[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 207 (Tuesday, October 27, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 57314-57318]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-28547]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Antitrust Division


International Competition Policy Advisory Committee: Request For 
Papers

    This represents a request for papers by the International 
Competition Policy Advisory Committee (Advisory Committee). The 
following is an illustrative list of topics and issues under 
consideration by the Advisory Committee in its three core areas of 
focus: multijurisdictional mergers; trade and competition policy 
interface matters; and enforcement cooperation. The intention of this 
list is to identify a wide range of key issues where written 
submissions from U.S. or foreign economists, lawyers, business 
executives or other experts would be particularly welcome. Interested 
parties also are invited to submit papers on other topics of their 
particular expertise if relevant to the three core areas identified 
above.
    In terms of timing, the Advisory Committee intends to conclude its 
work in the fall of 1999. Thus, we would very much like to have your 
views before the Advisory Committee by March of 1999. Submissions made 
after that date also would be considered. However, submissions made 
prior to March 1999 would be especially timely.

Multijurisdictional Merger Review

    A key of objective of the Advisory Committee in this area is to 
identify the burdens and conflicts stemming from procedural and 
substantive differences between competition authorities in 
multijurisdictional merger review, and to devise policy responses that 
might address these burdens and avoid conflicts while ensuring that 
antitrust authorities have the tools needed to identify and remedy 
anticompetitive mergers.
    1. A number of explanations have been advanced by experts for the 
increase in U.S. domestic and cross-border merger activity, among them 
the following: a robust U.S. economy and stock market; increased 
globalization; rapid technological change; economic deregulation; and 
general industry upheaval in particular industries. This paper would 
explore the principal factors driving international mergers, both 
outbound and inbound, and provide commercial and economic perspectives 
on the merger wave of the 1990s. Sectoral, historical and comparative 
perspectives would be welcome. For example, are there systemic 
differences between the current wave of translational mergers and 
earlier periods of robust M&A activity, be that in terms of industries 
affected, driving factors, concentration levels, or other factors?
    2. The Advisory Committee is charged with undertaking a medium-term 
perspective on international antitrust issues. Accordingly, analysis of 
likely future developments in international M&M activity could prove 
instructive, particularly if it identified likely regional, sectoral, 
industrial and other trends.
    3. In the last five years, if your firm has completed an 
acquisition, merger or joint venture with a U.S. or foreign firm which 
in turn required antitrust notification to one or more foreign 
competition authorities, please share your perspectives with respect to 
the following matters:
    Describe the problems, if any, that arose because of underlying 
differences in oversight by competition authorities at home and abroad. 
Consider both procedural and substantive factors--e.g., divergent 
timing and filing requirements, confidentiality concerns, transaction 
costs, differences in substantive law, agency procedures, 
politicization, and conflicts in law. If applicable, please also 
describe how your approach to addressing these issues (in the context 
of competition policy) differed from your approach to addressing 
analogous issues caused by differences in oversight in other legal 
contexts, i.e., securities laws, tax laws, etc.
    Please also describe any perceived benefits from differences in 
oversight, such as the ability to ``arbitrage'' a favorable decision in 
one jurisdiction vis-a-vis another jurisdiction. Also, what do you see 
as the positive features of foreign merger regulations, is any--e.g., 
speed, limited document production, etc.?
    4. From your experience as a business executive, lawyer or 
financial advisor involved in transactions, identify any policy 
measures that could be undertaken by U.S. antitrust authorities, acting 
on their own or in cooperation with foreign authorities, that you 
believe would help to reduce sources of friction, conflict or burden 
that arise in the context of mergers, joint ventures or acquisitions 
affecting or requiring antitrust merger notification in more than one 
jurisdiction. What new arrangements, if any, might be desirable to 
facilitate resolution of conflicts between U.S. and foreign reviewing 
authorities?
    5. This paper would identify the special problems, if any, arising 
from (time-consuming) multiple merger review processes faced by firms 
in rapidly changing, high-tech industries and, if there are such 
special problems, identify possible solutions.
    6. A number of jurisdictions extend the reach of their antitrust 
merger control laws to transactions that arguably have only a tenuous 
nexus to the jurisdiction. This paper would explore whether the 
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction to compel antitrust 
notification of a proposed transaction with no (or de minimis) 
potential effect(s) in that jurisdiction conflicts with principles of 
international law. Further, the paper would consider, inter alia, 
whether an ``effects'' test, similar to that applied in Sherman Act 
cases or whether limitations on notification requirements, such as the 
exemptions to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act for 
certain transactions involving foreign parties, could serve as a model 
for other jurisdictions.
    7. Regarding premerger notification requirements, jurisdictions 
differ widely with respect to, inter alia, jurisdictional thresholds, 
timing, information requirements and review period. Some argue that 
these differences hinder cooperation among antitrust

