[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 230 (Tuesday, December 1, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 66136-66146]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-32011]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY


Record of Decision on Management of Certain Plutonium Residues 
and Scrub Alloy Stored at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Record of Decision.

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SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE) has decided to prepare the 
categories of plutonium residues and scrub alloy listed below for 
disposal or other disposition as specified in the Preferred Alternative 
contained in the Final Environmental Impact Statement on Management of 
Certain Plutonium Residues and Scrub Alloy Stored at the Rocky Flats 
Environmental Technology Site (the Final EIS, DOE/EIS-0277F, August 
1998). The material categories covered by this Record of Decision are: 
(1) Sand, slag and crucible residues, (2) Direct oxide reduction salt 
residues (low plutonium concentration), (3) Combustible residues, (4) 
Plutonium fluoride residues, (5) Ful Flo filter media residues, (6) 
Glass residues, (7) Graphite residues, (8) Inorganic (metal and other) 
residues, and (9) Scrub alloy.
    Additional Copies: Copies of the Final EIS and this Record of 
Decision are available in the public reading rooms and libraries 
identified in the Federal Register Notice that announced the 
availability of the Final EIS (63 FR 46006, August 28, 1998), or by 
calling the Center for Environmental Management Information at 1-800-
736-3282 (toll free) or 202-863-5084 (in Washington, DC).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For information on the management of 
plutonium residues and scrub alloy currently stored at the Rocky Flats 
Environmental Technology Site, contact: Ms. Patty Bubar, Acting 
Director, Rocky Flats Office (EM-64), Office of Nuclear Material and 
Facility Stabilization, Environmental Management, U.S. Department of 
Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, DC 20585, 
Telephone: 301-903-7130.
    For information concerning development of the Final EIS or this 
Record of Decision, contact: Mr. Charles R. Head, Senior Technical 
Advisor, Office of Nuclear Material and Facility Stabilization (EM-60), 
Environmental Management, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence 
Avenue, S.W., Washington, DC 20585, Telephone: 202-586-5151.
    For information on DOE's National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
process, contact: Ms. Carol Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy 
and Assistance (EH-42), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence 
Avenue, S.W., Washington, DC 20585 Telephone: 202-586-4600, or leave a 
message at 1-800-472-2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Synopsis of the Decision

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) announced issuance of the Final 
Environmental Impact Statement on Management of Certain Plutonium 
Residues and Scrub Alloy Stored at the Rocky Flats Environmental 
Technology Site (the Final EIS, DOE/EIS-0277F) on August 28, 1998 (63 
FR 46006, August 28, 1998). In the Final EIS, DOE considered the 
potential environmental impacts of a proposed action to prepare certain 
plutonium residues and scrub alloy currently stored at the Rocky Flats 
Environmental Technology Site (Rocky Flats) near Golden, Colorado, for 
disposal or other disposition. After consideration of the Final EIS, 
including public comments submitted on the Draft EIS, and public 
comments submitted following issuance of the Final EIS, DOE has decided 
to implement the Preferred Alternative specified in the Final EIS for 
the following categories of material: (1) Sand, slag and crucible 
residues, (2) Direct oxide reduction salt residues (low plutonium 
concentration), (3) Combustible residues, (4) Plutonium fluoride 
residues, (5) Ful Flo filter media residues, (6) Glass residues, (7) 
Graphite residues, (8) Inorganic (metal and other) residues, and (9) 
Scrub alloy.
    Implementation of the Preferred Alternative will involve the 
following:
    1. Up to approximately 6,587 kg of plutonium residues (containing 
up to approximately 351 kg of plutonium) will be processed at Rocky 
Flats and packaged in preparation for disposal at the Waste Isolation 
Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico. These residues consist of direct 
oxide reduction salt residues containing low concentrations of 
plutonium, combustible residues, Ful Flo filter media residues, glass 
residues, graphite residues and inorganic (metal and other) residues. 
The processed residues will remain in storage at Rocky Flats until they 
are shipped to WIPP for disposal.
    2. Approximately 3,377 kg of sand, slag and crucible residues and 
plutonium fluoride residues (containing approximately 271 kg of 
plutonium), and approximately 700 kg of scrub alloy (containing 
approximately 200 kg of plutonium) will be packaged and shipped to the 
Savannah River Site near Aiken, South Carolina, where these materials 
will be stabilized in the F-Canyon by chemically separating the 
plutonium from the remaining materials in the residues and scrub alloy. 
The separated plutonium will be placed in safe and secure storage, 
along with a larger quantity of plutonium already in storage at the 
Savannah River Site, until DOE has completed the Surplus

[[Page 66137]]

Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement (DOE/EIS-0283, 
under preparation, draft issued in July 1998; see Section VII. A. 2, 
below, for additional discussion of the plutonium disposition topic) 
and made final decisions on the disposition of the separated plutonium. 
Transuranic wastes generated during the chemical separations operations 
will be sent to WIPP for disposal. Other wastes generated during the 
chemical separations operations will be disposed of in accordance with 
the Savannah River Site's normal procedures for disposing of such 
wastes.
    The actions summarized above are scheduled to take place at Rocky 
Flats between 1998 and 2004, and at the Savannah River Site between 
1998 and 2002.
    As specified in Section 1.4.2 of the Final EIS, DOE will issue a 
second Record of Decision in the near future regarding the remaining 
categories of plutonium residues within the scope of the Final EIS, 
after consideration of any comments submitted during an additional 
public comment period from August 28, 1998 through October 12, 1998. 
The material categories to be covered by the second Record of Decision 
are: (1) Incinerator ash residues, (2) Graphite fines residues, (3) 
Inorganic ash residues, (4) Molten salt extraction/electrorefining salt 
residues, (5) Direct oxide reduction salt residues (high plutonium 
concentration), (6) High-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter media 
residues, and (7) Sludge residues.

