[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 193 (Tuesday, October 6, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 53646-53648]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-26753]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

[Recommendations 98-1]


Integrated Safety Management and the Department of Energy (DOE) 
Facilities

AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

ACTION: Notice recommendations.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has made a 
recommendation to the Secretary of Energy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2286a 
concerning integrated safety management and the Department of Energy 
(DOE) facilities.

DATES: Comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this 
recommendation are due on or before November 5, 1998.

ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this 
recommendation to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana 
Avenue, NW, Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004-2901.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Kenneth M. Pusateri or Andrew L. Thibadeau at the address above or 
telephone (202) 208-6400.


[[Page 53647]]


Dated: October 1, 1998.
John T. Conway,
Chairman.

[Recommendation 98-1]

Integrated Safety Management and the Department of Energy (DOE) 
Facilities

Dated: September 28, 1998.
    On October 11, 1995, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 
(Board) issued to the Secretary of Energy its Recommendation 95-2, 
entitled Safety Management. The Recommendation proposed adoption by 
the Department of Energy (DOE) of a concept termed ``Integrated 
Safety Management'' (ISM) as a means of improving assurance of 
safety at DOE's defense nuclear facilities. The Secretary of Energy 
provided an implementation plan for the Recommendation on April 18, 
1996, which the Board accepted in turn. In accordance with the 
implementation plan, DOE issued its Policy Statement 450.4 to be the 
basis for initiation and conduct of ISM at its facilities.
    DOE and its contractors are making good progress in implementing 
the concept of ISM at defense nuclear facilities. One of the central 
functions of ISM called out both in the Recommendation and the 
implementation plan is ``feedback and improvement.'' That function 
is exercised both in planning work and establishing safety controls 
at the outset, and in subsequent assessment of the diligence in 
application and the success in achievement of safety.
    DOE has established through its directives system its 
expectation of actions by both the federal work force and contractor 
management in assessing the effectiveness of its safety management 
programs as they are practiced. Such safety assessments include both 
observance of work and determination of long term trends. They are 
accomplished principally through two major kinds of assessments for 
feedback and improvement.
     Self-assessment by the contractor of site/facility/
activity programs responsive to DOE Policy 450.5, and parallel 
oversight by DOE line managers and facility representatives 
responsible for the missions and contractor performance. This is 
assessment by line management.
     Corporate level assessments by DOE safety specialists 
(ES&H), independent of the line, responsible for capturing and 
sharing lessons learned, preparing trend analyses, performing 
special investigations and otherwise performing corporate-level 
reviews in support of the Secretarial Offices. This is independent 
assessment.
    These assessments and the corrective actions taken in response 
to them are important elements of the internal safety management 
program of DOE.
    In the course of its oversight of DOE's safety management 
program, the Board has noted considerable variability in 
implementation and effectiveness of the feedback and improvement 
function as performed by the numerous federal and contractor 
entities. There appears to be much collection of data (about 30 DOE 
directives drive the process) but less evidence of follow-up. To 
facilitate a closer examination of the matter, the Board in a March 
20, 1998, letter stated its observations, and requested a report on 
how the function was being performed at defense nuclear facilities. 
DOE, by letter dated June 3, 1998, provided such report. The report 
and the matter in general were the subject of discussions with 
representatives of DOE and its contractors at a public meeting held 
by the Board in Washington, DC, on June 24, 1998.
    The outcome of these exchanges to date has been a mutual 
understanding of a number of improvements that are merited. An 
action plan presented to the Board in DOE's letter of June 3, 1998, 
proposes to focus on four areas:
     Accelerating implementation of DOE Policy 450.5,
     Improving DOE's tracking and follow-on processes,
     Improving DOE's lessons Learned processes, and
     Improving implementation of the Functions, 
Responsibilities, Accountability Manual (FRAM) relative to feedback 
and improvement.
    The Board commends DOE for these initiatives. As worthy as they 
are, however, they are not, in the Board's view, sufficient to cover 
all aspects of DOE's feedback and improvement of its safety 
management programs. The Board has noted that the initiatives for 
improvement, particularly DOE's actions on findings, are limited to 
results of oversight by line operations. They do not address 
deficiencies in feedback and improvement based on results of 
independent oversight by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Environment, Health and Safety (EH)--more specifically that of the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oversight (EH-2). The purpose of this 
recommendation is to address that matter.
    For many years, it has been commonplace for DOE's Headquarters 
to conduct independent assessments of safety management by the field 
offices and their contractors, in relation to performance of DOE's 
hazardous work. This parallels a normal practice of headquarters of 
commercial hazardous industries which have multiple product lines 
and facilities and which therefore delegate primary responsibility 
for doing work safely to officials of a facility or a product line. 
But assessment of safety is not sufficient. To be effective, the 
constructive criticisms must be brought to the attention of 
corporate management. There they must be evaluated, and course 
corrections must be directed, if the benefits of assessment are to 
be achieved. This is especially true where resource issues are 
involved and allocation or re-allocation of funds is required.
    Recognizing that at times there is a need for Secretarial 
involvement at levels above the program offices and the corporate 
role of the independent assessors, in September 1989 Secretary 
Watkins established the Office of Nuclear Safety (ONS), reporting 
directly to him as described in SEN-6E-92. That led to Secretarial 
review of all findings of ONS, and an opportunity for response at 
the Secretarial level if necessary. With the change in 
Administration in 1994, this Office was assigned to report to the 
Assistant Secretary for ES&H, and it was redesignated as EH-2 with 
direction by a Deputy Assistant Secretary. In that capacity, EH-2, 
according to the DOE Manual of Safety Management Functions, 
Responsibilities, and Authorities (DOE M411.1-1), performs corporate 
level assessments, independent of the safety management programs as 
implemented by DOE program offices and associated contractors.
    Evaluations are provided to the Secretary of Energy, Congress, 
Cognizant Secretarial Offices, Field Managers and Contractors. 
However, under this organizational arrangement, most of the 
assessments and findings by EH-2 are treated largely as advisories. 
Such follow-up actions as are taken are no longer subjected to a 
deliberative process involving, when appropriate, the Office of the 
Secretary of Energy (Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Under Secretary). 
Rather, they become discretionary to lower levels of DOE line 
management (such as cognizant Secretarial Officers and Field 
Managers). An exception to this general discretionary pattern occurs 
when an accident results in death or serious injury of workers, or 
threatens the public. For example, Type A accident investigations 
require, among other things, corrective action plans (CAPs), 
approval of the CAPs by the cognizant secretarial officer, and 
completion of corrective actions subject to independent 
verification. These requirements, in DOE Order 225.1A, Accident 
Investigations, November 26, 1997, and supporting guidance 
effectively close the loop on accident investigations.
    EH-2 does make a practice of requesting a CAP after submission 
of a report on other types of investigation, and usually receives 
one from the cognizant party. Proposed corrective actions in these 
CAPs are frequently incomplete and are sometimes only loosely 
related to findings in the oversight report. Some CAPs are no more 
than commitments to provide a CAP in the future. The Department of 
Energy has not identified criteria for adequate CAPs, nor has DOE 
authorized EH-2 to require adequate CAPs which are responsive to 
evaluation reports. As a result, problems identified as accident 
precursors are not handled with the same rigor as accidents 
themselves. The end effect is that corrective action under the 
current system is reactive rather than proactive.
    Nothing prevents EH-2 from elevating safety issues via its 
management (Assistant Secretary for ES&H), but the process of 
evaluation is now ad hoc, not institutionalized and protocol driven. 
There is a natural tension between those charged with doing work 
safely and those tasked by management to monitor and evaluate how 
well the doers perform. There is also a natural resistance to having 
to reallocate resources when deficiencies are found. Such factors 
cause outcomes to depend highly on the forcefulness of the 
personalities involved. It is precisely at this interface between 
the Secretarial Program offices and the independent reviewers of 
safety performance (EH-2) that DOE's safety management program 
merits additional attention. The need for an institutionalized 
protocol for content and treatment of a CAP, and for

