[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 213 (Wednesday, November 4, 1998)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 59482-59492]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-29520]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

49 CFR Part 571

[Docket No. NHTSA-98-4281]
RIN 2127-AG38


Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Lamps, Reflective Devices 
and Associated Equipment

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), DOT.

ACTION: Statement of policy.

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SUMMARY: This document announces that NHTSA will participate in an 
international effort under the aegis of the United Nations' Meeting of 
Experts on Lighting to develop a process for evaluating new ideas for 
signal lamps on vehicles. When that effort is complete, NHTSA will 
evaluate the results and see if it is appropriate to implement some or 
all of that process in the agency's evaluations of signal lighting 
ideas. Until the internationally-recommended process is available for 
NHTSA's consideration, the agency is adopting the policy (described in 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION) for evaluating requests to require or permit 
new or different signal lighting or signal lighting actuation.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Stephen R. Kratzke, Director, Office 
of Crash Avoidance Standards, NHTSA, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., 
Washington DC 20590. Mr. Kratzke's telephone number is (202) 366-4931 
and his facsimile number is (202) 366-4329.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Statement of Policy

    When the agency is asked to evaluate a new signal lighting idea, 
NHTSA will ask:
    1. Does the new signal lighting idea require a change in the 
standardized operation or appearance of a required lamp or piece of 
lighting equipment?
    a. If NHTSA determines the answer is NO, does the new signal 
lighting idea impair the effectiveness of required lamps or lighting 
equipment?
    i. If NHTSA determines the answer is YES, the new signal lighting 
idea is expressly prohibited by the lighting standard.
    ii. If NHTSA determines the answer is NO, the new lighting signal 
idea may be installed on vehicles.
    b. If NHTSA determines the answer is YES, the agency will proceed 
to Part 2 of this evaluation.
    2. The current standardized approach for signal lighting has 
positive safety benefits by virtue of its broad public and 
international acceptance. Does the request to alter the current 
standardized approach for signal lighting present data purporting to 
show positive safety benefits from the new signal idea?
    a. If no data are provided, NHTSA will not treat the request as a 
petition for rulemaking. The request will be forwarded to a public 
docket that will collect information describing all proposed new signal 
lighting ideas and systems. The docket will be available for review by 
NHTSA and others who may wish to plan future research based on the 
ideas and inventions collected in the docket.
    b. If data are provided, NHTSA will treat the request as a petition 
for rulemaking. NHTSA will evaluate the data to determine if they show 
persuasive evidence of a positive safety impact.
    i. If NO determination of positive safety can be made, NHTSA will 
not change its regulations to permit the new signal lighting idea, 
because that would negatively affect standardization of signal 
lighting.
    ii. If YES, a determination of positive safety can be made. NHTSA 
will propose to amend its lighting standard to either permit or require 
the new signal lighting idea.

Background on Stop Lamps

    Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108, Lamps, Reflective 
Devices and Associated Equipment (49

[[Page 59483]]

CFR 571.108) specifies types of signal lamps to be installed on new 
motor vehicles, and regulates their performance in terms of color, 
brightness, quantity, duty cycle (steady or flashing), and details of 
activation (e.g., activated when the service brakes are applied) 
1. All motor vehicles are required to have red stop lamps on 
the rear of the vehicle. Standard No. 108 requires that those stop 
lamps be activated ``upon application of the service brakes.'' The goal 
of this activation requirement is to communicate to following drivers 
that the driver of the vehicle ahead has purposefully applied the 
brakes. This activation requirement does not differentiate between 
tapping the brakes and a hard braking application. Similarly, it does 
not indicate all times the vehicle may be slowing, such as when the 
driver downshifts or rapidly removes his or her foot from the 
accelerator pedal.
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    \1\ For the sake of simplicity, the rest of this document uses 
``NHTSA's lighting standard'' or ``Standard No. 108,'' instead of 
the full legal citation for this standard.
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    Many inventors have approached NHTSA over the past 30 years with 
ideas for changes that the inventors believe would improve stop lamps. 
Most of these ideas involve sending a different signal from the stop 
lamps for hard braking than for other, more typical brake applications. 
The agency has responded to these ideas by stating that it sees 
positive benefits from the current stop lamp activation provisions in 
Standard No. 108, which ensure a uniform, unambiguous signal that the 
driver has chosen to activate the service brakes. That is useful 
information for following drivers. However, NHTSA has acknowledged that 
it is possible that using a different action to activate the stop lamps 
or having the stop lamps send different signals might improve safety. 
The agency has stated it will consider changing the stop lamp 
requirements if it were shown that a change would yield a net safety 
benefit.

Baran's First Petition for ABWS and NHTSA'S Response

    Baran Advanced Technologies, Ltd. of Israel manufactures an 
Advanced Brake Warning System (ABWS) that is intended to activate the 
stop lamps during emergency braking before the driver puts his or her 
foot on the brake pedal. The goal of this system is to give drivers of 
following vehicles an earlier warning of emergency braking. ABWS senses 
the rate at which the accelerator pedal returns to its upper stop after 
being released. It activates the stop lamps for one second if the 
accelerator pedal reaches its upper stop at greater than the set rate. 
Its operation is based on the assumption that any rapid release of the 
accelerator pedal is the beginning of an emergency braking maneuver and 
will be immediately followed by application of the brake pedal.
    The issue of ABWS and the stop lamp requirements in Standard No. 
108 goes back nearly a decade. In 1989, an Israeli competitor of Baran 
called ATAT asked for an interpretation to permit its version of ABWS 
to be installed in the aftermarket. ATAT did not want any mandate to 
use its version of ABWS and it did not want to install the device on 
new vehicles. In a January 25, 1990 letter, NHTSA told ATAT that its 
device could not legally be installed even in the aftermarket. The 
agency explained that activating the stop lamps upon rapid removal of 
the driver's foot from the accelerator would undermine standardization 
of the stop lamp signal and ``can only create the potential for 
confusion and dilution of the effectiveness of the stop [lamp] 
signal.''
    The subject rested there until Baran filed a petition for 
rulemaking in 1993. Baran did not question the agency's interpretation 
of the existing requirements of Standard No. 108. However, Baran asked 
that the Standard's requirements be changed to permit its ABWS to 
activate the stop lamps upon rapid removal of the driver's foot from 
the accelerator pedal.
    Baran relied upon two studies to support its request for a change 
to Standard No. 108 to permit the installation of its ABWS system. The 
first was a paper by Enke titled ``Possibilities for Improving Safety 
Within the Driver-Vehicle Environment Control Loop.'' This paper 
estimates that the impact speed of 25 percent of rear end crashes is no 
more than 10 km/h, or 6 miles per hour and that the distance traveled 
at that speed in 0.25 second is exactly equal to the distance required 
to stop from 10 km/h. Baran claimed that this paper showed that 
providing a driver with an additional 0.25 second of warning of an 
impending stop by the driver ahead of him or her could yield a 25 to 30 
percent reduction in all rear-end crashes.
    The second paper on which Baran relied was a NHTSA report on 
Intelligent Vehicle Highway System (IVHS) countermeasures to rear end 
crashes (DOT HS 807 995). This report found that 75 percent of rear-end 
crashes ``do not involve simply a `too-slow' reaction of the following 
driver to a sudden crash threat.'' In fact, the most common scenario 
noted in the report for these 75 percent of rear-end crashes involves a 
lead vehicle that has been completely stopped for an extended interval 
(2 to 6 seconds) before it is struck by a following vehicle. However, 
the other 25 percent of rear-end crashes ``may involve driver reaction 
time following a sudden crash threat as a critical factor.'' Baran 
believed that this report's finding was consistent with and bolstered 
the finding in Enke's report.
    NHTSA carefully evaluated these reports and other data in response 
to Baran's petition. First, the IVHS paper found that rear-end crashes 
in which the following driver was attentive enough to respond to an 
earlier stop lamp signal were substantially less than 8 percent of all 
rear-end crashes, not 25 percent as interpreted by Baran. Second, a 
report by the Technical University of Darmstadt in Germany, titled 
Efficiency of Advanced Brake Light Devices, FO57 May 1994, found that 
responses by attentive test subjects improved by 0.10 to 0.15 second, 
instead of the 0.25 second improvement expected by Baran. This 
difference would substantially reduce the expected benefits of ABWS. 
Third, the potential safety benefits of ABWS appeared questionable. 
ABWS would allow as much as an additional 0.15 seconds of braking by 
following drivers, but only if the following driver immediately brakes 
hard upon seeing the stop lamps activated without waiting for any other 
cues that the lead vehicle is stopping, such as the car pitching or the 
tires and/or brakes squealing. To the extent the following driver waits 
for these other cues before braking, the potential benefits from ABWS 
are reduced. Recent research by Mercedes-Benz using a vehicle simulator 
in Germany found that more than 90 percent of drivers do not brake hard 
enough even when they have these cues and the lead vehicle's stop lamps 
are activated.
    Fourth and finally, NHTSA was concerned that ABWS could negatively 
impact existing safety. At present, stop lamps are activated when the 
driver of a vehicle applies the brakes. ABWS would change this so that 
stop lamps were activated when the driver applies the brakes or rapidly 
removes his or her foot from the accelerator pedal. Baran's report on 
its ABWS that was submitted along with its 1993 petition showed that 23 
percent of the time drivers did not brake after ABWS activated the stop 
lamps. Like the little boy who cried wolf, stop lamps that are 
activated when there is no subsequent braking are less likely to be 
immediately heeded in a real emergency. That undermines the most basic 
purpose of stop lamps. In addition, the agency was concerned that 
aggressive drivers could intentionally

