[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 226 (Tuesday, November 24, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 64977-64980]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-31337]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-213 (10 CFR 2.206); DD-98-12]


Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (Haddam Neck); Director's 
Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206

I. Introduction

    On March 13, 1998, Mr. Jonathan M. Block submitted a petition 
pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Section 2.206 
(10 CFR 2.206) on behalf of the Citizens Awareness Network (Petitioner) 
requesting that NRC (1) take immediate action to suspend Connecticut 
Yankee Atomic Power Company's (CYAPCO's) license to operate the Haddam 
Neck reactor and (2) investigate CYAPCO's intention to use an air 
cooling method as a backup cooling method for spent fuel.
    In support of his request, the Petitioner offers the following five 
bases: (1) CYAPCO has not resolved longstanding failures to exercise 
adequate radiological controls, (2) the nitrogen intrusion event of 
August 1996 demonstrates that CYAPCO is unable to

[[Page 64978]]

maintain operations in a shutdown condition, (3) CYAPCO's plan to use 
air cooling of the spent fuel pool (SFP) as a backup cooling method 
would constitute an unmonitored, unplanned release into the 
environment, (4) the proposal to use the air cooling method is a 
violation of CYAPCO's license, and (5) the proposal to use the air 
cooling method reveals CYAPCO's lack of comprehension of the defense-
in-depth approach to safety systems.

II. Background

    Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company is the holder of Facility 
Operating License No. DPR-61, which authorizes the licensee to possess 
the Haddam Neck Plant (HNP). The license states, among other things, 
that the facility is subject to all the rules, regulations, and orders 
of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or NRC) now 
or hereafter in effect. The facility consists of a pressurized-water 
reactor located at the licensee's site in Middlesex County, 
Connecticut. On December 5, 1996, CYAPCO submitted written 
certifications of permanent cessation of operation and that all nuclear 
fuel had been permanently removed from the reactor vessel. The 
certifications were docketed on December 11, 1996, and therefore, in 
accordance with Sec. 50.82(a)(2), the facility is permanently shut down 
and defueled and is no longer authorized to operate or place fuel in 
the reactor.
    Additional background relevant to the five bases offered by the 
Petitioner to support its requests is outlined below.
    The Petitioner's first basis regarding the adequacy of the Haddam 
Neck Plant's (HNP's) radiological controls program has been evaluated 
by the NRC. The Petitioner notes that (1) in November 1996, the 
licensee allowed two workers to become contaminated during an entry 
into the fuel transfer canal, (2) in February 1997, the licensee 
released contaminated equipment to an unlicensed facility, and (3) on 
numerous occasions during the operating phase of the HNP, the licensee 
released contaminated materials to unrestricted areas. The first two 
items noted were included in the basis for issuing a confirmatory 
action letter (CAL) to the licensee on March 4, 1997, which documented 
the licensee's commitments to improve its radiation controls program. 
Subsequently, on May 5, 1998, the NRC issued the results of an 
inspection of the changes to the licensee's radiation controls program 
and concluded that the licensee had met the commitments listed in the 
CAL. The third item noted was addressed by the NRC in the Haddam Neck 
Historical Review Team Report, dated March 1998. The report concluded, 
that based on dose assessments completed thus far, radiation exposure 
to members of the public from the release of contaminated materials to 
offsite locations did not exceed the regulatory limits of 10 CFR Part 
20.
    The Petitioner's second basis, that CYAPCO is unable to maintain 
operations in the shutdown condition, is based on an August 1996 event. 
At that time, the reactor was shut down with the head in place and 
contained a full core of fuel. However, operators allowed nitrogen to 
collect in the reactor vessel, displacing water contained in the top of 
the reactor vessel head. The NRC conducted an augmented inspection team 
(AIT) review of the event and concluded that the event, in combination 
with other events that took place at the same time, was safety 
significant. However, there were no actual public health and safety 
consequences. The AIT issued its report on October 30, 1996. A ``Notice 
of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties--$650,000'' was 
issued to the licensee by NRC on May 5, 1997, due, in part, to the 
nitrogen intrusion event.
    The Petitioner's third, fourth, and fifth bases pertain to 
modifications to the HNP spent fuel cooling system. CYAPCO submitted 
its Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report (PSDAR) on August 
22, 1997. The licensee plans to keep its spent fuel in wet storage in 
the spent fuel pool (SFP) until it can be transferred to the Department 
of Energy (DOE). In the interim period, the spent fuel building and 
systems necessary to accomplish fuel cooling will remain on site, 
separate from the rest of the site's mechanical and electrical systems. 
This arrangement is referred to as the ``spent fuel pool island.'' On 
March 11, 1998, at a public meeting at the Haddam Neck site, the 
licensee reported on the status of establishing the SFP island, among 
other items. The licensee stated that two trains of water cooling will 
be installed to cool the SFP. Heat rejection will be changed from the 
existing service water system to two new spray coolers to be mounted on 
the roof of the spent fuel building. During the discussion, the 
licensee stated that a backup cooling method, created by opening the 
building's doors and roof hatch to establish natural circulation air 
flow through the building, could be used to cool the spent fuel in the 
event that all other cooling systems became unavailable. The licensee 
did not present an evaluation of the dose consequences of radiological 
releases through the roof hatch, if the air cooling method was actually 
used. However, the licensee had not used the air cooling method and 
considered it highly unlikely that conditions would arise that would 
require its use.
    In order to respond to the petition, the NRC requested information 
from the licensee with respect to its plans to air cool the SFP if 
other cooling methods were unavailable. The licensee responded by 
letters dated June 29 and October 14, 1998.

