[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 174 (Wednesday, September 9, 1998)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 48294-48370]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-23645]
[[Page 48293]]
_______________________________________________________________________
Part II
Department of Transportation
_______________________________________________________________________
Federal Railroad Administration
_______________________________________________________________________
49 CFR Parts 229, 231, and 232
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Brake System Safety Standards for
Freight and Other Non-Passenger Trains and Equipment
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 174 / Wednesday, September 9, 1998 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 48294]]
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
49 CFR Parts 229, 231, and 232
[FRA Docket No. PB-9; Notice No. 13]
RIN 2130--AB16
Brake System Safety Standards for Freight and Other Non-Passenger
Trains and Equipment
AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
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SUMMARY: FRA proposes revisions to the regulations governing the power
braking systems and equipment used in freight and other non-passenger
railroad train operations. The proposed revisions are designed to
achieve safety by better adapting the regulations to the needs of
contemporary railroad operations and facilitating the use of advanced
technologies. These proposed revisions are being issued in order to
comply with Federal legislation, to respond to petitions for
rulemaking, and to address areas of concern derived from experience in
the application of existing standards governing these operations.
DATES: (1) Written Comments: Written comments must be received by
January 15, 1999. Comments received after that date will be considered
to the extent possible without incurring additional expenses or delay.
(2) Public Hearings: FRA is planning to conduct at least two public
hearings with the first public hearing being held in Washington D.C.
and one technical conference with interested parties in order to
provide all interested parties the opportunity to comment on the
proposed revisions contained in the NPRM. FRA will issue a separate
document in the Federal Register in the very near future to inform all
interested parties as to the exact dates and locations where the public
hearings and technical conference will be held.
ADDRESSES: (1) Written Comments: Address comments to the Docket Clerk,
Office of Chief Counsel, RCC-10, Federal Railroad Administration, 400
Seventh Street, S.W., Stop 10, Washington, D.C. 20590. Comments should
identify the docket and notice number, and five copies should be
submitted. Persons wishing to receive confirmation of receipt of their
comments should include a self-addressed, stamped postcard. The Docket
Clerk will indicate on the postcard the date on which the comments were
received and will return the card to the addressee. The dockets are
housed in the Seventh Floor of 1120 Vermont Avenue, N.W., Washington
D.C. Public dockets may be reviewed between the hours of 8:30 a.m. and
5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except holidays.
(2) Public Hearings: FRA is planning to conduct at least two public
hearings with the first public hearing being held in Washington D.C.
and one technical conference with interested parties in order to
provide all interested parties the opportunity to comment on the
proposed revisions contained in the NPRM. FRA will issue a separate
document in the Federal Register in the very near future to inform all
interested parties as to the exact dates and locations where the public
hearings and technical conference will be held.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Leon Smith, Deputy Regional
Administrator--Region 3, FRA Office of Safety, RRS-14, 400 Seventh
Street, S.W., Stop 25, Washington, D.C. 20950 (telephone 404-562-3800),
or Thomas Herrmann, Trial Attorney, Office of the Chief Counsel, RCC-
10, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Stop 10, Washington, D.C. 20950
(telephone 202-493-6053).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
In 1992, Congress amended the Federal rail safety laws by adding
certain statutory mandates related to power brake safety. See 49 U.S.C.
20141. These amendments specifically address the revision of the power
brake regulations by adding a new subsection which states:
(r) POWER BRAKE SAFETY.--(1) The Secretary shall conduct a
review of the Department of Transportation's rules with respect to
railroad power brakes, and not later than December 31, 1993, shall
revise such rules based on such safety data as may be presented
during that review.
(2) In carrying out paragraph (1), the Secretary shall, where
applicable, prescribe standards regarding dynamic brake equipment. *
* *
Pub. L. No. 102-365, Sec. 7; codified at 49 U.S.C. 20141, superseding
45 U.S.C. 431(r).
In response to the statutory mandate, the various recommendations
and petitions for rulemaking, and due to its own determination that the
power brake regulations were in need of revision, FRA published an
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) on December 31, 1992 (57
FR 62546), and conducted a series of public workshops in early 1993.
The ANPRM provided background information and presented questions on
various subjects including: the use and design of end-of-train (EOT)
telemetry devices; the air flow method of train brake testing; the
additional testing of train air brakes during extremely cold weather;
the training of employees to perform train brake tests and inspections;
computer-assisted braking systems; the operation of dynamic brakes on
locomotives; and other miscellaneous subjects relating to conventional
brake systems as well as information regarding high speed passenger
train brakes. The questions presented in the ANPRM on the various
topics were intended as fact-finding tools and were intended to elicit
the views of those persons outside FRA charged with ensuring compliance
with the power brake regulations on a day-to-day basis.
Based on the comments and information received, FRA published a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (1994 NPRM) regarding revisions to the
power brake regulation. See 59 FR 47676 (September 16, 1994). In the
1994 NPRM, FRA proposed a comprehensive revision of the power brake
regulations which attempted to preserve the useful elements of the
current regulatory system in the framework of an entirely new document.
FRA attempted to delineate the requirements for conventional freight
braking systems from the more diverse systems for various categories of
passenger service. In developing the NPRM, FRA engaged in a systems
approach to the power brake regulations. FRA considered all aspects of
a railroad operation and the effects that the entire operation had on
the train and locomotive power braking systems. Therefore, the proposed
requirements not only addressed specific brake equipment and inspection
requirements, but also attempted to encompass other aspects of a
railroad's operation which directly affect the quality and performance
of the braking system, such as: personnel qualifications; maintenance
requirements; written procedures governing operation, maintenance, and
inspection; record keeping requirements; and the development and
integration of new technologies.
Following publication of the 1994 NPRM in the Federal Register, FRA
held a series of public hearings in 1994 to allow interested parties
the opportunity to comment on specific issues addressed in the NPRM.
Public hearings were held in Chicago, Illinois on November 1-2; in
Newark, New Jersey on November 4; in Sacramento, California on November
9; and in Washington, D.C. on December 13-14, 1994. These hearings were
attended by numerous railroads, organizations representing railroads,
labor
[[Page 48295]]
organizations, rail shippers, and State governmental agencies. Due to
the strong objections raised by a large number of commenters at these
public hearings, FRA announced by notice published on January 17, 1995
that it would defer action on the NPRM and permit the submission of
additional comments prior to making a determination as to how it would
proceed in this matter. See 60 FR 3375. Although the comment period
officially closed April 1, 1995, FRA continued to receive comments on
the NPRM as well as other suggested alternatives well into October
1995.
Furthermore, beginning in mid-1995, FRA internally committed to the
process of establishing the Rail Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC). The
determination to develop the RSAC was based on FRA's belief that the
continued use of ad hoc collaborative procedures for appropriate
rulemakings was not the most effective means of accomplishing its goal
of a more consensual regulatory program. FRA believed that the
establishment of an advisory committee to address railroad safety
issues would provide the best opportunity for creating a consensual
regulatory program to benefit the Administrator in the conduct of her
statutory responsibilities. FRA envisioned that the RSAC would allow
representatives from management, labor, FRA and other interested
parties to cooperatively address safety problems by identifying the
best solutions based on agreed-upon facts, and, where regulation
appears necessary, identify regulatory options to implement these
solutions. The process of establishing the RSAC was not complete until
March 1, 1996, and on March 11, 1996, FRA published a notice in the
Federal Register that the Committee had been established. See 61 FR
9740.
In the interim, based on these considerations and after review of
all the comments submitted, FRA published a notice in the Federal
Register on February 21, 1996, stating that in order to limit the
number of issues to be examined and developed in any one proceeding FRA
would proceed with the revision of the power brake regulations via
three separate processes. See 61 FR 6611. In light of the testimony and
comments received on the 1994 NPRM, emphasizing the differences between
passenger and freight operations and the brake equipment utilized by
the two, FRA decided to separate passenger equipment power brake
standards from freight equipment power brake standards. As passenger
equipment power brake standards are a logical subset of passenger
equipment safety standards, it was determined that the passenger
equipment safety standards working group would assist FRA in developing
a second NPRM covering passenger equipment power brake standards. See
49 U.S.C. 20133(c). In addition, in the interest of public safety and
due to statutory as well as internal commitments, FRA determined that
it would separate the issues related to two-way EOTs from both the
passenger and freight issues, address them in a public regulatory
conference, and issue a final rule on the subject as soon as
practicable. A final rule on two-way EOTs was issued on December 27,
1996. See 62 FR 278 (January 2, 1997). Furthermore, it was announced
that a second NPRM covering freight equipment power brake standards
would be developed with the assistance of RSAC. At the Committee's
inaugural meeting on April 1-2, 1996, the RSAC officially accepted the
task of assisting FRA in development of revisions to the regulations
governing power brake systems for freight equipment. See 61 FR 29164.
Members of RSAC nominated individuals to be members of the Freight
Power Brake Working Group (Working Group) tasked with making
recommendations regarding revision of the power regulations applicable
to freight operations. The Working Group was comprised of thirty-one
voting members as well as a number of alternates and technical support
personnel. The following organizations were represented by a voting
member and/or an alternate on the Working Group:
Association of American Railroads (AAR)
American Short Line Railroad Association (ASLRA)
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE)
Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad (BNSF)
Canadian National Railroads (CN)
Canadian Pacific Rail Systems (CP)
Consolidated Rail Corporation (CR)
CSX Transportation (CSX)
Illinois Central Railroad (IC)
International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers (IAMAW)
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)(Advisor)
National Association of Regulatory Commissioners (NARUC)/California
Public Utilities Commission (CAPUC)
Norfolk Southern Corporation (NS)
Railway Progress Institute (RPI)
Sheet Metal Workers International Association (SMWIA)
Southern Pacific Lines (SP)
Transportation Communications International Union/Brotherhood of
Railway Carmen (TCU/BRC)
Transport Workers Union of America (TWU)
Union Pacific Railroad (UP)
United Transportation Union (UTU)
The Working Group held seven multi-day sessions in which all
members of the working group were invited. These sessions were held on
the following dates:
May 15-17, 1996 in Washington D.C.;
June 11-13, 1996 in Chicago, Illinois;
July 31, 1996 in Chicago, Illinois;
August 21-23, 1996 in Annapolis, Maryland;
September 26-27, 1996 in Washington D.C.;
October 29-30, 1996 in Washington D.C.; and
December 4, 1996 in St. Louis, Missouri.
General minutes of each of these meetings are contained in FRA
Docket PB-9 and are available for public inspection during the times
and at the location noted previously. In addition to these meetings,
there were numerous meetings conducted by smaller task force groups
designated by the Working Group to further develop various issues. All
of these smaller task forces were made up of various members of the
Working Group or their representatives, with each task force being
represented by management, labor, FRA and other interested parties. The
Working Group designated smaller task forces to address the following
issues: dry air; dynamic brakes; periodic maintenance and testing;
electronically controlled locomotive brakes; and inspection and testing
requirements. These task forces were assigned the job of developing the
issues related to the broad topics, presenting reports to the larger
Working Group, and if possible making recommendations to the Working
Group for addressing the issues (recommendations and reports of these
task groups will be addressed in detail in the Discussion of Issues
portion of the preamble to follow).
Although the Working Group discussed, debated, and attempted to
reach consensus on various issues related to freight power brakes,
consensus could not be reached. However, the working group in
conjunction with the various task forces developed a wealth of
information on various issues and further clarified the parties'
positions regarding how the issues could or should be addressed in any
regulation. The major cluster of issues, upon which resolution of many
of the other issues rested, were the requirements related to the
inspection and testing of brake equipment. The inspection and testing
task force met on numerous occasions, gathered and
[[Page 48296]]
reviewed data, and the labor and rail management representatives to the
task force drafted various proposals and options related to the
inspection and testing of freight brake equipment (these proposals are
addressed in detail in the Discussion of Issues portion of the preamble
to follow). Members of the inspection and testing task force presented
their proposals to the larger Working Group as well as the underlying
bases for the proposals. The Working Group discussed the proposals and
investigated many of the costs and benefits related to the various
proposals as well as the safety implications; however, the Working
Group could not reach any type of consensus position. Consequently, FRA
declared that an impasse had been reached and announced, at the
December 4, 1996 meeting of the Working Group, that FRA would proceed
unilaterally with the drafting of the NPRM.
Subsequent to December 4, 1996, several members of the Working
Group, including representatives from both rail management and labor,
continued informal discussions of some of the issues related to the
inspection and testing of freight equipment. These representatives
informed FRA that a consensus proposal might be possible provided that
the Working Group were permitted to continue deliberations.
Consequently, FRA agreed to reconvene the Working Group and in April
1997 three additional meetings were conducted on the following dates:
April 2-3, 1997 in Kansas City, Missouri;
April 10-11, 1997 in Phoenix, Arizona; and
April 23 in Jacksonville, Florida.
Representatives of both rail management and rail labor presented
the Working Group with inspection and testing proposals for
consideration and review both before and during this period. Although
the proposals were discussed and deliberated, the Working Group was
once again unsuccessful in reaching consensus on any of the freight
power brake inspection and testing issues. Consequently, by letter
dated May 29, 1997, FRA informed the members of the Working Group that
FRA would be withdrawing the freight power brake task from the Working
Group at the next full RSAC meeting on June 24, 1997. FRA provided this
notice to avoid any misunderstanding regarding the process by which the
proposed rule would be drafted. FRA also informed the members of the
Working Group that it would not invest further time in attempting to
reach consensus unless all other members of the Working Group jointly
indicated that they have reached consensus on a proposal and wanted to
discuss it with FRA. FRA noted that if that were to occur prior to June
24, 1997, it would reconsider withdrawing the task from RSAC. As no
consensus proposal was presented to FRA prior to June 24, 1997, FRA
withdrew the task from the Working Group and informed the members of
RSAC that FRA would proceed unilaterally in the drafting of a freight
power brake NPRM.
Although FRA proceeded on its own in drafting this document, FRA
believes that all members of the Freight Power Brake Working Group
should be commended for their hard work and dedication in attempting to
resolve and address some of the most difficult and complex issues with
which FRA deals. FRA believes that the information and knowledge
provided by these individuals has helped FRA draft a proposal that not
only ensures the continued safety of railroad employees and the public,
but also recognizes the needs of contemporary railroad operations.
FRA has carefully considered the information, data, and proposals
developed by the Freight Power Brake Working Group as well as all the
oral and written comments offered by various parties regarding the 1994
NPRM on power brakes. The resulting NPRM is based on this information
as well as FRA's experience with enforcing the current power brake
regulations.
Prologue
FRA's institutional experience in locomotive and train braking
safety extends backwards in time to the creation of the Department of
Transportation in 1967 (at which time the Bureau of Railroad Safety and
its functions were transferred from the Interstate Commerce
Commission), to the passage of the Power or Train Brakes Safety
Appliance Act of 1958, and ultimately to the passage of the original
Safety Appliance Act over 100 years ago. Current FRA personnel have,
during prior years, served in a variety of capacities on every major
railroad. These railroad safety inspectors, supervisors, and managers
contribute daily to the rulemaking judgments ultimately expressed by
the Federal Railroad Administrator, and the agency has made a special
effort in this proceeding to tap the knowledge that these individuals
possess to ascertain the means by which public and employee safety may
be secured.
As evidenced by the preceding discussion, FRA has spent years
attempting to develop new power brake regulations to ensure the safety
of our nation's railroads while recognizing the wide variety of
railroad operations and technologies that currently exist in the
industry. In the 1994 NPRM, FRA proposed a comprehensive and innovative
revision to the power brake regulations. At that time, FRA was
attempting to develop a set of regulations that addressed freight,
passenger, and tourist operations, and thus, required FRA to provide
certain latitudes and restrictions that were not completely compatible
with every type of operation covered by the proposal. Consequently,
many segments of the industry adamantly objected to the proposal. FRA
believes that many of these objections were due, at least in part, to
the complexity of the proposal as well as to a misunderstanding of
exactly what was being proposed.
Since that time, as noted above, FRA has instituted rulemakings to
address passenger and commuter operations and equipment, two-way end-
of-train devices, and has developed a channel of communication to
address tourist and excursion operational concerns. The current
proposal is focused solely on freight and other non-passenger
operations. Furthermore, FRA is limiting this proposal to the
operation, inspection, and maintenance of freight power brake systems.
Thus, unlike the previous proposal, FRA will not, for the most part,
attempt to include provisions related to the inspection and maintenance
of locomotive braking systems or to the performance of other mechanical
inspections that are currently addressed by other parts of the
regulations. Although FRA believes these requirements are interrelated
to the inspection, testing, and maintenance of freight power brakes,
FRA believes that they are adequately addressed in other regulations
and would only add to the complexity of this proposal causing confusion
and misunderstanding by members of the regulated community.
Furthermore, representatives of both rail labor and rail management
have indicated that if a consensus proposal could not be developed
within the RSAC process then FRA should proceed unilaterally with
developing a proposal which tracks the current requirements, and that
FRA should strictly enforce those requirements. Although FRA believes
that the current regulatory scheme tends to create incentives to
``overlook'' or fail to conduct vigorous inspections, FRA also believes
that the current regulatory scheme is an effective and proven method of
ensuring safety and that many of the ``negative incentives'' can be
greatly reduced by
[[Page 48297]]
strict and aggressive enforcement and with moderate, although
comprehensive, revision of the requirements. Consequently, the content
of this proposal is far less complex than the previous proposal and
more closely tracks the current requirements related to the inspection,
testing, and maintenance of the braking systems used in freight
operations.
This proposal is intended to be a moderate revision of the current
requirements related to the inspection, testing, and maintenance of the
brake equipment used freight operations. These proposed changes are
intended to balance the concerns of rail labor and management and would
increase the effectiveness of the regulation. Since the passage of the
Power or Train Brakes Safety Appliance Act of 1958, which required
adoption of the AAR recommended practices as regulatory text, FRA has
realized that improvements in clarity are badly needed. FRA believes
that the current regulations need to be reorganized and updated, and
that potential loopholes created by the current language need to be
eliminated. Furthermore, FRA believes that completely new requirements
are needed to address the qualifications of those individuals
conducting brake inspections and tests. FRA also proposes to codify the
statutory requirements related to the movement of freight equipment
with defective or inoperative brakes. In addition, this proposal
codifies and solidifies the maintenance requirements related to the
brake system and its components and prevents unilateral changes to
these provisions by the very party to which they apply.
This proposal also contains various incentives to the railroads to
encourage the performance of quality brake inspections, particularly at
locations where trains originate. These include incentives to use
qualified mechanical forces to conduct brake system tests at major
terminals where long-distance trains originate in order to move these
trains greater distances between brake inspections than currently
permitted. Consequently, this proposal retains the basic inspection
intervals and requirements contained in the current regulations and
preserves the useful elements of the current system; however, FRA
believes that the proposed additions, clarifications, and modifications
increase the safety, effectiveness, and enforceability of the
regulations.
Discussion of Issues and General FRA Conclusions
The following discussions are grouped by major themes and primary
issues addressed not only in the Freight Power Brake Working Group but
also in the 1994 NPRM issued on power brakes and the oral and written
comments submitted in relation to that document. In each of the major
issue areas FRA has attempted to discuss previous proposals, the
comments to those proposals, the information developed by the Working
Group, and any proposals or recommendations made by members of the
Working Group.
I. Accident/Incident History and Defective Equipment
FRA considers many factors in attempting to determine the relative
condition of the industry as it relates to the safety of train power
brake systems. Two factors which figure prominently in this
determination are the number of recent brake-related incidents and the
amount of defective brake equipment recently discovered operating over
the railroad system, both of which provide some indication as to the
potential or likelihood of future brake-related incidents. For purposes
of this discussion, a brake-related incident is one that was reported
to FRA as being caused by one of the following: brake rigging down or
dragging; air hose uncoupled or burst; broken brake pipe or
connections; other brake components damaged, worn, broken or
disconnected; brake valve malfunction (undesired emergency); brake
valve malfunction (stuck brake); hand brake broken or defective; hand
brake linkage and/or connections broken or defective. FRA did not
consider brake pipe obstruction-related incidents because they were
fully considered at the time that FRA promulgated the final rule
relating to the use of two-way end-of-train devices.
Table 1 below contains a compilation of the relevant brake-related
incidents that have been reported to FRA over the past 5 years. The
totals for 1997 reflect incidents through October 1997 and the incident
rate reflects train miles for 1996 (latest available). Both the number
of incidents and the number of train miles for 1997 will in all
probability be higher when they are finalized. As the table clearly
indicates, there were increases in both brake-related incidents and the
incident rate between 1994 and 1996. The incident rate remains fairly
low relative to other causes of derailments and collisions. However, it
should be noted that the figures presented in Table 1 most likely do
not accurately reflect the total number of incidents that are
potentially linked, in some part, to brake-related causes and do not
provide a complete picture of the costs associated with the identified
incidents. FRA obtains information on most incidents directly from the
railroads which generally identify the direct cause of an incident but
may not sufficiently identify all of the contributory causes in a
manner to permit FRA to conclude that the brake system played a part in
the incident. Thus, FRA believes that there may be numerous incidents
that occur in the industry which are at least partially due to brake-
related problems, but which are ultimately more closely linked to human
error or other mechanical problems and thus, are reported to FRA under
those cause codes. Furthermore, the damage costs noted in Table 1 for
the identified incidents are based on the damage to railroad property
or equipment together with the costs of the injuries or fatalities
involved. Thus, the damages presented fail to consider the costs
associated with such things as: loss of lading; wreck clearance; track
delay; environmental clean-up; removal of damaged equipment;
evacuations; or the impact on local traffic patterns. Consequently, the
railroad property damages have been multiplied by a factor of 1.5625 in
an effort to capture these non-reported damages.1
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\1\ AAR surveyed its members and reported that, on average,
these other costs constitute an additional 56.25 percent of the
reported damages.
Table 1.--Brake-Related Incidents
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rate per
Year Number of million Injured Killed Damages \2\
accidents train miles
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
93.......................................... 15 0.024 0 0 $1,298,109
94.......................................... 33 0.050 17 1 $2,440,347
95.......................................... 43 0.064 2 0 $6,710,280
96.......................................... 52 0.077 12 1 $10,534,903
97 \3\...................................... 29 0.043 1 0 $10,032,013
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[[Page 48298]]
Total................................... 172 ........... 32 2 $31,015,653
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A second factor that is considered by FRA, to some extent, in
determining the relative condition of the industry in regard to the
safety of power brake equipment is the percentage of equipment found
with defective brakes during FRA inspections and special projects. The
percentage of equipment with defective brakes was a contentious subject
within the RSAC Power Brake Working Group. The problem of brake defect
data and how it is collected and entered into the FRA database was
debated at length. The issue is important for cost and benefit
estimation of proposals put forth by labor and management and it is
useful to examine the problem in detail. Data on brake defects is
collected by FRA inspectors as they do rail equipment inspections.
Defect data is also collected for special projects under the Safety
Assurance and Compliance Program (SACP). In neither instance is the
data collection procedure designed to be suitable for use in
statistical analysis of brake defects.
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\2\ Increased by 56.25% to reflect unreported damages.
\3\ Based on train miles for 1996 and accidents through October,
1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In order to perform a statistically valid analysis, either all cars
and locomotives must be inspected (prohibitively expensive), or a
statistically valid sample must be collected. For the sample to be
valid for the purpose of statistical analysis, the sample must be
randomly selected so that it will represent the same characteristics as
the universe of data. Random samples have several unique
characteristics. They are unbiased, meaning that each unit has the same
chance of being selected. Random samples are independent, or the
selection of one unit has no influence on the selection of other units.
Most statistical methods depend on independence and lack of bias.
Without a randomized sample design there can be no dependable
statistical analysis, and no way to measure sampling error, no matter
how the data is modified. Random sampling ``statistically guarantees''
the accuracy of the results.
The sampling method used for regular FRA inspections is not random.
It is more of a combination between a judgement sample and an
opportunity sample. The opportunity sample basically just takes the
first sample population that comes along, while the judgement sample is
based on ``expert'' opinion. The sampling method used for SACP
inspections is also a judgement sample, where FRA is focusing its
inspections on a specific safety concern. This method is extremely
prone to bias, as FRA is typically investigating known problem areas.
Furthermore, some SACP inspections are joint inspections with labor.
Consequently, it is unknown whether the final reports reflect only FRA
defects, as many of the joint inspections had both AAR and FRA defects
recorded.
Neither the regular FRA inspections nor the SACP inspections were
designed for random data collection. Although both are very useful to
FRA, they were not designed for this purpose and the data should be
used carefully. FRA believes that data collected during routine
inspections is the most likely data to accurately reflect the condition
of the fleet. However, both FRA inspection data and SACP data lack any
measuring device, a defect is a defect and no distinction is made
between a critical defect versus a minor defect. Furthermore, there is
no correspondence between defects and accidents (no estimated
correlation coefficients were statistically significant). This does not
mean that defects cannot lead to collisions or derailments as the lack
of correlation could easily be a result of non-random sampling.
Consequently, the data collected both during routine FRA inspections
and under SACP cannot be used as a proxy for data collected by means of
a random sample for the purpose of statistical analysis. The sample is
not random, so no dependable statistical analysis may be performed.