[[Page 57315]]

enforcement agencies and lead to commercial inconvenience, additional 
transaction costs and legal uncertainty, even for parties to 
transactions that raise no substantive antitrust issues. This paper 
would evaluate the extent to which the burdens that stem from these 
procedural differences in pre-merger notification requirements are 
manageable by merging parties and experienced counsel and/or are 
acceptable costs of doing transnational deals and those that warrant 
reform. Further this paper would consider whether procedural 
harmonization (e.g., common forms, common timetables) is the 
appropriate response or whether alternative approaches might address 
these burdens. This paper should provide as much detail as possible 
with respect to the specific elements of procedural harmonization that 
are thought to be the most useful or the alternative approaches that 
should be considered.
    8. This paper would compare the premerger notification systems in 
the United States, the EC, Canada and Japan, identifying the major 
differences and similarities across the systems. Further, the paper 
would explore areas of change and evolution (e.g., has there been a 
trend toward convergence over time?).
    9. When more than one jurisdiction's competition authority reviews 
the same transaction, overlapping review may lead to conflicting 
decisions on the merits of the transaction or the appropriate remedy. 
For example, one authority may approve and another seek to block the 
same deal, often forcing the companies to respond to the most 
restrictive regime. This paper would seek to identify the types of 
cases that present an international conflict. That is, when do 
different results or remedies rise to the level of a global problem? 
Further, what mechanisms, if any, should be implemented to either avoid 
and/or resolve these conflicts?
    10. The antitrust merger control laws in a number of jurisdictions 
apply to foreign transactions. That is, the acquisition will occur 
outside the jurisdiction and to the extent the target has operations 
within the jurisdiction, the acquiror would acquire only indirect 
control over the operations. This paper would examine generally the 
remedies that may be imposed in foreign transactions, particularly 
where the appropriate remedy may be located outside the reviewing 
jurisdiction. The paper also would consider whether the findings 
support the proposition that an antitrust enforcement agency should 
decline jurisdiction where an appropriate remedy cannot be fashioned or 
defer to a reviewing agency that is able to impose a remedy. The paper 
also would seek to identify the circumstances where extraterritorial 
remedies would be perceived, and alternatively would not be perceived, 
to threaten the fundamental sovereignty of another jurisdiction.
    11. It has been suggested that transparency of laws and law 
enforcement activities has the potential to reduce uncertainty for 
merging parties, fosters consistency in case-by-case decision-making, 
encourages public confidence that the rules are being applied in even-
handed and rational ways, and promotes learning. This paper would 
consider how transparency could be achieved on a global basis and 
whether there is a way to reach an agreement at the international level 
that puts the onus on national authorities to improve transparency. 
Respondents also might consider whether existing international 
organizations (e.g., the OECD, the WTO, UNCTAD, or others) can play a 
role in this regard, and if so what that role might be.
    12. International cooperation between U.S. and foreign competition 
authorities reviewing the same merger offers the possibility of 
reducing costs and time, avoiding unnecessary duplication of efforts, 
enhancing the data gathering process and avoiding conflicts. This paper 
would seek to identify the types of cases that would most likely 
benefit from coordination as well as the current impediments to 
cooperation. For example, some commentators have suggested that mergers 
involving global markets or where the product market is essentially 
identical worldwide and/or where a remedy imposed by one jurisdiction 
is potentially capable of alleviating the competitive concerns of other 
jurisdictions are factors indicating the potential benefits of 
cooperation are significant. By contrast, cooperation may not be as 
useful in cases where few jurisdictions are affected, markets are 
local, market structure and competitive conditions are factually 
distinct, and/or competition concerns arising in any country are 
remediable by divestiture of one of the merging parties' local 
subsidiaries. Further, confidentiality rules are considered a 
significant impediment to cooperation. Can circumstances be identified 
where it would be in the best interest of merging parties to waive 
confidentiality? Also, what mechanisms could be implemented to 
encourage waivers? This paper also would consider the extent to which 
private antitrust enforcement in the U.S. and abroad has the potential 
to undermine effectiveness of consultation/relief coordination.
    13. This paper would consider the role traditional and/or positive 
comity should play in merger enforcement. Further, what are the policy 
and legal implications of an agency in one jurisdiction taking action 
under its antitrust merger control law in order to remedy antitrust 
concerns of another jurisdiction?
    14. When cooperation and other dispute avoidance efforts fail, 
antitrust authorities are left with attempting to find a mechanism for 
dispute resolution. Currently, no formal mechanism is in place to 
handle the role of dispute resolution between two jurisdictions which 
have reached different and incompatible conclusions following a merger 
investigation. Although the OECD currently provides a voluntary 
mechanism for dispute resolution among OECD Member States, this 
procedure has not been utilized in the past. This paper would explore 
what mechanisms, if any, could be implemented to resolve disputes. In 
particular, whether and when mediation would be an attractive option in 
the merger context. Consideration also needs to be given to the 
appropriate forum, timing, the composition of the decision-making 
panel, and the choice of law/legal test that would be applied.
    15. This paper would consider whether, and if so how, the U.S. 
premerger notification system could be reformed in the framework of 
reform globally. This paper would identify and discuss those aspects of 
the U.S. premerger notification system that adversely impact on 
international mergers. Issues to consider could include whether the 30 
day/20 day review periods are impractical, and if so what adjustments 
would be necessary to respond both to the needs of merging firms as 
well as those officials charged with scrutinizing proposed mergers; 
whether requests for additional information are overly broad; whether 
the jurisdictional test (including size of the parties and size of the 
transaction thresholds) should be altered (e.g., raised or lowered); 
and whether the exemption thresholds for transactions involving foreign 
firms should be raised. In addition, this paper could also consider how 
reform of domestic practices might be viewed by foreign jurisdictions.
    16. There is substantial overlap between the Antitrust Division and 
other federal agencies of the U.S. government with respect to 
responsibility for reviewing mergers, joint ventures or other 
alliances. This paper would provide a comparative