[[Page 59484]]

use these ``false alarms'' from the ABWS to further dilute the meaning 
of stop lamps.
    Based on these analyses, involving both the absence of demonstrated 
net safety benefits and the possibility of net safety losses, NHTSA 
denied Baran's ABWS petition in a Federal Register notice of August 3, 
1994 (59 FR 39522). In this denial, the agency expressly noted that it 
would consider data about the safety impacts of ABWS from a field study 
then being conducted by the Israeli Highway Safety Administration when 
those data became available and might reevaluate its decision in light 
of those data.

Baran's Second Petition for ABWS and NHTSA's Response

    Less than a year after NHTSA's denial of Baran's first petition to 
allow ABWS, Baran submitted a second petition to allow ABWS. There were 
two changed factors since Baran's 1993 petition. First, Allied Signal, 
a major U.S. manufacturer of braking systems and components, had joined 
Baran in the petition. Second, the petition provided some preliminary, 
but not validated, data from the ongoing Israeli field study indicating 
that ABWS-equipped vehicles were in fewer crashes. The bulk of the 
petition contained a thorough explanation of why Baran and Allied 
Signal disagreed with NHTSA's judgment that current stop lamp signals 
would be more ambiguous if ABWS were permitted in the United States.
    Upon review of this petition, NHTSA decided that the overarching 
issue was to define and articulate the agency's policy on braking and 
other lighting signals, so as to place the ABWS petition in the proper 
context. Once this NHTSA policy was articulated, the agency believed it 
would be a relatively simple matter to apply that policy in specific 
instances, whether to ABWS or some other signal. Up to this point, the 
ABWS discussions had involved only the parties asking for ABWS and the 
agency. Given the agency's desire to place ABWS in the broader context 
of signal lighting signals generally, NHTSA believed many more parties 
than ABWS petitioners and NHTSA should be involved in the discussion. 
Accordingly, NHTSA decided to publish a Federal Register notice asking 
for public comments on the agency's general policy on signals and on 
how that general policy should be applied in the case of four specific 
brake signaling ideas. Although all of the specific examples discussed 
in this notice were brake signaling ideas, NHTSA was also concerned 
about the appropriate policy for other signals, like turn signals. The 
four specific brake signaling ideas discussed were ABWS, flashing 
Center High Mounted Stop Lamps (CHMSLs) to warn of hard braking, 
flashing CHMSLs to identify a stopped vehicle, and ``brake'' lamps on 
the front of vehicles to indicate the vehicle is braking.

December 1996 Request for Comments

    NHTSA published a Federal Register notice on December 13, 1996 (61 
FR 65510) that articulated the agency's general policy regarding new 
signal lighting ideas and how that policy would apply in the case of 
four specific brake signaling ideas, including ABWS, and asked the 
public for comments. NHTSA explained the basic purpose underlying its 
signal lighting policy as follows:

    It is important that the integrity of the required signal lamps 
be maintained, and that auxiliary signal lamps not detract attention 
from the messages that the required signal lamps are sending. A 
vehicle signaling system must be as simple and as unambiguous as 
possible to others who share the roadway if traffic is to proceed in 
a safe and orderly fashion. As noted earlier, in many other 
countries, all auxiliary exterior lamps are expressly forbidden 
unless there is a specific regulation allowing it. 61 FR 65516.

    The agency went on to explain that its paramount concern with 
signaling was to maintain standardization so as to minimize ambiguity 
about the meaning of required signal lamps. NHTSA will not give up the 
safety benefits of standardization unless there are data showing a net 
safety gain from doing so. Such data would generally come from large 
scale fleet tests over a significant number of vehicle miles. NHTSA has 
sponsored fleet tests to demonstrate the effectiveness of Center High 
Mounted Stop Lamps (CHMSLs) and conspicuity treatments for heavy 
trailers and truck tractors. However, these fleet tests are very 
expensive and time-consuming. Accordingly, the agency only conducts 
fleet tests after the signaling concept being evaluated has been 
analyzed within the agency and found to be sufficiently promising to 
have fleet testing included in NHTSA's research plan. NHTSA has neither 
the budget nor the time to sponsor fleet testing of most signal 
lighting ideas presented to it.
    This leaves the inventor of the signaling concept as the other 
likely source to sponsor fleet tests or otherwise gather persuasive 
data showing a net safety benefit would result from the new signaling 
concept. NHTSA acknowledged that the costs and logistics of fleet 
testing may preclude most inventors from sponsoring those tests. 
Accordingly, the agency asked for comments on its recommendation to 
inventors that, unless the inventor has data showing a net safety 
benefit from his or her new signaling concept, the signaling concept 
should be presented to NHTSA as a candidate for further research. If 
the suggestions are found to have merit, they can influence agency 
research priorities and perhaps be included in the agency's research 
plan. Upon completion of the research project, NHTSA would have data 
that would allow it to consider whether to permit or require a new 
signaling concept.
    This broad policy was then applied to four specific signaling 
concepts. The first three were signaling ideas that were at that time 
unsupported by field tests or other data. The AlliedSignal/Baran ABWS 
was discussed, along with flashing CHMSLs to warn of hard braking and 
flashing CHMSLs to identify a stopped vehicle. While each of these 
concepts has some intuitive appeal, adopting any of these three 
suggestions would eliminate the standardization that is already in 
place for stop lamps. Since there were no data showing any offsetting 
safety benefits for diluting the standardization, NHTSA indicated that 
it was reluctant to amend its lighting standard to permit the 
introduction of any of these concepts, but asked for public comment on 
this approach.
    The fourth signaling idea on which public comment was sought was 
front ``brake'' lamp systems that would alert an oncoming vehicle that 
the subject vehicle was braking. Again, there were no data provided to 
show safety benefits for this signaling concept. However, S5.1.3 of 
Standard No. 108 provides that, ``No additional lamp, reflective 
device, or other motor vehicle equipment shall be installed that 
impairs the effectiveness of lighting equipment required by this 
standard.'' Front ``brake'' lamps can be implemented in ways that would 
not affect the operation of any of the required lamps now on vehicles. 
Assuming front ``brake'' lamps were implemented so as not to interfere 
with the effectiveness of required front lighting equipment, front 
brake lamps are permitted to be installed on vehicles now, without any 
changes to the lighting standard.
    There are some noteworthy paradoxes associated with these four 
signaling ideas. The first three have some intuitive appeal, but may 
not be offered because they would dilute standardization of stop lamp 
signals. The fourth has little, if any, intuitive appeal. In fact, 
NHTSA stated that it expected no safety benefits from front

[[Page 59485]]

``brake'' lamps. However, this concept may be offered on vehicles 
because it would not affect the standardized meaning of any required 
equipment. Nevertheless, the proponents of front ``brake'' lamps are 
not pleased with this result--they believe front ``brake'' lamps should 
be required. NHTSA asked the public for comments on its policy approach 
in this area and for comments on the four specific signaling ideas 
discussed in the notice.