The defect ratios for brake and brake-related defects from the FRA
inspection database are shown in Table 2 below. The five-year average
brake defect ratio is 3.84 percent. SACP data (which focuses on known
problem areas) indicates that brake defect ratios as high as 35 percent
have been found during the course of some investigations. FRA believes
that the reality lies between the two, and that it is more likely to
resemble the data collected during routine FRA inspections as FRA
examines almost a \1/2\ million freight cars and locomotives annually.
However, brake defects may be more common than FRA inspection data
indicates and the SACP data in all likelihood indicates that there are
localized areas of concern or that some railroads have particular yards
with persistent problems. For purposes of the cost/benefit analysis of
this proposal only, the brake defect ratio is assumed to be the five-
year average brake defect ratio and rounding up to 4 percent. The data
indicates that a slight increase in the percentage of cars with brake
defects has been reported by FRA during routine inspections over the
last five years. Due to the limitations of the available data, as
discussed in detail above, FRA is unable to determine whether the
defect ratio increase is the result of increased non-compliance with
existing regulations or the result of sampling bias.
Table 2.--Brake Defect Ratio
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ratio
(defective
Year equipment/
equipment
inspected)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1993....................................................... 0.0336
1994....................................................... 0.0347
1995....................................................... 0.0369
1996....................................................... 0.0419
1997....................................................... 0.045
Average.................................................... 0.0384
------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. Inspection and Testing Requirements
As noted in the preceding discussions, the issues related to the
inspection and testing of the brake equipment on freight trains are
some of the most complex and sensitive issues with which FRA deals on a
daily basis. A majority of the comments received with regard to the
1994 NPRM on power brakes issued in 1994 addressed the intervals and
methods for performing the various proposed brake inspections and
tests. Furthermore, the primary points of contention in the RSAC
Working Group discussions centered on the performance of brake
inspections and tests. Consequently, any proposed requirements related
to the inspection and testing of freight power brakes must be viewed as
the foundation on which
[[Page 48299]]
the rest of the proposed requirements are based.
A. Brake Inspections--General
The current regulations are primarily designed around four
different types of brake system inspections, these include: initial
terminal; 1,000-mile; intermediate terminal; and a brake pipe
continuity check. See 49 CFR 232.12 and 232.13. These brake system
inspections differ in complexity and detail based on the location of
the train or on some event that affects the composition of the train.
Each of the inspections detail specific actions that are to be
performed and identify the items that are to be observed by the person
performing the inspection.
The initial terminal inspection described in Sec. 232.12(c)-(j) is
intended to be a comprehensive inspection of the brake equipment
primarily required to be performed at the location where a train is
originally assembled. This inspection requires the performance of a
leakage test and an in-depth inspection of the brake equipment to
ensure that it is properly secure and does not bind or foul. Piston
travel must be checked during these inspections and must be adjusted to
a specified length if found not to be within a certain range of
movement. The brakes must also be inspected to ensure that they apply
and release in response to a specified brake pipe reduction and
increase. FRA recently issued enforcement guidance to its field
inspectors clarifying that both sides of a car must be observed
sometime during the inspection process in order to verify the condition
of the brake equipment as required when performing an initial terminal
inspection.
The current regulations require intermediate brake inspections at
points not more than 1,000 miles apart. These inspections are far more
limited than the currently required initial terminal inspections in
that the railroad is required only to determine that brake pipe leakage
is not excessive, the brakes apply on each car, and the brake rigging
is secure and does not bind or foul. See 49 CFR 232.12(b). In the 1982
revisions to the power brake rules, FRA extended the distance between
these inspections from 500 miles to 1,000 miles.
The current regulations also mandate the performance of an
intermediate terminal brake inspection on all cars added to a train en
route unless they have been previously given an initial terminal
inspection. This inspection requires the performance of a leakage test
and verification that the brakes on each car added to the train and the
rear car of the train apply and release. See 49 CFR 232.13(d).
Railroads are permitted to use a gauge or device at the rear of the
train to verify changes in brake pipe pressure in lieu of performing
the rear car application and release. The current regulations also
require that cars that are added to a train with only an intermediate
terminal brake inspection that have not previously been provided an
initial terminal inspection must be so inspected at the next location
where facilities are available for performing such an inspection.
The current regulations also require the performance of a brake
pipe continuity test whenever minor changes to a train consist occur.
This inspection requires that a brake pipe reduction be made and
verification that the brakes on the rear car apply and release.
Railroads are permitted to use a gauge or device at the rear of the
train to verify changes in brake pipe pressure in lieu of visually
verifying the rear car application and release. This inspection is to
be performed when locomotive or caboose is changed, when a one or more
consecutive cars are removed from the train, and when previously tested
cars are added to a train.
In the 1994 power brake NPRM issued in 1994, FRA proposed a power
brake inspection scheme in which various stated factors determined the
distance that a freight train would be allowed to travel without
additional inspection. See 59 FR 47732-47736. These factors included:
the qualifications of the employee performing the initial terminal
brake inspection; the extent of performance of supervisory spot checks
of maintenance and inspection activity; the presence or absence of a
single car test program on the railroad; the power brake defect ratio
on outbound trains for the railroad; and the type of equipment used and
installed on the train. Based on the conditions that were satisfied by
the railroad, a train would be allowed to travel anywhere between 500
and 3,500 miles from the point of initial terminal without additional
power brake tests or inspections. Thus, FRA proposed the elimination of
the 1,000-mile inspection and replaced it with a sliding-scale
performance-based inspection system. The inspection scheme proposed in
the 1994 NPRM was an attempt to balance the competing views of rail
management, which contended that trains can travel up to 5,000 miles
between inspections, and rail labor, which contended that a 500 mile
limit should be mandated as railroads are not living up to a commitment
made in 1982 to perform quality initial terminal inspections. See 59 FR
47692-47693.
As noted above, railroad representatives and shippers of goods by
rail vehemently opposed the 1994 NPRM. Many of these commenters
objected to the possibility that most trains would be reduced to 500
miles between brake inspections and that the incentives for moving
extended distances were unobtainable. They claimed that the brake
inspection scheme contained in the 1994 NPRM would increase not only
operational and delivery costs but would also substantially increase
delivery times. These commenters believed that the 1994 NPRM failed to
recognize the industry's improving safety record. Many railroad
representatives also objected to the use of power brake defect ratios
as a benchmark for determining the distances trains may travel between
brake inspections. These commenters believed that defect ratios were an
inappropriate performance standard in that it was too subjective and
included items that were not related to the safe operation of a train.
Several railroads also commented that the potential for being reduced
to 500 miles between brake inspections based on defect ratios each
quarter would require railroads to maintain facilities every 500 miles
in order to be prepared for a reduction in distance.
Rail labor representatives also objected to the brake inspection
scheme proposed in the 1994 NPRM. The primary objections these
commenters raised involved the ability of railroads to continue to use
train crews to conduct initial terminal brake inspections and the
ability to move trains in excess of 1,000 miles between brake
inspections. Most of these commenters believed that train crew
personnel are not sufficiently trained to adequately perform initial
terminal brake inspections. Several labor representatives also objected
to the movement of a freight train beyond 1,000 miles without an
additional inspection of the brake equipment. This objection was
primarily based on their view that railroads have failed to abide by
the commitment made in 1982, when the distance between such inspections
was increased from 500 miles to 1,000 miles, that complete and perfect
initial terminal inspections would be performed. These commenters also
contended that the incentives proposed for permitting trains to travel
extended distances were unenforceable and would result in extended
movements of trains with no appreciable increase in the safety of those
trains.
In light of these objections, FRA held the 1994 NPRM in abeyance
and requested that alternative approaches be
[[Page 48300]]
submitted by interested parties. The AAR and its member railroads
submitted an alternative performance standard approach based on
mechanically-caused accidents per million train miles (APMTM). AAR's
approach required various types of brake inspections to be performed
based on the mileage the train will travel, and based on the railroad's
performance versus the established foundation APMTM, the railroad could
potentially move trains up to 3,600 miles with fewer inspection
requirements. AAR's proposal also addressed certain maintenance
requirements and permitted maintenance levels to be determined based on
the accident level of the industry as a whole. In addition, the
proposal permitted trains to depart initial terminals with 95 percent
operative brakes and in some instances less than 95 percent operative
brakes. The proposal also set limits on the enforcement actions that
FRA could initiate based on a railroad's poor performance.
Several labor representatives strongly objected to AAR's
alternative proposal claiming that the proposal was merely self-
regulation disguised as a performance standard. These commenters
contended that AAR's proposal provided railroads the ability to
continue to manipulate data and statistics in order to reduce their
safety and regulatory responsibilities. The BRC submitted substantial
comments to FRA's 1994 NPRM as an alternative approach. The BRC's
submission suggested that many of the proposed provisions were
insufficient to ensure adequate compliance by the railroads.
Consequently, the BRC made numerous recommendations for strengthening
certain provisions contained in the NPRM and included: more stringent
requirements regarding the inspection of trains; additional limitations
on trains permitted to travel greater than 1,000 miles between brake
inspections; enhanced documentation of all inspections performed by the
railroad; and further limitations on the inspection abilities of train
crew members.
At the time that alternative proposals were being submitted and
reviewed, FRA was in the process of establishing RSAC. FRA believed
that RSAC might be a good forum for addressing the issues and
developing recommendations for revising the regulations governing power
brake systems for freight equipment. Therefore, on April 1-2, 1996, the
RSAC officially accepted the task of assisting FRA in development of
revisions to the regulations governing power brake systems for freight
equipment. See 61 FR 29164. As noted above, the RSAC Working Group met
on numerous occasions to discuss various issues and proposals related
to the inspection, testing and maintenance of freight power brake
systems. As the meetings progressed it became clear that most of the
issues being discussed by the Working Group were contingent on the
outcome of the requirements related to the inspection and testing of
the braking systems. Consequently, the Working Group created several
smaller task forces composed of representatives of both rail labor and
rail management to attempt to resolve these core issues.
On several occasions it appeared as though these smaller task
forces might reach resolution of at least a large portion of the
inspection and testing issues; however, after the individuals involved
in these meetings presented proposals based on the discussions of the
smaller group it appeared that either there was no agreement within the
task force, the parties did not understand what was agreed to, or the
parties disagreed as to whether an agreement was actually reached.
Representatives of both rail management and rail labor submitted
numerous proposals related to the inspection and testing of brake
equipment. Many of the proposals were revisions or amendments to
previous proposals based on the discussions of the Working Group at
that time. Rather than attempt to reiterate the various proposals
submitted by management and labor representatives, this document will
attempt to outline the major provisions and discuss the similarities
and differences of the various proposals in order to delineate the
general positions of the parties involved. In order to facilitate this
discussion, the proposals will generally be grouped as either a
management proposal or a labor proposal. It should be noted that the
items outlined below were developed over the period of a year, were
developed as part of a series of intense negotiation sessions, were
generally presented as part of a package by various parties with all of
the requirements of the package necessary for agreement, or were
presented in order to facilitate additional discussion of the group.
The proposals of both management and labor representatives
addressed the need to have brake and other mechanical inspections
performed by qualified inspectors. The proposals mandated that if
certain inspections were performed in a specified manner by highly
qualified inspectors then those trains could be moved either extended
distances between brake inspections or with a certain minimum
percentage of the brakes inoperative or both. However, the parties
differed on what constitutes a qualified inspector. This issue became
the key issue to resolving any of the other issues being debated within
the Working Group. Rail management proposed the use of the term
``mechanically qualified personnel'' (MQP) to describe those
individuals they would consider highly qualified inspectors. It was
unclear from the railroads' proposals exactly who could be designated
as MQP and the extent of the knowledge or training that would be
required to designate a person as MQP. It appeared that even train crew
personnel could qualify as MQPs under certain circumstances. Labor
representatives refused to accept any definition of MQP that would
permit train crew members to meet the designation. These
representatives were adamant that only carmen or individuals similarly
trained and experienced were qualified to perform the quality brake and
mechanical inspections contained in the proposals except in limited
circumstances. At a minimum, labor representatives sought to have the
railroads commit to using carmen or individuals similarly trained and
experienced to perform the majority of the proposed inspections and
tests. The railroads refused to agree to such a commitment. Railroad
representatives objected to the designation of the carman craft in the
rule text based on their belief that the discussion of such designation
would violate existing collective bargaining agreements. Labor
representatives disagreed that such discussion was a violation of any
collective bargaining agreements. Due to the nature of these
objections, several members of the Working Group believed they were
unable to continue deliberations which led to an adjournment of the
Working Group. Consequently, the Working Group was unable to resolve
the issue of what qualifications a person must possess in order to
adequately perform brake system inspections and tests.
Both labor and management representatives proposed to limit the
movement of trains inspected by train crews to at least 500 miles. The
railroads proposed that trains inspected by train crews would be
required to be inspected by an MQP within 500 miles of the train's
departure. It should be noted that the railroads' proposal of this
requirement was part of a package that permitted certain trains
inspected by MQPs to travel to destination without additional
inspection and that permitted all trains to be operated out of initial
terminals and elsewhere with only 95
[[Page 48301]]
percent operative brakes. The railroads contended that the only way to
economically justify a return to a 500-mile inspection would be to
permit trains to move extended distances and to relax the requirements
pertaining to the movement of defective equipment.
Rail labor proposed that trains inspected by train crews be
permitted to move only to the next yard, repair point, or crew change
point not to exceed 500 miles where it would be inspected by carmen.
This proposal permitted train crews to perform a ``cursory'' brake and
mechanical inspection at the initial terminal. Labor representatives
contended that train crews are not properly trained and do not possess
the experience to adequately perform the initial terminal brake test
and mechanical inspections required by the current regulations. These
parties also contend that when the regulations were revised in 1982 to
permit trains to travel 1,000 miles between brake inspections the
carriers committed to perform quality initial terminal brake
inspections, which they contend has not occurred and will not occur if
train crews are permitted to perform initial terminal brake
inspections. Consequently, the labor representatives contended that
their proposal was an attempt to hold the railroads to their 1982
commitment while permitting properly qualified train crews to perform
the inspections they are capable of performing.
The proposals of both rail labor and rail management also contained
provisions regarding the performance of a 1,000-mile brake and
mechanical inspection. The railroads proposed that all trains would
receive a brake and mechanical inspection at 1,000 mile intervals
performed by MQPs. However, the railroads' proposal also permitted
certain trains that are inspected by MQPs at the initial terminal and
which depart those locations with 100 percent operative brakes to
travel to destination without additional inspection if labor jointly
agreed to such operations. Labor's proposal required the performance of
brake and mechanical inspections on every train at intervals of every
1,000 miles regardless of the quality of the previous inspections.
Labor's proposal permitted the movement of a train beyond 1,000 miles
without inspection only through the filing of a joint labor/management
waiver petition pursuant to a proposed waiver process.
The proposals of both rail management and rail labor attempted to
provide benefits to a railroad that conducted inbound brake and
mechanical inspections. The railroads' proposals contained requirements
for the performance of inbound brake and mechanical inspections by
MQPs. The carriers proposed the requirements as an alternative to the
complete inspection of the train when it is assembled and outbound. All
cars found during the inbound inspection with cut-out or defective
brakes were to be removed from the train and given a repair track air
brake test. In addition, all cars found with mechanical or safety
appliance defects were to be repaired or switched out of the train. The
railroads' proposals permitted trains to depart these locations with
only 95 percent operative brakes. The railroads' proposals did not
require the performance of inbound inspections but were intended to
alleviate some of the inspection requirements on outbound trains since
they were performed inbound.
Rail labor's proposals also included provisions for the performance
of inbound brake and mechanical inspections. Labor proposed that these
inspections must be performed by carmen. The basic requirements
regarding the treatment of defective equipment were similar to those
proposed by the railroads. Labor's proposal also contained provisions
requiring dynamic brakes, event recorders, and two-way EOTs. Labor
representatives attempted to provide an incentive to railroads that
perform inbound brake and mechanical inspections by permitting
railroads to depart with only 95 percent operative brakes from
locations where these inbound inspections are performed. If a railroad
performed all of the inspections on the outbound trains, however, then
labor's proposal required 100 percent operative brakes from those
locations.
Both the labor and management proposals also addressed the method
by which the various proposed inspections were to be performed.
Railroad representatives proposed that mechanical inspections be
conducted on both sides of each car where physically possible. These
proposals also indicated that brake inspections could be conducted on
one side of the cars during the set and one side during the release
with a roll-by option if the design of the car permits the observation
of the application and release from one side of the car. However, the
proposals do not require a mechanical inspection at 1,000-mile brake
inspections and fail to specify exactly how the brakes are to be
observed during this inspection. Thus, the railroads' position
regarding the precise method of performing a brake inspection when not
combined with a mechanical inspection is somewhat unclear. The
railroads also proposed that piston travel be observed on each car
during every brake inspection except a continuity check, thereby
mandating that inspectors cross over the cars if necessary to view the
piston travel.
Rail labor representatives proposed detailed requirements relating
to the methods for performing a proper brake inspection. These
individuals proposed that both sides of a train must be walked during
both the application and release of the brakes. These representatives
believed that the only way to view all of the equipment necessary to
conduct a proper brake inspection is by walking the train. Labor's
proposal did permit trains that receive a mechanical inspection
pursuant to Part 215 by a carman to have its brakes inspected by a
walking inspection of one side of the train with the option to use a
vehicle on the other side during the application of the brakes. Such
trains also had the option to use a vehicle or perform a roll-by
inspection on both sides of the train to observe the release of the
brakes. Labor's proposals also permitted carriers to conduct an
inspection of the application of the brakes and its component parts
from one side of the train and the release of the brakes from the other
side of the train if the carrier could effectively demonstrate that the
design of the cars is such to permit the brake application, brake
release, and component parts to be observed from one side of the train.
The proposals of both rail management and rail labor also addressed
the inspection of cycle trains (i.e., trains that operate in a
continuous cycle between two points, that remain intact, and that
generally consist of cars of the same mechanical type). Both proposals
required that cycle trains receive a mechanical and initial terminal
brake inspection based on the distance the train has traveled. The
railroads' proposal would require these inspections at 1,000 mile
intervals. Whereas, the labor proposal required the inspections once
every cycle for trains traveling between 500 and 1,000 miles between
origination and destination, and once every other cycle for trains
traveling less than 500 between origination and destination.
FRA Conclusions. Based on consideration of the information and
proposals outlined above as well as its experience in the enforcement
of the current power brake regulations, FRA believes that the
alternative proposals submitted in response to the 1994 NPRM, as well
as the proposals developed as part of the RSAC process, are not viable
models upon which a revision of the freight power brake
[[Page 48302]]
requirements can be based. The alternative approach submitted by AAR in
response to the 1994 NPRM contains a performance standard based upon
the number of mechanically-caused incidents per million train miles.
FRA does not believe this is an appropriate standard on which to base
the frequency of brake inspection and maintenance requirements. Such a
standard is based on the occurrence of incidents rather than on a
factor which could measure a railroad's performance prior to an
accident occurring and thus, prevent incidents before they happen. In
addition, the applicability of the standard to the entire industry
would be difficult to calculate on a railroad-by-railroad basis,
especially due to the large number of short line railroads currently
operating in the country. The proposed performance standard is also
very subjective as many incidents are due to a variety of causes only
part of which may be a mechanical or brake related cause. Thus,
identifying what actually constitutes a mechanically-caused incident
would be very difficult, if not impossible in some circumstances.
Furthermore, as the calculation of the performance standard would be
based on incident information submitted to FRA by the railroad's
themselves, the potential for data manipulation would exist which could
cast doubt on the validity and accuracy of the performance standard.
The AAR's alternative proposal also seriously limited FRA's ability
to take necessary enforcement actions until a railroad's non-compliance
resulted in a substantial increase in mechanically-caused incidents. In
addition, the restrictions imposed on a railroad with poor performance
would have permitted the railroad to operate under more lenient
inspection requirements than the current power brake regulations. The
proposal also permitted the operation of trains out of initial
terminals with only 95 percent operative brakes and thus, would
potentially permit cars with inoperative brakes to be moved past
locations where the necessary repairs could be performed which would be
contrary to the statutory provisions related to the movement of cars
with defective brakes contained at 49 U.S.C. 20303. Consequently, FRA
believes that the alternative approach submitted by the AAR in response
to the 1994 NPRM is based on a very subjective performance standard,
would be extremely difficult to enforce, is contrary to certain
statutory requirements, and most likely would not achieve the same
level of safety as the current regulations.
Although the proposals submitted by both rail labor and rail
management during the discussions of the RSAC Working Group meetings
contain elements which FRA believes would increase the safety of
railroad operations, both proposals also contain elements that cannot
be sustained on either a safety, economic, or legal basis. As noted in
the discussion above, the proposals submitted by both labor and
management were presented as packages. The parties made clear that the
various elements contained in the proposals could not be isolated and
be acceptable, they had to be considered in conjunction with all of the
elements contained in the proposals. Therefore, FRA is reluctant to use
any of the proposals submitted during the RSAC process as a basis for
any revision of the power brake regulations. Furthermore,
representatives of both labor and management indicated that if they
could not reach agreement on the revision of the power brake
regulations, then any revision contemplated by FRA should track the
current inspection requirements and intervals.
Both proposals contained requirements restricting the movement of
trains inspected by train crews to no more than 500 miles before the
train would be reinspected by more highly qualified inspectors.
However, railroad representatives stressed that their acceptance of a
return to a 500 mile brake inspection was conditioned on and could only
be economically justified if the railroads were provided the ability to
move some trains to destination (i.e. 2,000 miles or more) as well as
flexibility in the movement of defective equipment, both of which were
included in their proposal. Whereas, labor representatives stated that
the acceptance of permitting train crews to perform any inspections was
conditioned on a commitment by the railroads to ensure that all other
inspections would be performed by carmen or similarly trained personnel
and that the current 1,000 mile interval between inspections be
retained unless labor and management jointly agreed to an extension.
Labor's proposal also would have permitted a ``cursory'' inspection to
be performed by train crews at initial terminals in order to reduce the
burden on railroads if a 500 mile inspection were adopted.
Consequently, although both proposals contained a 500-mile restriction
on trains inspected by train crews, both proposals also contained
various other restrictions or conditions that were part of the 500-mile
restriction that were very different and in FRA's view are
irreconcilable.
Although FRA believes that a 500-mile inspection interval would
most likely increase the safety on today's railroads, FRA does not
believe that the return to a 500-mile interval is the most efficient or
most cost-effective method of achieving the desired result, as
discussed below in more detail. In FRA's view, many of the items
proposed by the parties in order to make a 500-mile inspection interval
a viable approach would have the potential for increasing the safety
risks that already exist. For example, FRA is not currently willing to
permit trains to travel extended distances without strict operational
conditions being imposed and without a means to obtain information on
the condition of such trains at the time they arrive at destination.
Furthermore, FRA is concerned that any safety gains acquired from a
500-mile inspection interval would be negated by other provisions
contained in the various proposals such as allowing the extended
movement of defective equipment or the performance of ``cursory''
inspections by train crews at initial terminals.
As noted above, both proposals also contained provisions extending
some flexibility in the movement of defective brake equipment. The
railroads' proposal permitted the movement of any train with only 95
percent operative brakes and permitted the defective cars to be hauled
as far as destination. Although the labor proposal limited the
locations and trains where defective equipment could be hauled, the
proposal did permit defective equipment to be hauled out of initial
terminals and to destination if certain stringent inspection practices
were implement by the railroad. Currently, 49 U.S.C. 20303 permits
equipment with defective brakes to be moved only if the movement is
necessary for conducting repairs and limits such movement to the
nearest location where the necessary repairs can be effectuated.
Therefore, both of the proposals were based, in part, on provisions
designed to provide incentives to perform heightened inspections that
are contrary to the statutory requirements regarding the movement of
equipment with defective safety appliances. At the time these proposals
were discussed by the members of the Working Group it was agreed that
if a consensus could be achieved, then representatives of all parties
involved would petition Congress in an attempt to change the current
statutory requirements. As no consensus was reached, FRA is bound by
the statutory requirements regarding
[[Page 48303]]
the movement of defective equipment and will not propose any
requirements that are not in accordance with those provisions. (See
discussion below titled ``Movement of Defective Equipment.'')
In 1982, when FRA extended the 500-mile inspection interval to
1,000 miles, FRA intended that quality initial terminal brake
inspections would be performed by the railroads. FRA feels that
railroads have not conducted the excellent initial terminal inspections
that were contemplated in 1982. Furthermore, contrary to the railroads'
contention, FRA feels that many initial terminal brake inspections are
being performed by individuals who are not sufficiently qualified or
trained. FRA recognizes that since 1982 new technology and improved
equipment have been developed that allow trains to operate for longer
distances with fewer defects. However, the key to achieving this
improved capability is to ensure the proper operation and condition of
the equipment at the location where the train is initially assembled.