[[Page 57316]]

institutional analysis of U.S. agency responsibility for merger review 
and address the implications of ``bifurcated'' or ``overlapping'' 
responsibilities in those sectors where the markets are global. 
Further, the paper would draw comparative implications for foreign 
regimes that also have bifurcated or overlapping review.
    17. National competition policies governing patent and know-how 
licensing contracts impose conflicting obstacles to cross-border 
business transactions and arrangements, particularly technology 
licensing, joint ventures, mergers and distribution arrangements. For 
example, the United States, the EU and Japan have adopted detailed 
policies on the validity of restrictive clauses in such agreements. The 
three sets of rules exhibit marked differences, however, in both 
procedure and substance. This paper would explore the differences of 
approach (in these and other major countries), analyze when differences 
are justified and when compliance with different regimes is an 
unnecessary burden. What are possible solutions to minimize the burden? 
Is harmonization a feasible option?
    18. Concerns about confidentiality and leakage of information 
appear to have been successfully addressed with respect to domestic 
mergers through the Protocol for Coordination in Merger Investigations 
Between the Federal Enforcement Agencies and State Attorneys General. 
This paper should assess that arrangement, with particular focus on 
whether or not the approach taken to the treatment of confidential 
information and the penalties associated with misuse might provide 
relevant precedence for new international arrangements.
    19. This paper would identify the areas of substantive divergence 
in major jurisdictions with active antitrust merger control regimes. 
Further, the paper would explore areas of change and evolution (e.g., 
has there been a trend toward convergence over time?)