II. Background

    During the Cold War, DOE and its predecessor agencies conducted 
various activities associated with the production of nuclear weapons. 
Several intermediate products and wastes were generated as a result of 
those operations, some of which are still in storage at various DOE 
sites, including Rocky Flats. Now that the Cold War is over and the 
United States has ceased production of fissile nuclear weapons 
materials, DOE is conducting activities to safely manage, clean up, and 
dispose of (where appropriate) the intermediate products and wastes 
from prior nuclear weapons production activities. Among the 
intermediate products and wastes requiring proper management and 
preparation for disposal or other disposition are approximately 106,600 
kg of plutonium residues and 700 kg of scrub alloy currently stored at 
Rocky Flats.
    The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (the Board) in its 
Recommendation 94-1, addressed health and safety concerns regarding 
various materials at Rocky Flats, including the plutonium residues and 
scrub alloy. The Board concluded that hazards could arise from 
continued storage of these materials in their current forms and 
recommended that they be stabilized as expeditiously as possible. 
Approximately 64,400 kg of the plutonium residues in storage at Rocky 
Flats contain very low concentrations of plutonium and are currently 
being stabilized and prepared for disposal under the Solid Residue 
Treatment, Repackaging, and Storage Environmental Assessment/Finding of 
No Significant Impact (DOE/EA-1120, April 1996). However, the remaining 
42,200 kg of plutonium residues, which contain higher concentrations of 
plutonium, and all 700 kg of scrub alloy still require processing for 
stabilization and to prepare them for disposal or other disposition. 
These materials are addressed in the Final EIS.
    The approximately 42,200 kg of plutonium residues consist of nine 
heterogeneous categories of materials (e.g., ashes, salts, combustible 
materials, sludges, pieces of glass, pieces of graphite). On average, 
the plutonium residues contain about 6% plutonium by weight, although a 
small amount of the plutonium residues contains well above the average 
percentage of plutonium by weight. For example, the 315 kg of plutonium 
fluoride residues (less than 1 percent of the material addressed in the 
Final EIS) contains approximately 45% plutonium by weight. The 
approximately 700 kg of scrub alloy (less than 2 percent of the 
material addressed in the Final EIS) consists primarily of a metallic 
alloy of magnesium, aluminum, americium, and plutonium, containing 
approximately 29% plutonium by weight.
    Although the average concentration of plutonium in the 42,200 kg of 
residues is small, there is still enough plutonium present (about 2,600 
kg) to subject the residues to a special set of requirements (referred 
to as ``safeguards and security'' requirements) to maintain control of 
the materials and ensure that the plutonium in them is not stolen or 
diverted for illicit use, perhaps in a nuclear weapon. The 700 kg of 
scrub alloy, with its greater plutonium concentration, is also subject 
to safeguards and security requirements. Prior to disposal or other 
disposition of the residues and scrub alloy, action must be taken to 
reduce the plutonium concentration in the materials, make the plutonium 
more difficult to remove from the materials, or otherwise implement 
steps to ensure that the plutonium would not be stolen or diverted for 
illicit purposes. This process is referred to as ``termination of 
safeguards'' or ``meeting safeguards termination limits.''
    Accordingly, the Purpose and Need for Agency Action addressed in 
the Final EIS was to evaluate action alternatives for processing the 
approximately 42,200 kg of plutonium residues and 700 kg of scrub alloy 
currently in storage at Rocky Flats to address the health and safety 
concerns regarding storage of the materials, as raised by the Board in 
its Recommendation 94-1, and to prepare the materials for offsite 
disposal or other disposition (including termination of safeguards, 
when appropriate). The action alternatives evaluated would be 
implemented in a manner that supports closure of Rocky Flats by 2006 
and limits worker exposure and waste production. Disposal or other 
disposition would eliminate the health and safety concerns associated 
with indefinite storage of these materials.
    Subsequent to completion of the Final EIS, DOE has completed its 
compliance process under the requirements of the Endangered Species 
Act. Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act provides Federal agencies 
with the authority to determine whether a proposed Federal action may 
affect protected species or habitats and, if the agency determines that 
it will not (i.e., makes a ``no effect'' determination), then no 
consultation with the Fish and Wildlife Service is required. Rather 
than specifying a ``no effect'' determination, the Final EIS concludes 
that the proposed processing of plutonium residues and scrub alloy is 
not likely to adversely affect threatened or endangered species or 
critical habitats in areas involved in this proposal. Although 
indicating some effect on threatened or endangered species, a ``not 
likely to adversely affect'' determination falls short of a 
determination that a species or critical habitat is likely to be 
adversely affected overall by the proposed action.
    Upon further review of the likely impacts of the proposed 
processing, DOE concludes that a ``no effect'' determination would have 
been more appropriate in this case because DOE does not believe that 
the proposed processing will affect protected species or critical 
habitats overall. Therefore, no consultation with the Fish and Wildlife 
Service is required.
    The decision process reflected in this Record of Decision complies 
with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (42 
U.S.C., Sec. 4321 et seq.) and DOE's NEPA implementing regulations at 
10 CFR Part 1021. Further, Section 308 of the Fiscal Year 1999 Energy 
and Water

[[Page 66138]]

Development Appropriations Act (Public Law 105-245) specifies that 
``None of the funds in this Act may be used to dispose of transuranic 
waste in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant which contains concentrations 
of plutonium in excess of 20 percent by weight for the aggregate of any 
material category on the date of enactment of this Act, or is generated 
after such date.'' The decisions specified in this Record of Decision 
comply with the requirements of Pub. L. 105-245.

III. Alternatives Evaluated in the Final EIS

    DOE evaluated the following alternatives for management of the 
Rocky Flats plutonium residues and scrub alloy covered by this Record 
of Decision:

III.A. Alternative 1 (No Action--Stabilize and Store)

    This alternative consists of stabilization or repackaging to 
prepare the material for interim storage as described in the Rocky 
Flats Solid Residue Environmental Assessment (Solid Residue Treatment, 
Repackaging, and Storage Environmental Assessment/Finding of No 
Significant Impact, DOE/EA-1120, April 1996). Under this alternative, 
further processing to prepare the material for disposal or other 
disposition would not occur. Since scrub alloy was not addressed in the 
Rocky Flats Solid Residue Environmental Assessment, the ``No Action'' 
alternative for scrub alloy has been defined as continued storage at 
Rocky Flats with repackaging, as necessary. Under this alternative, 
approximately 40 percent of the Rocky Flats plutonium residues and all 
of Rocky Flats scrub alloy would be left in a form that would not meet 
the requirements for termination of safeguards, thus making these 
materials ineligible for disposal. Thus, while implementation of this 
alternative would address the immediate health and safety concerns 
associated with near-term storage of the materials, the health and 
safety risks associated with potential long-term storage of these 
materials would remain.

III.B. Alternative 2 (Processing Without Plutonium Separation)

    Under this alternative, the materials would be processed to convert 
them into forms that would meet the requirements for termination of 
safeguards. The materials would be ready for shipment to WIPP in New 
Mexico for disposal.
    The technologies evaluated for use under this alternative for the 
material categories covered by this Record of Decision are listed in 
Table 1.

             Table 1.--Alternative 2 Processing Technologies
------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Material category                  Processing technology
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sand, slag and crucible residues.......  Calcination/vitrification, or
                                          blend down.
Direct oxide reduction salt residues     Blend down.
 (low plutonium concentration).
Combustible residues...................  Blend down, catalytic chemical
                                          oxidation, or sonic wash.
Plutonium fluoride residues............  Blend down.
Ful Flo filter media residues..........  Blend down or sonic wash.
Glass residues.........................  Calcination/vitrification,
                                          blend down, or sonic wash.
Graphite residues......................  Cementation, calcination/
                                          vitrification, or blend down.
Inorganic (metal and other) residues...  Calcination/vitrification, or
                                          blend down.
Scrub alloy............................  Calcination/vitrification.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    All of the technologies specified in Table 1 would be implemented 
onsite at Rocky Flats. The blend down technology referred to in Table 1 
would consist of mixing the plutonium residues within the scope of the 
Final EIS with other, lower plutonium content residues that are also 
planned for disposal in WIPP, or with inert material, so that the 
resulting mixture would be below the safeguards termination limits.

III.C. Alternative 3 (Processing With Plutonium Separation)

    Under this alternative, the plutonium residues and scrub alloy 
would be processed to separate plutonium from the material and 
concentrate it so that the secondary waste would meet the requirements 
for termination of safeguards and be ready for disposal, while the 
separated and concentrated plutonium would be placed in safe and secure 
storage pending disposition in accordance with decisions to be made 
under the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement 
(DOE/EIS-0283, under preparation, draft issued in July 1998). DOE would 
not use this plutonium for nuclear explosive purposes.
    The technologies evaluated for use under this alternative for the 
material categories covered by this Record of Decision are listed in 
Table 2. These technologies would be implemented at the sites specified 
in Table 2.