Although FRA agrees that many of the initial terminal inspections
conducted by train crews are not of the quality anticipated in 1982
when the inspection interval was increased from 500 miles to 1,000
miles, FRA believes that properly trained and qualified train crew
personnel could perform certain brake inspections and some have been
performing such inspections for several years. FRA believes that a
reversion to a 500 mile restriction on trains inspected by train crews
does not adequately address the concerns regarding the safety of these
trains and would impose an economic burden on the railroads that cannot
be justified. Two of the major factors in ensuring the quality of brake
inspections is the proper training of the persons performing the
inspections and adequate enforcement of the requirements. Therefore,
FRA believes that the current 1,000 mile inspection interval should be
retained but intends to propose general training requirements for
persons conducting brake inspections. These proposed training
requirements will include general provisions requiring both classroom
and ``hands-on'' training, general testing requirements, and annual
refresher training provisions. FRA is also proposing to require that
various training records be maintained by the railroads in order for
FRA to determine the basis for a railroad's determination that a
particular person is considered qualified to perform a brake
inspection, test, or repair. FRA believes these general training and
recordkeeping requirements will provide some assurances that qualified
people are conducting the required brake system inspections and tests.
FRA also intends to enhance and increase its enforcement activities
with regard to the performance of the brake inspections and tests
proposed in this NPRM, particularly those performed by train crews. FRA
intends to make a concerted effort to focus on the qualifications of
train crew members and will strictly scrutinize the method and length
of time spent by these individuals in the performance of the required
inspections. This may involve the review of event recorder tapes to
ensure that a sufficient amount of time was afforded for conducting a
proper inspection of the brake system. FRA will also focus its
inspection activities to ensure that train crews are provided the
proper equipment necessary to perform many of the required inspection.
In addition to focusing its enforcement and to aid in that
initiative, FRA proposes to clarify, update, and modify the current
inspection requirements in order to close what are perceived to be
existing loopholes and to incorporate what FRA believes to be the best
practices currently existing in the industry while updating the
requirements to recognize existing technology. FRA believes, and many
representatives of rail labor and management agree, that the current
inspection requirements are very good for the most part and are
sufficient to ensure a high level of safety, but that they need to be
strictly enforced, clarified, and updated to recognize existing and new
technology. Therefore, FRA does not propose an extensive revision of
the basic brake inspection intervals or requirements. Rather, FRA
proposes a moderate revision of the requirements, with the intent of
tightening, expanding, or clarifying those inspection or testing
requirements which have created enforcement problems or inconsistencies
in the past. FRA intends to recognize some of the technological
improvements made in the industry such as the use of two-way EOTs
during the brake tests and use of the air flow method of qualifying
train air brake systems. FRA also recognizes that some trains are
capable of moving extended distances between inspections provided that
comprehensive inspections are performed at the locations where the
trains are originated. (See discussion below titled ``Extended Haul
Trains.'')
In order to clarify the requirements regarding where and when
various brake inspections and tests must be performed, FRA proposes to
modify the terminology related to the power brake inspection and
testing requirements contained in the current regulations, which is
generally based on the locations where the inspections and tests are
performed (i.e., initial terminal, intermediate locations). Instead,
FRA proposes to identify various classes of inspections based on the
duties and type of inspection required, such as: Class I; Class IA; and
Class II. This is similar to the approach taken by FRA in the 1994 NPRM
and in the proposed rulemaking on passenger equipment safety standards.
See 59 FR 47736-40. FRA believes that this type of classification
system will avoid some of the confusion that currently arises regarding
when and where a certain brake inspection must be performed.
Currently, the brake system inspection and testing requirements are
interspersed within Sec. 232.12 and Sec. 232.13 and are not clearly
delineated. Therefore, FRA believes that reorganizing the major types
of brake inspections currently contained in the regulations into
separate and distinct sections will provide the regulated community
with a better understanding as to when and where each inspection or
test is required. Although FRA proposes a change in the terminology
used to describe the various power brake inspections and tests, the
requirements of these inspections and tests will mirror the current
requirements and are not intended to change or modify any of the
voluminous case law that has been developed over the years regarding
the inspections. Consequently, FRA proposes four major types of brake
inspections to be performed by freight railroads some time during the
operation of the equipment. FRA proposes the terms ``Class I,'' ``Class
IA,'' ``Class II,'' and ``Class III'' to identify the four major types
of brake inspections required by this proposal.
The proposed Class I brake test generally contains the requirements
currently contained in Sec. 232.12 (a) and (c)-(h). These requirements
have been reorganized to clearly delineate when and how the inspection
is to be performed based on current interpretations and comments
received since the 1994 NPRM. The requirements have also been modified
to require written notification that the test was performed and that
this notification be retained in the train until it reaches
destination. The proposed revisions also acknowledge the use of the air
flow method for qualifying train brake systems and permits the use of
end-of-train devices in the performance of the test. The proposal also
provides some latitude to trains received in interchange
[[Page 48304]]
that have a pre-tested car or solid block of cars added at the
interchange point or that are moved less than 20 miles after being
received in interchange based on the relative safety of permitting
these types of trains to continue without the performance of a
comprehensive Class I brake test.
The proposed Class IA brake test clarifies the requirements for
performing 1,000-mile brake inspections currently contained in
Sec. 232.12(b). The proposal makes clear that the most restrictive car
or block of cars in the train determines when this inspection must
occur on the entire train. FRA also proposes to require that railroads
designate the locations where these inspections will be conducted and
does not permit a change in those designations without 30-day notice or
the occurrence of an emergency situation. The proposed Class II and
Class III brake tests essentially clarify the intermediate terminal
inspection requirements currently contained in Sec. 232.13(c) and (d)
regarding the performance of brake system inspections when cars are
added en route or when the train consist is slightly altered en route.
In addition to the modifications and clarifications proposed with
regard to the four major types of brake system inspections, FRA also
proposes to retain, with clarification and elaboration, the basic
inspection requirements related to transfer trains currently contained
at Sec. 232.13(e) as well as the requirements for performing brake
system inspections using yard air sources currently contained at
Sec. 232.12(i). FRA also proposes to retain the requirements related to
the inspection and testing of locomotives when used in double heading
and helper service currently contained at Sec. 232.15. FRA proposes
some additional inspection requirements of locomotives when used in
helper service or when used in distributed power operations to ensure
the proper functioning of the brakes on these locomotives as these
types of inspections are not adequately addressed in the current
regulation. Furthermore, FRA does recognize in this proposal that
trains, if properly inspected, can safely travel greater than 1,000
miles between brake inspections. (See discussion below titled
``Extended Haul Trains.'')
B. Extended Haul Trains
In the 1994 NPRM, FRA recognized that since 1982 new technology and
improved equipment have been developed that allow trains to operate for
longer distances with fewer defects. However, FRA further acknowledged
that the key to achieving this improved capability is to ensure the
proper operation and condition of the equipment, and that the best way
of ensuring the proper operation and condition of equipment is to
perform quality initial terminal brake inspections and to conduct
proper equipment maintenance. Therefore, in 1994 FRA proposed a
sliding-scale approach that based the allowable distance a train may
travel between brake inspections on a variety of factors and based on
the conditions that were satisfied by the railroad. Consequently, a
train would be allowed to travel anywhere between 500 and 3,500 miles
from the point of initial terminal without additional power brake tests
or inspections. See 59 FR 47735.
As noted in the previous discussion, the AAR submitted an
alternative proposal which would have permitted some trains to travel
as far as 3,600 miles between brake inspections. Whereas, the BRC and
other labor representatives objected to any movement beyond 1,000 miles
based on the railroads' commitment to perform quality initial terminal
inspections in 1982, which they claim has not happened. However, the
proposals submitted by both rail labor and rail management during the
RSAC Working Group deliberations provided provisions for the potential
movement of trains greater than 1,000 miles between brake and
mechanical inspections. (A detailed synopsis of these proposals is
contained in the preceding discussion and will not be reiterated).
Admittedly, the proposals differed greatly regarding exactly which
trains would be permitted the extended movements and the process by
which such movements would be sanctified by FRA. However, all of the
proposals stressed the necessity that any train permitted to travel
longer distances between brake inspections would be required to be
thoroughly inspected by highly qualified inspectors at its point of
origin or early in the life of the train. Consequently, it is clear
from the submitted proposals and the presentations made at the time
they were presented that virtually every member of the industry
acknowledges that the key to permitting trains to move extended
distances lies in the quality of the inspection the train receives at
or near the beginning of its journey.
FRA Conclusions. FRA continues to believe that if a train is
properly and thoroughly inspected, with as many defective conditions
being eliminated as possible, that the train is capable of traveling
well over 1,000 miles between brake inspections. By this, FRA contends
that not only must the brake system be in quality condition but that
the mechanical components of the equipment must be in equally prime
condition. As the distance a train is allowed to travel increases, the
mechanical condition of the equipment is a key factor in ensuring the
proper and safe operation of the train brake system throughout the
entire trip. FRA also continues to believe that the best place to
ensure the proper conduct of these inspections and to ensure that the
train's brake system and mechanical components are in the best
condition possible is at a train's point of origin (initial terminal).
In 1994, FRA proposed a set of requirements that must be met by a
railroad in order to move a train up to 1,500 miles without performing
additional brake inspections. The requirements included such things as
low defect ratios, maintenance programs, and the performance of quality
brake and mechanical inspections at a train's point of origin. FRA
agrees with several commenters that some of the proposed requirements
were overly burdensome and were partially predicated on potentially
subjective standards. However, FRA continues to believe that many of
the inspection requirements and movement restrictions proposed in 1994
are valid conditions that must be met in order to permit the extended
movement of trains. These include: the performance of a quality in-
depth brake inspection by a highly qualified inspector; the performance
of a quality mechanical inspection by a person qualified under 49 CFR
215.11; and a restriction on the number of set-outs and pick-ups
occurring en route. FRA also believes these trains must be closely
monitored to ensure that both the brake system and mechanical
components remain safely intact throughout the train's journey.
FRA proposes to permit certain designated trains to move up to
1,500 miles between brake and mechanical inspections provided the
railroad meets various inspection and monitoring requirements, which
FRA believes will ensure the safe and proper operation of these trains.
As no trains are currently permitted to travel in excess of 1,000 miles
between inspections, FRA is not willing to propose more than 1,500
miles between such inspections until appropriate data is developed
which establishes that equipment moved under the proposed criteria
remains in proper condition throughout the train's trip. FRA believes
that the proposed provision requiring the performance of an inbound
inspection at destination or at 1,500 miles and the requirement that
carriers maintain records of all defective
[[Page 48305]]
conditions discovered on these trains create the bases for developing
such data. In order to ensure the accuracy of the data as well as
ensure the proper and safe operation of these trains, FRA also proposes
that these trains have 100 percent operative brakes and contain no cars
with mechanical defects at their points of origin and at the time of
departure from the 1,500 point, if moving an additional 1,500 miles
from that location between brake inspections. FRA further proposes that
these trains not conduct any pick-ups or set-outs en route, except for
the removal of defective equipment, in order to minimize the
disruptions made to the integrity of the train's brake system and
reduce mechanical damage that may occur during switching operations. In
addition, there is currently no reliable tracking system available to
FRA to ensure that cars added to the train en route have been inspected
in accordance with the proposed requirements.
As noted earlier in the discussion, FRA believes that in order for
a train to be permitted to travel 1,500 miles between inspections, the
train must receive inspections that ensure the optimum condition of
both the brake system and the mechanical components at the location
where the train originates. In order to ensure that these quality
inspections are being performed, FRA proposes to require that they be
performed by highly qualified and experienced inspectors. As FRA
intends the Class I brake test that is required to be performed on
these trains at their point of origin to be as in-depth and
comprehensive as possible, FRA believes that these inspections must be
performed by individuals possessing the knowledge to not only identify
and detect a defective condition in all of the brake equipment required
to be inspected, but also possess the knowledge to recognize the
interrelational workings of the equipment and the ability to trouble-
shoot and repair the equipment. Therefore, FRA proposes the term
``qualified mechanical inspector'' to identify and describe those
individuals it believes possess the necessary knowledge and experience
to perform the proposed Class I brake tests on these trains.
A ``qualified mechanical inspector'' is a person with training or
instruction in the troubleshooting, inspection, testing, maintenance,
or repair of the specific train brake systems the person is assigned
responsibility and who's primary responsibilities include work
generally consistent with those functions. (See Sec. 232.5 of the
section-by-section for a more detailed discussion of ``qualified
mechanical inspector.'') FRA further believes these same highly
qualified inspectors must be the individuals performing the proposed
inbound inspection on these extended haul trains in order to ensure
that all defective conditions are identified at the train's destination
or 1,500 mile location. Similarly, FRA proposes that all of the
mechanical inspections required to be performed on these trains be
conducted by inspectors designated pursuant to 49 CFR 215.11, rather
than train crew members, in order to ensure that all mechanical
components are in proper condition prior to the train's departure.
C. Air Flow Method
The air flow method (AFM) of train air brake testing monitors the
rate of air flow through the automatic brake valve to the brake pipe by
the means of a brake pipe flow indicator. The AFM of brake testing is a
more comprehensive test than the present leakage test. The leakage
method only measures the amount of leakage from the brake and branch
pipes, whereas the AFM tests the entire brake system including the
reservoirs and control valves. In addition, the leakage method does not
test the capability of the pressure-maintaining feature of the 26L
brake equipment. The AFM, on the other hand, tests the brake system
just as it is operated, with the pressure-maintaining feature cut in.
The AFM of qualifying train air brake systems has been allowed in
Canada as an alternative to the leakage test since 1984. In addition,
several railroads in the United States have been using the AFM since
1989 when the AAR's petition for a waiver of compliance was granted
allowing the AFM as an alternative to the leakage test. In order to
determine if the AFM of train air brake testing should be included as
an alternative to the leakage test, FRA requested comments from
interested parties in the ANPRM regarding the operating history of the
AFM. See 57 FR 62552.
The AAR and several railroads commented on the operating experience
of using the AFM. These commenters reported that the AFM is an
effective and reliable method of qualifying train brakes and that the
greatest benefit of the method is the information it provides to the
train crew. CP Rail reported that testing on the AFM started in Canada
in 1975 and became an alternate method of qualifying train brakes in
1984. CP Rail as well as several other railroads stated that they have
experienced no problems with the method. Conrail commented that,
although it initially experienced problems with sticking pointers,
defective check valves, and protruding screws on the air flow meters,
these problems have been eliminated. Conrail also stated that use of
the AFM has indicated a slight reduction in undesired emergencies.
Several railroads commented that the AFM provides information to the
train crew regarding the brake pipe that is not provided by the leakage
test. Two railroads responded that in all the years they have used the
AFM they have experienced no instance where a train had to stop because
the air flow could not be maintained. The AAR maintained that the
failure rate of the air flow indicators is less than 1 percent. In
fact, Conrail stated that it performed 9,000 air flow indicator
calibrations in 1992 and found only 90 defective indicators. Several
railroads commented that they currently calibrate the air flow meters
on a 60-day to 92-day basis and have no problem with current
calibration procedures. Two railroads noted that they initially had
problems calibrating the devices due to orifice sizes but have since
cured this problem. One railroad mentioned that it had problems
calibrating the devices in extremely cold weather until it applied
condition eight of FRA's waiver to the calibration of the gauge on the
locomotive as well as the test orifices. (``The air flow indicator
calibration test orifice shall be calibrated at temperatures of not
less than 20 degrees Fahrenheit.'')
Railroad representatives unanimously opposed any requirement that
would make using the AFM mandatory or the sole method of qualifying
brake systems. All railroad commenters supported the adoption of the
AFM as an alternative to the leakage test for qualifying braking
systems. Most of these commenters suggested that the use of either
method is an economical or operational decision that should be made by
each individual railroad. One railroad recommended that trains
qualified under the AFM should be requalified with the leakage test if
the air flow indicator fails en route. The cost figures presented by
the AAR and several railroads for equipping locomotives with air flow
meters range from $350 to $1,450 per unit.
Both the Railway Labor Executives' Association (RLEA) and the BRC
as well as several individual carmen opposed the adoption of the AFM as
an alternative method of qualifying brake systems. The parties felt
that the leakage test is the only reliable method for determining the
integrity of the air brake system and for identifying leaks. These
commenters stated that the AFM only determines whether the brake pipe
is
[[Page 48306]]
compensating for existing leaks and does not identify the severity of
the leak, and thus, trains would be allowed to operate with leaks over
5-psi, which is dangerous especially in cold weather and could result
in an emergency application or derailment.
Westinghouse Air Brake Company (WABCO) responded stating that both
the leakage test and the AFM combined with the 15-psi gradient
restriction are effective and acceptable methods of qualifying braking
systems. WABCO commented that the 60-CFM limit required by the AFM and
the 5-psi limit required by the leakage test are both conservative
figures in view of today's braking system capabilities, and that the 5-
psi limit was derived long before today's pressure maintaining feature
which is an integral part of all locomotive brake valves. WABCO stated
that front-to-rear gradient is the most important element of braking
performance and that long trains with a 15-psi gradient can be operated
with no problem. This commenter also mentioned that the 60-CFM limit of
the AFM would allow higher leakage on shorter trains but nothing that
would cause a problem in brake operations if the 15-psi gradient is
maintained.
Based on these comments, FRA proposed the air flow method as an
alternative method for qualifying train brake systems in the 1994 NPRM.
See 59 FR 47734. In response to this proposal, labor representatives
continued to express opposition to the use of the air flow method as an
alternative to the leakage test contending that it would not accurately
measure the overall leakage in a train's air brake system. At a
minimum, these commenters recommended that short freight trains not be
allowed to use the air flow method as it may allow their operation with
excessive leakage; however, these commenters did not provide an
indication on what the size limitation should be. These commenters also
urged FRA to adopt a 92-day calibration period as that is current
practice. The proposals submitted by railroad management in the RSAC
Working Group meetings included the option of using the air flow method
when performing brake inspections. The Working Group did not address
this portion of the carrier's proposal since the discussions were
focused on more general requirements related to the inspection and
testing of brake equipment.
FRA Conclusions. FRA believes that if a train contains a locomotive
equipped with 26L freight locomotive brake equipment and the train is
equipped with an EOT device, that train should be allowed to be
qualified using the AFM. The AFM would be an alternative to the leakage
test for qualifying properly equipped freight train brake systems. FRA
recognizes the concerns of several labor organization commenters
opposing the adoption of the AFM; however, FRA believes these
commenters' apprehension is based on their unfamiliarity with the
method. As FRA pointed out in the ANPRM and the 1994 NPRM, and as
several commenters confirmed, the AFM is a much more comprehensive test
than the leakage test. See 57 FR 62551, 59 FR 47682-47683. The AFM
tests the entire brake system just as it is used, with the pressure-
maintaining feature cut in. The method has been allowed in Canada since
1984 without any problems. Based on the comments from several railroads
and information obtained during the method's testing from 1981 to 1988,
FRA feels the AFM is an effective and reliable alternative method of
qualifying train brakes. Although FRA is not mandating the use of the
AFM, FRA does encourage railroads to use the method on all trains, not
necessarily for qualifying the brake systems, but as a means of
providing additional information regarding the brake system to the
train crew. FRA further believes that calibration of the air flow
indicators should be performed at least every 92 days, based on the
fact that it is the calibration period required by the current FRA
waiver granted to the AAR and because most railroads stated that they
already calibrate the air flow indicators every 60 to 92 days and gave
no indication that the period should be altered. See 54 FR 5195 (Feb.
1, 1989).
FRA also shares the same concerns as some commenters in allowing
the use of the AFM as a means of qualifying braking systems on
relatively short freight trains. FRA tends to agree that due to the
shorter length of these types of trains the use of the AFM to qualify
their brake systems might allow these trains to operate with excessive
brake pipe leakage. However, FRA also tends to agree that if the
proposed 15-psi gradient is maintained then the leakage on these
shorter freight trains should not cause a problem in brake operations.
Furthermore, FRA is not currently able to adequately delineate those
freight trains, if any, that should not be afforded the option of using
the AFM. Consequently, FRA seeks comment from interested parties on the
following:
1. What is the current industry practice and experience regarding
the use of the AFM on relatively short freight trains?
2. Is there an identifiable train length at which the use of the
AFM creates the potential for a train to operate with excessive
leakage?
D. Brake Pipe Reduction
Present regulations require brake-pipe reductions of either 15
pounds, 20 pounds, or full service depending on which of the required
train air brake test is being performed. See 49 CFR 232.12, 232.13. In
the ANPRM, FRA sought comments from interested parties to determine if
it is feasible and beneficial for FRA to establish one standard brake-
pipe reduction for all required train air brake tests. See 57 FR 62556.
The AAR and several railroads recommended that some type of
performance standard be established so that each railroad could
determine the amount of reduction that best suits its operation. The
AAR also suggested that if the reduction amounts were left in the
discretion of the individual railroads, it would be receptive to a
requirement that the railroad indicate what reduction rates it would
use at different locations. Several railroads commented that one
standard reduction should be required for all tests and inspections and
that the standard should not require an increase to a full service
reduction because such a practice could cause undesired releases. These
commenters also noted that one standardized reduction for all tests
would simplify air brake tests and make it easier for the railroads to
train and instruct their employees. Most of the commenting railroads
suggested a 20-psi reduction if a specific amount were established.
Representatives of several labor organizations recommended that one
standard reduction be established by FRA rather than allowing each
individual railroad to determine their own reductions. This
recommendation was based on the commenters' concern that varying
reduction standards among the railroads would cause confusion for train
crews since many railroads swap trains and operate crews over each
other's lines. These commenters also felt that one standardized
reduction would make training easier.
In the 1994 NPRM, FRA proposed a standardized brake pipe reduction
of 20-psi for all required brake inspections and tests. See 59 FR
47688. The only response FRA received to this proposal was from the BRC
which contended that a 20-psi reduction was not good for determining
brake pipe leakage since the higher the pressure in the brake pipe, the
greater the leakage. This commenter recommended that FRA retain a 15-
psi reduction requirement for the performance of the leakage test.
FRA Conclusions. FRA intends to again propose a standardized brake
pipe
[[Page 48307]]
reduction of 20-psi for all brake inspections except in regard to the
brake inspection performed on a transfer train. Due to the lower air
pressure at which the transfer train brake test is performed, FRA
believes that requiring only a 15-psi reduction during this inspection
is the most effective for ensuring the proper operation of the brake
system on these train. FRA recognizes BRC's concerns regarding impact
of an increased air pressure reduction on the performance of the
leakage portion of a brake test; however, FRA believes that the
concerns are addressed by FRA's proposal to increase the minimum
pressure at the rear of the train from 60-psi to 75-psi. Furthermore,
FRA agrees with many of the commenters that a standardized brake pipe
reduction of 20-psi is sufficient for the performance of all other
required brake inspections and tests. FRA believes that the adoption of
one standard reduction will simplify both the performance of the
required inspections and the training of employees charged with
performing these inspections. Under the proposal, FRA would no longer
require full service reductions for any of required inspections in
order to avoid the possibility of undesired releases.
FRA believes that the suggestion of several commenters to allow
each railroad to determine its own brake pipe reduction is not viable.
It is not uncommon to find train crews operating in several different
locations or to find the train crew of one railroad operating the
equipment belonging to another railroad or operating over the lines of
another railroad. Thus, if various reductions were established by
different railroads or by one railroad in different locations, it would
cause further confusion in both the performance of the inspections and
the training of personnel.
E. Charging of Air Brake System
Present regulations for air brake testing basically require that
cars that have previously been tested in accordance with the
regulations either ``be kept charged until road motive power is
attached'' or be retested. 49 CFR 232.12(i). Based on longstanding
administrative interpretation and practice, FRA presumes that a brake
system is no longer adequately charged if disconnected from the
charging device (supply of pressurized air) for more than two hours
before coupling of locomotives; otherwise, retesting is required. In
the ANPRM, FRA requested comments from interested parties regarding the
viability of this interpretation and sought information for developing
alternative procedures that would not jeopardize safety. See 57 FR
62556.
The AAR and several railroads stated that there is no reason to
assume that once a train is charged and tested and then left standing
without being provided with a source of compressed air that the brake
system would become defective. These parties suggested that leakage on
standing trains has been greatly reduced through the use of welded
brake piping and fittings and ferrule-clamped air hoses. These
commenters felt that FRA's interpretation of allowing trains to sit
without air for only two hours is from an era when this new equipment
was not used. They also stated that FRA's current interpretation costs
the industry money, fuel, and time and creates pollution because trains
must either be reinspected or left with a locomotive attached and
idling in order to avoid performing a full initial terminal test.
Several railroads suggested that trains could be off air indefinitely
if the consist is not altered, or at least as long as 24 hours, and
remain in the same condition. Several commenters recommended that if a
set of cars is off air for an extended period, all that should be
required is a set-and-release test to assure the continuity of the
brake pipe. CP Rail Services mentioned that there is no such two-hour
rule in Canada and stated that in Canada if cars are off air for any
length of time a set-and-release continuity test is required. Every
commenting railroad felt the current two-hour interpretation is onerous
and unrealistic.