III. Discussion of Petitioners' Requests

    Each of the Petitioner's requests is discussed below. The five 
bases presented by the Petitioner are considered for each request, and 
determinations are made as to whether the bases support the request.
    The Petitioner's first request is to immediately suspend CYAPCO's 
operating license.
    The first basis presented by the Petitioner, that the licensee has 
not resolved failures to exercise adequate radiological controls, no 
longer pertains to the first request, since the licensee has 
implemented improvements, and the NRC has found them acceptable.
    The second basis presented was the nitrogen intrusion event of 
August 1996. Although the NRC took enforcement action in response to 
the event, the basis no longer pertains to the first request since the 
reactor vessel has been permanently defueled and no reactor accident 
is, or ever will be, possible at HNP.
    The third basis presented to support the request to suspend HNP's 
operating license is that air cooling the spent fuel through the spent 
fuel building roof hatch would constitute an unplanned, unmonitored 
release of radioactivity to the environment. The Commission's 
regulations require a licensee to monitor and control radioactive 
releases. The Commission places a licensee under the authority of the 
regulations by issuing a license with appropriate conditions. For 
example, the HNP operating license imposes the requirements of 10 CFR 
Part 20, ``Standards for Protection Against Radiation,'' and 10 CFR 
Part 50, ``Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization 
Facilities,'' among others, on the licensee. 10 CFR Part 20 limits the 
radiation exposure a licensee may allow a person to receive and 
requires the licensee to demonstrate that it has controlled exposures 
to levels less than the limits. 10 CFR Part 50 governs the operation 
and decommissioning of a reactor facility, and, perhaps most 
significantly in view of the third basis presented, requires a licensee 
to limit

[[Page 64979]]

the release of radioactive materials in effluents to ``as low as 
reasonably achievable'' (ALARA). Suspending the HNP license would not 
relieve the licensee of its responsibility to adequately control the 
use of radioactive materials in its possession, but could impede the 
NRC's ability to enforce regulatory requirements. Since the license is 
a mechanism through which the NRC holds the licensee to its 
responsibility, the third basis presented does not support suspension 
of the license.
    The fourth basis presented to support the request to suspend the 
license is that the licensee's proposal to air cool the SFP using a 
flow path through the spent fuel building doors and roof hatch 
constitutes a violation of the license conditions. However, the license 
does not prohibit making proposals for alternate methods of operation 
of a reactor facility. Since making a proposal to air cool the SFP does 
not violate the license, the fourth basis does not support suspension 
of the license.
    The fifth basis presented to support the request to suspend the 
license is that the air cooling proposal reveals that CYAPCO does not 
understand the defense-in-depth approach to backing up safety systems. 
Defense-in-depth, as applied at the system level, can be achieved by 
providing redundant and diverse methods to accomplish a function. The 
licensee described the normal and alternate SFP cooling systems. The 
normal system consists of redundant components for the SFP cooling 
system, the intermediate cooling loop, and the roof-mounted spray 
coolers. These are closed loops and do not require outside water to 
remain in operation, except for makeup water to the sprayers in hot 
weather. The redundancy provided in the normal cooling system allows 
several configurations to remove SFP heat. In addition, the SFP cooling 
pumps are backed up by alternate pumps that can be used to circulate 
river water through the normal system heat exchangers, which provides a 
diverse heat sink for the normal system. The pumps may be powered from 
offsite or onsite electrical power sources, and there is an engine-
powered pump available that does not require electrical power. Thus, 
there are redundant and diverse sources of power for pumping. In the 
event no heat exchange systems are available, makeup water could be 
added to the SFP, and the cooling could be accomplished through 
evaporation. The heat would then be removed by the building exhaust 
fan, which is the normal release path. As evidenced by the components 
and alternates listed above, redundant and diverse methods are 
available to provide defense-in-depth for the SFP cooling function. The 
air cooling method is not required. Thus, the fifth basis does not 
support the request to suspend the license.
    For the reasons stated above, the Petitioner's request to suspend 
the licensee's operating license is denied.
    The Petitioner's second request is to investigate CYAPCO's proposal 
to air cool the SFP by opening the spent fuel building's doors and roof 
hatch.
    The first basis presented by the Petitioner, that the licensee has 
not resolved failures to exercise adequate radiological controls, no 
longer pertains to the second request, since the licensee has 
implemented improvements, and the NRC has found them acceptable.
    The second basis presented was the nitrogen intrusion event of 
August 1996. Although the NRC took enforcement action in response to 
the event, the basis does not pertain to the second request since the 
reactor vessel has been permanently defueled and no reactor accident 
is, or ever will be, possible at HNP.
    The third basis presented by the Petitioner to support the request 
to investigate the licensee's air cooling proposal is that the 
licensee's plan to air cool the SFP by opening the spent fuel 
building's doors and roof hatch would constitute an unplanned, 
unmonitored release into the environment. The third basis concerns 
actions that have not occurred, and that the licensee does not expect 
to take. However, because the licensee plans to use the air cooling 
method under certain circumstances, the NRC considers the Petitioner's 
basis to be sufficient to grant the second request. A review of the 
licensee's regulatory responsibilities is presented in Section IV 
below.
    The fourth basis presented to support the request for an 
investigation is that the licensee's proposal to air cool the SFP using 
a flow path through the spent fuel building doors and roof hatch 
constitutes a violation of the license conditions. However, the license 
does not prohibit making proposals for alternate methods of operation 
of a reactor facility. Since making a proposal to air cool the SFP does 
not violate the license, the fourth basis does not support the request.
    The fifth basis presented to support the request to investigate the 
licensee's proposal is that the air cooling proposal reveals that 
CYAPCO does not understand the defense-in-depth approach to backing up 
safety systems. As noted above, the system proposed by the licensee 
achieves defense-in-depth by installing redundant and diverse 
components, power supplies, and heat sinks. The air cooling method is 
not required for defense-in-depth. Thus, the fifth basis does not 
support the request.
    The NRC has determined that the third basis presented by the 
Petitioner is sufficient to grant the Petitioner's request to 
investigate the licensee's proposal to air cool the SFP. The staff's 
evaluation of the licensee's proposal is presented in Section IV below.