             Table 2.--Alternative 3 Processing Technologies
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      Processing
        Material category             technology        Processing site
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sand, slag and crucible residues  Purex processing..  Savannah River
                                                       Site.
Direct oxide reduction salt       Acid dissolution/   Los Alamos
 residues (low plutonium           plutonium oxide     National Lab
 concentration).                   recovery, or.      Salt scrub at
                                  Salt scrub           Rocky Flats,
                                   followed by Purex   Purex at the
                                   processing, or.     Savannah River
                                                       Site.
                                  Water leach, or...  Rocky Flats
                                  Water leach.......  Los Alamos
                                                       National Lab.
Combustible residues............  Mediated            Rocky Flats.
                                   electrochemical
                                   oxidation.
Plutonium fluoride residues.....  Purex processing,   Savannah River
                                   or.                 Site
                                  Acid dissolution/   Rocky Flats.
                                   plutonium oxide
                                   recovery.
Ful Flo filter media residues...  Mediated            Rocky Flats.
                                   electrochemical
                                   oxidation.
Glass residues..................  Mediated            Rocky Flats.
                                   electrochemical
                                   oxidation.

[[Page 66139]]

 
Graphite residues...............  Mediated            Rocky Flats
                                   electrochemical    Savannah River
                                   oxidation, or.      Site.
                                  Mediated
                                   electrochemical
                                   oxidation.
Inorganic (metal and other)       Mediated            Rocky Flats
 residues.                         electrochemical    Savannah River
                                   oxidation, or.      Site.
                                  Mediated
                                   electrochemical
                                   oxidation.
Scrub alloy.....................  Purex processing..  Savannah River
                                                       Site.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. D. Alternative 4 (Combination of Processing Technologies)

    Under this alternative, the residues would be stabilized and 
blended down, if necessary, and repackaged in preparation for shipment 
of the material to WIPP. Termination of safeguards would be 
accomplished through use of a variance to the safeguards requirements. 
A variance is the record of a review process whereby DOE's Office of 
Safeguards and Security approves a proposal by another part of DOE to 
terminate safeguards on specific quantities of safeguarded materials 
because of special circumstances that make the safeguards controls 
unnecessary. The variance to safeguards termination limits that is 
required to allow implementation of this alternative was approved by 
the DOE Office of Safeguards and Security after conducting a detailed 
review and extensive vulnerability assessment regarding the alternative 
mechanisms that would be used to protect and control access to the 
material. The Office of Safeguards and Security concluded that the 
nature of the residues, the relatively low concentration of plutonium 
in the residues after blend down (if necessary), and the waste 
management controls that would be in effect during the transportation 
to and staging at WIPP prior to disposal would be sufficient to provide 
a level of protection for the materials comparable to that required by 
safeguards.
    The plutonium fluoride residues and the scrub alloy were not 
analyzed under this alternative because their higher plutonium content 
would make application of a safeguards termination limit variance 
impractical. In addition, the Ful Flo filter media residues were not 
analyzed under this alternative because they had not been identified in 
the Draft EIS as materials for which a variance to the safeguards 
termination requirements had been requested. Accordingly, application 
of a variance to these materials was not considered in the Final EIS.

III. E. Strategic Management Approaches

    Theoretically, it would be possible to process all of the residues 
using only one of the alternatives listed above (e.g., all the 
materials would be processed under a single alternative, except for 
certain material categories for which there is no processing technology 
under that alternative). Nevertheless, in practice, DOE recognized in 
preparing the EIS that the most appropriate technologies were likely to 
be chosen separately for each material category by selecting from among 
the technologies in all the alternatives. However, there are too many 
combinations of material categories, processing technologies and 
processing sites to address each individual combination in the EIS in a 
manner that would be easily understandable. As a result, in addition to 
individually evaluating technologies that could be used to implement 
the alternatives for each material category, DOE also evaluated several 
``Strategic Management Approaches''. These approaches involve 
compilations of sets of processing technologies which would allow a 
specific management criterion to be met. The management criteria 
addressed in the Strategic Management Approaches are as follows:

1. No Action (i.e., Alternative 1 discussed above)
2. Preferred Alternative (Discussed in more detail in Section III. 
F. below)
3. Minimizing Total Processing Duration at Rocky Flats
4. Minimizing Cost
5. Conducting all Processing at Rocky Flats
6. Conducting the Fewest Actions at Rocky Flats
7. Processing with the Maximum Amount of Plutonium Separation
8. Processing without Plutonium Separation

    The decisions on which technology to implement have been made 
separately for each material category covered by this Record of 
Decision; the Strategic Management Alternatives were merely 
illustrative. Nevertheless, evaluation of the Strategic Management 
Approaches allowed presentation of the environmental impacts of the 
proposed action as one set of data, instead of separate sets of data 
representing the impacts from management of each of the material 
categories individually. Examination of the various Strategic 
Management Approaches also allowed DOE and the public to determine 
whether there are any significant differences between the impacts that 
would result from implementation of one Strategic Management 
Alternative as compared to any other.

III. F. Preferred Alternative

    The preferred alternative was constructed by selecting a preferred 
technology for each material category from among the action 
alternatives (i.e., Alternatives 2, 3 and 4) described above.
    The technologies that comprise the Preferred Alternative for the 
material categories covered by this Record of Decision are listed in 
Table 3 (the bases for selection of these technologies are discussed in 
Section 2.4 of the Final EIS, and again in Section VII. of this Record 
of Decision). These technologies would be implemented at the sites 
specified in Table 3.

         Table 3.--Preferred Alternative Processing Technologies
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      Processing
        Material category             technology        Processing site
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sand, slag and crucible residues  Purex processing    Savannah River
                                   (Alternative 3).    Site.
Direct oxide reduction salt       Repackage           Rocky Flats.
 residues (low plutonium           (Alternative 4).
 concentration).
Combustible residues............  Stabilize, if       Rocky Flats.
                                   necessary, and
                                   repackage
                                   (Alternative 4)
                                   (see Note 1).
Plutonium fluoride residues.....  Purex processing    Savannah River
                                   (Alternative 3).    Site.
Ful Flo filter media residues...  Blend down          Rocky Flats.
                                   (Alternative 2).

[[Page 66140]]

 
Glass residues..................  Stabilize (i.e.,    Rocky Flats.
                                   neutralize and
                                   dry) and
                                   repackage
                                   (Alternative 4).
Graphite residues...............  Repackage           Rocky Flats.
                                   (Alternative 4).
Inorganic (metal and other)       Repackage           Rocky Flats.
 residues.                         (Alternative 4).
Scrub alloy.....................  Purex processing    Savannah River
                                   (Alternative 3).    Site.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Note 1--Aqueous contaminated residues would be stabilized by 
neutralizing and drying. Organic contaminated residues would be 
stabilized by thermal desorption/steam passivation.

IV. Other Factors

    In addition to comparing the environmental impacts of implementing 
the various alternatives, DOE also considered other factors in reaching 
the decisions announced here. These other factors included issues 
raised by comments received during scoping, or on the Draft and Final 
versions of the EIS. The other factors considered are briefly 
summarized in the following paragraphs.