Public Comments on the December 1996 Notice

    NHTSA received more than 25 comments in response to its request for 
comments. With respect to the policy that should be followed in this 
area, Professor Rudolf Mortimer of the University of Illinois cautioned 
that decisions on any specific signal lighting idea should be made by 
looking broadly at all parts of the signaling system, not by 
considering ``a host of seemingly desirable separate items that have no 
relationship to each other or the system as a whole.'' Other 
commenters, including the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) 
and the American Automobile Manufacturers Association (AAMA) noted that 
opportunities may exist to further improve the signaling required by 
Standard No. 108, and that it is important for the agency to 
periodically review design-restrictive standards like Standard No. 108 
to assure that its restrictions still serve a safety need.
    Volvo's comments urged the agency to adopt a permissive standard. 
Volvo suggested that NHTSA permit the installation of any auxiliary 
signal function that might work, unless that auxiliary signal plainly 
impaired the effectiveness of required signal lamps. However, Volvo 
commented that auxiliary signal functions should be mandated only if 
there were proof of significant safety benefits.
    With the exception of Volvo, however, there was a general consensus 
in favor of the broad policy outlined by NHTSA in its request for 
comments. Most commenters agreed that NHTSA is correct to treat 
unsubstantiated concepts as requests for research and not to spend its 
resources responding to every signaling idea presented to the agency. 
For instance, the Truck Manufacturers Association (TMA) said: ``TMA 
believes the responsibility for developing the necessary objective data 
lies with the petitioners and that the agency should not grant 
petitions unless such data are provided.'' Toyota and AAMA made the 
same point, and both also asked that NHTSA consider harmonizing any new 
signals with other countries' signaling requirements. Baran and 
AlliedSignal, the parties that petitioned for ABWS, concurred with the 
agency's intended policy of putting the burden on petitioners to 
provide data demonstrating the effectiveness of new signaling ideas 
before the agency began any rulemaking to modify its lighting standard. 
In the words of the ABWS petitioners:

    Petitioners are sensitive to NHTSA's concerns about the agency 
being inundated with untested ideas by inventors who lack data to 
support their ideas. Clearly, the agency cannot, and should not, 
initiate a rulemaking on each such idea. By contrast, where the 
efficacy of a logically attractive concept has been demonstrated by 
objective data, and where there is actual experience with the 
concept, we believe that a rulemaking is warranted. NHTSA Docket 96-
041-N01-014, at 15.

    Given this general agreement by commenters on the policy that 
should be applied when considering new signaling concepts, it is not 
surprising that the primary issue in each of the four examples 
identified by the agency was the quality of the available data. ABWS 
was the concept that drew the most comments specifically addressing it.
    Five commenters favored ABWS. These five included Volvo, who 
commented that ABWS might work, so the concept should be permitted but 
not required. The petitioners for ABWS commented:

    Support for the ABWS concept is based on more than speculation 
or testimonials as to the efficacy of these safety devices. The 
recent report of a comprehensive fleet study conducted for the 
Government of Israel demonstrates that vehicles equipped with ABWS 
incurred a statistically significant (at the 95% confidence level) 
17.6% lower rate of rear-end crashes than did a control group of 
non-equipped vehicles. * * * Together with other available data, the 
fleet study results persuasively demonstrate that ABWS devices offer 
significant safety benefits to the driving public, and that such 
devices do not pose any safety hazard. NHTSA Docket 96-041-N01-014, 
at 2.

    ABWS petitioners also sought to address the agency's concerns about 
the high rate of ``false alarms.'' NHTSA's 1994 denial expressed the 
agency's concern that 23 percent of the time ABWS activated the stop 
lamps, the driver never applied the brakes. ABWS petitioners included 
an Exhibit 9 to their comments. This exhibit was a study of six 
vehicles driven more than 61,000 kilometers. Table 1 of this study 
shows that ABWS activated the stop lamps 17.33 times per 1000 
kilometers, and the driver never applied the brakes 2.57 of those 
times. Dividing these numbers gives an updated ``false alarm'' rate of 
15 percent.
    However, the ABWS petitioners contended that the agency had 
improperly calculated the ``false alarms'' for ABWS. NHTSA's 
calculations had been made by dividing the number of times ABWS 
activated the stop lamps with no subsequent braking by total number of 
times ABWS activated the stop lamps. The petitioners urged the agency 
to change the denominator and divide the number of times ABWS activated 
the stop lamps with no subsequent braking by the total number of times 
the stop lamps were activated. This change gives a much lower rate 
-2.57 is now divided by 1,564.33 (1,547 times stop lamps activated by 
brake application + 17.33 times stop lamps activated by ABWS). By 
making this change, the ``false alarm'' rate is reduced to 0.2 percent, 
which petitioners argue is so small as to have no impact on drivers' 
reactions to stop lamps.
    Two other commenters, the American Trauma Society and the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police, also were aware of the 
Israeli field study. Both stated in their comments that the Israeli 
field study had demonstrated an 18% reduction in rear-end crashes, and 
that NHTSA should permit ABWS. The Insurance Institute for Highway 
Safety (IIHS) commented that, ``if the claims of Baran can be 
verified,'' then ABWS should not be a detriment to highway safety and 
may actually result in crash reductions. In that case, IIHS favored 
permitting ABWS. The American Automobile Association (AAA) did not 
comment specifically on ABWS, but did note in its comment that ABWS 
``has been demonstrated in field trials to reduce the rear end crash 
experience of vehicles in which it has been installed.''
    On the other hand, ten commenters stated that ABWS should not be 
permitted. These commenters included vehicle manufacturers (American 
Automobile Manufacturers Association (AAMA), as well as BMW, 
Mitsubishi, and Toyota), the American Trucking Association (ATA), and 
Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety (Advocates). Professor Mortimer 
commented that the brake signal is ``the most important signal 
presently displayed on motor vehicles and nothing should be done to 
increase its ambiguity.'' Most of these commenters were of the opinion 
that, as expressed by AAMA, ``research to date does not provide 
sufficient evidence that motor vehicle safety will be enhanced'' by 
ABWS. ATA commented that NHTSA's signaling standards should be changed 
only to correct a demonstrated deficiency or when a