The BLE, BRC, and several individual carmen felt that the current
interpretation is reasonable. Most of these commenters expressed
concern for the integrity of the brake system if a consist were left
standing for longer than two hours. These concerns were aimed at the
effect that climate might have on the equipment and the increased
possibility of vandalism to the equipment if consists sat without air
for longer periods. One conductor recommended returning to a four-hour
limit as a minimum.
FRA Conclusions. In the 1994 NPRM, FRA proposed to permit trains to
be removed from a continuous source of compressed air for up to four
hours without requiring the re-performance of a comprehensive brake
inspection. FRA received very few comments that directly addressed the
safety implications of this proposal, thus, FRA intends to propose the
four hour time limitation in this NPRM. FRA agrees that our
longstanding administrative interpretation, that requires the retesting
of cars disconnected from a charging device for longer than two hours,
was established prior to the development of new equipment that has
greatly reduced leakage problems, such as welded brake piping and
fittings and ferrule-clamped air hoses. However, contrary to several
railroads' assertions, FRA does not believe that cars should be allowed
to be off air for extended periods of time without being retested. FRA
believes that the longer cars sit without air attached the greater the
chances are that the integrity of the brake system will be compromised.
The longer cars sit the more susceptible they may be to weather
conditions or even vandalism, as some commenters suggested.
Consequently, based on today's equipment, operating practices, and
overriding safety concerns, FRA feels that cars should not be
disconnected from a continuous supply of pressurized air for longer
than four hours without being retested. FRA also believes that the
source of compressed air must be sufficient to maintain the integrity
of the brake system. Consequently, FRA proposes to require that the
source of compressed air be maintained at a minimum level of 60 psi.
III. Movement of Equipment With Defective Brakes.
The current regulations do not contain requirements pertaining to
the movement of equipment with defective power brakes. The movement of
equipment with these types of defects is currently controlled by a
specific statutory provision originally enacted in 1910, which states:
(a) GENERAL.-- A vehicle that is equipped in compliance with
this chapter whose equipment becomes defective or insecure
nevertheless may be moved when necessary to make repairs, without a
penalty being imposed under section 21302 of this title, from the
place at which the defect or insecurity was first discovered to the
nearest available place at which the repairs can be made--
(1) on the railroad line on which the defect or insecurity was
discovered; or
(2) at the option of a connecting railroad carrier, on the
railroad line of the connecting carrier, if not further than the
place of repair described in clause (1) of this subsection.
49 U.S.C. 20303(a) (emphasis added).
Although there is no limit contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303 as to the
number of cars with defective equipment that may be hauled in a train,
FRA has a longstanding interpretation which requires that, at a
minimum, 85 percent of the cars in a train have operative brakes. FRA
bases this interpretation on another statutory requirement which
permits a railroad to use a train only if ``at least 50 percent of the
vehicles in
[[Page 48308]]
the train are equipped with power or train brakes and the engineer is
using the power or train brakes on those vehicles and on all other
vehicles equipped with them that are associated with those vehicles in
a train.'' 49 U.S.C. 20302(a)(5)(B). As originally enacted in 1903,
section 20302 also granted the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) the
authority to increase this percentage, and in 1910 the ICC issued an
order increasing the minimum percentage to 85 percent. See 49 CFR
232.1, which codified the ICC order.
As virtually all freight cars are presently equipped with power
brakes and are operated on an associated trainline, the statutory
requirement is in essence a requirement that 100 percent of the cars in
a train have operative power brakes, unless being hauled for repairs
pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 20303. Consequently, FRA currently requires that
equipment with defective or inoperative air brakes make up no more than
15 percent of the train and that if it is necessary to move the
equipment from where the railroad first discovered it to be defective,
the defective equipment be moved no further than the nearest place on
the railroad's line where the necessary repairs can be made or, at the
option of the receiving carrier, to a repair location that is no
further than the repair location on the delivering line.
In addition to the general requirements relating to the movement of
equipment with defective safety appliances, FRA requires 100 percent
operative brakes on trains departing initial terminal locations. The
100 percent at initial terminal requirement has been a standard by
which the railroad industry has operated for decades and one which FRA
has endorsed since its inception. The requirement is founded on
Congress' incorporation of the AAR's rules, standards, and instructions
as of April 11, 1958, regarding the installation, inspection,
maintenance, and repair of train brakes. In 1958, Congress amended
Sec. 9 of the Safety Appliance Acts by incorporating the inspection
requirements of the AAR into the statute and permitting their change
only for the purpose of achieving safety.4 Based on a review
of the legislative history surrounding that amendment, FRA believes it
is clear that Congress interpreted the AAR standards as requiring 100
percent operative on all trains prior to departure from an initial
terminal. As the current regulations regarding the performance of an
initial terminal inspection contained at 49 CFR Sec. 232.12 (c)-(j)
were basically an adoption of the AAR inspection and testing standards
as they existed in 1958, FRA believes that the current regulations are
intended and do require 100 percent operative brakes at initial
terminals.
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\4\ In 1994, Congress recodified the federal railroad safety
laws and 45 U.S.C. Sec. 9 of the Safety Appliance Acts is currently
codified at 49 U.S.C. Secs. 20301 and 20302. The reference to the
AAR rules, standards, and instructions was removed during the
recodification as being obsolete. See Pub. L. 103-272 (July 5,
1994).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the 1994 NPRM, FRA proposed conditions for the movement of
equipment with defective brakes without civil liability which
incorporated the stringent conditions contained in the Safety Appliance
Acts, presently codified at 49 U.S.C. 20302, 20303, 21302, and 21304.
See 59 FR 47728. FRA proposed the codification of these requirements in
order to clarify the duties of a railroad and to ensure the safe
movement of this equipment. In 1994, FRA further proposed that all cars
and locomotives found with defective brake equipment be required to be
tagged as bad ordered and determined safe to move by a qualified person
in order to be deemed as being hauled for repairs. FRA also attempted
to delineate when a location would be considered a repair location by
interpreting that locations where repair trucks or vehicles had visited
within the last 365 days would be considered repair locations for
purposes of the proposal. See 59 FR 47697.
Several railroad representatives commented that FRA's
interpretation of a repair location with regard to mobile repair trucks
was inadequate, overly broad, and failed to consider many of the
factors necessary for determining whether a location is a place where
repairs can be effectuated. Labor representatives not only recommended
that defective equipment not be allowed to move past a yard, siding, or
other location accessible to a mobile repair truck, but also suggested
a 125 mile limit on the movement of such equipment. In its alternative
proposal to the 1994 NPRM, the AAR proposed that all trains could
depart initial terminals with only 95 percent operative brakes,
regardless of whether repairs could be effectuated at the location.
This proposal was premised on the contention that there is not a safety
risk posed by a train operating with 95 percent operative brakes and
that FRA acknowledges this because it currently permits trains to
operate with only 85 percent operative brakes. The AAR's alternative
proposal also would have permitted some trains to operate with less
than 85 percent operative brakes if appropriate operational measures
were taken to move the train safely.
The proposals submitted by both rail labor and rail management
representatives as part of the RSAC Working Group deliberations
contained provisions for permitting the movement of equipment with
defective brakes to be hauled from or past locations where the
necessary repairs could be effectuated. Similar to the AAR's
alternative proposal, the carrier's proposal would have permitted all
trains to operate with only 95 percent operative brakes but would have
capped the percentage at 90 percent rather the current 85 percent. As
noted previously, the railroad's proposal was part of a package that
included 500-mile inspections and flexibility in the movement of
defective equipment was considered essential by the railroads in order
to accept the reduced inspection intervals. Although labor's proposal
permitted some trains to operate out of initial terminals and to
destination with only 95 percent operative brakes, the proposal limited
the flexibility to trains that were thoroughly inspected by carmen.
Furthermore, labor's proposal was also presented as a package which
included many other requirements intended to ensure the safety of
permitting some trains to operate with a few defective cars entrained.
FRA Conclusions. It is clear from the preceding discussion that
many of the proposals received by FRA since the issuance of the 1994
NPRM are in direct conflict with various statutory requirements. As the
RSAC Working Group was unable to reach a consensus on the inspection,
testing, and maintenance requirements for freight train brake systems,
FRA is not willing or able to propose provisions regarding the movement
of equipment with defective brakes that would be contrary to existing
statutory mandates. Therefore, FRA intends to propose provisions
related to the movement of defective equipment which are very similar
to the requirements proposed in the 1994 NPRM. See 59 FR 47728.
However, the current proposal clarifies the tagging requirements,
contains provisions regarding the placement of defective equipment, and
provides a consistent method for calculating the percentage of
operative brakes on a train. Consequently, in addition to being
consistent with the statutory requirements, FRA believes that the
proposed requirements will ensure the safe and proper movement of
defective equipment and will clarify the duties imposed on a railroad
when moving such equipment.
FRA proposes that all cars or locomotives found with defective or
[[Page 48309]]
inoperative braking equipment be tagged as bad ordered with a
designation of the location where the necessary repairs can and will be
effectuated. FRA has again attempted to expressly clarify the
requirement that equipment with defective brakes shall not depart from
or be moved beyond a location where the necessary repairs to the
equipment can be performed. Therefore, if a car or locomotive is found
with defective brakes during any of the proposed brake inspections or
while the piece of equipment is en route and the location where the
defective equipment is discovered is a place where repairs of the type
needed can be performed, that car or locomotive shall not be moved from
that location until the necessary repairs are effectuated. However, if
repairs to the defective condition cannot be performed at the location
where the defect is discovered, or should have been discovered, this
proposal makes clear that the railroad is permitted to move the
equipment with the defective condition only to the nearest location
where the necessary repairs can be performed.
What constitutes the nearest location where the necessary repairs
can be performed is an issue FRA has grappled with for decades and has
become exceedingly more difficult with the growing use of mobile repair
trucks. In the preamble to the 1994 NPRM, FRA attempted to clarify the
issue by stating that any location visited in the last 365 days by a
repair truck or vehicle, capable of making repairs of the type
required, would be considered the nearest point where repairs could be
effectuated. See 59 FR 47697. After consideration of all of the
comments received and based upon FRA's enforcement experience, FRA
believes that this statement does not sufficiently address the issue
and may lead to undesired consequences. FRA believes that mobile repair
trucks are a valuable asset, not only economically for the railroads
but also from a safety perspective, as they provide the ability to
conduct repairs at outlying locations and thus, reduce the movement of
defective equipment. It became apparent to FRA that the statement made
in the 1994 NPRM regarding mobile repair trucks, would lead to
railroads contending that various repair trucks lacked the capability
of making brake repairs because the railroad voluntarily removed spare
brake equipment and air compressors from the trucks, thus,
circumventing the trucks' usefulness. In addition, the statement would
tend to create a potential repair location whenever a truck was used to
effectuate a repair at a location where it has never conducted repairs
in the past, thereby, decreasing a railroad's incentive for performing
repairs on a particularly hazardous piece of equipment if it is not a
certain location.
Rather than attempt to develop a standard applicable to all
situations, which FRA does not believe can be accomplished, FRA intends
to approach the issue of what constitutes the nearest repair location
based on a case-by-case analysis of each situation. FRA believes that
its field inspectors are in the best position to determine whether a
railroad exercised good faith in determining when and where to move a
piece of defective equipment. In making these determinations both the
railroad as well as FRA's inspectors must conduct a multi-factor
analysis based on the facts of each case.
The following discussion is based upon the voluminous case law
which exists that establishes the guiding principles for determining
whether a location constitutes the nearest location where the necessary
repairs can be made as well as previous guidance provided by FRA
regarding identification of repair locations. In determining whether a
particular location is a location where necessary repairs can be made
or whether a location is the nearest repair location, the accessibility
of the location and the ability to safely make the repairs at that
location are the two overriding factors that must be considered in any
analysis. These two factors have a multitude of sub-factors which must
be considered, such as: the type of repair required; the safety of
employees responsible for conducting the repairs; the safety of
employees responsible for getting the equipment to or from a particular
location; the switching operations necessary to effectuate the move;
the railroad's recent history and current practice of making repairs
(brake and non-brake) at a particular location; and relevant weather
conditions. Although the distance to a repair location is a key factor,
distance alone is not the determining factor of whether a particular
location is the nearest location for purposes of effectuating repairs
and must be considered in conjunction with the factors noted above.
Existing case law makes clear that neither the congestion of work at a
particular location or convenience to the railroad are to be considered
when conducting this analysis.
FRA will continue to require 100 percent operative brakes on trains
at their point of origin (initial terminal). As noted above, this has
been a requirement in the railroad industry for decades and FRA
believes it is not only wise from a safety standpoint, as it ensures
the proper operation of a train's brake system at least once during its
life, but it sets the proper tone for what FRA expects to be
accomplished at these locations. FRA believes that requiring 100
percent operative brakes on all trains at their inception provides the
railroads with a margin for failure of some brakes while the train is
in transit (up to 15 percent) and tends to ensure that defective
equipment is being repaired in a timely fashion. In addition, FRA
believes that the 100 percent requirement is consistent not only with
Congress' understanding of the AAR inspection standards that were
adopted in 1958, but also with the intent of FRA, rail management, and
rail labor as to what was to occur at initial terminals when the
inspection interval was increased from 500 miles to 1,000 miles in
1982. At that time, carrier representatives committed to the
performance of quality initial terminal inspections in exchange for an
extension in the inspection interval, for which FRA intends to hold
them accountable. In addition, the 100 percent requirement is
consistent with the statutory requirements regarding the movement of
defective equipment because a majority of the locations where trains
are initiated have the capability of conducting virtually any brake
system repair, and thus, the defective equipment could not be moved
from those locations anyway.
FRA recognizes that the 100 percent requirement at points of origin
tends to be somewhat burdensome for some railroads at certain
locations. However, FRA has made clear in its technical bulletins that
railroads are free to petition for a waiver of this requirement upon
showing that it is not capable of making repairs at these locations and
that alternative means are provided to ensure a similar level of safety
at those locations. To date, no railroad has filed such a petition.
Therefore, it appears that there are very few locations where the
requirement is a burden and railroads are either capable of repairing
the cars at those locations or have devised alternative means for
moving the cars from those locations.
The latter portion of the preceding scenario is somewhat troubling
to FRA. Currently, railroads are required to have 100 percent operative
brakes at initial terminals, however, railroads are permitted to pick-
up defective cars at these same locations, if the necessary repairs
cannot be performed, and haul them for repairs. Thus, a situation
exists wherein the railroad is required to set defective cars out of a
train if the train
[[Page 48310]]
is initiated at that location, but are then able to pick-up those same
defective cars in an en route train and haul them to the nearest
location where the necessary repairs can be performed. FRA recognizes
that this creates a somewhat illogical situation; however, FRA believes
that by retaining the 100 percent requirement at these locations the
public is assured that a train's brake system is in near perfect
condition at the beginning of its journey, train crews are more
cognizant of the presence of defective cars in the train when they are
picked-up en route, railroads are more likely to perform repairs at a
location where trains are initiated in order to avoid breaking-up
trains to set-out defective cars once the trains are assembled, and FRA
retains a clear and consistent enforcement standard that can be easily
understood by its inspectors and railroad industry employees.
Although FRA has internally attempted to develop suitable industry-
wide criteria for permitting trains to depart points of origin with a
minimum number of defective brakes if the location is one where the
necessary repairs cannot be made, FRA is not willing to permit such
flexibility without fully considering the safety hazards or potential
abuses which may accompany such an approach. Therefore, FRA seeks
comment from interested parties regarding the potential for permitting
very limited flexibility in moving defective equipment from outlying
points of origin which lack the capability of effectuating brake system
repairs. Of major concern to FRA is the potential for railroads to
designate a large number of locations, where trains are initiated, as
being unable to effectuate brake system repairs by merely closing
existing repair facilities or reducing the capability of mobile repair
vehicles at the locations. Therefore, any potential flexibility must
ensure that only those locations that are truly incapable of performing
brake system repairs, due the physical geography or design of the
location, are afforded the flexibility. In addition, FRA must have the
ability to approve any designation made by a railroad to ensure that
the location is truly one in need of the flexibility and that the
designated repair location is actually the nearest location where
proper repairs could be made. Furthermore, any approach must also
ensure the adequate identification and tracking of the trains and
defective equipment moved from the location.
One potential method of ensuring limited designations is to require
the designation of a location within a very short distance (50-100
miles) of the outlying location where all repairs will be conducted.
Under this approach, FRA would strictly limit the percentage of
inoperative brakes (5 percent or less) that could be moved in a train
from that location and would require a qualified inspector to determine
the safety of such a move. An alternative approach might include the
ability of the railroad to perform something less than a full Class I
brake test at the train's point of origin and permit the movement of
the train a very short distance (50 miles or less) to a designated
location where the train would receive a complete Class I brake test.
FRA believes that permitting some limited flexibility in this area
might have the potential of actually increasing the safety of trains
originating at some outlying locations that lack the ability to
effectuate brake system repairs. It would likely reduce the amount of
switching that occurs at these locations as defective equipment could
remain entrained until it reaches a more conducive location for being
repaired, inspected, or set-out of the train. It might also reduce the
percentage of defective equipment which may move in any single train
from some of these locations where run-through or local trains are used
to move the defective equipment to another location for repair as
railroads will not let the number of cars with defects build-up. In
addition, it would reduce the distance that defective equipment is
hauled before proper repairs are made since any approach would limit
the distance such cars could be hauled before repairs or reinspection
would be required. Furthermore, a more flexible approach might have the
potential for increasing the quality of inspections since the
restrictions for handling a defective piece of equipment would be
somewhat less and trains would have the ability to be moved to a
location where highly experienced inspectors are available.
In light of the preceding discussion, FRA seeks comments from all
interested parties regarding the viability of permitting some
flexibility in the 100 percent requirement for trains initiated at
outlying locations that lack repair capability and seeks
recommendations on potential approaches for permitting such
flexibility. Specifically, FRA seeks comment or information on the
following:
1. How many locations currently exist that are initial terminals
for some trains that lack the capability of effectuating any brake
system repairs? Partial repair ability? If so, what types of repairs
can generally be made?
2. How many trains are currently initiated at locations that lack
the capability to perform brake system repairs?
3. How do railroads currently handle equipment found with defective
brakes at initial terminals that lack the ability to effectuate the
necessary repairs?
4. What operational or recordkeeping requirements should be imposed
on trains if they were permitted to depart a point of origin with a
minimum number of cars with defective brakes entrained?
5. Are any of the potential safety benefits described above valid?
What are the potential safety hazards or concerns in permitting such
flexibility?
IV. Dynamic Brakes
The issue of dynamic brakes, and the extent to which FRA should
impose regulatory requirements governing their use, if at all, is one
which has prompted lengthy and animated debate between all affected
parties since the issuance of the ANPRM in December 1992. Coincident
with the drafting of the ANPRM, the Rail Safety Enforcement and Review
Act amended Section 202 of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970
(recodified at 49 U.S.C. 20141), and mandated, in part, that FRA,
``where applicable, prescribe regulations that establish standards on
dynamic braking equipment.'' This specific mandate is derived largely
from two NTSB recommendations to FRA concerning dynamic brakes
following the Southern Pacific Transportation Company (SP) accident at
San Bernardino, California on May 25, 1989.
In this accident, excessive tonnage and excessive speed cresting a
2.2 percent grade, complicated by the fact that the train crew had been
provided erroneous information regarding available and operative
dynamic brakes, led to a train that was out of control and was
ultimately unable to stop before derailing. While the NTSB determined
the primary cause of the accident to be the excessive weight of the
train as compared to that reported to the train crew, a secondary cause
was determined to be the fact that the engineer had far less operable
dynamic braking available for use than expected. The combination of
these two conditions likely led to flawed decision making by the train
crew in developing train handling strategies for negotiating the grade
safely. In its final report, the Safety Board issued the following
recommendations to the FRA regarding dynamic brakes:
1. Study, in conjunction with the AAR, the feasibility of
developing a positive method to indicate to the operating engineer in
the cab of the controlling locomotive unit the
[[Page 48311]]
condition of the dynamic brakes on all units in the train.
2. Revise regulations to require that if a locomotive unit is
equipped with dynamic brakes that the dynamic brakes function.
To reiterate the general explanation of the principles of dynamic
braking, as provided in both the ANPRM (57 FR 62546) and 1994 NPRM (59
FR 47676), dynamic brakes were developed as a ``free'' by-product of
the diesel-electric drive train. By engaging the dynamic brake, the
normally powered traction motors on each axle are changed to
generators, and the power generated is dissipated through resistance
grids. The effect is similar to that of shifting an automobile to a
lower gear when descending a steep grade. The additional hardware
needed to outfit a locomotive with dynamic brakes includes the grids
and the controls and switches.
The primary selling point of dynamic brakes has been the ability to
reduce freight car brake shoe wear. The dynamic brake is also useful in
controlling train slack in lieu of using the locomotive independent
brake. Furthermore, use of the dynamic brake in controlling train speed
in lieu of power braking, where the train brake is applied with the
locomotive under power, is a major factor in fuel savings. Due to these
benefits, railroads currently emphasize and encourage the use of
dynamic brakes as evidenced through examination of numerous carriers'
operating rules which dictate the use of dynamic braking as the
preferred method of slowing and/or controlling a train, especially in
heavy grade territory. Historically, dynamic brakes have been applied
to locomotives at the individual railroad's option, primarily based on
economic considerations. It is important to note that, at present, the
vast majority of new locomotives procured by the railroads are equipped
with dynamic brakes.
In order to determine the types of requirements or standards that
should be developed regarding the design and use of dynamic brakes, FRA
requested comments from interested parties regarding the reliability,
testing, and cost of dynamic brakes as well as the types of information
that are or could be provided to the engineer regarding the
availability and operation of the devices. See 57 FR 62555. Comments
were received from numerous interested parties, and were discussed at
length in the 1994 NPRM. See 59 FR 47686. Nearly all of these comments
parallel discussions that transpired throughout the RSAC Working Group
deliberations and negotiations, discussed later in this section, and as
such, are not reiterated here in an effort to avoid redundancy. In
summary, while FRA was not persuaded that dynamic brakes warrant
emphasis as the primary safety system, the agency recognized that the
statute communicates a valid safety concern, properly construed. That
is, to the extent significant emphasis is placed on dynamic brakes,
either by the railroads as a legitimate means of limiting fuel
consumption, undesired emergency brake applications, and wear to
freight car components, or by safety critics who do not foresee that
hazard of reliance on such systems, engineers may in fact be encouraged
to make errors in judgment that take them beyond prudent safety
margins. At such a critical point, proper functioning of any secondary
safety system, however subject to failure, is very desirable. Further,
dynamic brakes offer a redundant safety feature should the engineer
make a mistake in judgment leading to excessive speed under the
prevailing conditions of grade, tonnage, and weather.
Although FRA did not propose requiring that locomotives be equipped
with dynamic brakes in the 1994 NPRM, FRA did acknowledge that
Congress, in Sec. 20141, intended for FRA to develop meaningful and
enforceable standards regarding the safe use and operation of dynamic
brakes. Accordingly, and upon considering comments received in response
to the ANPRM, FRA proposed the following general requirements for
inclusion in the 1994 NPRM:
(1) Engineers should be informed on the safe and proper use of
dynamic brakes;
(2) Engineers should be provided with information regarding the
total dynamic brake retarding force available on all outbound trains
equipped with dynamic brakes;
(3) Railroads operating braking systems that include dynamic brakes
should have written operating rules, tailored to the specific equipment
and territory of each railroad, governing the safe handling procedures
for the use of dynamic brakes under all operating conditions, including
procedures covering the loss of dynamic brakes;
(4) Running tests of the dynamic brake should be performed whenever
the motive power or engine crew is changed so that the availability, or
lack of availability, of the device can be rechecked; and
(5) Locomotives built after January 1, 1996, and equipped with
dynamic brakes, should be able to (i) test the electrical integrity of
the dynamic brake at rest, and (ii) display the total train dynamic
brake retarding force, at certain speed increments in the cab of the
controlling locomotive.
Comments received during both the public hearings and in writing,
following issuance of the 1994 NPRM, predominately reiterated comments
provided in response to the ANPRM. Specifically, railroads and
suppliers emphasized their contention that dynamic brakes are not the
primary braking system for a train, but rather are economical devices
utilized to increase the efficiency of their operations. These
commenters clearly stated that the decision to equip and operate
locomotives with dynamic brakes is one dictated by economics, and as
such, should be governed by specific operating rules and not by federal
regulation. A number of railroads noted that the technology has not
been developed to continuously monitor the status of available dynamic
brakes on trailing locomotive units. These commenters further
questioned FRA's inclusion of such a requirement in the NPRM, noting
that dynamic brakes can fail at any time, and tend to fail while in
use, rendering a real-time display of available dynamic braking
capacity somewhat meaningless when relied upon to develop train
handling strategies. Several railroads also noted that running tests as
prescribed in the NPRM are unnecessary, impractical, and may increase
safety risks at some locations.
Railroad labor representatives commented that if locomotives are
equipped with dynamic brakes, then they should be fully operative and
functional at all times and they should be maintained on a regular
basis. Rail labor provided comments in response to the ANPRM stating
that they did not feel that dynamic brakes could be monitored, and even
if they could, monitoring would probably not be that effective since
dynamic brakes tend to fail in use. In contrast, however, rail labor
testified during the public hearings and in written comments to the
1994 NPRM that they fully support the use of whatever technology is
available to continuously monitor the status of available dynamic
braking.