IV.A. Nonproliferation

    Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons has been a fundamental 
national security and foreign policy goal of the United States since 
1945. The current U.S. policy is summarized in the White House Fact 
Sheet on Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy, dated September 
27, 1993. This policy makes it clear that the United States does not 
encourage the civil use of plutonium and, accordingly, does not itself 
engage in plutonium reprocessing (that is, separation of plutonium from 
spent nuclear fuel) for either nuclear power or nuclear explosives 
purposes. In addition, it is U.S. policy to seek to eliminate where 
possible the accumulation of stockpiles of plutonium.
    The alternatives analyzed in the Final EIS, including plutonium 
separation alternatives, would result in varying levels of risk 
associated with potential use of the plutonium in nuclear weapons, 
either by the U.S. or an adversary. None of the alternatives would 
eliminate the plutonium from the current inventory. Nevertheless, as 
discussed in Section 4.1.9 of the Final EIS, all of the action 
alternatives would result in appropriate management of the plutonium 
residues and scrub alloy to ensure that they are not stolen or diverted 
for illicit purposes. Furthermore, all of the action alternatives set 
the stage for ending the proliferation risk posed by the plutonium in 
the plutonium residues and scrub alloy by preparing these materials for 
disposal or other disposition in a form that is proliferation resistant 
(i.e., a form which contains very little plutonium per unit weight, 
from which the plutonium would be especially difficult to extract, or 
for which other measures are taken to ensure sufficient security). In 
addition, because of the potential concern regarding any processing and 
consolidating of plutonium that might be accomplished by DOE, the 
Secretary of Energy has committed that any separated or stabilized 
plutonium-239 would be prohibited from use for nuclear explosive 
purposes (Secretarial Action Memorandum approved December 20, 1994). 
This prohibition would apply to plutonium-239 separated as a result of 
actions implemented under this Record of Decision.

IV.B. Technology Availability and Technical Feasibility

    DOE considered technology availability and technical feasibility in 
identifying processing technologies to be evaluated in the Final EIS 
and in making the decisions specified in Section VI of this Record of 
Decision. DOE considered the extent to which technology development 
would be required and the likelihood of success of such endeavors. All 
of the technologies evaluated in the Final EIS are technically 
feasible. In general, however, the more that processing technologies 
vary from the historical processes and facilities used by DOE, the 
greater the technical uncertainty and extent to which new facilities or 
modifications to existing facilities would have to be made (as 
discussed in Section 4.17.7 of the Final EIS).

IV.C. Timing

    DOE considered the degree to which the various technologies that 
could potentially be used in management of the plutonium residues and 
scrub alloy would support DOE's plans for cleanup of the radioactive, 
chemical and other hazardous wastes left after 50 years of nuclear 
weapons production by the United States, as outlined in the document 
titled Accelerating Cleanup: Paths to Closure (DOE/EM-0362, June 1998), 
including the goal of closing Rocky Flats by 2006.

IV.D. Cost

    In reaching decisions on processing technologies, an important 
consideration for DOE was cost. DOE evaluated the costs of implementing 
the various processing technologies for each material category on both 
an individual basis and collectively. DOE estimates it would cost from 
approximately $428 Million to $814 Million to implement the Strategic 
Management Approaches (other than No Action) analyzed in the Final EIS. 
An even larger expenditure (approximately $1.1 Billion) would be 
required to pay for continued storage of the nuclear materials if DOE 
chose to implement the No Action alternative. On the other hand, DOE 
expects that the annual costs of operating and maintaining Rocky Flats 
facilities will decrease as nuclear materials are removed from the 
site. DOE expects further reductions in costs as the Rocky Flats 
facilities are deactivated.

V. Comments on the Final EIS

    After issuing the Final EIS, DOE received two letters commenting on 
the preferred alternative, one from Alternatives in Action, and the 
other from the Environmental Evaluation Group. In addition, while DOE 
was in the process of distributing the Final EIS, DOE received a copy 
of a letter from the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research to 
the South Carolina State Department of Health and Environmental Control 
commenting on an issue that is relevant to this Record of Decision. 
Finally, during consultations conducted after completion of the Final 
EIS, DOE received a comment on the Final EIS from the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service of the Department of the Interior. DOE's responses to 
these comments are as follows:

V.A.

    The letter from Alternatives in Action (signed by Virginia Dollar 
and dated September 23, 1998) expressed a

[[Page 66141]]

preference for implementation of the No Action alternative because it 
would not involve separation of plutonium; would reduce the number of 
people who would move, handle, treat and repackage the materials; and 
would result in management of the materials close to their point of 
origin. The No Action alternative is fully evaluated in the Final EIS, 
along with the action alternatives. Section VII. of this Record of 
Decision specifies the technologies that DOE has decided to implement 
for each material category addressed in the Final EIS and explains why 
DOE chose those technologies. DOE did not choose to implement the No 
Action alternative for any material category because implementation of 
the No Action alternative would leave the plutonium residues and scrub 
alloy in forms that could not be disposed of or otherwise 
dispositioned. Such an action would only postpone eventual action 
necessary to terminate storage of these materials and would result in 
continuation of the risks and costs associated with their indefinite 
storage.

V.B.

    The letter from the Environmental Evaluation Group \1\ (signed by 
Robert H. Neill and dated October 6, 1998) contained several comments 
on two topics, (1) safeguards termination limits, and (2) treatment of 
ash residues and other residues containing fines or powder. DOE's 
responses to the Environmental Evaluation Group comments are provided 
below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ The Environmental Evaluation Group is an independent group 
established in 1979 as a part of the New Mexico Institute of Mining 
and Technology with funds provided to the State of New Mexico by 
DOE. Pursuant to Pub.L. 100-456, the Environmental Evaluation Group 
conducts an independent technical evaluation of WIPP to assist in 
ensuring protection of the environment and the public health and 
safety.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

V.B.1. Safeguards Termination Limits
    The Environmental Evaluation Group letter raised several issues 
that relate to ``safeguards termination limit variances''. The comments 
requested more details regarding the process used to review and approve 
applications for variances, and raised issues relating to the basis for 
any variances.
    The Office of Safeguards and Security is the organization within 
DOE that is responsible for determining when special nuclear materials 
(such as plutonium) must be subject to physical safeguards to prevent 
theft or diversion. To that end, the Office of Safeguards and Security 
has established concentrations of plutonium that DOE organizations use 
to determine which materials containing plutonium must be safeguarded 
and which can be held or disposed of without maintaining physical 
safeguards. However, the Office of Safeguards and Security recognizes 
that there are circumstances under which the threat of theft or 
diversion would be very small even if these concentrations were 
exceeded. Accordingly, it has a procedure under which a DOE site may 
petition for a variance from the safeguards termination limits. To 
obtain a variance, the site must demonstrate that `` given the nature 
of the materials, their plutonium concentrations, and the other 
management controls that would be in effect during their transportation 
and storage--safeguards controls would not be needed to adequately 
ensure that the material would not be stolen or diverted for illicit 
purposes. This process was discussed in Section 1.3.1 of the Final EIS.
    The Environmental Evaluation Group letter states that some of the 
residues are above the Economic Discard Limits for plutonium. With the 
termination of plutonium production in the United States, the Economic 
Discard Limit concept has become obsolete and has been replaced by 
criteria that comprise DOE's current plutonium disposition methodology. 
These criteria include consideration of security and nonproliferation, 
waste minimization and costs. All of these criteria were satisfied in 
the development of the safeguards termination limit variance associated 
with Alternative 4, the Combination Alternative analyzed in the Final 
EIS (see Section III. D.).
    The Environmental Evaluation Group letter also refers to the Office 
of Safeguards and Security Version 1.2 formula supposedly used to 
calculate safeguards termination limits. The Version 1.2 formula was a 
draft proposal developed in 1995 that was not used in the development 
of the safeguards termination limits established in 1996. After 
detailed technical evaluations of the Version 1.2 formula, DOE 
concluded that the formula had no relationship to actual capability to 
recover plutonium from plutonium residues and other plutonium bearing 
materials. Therefore, the formula is not pertinent to making decisions 
regarding the plutonium contained in the Rocky Flats plutonium residue 
inventory.
    Current DOE policies allow a variance to safeguards termination 
limits to be approved for materials containing plutonium above the 
limits when vulnerability assessments conclude that no additional 
significant risk would occur by approving a variance. To support a 
variance request for certain categories of plutonium residues, Rocky 
Flats conducted vulnerability (or risk) assessments. The vulnerability 
assessments for the residues and their disposition paths were conducted 
to evaluate risks and determine acceptable protection measures needed 
to mitigate any unacceptable risks. These vulnerability assessments 
were thoroughly reviewed by the DOE Office of Safeguards and Security 
and were a primary basis for DOE's decision to grant the safeguards 
termination limit variance for the Rocky Flats plutonium residues. 
These assessments included consideration of all design based threats 
and adversary capabilities for diversion, theft and sabotage, not only 
at Rocky Flats, but also during transportation and final staging and 
disposal at WIPP.
    The Environmental Evaluation Group opposes granting a variance to 
safeguards termination limits until there is a review by affected state 
technical oversight agencies of the Rocky Flats application, the Office 
of Safeguards and Security review and decision, and the vulnerability 
assessments. Normally DOE does not involve outside organizations, 
including state government agencies, in the nuclear safeguards and 
security vulnerability review process. Furthermore, the governments of 
states potentially impacted by the issuance of safeguards termination 
limit variances have expressed no concerns on this matter to DOE. 
Moreover, the Office of Safeguards and Security received a letter from 
the Director of the State of Colorado Department of Public Health and 
Environment, dated December 30, 1997, that strongly endorsed DOE's 
approval of Rocky Flats request for variances to safeguards termination 
limits. The letter states that ``* * * approval of the proposal [a 
Safeguards Termination Limit (STL) variance] would result in processing 
which is strictly designed to stabilize residue material and meet the 
WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria rather than requiring further processing 
only to meet STLs.'' Comments on the Draft EIS from the State of New 
Mexico Environment Department (see Chapter 9 of the Final EIS) include 
no mention of variances to safeguards termination limits.
V.B.2. Treatment of Residues Containing Fines and Powders
    The Environmental Evaluation Group recommends that certain residues 
that contain fines and powders be ``fixed'' to minimize dispersibility 
in the event of accidents, reduce their attractiveness for diversion, 
or improve short and long term performance in WIPP. The Environmental 
Evaluation Group specifically identifies incinerator ash,