[[Page 53648]]

addressing and resolving differences are the central points of 
issue.
    The Board is of the opinion that the Department of Energy should 
take additional action with respect to its program for improvement 
of feedback and safety for defense nuclear facilities by 
establishing clearer lines of authority and responsibility for 
resolution of safety findings of its internal, independent safety 
organization. Towards such end, the Board recommends that the 
Department of Energy:
    1. Establish by policy statement, directives, or other 
protocols, the manner in which the Secretary expects Cognizant 
Program Secretarial Officers (Assistant Secretaries) and Field 
managers to address and resolve findings of its independent internal 
corporate safety organization (Assistant Secretary for ES&H). In so 
doing, consideration should be given to direction and guidance for 
the following:
     Establishing authority and responsibility for 
conducting and responding to independent oversight, preparing and 
approving corrective action plans, reporting on progress toward 
timely and adequate closure of findings, and subsequent closure, 
including independent verification of closure.
     Elevating cases of inadequate or untimely response to 
findings to the Office of the Secretary for resolution.
     Describing the purpose and content of corrective action 
plans responsive to oversight findings (e.g., cause identification, 
actions, to correct immediate problem, lessons learned, actions to 
prevent recurrence).
    Scheduling the time frames within which the evaluation and 
process activities must occur.
     Periodically reporting the status of corrective actions 
by the responsible entity.
     Tracking findings and corrective actions to closure 
with a system accessible to DOE line management and the independent 
oversight organization.
    2. Make explicit the Secretarial Officer or designee assigned 
the resolution function.
John T. Conway,
Chairman.

September 28, 1998.
The Honorable Bill Richardson,
Secretary of Energy,
1000 Independence Avenue, SW,
Washington, DC 20585-1000

    Dear Secretary Richardson: On September 28, 1998, the Defense 
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board), in accordance with 42 
U.S.C. Sec. 2286a(a)(5), unanimously approved Recommendation 98-1, 
which is enclosed for your consideration. Recommendation 98-1 deals 
with Integrated Safety Management and the Department of Energy (DOE) 
facilities.
    42 U.S.C. Sec. 2286d(a) requires the Board, after receipt by 
you, to promptly make this recommendation available to the public in 
DOE's regional public reading rooms. The Board believes the 
recommendation contains no information which is classified or 
otherwise restricted. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 
Secs. 2161-68, as amended, please arrange to have this 
recommendation promptly placed on file in your regional public 
reading rooms.
    The Board will publish this recommendation in the Federal 
Register.
        Sincerely,
John T. Conway,
Chairman.

c: Mr. Mark B. Whitaker, Jr..

[FR Doc. 98-26753 Filed 10-5-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3670-01-M