At the initial RSAC Power Brake Working Group meeting in May 1996,
the working group members acknowledged the need for, and established a
separate task force to specifically address the issue of dynamic
brakes. The working group identified four broad areas relating to
dynamic brakes to be further developed by the task force as follows:
(1) Operational requirements; (2) available indicators; (3) en-route
failures; and (4) testing and inspection. The task force
[[Page 48312]]
was comprised of representatives from FRA, labor, management,
suppliers, and NTSB.
The task force initially focused its efforts on identifying
alternative technologies capable of providing a locomotive engineer
with information regarding dynamic brakes on trailing units. Various
methodologies, at differing levels of development and/or testing, were
discussed as potentially viable options to provide such information
including: placement of an accelerometer in the lead locomotive;
incorporation of indicator lights to inform the engineer whether
dynamic brakes set up on trailing units; utilization of intra-train
communication links; and utilization of the ECP train brake system
under development to transmit the desired information. However, these
discussions quickly refocused on the larger and more fundamental
question raised during the 1994 NPRM and subsequent comments; namely,
even assuming that technology is or will be available in the near
future to continuously monitor the status of available dynamic brakes,
is this information somewhat meaningless to the engineer when
formulating braking strategies given the nature of dynamic brake
failures. The task force quickly lost focus and direction while
contemplating this larger, more complex issue, and solicited guidance
from the full Working Group to refine the broad issues established at
the initial meeting of the full Working Group and further define the
specific issues and information to be developed by the task force.
The Working Group developed four specific issues for detailed
review by the task force. First, if a locomotive is equipped with
dynamic brakes, do or must they work. Railroad representatives on the
task force maintained, consistent with previous comments, that an
inoperative dynamic brake is not considered an impairment to train
braking, and that the automatic brake is considered the primary brake
capable of controlling the speed of the train under all conditions.
These representatives noted that an engineer must be prepared to
operate a train with only air brakes at all times since the dynamic
brake may fail at any time without advance signs of deterioration.
These commenters also stressed that it is not correct to speak of
``stopping'' a train through use of the dynamic brake because the
locomotive must be in motion before any retarding force is generated.
Simply restated, these representatives did not feel that dynamic brakes
are safety devices, but rather are economical devices whose operation
should be governed by the railroads' operating procedures and not
through federal regulations.
Rail labor representatives on the task force countered by noting
that many railroads have published operating rules which instruct
engineers to utilize dynamic brakes as an integral part of their train
handling techniques. More importantly, these task force members
referenced an AAR research paper presented at the Air Brake Association
Meeting in September 1991 which provided results from stopping distance
tests performed in grade territory with double-stack equipment with
approximately 101 tons per operating brake. Summarily, this report
concluded that, ``From this it can be seen that trains such as this
double-stack test train cannot be safely controlled on 3% grades with
the service brake alone, and that dynamic brake failure on two or more
units would require a train to be stopped with an emergency application
on the grade.'' Given the current emphasis of many railroads' operating
procedures regarding the utilization of dynamic brakes, labor
representatives strongly recommended that the railroads be required to
repair defective dynamic brakes within a specified interval. These task
force representatives strongly believed that the failure of the current
regulation to mandate the timely repair of locomotive units with
inoperative dynamic brakes has resulted in the railroads being free to
repair these units at their leisure based primarily on economics and
convenience. Labor representatives contended that a requirement to
repair inoperative dynamic brakes concurrent with the 92-day locomotive
inspection interval would impose a minimal logistical burden on the
railroad and would help ensure a locomotive fleet with operating and
effective dynamic brakes.
All members of the task force discussed methods by which to allow a
railroad to declare a locomotive unit ``not equipped'' without
physically removing the hardware necessary for operation of the dynamic
brakes. There was general agreement within the task force that such a
provision was necessary, specifically when considering the needs of
short line railroads. These railroads typically have limited need or
desire to utilize dynamic brakes within their operating environment,
but tend to purchase locomotives from larger Class 1 carriers that are
equipped with dynamic brakes. Although there was general agreement
regarding the necessity for such a provision, the task force members
were unable to reach consensus on the particulars that would ensure
declarations of ``not equipped'' were not made to intentionally
circumvent any prescribed maintenance requirements that might be
imposed. Concerns were also raised regarding the perceived ability of a
railroad under such a provision to declare a locomotive ``not
equipped'' one day and ``equipped'' soon thereafter based primarily on
operational considerations and/or economics.
The second specific issue assigned to the task force by the Working
Group centered on whether the level of dynamic brakes can or should be
continuously monitored and conveyed to the engineer, and how the
locomotive engineer is notified if the dynamic brakes do not work.
Comments received in response to questions posed in the ANPRM,
testimony provided in the public hearings, and discussions in both the
Working Group and the task force deliberations have not identified an
existing, accurate, and cost-effective means by which to provide the
engineer a continuous, real-time status of dynamic braking availability
and capacity. Absent such a real-time status indicator of dynamic
brakes, rail labor representatives on the task force clearly advocated
the need for engineers to be apprised of the status of the dynamic
brakes on each unit in the locomotive consist, either verbally or in
writing, prior to departing each initial terminal location and at each
crew change location.
The task force considered utilizing accelerometers as an interim or
alternative solution to the current lack of technology. Accelerometers
have become very common in the industry in the last several years, and
several demonstrations of an accelerometer's ability to display braking
effort were reviewed by the task force. Using various locomotive
simulators, task force members observed examples of dynamic braking on
both relatively flat and heavy grade conditions which demonstrated how,
in some cases, an accelerometer can provide more information to the
engineer than a display of the amperage from the trailing locomotives.
During the simulation exercise, the amperage reading remained unchanged
on all locomotives in the simulated consist during the slow down, but
the accelerometer provided information as to the actual braking effort
of the dynamic brake through changes in its rate of deceleration value
(expressed in mph/minute) as the dynamic brake slowed the simulated
train through the dynamic brake's effective range. While additional
simulations further demonstrated advantages of using
[[Page 48313]]
accelerometers as opposed to amperage readings, the task force did not
collectively endorse this equipment as a solution to the issue of
dynamic brake monitoring.
In addition to the uncertainty of available technology, the task
force addressed the ancillary issue of ``information overload''
associated with an additional display being shown on the engineer's
console. Task force members cited a parallel example of this phenomenon
related to current radio-controlled distributive power equipment and
its ability to display all conditions such as brake pipe, equalizing
reservoir, amperage, throttle or dynamic brake position, and locomotive
brake cylinder pressure on remote locomotives. Concerns have been
expressed that the redundant information being provided via these
screens is not being utilized by most locomotive engineers, and that
such information simply clutters an already visually challenging
control stand and may contribute to decreased levels of safety by
drawing the engineer's attention away from other necessary duties.
The task force contemplated the feasibility and benefits of
incorporating a ``dynamic brake light'' outside the cab of a locomotive
to provide the engineer with a status display of available dynamic
brakes. A strobe light was recommended in order to offer visibility in
foggy, rainy, and other inclement weather conditions. Upon further
discussion, this option was considered questionable in that it could
prove to be a distraction to the locomotive engineer by directing his/
her attention to the rear when critical braking decisions would require
the attention of the engineer to be in the direction of travel. Several
task force members also noted that the curvature of the track in
certain locations could conceivably obscure visual contact with the
light, while others maintained that a light alone offered little
information about the actual performance of the dynamic brake and could
simply mislead the engineer.
The third specific issue assigned to the task force for resolution
involved the establishment and maintenance of records concerning
dynamic brakes on locomotive units. This issue was not fully developed
by the task force, in that any specific recordkeeping requirements are
somewhat predicated on resolution of the previously discussed issues
regarding whether or not locomotives need to be equipped with operative
dynamic brakes. The task force noted that appropriate records would be
required if specific maintenance intervals were established (i.e. at
the 92-day locomotive inspection as discussed earlier), but no
consensus was reached on this issue.
The last issue provided to the task force focused on en route
failures of the dynamic brakes. Railroad representatives on the task
force again stated that the dynamic brakes are not the primary braking
system for the train, and that they are not used to actually stop the
train. Based on this assertion, these representatives did not believe
that any operating restrictions should be imposed on continued movement
of the train should the dynamic brakes fail on a unit or units en
route. Rail labor representatives on the task force refuted this
position, and maintained that a railroad should implement a number of
safeguards should a dynamic brake become inoperative en route. These
representatives advocated a reduction in train speed if the defective
dynamic brake is on the lead locomotive, and that no train be operated
on certain grades (1 percent suggested) with inoperative dynamic brakes
on the lead locomotive.
A stated objective of any task force is to develop and/or gather
specific information, facts, and data directly relating to the issue;
in this case, dynamic brakes. The task force pursued this by
formulating and distributing a questionnaire to a number of engineers
soliciting their input regarding the use of dynamic brakes, the
importance of a display showing available dynamic braking force, and
other related issues as discussed above. The results of this
questionnaire clearly support the positions stated and advocated by
rail labor representatives throughout this process. Specifically, 86
percent of the 138 respondents replied that operative dynamic brake is
``very'' important to safely control a train in grade territory, 93
percent of the respondents felt it to be ``very'' important that if a
locomotive is equipped with dynamic brakes, they should be required to
be operative, 86 percent of the respondents felt it to be ``very''
important the dynamic brakes should continue to function during
emergency applications, 83 percent of the respondents are instructed to
use dynamic brakes for fuel conservation, and a significant minority
felt that a real-time display of available dynamic braking effort would
``overload'' the information provided on the control stand. This
questionnaire was not conducted scientifically, nor was it intended to
be a statistically valid sampling of dynamic brake issues and
locomotive engineers throughout the country. It did, however, provide
support and confirmation of views that have been presented by rail
labor over the past 5 years regarding the importance of, and reliance
on, dynamic brakes in train handling by locomotive engineers.
As illustrated in the discussions above, deliberations within the
dynamic brake task force largely focused on the fundamental issues
posed as early as 1992 in the ANPRM. The task force was unable to reach
consensus on resolution of these issues, and ceased meeting as the
negotiations within the inspection and testing task force dominated the
RSAC proceeding. Dynamic brake issues were included in the subsequent
negotiations and deliberations of the inspection and testing task
force, but did not play an integral role in shaping the numerous
proposals that were generated for discussion. At the completion of the
Working Group activities, it was apparent that both labor and
management representatives recognized that minimum standards need to be
established for the operation, testing, and maintenance of dynamic
brakes. Labor representatives continued to promote shorter maintenance
and repair intervals, while management representatives were hesitant to
jeopardize locomotive availability due to inoperability of a feature
that they view as one which provides increased operational flexibility
but which is not safety-critical.
FRA Conclusions. A wealth of information has been gathered
regarding the operation, testing, and maintenance of dynamic brakes in
the five years since the publishing of the ANPRM. Based on the
information provided, FRA proposes appropriate standards for dynamic
brakes that are consistent with the statutory mandate, that take into
consideration NTSB recommendations, that potentially promote
progressive improvements in dynamic brake information systems through
the phased introduction of technology, and that avoid excessive
requirements that discourage the use of dynamic brakes. As should be
evident from the preceding discussion, FRA has been confronted with
issues not limited to equipping locomotives with dynamic brakes,
development of standards for dynamic brakes, or implementation of
technologies to advise the engineer on the condition of dynamic brakes.
Rather, given the increased emphasis on dynamic brake usage as
prescribed in operating rules, it is paramount to consider whether the
current emphasis on the use of dynamic brakes to achieve fuel
efficiency and avoid wear on power brake components has resulted in
issuance of train handling instructions that can lure the engineer into
a trap in those situations where dynamic brakes
[[Page 48314]]
must be relied upon to control speed within a zone of safety.
The RSAC Working Group and task force deliberations provided no
rationale to warrant a reconsideration of FRA's stated position that
dynamic brakes do not offer the technical capability to serve as a
primary train braking system since: (i) they provide braking force only
on powered locomotive axles and are incapable of controlling in-train
forces in the same manner as the automatic braking system; (ii) they
are effective only within a narrow speed range and have no capability
to actually stop a train; (iii) they can fail without prior warning;
and (iv) their failure mode is characterized by loss of braking force
(as opposed to the automatic brake, which, properly employed, initiates
an emergency brake application upon loss of system integrity).
Similarly, however, the RSAC working group and task force
deliberations reinforced FRA's belief that dynamic brakes have become,
de facto, a second-order safety system where employed. While from the
point of view of logical priorities, dynamic brakes ``back up'' the
automatic train brake system, in sequence of operational procedures the
priority is reversed. Stated differently, either the proper functioning
of these systems, or the provision of reliable information concerning
degraded functioning of these systems, should prevent locomotive
engineers from operating trains in a manner that might make recovery
through use of the automatic brake impossible. As between these two
alternatives, proper functioning is marginally preferred, since
communication, perception, and comprehension of information is not a
uniformly successful enterprise.
In considering the entirety of the information available, FRA
concludes that it is imperative that the locomotive engineer be
informed in writing of the operational status of the dynamic brakes on
all locomotives in the consist at the initial terminal or point of
origin for a train or at other locations where a locomotive engineer
first takes charge of a train. Therefore, FRA proposes to require that
locomotive engineers be provided this information at these locations.
This proposed provision directly addresses the foremost concern
articulated by the NTSB following the San Bernardino accident. FRA also
proposes to require visible identification of locomotive units with
inoperative dynamic brakes. FRA is in full agreement that when
locomotives are equipped with dynamic brakes, they should be in proper
operating condition and be maintained on a regular basis, to the
maximum extent practical, to enhance train handling. FRA does recognize
that these maintenance requirements may be overly burdensome in some
instances for railroads (primarily short lines) who do not utilize
dynamic brakes in their respective operations, but yet own and operate
locomotives equipped with dynamic brakes. Consequently, FRA further
proposes provisions for deactivating a locomotive's dynamic brakes
without physically removing the components. FRA also specifically
solicits input regarding the placement of a locomotive in a consist
that has been declared ``deactivated'' in accordance with this
proposal. Some existing railroad operating rules dictate that a
locomotive which has been determined to have inoperative dynamic brakes
may be dispatched in a train, but prohibit its placement in the lead
position of the consist. Are there technical reasons to prohibit a
locomotive with inoperative dynamic brakes from functioning as the lead
locomotive, providing the deactivated locomotive still has the
capability to fully control the dynamic braking functions of all other
locomotives in the consist that are so equipped?
In addition to the information and maintenance requirements, FRA
also proposes the development of operating rules and training programs
to ensure the proper and safe use of dynamic brakes. For example, FRA
proposes to require that railroads operating trains with brake systems
that include dynamic brakes develop, implement, and make available to
FRA upon request written operating rules governing safe train handling
procedures using these dynamic brakes under all operating conditions,
which shall be tailored to the specific equipment and territory of the
railroad. More importantly, FRA also proposes to require that a
railroad's operating rules be based on the ability of friction brakes
alone to safely stop the train under all operating conditions.
Furthermore, FRA also proposes to require a railroad operating a train
with a brake system that includes dynamic brakes to develop, implement,
and make available to FRA upon request a plan to ensure that its
locomotive engineers are fully trained in the operating rules
prescribed above and at a minimum includes classroom, hands-on, and
annual refresher training.
FRA views the establishment of these comprehensive operating rules
and training plans as the most effective means by which to minimize the
possibility of future incidents caused by excessive reliance on dynamic
brakes by the train crew as a method of controlling the speed of a
train in its descent through a difficult grade, as was the case in the
San Bernardino incident. FRA views as unfortunate, and potentially
reckless, the increasing number of train handling and power brake
instructions issued by freight railroads that emphasize the use of
dynamic brakes without including prominent warnings that such systems
may not be relied upon to provide the margin of safety necessary to
stop short of obstructions and control points or to avoid overspeed
operation. Such instructions, while not yet affirmatively misleading to
seasoned locomotive engineers, threaten to overcome the good judgement
of safety critics and regulators by leading to excessive reliance upon
these systems. Given the ever-increasing weight and length of freight
trains, and the severe grades that they are often required to negotiate
en route, the need for locomotive engineers who are thoroughly trained
and knowledgeable in all aspects of train handling is paramount for
continued safety in the rail industry.
In both the ANPRM (57 FR 62555) and the 1994 NPRM (59 FR 47687),
FRA requested comments from the industry on possible methods of
providing information regarding the status of dynamic brakes to the
engineer in the cab of the controlling locomotive. The only workable
option presented to FRA in the comments received was the equipping of
locomotives with a dynamic brake display. Although FRA recognizes that
the technology for dynamic brake displays with the ability to provide
the type of information sought by FRA in the 1994 NPRM is not readily
available today, several commenters suggested that it is currently
being developed. Consequently, FRA is not ready or willing to require
the use of such indicators at this time. However, FRA believes that the
benefit of such an indicator would be to alert engineers that they have
diminished or excessive dynamic capabilities, thus permitting the
engineer to control the braking of their train in the safest possible
manner. In order to fully evaluate the viability and potential use of
dynamic brake indicators designed to test the electrical integrity of
the dynamic brakes at rest and to display the available total train
dynamic brake retarding force at each speed in 5-mph increments in the
cab of the controlling locomotive, FRA again seeks comments from all
interested parties regarding the following specific issues:
1. What is the status on the future availability of dynamic brake
indicators
[[Page 48315]]
capable of providing the information discussed above?
2. What are the current cost estimates associated with the
acquisition and installation of such indicators?
3. What quantitative and/or qualitative operational or safety
benefits can be derived from the use of these dynamic brake indicators?
4. What alternative methods are available for providing the same
information that a dynamic brake indicator would provide to a
locomotive engineer?
V. Training and Qualifications of Personnel
Currently, the regulations contain no specific training
requirements or standards for personnel who conduct brake system
inspections. The regulations merely require that a ``qualified person''
perform certain inspections or tasks. See 49 CFR 232.12(a).
Furthermore, the current regulations do not require that railroads
maintain any type of records or information regarding the training or
instruction it provides to its employees to ensure that they are
capable of performing the brake inspections for which they are assigned
responsibility. In several cases, FRA has found that a railroad's list
of ``qualified persons'' is merely a roster of all of its operating and
mechanical forces.
In the 1994 NPRM, FRA proposed a series of broad qualification
standards addressing various type of personnel engaged in the
inspection, testing, and maintenance of brake equipment. See 59 FR
47731-47732. These broad qualifications were separated into distinct
subgroups which identified various types of personnel based on the type
of work those individuals would be required to perform under the
proposal. These included: supervisors; train crew members; mechanical
inspectors; and electronic inspectors. Although not proposed in the
rule text of the 1994 NPRM, the preamble contained various guidelines
regarding specific hours of classroom and hands-on training as well as
guidelines regard the level of experience each of these types of
employees would be required to possess or be provided. See 59 FR 47702-
47703. The proposal also contained various requirements regarding the
development and retention of records and information used by a railroad
in determining the qualifications of its employees. See 59 FR 47732.
FRA proposed these training and experience requirements and
guidelines based on its belief that the current training provided to
the individuals charged with performing brake maintenance, tests, and
inspections should be greatly improved in order to ensure that train
brake system maintenance, tests, and inspections are performed
properly. During the technical workshops conducted in conjunction with
the ANPRM, several labor organizations and their individual members
explicitly commented that they are not sufficiently trained to perform
the inspections and tests required of them. In addition, several
railroads admitted that the training they currently provide could be
improved. Although FRA recognized that many railroads were attempting
to improve their training programs, FRA believed that minimum training
qualifications needed to be established to assure that brake
inspections and tests are being properly performed in order to protect
both the public and railroad employees from the operation of equipment
that does not meet Federal standards.
Several railroads responded to the 1994 NPRM contending that the
specific guidelines contained in the preamble to the proposal,
regarding years of experience as well as hours of classroom and
``hands-on'' training were unnecessary and overly broad. Many of these
commenters believed that railroads were in the best position to
determine the type of training that is necessary in any given
circumstance based on the employee or employees involved. These
commenters also indicated that many railroads are currently upgrading
their training programs or already have training programs in place that
could be fine tuned or slightly altered to provide sufficient training
to its employees to accomplish the tasks for which they are assigned.
Several commenters as well as the CAPUC recommended that it would be
more appropriate for FRA to specify performance objectives rather than
specific years of service or classroom hours. They believed that any
training requirements should specify the training objectives and goals
and refer to the employee's proficiency rather than the specific method
used in reaching those objectives and proficiency. Several railroads
also commented that an employee should only be required to receive
training for those tasks which they are required to perform. Thus, an
employee who performs only intermediate type brake inspections should
not be required to receive training or instruction on the repair or
maintenance of the equipment.
Although several labor organizations objected to some of the
specific provisions contained in the preamble to the proposal, such as
the potential for train crew personnel to be deemed a mechanical
inspector and the recognition of the potential use of contract
employees, these commenters did not dismiss the approach as unworkable.
However, several labor representatives continue to contend that all
brake and mechanical inspections must be performed by carmen, or
similarly qualified individuals, and that train crew members are not
and can never be adequately trained to properly perform these types of
inspections. Some commenters suggested that FRA would not have to
propose any qualification standards if it would simply require that all
brake inspections and tests be performed by a carman.
Although the subject of employee training was a subject of concern
during the RSAC Working Group deliberations, particularly as it relates
to train crew members, there were no discussions which specifically
addressed the training or knowledge that must be provided to employees
responsible for conducting train brake inspections and tests. As noted
in the above discussions, the Working Group discussions generally
concentrated on instances when train crews would be permitted to
perform and what distances such trains or cars could move after such
inspections. However, it was clear that several railroad
representatives on the Working Group believed better training needs to
be provided to train crews to ensure the proper performance of quality
brake inspections, particularly at initial terminals. Furthermore, all
members of the Working Group appeared to recognize that a journeyman
carman or other similarly trained individual possesses the knowledge
and experience to conduct any of the required mechanical or brake
inspections would be considered a qualified inspector without further
training, with the exception of periodic refresher training.
FRA Conclusions. FRA has noticed continued improvement in the
training provided by railroads to individuals charged with performing
brake system inspections, tests, and maintenance; however, FRA
continues to believe that this training could be greatly improved and
enhanced. Although there has been a decline in the number of train
incidents, derailments, fatalities, and injuries over the last ten
years, FRA believes that the number of these incidents will be further
reduced if maintenance, inspections, and tests of the brake system are
performed by individuals who have received proper training specifically
targeting the activities for which an individual is assigned
responsibility. As stated previously, FRA believes one of the
[[Page 48316]]
major factors in ensuring the quality of brake inspections and the
proper operation of that equipment is the adequate training of those
persons responsible for inspecting and maintaining that equipment.
Railroads continue to consolidate mechanical work to fewer and
fewer locations on the railroad. This trend places an increasing
premium on the ability of train crews to conduct meaningful inspections
and tests of the power brake system. Increases in train speeds and
increased pressure on operating personnel due to growing traffic
density will continue to make it critical for train crews and
mechanical forces to discharge their duties with respect to power brake
systems both diligently and effectively even under the most optimistic
of scenarios with respect to the operation of incentives. FRA proposes
to allow increases in the distances some trains may travel between
brake system inspections where mechanical forces perform all of the
inspection functions (including a complete inspection under 49 CFR part
215). The latitude that would be provided to some trains under this
proposal would result in fewer inspections per distance traveled and
reduce the number of opportunities that will exist for a serious defect
to be found before it could result in a train incident. It is
imperative, therefore, that each inspection be of uniformly high
quality. Consequently, FRA believes that at a minimum broad, yet
enforceable, performance-based training and qualification requirements
for personnel charged with conducting brake system inspections, tests,
and maintenance will help raise the overall quality of these
activities.
Furthermore, as noted in the 1994 NPRM, technological change
presents an additional reason for placing strong emphasis on
qualifications of inspection personnel. Train crew and mechanical
personnel alike are confronted with an increasing variety of power
brake arrangements and features. The AAR has been intensifying its
effort to develop and deploy electronic braking systems on freight
equipment. This trend will make it important for personnel to be fully
familiar with the systems that they are required to inspect and
maintain. FRA recognizes that although technological advancements may
increase the need for more qualified maintenance forces, they may also
reduce the complexity and extent of the inspecting and testing
requirements for certain equipment with the emergence of brake
indicators and sensors or the development of more reliable equipment.
Consequently, FRA proposes broad performance-based training and
qualification requirements which permit railroads to develop programs
specifically tailored to the type of equipment it operates and the
employees designated by the railroad to perform the inspection,
testing, and maintenance duties required in this proposal. FRA tends to
agree with several railroad commenters that there is no reason for
individuals who solely perform pre-departure air brake tests and
inspections to be as highly trained as a carman since carmen perform
many other duties which involve the maintenance and repair of equipment
in addition to brake inspections. Therefore, the proposed training and
qualification requirements permit railroads to tailor their training
programs to ensure the capability of its employees to perform the tasks
for which they are assigned. FRA intends for the proposed training and
qualification requirements to apply not only to railroad personnel but
also to contract personnel and personnel in plants that build cars and
locomotives that are responsible for brake system inspections,
maintenance, or tests.
