[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 189 (Wednesday, September 30, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 52304-52307]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-26208]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, 50-287]


Duke Energy Corporation; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of 
Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses, Proposed No Significant 
Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
considering issuance of amendments to Facility Operating License Nos. 
DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55, issued to Duke Energy Corporation (the 
licensee) for operation of the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 
3, located in Seneca, South Carolina.
    The proposed amendments would incorporate a License Condition that 
would allow a revision to the Oconee Updated Final Safety Analysis 
Report that addresses potential plant conditions that could occur 
during engineered safeguards functional tests of the emergency 
electrical system. These tests are planned to be performed on Unit 3, 
with Unit 3 in the cold shutdown condition, and Units 1 and 2 operating 
at power. If an actual loss-of-coolant accident with loss of offsite 
power were to occur on Unit 1 or 2, simultaneously with test initiation 
on Unit 3, the Emergency Power System would be placed in a condition 
outside the present design basis. In addition, the requirements of 
Selected Licensee Commitment 16.5.5, Shutdown Cooling Requirements, 
will not be met during the tests, when power is intentionally 
interrupted to the low pressure injection pumps. The tests are 
scheduled to be performed in November 1998, during the Unit 3 refueling 
outage. The proposed changes address an unreviewed safety question that 
requires prior NRC approval before implementation.
    Before issuance of the proposed license amendments, the Commission 
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
    The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment 
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the 
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of 
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendments would not (1) 
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; 
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As 
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of 
the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented 
below:

    1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    No. For this test, the affected unit is Oconee 3 which will be 
in a post refueling shutdown condition. All safety functions for 
maintaining safe shutdown of the unit are available. The UFSAR 
[Updated Final Safety Analysis Report] Loss of Electric Power 
accident assumes two types of events: (1) Loss of load and (2) Loss 
of all system and station power. Since Unit 3 will be shutdown 
during performance of this test, a unit trip cannot occur. Nothing 
associated with this test will result in a significant increase in 
the likelihood of a loss of all systems and station power since both 
Keowee units and the switchyard will remain available. In addition, 
the gas turbines at Lee Steam station will be available and the SSF

[[Page 52305]]

[Standby Shutdown Facility] diesel will be operable. The loss of all 
station power accident analysis assumptions are still valid. 
Additionally, since the switchyard will remain energized and 
available, offsite power can quickly be reconnected to the plant. 
Core uncovery and possible fuel damage is not considered a concern 
during the performance of this test.
    Oconee Units 1 and 2 will continue to operate as normal during 
this test, and should be unaffected. The intentional and controlled 
interruption of power to the Oconee Unit 3 auxiliaries, including 
decay heat removal (DHR) systems will not effect the two operating 
units. There are no reactor trip, shutdown margin or reactivity 
management concerns on either of the operating units.
    The Keowee units provide the main source of emergency power for 
the Oconee units, but they are not accident initiators. This test 
has no adverse impact on the ability of the Keowee units to satisfy 
their design requirements of achieving rated speed and voltage 
within 23 seconds of receipt of an emergency start signal.
    Although not a design basis accident, a hypothetical station 
blackout condition where all offsite power and the Keowee units are 
lost is described in the UFSAR. As detailed above, this test will 
not deenergize the switchyard or remove the Keowee units. Thus, 
emergency power systems will remain available, as well as the 
standby shutdown facility (SSF) diesel, and there is no significant 
increase in likelihood of a station blackout. The performance of 
this test does not affect the probability of an accident evaluated 
in the UFSAR (LOOP [Loss of Offsite Power], LOCA [Loss-of-Coolant 
Accident], and LOCA/LOOP) occurring on an operating unit.
    In the extremely unlikely (2E-9) event that a real LOCA/LOOP 
were to occur on either of the operating units simultaneously with 
test initiation (simulated LOCA/LOOP) on Unit 3, the Oconee 
Emergency Power System would be placed in a condition outside the 
design bases. The Emergency Power System may not be capable of 
handling the electrical loading of two instantaneous LOCA/LOOP 
events without some safety related equipment being adversely 
affected, i.e. tripping off, experiencing low voltage, etc. 
Therefore, an infinitesimally small, but non-zero, increase in the 
probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety AND 
the potential consequences of a LOCA/LOOP event is created by the 
test. Additionally, the requirements of Selected Licensee Commitment 
16.5.5 Shutdown Cooling Requirements (RCS [Reactor Coolant System] 
Loops not full and Fuel Transfer Canal is not full) will not be met 
during each test when power is intentionally interrupted to the LPI 
[Low Pressure Injection] pumps during the simulated LOOP and again 
during the dead bus transfer back to the unit startup transformer. 
However, the chances of an actual LOCA/LOOP occurring on one of the 
operating units during the short interval of performance of this 
test has been shown to be insignificant.
    There is no adverse impact on containment integrity, 
radiological release pathways, fuel design, filtration systems, main 
steam relief valve setpoints, or radwaste systems. Therefore, based 
on the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) analysis and information 
presented in the Safety Analysis Section of [the licensee's] 
submittal, the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated will not be significantly increased by the proposed test 
and related UFSAR change.
    2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident 
from the accidents previously evaluated?
    No. The emergency power systems will remain operable and 
available to mitigate accidents. Unit 3 will already be in a 
shutdown condition, so there is no risk of an Oconee Unit 3 trip, 
challenge to the reactor protective system (RPS), and LOCA/LOOP 
scenarios, and most UFSAR analyzed accident scenarios do not apply 
to it. Since Unit 3 will have been shutdown for greater than 30 days 
and be in a post refueling condition, the decay heat loads are 
relatively low. Additionally, on Oconee Unit 3, while the vessel 
head will be on and intact and with fuel in the core when ECCS 
[Emergency Core Cooling System] injection occurs, the steam 
generator hand holds and one pressurizer safety valve will be 
removed. This arrangement precludes any potential for low 
temperature overpressurization (LTOP) problems. The suction source 
for the injection systems will be the BWST [Borated Water Storage 
Tank] which contains highly borated water at >75 F. Thus there are 
no reactivity management or 10 CFR [Part] 50 Appendix G (NDTT [nil-
ductility transition temperature]) concerns. The test injection flow 
rates are insignificant compared to those required to cause fuel 
assembly/control rod lift.
    Oconee Units 1 and 2 will continue to operate as normal during 
this test, and should be unaffected. The intentional and controlled 
interruption of power to the Oconee Unit 3 auxiliaries, including 
decay heat removal (DHR) systems will not affect the two operating 
units. There are no reactor trip, shutdown margin or reactivity 
management concerns on either of the operating units.
    Preplanning, use of dedicated operators, and independent 
verification will be employed during critical test phases.
    As addressed in question 1 above, in the extremely unlikely (2E-
9) event that a real LOCA/LOOP were to occur on either of the 
operating units simultaneously with test initiation (simulated LOCA/
LOOP) on Unit 3, the Oconee Emergency Power System would be placed 
in a condition outside the design bases. Therefore, an 
infinitesimally small, but still non-zero, increase in the 
probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety AND 
the potential consequences of a LOCA/LOOP event is created by the 
test and related UFSAR change. However, based on the supporting 
information in the PRA calculation and the supporting Safety 
Analysis, no new significant failure modes or credible accident 
scenarios are postulated.
    3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
    No. No function of any safety related emergency power system/
component will be adversely affected or degraded as a result of this 
test. No safety parameters, setpoints, or design limits are 
adversely affected. For this test, Unit 3 will be in a shutdown 
condition, so there is no risk of an Oconee Unit 3 trip, challenge 
to the reactor protective system (RPS), LOCA/LOOP scenarios, and 
most UFSAR analyzed accident scenarios. Strictly per the Technical 
Specifications, emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) and auxiliary 
power systems are not required on a unit with RCS temperature less 
than 200 deg.F. However, both the emergency power and DHR systems 
will remain available during the test. Decay heat removal will only 
be briefly interrupted during the simulated LOCA/LOOP portions of 
the test. Since Unit 3 will be shutdown for greater than 30 days at 
the time of the test, the decay heat loads will be relatively low, 
and compensatory measures will be in place to ensure heat removal 
capability can be regained in a timely manner. Additionally, while 
the vessel head will be in place and torqued and fuel will be in the 
core on Oconee Unit 3 when ECCS injection occurs, the steam 
generator hand holes and one pressurizer safety valve will be 
removed.
    Oconee Units 1 and 2 will continue to operate as normal during 
this test, and should be unaffected. The intentional and controlled 
interruption of power to the Oconee Unit 3 auxiliaries, including 
decay heat removal (DHR) systems will not affect the two operating 
units. There are no significant reactor trip, shutdown margin or 
reactivity management concerns on either of the operating units.
    There is no adverse impact to the nuclear fuel, cladding, RCS, 
or required containment systems. Therefore, the margin of safety is 
not significantly reduced as a result of this test.
    Duke has concluded based on the above information that there are 
no significant hazards considerations involved in this amendment 
request.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination.
    Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendments until the 
expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances 
change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely 
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, 
the Commission may issue the license amendments before the expiration 
of the 30-day notice period, provided that its