[[Page 59486]]

proponent demonstrates significant, cost-effective safety improvements 
from the change. The Truck Manufacturers Association (TMA) commented 
that ABWS should not be permitted because it could result in continuous 
activation of stop lamps when the driver of a big truck shifts gears. 
However, TMA noted in its comment that there are likely to be 
situations in the future where it is appropriate for stop lamps to be 
activated without service brake application. TMA offered as examples 
automatic braking being explored as part of Intelligent Transportation 
Systems and ``differential braking'' for heavy trucks. TMA suggested 
that stop lamps then should probably be activated as a function of the 
rate of deceleration, instead of by brake application alone.
    There were fewer comments on the other three signaling concepts. 
Only 11 commenters specifically addressed the idea of flashing CHMSLs 
to warn of hard braking. Three commenters supported the idea. Volvo, as 
per its overall policy view, believed NHTSA should permit flashing 
CHMSLs for hard braking, because the concept might work. In Volvo's 
opinion, NHTSA should not prohibit signaling concepts that might work. 
Mr. Chris Egger of Las Vegas, Nevada commented that the idea of 
flashing CHMSLs to warn of hard braking would allow following vehicles 
``to take quick evasive action,'' and that this idea had merit. 
However, Mr. Egger believed flashing CHMSLs would only be beneficial if 
they were mandated on all vehicles, because the mandate would 
``establish an understood signal and eliminate ambiguity.'' Finally, 
Mr. Hamid Kashefy of Montreal, Quebec commented that NHTSA should 
permit flashing CHMSLs to indicate hard braking.
    The eight commenters, including Advocates, ATA, TMA, Professor 
Mortimer, and AAMA, that opposed this concept expressed the view that 
the public would get no benefits for the added costs of flashing CHMSLs 
to indicate hard braking. TMA referred to NHTSA's 1981 research showing 
no additional benefits from a flashing CHMSL for hard braking as 
compared with a steady-burning CHMSL. TMA suggested that, until new 
data are presented, there is no basis for changing the current 
requirements in this area. Both IIHS and Mitsubishi opposed the concept 
of flashing CHMSLs for hard braking because they were concerned this 
might not be a helpful signal for following drivers.
    Nine commenters commented on the concept of flashing CHMSLs to 
indicate a stopped vehicle. The only commenter supporting this concept 
was Mitsubishi, which said it did not object to flashing CHMSLs as a 
stopped vehicle signal. The other eight commenters that addressed this 
concept opposed it. Professor Mortimer commented, ``There is no 
question that the single most important signal for the rear of motor 
vehicles to augment those presently provided would be a signal 
indicating that a vehicle is stopped or moving very slowly.'' However, 
Professor Mortimer asserted that a flashing CHMSL is not the way to 
provide a stopped vehicle signal because of confusion with the flashing 
lamps for turn and hazard signals. In the same vein, Advocates and IIHS 
commented that flashing CHMSLs could increase confusion and annoyance, 
especially in rush hour. Three other commenters, including ATA and 
Volvo, noted that 4-way hazard lamps are already on vehicles to serve 
exactly this purpose. Volvo stated its preference that flashing CHMSLs 
be reserved to indicate hard braking.
    Eight commenters addressed the concept of front ``brake'' lamps. 
Volvo commented only that, at this time, NHTSA should not prohibit 
these signal lamps. The other seven commenters had less favorable 
views. Professor Mortimer commented that these signals should be 
prohibited because they can do more harm than good. Mr. Kashefy, an 
inventor of signal devices himself, also commented that front ``brake'' 
lamps should be expressly prohibited because there is a greater 
likelihood of safety losses than gains from this concept. However, Mr. 
Kashefy indicated that NHTSA should consider requiring front lamps that 
report when a vehicle is accelerating. TMA and IIHS, among others, 
commented that these front ``brake'' lamps might increase crashes and 
dilute the meaning of turn signals. ATA commented that front ``brake'' 
lamps would provide no benefits, while Advocates commented simply that, 
in that group's opinion, front ``brake'' lamps ``have no merit 
whatsoever.''

October 1997 Notice Reopening the Comment Period

    Upon reviewing these comments, it was difficult to reconcile the 
general agreement about what policy NHTSA should apply to new signaling 
ideas with the widely divergent opinions about whether ABWS should be 
permitted. A closer look, however, readily explains the difference. 
With the exception of Volvo, the commenters agreed that new signaling 
concepts should be permitted when there are data demonstrating net 
safety gains from changing the current well-understood and effective 
signaling scheme. The commenters that favored ABWS had reviewed the 
Israeli field study cited by the ABWS petitioners in their comments and 
concluded that it was a convincing demonstration of safety gains from 
ABWS. None of the commenters that opposed ABWS referred to the Israeli 
study. Hence, this Israeli study of ABWS seemed to be a key factor for 
NHTSA in deciding whether to amend the current signaling requirements 
of Standard No. 108 to permit ABWS.
    Unfortunately, the Israeli study had not been reviewed by many 
commenters because it became available to the public in NHTSA's docket 
on the day before the comment period closed. None of the commenters who 
indicated there was insufficient evidence that ABWS would offer safety 
benefits appeared to have reviewed the Israeli study. On the other 
hand, all of the parties that said ABWS had been shown to offer 
positive safety benefits based their statements on the Israeli study.
    Given the importance of this study in commenters' views about 
whether ABWS should be permitted, NHTSA decided to reopen the comment 
period to make all commenters aware of the Israeli study and to get 
comments specifically directed to the merits of the study. NHTSA also 
decided it would be helpful to commenters for the agency to set forth 
its preliminary review of the Israeli study and ask for public comment 
on specific aspects of the Israeli study. Hence, NHTSA published an 
October 27, 1997 notice (62 FR 55562) reopening the comment period for 
an additional 30 days, with a request that commenters focus on the 
Israeli study and the other materials that were not previously 
available for public review.
    The Israeli study of ABWS involved 764 Israeli government vehicles 
tracked over a two-year period. Half the vehicles were equipped with 
ABWS, the other half were not. The control group (those vehicles that 
did not have ABWS) were matched to the ABWS-equipped vehicles. That is, 
each vehicle in the control group was the same make, model, and model 
year as a vehicle in the ABWS group.
    These 764 vehicles were in a total of 881 crashes, 78 of which were 
crashes in which the government vehicle was struck from the rear. Of 
these 78 rear-end crashes, 37 occurred in the vehicle fleet equipped 
with ABWS, while 41 crashes occurred in the control group. After 
adjusting for the distance driven by three particular vehicles, the 
study's authors concluded that the rear-end crash involvement rate of 
the ABWS equipped vehicles was 17.6 percent less than that of the 
control vehicles. In addition, these 78 crashes were then

[[Page 59487]]

sorted into ``relevant,'' defined in the report as ``crashes in which 
the government vehicle was struck from behind while braking or 
immediately after braking,'' and ``irrelevant,'' defined in the report 
as ``crashes in which the government vehicle was already stopped for a 
while, or the driver reported that (s)he decelerated or braked 
gradually rather than abruptly, and/or the driver of the striking 
vehicle testified that he failed to pay attention to the stopping or 
stopped vehicle ahead.'' Of the 78 rear-end crashes, 26 were classified 
as ``relevant'' and the other 52 were deemed ``irrelevant.'' The study 
concluded that the crash involvement rate of the ABWS-equipped vehicles 
in relevant rear end crashes was 64 percent less than that of the 
control group.
    NHTSA identified some concerns about the study and the conclusions. 
The first concern was about how closely the ABWS group matched the 
control group. The Israeli study mentions that vehicle attributes 
(make, model, and year) were matched precisely in the ABWS group and 
the control group. However, no mention was made of matching important 
vehicle use patterns, such as the driving environment and the typical 
driver. It appeared that vehicle use patterns were not considered.
    NHTSA next indicated in the October 27, 1997 notice that the 
analysis of the results appeared unusual. The data collected in the 
field study showed that there were 417 crashes for the ABWS-equipped 
vehicles and 464 crashes for the control group, or 9 percent fewer 
crashes for the ABWS group. This 9 percent reduction in crashes for the 
ABWS-equipped vehicles was found for:
     All crashes;
     Rear-end crashes; and
     Crashes other than rear-end crashes.
    In other words, the ABWS-equipped vehicles in this field study were 
just as likely to avoid a frontal or side crash as they were to avoid a 
rear crash. Since ABWS would not be visible to the driver of the other 
vehicle in a frontal or side crash, there is no apparent reason to 
believe that ABWS would have any effect on those types of crashes. 
Thus, the data from this study do not appear to show any significant 
positive effect for ABWS. However, this simple analysis, which would be 
a conventional starting point for many analysts, was not reported in 
the study. NHTSA asked for comments on what significance should be 
given to the fact that one of the simplest uses of the data does not 
indicate any significant effect for ABWS in rear-end crashes relative 
to all other types of crashes.
    The final major concern expressed by the agency in its October 1997 
request for comments was that, as noted in the study, there was a large 
difference in the ``relevant'' rear-end crashes for the two groups--18 
relevant rear-end crashes for the control group, but only eight 
relevant rear-end crashes for the ABWS group. However, the total rear-
end crashes reported were substantially identical--41 for the control 
group and 37 for the ABWS group. The difference of four crashes in this 
sample size is not statistically significant. Thus, one interpretation 
of the data is that ABWS shifts rear-end crashes from the relevant to 
the irrelevant classification without reducing significantly the number 
of rear-end crashes. NHTSA asked for comments on the appropriate 
interpretation of the data.
    In addition, the parties petitioning for ABWS had noted that 
several other countries permit the use of ABWS. The petitioners have 
identified Israel, Germany, Norway, the Czech Republic, and Austria, 
among others, as countries that currently permit ABWS on vehicles. 
NHTSA concurs with the petitioners that the practices in other 
countries ought to be given careful consideration. NHTSA has 
participated as the United States Delegate to the United Nations-
sponsored Meetings of Experts on Lighting and Light Signaling in 
Geneva, Switzerland for more than 15 years. To bring insights and 
knowledge from lighting experts around the world, NHTSA sent a letter 
to each of the other 32 delegates, enclosing a copy of the Israeli 
field study and a copy of the October 27, 1997 notice reopening the 
comment period on this subject. These delegates to the Meeting of 
Experts on Lighting and Light Signaling were invited to review the 
documents and share any comments they might have.

