The low probability of an inadvertent 
criticality constitutes good cause for granting an exemption to the 
requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(a).

IV

    The Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 70.14, this 
exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or 
the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public 
interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants the licensee an 
exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24 for the RBS.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the 
granting of this exemption will not result in any significant adverse 
environmental impact (63 FR 63755).
    This exemption is effective upon issuance.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 2nd day of December 1998.
Roy P. Zimmerman,
Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 98-33111 Filed 12-11-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P