[[Page 52306]]

final determination is that the amendments involve no significant 
hazards consideration. The final determination will consider all public 
and State comments received. Should the Commission take this action, it 
will publish in the Federal Register a notice of issuance and provide 
for opportunity for a hearing after issuance. The Commission expects 
that the need to take this action will occur very infrequently.
    Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and 
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of 
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of 
this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to 
Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of 
written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document 
Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.
    The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to 
intervene is discussed below.
    By October 30, 1998, the licensee may file a request for a hearing 
with respect to issuance of the amendments to the subject facility 
operating licenses and any person whose interest may be affected by 
this proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the 
proceeding must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for 
leave to intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to 
intervene shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of 
Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR part 2. 
Interested persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which 
is available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public 
document room located at the Oconee County Library, 501 West South 
Broad Street, Walhalla, South Carolina. If a request for a hearing or 
petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the 
Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the 
Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 
Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or 
the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of 
hearing or an appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following factors: (1) the nature of the petitioner's right under the 
Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of 
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the 
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be 
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition 
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of 
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person 
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been 
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of 
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy 
the specificity requirements described above.
    Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to 
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions 
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must 
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be 
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a 
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise 
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the 
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the 
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references 
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is 
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those 
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information 
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material 
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within 
the scope of the amendments under consideration. The contention must be 
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A 
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these 
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be 
permitted to participate as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
    If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final 
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The 
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves 
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the 
amendments and make them immediately effective, notwithstanding the 
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance 
of the amendments.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a 
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place 
before the issuance of any amendment.
    A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must 
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and 
Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public 
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, 
by the above date. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the 
Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to J. Michael McGarry, III, Winston and 
Strawn, 1200 17th Street, NW., Washington, DC 20036, attorney for the 
licensee.
    Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended 
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not 
be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding 
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the 
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the 
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(I)-(v) and 2.714(d).
    For further details with respect to this action, see the 
application for amendments dated September 17, 1998, which is available 
for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the 
Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local 
public document room located at the Oconee County Library, 501 West 
South Broad Street, Walhalla, South Carolina.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 24th day of September 1998.


[[Page 52307]]


    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
David E. LaBarge,
Senior Project Manager, Project Directorate II-2, Division of Reactor 
Projects--I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 98-26208 Filed 9-29-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P