Comments on the October 1997 Notice

    Twelve parties responded to the reopening of the comment period 
with additional comments. Three commenters (the ABWS petitioners, the 
National Association of State Directors of Pupil Transportation 
Services, and Data Link, Inc.) said ABWS should be permitted because of 
its potential safety benefits, unless there were data showing a safety 
detriment from ABWS. Since there are no such data for ABWS, these 
commenters urged ABWS be permitted.
    NHTSA notes that these comments argue for a different standard than 
those commenters favoring ABWS had urged in response to the December 
1996 notice. In the previous notice, commenters had indicated that the 
Israeli study ``persuasively demonstrate that ABWS devices offer 
significant safety benefits to the driving public,'' in the words of 
the ABWS petitioners. No such assertions were made on behalf of the 
Israeli study in response to the reopening of the comment period. The 
position now advocated was that ``the intuitive appeal of ABWS benefits 
is so strong as to render unnecessary the conduct of a fleet study to 
prove benefits,'' in the words of Data Link (NHTSA Docket No. 96-041-
N02-006). Instead, ``the key question NHTSA should be asking in this 
proceeding is whether there is a demonstrable safety disbenefit 
associated with ABWS,'' according to the ABWS petitioners (NHTSA Docket 
No. 96-041-N02-005, at p.3). Stated in a broader policy perspective, 
ABWS advocates believe that a signaling concept that is ``intuitively 
appealing'' should be permitted unless there are data demonstrating 
that this concept will negatively affect safety.
    Three commenters (Nebraska Motor Carriers Association, Advocates, 
and AAMA) said that, for the reasons identified in the agency's October 
27 notice, the Israeli field study was inadequate to serve as the basis 
for any change to current signaling requirements. In its comments, AAMA 
agreed with the ABWS petitioners that ``the concept of advanced brake 
warning is intuitively appealing and worthy of further research.'' 
(NHTSA Docket 96-041-N02-007). AAMA recommended that a controlled fleet 
study be undertaken in the United States.
    The remaining six commenters were Delegates to the United Nations-
sponsored ``Meetings of Experts on Lighting and Light Signaling'' in 
Geneva, Switzerland. These six international experts said that the 
Israeli study was not conclusive and was an insufficient basis for a 
change to current signaling. The Society of Motor Manufacturers and 
Traders (SMMT), the United Kingdom vehicle manufacturers' group, 
commented that ``if all vehicles were fitted with ABWS and gave 23% 
false signals, the value of the stop signal would be greatly debased.'' 
(NHTSA Docket No. 96-041-N02-008). SMMT also commented that the issue 
of signaling and ABWS ought to be considered in a world-wide context, 
not just by the United States.
    The second of the international commenters was Mr. Hanno 
Westermann, the chair of a Safety and Visual Performance (SVP) working 
group that has been asked by the UN-sponsored ``Meetings of Experts on 
Lighting and Light Signaling'' to study the subject of signaling, 
including ABWS, and to report the findings back to the Experts. Mr. 
Westermann

[[Page 59488]]

commented that the current signaling system has evolved continuously 
and is well understood. The Israeli study of ABWS ``shows possible 
benefits,'' but those benefits do not appear to be significant, 
according to Mr. Westermann. In addition, the study shows that ABWS 
``exhibits a number of negative aspects.'' Specifically, Mr. Westermann 
referred to the instances when the stop lamp is illuminated but the 
brake is never applied (NHTSA Docket 96-041-N02-009). Mr. Westermann 
also noted that the 100 millisecond earlier warning of braking that is 
achieved with ABWS can also be achieved by means of light-emitting 
diodes (LEDs) or neon lamps in stop lamps (because they have a faster 
rise time than conventional incandescent lamps), without illuminating 
the stop lamps in situations where the brakes are never applied.
    The third international commenter was Dr. Karl Manz, a consultant 
to the German Delegate to the Meeting of Experts. Dr. Manz stated that 
the Israeli field study is not sufficient to demonstrate the safety 
benefits claimed for ABWS.
    The fourth international commenter was Mr. Hans Ammerlan, the 
Netherlands Delegate to the Meeting of Experts. Mr. Ammerlan stated 
that ``false alarms,'' i.e., activation of the stop lamps when the 
brakes are never applied, are inherent in the design of ABWS because 
the assumption that rapid removal of the foot from the accelerator 
pedal will be followed by braking may be true most of the time, but 
will not be true 100% of the time. Mr. Ammerlan commented, ``We 
consider such false alarms as a degradation of the brake signal.'' 
(NHTSA Docket No. 96-041-N02-012). Mr. Ammerlan also commented that if 
earlier warning of braking is useful, one would begin by addressing the 
rise times of current stop lamps since that has no possibility of 
degrading the brake signal.
    The fifth international commenter was Mr. Kari Saari, Finland's 
Delegate to the Meeting of Experts. Mr. Saari commented that Finland 
follows the European Commission's lighting regulations, so it does not 
allow ABWS on vehicles.
    The sixth international commenter was Mr. I. Ajtos, Hungary's 
Delegate to the Meeting of Experts. Mr. Ajtos commented that he agreed 
with NHTSA's observations about the shortcomings of the Israeli study. 
Mr. Ajtos also commented that human factors should have been studied, 
and specifically asked whether more frequent illuminations of stop 
lamps would not adversely affect the response of following drivers to 
those lamps. Mr. Ajtos concluded by stating that Hungary specifically 
rejected a petition to allow ABWS in that country in 1995 for two 
reasons. First, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Traffic, which 
Hungary has ratified, defines a ``stop lamp'' as ``the lamp used to 
indicate to other road users to the rear of the vehicle that the driver 
is applying the service brake.'' (Emphasis in Mr. Ajtos' comment--NHTSA 
Docket No. 96-041-N02-013, at page 5). According to Mr. Ajtos, Hungary 
interprets this language as precluding the use of ABWS. Second, Mr. 
Ajtos commented that Hungary denied the ABWS petition because it agreed 
with the reasoning in NHTSA's 1994 ABWS petition denial.