IV. Review of the Licensee's Proposal

    The NRC requested information from the licensee with respect to its 
plans to air cool the SFP if other cooling methods become unavailable. 
The licensee responded by letters dated June 29 and October 14, 1998. 
The NRC also reviewed the licensee's operating license, Updated Final 
Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), and Offsite Dose Calculation Manual 
(ODCM).
    By letter dated October 14, 1998, the licensee stated that the dose 
consequence to an offsite member of the public from an airborne release 
from the SFP if the doors and roof hatch were opened to cool the spent 
fuel would be 0.254 mrem. The dose was calculated assuming that the air 
cooling method would be in use for 2 weeks before returning to a water 
cooling method and closing the doors and roof hatch. The dose is within 
regulatory limits. The licensee stated that procedures are in place to 
monitor a radioactive release from the roof hatch.
    The licensee's October 14 letter contained a commitment to develop 
procedural guidance regarding when to open and subsequently close the 
spent fuel building (SFB) doors and roof hatch, in the event air 
cooling becomes necessary. The procedure will also direct operators to 
request airborne radioactivity surveys when the SFB doors and roof 
hatch are opened.
    The Facility Operating License limits gaseous effluents in 
accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.11.2. That TS also 
requires that if a dose rate exceeds the limit, the licensee must 
decrease the release rate within 15 minutes to comply with the limits.
    The UFSAR, Section 9.1.3, describes the SFP cooling system. Under 
the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59, a change to a system described in the 
UFSAR requires the licensee to perform a safety evaluation and, if 
necessary, obtain NRC approval before implementing the change. Using 
the air cooling method would fall within the scope of 10 CFR 50.59. 
Therefore, when the licensee revises its procedure to permit use of the 
air cooling method, it must perform a safety evaluation.

[[Page 64980]]

    The ODCM provides the parameters and methodology to be used to 
calculate offsite doses and effluent monitor setpoints. Each effluent 
pathway used by the licensee must be accounted for in the ODCM. The 
licensee has procedures to monitor and quantify airborne releases, 
although, at the time of this review, the ODCM did not contain 
parameters or a methodology for a release path from the SFB roof hatch. 
However, there is no requirement to develop that information until the 
release path is used.
    In summary, a release from the SFB doors and roof hatch from air 
cooling the SFP is required to be within regulatory limits. Before the 
air cooling method could be used, the licensee would have to perform a 
safety evaluation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 and revise its ODCM. 
In the event that the SFB doors and roof hatch are actually used for 
cooling the SFP, the release path must be monitored and actions taken 
to meet regulatory limits. However, there is no requirement to revise 
the ODCM unless the licensee, in fact, uses the air cooling method.

V. Decision

    For the reasons stated above, the petition is denied in part and 
granted in part. The request to suspend the operating license is 
denied. The request to investigate the licensee's proposal to air cool 
the SFP is granted. The investigation is presented as the review in 
Section IV above. The decision and the documents cited in the decision 
are available for public inspection in the Commission's Public Document 
Room, the Gelman Building, 2210 L Street NW., Washington, D.C., and at 
the Local Public Document Room for the Haddam Neck Plant at the Russell 
Library, 123 Broad Street, Middletown, Connecticut.
    In accordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c), a copy of this decision will be 
filed with the Secretary of the Commission for the Commission's review. 
As provided for by this regulation, the decision will constitute the 
final action of the Commission 25 days after issuance, unless the 
Commission, on its own motion, institutes a review of the Decision 
within that time.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th day of November 1998.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Collins,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 98-31337 Filed 11-23-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P