Trade and Competition Interface Issues

    The Advisory Committee is interested in considering policy 
responses that could deter anticompetitive foreign restraints that 
block access to markets; reduce barriers to effective prosecution of 
such restraints with adverse effects in the United States, and expand 
cooperation between U.S. and foreign authorities. Accordingly, papers 
need to consider what might be done to facilitate vigorous enforcement 
of competition laws and policies in those jurisdictions with 
competition laws or policies in place, as well as those steps that 
might usefully be undertaken to promote effective competition.
    1. This paper would consider the evidence that anticompetitive 
arrangements or practices involving conduct that occurs in more than 
one country are prohibiting or thwarting international trading nations 
from deriving the gains from international trade liberalization. More 
specifically, how do anticompetitive business practices impede U.S. 
firms from selling goods or services or investing abroad? How serious a 
problem in this? Which practices cause the most serious problems from 
the standpoint of international trade effects? From the standpoint of 
competition policy?
    2. What is the proper role of competition policy in addressing 
barriers to international trade and investment stemming from private 
anticompetitive arrangement? Should a decision by a nation to tolerate 
private arrangements that create such barriers to access to a market be 
judged by competition principles or principles of trade policy? If the 
former, should conduct be judged by that nation's competition 
principles under a non-discrimination standard or some other 
competition principles?
    3. Under what conditions can traditional tools of domestic 
competition policy be applied to address anticompetitive private 
practices in those jurisdictions that have such laws and policies in 
place?
    4. Is a decision by one nation not to adopt or enforce consumer-
oriented competition laws that would ameliorate access problems (a) an 
appropriate exercise of its sovereignty, (b) an affront to sound 
competition objectives, or (c) a breach of government-to-government 
obligations best treated as a trade dispute? How should these disputes 
be addressed?
    5. There have been a number of international trade disputes 
centering around allegations of lax or discriminatory enforcement of 
competition laws. In addition, the very question of what comprises an 
effective competition policy and enforcement regime is under 
examination in major international fora such as the OECD and elsewhere. 
This paper would analyze the criteria by which national or 
international competition authorities could assess enforcement of 
competition laws. How might one judge whether a jurisdiction has a 
strong or weak enforcement record--e.g., using statistical evaluations 
of cases brought, investigatory staff, penalties imposed, etc.? Would 
it be useful for international organizations to be reviewing such 
enforcement practices? If so, whether? If not, why not?
    6. This paper would consider the extent to which non-competition 
policy objectives are being facilitated by competition policies in 
foreign jurisdictions--e.g., industrial policies, job preservation, 
etc.
    7. This paper would provide an analysis of the unilateral 
enforcement of the U.S. antitrust laws to attack foreign conduct abroad 
that affects U.S. exports. It would analyze the government and private 
case law concerning ``outbound'' foreign commerce.
    8. Some experts view positive comity as the best option for 
developing cooperation between U.S. and foreign competition authorities 
and thereby attacking anticompetitive conduct abroad that thwarts 
exports of U.S. goods and services. This paper would evaluate the 
record to date as well as the potential application of the positive 
comity provisions of the 1991 EC-U.S. antitrust cooperation agreement 
and the 1998 EC-U.S. positive comity agreement.
    9. It has long been recognized that market access problems can stem 
not only from private anticompetitive restraints that can nullify the 
effects of trade liberalization, but also those restraints that emanate 
from hybrid government-private arrangements. This paper would analyze 
the different ways in which governments can facilitate anticompetitive 
conduct including encouragement, government ownership or part 
ownership, lack of enforcement of competition laws, discriminatory 
enforcement, as well as other means. What role should antitrust 
enforcement play in attacking these types of practices?
    10. What role should unilateral and bilateral U.S. trade policy 
initiatives play in addressing anticompetitive conduct by private 
parties? By government-owned companies? By private-public hybrid 
companies? By private parties encouraged by governmental agencies?
    11. The World Trade Organization (WTO) has taken an increasing 
interest in competition policy including the formation of a Working 
Group on Trade an Competition Policy. Is the WTO a suitable forum for 
competition issues? Some suggest a dispute settlement role for the WTO. 
Others suggest that the WTO could serve to encourage the development of 
effective competition laws and enforcement in members countries. What 
role should the World Trade Organization (WTO) play in competition 
policy? What should be the next steps for the WTO Working group?

[[Page 57317]]

    12. A variety of proposals are being debated to address the 
conflicts between competition authorities (in both the merger and 
cooperative enforcement contexts). As a way of evaluating these dispute 
resolution proposals, please describe and assess dispute resolution 
mechanisms in non-antitrust public enforcement actions, i.e., tax, 
international trade, securities, commodities, etc. Are there any 
lessons that can be drawn from these experiences that might apply in 
the antitrust context?