September 1998 Withdrawal of ABWS Petition

    On September 16, 1998, the ABWS petitioners withdrew their petition 
for rulemaking to permit ABWS. The petitioners explained the withdrawal 
as follows:

    Given that NHTSA now seems to be applying a higher standard than 
that which should be applied for optional safety devices, and in 
spite of the considerable evidence of the safety benefits of ABWS 
that Petitioners have presented to date, Petitioners have decided 
that they cannot at this time move forward with their Petition. 
Other nations have approved the use of ABWS based on the 
considerable volume of data showing that it is a proven crash 
avoidance device, and additional nations are in the process of 
considering ABWS technology. In light of NHTSA's current views, 
resources at this time will be focused on these nations.

NHTSA's Conclusions and Decisions

    After considering all the comments and the other information that 
is available on the subject of signals for braking, the agency has 
reached the following conclusions.

1. Current NHTSA Signaling Requirements Are the Norm Internationally, 
Not the Exception

    The current signaling requirements for braking in NHTSA's lighting 
standard (stop lamps come on when service brakes are applied, stop 
lamps are steady-burning, not flashing, and stop lamps do not give a 
different signal for hard braking than lighter braking) are all 
consistent with the prevailing international practice. Indeed, the 1968 
Vienna Convention on Road Traffic, signed by the United States and many 
other countries, sets forth an international consensus on what signal 
lamps should mean. Suggested changes to the prevailing international 
consensus on signaling requirements may of course be considered by 
individual countries to respond to particular needs, but such changes 
should also be considered internationally at an international forum.

2. Current Information Provided by Signal Lamps That Conform With 
NHTSA's Signaling Requirements is Standardized and Well Understood by 
the Driving Public

    The information currently provided by signal lamps that conform 
with the requirements of NHTSA's lighting standard is well understood 
by the driving public. The information that is provided by signals 
(driver has applied brakes, has shifted into reverse, etc.) is 
instantly recognized and unambiguously informative. Even the ABWS 
petitioners expressly acknowledge the importance of uniform, 
unambiguous signals. Petitioners said, ``The October 27 notice 
recognizes, quite properly, that there is a benefit associated with a 
uniform, unambiguous signal system;'' NHTSA Docket No. 96-41-N02-005, 
at page 6. Given the benefits of the current standardized signaling 
system, it is reasonable and appropriate to require parties asking for 
a change to the current system to bear the burden of demonstrating that 
the benefits that will be lost by changing from the current uniform, 
unambiguous signals will be more than offset by new safety benefits 
from the signaling change.

3. It Is Appropriate for NHTSA and Other Countries To Re-Examine the 
Current Signaling Requirements To See If They Can Be Improved

    The Vienna Convention set forth the international consensus about 
the state of the art of signaling information in 1968. There have been 
significant advances in electronics and sensors in vehicles over the 
past 30 years. Those advances make it appropriate to reexamine the 
information provided by signal lamps to see if the information can be 
improved.
    NHTSA understands that the total information that can be provided 
by signal lamps is limited. It is clear that drivers won't respond 
instinctively to 100 different lights on the rear of vehicles. 
Likewise, illumination of a lamp can't mean ten different things. 
However, much human factors work needs to be done to understand these 
limits and other areas such as how many signals will produce 
``information overload,'' dilution of the intended message, and the 
risk that activation of one signal lamp will mask information from 
other signal lamps. In addition,

[[Page 59489]]

NHTSA understands that much work needs to be done on crash data 
analysis to determine what new functions that could be served by signal 
lamps in 1998 would provide the biggest added safety gains. The goal of 
this work would not be to have vehicles provide more and more signals, 
but to assure that vehicles have clear signals that provide the most 
important information to other drivers.
    In addition, NHTSA believes that any decision about what additional 
or improved information can or should be provided by signal lamps 
should be made after a comprehensive look at all the possibilities for 
enhancement, instead of as a piecemeal response to individual concepts. 
For instance, a decision to permit stop lamps to perform the ABWS 
function may limit those lamps' suitability for performing other 
functions, such as signaling onset of rapid deceleration or following 
too closely. While that may ultimately be the right decision, it should 
be made after considering the significance of those other functions.
    In accordance with these conclusions, NHTSA is taking the following 
actions.
1. NHTSA Will Participate in the Efforts To Try To Develop an 
International Consensus on How To Handle New Signaling Ideas
    The SVP Group has been asked by the UN-sponsored Experts on 
Lighting to study the subject of signaling and to report 
recommendations back to the Experts Group. The need to reexamine 
signaling ideas as we enter the 21st Century is an international 
concern. It seems appropriate to try to address that concern 
internationally. For example, according to the ABWS petitioners, 
Israel, Germany, Norway, and the Czech Republic currently permit the 
installation of ABWS on vehicles. The United States and Hungary have 
previously said no to ABWS. It would seem to be better for everyone, 
including the driving public, the governments, and vehicle and lighting 
manufacturers, if there were clear standardized meanings for signal 
lamps in all six of these countries.
    Moreover, there is an international need to address this concern. 
All 16 of the countries that regularly participate in the U.N. Meeting 
of Experts on Lighting and Light Signaling report that they have been 
approached by people who believe they have devised improvements to the 
current signaling. It would be preferable to develop a global means for 
considering such changes to signaling, instead of having each nation 
consider the changes in isolation from the rest of the world.
    NHTSA has already had a representative, the same person who is the 
United States Delegate to the Meeting of Experts on Lighting and Light 
Signaling, attend three meetings and participate in two video 
conferences of the SVP to participate in the effort to develop 
recommendations for signaling to be presented to the Meeting of Experts 
on Lighting and Light Signaling. NHTSA will make every effort to assure 
that an agency representative is actively involved in the SVP work and 
any other efforts of the Meeting of Experts to forge an international 
consensus on updating light signaling.
2. Until a New International Consensus Emerges, NHTSA Will Follow the 
Policies for Evaluating New Signaling Concepts Described in the 
December 1996 Request for Comments
    NHTSA recognizes that it often takes years to arrive at an 
international consensus. It would be inappropriate for the agency to 
refuse to take any action on the subject of improved signaling until an 
international consensus is reached and the agency evaluates that 
consensus to see if some or all of it can be implemented by NHTSA, 
consistent with its safety mission and applicable legal requirements. 
Accordingly, NHTSA is announcing the policy it will follow for 
evaluating requests for changes to current signaling requirements for 
lamps. This policy is the same approach that was set forth in the 
December 1996 request for comments, which was supported by the vast 
majority of commenters to that notice.
    The first question NHTSA must address in considering a new signal 
lighting idea is whether it requires a change in the standardized 
operation or appearance of a required lamp or piece of lighting 
equipment. As indicated above, the agency reiterates that there is a 
positive benefit to the motoring public from standardizing signals. 
NHTSA has always tried to tailor its signal lamp requirements to assure 
the public of the benefits of standardization, while at the same time 
allowing as much design freedom as possible for the location, shape, 
styling, and light source designs for those lamps. In the December 1996 
request for comments, NHTSA noted that the intensity ranges of 
taillamps and stop lamps are regulated so that a following driver can 
distinguish a red stop lamp from a red taillamp as soon as the stop 
lamp is actuated by braking, without having to notice the transition. 
However, the size and shape of stop lamps and taillamps are left to the 
designer of the lamps. Likewise, stop lamps are required to be steady-
burning to distinguish them from the required flashing of turn signals 
and hazard warning signal lamps of the same brightness and color.
    In keeping with this approach, NHTSA also allows for lighting 
equipment beyond what is required by the lighting standard, called 
``auxiliary'' lighting, provided that this auxiliary lighting does not 
``impair the effectiveness'' of the required lamps and reflectors. 
Thus, when NHTSA is asked about a new signal lighting idea, the 
agency's first question is whether the new signal lighting would 
require a change to the standardized operation of required lighting 
equipment. If the new idea does not require a change to the 
standardized operation of required lighting equipment, the only 
question left for the agency is whether the new lighting would impair 
the effectiveness of required lighting. If it would impair the 
effectiveness of required lighting (e.g., by masking the operation of 
required lighting or introducing ambiguity into the meaning of required 
lighting), the idea is expressly prohibited by S5.1.3 of Standard No. 
108 and it may not be installed on vehicles. That is because this 
lighting would undermine the safety benefits that NHTSA has determined 
are associated with the required lighting.
    If, however, NHTSA determines the new signal lighting would not 
impair the effectiveness of required lighting, it may be installed on 
vehicles consistent with the existing requirements of the lighting 
standard. This is true even if there is no safety value for such 
auxiliary lighting. In these circumstances, the public is not losing 
any of the safety benefits from the required lighting. Thus, even if 
the public gains nothing of value from such auxiliary lighting, the 
result is safety-neutral.
    Many new signal lighting ideas, however, would require a change in 
the standardized operation of required lamps or lighting equipment. In 
these instances, the hurdle that these ideas must clear is higher. This 
is because the public would be losing the safety benefits of the 
current standardized operation of required lighting that result from 
the broad public and international acceptance of the standardized 
operation. In these cases, NHTSA has long said that it is certainly 
possible that a new idea for the operation of signal lighting might 
improve safety. However, given the safety benefits associated with the 
standardized operation and meaning of required lighting, the burden is 
on the proponents of the new signal lighting idea to demonstrate that 
the use of the