[[Page 66142]]

graphite fines, inorganic ash, molten salt extraction salt/
electrorefining salts, sludges and HEPA filter residues as being 
subject to this comment and mentions cold ceramification and 
vitrification as potential fixation processes.
    DOE's decisions on future management of each material category 
covered by these comments will be included in the second Record of 
Decision, as discussed in Section I of this Record of Decision (above). 
Nevertheless, DOE is responding to these comments in this Record of 
Decision, thus making the responses available to the public sooner, and 
addressing the comments in the same document that addresses the 
preceding comment on safeguards termination limits.
    DOE considers that the actions recommended by the Environmental 
Evaluation Group to control dispersibility in the event of accidents 
under the preferred alternative are not necessary. As stated in Section 
2.6.1 of the Final EIS, the residues would be packaged in multiple 
layers of sealed packages specifically to preclude dispersion if an 
accident were to occur. The residues would first be packaged in either 
metal containers or plastic bags. They would then be placed in 
stainless-steel pipe components, as appropriate, which in turn would be 
placed inside 55-gallon drums. When ready for transport to WIPP, the 
drums would be placed into TRUPACT-II containers, which are Type B 
shipping packages, certified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and 
approved by the Department of Transportation. The multiple containment 
afforded the residues would virtually eliminate the possibility for 
their dispersion into the environment, even in the unlikely event of an 
accident.
    Concerning the improvement of short and long term performance in 
WIPP, the specific residues identified by the Environmental Evaluation 
Group (and certain other residues) do not require further stabilization 
prior to repackaging to meet the WIPP waste acceptance criteria (WIPP 
WAC), except that some of the sludges would have to be filter-dried and 
some of the HEPA filters neutralization-dried prior to being repackaged 
in order to meet the WIPP WAC. This is discussed in Section 2.1 of the 
Final EIS. Compliance with the WIPP WAC would demonstrate that 
requirements for disposal at WIPP have been met. While ``fixing'' some 
of the residues, as evaluated in the Final EIS under several of the 
Alternative 2 technologies, could improve performance at WIPP, the 
improvement would be modest, and would be accompanied by additional 
costs, delays in the time when the residues would be ready to leave 
Rocky Flats, and additional hazards to workers who would perform the 
``fixing'' process. Although the ``fixing'' would make extraction of 
the plutonium from these residues more difficult, DOE's analyses (see 
Section V. B. 1, above) demonstrate that the residues are suitable for 
termination of safeguards (including consideration of the potential for 
diversion of the material) without such additional processing. 
Furthermore, conducting the operations necessary to ``fix'' the 
residues would subject workers to unnecessary radiation exposure. 
Nevertheless, DOE will consider all of the alternatives evaluated for 
these material categories in the Final EIS in the process of preparing 
the second Record of Decision.

V. C.

    The letter from the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research 
to the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control 
(signed by Brian Costner and dated September 24, 1998) questioned 
whether the proposal in the Draft EIS to ship the plutonium fluoride 
residues from Rocky Flats to the Savannah River Site for processing 
through the canyons is consistent with the requirements of the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and asserted that the public has 
been largely excluded from the decision making process in this matter.
    DOE's management of the plutonium fluoride residues will comply 
with all applicable RCRA requirements. DOE will transport the plutonium 
fluoride residues to the Savannah River Site in compliance with RCRA 
transportation requirements, and will store them there pursuant to RCRA 
storage requirements prior to processing. The applicability of RCRA 
requirements to the processing of the plutonium fluoride residues in 
the canyons is the subject of ongoing discussions between DOE and the 
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control.
    DOE currently is in the process of preparing the Surplus Plutonium 
Disposition Environmental Impact Statement (DOE/EIS-0283), which 
addresses the extent to which two surplus plutonium disposition 
approaches (immobilization and use in mixed oxide fuel [MOX]) would be 
implemented. Even after completion of the Surplus Plutonium Disposition 
Environmental Impact Statement, currently scheduled for early 1999, DOE 
does not expect to make decisions about which, if any, of the plutonium 
to be separated in the canyons would be used in MOX fuel until shortly 
before the material would be transferred to a MOX fabrication facility. 
Those decisions are not expected to be made until the plutonium 
separation operations under this Record of Decision have been 
completed.
    DOE does not believe that the public has been excluded from the 
decision making process regarding the management of the plutonium 
fluorides. The public was provided an opportunity to comment on 
management of the plutonium fluoride residues through this NEPA 
process. The Draft EIS discussed processing of the plutonium fluorides 
in the Savannah River Site canyons, followed by either immobilizing the 
separated plutonium or using it in MOX fuel.