Contrary to the 1994 NPRM, FRA does not intend to issue specific
experience, classroom training, or ``hands-on'' training guidelines.
FRA agrees that many of the guidelines contained in the preamble to
that proposal were overly restrictive and may have impeded the
implementation of certain training protocols capable of achieving
similar results with less emphasis on solely the time spent in the
training process. Furthermore, the proposed guidelines failed to
consider the potentially narrow scope of training that might be
required for some employees, particularly some train crew personnel,
that perform very limited inspection functions on very limited types of
equipment. Consequently, although the training and qualification
requirements currently proposed continue to require that any training
provided include classroom and ``hands-on'' training as well as verbal
or written examinations and ``hands-on'' proficiency, they do not
mandate a specific number of hours that this training must encompass as
that will vary depending on the employee or employees involved, which
is probably best determined by the railroad. The proposed requirements
also contain provisions for conducting periodic refresher training and
supervisor oversight of an employee's performance once training is
provided.
FRA believes that the recordkeeping and notification requirements
contained in this proposal are the cornerstone of the training and
qualification provisions. As FRA is not proposing specific training
curriculums or specific experience thresholds, FRA believes that these
recordkeeping provisions are vital in ensuring that proper training is
being provided to railroad personnel. FRA believes these requirements
provide the means by which FRA will judge the effectiveness and
appropriateness of a railroad's training and qualification program.
These provisions also provide FRA with the ability to independently
assess whether the training provided to a specific individual
adequately addresses the tasks for which the individual is deemed
capable of performing and will most likely prevent potential abuses by
railroads to use insufficiently trained individuals to perform the
necessary inspections, tests, and maintenance required by this
proposal. FRA proposes to require that railroads maintain specific
personnel qualification records for all personnel (including contract
personnel) responsible for the inspection, testing, and maintenance of
train brake systems. FRA proposes that these records contain detailed
information regarding the training provided as well as detailed
information on the types of equipment the individual is qualified to
inspect, test, or maintain and the duties the individual is qualified
to perform. Most Class I and larger Class II railroads already keep
records of this type; however, they are not always easily obtained by
FRA. As an additional means of ensuring that only properly qualified
individuals are performing only those tasks for which they are
qualified, FRA proposes to require that railroads promptly notify
personnel of changes in their qualification status and specifically
identify the date that the employee's qualification ends unless
refresher training is provided.
FRA recognizes that some railroads will be forced to place a
greater emphasis on training and qualifications than they have in the
past, and this requirement will result in additional costs for those
railroads. However, the proposed rule allows the railroads the
flexibility that they need to provide only that training which an
employee needs for a specific job. The proposed rule does not require
an employee who only performs brake inspections while en route (i.e.,
Class II brake tests) to receive the intensive training needed for an
employee who performs Class I brake tests or one who is charged with
the maintenance or repair of the equipment. The training can be
tailored to the specific needs of the railroad. Across the industry as
a whole, this proposal will
[[Page 48317]]
not require extensive changes in the way most railroads currently
operate, but it will require some railroads to invest more time in the
training of their personnel and should prevent railroads from using
minimally trained and unqualified people to perform crucial safety
tasks.
FRA recognizes that the costs of the proposed training requirements
are fairly substantial, however, FRA believes that most Class I
railroads have already invested in training, routinely schedule
training for their employees, and offer training to other interested
parties. For example, the Union Pacific, Southern Pacific, CSX
Transportation, and Norfolk Southern and all other Class I railroads
have a training department, have training staff available, and have the
knowledge to complete this proposed requirement. However, it is
unlikely that Class I railroads have identified each task or the steps
necessary to complete each task of inspection, testing, and maintenance
of each type of freight car they operate. Furthermore, most railroads
do not engage in the ``hands-on'' training and testing contained in
this proposal nor do most railroads maintain the records required in
this proposal. It should be noted that many Class I railroads have
participated in a Safety Assurance and Compliance Program (SACP) with
FRA and labor. Most of the SACP's have required additional training by
the participating railroads. Many of the proposed training requirements
would already be met by those railroads that have completed the
training required under the SACP.
Short line railroads, particularly Class II railroads may send
employees to other railroads for training, participate in ASLRA and FRA
training, and have on-the job training. Class III railroads are less
likely to send employees to other railroads for training, most of the
training would be on-the-job training, training by FRA, or through
ASLRA programs. Typically on-the-job training on these smaller
railroads involves having their employees work with a more experienced
employee or an individual who may have been previously employed by a
Class 1 railroad and received formal training with that railroad.
Furthermore, Class III railroad employees are not likely to require
extensive training on different types of brake equipment since most of
the equipment used by Class III railroads have only one type of brake
valve. Furthermore, the employees of these small railroads would likely
not be required to receive any training in the areas of EPIC brakes,
dynamic brakes, two-way EOT devices, or on some of the brake tests and
maintenance mandated in the proposal due to the limited distances
traveled by these trains, the low tonnages hauled, and because many of
the maintenance functions are contracted out to larger railroads.
Although FRA is proposing broad performance-based training
requirements rather than specific experience, classroom training, or
``hands-on training guidelines, FRA expects that railroads will incur a
significant cost to comply with the requirements contained in this
proposal. Training related costs have been identified as the most
significant cost item contained in this proposal, accounting for nearly
$77 million dollars of the approximate $98 million cost of this
proposal. See Regulatory Impact Analysis and Regulatory Impact
discussion below. However, virtually all of the safety related
benefits, conservatively estimated at over $31 million, for this
proposal are derived from the increase and improvement in the training
of railroad personnel, which FRA believes will result in the reduction
and prevention of accidents and the resulting fatalities, injuries, and
property damage. There are also a number of unquantifiable safety and
economic benefits which will be derived from the prevention of
accidents such as: associated accident clean-up costs, evacuation and
medical costs, road closures, and the environmental damage caused by
hazardous materials releases. It should be noted that FRA also believes
that there will be a significant unquantifiable operational benefit
derived from the enhanced training of railroad personnel, particularly
in the areas of increased equipment utilization, reduced train delays,
repair costs, and debris removal. In order to further assess both the
cost and benefits as well as other impacts the proposed training and
qualification requirements will have, particularly on smaller
railroads, FRA requests comments from interested parties on the
following:
1. What is the potential impact of the proposed training and
qualification requirements on short line railroads (i.e., Class II and
Class III railroads)? How will these types of railroads meet the
proposed requirements?
2. What is the potential impact of the proposed recordkeeping
requirements to smaller railroads (i.e., Class III railroads)? Do these
railroads currently maintain some sort of training records?
3. As FRA believes these records are a key element of the proposed
training and qualification requirements, are there alternative methods
available to smaller railroads (i.e., Class III railroads) for
maintaining and developing the required information?
4. Currently, what percentage of employees will require additional
training?
5. Are there a sufficient number of ``qualified'' employees at
present to ensure that no operational difficulty will result? If not,
what is a reasonable timeline for permitting railroads (particularly
smaller railroads) to reach full compliance with regard to these
requirements?
VI. Air Source Requirements
In the ANPRM, FRA provided background information and presented
questions on the issue of requiring additional testing of train air
brakes in extremely cold weather, especially in mountainous territory.
See 57 FR 62552. Though it is acknowledged that cold temperatures may
affect the train air brake system in many ways, the freezing of
moisture that has accumulated in the trainline which potentially causes
blockages or restrictions in air flow in the brake pipe and reduces
braking effort is an obvious and major concern. As a means to combat
this dangerous combination of factors that could lead to a loss of or a
reduction in braking effort, the industry has historically utilized
methanol and other alcohols in the trainline to act as an anti-freeze
during these cold weather operations. However, based on FRA experience
and the statements of several commenters, it is evident that the use of
these chemicals in the trainline causes untimely wear and tear to brake
system components and has a long-term detrimental effect on train air
brakes. Comments provided to FRA indicated that air dryers on
locomotives are very effective in improving the performance of train
brake systems, particularly under cold weather conditions, and
generally eliminate the need to use alcohol and other foreign
substances in the trainline. Several railroads commented that they have
already equipped their locomotives with air dryers in order to curb the
use of chemicals in the trainline. Furthermore, several railroads
frequently operating under extreme cold weather conditions commented
that they have prohibited chemicals from being placed in brake air
systems to prevent freeze-up. These railroads stated that they have
been able to operate trains in cold weather without resorting to
chemicals, such as alcohol.
Based on these comments and experiences, FRA proposed in the 1994
NPRM to ban the use of anti-freeze chemicals in train air brake
systems. See 59 FR 47728. In addition, FRA proposed
[[Page 48318]]
that all new and rebuilt locomotives and all yard air sources be
equipped with air dryers capable of achieving a 30 deg.F air dew point
depression at a 100 cfm air flow rate, unless the new or rebuilt
locomotive would not be operated in cold weather conditions, would
power only trains limited to 30 mph or less, or would power only trains
of 20 cars or less. FRA believed that an exception from the proposed
requirements for these types of operations was warranted based on the
comments received and on FRA's experience that moisture in the brake
line in these types of operations has never been a problem.
Many railroads commented that the proposed requirements for air
dryers would be costly and ineffective if implemented. These commenters
cited testimony provided by Canadian railroads, operating in extreme
cold weather conditions, which indicated that none of their locomotives
are currently equipped with air dryers, yet they have not experienced
problems with frozen brake lines. Additional comments provided by
Canadian railroads maintained that their experience shows that the
prevention of brake pipe freeze-up is not a direct benefit of equipping
air sources with air dryers. These commenters stated that freezing of
the brake pipe is of much less concern when trains are operated with
two-way end-of-train devices, in that any restriction or blockage in
the brake pipe will be recognized and appropriate steps will be taken
to stop the train safely. Commenters noted that the majority of
railroads have adopted operating rules which prohibit the use of
chemicals in the trainline as proposed in the NPRM. A supplier of air
brake equipment commented that in order for air dryers to be effective,
the temperature of the air going into the dryers must be controlled.
This would typically be accomplished through equipping the air source
with an aftercooler to get the input air to within 20 degrees of the
ambient temperature. Railroad commenters supported the use of
aftercoolers as advocated by this supplier representative,
acknowledging that locomotives equipped with aftercoolers help reduce
the relative humidity, ensuring moisture will not precipitate. These
commenters noted that experience has shown aftercoolers to be much
cheaper to install and maintain when compared to air dryers.
At the initial meeting of the full Power Brake Working Group,
members discussed the broad topic area of ``Design Requirements--
Locomotive Standards.'' The issue of air dryers on locomotives, and
also on yard/ground air sources, was included in this discussion.
Several members of the Working Group suggested that any requirements
for air dryer or similar technology be expressed in terms of a
performance standard for air dryness, and that such a standard should
be developed by a separate task force. Consequently, a task force was
formed and was comprised of representatives from FRA, labor,
management, and suppliers (through the participation of the RPI). The
Working Group articulated the task of this subgroup as follows: (1)
Determine how dry the air should be, and subsequently, (2) what
technology/hardware exists and is available to achieve these prescribed
levels. The task force was also directed to consider and evaluate any
economic implications that may impact prospective air dryer
requirements.
At the second meeting of the full Working Group, members of the
task force presented a general discussion of the basic principles of
air and the amount of water contained in air. This discussion provided
detailed information regarding the weight or amount of water contained
in air, the effect of water condensation when air pressure is
increased, how temperature affects water condensation, and the quantity
of air required to charge a train. Several methodologies and
technologies capable of drying air and preventing condensation were
described and discussed, including broad economic considerations
associated with each. Several members of the Working Group noted that
the discussions had centered predominately on locomotives, and that
more information was needed regarding ground/yard air sources such as
those used to charge the trainline prior to the addition of
locomotives. These members indicated that they felt ground/yard air
plants used in this capacity are the major cause of moisture in a
train.
Members of the task force addressed the issue of ``dew point
depression'' in detail, defining dew point depression as the
temperature reduction below ambient conditions at which moisture begins
to form, describing how it is calculated, and identifying
specifications utilized by other industries when considering dew point
depression parameters. As the Working Group had emphasized their
preference that any requirements developed for dry air be based on a
performance-type standard, the group quickly focused task force efforts
toward the development of a specific numerical value of dew point
depression that would minimize the possibility of water being
introduced into the brake system. One member of the task force
recommended, based on information that had been presented and practical
field experience, that a dew point depression of -6 deg. to -10 deg.
Fahrenheit would be sufficient to prevent the development of
condensation in train operations. This member noted that aftercoolers
alone can achieve this level of dew point depression, and could be
utilized in conjunction with air dryers to produce even lower levels.
It is important to note that these conclusions and recommendations were
made by one member of the task force, and did not represent consensus
conclusions or recommendations of the task force. Numerous concerns
were raised regarding the technical rationale employed in formulating
this ``acceptable range'' of temperatures, and several members voiced
apprehension regarding FRA's ability to effectively and uniformly
enforce such a requirement, should it be imposed.
Extended discussions ensued regarding the establishment of a
performance standard for dry air which would serve to eliminate or
minimize the introduction of moisture into the train brake system,
using dew point depression as the defining parameter. The Working Group
members were unwilling to unanimously and fully endorse the -6 deg. to
-10 deg. Fahrenheit temperature range proposed by the task force leader
given the lack of detailed, documented, and substantiated test data to
support this conclusion. Noting that fact finding and data development
are the major functions of a task force under the stated guiding
principles of the RSAC process, the Working Group directed the task
force to study, through instrumented testing, the appropriate value of
dew point depression that is required to ensure safe operations for
both locomotives and yard/ground air systems.
In an effort to gather field data to either confirm the proposed
parameters or to develop alternative measures, task force members
visited two train yards and gathered data using a device specifically
designed to measure dew points. The task force performed tests on
numerous locomotives and yard air plants, with and without air dryers,
to determine the amount of dew point depression in the air lines. The
results of these tests confirmed the assumptions of the Working Group
members in that the vast majority of locomotives did not contribute to
moisture in the train air lines, but rather, the main source of raw
water came from yard charging units. Further, the majority of the yard
units which were tested were relatively old and had not been properly
maintained or upgraded in years. During the task force tests, it was
noted that all units
[[Page 48319]]
equipped with air dryers produced minimal moisture in the system. Based
on these results, some member of the task force believed that both yard
charging units and locomotives be equipped with a device which would
assist in the reduction of moisture in the train air lines. Since a
large number of trains are charged by yard air sources (up to 80
percent by some estimations), it appeared that yard air charging units
should be given the greatest priority. Several members of the task
force suggested that all yard air sources be equipped with a device
which will produce a minimum dew point depression of -25 deg.F and
similarly equip locomotives to produce a minimum dew point depression
of -8 deg.F. This was not a consensus recommendation from the task
force, as some members of the task force felt that the issue of
moisture in the trainline is not a safety issue, but more appropriately
an item addressed through improved maintenance procedures. In addition,
these members firmly believed that the installation of air dryers as
proposed was cost prohibitive given the limited safety benefit to be
realized, and that the task force had not adequately addressed the
economic implications of requiring locomotives and yard air units to
meet the recommendations as forwarded to the Working Group.
FRA Conclusions. FRA intends to ban the use of anti-freeze
chemicals in train air brake systems, reiterating the position stated
in the 1994 NPRM, in order to prevent the untimely damage and wear to
the brake system components. See 59 FR 47728. FRA did not receive any
adverse comments on this issue in response to the 1994 NPRM, and based
on the statements and considerations raised in various Working Group
meetings it appears that both rail labor and management representatives
believe that such a provision would be acceptable.
Based on information gathered throughout the RSAC process, previous
comments by industry parties, and agency experience, FRA firmly
believes that the presence of moisture in the train air brake system
poses potential safety, operational, and maintenance issues that
require attention in this rulemaking. After completion of detailed,
instrumented testing on both locomotives and yard test plants performed
as part of the task force activities, FRA tends to believe that
locomotives rarely contribute to moisture in the trainline. As such,
FRA is not proposing that air dryers be installed on new locomotives,
as was proposed in the 1994 NPRM (59 FR 47729).
The results of this same testing clearly indicated that yard air
plants often provide unacceptably high levels of moisture while
charging the train air brake system due to the age of the system,
improper design, inadequate maintenance, or a combination thereof. Task
force efforts also estimated that upwards of 80 percent of train air
brake systems are charged using yard/ground air plants. However, FRA
believes that simply requiring that yard air sources be equipped with
air dryers may not alone necessarily effectuate the desired results
unless the air dryers are appropriately placed to sufficiently
condition the air source. Many yard air sources are configured such
that a single air compressor services several branch lines used to
charge train air brake systems, and as such, multiple air dryers may be
required to eliminate the introduction of wet air into the brake
system. FRA believes that, as with locomotives, requiring yard air
sources to be equipped with air dryers will likely impose a significant
and unnecessary cost burden on the railroads.
Based on the above discussion, FRA is proposing that each railroad
develop and implement a system by which they monitor all yard air
sources to ensure that they operate as intended and do not introduce
contaminates into the brake system. FRA believes that implementation of
this monitoring program as proposed represents a method by which the
industry can truly maximize the benefits to be realized through air
dryer technology, which all parties acknowledge has been proven to
reduce the level of moisture introduced into the trainline, at a cost
that is commensurate with the subsequent benefits. This proposed
program requires a railroad to take remedial action with respect to any
yard air sources that are found not to be operating as intended, and
further proposes to establish a retention requirement with respect to
records of these deficient units to facilitate the tracking and
resolution of continuing problem areas. Further, FRA believes that yard
air reservoirs should either be equipped with an operable automatic
drain system or be manually drained at least once each day that the
devices are used or when moisture is detected in the system. FRA
believes that these provisions, in concert with assurances that
condensation is blown from the pipe or hose from which compressed air
is taken prior to connecting the yard air line or motive power to the
train as currently prescribed in Sec. 232.11(d), will minimize the
possibility of moisture being introduced into the train air brake
system.
It should be noted that FRA recently published a final rule
mandating the incorporation of two-way end-of-train telemetry devices
(two-way EOTs) on a variety of freight trains, specifically those
operating at speeds of 30 mph or greater or in heavy grade territories.
See 62 FR 278. Two-way EOTs provide locomotive engineers with the
capability of initiating an emergency brake application that commences
at the rear of the train in the event of a blockage or separation in
the train's brake pipe that would prevent the pneumatic transmission of
the emergency brake application throughout the entire train. These
devices consist of a front unit, located in the cab of the controlling
locomotive, and a rear unit, located in the rear of the train and
attached to the brake pipe. Radio communication between the front and
rear end units is continually monitored and confirmed at regular
intervals, and the rear unit is only activated when continuity of these
radio transmissions is not maintained over a specified time interval.
This discussion of two-way EOTs is particularly appropriate within the
context of the air source requirements and air dryers. In the unlikely
event that the proposed requirements regarding air dryers fail to
sufficiently eliminate moisture from the trainline, and a restriction
or obstruction in the form of ice forms as the result of the freezing
of this moisture during cold weather operations, the two-way EOT device
becomes a first order safety device and will initiate an emergency
application of the brakes from the rear of train. As such, the vast
majority of concerns associated with moisture in the trainline freezing
in cold weather operations have been alleviated through the
incorporation of this technology in most freight operations.
In an effort to further develop and evaluate this proposal, FRA
seeks comments from all interested parties regarding the following
specific issues:
(1) How many yard sources are there that are used to charge train
air brake systems?
(2) What time period will be required to effectively institute the
monitoring program as prescribed?
(3) How many of these yard air sources are equipped with automatic
drain valves?
(4) If the yard air source is not equipped with an automatic drain
valve, how long does it take to drain manually?
[[Page 48320]]
VII. Maintenance Requirements
In the ANPRM, FRA solicited comments from interested parties
regarding the elimination of cleaning, oiling, testing, and stencilling
(COT&S) requirements for freight brake valves as a result of the AAR's
adoption of enhanced single car and repair track air brake testing
requirements in 1990. See 57 FR 62556. In response, all industry
representatives, including rail management, labor, and suppliers,
acknowledged that the improved single car test constituted a
significant improvement over the previous time-based COT&S requirements
in detecting and eliminating defective brake equipment and components.
However, labor representatives contended that the railroads are
circumventing the use of the new procedures by eliminating repair
tracks all over the nation in order to avoid performing these single
car tests. Several individuals presented examples of how the single car
test and repair track test are being circumvented, such as making
repairs in the field or moving cars to expediter tracks for repairs
rather than to repair tracks. Therefore, these commenters recommended
that some type of in-date testing or attention must be reinstated. The
RLEA also recommended that periodic attention be reinstated, contending
that acceptance of AAR's unilateral change in the maintenance
requirements allows the AAR to unilaterally establish regulations
without public comment. Labor representatives forwarded similar
recommendations, stating that any changes made by the AAR in their
recommended maintenance practices should be reviewed and approved by
the FRA.
Based on the comments received, FRA agreed that the new single car
test established a better and more comprehensive method of detecting
and eliminating defective brake equipment and components, but further
agreed that cars must receive the test in order to fully benefit from
the advantages of the enhanced single car test. Accordingly, in the
1994 NPRM, FRA proposed to require the single car or repair track test
be conducted on any car that is on a repair or shop track for various
wheel or brake equipment defects, and that at a minimum, freight
service equipment should receive the test every one or two years
depending on whether the equipment is high-utilization or non-high-
utilization equipment (as defined in the 1994 NPRM). See 59 FR 47741.
FRA did not feel that requiring the performance of the repair track or
single car test at the proposed time periods would be overly burdensome
on the industry since, according to studies conducted by the AAR
showing that a car is typically on the repair track 1.7 times a year,
most cars will be on a repair or shop track within the proposed time
limits. The proposal further allowed parties to request a change in the
time interval for performing the single car test by monitoring their
single car tests and conducting a statistical analysis of the results.
In order to ensure that the single car tests are properly performed,
FRA proposed that only qualified brake system inspectors should conduct
the tests and that the single car testing devices should be tested at
least once a day and receive maintenance at least every 92 days.
Furthermore, in order to ensure proper maintenance of brake equipment,
FRA proposed that each railroad should develop and enforce written
maintenance procedures for all types of brake systems it operates which
meet or exceed current industry standards and all federal train brake
system safety requirements. The maintenance required by these proposed
procedures would be performed only by individuals qualified as
mechanical or electronic brake system inspectors as designated in other
sections of the 1994 NPRM. Spot checks of both the single car tests and
the maintenance procedures would be conducted by qualified supervisory
personnel to ensure the procedures are being followed and the tests are
properly performed.
In response to the 1994 NPRM, many railroads commented that car
utilization would be significantly decreased if the proposed
requirements were adopted. These commenters felt that this decline
would be directly attributable to the proposed requirements regarding
craft-specific designation for the conduct of the single car tests,
periodic intervals for conduct of the tests that were viewed as overly
burdensome, and stencilling requirements that were viewed as similarly
burdensome and costly. Labor organizations countered, reiterating their
comments provided in response to the ANPRM regarding a perception that
the carriers are directly circumventing the single car and repair track
test by moving cars to expediter tracks for repairs rather than to
repair tracks, or simply by making repairs in the field. Therefore,
these labor organizations strongly advocated that FRA require and
enforce periodic testing and inspection to ensure the continued safety
of both railroad employees and the general public through realization
of brake equipment that will be in better and safer condition as a
result.
At the initial meeting of the Freight Power Brake Working Group,
the specific issues of periodic maintenance and single car test
requirements were identified as topics best addressed through formation
of a separate task force. Thus, a task force was created and was
charged with assembling and analyzing existing data pertaining to
single car and repair track testing, and formulating appropriate
recommendations based on an evaluation of this data. This task force
was comprised of representatives from rail management, labor, and FRA.
Task force deliberations commenced with a review of recent changes
incorporated by the AAR with regard to single car and repair track test
procedures, and a presentation of related data and statistics showing
the direct benefits realized as a result of these revised procedures in
terms of the number of defective brake system components detected and
repaired. However, several members of the task force voiced strong
objections regarding the accuracy and credibility of the data
accumulated in the development of the presentation material. Beyond a
fundamental questioning of the accuracy and credibility of this data,
the group identified specific issues of concern to include incorrect
data reported from the field, brake tests performed on defective cars,
problems with accessibility to the AAR's UMLER reporting system, and
questions regarding the service life of brake valves as reported.
The task force related their reservations regarding reliability of
the available data to the Working Group, specifically with respect to
the manner in which it has been collected and analysed, and requested
clarification regarding the definition of their specific assignment.
Extensive discussions ensued regarding the source and accuracy of data
that had been presented by each the FRA, AAR, and labor. Working Group
members conceded that each respective database was likely biased to
some extent due to variances in the way inspections are conducted and
alternative methodologies used in collecting and evaluating the
resulting data. Several members felt that FRA's database does not
accurately reflect defect ratios since railroads are permitted to
repair defects prior to the FRA taking exceptions, and others suggested
that FRA's data is skewed toward problem areas, and that more random
and unbiased data is necessary to formulate an accurate portrayal of
the current state of the industry. Given the divergent views on the
existing data, several members of the
[[Page 48321]]
Working Group suggested that the group consider the purposes for which
the data is needed, and whether it is needed at all. The group agreed
that a uniform understanding of the data and its relevance by all
parties was necessary to validate current practices, and that there is
great difficulty in detecting a systematic problem with the existing
methodologies unless data is collected.