[[Page 59490]]

new signal lighting idea would yield a positive safety benefit large 
enough to more than offset the adverse safety effects of giving up the 
standardized operation and meaning of signal lights.
    Some commenters to the October 1997 notice reopening the comment 
period argued that this standard is too demanding. Instead, they urged 
that the appropriate standard should be that lighting will be permitted 
that necessitates changes to the standardized operation and meaning of 
required lighting unless there are data available showing adverse 
safety consequences from the new signal lighting. In other words, one 
should not have to demonstrate that new signal lighting offers the 
public any safety gains, just that it would not cause the public any 
safety harm.
    NHTSA is not adopting this position as its policy. As noted above, 
the currently standardized operation and meaning of required lighting 
gives safety benefits because it enjoys broad public and international 
recognition and acceptance. NHTSA has made findings of benefits for the 
current standardized approach and discussed its current standardized 
approach with lighting experts from other nations at a United Nations-
sponsored forum. Given this background, it seems reasonable and 
appropriate to require advocates of change to the current standardized 
approach to say more than that different decisions could have been made 
to achieve the same results from standardization. Even if that is true, 
it results in nothing of value for the American driving public. NHTSA 
concludes that it is more appropriate to require advocates of change to 
demonstrate that different decisions would have achieved better safety.
    But, those advocates may ask, why is it acceptable for auxiliary 
lighting that does not impair the effectiveness of required lighting to 
merely be safety-neutral, while changes to the standardized approach 
for required lighting must be shown to be affirmatively safety-
beneficial? The answer is that whatever happens with such auxiliary 
lighting does not effect the core safety functions performed by the 
required lighting, whereas changes to the standardized operation of 
required lighting directly impacts the core safety functions performed 
by those lamps. NHTSA believes a higher standard is appropriate for 
changes to the core safety functions of required lamps and signals than 
for changes to peripheral, non-required lamps that do not affect any of 
the core safety functions of required lamps and signals.
    Required lighting cannot achieve its intended safety purpose unless 
the message of the lighting is instantly and unambiguously recognized 
by other drivers. The only way to achieve that level of clear 
recognition is to standardize the operation and meaning of required 
lamps--in other words, NHTSA must pick a single approach. When NHTSA 
changes the single standardized approach, it must specify a different 
single standardized approach for required lamps and lighting equipment. 
Such a change requires the public to adapt to new meaning and/or 
operation for required lamps and vehicle and lighting manufacturers to 
make any needed changes to their products. Something of this magnitude 
should not be undertaken lightly and should be justified by a greater 
good for all at the end, such as enhanced safety for the driving 
public.
    In the case of auxiliary lighting that does not impair the 
effectiveness of required lighting, NHTSA has not recognized any safety 
purpose for that auxiliary lighting. It does not matter whether the 
public recognizes the message of the auxiliary lighting, as long as 
this lighting does not detract from the required lighting. There are 
hundreds of possible approaches for this type of lighting and NHTSA has 
no reason to pick any single approach over the others. In this 
situation, all that is required is that the auxiliary lighting not do 
harm to the required lighting.
    NHTSA's regulations currently set forth at 49 CFR Part 552 the 
requirements for the agency to treat a request as a petition for 
rulemaking. Section 552.4 provides:
    Each petition filed under this part must:
    (a) Be written in the English language;
    (b) Have, preceding its text, a heading that includes the word 
``Petition'';
    (c) Set forth facts which it is claimed establish that an order is 
necessary;
    (d) Set forth a brief description of the substance of the order 
which it is claimed should be issued; and
    (e) Contain the name and address of the petitioner.
    The pertinent requirement for this discussion is the one in 
Sec. 552.4(c) that a petition must ``set forth facts'' to support the 
contention that a rulemaking change is needed. In the case of signal 
lighting ideas, NHTSA has, as noted, made findings of benefits for the 
current standardized approach and discussed this approach at least 
twice a year with lighting experts from other nations at a United 
Nations-sponsored forum on lighting. In this context, NHTSA interprets 
its regulation as requiring that a request for a change to signal 
lighting must provide more than assertions of an unaddressed need, 
speculations about how to address that need, and testimonials about the 
efficacy of the requested approach, and the like. Those are not 
``facts'' within the meaning of 49 CFR 552.4(c); they are simply 
opinions.
    Thus, when NHTSA is requested to alter the current standardized 
operation and meaning for signal lighting, the agency determines 
whether the request provides data purporting to show positive safety 
benefits sufficient to more than offset the benefits lost from eroding 
standardization. If the request contains no such data, NHTSA interprets 
its regulations as providing that such a request will not be treated as 
a petition for rulemaking. Instead, the request will be treated as a 
suggestion for research to try to gather the necessary data. The 
request will be forwarded to a public docket that will collect 
information describing all proposed new signal lighting ideas and 
systems. The docket will be available for review by NHTSA and others 
who may wish to plan future research based on the ideas and inventions 
collected in the docket.
    If the request provides data, NHTSA will treat it as a petition for 
rulemaking asking for changes to the current standardized meaning and 
operation for signal lighting. The agency will evaluate the data to 
determine if they show persuasive evidence of a positive safety impact. 
If that evaluation does not permit a determination of positive safety 
from the requested change, NHTSA will not change its lighting standard 
to permit the new signal lighting idea. If the evaluation of the data 
leads the agency to the conclusion that positive safety effects are 
likely from the requested change, NHTSA will propose to amend its 
lighting standard to either permit or require the new signal lighting 
idea.
    NHTSA intends to apply this policy to any requests it receives for 
new signal lighting ideas. Because this notice explains how the agency 
will analyze requests and what sort of data is needed to support 
requests for changes in the standardized operation and meaning of 
required lighting, people with ideas for new signal lighting should now 
have a better understanding of what supporting information is needed 
when they request changes to standardized signal lighting. The agency 
will reexamine this policy periodically to assure that it continues to 
be appropriate. NHTSA will carefully consider the work in this area of 
SVP and the United Nations-sponsored Meeting of Experts on Lighting and 
Light Signal when such