V. D.

    The comment from the Fish and Wildlife Service (from Craig Miller 
of the Fish and Wildlife Service office in Lakewood, Colorado on 
September 4, 1998) pertained to the listing of Federal threatened, 
endangered and candidate species that may be found on or in the 
vicinity of Rocky Flats, as provided in Section 3.1.6, Table 3-6 of the 
Final EIS. During discussions on the Final EIS between DOE and the Fish 
and Wildlife Service office in Lakewood, Colorado, the Fish and 
Wildlife Service requested that DOE update the list of Federal 
threatened, endangered and candidate species in Table 3-6 as follows 
(new entries are marked with an *, other changes are noted in italics):

Revise the list of Federal Endangered Species to read as follows:

American peregrine falcon
whooping crane*
eskimo curlew*
black-footed ferret*

Revise the list of Federal Threatened Species to read as follows:

bald eagle
pawnee mountain skipper*
Mexican spotted owl*
Preble's meadow jumping mouse
greenback cutthroat trout*
utes ladies-tress orchid*
Colorado butterfly plant (proposed)* [moved from ``Candidate 
Species'' list]
Canada lynx (proposed)*

Revise the list of Federal Candidate Species to read as follows:

mountain plover
boreal toad*
swift fox*
[the Southwest willow flycatcher has been deleted from this list]

[[Page 66143]]

VI. New Information

    Since the Final EIS was issued, DOE has improved its estimate of 
the number of shipments that would be required to transport certain 
residues off-site for processing. While the amount of residues (and the 
amount of plutonium in the residues, both measured in terms of their 
weight) that would be shipped under the Preferred Alternative has not 
changed, the number of shipments that would be required to implement 
the Preferred Alternative is now projected to be greater than the 
number discussed in the Final EIS (Chapter 2, ``Alternatives'').
    Specifically, routine characterization of the sand, slag and 
crucible residues that was conducted in parallel with preparation of 
the Final EIS found these residues to be less dense (i.e., they occupy 
more volume per unit mass) than had been assumed during preparation of 
the Final EIS. As a result, less sand, slag and crucible residues could 
be placed in any shipping container, resulting in a projected increase 
in the number of shipments that would be required from Rocky Flats to 
the Savannah River Site.
    In addition, the precise radiation levels being emitted by the 
plutonium fluoride residues are not known at the present time. If the 
radiation level emitted by the plutonium fluoride residues is found to 
be higher than had been assumed during preparation of the Final EIS, 
then the amount of plutonium fluoride residues that could be included 
in any shipment would have to be reduced to avoid exceeding a 
transportation regulatory limit, thus also requiring the number of 
shipments to be increased. The actual radiation levels being emitted by 
the plutonium fluoride residues would not be known until they were 
repackaged for shipment. To avoid unnecessary radiation exposures to 
workers, DOE has deferred taking these measurements until the 
repackaging operation, when personnel would have to be near the 
material in any case.
    Finally, if it becomes necessary to change from use of the 6M 
shipping container, the container assumed in the Final EIS, to the 9975 
shipping container, the number of scrub alloy shipments could also 
increase. This is due to the fact that, after the 9975 container is 
certified, DOE will phase out use of the 6M containers as sufficient 
numbers of 9975 containers become available, and the 9975 container can 
hold less scrub alloy than the 6M container could.
    Overall, the changes in the number of shipments, as discussed 
above, increase shipments that might be made under the Preferred 
Alternative from 39, as estimated in the Final EIS, to a current 
estimate of between 60 and 90 shipments.
    DOE has considered the environmental implications of this increase 
in the estimated number of shipments that would be necessary to 
implement the Preferred Alternative and has concluded that there would 
be no significant change to the small impacts as estimated in the Final 
EIS for the following reasons:

VI. A.

    First, the estimate of the incident free radiological impacts from 
each individual shipment would remain the same as in the Final EIS. 
Such impacts were calculated under a simple, but conservative, 
assumption that all shipments emit radiation at the regulatory limit. 
Accordingly, the total of the incident free radiological impacts for 
all shipments would increase, in proportion to the increased number of 
shipments. However, the incident free radiological impacts would remain 
low. For example, the highest incident free radiological impact (that 
of the transportation crew for 90 shipments) would be 0.0055 latent 
cancer fatalities (as opposed to 0.0024 latent cancer fatalities as 
estimated in the Final EIS).

VI. B.

    Second, the radiological impacts associated with accidents would 
remain unchanged because the increased likelihood of an accident (due 
to the increased number of shipments) is offset by the decrease in the 
amount of radioactive material that would be present in an accident 
\2\.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ Note that the radiological impacts of incident free 
transportation and transportation accidents are calculated 
differently. As noted above, incident free impacts are calculated 
under the simplifying assumption that all shipments contain enough 
radioactive material to cause them to emit radiation at the 
regulatory limit. This assumption overstates impact estimates for 
some shipments, but more precise calculations were not needed in 
this case to estimate the nature of the impacts. Accident impacts, 
however, are estimated based on the likely contents of the shipping 
containers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VI. C.

    Third, although the nonradiological impacts (incident free and 
accident) would be increased in proportion to the increased number of 
shipments, the estimate remains small (approximately 0.0012 emission 
related latent cancer fatalities and approximately 0.010 traffic 
accident related fatalities for the new shipment values, as opposed to 
0.00051 and 0.0039, respectively, as estimated in the Final EIS).
    In summary, the transportation impacts from the current estimated 
number of shipments from Rocky Flats to the Savannah River Site would 
be small, and the current impact estimates differ insignificantly from 
corresponding estimates presented in the Final EIS.

VII. Decision

    DOE has decided to implement the proposed action in the manner 
described in this section. The alternatives that DOE has decided to 
implement are presented separately below for each material category 
because the decisions on the selected technology were based on 
considerations that are unique to the chemical and physical 
characteristics of the individual material categories. Furthermore, 
these decisions are independent of one another and are not connected to 
the decisions to be made in the upcoming second Record of Decision. 
Although alternative technologies analyzed in the EIS might use certain 
common facilities or personnel, sufficient facility capacity and 
personnel are available to allow use of any technology without 
interfering with any other.
    For clarity and brevity, this section also includes the discussion 
of the environmentally preferable alternative (as required by CEQ 
regulations [40 CFR 1505.2]) and the basis for selection of the 
alternative to be implemented.
    The analysis of alternative technologies presented in the Final EIS 
indicates that all of the alternative technologies, including those in 
the Preferred Alternative and the No Action alternative, would have 
only small impacts on the human environment on or around the DOE 
management sites and on the populations along transportation routes 
(see Sections 4.23 and 4.24 of the Final EIS). Using conservative 
assumptions (i.e., assumptions that tend to overestimate risks), the 
potential risks from incident-free operations and postulated accidents 
that are of most interest would be (1) Those associated with radiation 
exposure to workers performing processing operations on the plutonium 
residues and scrub alloy or near loaded transportation containers, and 
(2) radiation risks to the general public in and around the DOE 
management sites and along the transportation routes. The Final EIS 
also estimates (1) the risks from incident-free operations and 
postulated accidents associated with chemical releases and 
transportation accidents; (2) the amounts of various wastes and other 
materials that would result from implementation of the various 
alternative technologies; (3) the cost of implementing the various