Enforcement Cooperation

Barriers to U.S. Transnational Litigation and Investigation Efforts

    It has long been argued by U.S. enforcement officials that 
effective prosecution of anticompetitive restraints, particularly 
prosecutions involving foreign corporations and defendants, can be 
constrained by limited access to documents and witnesses located abroad 
e.g., by a foreign country's law (such as a blocking law) or by 
differences in legal standards. Accordingly, this paper (or papers) 
could consider:
    1. Those barriers most often encountered in major foreign 
jurisdictions that affect U.S. transnational litigation and 
investigation efforts, both with respect to outbound and inbound 
effects on U.S. commerce. Are these obstacles statutory in nature (such 
as a blocking law) or statutory in combination with local business 
practice (such as might be the case with secrecy practices)? Are these 
barriers traditional or have they arisen through laws enacted within 
the past two decades?
    2. What has the United States done--unilaterally or through 
multilateral or plurilateral fora--to overcome barriers to U.S. 
transnational litigation and investigation efforts? Have U.S. efforts 
been successful in lowering or eliminating barriers to litigation and 
investigative efforts in transnational matters? Provide examples of 
case law or of specific experiences that indicate the results achieved 
by any such efforts by the United States. What further steps might the 
United States take and why? What steps would be inadvisable for the 
United States to undertake and why?
    3. From the perspective of a potentially cooperative foreign 
defendant or witness, describe the foreign laws or practices that 
impede or delay a person from providing information to U.S. authorities 
for use in an antitrust enforcement matter. What specific examples can 
be used to illustrate these barriers? How, if at all, can such 
obstacles be overcome and what resulting impact would there be on U.S. 
antitrust investigations or litigation? Would any changes in U.S. law 
improve the likelihood that barriers might be lowered for foreign 
persons providing information to U.S. antitrust authorities?
    4. Enhancing Antitrust Enforcement in Foreign Jurisdictions. This 
paper could address several questions: How can the United States 
encourage foreign jurisdictions to enhance their antitrust or 
competition law enforcement programs and, in particular, to engage in 
stronger enforcement and cooperative enforcement undertakings vis-a-vis 
hard core cartel activities? Are criminal penalties necessary? Compare 
the benefits and drawbacks of taking up this issue in regional or 
plurilateral fora, e.g., respectively NAFTA or the OECD, or on a 
bilateral basis.

Comparative Antitrust Enforcement

    The suggestions below for papers may be addressed in a single 
comprehensive piece or else selected topics may the subject of a paper.
    5. Compare the level and type of federal U.S. antitrust enforcement 
with antitrust enforcement in other major jurisdictions that have 
developed antitrust or competition laws. What accounts for differences 
in enforcement practices and records?
    6. Compare remedies and the effectiveness of remedies for antitrust 
violations in the U.S. and other major jurisdictions with developed 
antitrust laws. What is the impact of these differences on detection 
and enforcement of international cartels? This paper should focus 
substantial attention on a comparison of criminal antitrust enforcement 
programs between the United States and other jurisdictions with 
criminal antitrust laws. Similarly, this paper should identify those 
U.S. enforcement tools and U.S. sanctions that are most effective in 
advancing the United States civil and criminal antitrust enforcement 
efforts (e.g., in the criminal context, enforcement tools such as 
compulsory powers, grand jury process, and the Department of Justice's 
corporate leniency program; and sanctions including, for example, 
personal liability and the possibility of incarceration).
    7. To what extent do differences in private rights of action impact 
antitrust compliance and antitrust enforcement in the United States and 
in foreign countries? How do private rights and available remedies in 
the United States compare with those in other jurisdictions? What are 
the causes of this disparity? What other jurisdictions have active 
private antitrust bars? What propels (or inhibits) private actions in 
these jurisdictions as compared with the United States? Should there be 
changes in the U.S. laws or elsewhere--why, and how might these be 
accomplished?
    8. Exchange of Confidential Information--Business Perspective. This 
paper will provide the business perspective on cooperative antitrust 
enforcement and associated concerns regarding the exchange of 
confidential business information between the U.S. and foreign 
antitrust authorities for use in their respective antitrust enforcement 
activities. Provide specific examples of incidents that have given rise 
to such concerns and the laws or practices underlying such incidents. 
Include any differences in concerns, if any, that exist when the 
information is exchanged for use in a civil or, separately, in a 
criminal matter.