[[Page 59491]]

work becomes available. To repeat, the agency will actively participate 
in the international effort in this area.
3. Results of Applying These Policies To the Four New Signaling 
Concepts Described in the December 1996 Request for Comments
    a. ABWS. ABWS requires a change in the standardized operation of 
required lamps (the stop lamps). Those lamps are currently required to 
be activated only when the service brakes are applied. ABWS would also 
activate those lamps if the driver rapidly removes his or her foot from 
the accelerator pedal. The next question for NHTSA's determination is 
whether the ABWS request to alter the activation of stop lamps presents 
data purporting to show positive safety benefits. Again the answer to 
this question is yes. The Israeli field study that was the subject of 
NHTSA's October 27, 1997 reopening of the comment period concluded that 
the rear-end crash involvement rate of ABWS-equipped vehicles was 17.6 
percent less than the rear-end crash involvement rate of the control 
vehicles. Thus, NHTSA would treat the ABWS request as a petition for 
rulemaking under this policy.2
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ Under its policies in place at that time, NHTSA treated the 
ABWS request as a petition and granted it on July 26, 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The next step under this policy would be for the agency to evaluate 
the Israeli study to determine if it shows persuasive evidence of a 
positive safety impact. After its evaluation, NHTSA has concluded that 
the Israeli study does not demonstrate any significant positive effect 
for ABWS. As noted in the October 27, 1997 request for comments, the 
data collected in the field study showed that there were 417 crashes 
for the ABWS-equipped vehicles and 464 crashes for the control, or 9 
percent fewer crashes for the ABWS group. However, this 9 percent 
reduction in crashes for the ABWS-equipped vehicles was found for:
     All crashes;
     Rear-end crashes, and
     Crashes other than rear-end crashes.
    In other words, the ABWS-equipped vehicles in this field study were 
just as likely to avoid a frontal or side crash as they were to avoid a 
rear crash. Since ABWS would not be visible to the driver of the other 
vehicle in a frontal or side crash, there is no reason to believe it 
would have any effect on these types of crashes. Thus, the data from 
this study do not appear to show any positive effect for ABWS.
    In addition, the Israeli study did not show any significant effect 
on the total number of rear end crashes for ABWS-equipped vehicles. As 
noted in the October 27, 1997 request for comments, the authors of the 
field study sorted the rear-end crashes into a ``relevant'' and an 
``irrelevant'' category, and claimed a major reduction of ``relevant'' 
rear-end crashes for ABWS--there were 18 relevant rear end crashes for 
the control vehicles, as compared with 8 relevant rear end crashes for 
the ABWS-equipped vehicles. However, the total rear end crashes for the 
ABWS vehicles and the control vehicles were substantially identical--41 
rear-end crashes for the control group and 37 for the ABWS group. 
Whatever the merits of ABWS at shifting rear-end crashes from the 
``relevant'' to the ``irrelevant'' category, the crashes still 
occurred. The data from the Israeli field study do not demonstrate any 
substantial reduction in total rear-end crashes for vehicles with ABWS 
compared with vehicles with conventional activation of stop lamps.
    After evaluating the data from the Israeli study, NHTSA concludes 
that these data do not demonstrate any significant positive safety 
impact for ABWS, so there would be nothing gained for the American 
public to more than offset the safety lost by changing the current 
standardized approach to stop lamps. It seems that the ABWS petitioners 
came to the same conclusion after reviewing the Israeli study. In March 
1997, when the ABWS petitioners submitted the Israeli study to NHTSA, 
they said that ``the fleet study results persuasively demonstrate that 
ABWS devices offer significant safety benefits to the driving public.'' 
NHTSA Docket 96-041-N01-014, at 2. However, eight months later in 
November 1997, when they responded to the reopening of the comment 
period to allow public review of the Israeli study, the ABWS 
petitioners made no such claims. Instead, they now asserted, ``In sum, 
all of the real-world evidence drawn from actual crash statistics, and 
all of the available studies, point in the same direction--there is no 
safety disbenefit associated with ABWS.'' NHTSA Docket No. 96-041-N02-
005, at p.9. The agency also notes that none of the other commenters 
whose March 1997 comments indicated that they believed the Israeli 
study demonstrated significant benefits for ABWS (AAA, International 
Association of Chiefs of Police, and the American Trauma Society) 
responded to the agency's reopening of the comment period and 
preliminary evaluation of the Israeli study.
    The Israeli study is an insufficient demonstration of positive 
safety impacts from ABWS. Accordingly, NHTSA's rulemaking action on 
ABWS is hereby withdrawn.
    b. Flashing CHMSLs to warn of hard braking.
    c. Flashing CHMSLs to warn that the vehicle is stopped. Flashing 
CHMSLs to warn of hard braking or that the vehicle is stopped would 
require a change in the standardized operation of required lamps (the 
stop lamps). Those lamps are currently required to be steady-burning. 
As noted above, the requirement for stop lamps to be steady-burning is 
intended to assure that drivers can instantly distinguish stop lamps 
from turn signals and hazard warning lamps, which flash when activated. 
The next question NHTSA must answer then is whether the requests to 
alter the activation of stop lamps to permit flashing CHMSLs for hard 
braking or a stopped vehicle have presented data purporting to show 
positive safety benefits sufficient to more than offset the safety 
losses from changing standardization. The answer to this is no. As 
noted by TMA in its comments, the only data in this area indicates no 
significant improvement from flashing CHMSLs (NHTSA's large scale field 
study in 1981). Accordingly, NHTSA would not treat these requests as 
petitions for rulemaking. Instead, the requests would be treated as 
suggestions for research to try to gather the necessary data. The 
requests would be forwarded to a public docket that will collect 
information describing all proposed new signal lighting ideas and 
systems. The docket will be available for review by NHTSA and others 
who may wish to plan future research based on the ideas and inventions 
collected in the docket. NHTSA notes that since it has already 
researched the merits of flashing CHMSLs, it is unlikely that the 
agency will research the same area again until there is some reason 
(such as new data in this area) to believe the 1981 study may no longer 
be valid.
    d. Front ``Brake'' lamps to alert oncoming vehicles the subject 
vehicle is braking. Front ``brake'' lamp systems to alert oncoming 
vehicles that the subject vehicle was braking would not require any 
change in the standardized operation of required lamps. Thus, this idea 
has a much lower hurdle to clear than ideas that would require changes 
in the standardized operation of required lamps. The only issue for 
these front ``brake'' lamps is whether they would impair the 
effectiveness of required lighting. Assuming NHTSA determines that the 
front ``brake'' lamps are designed so as not to impair the 
effectiveness of the required lighting on the front of the vehicle, 
NHTSA's

[[Page 59492]]

lighting standard already permits these front ``brake'' lamps to be 
installed on vehicles.
    Of course, petitions to require front brake lamps or any other 
motor vehicle equipment are evaluated according to NHTSA's normal 
approach--will the American public get its money's worth from this 
requirement? In other words, are the safety benefits for the new 
equipment sufficient to justify the costs that will be imposed on the 
American people by a new requirement for this equipment? In the case of 
front brake lamps, NHTSA concluded in 1996 (61 FR 10556; March 14, 
1996) that the answer was no, and denied a petition to require front 
``brake'' lamps. Any future petitions to require front ``brake'' lamps 
will need to demonstrate greater safety benefits (which can most 
readily be done with testing and other data) to perhaps get a different 
result than the denial NHTSA announced in 1996.
    In the December 1996 request for comments, NHTSA asked for comments 
on whether the agency should expressly prohibit front ``brake'' lamps 
because of the lack of data to show any positive safety effects for 
these lamps and the likely negative safety consequences of the 
widespread use of these lamps. After consideration of this possibility, 
NHTSA has decided not to take this action. These lamps do not 
necessarily affect the standardized operation, or impair the 
effectiveness, of any required lighting. NHTSA has traditionally had no 
regulations for such lamps, because they had no impact on the core 
safety functions of lighting. The agency will reexamine this approach 
if it has some testing or other indication that this approach may need 
to be changed. At this time, NHTSA has no such data. If front ``brake'' 
lamps are installed more widely and the agency's concerns remain, NHTSA 
will carefully consider a research effort to get more information about 
the safety impact of such lamps.

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115, 30117, and 30166; 
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50 and 501.8.

    Issued on October 30, 1998.
James R. Hackney,
Acting Associate Administrator for Safety Performance Standards.
[FR Doc. 98-29520 Filed 11-3-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P