[[Page 66144]]

alternative technologies; (4) the effect on nuclear weapons 
nonproliferation; and (5) air quality impacts.
    Environmentally Preferable Alternative--Although there are 
differences among the estimated impacts for the various alternatives, 
the impacts would be small for any of the alternative technologies, and 
the magnitude of the differences in potential impacts between 
alternatives is small. In addition, the nature of the potential impacts 
is such that comparing them is a very judgmental process. For example, 
under the preferred alternative for scrub alloy (plutonium separation), 
only 61 drums of transuranic waste would be generated; whereas the 
other action alternative for this material (calcination and 
vitrification) would generate 2,809 drums of transuranic waste. 
However, the plutonium separation would also result in generation of 
200 kg of separated plutonium; whereas calcination and vitrification 
would result in no separated plutonium. Comments received from members 
of the public on the Draft EIS demonstrate that different individuals 
would make different value judgments as to which of these product/waste 
materials is of most concern. Furthermore, in addition to having no 
indisputable means of identifying which waste or product stream would 
be most important to minimize, there is no indisputable way to trade 
off differences between the amounts of various types of waste and 
separated plutonium against differences in levels of radiological risk 
or chemical hazards; or between risks to workers versus risks to the 
public (risks to the public would be lower than those to workers for 
all technologies evaluated in the Final EIS).
    In general, because of the small risks that would result from any 
of the action alternatives (as demonstrated by Tables 2-9 through 2-26, 
and 4-8 through 4-54 of the Final EIS) and the absence of any clear 
basis for discerning an environmental preference, DOE concludes that no 
one of the action alternatives is clearly environmentally preferable 
over any other action alternative.
    On the other hand, under the No Action alternative, the materials 
would be left in storage at Rocky Flats with no defined disposal path. 
There would be additional risk associated with both the indefinite 
storage and whatever processing may ultimately be determined to be 
necessary to prepare the material for ultimate disposition. There would 
also be risks from potential degradation of storage facilities and 
containers. Accordingly, in consideration of the long term risks that 
would be associated with implementation of the No Action alternative, 
DOE considers that all of the action alternatives are environmentally 
preferable over the No Action alternative.
    The processing technologies that DOE has decided to implement are 
as follows for each material category addressed in this Record of 
Decision:

VII.A. Sand, Slag and Crucible Residues

VII.A.1. Selected Alternative
    DOE has decided to preprocess the sand, slag and crucible residues 
at the Rocky Flats site and then transport them to the Savannah River 
Site for stabilization in the F-Canyon. The Purex process will be used 
to chemically separate the plutonium from the other residue 
constituents (i.e., Alternative 3). The separated plutonium will then 
be placed in storage at the Savannah River Site until it is 
dispositioned as determined by DOE after completion of the Surplus 
Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement (DOE/EIS-0283, 
under preparation, draft issued in July 1998).
VII.A.2. Basis for the Decision
    Transporting the residues and processing them at the Savannah River 
Site was chosen as the technology to be implemented for this material 
category because it provides the most expeditious approach for 
stabilization of these residues. The Savannah River Site is now 
processing in the canyons sand, slag, and crucible residues that were 
produced at the Savannah River Site. Consideration of alternative 
processing technologies that would result in sending the Rocky Flats 
sand, slag and crucible residues directly to WIPP for disposal as 
transuranic waste revealed that significant further characterization of 
the material would be required to verify its suitability for disposal 
in WIPP, due to the presence of reactive calcium in the residues. 
Resolution of the issues raised by the reactive calcium would require 
(1) Further testing to demonstrate that no more than 5 percent of the 
residues contain enough reactive calcium to be pyrophoric, (2) approval 
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of a change to the WIPP TRUCON 
Shipping Code to change the allowable passivated calcium metal content 
from a trace (i.e., less than 1 percent) to a minor (i.e., 1 to 10 
percent) constituent, and (3) obtaining WIPP certification of the 
material. This strategy, if successful, would take about one year 
longer to implement than processing at the Savannah River Site. 
Therefore, in conformance with Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 
Recommendation 94-1 concerning expeditious stabilization of plutonium 
bearing materials to resolve health and safety concerns, DOE has 
decided to stabilize the sand, slag and crucible residues as quickly as 
possible by transporting them to the Savannah River Site for 
processing, even though this technology would cost $25 Million more 
than the more technically uncertain calcination/vitrification 
technology (see Section 4.17.7 of the Final EIS).
    The Final EIS specified that any plutonium separated under any 
alternative analyzed in this EIS would be disposed of using the 
immobilization process. (Final EIS, page 2-2.) Upon further review, DOE 
has decided for the following reasons not to make a determination at 
this time on the disposition of any plutonium separated under the 
decisions announced in this ROD. In December 1996, DOE published the 
Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final 
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (DOE/EIS-0229, the PEIS). 
That PEIS analyzed, among other things, the potential environmental 
consequences of alternative strategies for the long term storage and 
disposition of weapons-usable plutonium that has been or may be 
declared surplus to national security needs. DOE announced the Record 
of Decision for that PEIS in January 1997, which outlines an approach 
to plutonium disposition that would allow for both the immobilization 
of some of the surplus plutonium, and the use of some of the surplus 
plutonium as MOX fuel in existing domestic, commercial reactors (62 FR 
3014).
    As a follow-on analysis to that PEIS, DOE is in the process of 
preparing the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact 
Statement (DOE/EIS-0283, draft issued July 1998), which addresses the 
extent to which each of the two surplus plutonium disposition 
approaches (immobilization and MOX) would be implemented. Thus, at the 
present time, DOE has not decided the extent to which either the 
immobilization or the MOX approach to surplus plutonium disposition 
would be implemented. Moreover, as noted above, even after completion 
of the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement, 
DOE does not expect to make decisions about which, if any, of the 
surplus plutonium would be used in MOX fuel until shortly before any 
such material would be transferred to a MOX fabrication facility. Thus, 
DOE believes at this time it is appropriate not to make any commitment 
as to which

[[Page 66145]]

approach would be implemented for the disposition of any plutonium to 
be separated under the decisions announced in this Record of Decision.
    The plutonium declared to be surplus includes any weapons-useable 
plutonium resulting from the stabilization (for health and safety 
reasons) of the Rocky Flats plutonium residues and scrub alloy 
discussed under this Record of Decision. As a result, weapons-useable 
plutonium that is separated under actions from this Record of Decision 
is a candidate for both of the surplus weapons-useable plutonium 
disposition alternatives that have been identified by DOE (i.e., MOX 
and immobilization).

VII. B. Direct Oxide Reduction Salt Residues (low plutonium 
concentration)

VII. B. 1. Selected Alternative
    DOE has decided to repackage the low plutonium concentration direct 
oxide reduction salt residues to prepare them for disposal in WIPP 
(Alternative 4). A portion of these residues may be pyro-oxidized, if 
this additional processing is found to be necessary during examination 
of the residues prior to repackaging. During the repackaging operation, 
the residues may be mixed with other, lower plutonium concentration 
residues from the same material category, or with an inert material.
VII. B. 2. Basis for the Decision
    Repackaging at Rocky Flats was chosen as the technology to be 
implemented for this material category because it is the simplest and 
least costly of all processing technologies considered, and the one 
that will allow DOE to complete processing and ready the material for 
disposal most expeditiously. This approach will also allow use of 
resources that would otherwise be required to manage these residues to 
speed up other activities required to close the site.

VII. C. Combustible Residues

VII. C. 1. Selected Alternative
    DOE has decided to stabilize, if necessary, and repackage the 
combustible residues to prepare them for disposal in WIPP (Alternative 
4). Aqueous-contaminated combustible residues will be neutralized and 
dried, with any fines stabilized by cementation or repackaging. Organic 
contaminated combustible residues will be stabilized with a combination 
of washing, low-temperature thermal desorption, stabilization of 
plutonium fines, mixing with an absorbent material, and cementation. 
Dry combustible residues will just be repackaged because they are in a 
form that does not require stabilization. During the repackaging 
operation, the residues may be mixed with other, lower plutonium 
concentration residues from the same material category, or with an 
inert material.
VII. C. 2. Basis for the Decision
    Stabilizing and repackaging at Rocky Flats was chosen as the 
technology to be implemented for this material category because it is 
the simplest of all processing technologies considered and the one that 
will allow the site to complete processing and ready the material for 
disposal most expeditiously. This approach will also allow use of the 
resources that would otherwise be required to manage these residues to 
speed up completion of other activities required to close the site. 
Finally, selection of stabilization and repackaging avoids the 
technical uncertainty (discussed in Section 4.17.7 of the Final EIS) 
that would be associated with implementation of the $10 Million less 
expensive blend down alternative.