Exchange of Confidential Information--Civil Enforcement Matters

    The United States is authorized under the International Antitrust 
Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994 (IAEAA) to negotiate agreements with 
foreign jurisdictions under which U.S. antitrust authorities who are 
engaged in a civil investigation may request that the foreign authority 
provide confidential information from its files to the United States or 
that the foreign authority retrieve confidential information to assist 
the United States in its investigation. The IAEAA permits U.S. 
antitrust authorities, with certain assurances, to provide reciprocal 
assistance to the foreign authority with which it has a mutual 
assistance agreement (excepting confidential information obtained in 
connection with a Hart-Scott-Rodino premerger notification). Further, 
the IAEAA requires that a foreign authority must accord confidential 
information furnished to it by U.S. antitrust authorities with the same 
degree of confidentiality protection as the information would receive 
in the United States, including downstream confidentiality. The United 
States and Australia have recently negotiated a bilateral accord that 
is awaiting final approval. This paper (or papers) could consider the 
following.
    9. In what other jurisdictions are authorities eligible to enter 
into confidential information sharing agreements? With the goal of 
enhanced enforcement cooperation in mind, should the United States 
encourage antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions to obtain 
authority like that in the United States which enables the

[[Page 57318]]

exchange and protection of confidential information? If so, how? If 
not, why not?
    10. What form of agreement(s) would best achieve the goal of 
enhanced enforcement cooperation? Should such agreements be negotiated 
on a bilateral or another basis?

Exchange of Confidential Information--Criminal Enforcement Matters

    The United States is party to 19 bilateral mutual assistance 
treaties in criminal matters (MLATs), under which it can request 
assistance in obtaining information, including confidential 
information, from its MLAT partners for use in U.S. criminal antitrust 
enforcement investigations and litigation. This paper (or papers) could 
consider the following.
    11. What has been the United States' experience in seeking 
assistance for criminal antitrust matters under its MLATs? For those 
jurisdictions that are party to bilateral antitrust agreements with the 
United States but not to MLATs, is there any meaningful difference in 
the assistance that can be provided? With the goal of enhanced 
cooperation in mind, how might the United States encourage antitrust 
authorities in other jurisdictions to change restrictions in their laws 
so that existing (or future) MLATs with such countries may extend to 
antitrust matters?
    12. The United States also encounters obstacles when seeking 
extradition from abroad of defendants to U.S. antitrust actions. In 
what way can the United States encourage foreign countries to lower 
their barriers to providing the United States with extradition 
assistance in antitrust matters? Provide examples and an analysis of 
successes or frustrations in U.S. efforts to seek extradition 
assistance from abroad in connection with a U.S. criminal antitrust 
matter.

Transnational Cartels

    The topics below are intended to be addressed in separate essays.
    13. This paper should consider the incidence of transnational 
cartels. What does the empirical evidence suggest is the impact that 
transnational cartels have on the United States' economy and on U.S. 
business interests? This paper should also compare the nature and 
effect of transnational cartels and of cartel enforcement in the U.S. 
today with earlier periods. This paper might also explore whether the 
structure of international markets has changed so that international 
cartels are more likely to be detected now than in earlier periods. 
Finally, this paper should assess what recent evidence suggests about 
the relative economic significance, in terms of cartel structure and 
welfare losses, of transnational versus domestic cartel arrangements.
    14. Is there any evidence that weak antitrust or competition policy 
enforcement is producing environments that are home to international 
cartels? Are there global markets or market structures that are likely 
to foster cartel arrangements? Or more generally, are there market or 
structural factors that can be identified as associated with domestic 
or international cartel formation and operations, and are there any 
differences between the two?
    15. Hard Core Cartels. This paper will comment on whether it is 
necessary or useful to have a common international understanding about 
what constitutes a ``hard core cartel'', both domestically and 
internationally, and on how the term should be defined. This paper 
would consider the potential for cooperation under existing bilateral 
or international instruments (e.g., bilateral accords and OECD 
Recommendations, among others), and assess next steps under these 
agreements. Further, this paper would make suggestions for enhanced 
enforcement cooperation between the United States and foreign 
jurisdictions in enforcement efforts against hard core cartels. These 
suggestions would include recommendations for positive incentives the 
United States might offer to foreign jurisdictions as encouragement for 
them to alert the United States to hard core cartel activities that are 
affecting the United States.
    Please send written replies to: ICPAC, U.S. Department of Justice, 
Antitrust Division--Rm. 10011, 601 D Street, N.W., Washington, DC 
20530, Facsimile: (202) 514-4508, Electronic Mail: [email protected].
Merit E. Janow,
Executive Director, International Competition Policy Advisory 
Committee.
[FR Doc. 98-28547 Filed 10-26-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-11-M