The task force elected to continue discussions regarding the
applicability and content of AAR's Rule 3, Chart A, which prescribes
tests and attention required per AAR Specification S-486 (Code of Air
Brake System Tests for Freight Equipment). In doing so, the Working
Group instructed the task force to consider the extent to which an
industry rule such as AAR's Rule 3, and specifically, Chart A, could be
incorporated into a Federal regulation, and the necessary restrictions
associated with publication date and subsequent changes that would need
to be addressed. The task force continued its exhaustive review of
AAR's Rule 3, Chart A, and made significant progress in reaching full
consensus on the provisions contained therein. However, as the broad
issues under consideration by this task force were directly tied to
acceptance of the available data, continued progress was significantly
impeded by the inability of the Inspection and Testing task force to
reach resolution of what developed as a core issue of the working group
proceeding in general; namely, data validity and reliability.
Nonetheless, the task force continued efforts to evaluate the
effectiveness of the AAR's UMLER reporting system, and examined
possible modifications that would facilitate tracking maintenance and
testing of equipment via this system as opposed to stencilling. Members
of the task force also visited three facilities to view their
approaches to periodic maintenance, single car testing, and repair
track air tests. Ultimately, this task force was unable to provide
consensus recommendations to the Working Group regarding periodic
maintenance and testing requirements due to the Working Group members'
collective unwillingness to agree on the issues relating to data
collection, evaluation, and relevance as discussed in detail above.
FRA Conclusions. Based on comments received in response to the 1994
NPRM, deliberations of the Working Group and task force, and field
experience, FRA remains confident that the ``new'' repair track and
single car test, which have been used industry-wide since January of
1992, are a much better and more comprehensive method of detecting and
eliminating defective brake equipment and components than the old,
time-based COT&S requirements. FRA believes that performance of the
single car test significantly reduces the number of defective
components and dramatically increases the reliability of brake
equipment. Accordingly, FRA proposes to incorporate AAR Interchange
Rule 3 and Chart A into this regulation, thus codifying the repair
track air test requirements per Chart A such that a railroad is
required to perform a repair track brake test on freight cars when: (i)
A freight car is removed from a train due to an air brake related
defect; (ii) a freight car has its brakes cut-out when removed from a
train or when placed on a shop or repair track; (iii) a freight car is
on a repair or shop track for any reason and has not received a repair
track brake test within the previous 12 month period; (iv) a freight
car is found with missing or incomplete repair track brake test
information; (v) the brake reservoir(s), the control valve mounting
gasket, and the pipe bracket stud is removed, repaired, or replaced; or
(vi) a freight car is found with a wheel with built-up tread, slid
flat, or thermally cracked. Further, FRA proposes that each freight car
shall receive a repair track air test no less frequently than every 5
years, and not less than 8 years from the date the car was built or
rebuilt. Similarly, the single car test requirements of Chart A will be
codified such that a railroad will perform a single car test on a
freight car when one or more of the service portion, the emergency
portion, or the pipe bracket is removed, repaired, or replaced.
FRA recognizes that circumstances arise such that required repair
track brake tests or single car tests cannot always be performed at the
point where repairs can be made. In these instances, FRA proposes to
allow a car, after repairs are effectuated, to be moved to the next
forward location where the test can be performed. FRA intends to make
clear that the inability to perform a repair track brake test or a
single car test does not constitute an inability to effectuate the
necessary repairs. At the same time, however, FRA recognizes rail
labor's contention that some carriers often attempt to circumvent the
requirements for single car and repair track testing through the
elimination of repair tracks, by moving cars to expediter tracks for
repair, or simply by making the repairs in the field. As a means to
curtail these practices, FRA proposes to impose extensive tagging
requirements on freight cars which, due to the nature of the defective
condition(s) detected, require a repair track brake test or single car
test but which are moved from the location where repairs are performed
prior to receiving the required test. As an alternative to the tagging
requirements, FRA proposes to permit a railroad to utilize an automated
tracking system to monitor these cars and ensure they receive the
requisite tests provided the automated system is approved by FRA. FRA
also proposes to require stencilling requirements regarding the
location and date of the last repair track or single car test.
Alternatively, FRA intends to permit railroads to utilize an electronic
record keeping system to accomplish this tracking requirement, provided
such a system is approved by FRA. FRA believes these requirements are
necessary to ensure the timely performance of these important tests.
Without such information, there would be virtually no way for FRA to
verify a railroad's compliance with the proposed repair track and
single car test requirements.
As in the 1994 NPRM, FRA continues to believe that single car
testing devices should be tested at least once a day and receive
routine maintenance at least every 92 days. Additionally, FRA feels
that mechanical and electronic test devices should be regularly
calibrated. FRA received no comments objecting to these requirements
when previously proposed.
FRA agrees that any changes to the AAR standards incorporated into
regulation should be reviewed and approved by all affected parties,
including FRA and rail labor. Consequently, FRA proposes to implement a
Special Approval process, whereby the AAR will be required to submit
any proposed changes to the FRA. FRA will review the proposed change to
determine whether the change is ``safety-critical,'' to include, but
not limited to (i) any changes to Chart A, (ii) changes to established
maintenance intervals, and (iii) changes to UMLER reporting
requirements. If the proposed change is deemed by FRA to be ``non
safety-critical,'' FRA will permit the change to be implemented
immediately. If the proposed change is deemed ``safety-critical,'' FRA
proposes to publish a Federal Register Notice, conduct a Public Hearing
if necessary, and act based on the information developed and submitted
in regard to these proceedings.
FRA proposes development of this Special Approval process in
response to comments from several railroads and manufacturers, both in
response to the 1994 NPRM and at the RSAC Working Group meetings, that
FRA needed to
[[Page 48322]]
devise some sort of quick approval process in order to permit the
industry to make modifications to existing standards or equipment based
on the development of new technology. Thus, FRA has attempted to
propose an approval process it believes should speed the process for
taking advantage of new technologies over that which is currently
available under the waiver process. However, in order to provide an
opportunity for all interested parties to provide input for use by FRA
in its decision-making process as required by the Administrative
Procedure Act, FRA believes that any special approval provision must,
at a minimum, provide proper notice to the public of any significant
change or action being considered by the agency with regard to existing
regulations.
VIII. Two-way End-of-Train Devices
On January 2, 1997, FRA issued a final rule which contained design,
performance, and testing requirements relating to end-of-train devices
(EOTs), which became effective for all railroads on July 1, 1997,
except for those for which the effective date was extended to December
1, 1997 by notice issued on June 4, 1997. See 62 FR 278 and 62 FR
30461. FRA intends to incorporate the provisions contained in that
final rule into this proposal. As the provisions contained in that rule
were just recently issued, there is little need to discuss these
requirements in detail as they were fully discussed in the publications
noted above. However, since their issuance, FRA has discovered that a
few of the provisions are in need of minor modification for
clarification purposes and to address some valid concerns that have
been raised both internally by FRA inspectors and by outside parties.
Consequently, FRA intends to propose a few specific modifications to
the currently effective requirements which are discussed in detail in
the ``Section-by-Section'' portion of this preamble regarding Subpart E
of this part.
Although FRA is proposing only a few specific changes to the
current two-way EOT requirements, the following discussion details
several issues which have arisen since the issuance of the final rule
on EOTs. FRA seeks comment and information from all interested parties
related to the issues discussed below in order to potentially take
appropriate action on these issues at the final rule stage of this
proceeding.
The first issue of concern involves the ability of a railroad to
test the ability of the devices to initiate an emergency brake
application via a bench test. In the final rule, FRA elected to permit
railroads some flexibility in determining that a device is capable of
initiating an emergency brake application. Thus, FRA included a broad
performance requirement and then discussed various methods of complying
with the requirement in the preamble to the rule, one of which
permitted a bench test of the devices. See 62 FR 287, 290, and 295.
Based on information and questions received by FRA, it is obvious that
the bench testing option needs further clarification. The reason FRA
requires that the devices be tested at the initial terminal or other
point of installation is to ensure that the front unit will transmit an
emergency brake application signal to the rear device and that the rear
device is capable of initiating an emergency brake application from the
rear of the train. Thus, the test must include a testing of both the
front and rear units (devices) that will be used on a train. The bench
test allows railroads to perform the above test in a shop environment
that may be more conducive to finding problems with the devices and
making appropriate repairs as well as permitting railroads some
efficiency in performing the test.
In order to clarify what is required when a railroad performs a
bench test, FRA issued guidance to its inspectors on July 28, 1997. See
Technical Bulletin MP&E 97-8. In this guidance FRA made clear that a
bench test could be performed on both the front and rear units,
independent of each other, as long as the test is performed within the
yard limits or location where the device will be installed on the
train. In FRA's view, bench testing the rear unit requires applying air
pressure to the device and then transmitting an emergency brake
application from a front unit using the front unit manual switch. The
individual performing the test would determine the emergency valve
functions properly by either observing the emergency indicator pop out
or observing brake pipe pressure at the rear device go to zero while
hearing the exhaust of air from the device. Whereas, bench testing the
front unit would entail transmitting an emergency brake application
from the front unit, using the front unit manual switch, and observing
that a rear device successfully receives the signal and activates the
emergency air valve.
FRA further believes that both tests must be performed within a
reasonable time period prior to the device being armed and placed on
the train. To determine a reasonable time period, the environment where
the device is stored and the conditions the device is subjected to
after completing a successful bench test have to be considered. If the
devices are tested and stored in a controlled environment that is free
from weather elements, excessive dust, grease, and dirt prior to the
immediate installation on a train, then 4-8 hours would be acceptable.
If the devices are tested and haphazardly thrown into a corner of a
shop or are placed in the rear of a truck to be bounced around a yard,
1 hour would likely be considered reasonable before installation. FRA
also made clear that bench tests must be performed at the location or
yard where the device will be installed on a train.
To further develop the details of this issue, FRA seeks comments
from all interested parties on the following:
1. What procedures do railroads currently have in place regarding
the performance of bench tests on two-way EOTs?
2. How many railroads currently conduct bench testing of these
devices? What number of devices are tested in this manner?
3. As noted above, FRA believes that 8 hours is about the maximum
time limit that should be permitted between the performance of a bench
test and the installation of a device on a train. Is this reasonable?
4. Should FRA specifically include provisions regarding the
performance of a bench test in the regulations?
Another subset of issues that has arisen regarding two-way devices,
is the requirements related to handling trains on heavy grades. The two
most prevalent issues involve the actions that must be taken when the
devices fail en route on a heavy grade and situations where a train
must be separated in order to traverse a grade. FRA does not intend for
engineers to place themselves in an unsafe situation when they
encounter an en route failure of the device when traversing a heavy
grade. Although the rule prohibits the operation of a train over
certain heavy grades when a failure of the device occurs en route, FRA
did not intend that the train be immediately stopped when a failure of
the device occurs while operating on a heavy grade. Rather, FRA intends
for the locomotive engineer to conduct the movement in accordance with
the railroad's operating rules for bringing the train safely to a stop
at the first available location. Therefore, safety may require that the
train continue down the grade or to a specific siding rather than to an
immediate halt. Consequently, FRA expects railroads to develop
appropriate procedures and train their engineers on those procedures
related to the handling of trains on heavy grades when a two-way EOT
fails during heavy grade operation.
[[Page 48323]]
A second issue related to heavy grades involves situations where a
train must be divided in two in order to traverse a particularly heavy
grade due to the lack of sufficient motive power to haul the entire
train up the grade. This practice is referred to in the industry as
``doubling a hill.'' Initially, FRA felt that the two-way EOT should be
connected to that portion of the train traversing the grade. However,
such an approach creates a multitude of operational as well as safety
concerns. Such an approach would require train crews to repeatedly
switch the rear unit from one portion of the train to another, which
would require these individuals to repeatedly walk sections of the
train at locations where it may not be safe to do so. Alternatively,
such an approach might require some trains to carry extra devices while
in transit. Both options tend to compromise the proper operation of the
rear devices. Consequently, FRA is seeking information and suggestions
on how to handle these types of situations that most effectively deal
with all of the safety hazards involved in these types of operations.
In order to further develop the two issues discussed above, FRA
seeks comment and information from all interested parties on the
following:
1. What procedures do railroads currently have in place concerning
the handling of a train that experiences a failure of the two-way EOT
while operating on a heavy grade?
2. Should trains be permitted to continue down a heavy grade if a
failure of the two-way EOT occurs while descending the grade? For what
distance or to what type of location?
3. How many railroads currently engage in the practice of having
trains ``double a hill?'' How many trains engage in this activity? At
what locations?
4. Are there helper locomotives stationed near the locations where
trains engage in the practice of ``doubling a hill?'
5. Is safety better served by permitting railroads to leave the
rear unit on the rear of the train and proceeding with the front
section of the train over the grade? What safety hazards are created by
permitting such operation? Are there operational restrictions that
could be imposed to limit the potential safety hazards?
Section-by-section analysis
Amendments to 49 CFR Part 229
The amendments to part 229 contained in this proposal principally
concern the testing of electronic gauges commonly used in
electronically controlled locomotive brake systems. Currently, there
are two electronically controlled locomotive brake systems in use on
the nation's railroads, the Electro-Pneumatic Integrated Control (EPIC)
system supplied by Westinghouse Air Brake Company and the Computer
Controlled Brake (CCB) system developed by New York Air Brake Company.
It is projected that by the end of 1997 there will be over 1,000
locomotives in service equipped with the CCB system and over 1,400
locomotives in service equipped with the EPIC system.
In May of 1996, the RSAC Working Group decided to form a task force
to consider issues related to electronically controlled locomotive
brake systems. Rather than create an entirely new task force, the
Working Group assigned the task to a group of individuals that were
members of the previously established ``New Technology Joint
Information Committee'' created to address issues related to the
operation of these types of brake systems as well as the training of
those individuals using this new technology. This task force addressed
several issues related to these braking systems including: design;
training; inspection and testing; and maintenance. The task force
concluded that additional regulation of these types of locomotive
braking systems was unnecessary since the current regulations or
waivers sufficiently address the training, inspection, and maintenance
of these systems and any additional design requirement would most
likely not enhance safety and would probably restrict the advancement
of new technology.
The task force did recommend that some changes be made to language
contained in part 229 to permit an extension in the testing cycles for
the electronic gauges used in these types of locomotive brake systems.
The task force recommended that part 229 be revised to increase the
testing interval for these electronic gauges from 92 days to an annual
cycle. The task force believed that such an extension was warranted
based on the technology incorporated into these types of electronic
gauges, which has significantly increased their reliability over
standard mechanical gauges. Some of the items noted by the task force
which create greater reliability of these gauges included the
following: the electronic components have longer life cycles than those
in mechanical gauges; the accuracy and durability of the transducer has
been extended; and internal computer diagnostics detect inaccuracies
prior to gauges becoming defective under federal regulations. FRA
concluded from facts and judgements expressed by individual members of
the Working Group that the recommendations of the task force would be
acceptable. Furthermore, FRA agrees with the findings of the task
force, and thus, proposes the changes to part 229 recommended by the
task force.
FRA also proposes to amend part 229 by adding a new provision to
the annual test required by Sec. 229.27 to require that the locomotive
compressor or compressors be tested for capacity by orifice test at
this interval. This requirement is currently contained in
Sec. 232.10(c) but does not currently specify a time frame within which
the testing must occur. Thus, in order to clarify the requirement FRA
believes that the performance of this test on an annual basis will
ensure the proper operation of these compressors. FRA believes that the
specification of a time frame for performance of this test will have
little or no impact on the railroads as many railroads currently
perform this test at this interval and because the test is fairly
simple to perform.
Amendments to 49 CFR Part 231
FRA proposes minor clarifying changes in the applicability section
of this part. These changes are intended to make the regulatory
exceptions consistent with the exceptions contained in the statute. The
added exceptions are taken directly from 49 U.S.C. 20301 (previously
codified at 45 U.S.C. 6). It is noted that the word ``freight'' has
been added to the exceptions in order to remain consistent with
Congress' intent when the statutory exceptions were created. At the
time Congress provided an exception from the requirements of the Acts,
Congress did not and could not envision that the equipment used in
these operations would be modified for the purposes of hauling
passengers, which FRA has discovered with regard to four-wheel coal
cars. Consequently, FRA will only except freight operations which
employ the types of equipment contained in these amendments.
FRA also proposes to move the provisions related to drawbars from
part 232 where they are currently contained to this part. FRA believes
that part 231 is a more logical place for the drawbar provisions to be
located as they are more of a safety appliance-type component than a
brake system component. Although FRA has redrafted the provisions for
clarity and readability, FRA does not intend to change any of the basic
drawbar provisions currently contained in Sec. 232.2.
[[Page 48324]]
49 CFR Part 232
Subpart A--General
Section 232.1 Purpose and Scope
This section contains a formal statement of the proposed rules'
purpose and scope. FRA intends the proposed rules to cover all brakes
systems and brake components used in any freight train operation or any
other non-passenger train operation.
Section 232.3 Applicability
As a general matter, in paragraph (a), FRA proposes that this rule
apply to all railroads that operate freight or other non-passenger
train service on standard gage track which is part of the general
railroad system of transportation. In paragraph (b) of this section,
FRA makes clear that Subpart E of this proposal applies to all trains
that operate on the general system regardless of the commodity it
hauls, unless it is specifically excepted by the provisions contained
in Subpart E. Subpart E contains the requirements regarding the use of
two-way end-of-train devices which were issued on January 2, 1997 and
became effective on July 1, 1997. Although FRA proposes some minor
changes to these requirements, principally for clarification, the
provisions contained in Subpart E are virtually identical to the
existing requirements.
Paragraph (c) of this section contains a listing of those
operations and equipment for which FRA does not intend this proposed
rule to apply. These include: rapid transit operations not connected to
the general system; commuter, intercity, and other short-haul passenger
operations; and tourist, scenic, historic, or excursion operations. In
1994, FRA issued a power brake NPRM in which FRA attempted to draft a
proposal covering all railroad operations. FRA received a multitude of
comments suggesting that similar treatment of passenger and freight
operations was not a viable approach due to the significant differences
in the operating environment and equipment used in these operations.
Based on these comments, FRA decided to separate passenger and freight
operations and FRA is currently addressing the power brake issues
related to passenger and commuter operations in a separate rulemaking
specifically tailored to those types of operations. Similarly, the
Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1994 directs FRA to
examine the unique circumstances of tourist and historic railroads when
establishing safety regulations. The Act, which amended 49 U.S.C.
20103, states that:
In prescribing regulations that pertain to railroad safety that
affect tourist, historic, scenic, or excursion railroad carriers,
the Secretary of Transportation shall take into consideration any
financial, operational, or other factors that may be unique to such
railroad carriers. The Secretary shall submit a report to Congress
not later than September 30, 1995, on actions taken under this
subsection.
Pub. L. No. 103-440, Sec. 217, 108 Stat. 4619, 4624, November 2, 1994.
In response to this mandate, FRA has established a Tourist and Historic
Railroads Working Group formed under RSAC to specifically address the
applicability of FRA's regulations to these unique types of operations.
Consequently, any requirements proposed by FRA for these types of
operations will be part of a separate rulemaking proceeding. However,
FRA may retain existing provisions of part 232 as applicable to such
operations to the extent part 232 currently applies in order to avoid
regulatory gaps while power brake provisions for such service are
finalized.
Similar to the amendments proposed for part 231, paragraph (c)(6)-
(c)(8) of this section also contains the expressed exceptions currently
contained in the statute for certain coal cars and logging cars. These
proposed provisions are intended to make the regulatory exceptions
consistent with the exceptions contained in the statute. The added
exceptions are taken directly from 49 U.S.C. 20301 (previously codified
at 45 U.S.C. 6). It is noted that the word ``freight'' has been added
to the exceptions in order to remain consistent with Congress' intent
when the statutory exceptions were created. At the time Congress
provided an exception from the requirements of the Acts, Congress did
not and could not envision that the equipment used in these operations
would be modified for the purposes of hauling passengers, which FRA has
discovered with regard to four-wheel coal cars. Consequently, FRA will
only except freight operations which employ the types of equipment
contained in these amendments.
Proposed paragraph (d) and (e) of this section revokes the
Interstate Commerce Commission Order 13528, of May 30, 1945, as amended
(codified in existing Sec. 232.3 and Appendix B to part 232), and
codifies some of the relevant provisions of that Order. Thus, paragraph
(e) of this section contains a list of equipment which were excepted
from the Order's specifications and requirements for operating power-
brake systems for freight service and to which the proposed
requirements are not applicable. FRA believes that the Order is no
longer completely relevant or necessary and believes that the relevant
provisions should be incorporated into this section. In addition, FRA
intends to reference current industry standards containing performance
specifications for freight power brakes in other portions of this
proposal which mirror the provisions contained in the Order.
It should be noted that this section contains no specific reference
to private cars or circus trains. As private cars are designed to carry
passengers and are generally hauled in both freight and passenger
trains, FRA intends that these types of cars be covered by both the
recently proposed Passenger Equipment Safety Standards and these
proposed requirements. For example, these types of cars will be subject
to the maintenance and equipment standards applicable to passenger
equipment but will be covered by the inspection requirements contained
in this proposal when hauled in a freight train. With regard to circus
trains, FRA intends that these operations be covered by this proposal
due to the unique nature of this equipment and operations. Although
circus trains carry some employees, the majority of the train is
composed of freight-type equipment and are operated in manner similar
to a freight train. Thus, for consistency purposes, FRA intends that
the proposed rules apply to circus train operations.
Section 232.5 Definitions
This section contains an extensive set of definitions to introduce
the regulations. FRA intends these definitions to clarify the meaning
of important terms as they are used in the text of the proposed rule.
The proposed definitions are carefully worded in an attempt to minimize
the potential for misinterpretation of the rule. Several of the
definitions introduce new concepts or new terminologies which require
further discussion.
``Brake indicator'' means a device, actuated by brake cylinder
pressure, which indicates whether brakes are applied or released on a
car. The use of brake indicators in the performance of brake tests is a
controversial subject. Rail labor organizations correctly maintain that
brake indicators are not fully reliable indicators of brake application
and release on each car in the train. Further, railroads correctly
maintain that reliance on brake indicators is necessary because
inspectors cannot always safely observe brake application and release.
FRA believes that brake indicators can serve an important role in the
performance of brake tests, particularly in those
[[Page 48325]]
instances where the design of the equipment requires inspectors to
place themselves in potentially dangerous position in order to observe
the brake actuation or release.
The concept of ``ordered'' or ``date ordered'' is vital to the
correct application of this proposed rule. The terms mean the date on
which notice to proceed is given by a procuring railroad to a
contractor or supplier for new equipment. Some of the provisions of the
proposed rule will apply only to newly constructed equipment. When FRA
proposes to apply requirements only to equipment ordered on or after
January 1, 1999, or placed in service for the first time on or after
January 1, 2001, FRA intends to grandfather any piece of equipment that
is both ordered before January 1, 1999, and placed in service for the
first time before January 1, 2001. FRA believes this approach will
allow railroads to avoid any costs associated with changes to existing
orders and yet limit the delay in realizing the safety benefits of the
requirements proposed in this rule.
The definition of ``point of origin'' is intended to encompass
those locations traditionally considered initial terminals, that is the
location where a train is originally assembled. For clarity purposes,
FRA will consider a location to be a place where a train is originally
assembled, to be the location where a vast majority of the cars in a
train are added to the train. FRA has discovered that some railroads
are assembling two or more locomotives together with only a few cars at
one location and performing an initial terminal inspection pursuant to
Sec. 232.12 on the train at that location. The train is then moved a
very short distance (less than 20 miles) where forty or more cars are
added to the train with the performance of only an intermediate brake
inspection being performed. FRA believes this practice is clearly an
attempt to circumvent the inspection requirements currently contained
in the regulations. Consequently, FRA intends to make clear that it
will consider that location where the majority of cars are added to the
train to be the point of origin or initial terminal for that train, as
that is the location where the train is in fact assembled. FRA
recognizes that such a standard will have to be looked at on a case-by-
case basis, but believes that the above mentioned scenario is a clear
case where a railroad is attempting to avoid the comprehensive
inspection requirements imposed on a train at its point of origin.
The definitions of ``qualified person'' and ``qualified mechanical
inspector'' are vital to interpreting the proposed inspection, testing,
and maintenance provisions of the rule. A ``qualified person'' is a
person determined by the railroad to have the knowledge and skills
necessary to perform one or more functions required under this part.
With the proper training, a train crewmember could be a qualified
person. Whereas, a ``qualified mechanical inspector'' is a ``qualified
person'' who as a part of the training, qualification, and designation
program required under Sec. 232.203 has received instruction and
training that includes ``hands-on'' experience (under appropriate
supervision or apprenticeship) in one or more of the following
functions: trouble-shooting, inspection, testing, maintenance, or
repair of the specific train brake and other components and systems for
which the inspector is assigned responsibility. Further, the mechanical
inspector must be a person whose primary responsibility includes work
generally consistent with those functions. Consequently, a train
crewmember would likely not be a qualified mechanical inspector.