VII. D. Plutonium Fluoride Residues

VII. D. 1. Selected Alternative
    DOE has decided to transport the plutonium fluoride residues to the 
Savannah River Site and use the F-Canyon to stabilize the material 
(i.e., Alternative 3). The separated plutonium will then be placed in 
storage at the Savannah River Site until it is dispositioned as 
determined by DOE after completion of the Surplus Plutonium Disposition 
Environmental Impact Statement (under preparation--see Section VII. A. 
2. above). No decision concerning the final disposition of any 
plutonium separated from the plutonium fluoride residues, however, is 
expected in the near future, and not until after completion of the 
plutonium separation operations at the Savannah River Site. Even after 
completion of the Surplus Plutonium Deposition Environmental Impact 
Statement, currently scheduled for early 1999, DOE expects to make 
decisions about which, if any, of the plutonium would be used in MOX 
fuel shortly before the material would be transferred to a MOX 
fabrication facility. As a result, DOE does not expect to know soon 
whether the separated plutonium will be used in MOX fuel and will keep 
it in storage pending such a decision.
VII. D. 2. Basis for the Decision
    Purex plutonium separation at the Savannah River Site was chosen as 
the technology to be implemented for this material category because it 
poses less technical risk and will cost less than would establishment 
of a new acid dissolution/plutonium oxide recovery capability at Rocky 
Flats. Blend down, while technically feasible, would result in a very 
large increase in the amount of transuranic waste requiring disposal, 
and would result in higher costs.

VII. E. Ful Flo Filter Media Residues

VII. E. 1. Selected Alternative
    DOE has decided to shred and blend down the Ful Flo filter media 
residues with an inert material to below the safeguards termination 
limits, and to repackage the product for disposal in WIPP (Alternative 
2).
VII. E. 2. Basis for the Decision
    Shred and blend down at Rocky Flats was chosen as the technology to 
be implemented for this material category because the other 
alternatives are aqueous processes that would be more difficult and 
more costly to implement. The increase in the amount of material to be 
disposed of after blend down is much less of a concern because of the 
relatively small amount of material in this category and the small 
amount of plutonium it contains (about 800 kg of residues containing 
about 20 kg of plutonium).

VII. F. Glass Residues

VII. F. 1. Selected Alternative
    DOE has decided to stabilize (i.e., neutralize and dry) and 
repackage the glass residues to prepare them for disposal in WIPP 
(Alternative 4). During the repackaging operation, the glass residues 
may be mixed with other, lower plutonium concentration residues from 
the same material category, or with an inert material.
VII. F. 2. Basis for the Decision
    Stabilizing and repackaging at Rocky Flats was chosen as the 
technology to be implemented for this material category because it is 
the simplest and least costly of all processing technologies 
considered, and the one that will allow the site to complete processing 
and ready the material for disposal most expeditiously. This approach 
will also allow use of the resources that would otherwise be required 
to manage these residues to speed up other activities required to close 
the site.

VII. G. Graphite Residues

VII. G. 1. Selected Alternative
    DOE has decided to repackage the graphite residues to prepare them 
for disposal in WIPP (Alternative 4). During

[[Page 66146]]

the repackaging operation, these residues may be mixed with other, 
lower plutonium concentration residues from the same material category, 
or with an inert material.
VII. G. 2. Basis for the Decision
    Repackaging at Rocky Flats was chosen as the preferred processing 
technology for this material category because it is the simplest and 
least costly of all processing technologies considered, and the one 
that will allow the site to complete processing and ready the material 
for disposal most expeditiously and at least cost. This approach will 
also allow use of the resources that would otherwise be required to 
manage these residues to speed up other activities required to close 
the site.

VII. H. Inorganic (Metal and Other) Residues

VII. H. 1. Selected Alternative
    DOE has decided to repackage the inorganic (metal and other) 
residues to prepare them for disposal in WIPP (Alternative 4). During 
the repackaging operation, these residues may be mixed with other, 
lower plutonium concentration residues from the same material category, 
or with an inert material.
VII. H. 2. Basis for the Decision
    Repackaging at Rocky Flats was chosen as the preferred processing 
technology for this material category because it is the simplest and 
least costly of all processing technologies considered, and the one 
that will allow the site to complete processing and ready the material 
for disposal most expeditiously, and at the least cost. This approach 
will also allow use of the resources that would otherwise be required 
to manage these residues to speed up other activities required to close 
the site.

VII. I. Scrub Alloy

VII. I. 1. Selected Alternative
    DOE has decided to package the scrub alloy, transport it to the 
Savannah River Site and use the F-Canyon to stabilize the material 
(i.e., Alternative 3). The separated plutonium will then be placed in 
storage at the Savannah River Site until it is dispositioned as 
determined by DOE after completion of the Surplus Plutonium Disposition 
Environmental Impact Statement (under preparation--see Section VII. A. 
3. above).
VII. I. 2. Basis for the Decision
    Purex plutonium separation at the Savannah River Site was chosen as 
the preferred processing technology for this material category because 
this alternative will allow the most expeditious and least expensive 
removal of the scrub alloy from Rocky Flats. Furthermore, scrub alloy 
has traditionally been processed at the Savannah River Site using the 
Purex technology, and it is a well understood operation that has been 
demonstrated to work. By comparison, the calcine and vitrify technology 
(Alternative 2) would involve more technical risk because vitrification 
operations have never been conducted at Rocky Flats on a production 
basis.

VIII. Use of All Practical Means to Avoid or Minimize Harm

    Implementation of this decision will result in low environmental 
and health impacts. However, DOE will take the following steps to avoid 
or minimize harm wherever possible:

VIII. A.

    DOE will use current safety and health programs and practices to 
reduce impacts by maintaining worker radiation exposure as low as 
reasonably achievable and by meeting appropriate waste minimization and 
pollution prevention objectives.

VIII. B.

    DOE will provide a level of health and safety for DOE 
transportation operations that is equivalent to or greater than that 
provided by compliance with all applicable Federal, State, Tribal, and 
local regulations. In addition to meeting applicable shipping 
containment and confinement requirements of the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission regulations on Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive 
Material (10 CFR Part 71) and Department of Transportation regulations 
at 49 CFR, all packaging for transportation of the material covered by 
this Record of Decision will also be certified by DOE. DOE also 
provides Federal, State, Tribal and local authorities with access to 
training and technical assistance necessary to allow them to safely, 
efficiently, and effectively respond to any incident involving 
transportation of the materials covered by this Record of Decision.
    Items A and B above will be accomplished under existing business 
practices in the normal course of implementing this Record of Decision.

VIX. Conclusion

    DOE has decided to implement the Preferred Alternative specified in 
the Final EIS to prepare the plutonium residue categories and scrub 
alloy specified in Sections I and VII. of this Record of Decision for 
disposal or other disposition. This decision is effective upon being 
made public, in accordance with DOE's NEPA implementation regulations 
(10 CFR 1021.315). The goals of this decision are to prepare the 
plutonium residues and scrub alloy for disposal or other disposition in 
a manner that addresses immediate health and safety concerns associated 
with storage of the materials and to support Rocky Flats' closure. 
Disposal or other disposition of these materials will also eliminate 
health and safety concerns and costs that would be associated with 
indefinite storage of these materials.

    Issued in Washington, D.C. this 25th day of November, 1998.
James M. Owendoff,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management.
[FR Doc. 98-32011 Filed 11-30-98; 8:45 am]
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