FRA includes a clear definition of ``qualified person'' to allow
railroads the flexibility of having train crews continue to perform
various brake tests. A qualified person must be trained and designated
as able to perform the types of brake inspections and tests that the
railroad assigns to him or her. However, a qualified person need not
have the extensive knowledge of brake systems or components or be able
to trouble-shoot and repair them. The qualified person is the
``checker.'' He or she must have the knowledge and experience necessary
to be able to identify brake system problems.
FRA provides a clear definition of qualified mechanical inspector
so that a differentiation can be made between the comprehensive
knowledge and training possessed by a professional mechanical employee,
and the more specialized training and general knowledge possessed by
train crews. This definition largely rules out the possibility of train
crewmembers becoming a qualified mechanical inspector. Part of the
definition requires the primary job of a qualified mechanical inspector
to be inspection, testing, or maintenance of freight brake equipment.
FRA intends the definition to allow the members of the trades
associated with testing and maintenance of equipment such as carmen,
machinists, and electricians to become qualified mechanical inspectors.
However, membership in labor organizations or completion of
apprenticeship programs associated with these crafts is not required to
be a qualified mechanical inspector. The two primary qualifications are
possession of the knowledge required to do the job and a primary work
assignment inspecting, testing, or maintaining the equipment.
Discussions conducted in the Working Group meetings revealed that
railroad operators believe these definitions are too restrictive and
will require training beyond the minimum needed for many employees to
do their jobs. On the other hand, the representatives of labor
organizations maintain that this approach will allow unqualified train
crewmembers to conduct tests and inspections that should be performed
only by mechanical employees.
FRA believes the proposed rule strikes the correct balance between
these conflicting points of view. FRA agrees with labor representatives
that mechanical employees generally conduct a more thorough inspection
than train crewmembers. As a result, FRA will only permit trains which
have been inspected by mechanically qualified inspectors to move beyond
the currently permitted 1,000 mile limit without an additional brake
inspection. At the same time, FRA agrees with railroad operators that
properly trained train crewmembers are capable of performing brake
tests and have been doing so effectively for years. As a result, the
proposed rule grants flexibility to railroads to continue to use
properly trained train crewmembers to perform certain brake tests,
while providing the incentive of extended movements to railroads that
use more highly qualified mechanical inspectors to perform other brake
tests.
The definition of ``solid block of cars'' is included in order to
clarify some serious misunderstandings currently existing in various
segments of the industry. FRA believes that the definition provided in
this proposal is consistent with longstanding agency interpretation and
the clear intent of the regulations. This definition makes clear that
the phase ``solid block of cars'' is intended to describe a set of cars
that were all a part of one train and that have remained coupled
together until added to another train. The phrase was never intended,
nor is it intended in this proposal, to mean groups of cars removed
from various different trains that are then assembled into a block for
addition into another train. In FRA's view, the above described action
constitutes the assembling of a new train which would require the
performance of an appropriate brake test and inspection.
[[Page 48326]]
The definitions of ``transfer train,'' ``yard train,'' and
``switching service'' are somewhat interrelated since the determination
as to whether, at a minimum, a transfer train brake test is required is
based on whether the movement is a switching movement or a train
movement. A ``transfer train'' is defined as a train that travels
between a point of origin and a point of destination, located no more
than 20 miles apart, and which is not performing switching service. A
``yard train'' is defined as a train that only performs switching
service within a single yard complex. ``Switching service'' is defined
as the classification of cars according to commodity or destination;
assembling of cars for train movements; changing the position of cars
for purposes of loading, unloading, or weighing; placing of locomotives
or cars for repair or storage; or moving of rail equipment in
connection with work service that does not constitute a train movement.
Thus, a train engaged in switching service carries the potential of
becoming a transfer train, subject to a transfer train's testing
requirements, if the movement it will be engaged in is considered a
``train movement'' rather than a ``switching movement.'' FRA's
determination of whether the movement of cars is a ``train movement,''
subject to the requirements of this section, or a ``switching
movement'' is and will be based on the voluminous case law developed by
various courts of the United States.
FRA's general rule of thumb as to whether a trip constitutes a
``train movement'' requires five or more cars traveling a distance of
at least one mile without a stop to set off or pick up a car and not
moving for the purpose of assembling or disassembling a train. However,
FRA may consider movements of less than one mile ``train movements'' if
various circumstances exist. In determining whether a particular
movement constitutes a ``train movement,'' FRA conducts a multi-factor
analysis based upon the discussions contained in various court
decisions on the subject. See e.g. United States v. Seaboard Air Line
R. R. Co., 361 U.S. 78 (1959); Louisville & Jeffersonville Bridge Co.
v. United States, 249 U.S. 543 (1919). The following factors are taken
into consideration by FRA: the purpose of the movement; the distance
traveled without a stop to set out or pick up cars; the number of cars
hauled; and the hazards associated with the particular route traveled
(e.g., the existence of public or private crossings with or without
crossing protection, the steepness of the grade, the existence of
curves, any other conditions that minimize the locomotive engineer's
sight distance, and any other conditions that may create a greater need
for power brakes during the movement). The existence of any of these
hazards would tend to weigh towards the finding of a ``train
movement,'' since these are the types of hazards against which the
power brake provisions of the Federal rail safety laws were designed to
give protection.
Section 232.7 Waivers
This section sets forth the procedures for seeking waivers of
compliance with the requirements of this rule. Requests for such
waivers may be filed by any interested party. In reviewing such
requests, FRA conducts investigations to determine if a deviation from
the general criteria can be made without compromising or diminishing
rail safety.
Section 232.9 Responsibility for Compliance
General compliance requirements are contained in this section. In
accordance with the ``use'' or ``haul'' language previously contained
in the Safety Appliance Acts (49 U.S.C. chapter 203), and with FRA's
general rulemaking authority under the Federal railroad safety laws,
FRA proposes that any train, railroad car, or locomotive covered by
this part will be considered ``in use'' prior to departure but after it
receives or should have received the necessary tests and inspections
required for movement. FRA would no longer necessarily wait for a piece
of equipment with a power brake defect to be hauled before issuing a
violation, a practice frequently criticized by the railroads. FRA
believes that this approach will increase FRA's ability to prevent the
movement of defective equipment that creates a potential safety hazard
to both the public and railroad employees. FRA does not feel that this
approach increases the railroads' burden since equipment should not be
operated if it is found in defective condition in the pre-departure
tests and inspections, unless permitted by the regulations. In fact,
this modification of FRA's perspectives as to when a piece of equipment
will be considered ``in use'' was fully discussed by members of the
Working Group and based upon the opinions and judgments expressed by
individual members of the group, FRA has concluded that the proposal is
an appropriate approach. Both rail labor and rail management
representatives supported the approach contained in this proposal
agreeing that the current practice of waiting for a defective piece of
equipment to depart from a location does very little to promote or
ensure the safety of trains.
This section also clarifies FRA's position that the requirements
contained in the proposed rules are applicable to any ``person,'' as
broadly defined in Sec. 232.11, that performs any function required by
the proposed rules. Although various sections of the proposed rule
address the duties of a railroad, FRA intends that any person who
performs any action on behalf of a railroad or any person who performs
any action covered by the proposed rule is required to perform that
action in the same manner as required of a railroad or be subject to
FRA enforcement action. For example, private car owners and contract
shippers that perform duties covered by these proposed regulations
would be required to perform those duties in the same manner as
required by a railroad.
Paragraph (c) proposes that any person as broadly defined in
Sec. 232.11 that performs any function or task required by this part
will be deemed to have consented to FRA inspection of their operation
to the extent necessary to ensure that the function or task is being
performed in accordance with the requirements of this part. This
proposed provision is intended to put railroads, contractors, and
manufacturers which elect to perform tasks required by this part on
notice that they are consenting to FRA's inspection of that portion of
their operation which is performing the function or task required by
this part. In most cases, this involves a contractor's performance of
certain required brake inspections or the performance of specified
maintenance on cars, such as, conducting single car or repair track
tests on behalf of a railroad. FRA believes that if a person is going
to perform a task required by this part, FRA must have the ability to
view the performance of such tasks to ensure that they are conducted in
compliance with federal regulations. Without such oversight, FRA
believes that the requirements contained in the regulations would
become illusionary and could be easily circumvented by some railroads.
FRA believes that it has the statutory authority pursuant to 49 U.S.C.
20107 to inspect any facility or operation which performs functions or
tasks required under this part, and this provision is merely intended
to make that authority clear to all persons performing such tasks or
functions.
Section 232.11 Penalties
This section identifies the civil penalties that FRA may impose
upon
[[Page 48327]]
any person, including a railroad or an independent contractor providing
goods or services to a railroad, that violates any requirement of this
part. These penalties are authorized by 49 U.S.C. 21301, 21302, and
21304. The penalty provision parallels penalty provisions included in
numerous other safety regulations issued by FRA. Essentially, any
person who violates any requirement of this part or causes the
violation of any such requirement will be subject to a civil penalty of
at least $500 and not more than $11,000 per violation. Civil penalties
may be assessed against individuals only for willful violations, and
where a grossly negligent violation or a pattern of repeated violations
creates an imminent hazard of death or injury to persons, or causes
death or injury, a penalty not to exceed $22,000 per violation may be
assessed. In addition, each day a violation continues will constitute a
separate offense. It should be noted that, the Federal Civil Penalties
Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-410 Stat. 890, 28 U.S.C.
2461 note, as amended by the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996
Pub. L. 104-134, April 26, 1996 required agencies to adjust for
inflation the maximum civil monetary penalties within the agencies
jurisdiction. The resulting $11,000 and $22,000 maximum penalties noted
in this section were determined by applying the criteria set forth in
sections 4 and 5 of the statute to the maximum penalties otherwise
provided for in the Federal railroad safety laws. Finally, paragraph
(b) makes clear that a person may be subject to criminal penalties
under 49 U.S.C. 21311 for knowingly and willfully falsifying reports
required by these regulations. FRA believes that the inclusion of
penalty provisions for failure to comply with the regulations is
important in ensuring that compliance is achieved.
The final rule will include a schedule of civil penalties as
appendix A to this part. Because such penalty schedules are statements
of policy, notice and comment are not required prior to their issuance.
See 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(A). Nevertheless, commenters are invited to
submit suggestions to FRA describing the types of actions or omissions
under each regulatory section that would subject a person to the
assessment of a civil penalty. Commenters are also invited to recommend
what penalties may be appropriate, based upon the relative seriousness
of each type of violation.
Section 232.13 Preemptive Effect
This section informs the public as to FRA's views regarding what
will be the preemptive effect of the final rule. While the presence or
absence of such a section does not in itself affect the preemptive
effect of a final rule, it informs the public concerning the statutory
provision which governs the preemptive effect of the rule. Section
20106 of title 49 of the United States Code provides that all
regulations prescribed by the Secretary relating to railroad safety
preempt any State law, regulation, or order covering the same subject
matter, except a provision necessary to eliminate or reduce an
essentially local safety hazard that is not incompatible with a Federal
law, regulation, or order and that does not unreasonably burden
interstate commerce. With the exception of a provision directed at an
essentially local safety hazard, 49 U.S.C. 20106 will preempt any State
regulatory agency rule covering the same subject matter as the
regulations proposed today when issued as final rules. This section
further informs the public that FRA does not intend to preempt
provisions of State criminal law that impose sanctions for reckless
conduct that leads to actual loss of life, injury, or damage to
property, whether such provisions apply specifically to railroad
employees or generally to the public at large.
Section 232.15 Movement of Defective Equipment
This section contains the provisions regarding the movement of
equipment with defective brakes without civil penalty liability. The
proposed provisions contained in this section are almost identical to
the provisions proposed in the 1994 NPRM and incorporate the stringent
conditions currently contained in 49 U.S.C. 20302, 20303, 21302, and
21304 (previously codified at 45 U.S.C. 13). As pointed out in the
previous discussion, most of the alternative proposals received by FRA
in response to the 1994 NPRM and the subsequent RSAC Working Group
meetings all contained provisions regarding the movement of equipment
with defective brakes which are in direct conflict with the statutory
requirements. See Discussion of Issues and General FRA Conclusions
portion of the preamble under the heading ``Movement of Equipment with
Defective Brakes.'' Therefore, FRA intends to propose provisions
related to the movement of defective equipment which are very similar
to the requirements proposed in the 1994 NPRM. See 59 FR 47728.
However, the current proposal clarifies the tagging requirements,
contains provisions regarding the placement of defective equipment, and
provides a consistent method for calculating the percentage of
operative brakes on a train. Consequently, in addition to being
consistent with the statutory requirements, FRA believes that the
proposed requirements will ensure the safe and proper movement of
defective equipment and will clarify the duties imposed on a railroad
when moving such equipment.
Paragraph (a) of this section proposes various parameters which
must exist in order for a railroad to be deemed to be hauling a piece
of equipment with defective brakes for repairs. The majority of the
proposed requirements in this paragraph should pose absolutely no
burden to railroads as they are merely a codification of existing
statutory requirements. The only new requirement being proposed by FRA
in this paragraph is that all cars or locomotives found with defective
or inoperative braking equipment be tagged as bad ordered with a
designation of the location where the necessary repairs can and will be
effectuated and that a qualified person determine the safety parameters
for moving a piece of defective equipment. Although these are new
requirements, most railroads already tag defective brake equipment upon
its discovery. In paragraph (a), FRA has again attempted to expressly
clarify the requirement that equipment with defective brakes shall not
depart from or be moved beyond a location where the necessary repairs
to the equipment can be performed. Therefore, if a car or locomotive is
found with defective brakes during any of the proposed brake
inspections or while the piece of equipment is en route and the
location where the defective equipment is discovered is a place where
repairs of the type needed can be performed, that car or locomotive
shall not be moved from that location until the necessary repairs are
effectuated. However, if repairs to the defective condition cannot be
performed at the location where the defect is discovered, or should
have been discovered, this proposal makes clear that the railroad is
permitted to move the equipment with the defective condition only to
the nearest location where the necessary repairs can be performed.
Paragraph (a) also codifies and clarifies the statutory
restrictions on the movement of equipment with defective brakes onto
the line of a connecting railroad. Hence, the delivery of defective
equipment in interchange would be covered by these restrictions. In
addition to fulfilling the other requirements set out in this section,
the railroad seeking relief from civil penalty liability must show that
the connecting
[[Page 48328]]
railroad has elected to accept the non-complying equipment and that the
point of repair on the connecting railroad's line, where the equipment
will be repaired, is no further than the point where the repairs could
have been made on the line where the equipment was first found to be
defective.
What constitutes the nearest location where the necessary repairs
can be performed is an issue FRA has grappled with for decades and has
become exceedingly more difficult with the growing use of mobile repair
trucks. As discussed in detail above, FRA does not believe that one
standard can be adequately developed which would be applicable to all
situations. Thus, FRA intends to approach the issue of what constitutes
the nearest repair location based on a case-by-case analysis of each
situation. FRA believes that its field inspectors are in the best
position to determine whether a railroad exercised good faith in
determining when and where to move a piece of defective equipment. In
making these determinations both the railroad as well as FRA's
inspectors must conduct a multi-factor analysis based on the facts of
each case.
In determining whether a particular location is a location where
necessary repairs can be made or whether a location is the nearest
repair location, the accessibility of the location and the ability to
safely make the repairs at that location are the two overriding factors
that must be considered in any analysis. These two factors have a
multitude of sub-factors which must be considered, such as: the type of
repair required; the safety of employees responsible for conducting the
repairs; the safety of employees responsible for getting the equipment
to or from a particular location; the switching operations necessary to
effectuate the move; the railroads recent history and current practice
of making repairs (brake and non-brake) at a particular location; and
relevant weather conditions. Although the distance to a repair location
is a key factor, distance alone is not the determining factor of
whether a particular location is the nearest location for purposes of
effectuating repairs and must be considered in conjunction with the
factors noted above. Existing case law makes clear that neither the
congestion of work at a particular location or convenience to the
railroad are to be considered when conducting this analysis.
Paragraph (b) of this section contains the specific requirements
regarding the tagging of equipment found with defective brake
components. The requirements proposed in this paragraph are very
similar to the tagging requirements currently contained in part 215,
regarding the movement of equipment not in compliance with the Freight
Car Safety Standards, and are generally consistent with how most
railroads currently tag equipment found with defective brakes. FRA
recognizes that the industry is attempting to develop some type of
automated tracking system capable of retaining the information required
by this section and tracking defective equipment electronically, which
FRA envisions would be used on an industry-wide level. Consequently,
FRA has expressly provided the option to use an automated tracking
system if it is approved by FRA. Currently, FRA has several concerns
regarding the accessibility, reliability, and security of the system
being considered by the industry and would not approve such a system
without having those concerns addressed.
Paragraph (c) contains the proposed provision restricting the
movement of a vehicle with defective brakes for the purpose of
unloading or purging only if it is necessary for the safe repair of the
car. This proposed restriction is fully consistent with the statutory
provisions regarding the movement of equipment with defective safety
appliances.
Paragraph (d) explains the term ``inoperative power brakes'' and
proposes a new method for calculating the percentage of operative power
brakes (operative primary brakes) in a train. Regarding the term
itself, a cut-out power brake is an inoperative power brake, but the
failure or cutting out of a secondary brake system does not result in
inoperative power brakes; for example, failure of the dynamic brake
does not render a power brake inoperative. FRA also intends to make
clear that inoperative handbrakes or power brakes overdue for
maintenance or stenciling should not be considered inoperative for
purposes of calculation. Furthermore, although a car may be found with
piston travel which is in excess of the Class I brake test limits, it
should not be considered inoperative until it exceeds the outside
limits established for that particular type of piston design. However,
a car found with piston travel that exceeds its Class I brake test
limits would be considered a defective condition if the piston travel
were not adjusted at the time that a Class I brake test were performed.
Although the statute discusses the percentage of operative brakes
in terms of a percentage of vehicles, the statute was written nearly a
century ago and at that time the only way to cut out the brakes on a
car or locomotive was to cut out the entire unit. See 49 U.S.C.
20302(a)(5)(B). Today, many types of freight equipment can have the
brakes cut out on a per-truck basis and FRA expects this tend to
increase as the technology is applied to newly acquired equipment.
Consequently, FRA merely proposes a method of calculating the
percentage of operative brakes based on the design of equipment used
today, and thus, a means to more accurately reflect the true braking
ability of the train as a whole. FRA believes that the proposed method
of calculation is consistent with the intent of Congress when it
drafted the statutory requirement and simply recognizes the
technological advancements made in braking systems over the last
century. Consequently, FRA proposes to permit the percentage of
operative brakes to be determined by dividing the number of control
valves that are cut-in by the total number of control valves in the
train.
Paragraph (e) contains the proposed requirements regarding the
placement of cars in a train that have inoperative brakes. The proposed
restrictions are consistent with current industry practice and are part
of almost every major railroad's operating rule. The proposed provision
would prohibit the placing of a vehicle with inoperative brakes at the
rear of the train. In addition, the proposal would prohibit the
consecutive placing of more than two vehicles with inoperative brakes
as test rack demonstrations have indicated that when three consecutive
cars have their brakes cut-out it is not always possible to obtain an
emergency brake application on trailing cars. FRA has extrapolated the
restriction on the consecutive placing of defective cars to multi-unit
articulated equipment, prohibiting the placement in a train of such
equipment if it has consecutive individual control valves cut-out or
inoperative, which is consistent with current industry practice.
Section 232.17 Special Approval Process
This section contains the procedures to be followed when seeking to
obtain FRA approval of a pre-revenue service acceptance plan under
Sec. 232.505 for completely new brake system technologies or major
upgrades to existing systems or when seeking to change one of the
established industry maintenance standards referenced in Secs. 232.303,
232.305, or 232.307. Several railroads and manufacturers contended,
both in response to the 1994 NPRM and at the RSAC Working Group
meetings, that FRA needed to devise some sort of quick approval process
in order to permit the industry to make
[[Page 48329]]
modifications to existing standards or equipment based on the
development of new technology. Thus, FRA has attempted to propose an
approval process it believes should speed the process for taking
advantage of new technologies over that which is currently available
under the waiver process. However, in order to provide an opportunity
for all interested parties to provide input for use by FRA in its
decision making process, as required by the Administrative Procedure
Act, FRA believes that any special approval provision must, at a
minimum, provide proper notice to the public of any significant change
or action being considered by the agency with regard to existing
regulations.
Subpart B--General Requirements
Section 232.101 Scope
This section contains a formal statement of the scope of this
specific subpart of the proposal. This subpart is intended to provide
general operating, performance, and design standards for railroads that
operate freight or other non-passenger trains and further contains
specific requirements for equipment used in these types of operations.
Section 232.103 General Requirements for All Train Brake Systems
This section contains general requirements that are applicable to
all freight and non-passenger train brake systems. FRA proposes to
specifically include basic train brake system practices and procedures
that form the foundation for the safe operation of all types of trains.
Some of these basic principles are so obvious that they have not been
specifically included in past rules. For example, in paragraphs (a)-(c)
FRA has included the most basic safety requirements for all train brake
systems which include having the ability to stop a train within the
existing signal spacing, maintaining and monitoring the integrity of
the train brake communication line, and having the train brake system
respond as intended to signals from the brake communication line.
In paragraph (d), FRA proposes to continue the requirement that
prior to use or departure from a point of origin (initial terminal) all
trains shall have 100 percent operative and effective brake systems.
This has been a requirement in the railroad industry for decades and
FRA believes it is not only wise from a safety standpoint, as it
ensures the proper operation of a train's brake system at least once
during its life, but it sets the proper tone for what FRA expects to be
accomplished at these locations. FRA believes that requiring 100
percent operative brakes on all trains at their inception provides the
railroads with a margin for failure of some brakes while the train is
in transit (up to 15 percent) and tends to ensure that defective
equipment is being repaired in a timely fashion. In addition, FRA
believes that the 100 percent requirement is consistent not only with
Congress' understanding of the AAR inspection standards that were
adopted in 1958, but also with the intent of FRA, rail management, and
rail labor as to what was to occur at initial terminals when the
inspection interval was increased from 500 miles to 1,000 miles in
1982. At that time, carrier representatives committed to the
performance of quality initial terminal inspections in exchange for an
extension in the inspection interval, for which FRA intends to hold
them accountable. In addition, the 100 percent requirement is
consistent with the statutory requirements regarding the movement of
defective equipment because a majority of the locations where trains
are initiated have the capability of conducting virtually any brake
system repair, and thus, the defective equipment could not be moved
from those locations anyway.
FRA recognizes that the 100 percent requirement at points of origin
tends to be somewhat burdensome for some railroads at certain
locations. Although railroads are required to have 100 percent
operative brakes at initial terminals, railroads are currently
permitted to pick-up defective cars at these same locations, if the
necessary repairs cannot be performed, and haul them for repairs. Thus,
a situation exists wherein the railroad is required to set a defective
car out of a train if the train is initiated at that location, but are
then able to pick-up that same defective car in an en route train and
haul it to the nearest location where the necessary repairs can be
performed. FRA recognizes that this creates a somewhat illogical
situation; however, FRA believes that by retaining the 100 percent
requirement at these locations the public is assured that a train's
brake system is in near perfect condition at the beginning of its
journey, train crews are more cognizant of the presence of defective
cars in the train when they are picked-up en route, railroads are more
likely to perform repairs at a location where trains are initiated in
order to avoid breaking-up trains to set-out defective cars once the
trains are assembled, and FRA retains a clear and consistent
enforcement standard that can be easily understood by its inspectors
and railroad industry employees.
Although FRA has internally attempted to develop suitable industry-
wide criteria for permitting trains to depart points of origin with a
minimum number of defective brakes if the location is one where the
necessary repairs cannot be made, FRA is not willing to permit such
flexibility without fully considering the safety hazards or potential
abuses which may accompany such an approach. Therefore, FRA seeks
comment from interested parties regarding the potential for permitting
very limited flexibility in moving defective equipment from outlying
points of origin which lack the capability of effectuating brake system
repairs. Of major concern to FRA is the potential for railroads to
designate a large number of locations, where trains are initiated, as
being unable to effectuate brake system repairs by merely closing
existing repair facilities or reducing the capability of mobile repair
vehicles at the locations. Therefore, any potential flexibility must
ensure that only those locations that are truly incapable of performing
brake system repairs, due to the physical geography or design of the
location, are afforded the flexibility. In addition, FRA must have to
have the ability to approve any designation made by a railroad to
ensure that the location is truly one in need of the flexibility and
that the designated repair location is actually the nearest location
where proper repairs could be made. Furthermore, any approach must also
ensure the adequate identification and tracking of the trains and
defective equipment moved from the location.
One potential method of ensuring limited designations is to require
the designation of a location within a very short distance (50-100
miles) of the outlying location where all repairs will be conducted.
Under this approach, FRA would strictly limit the percentage of
inoperative brakes (5 percent or less) that could be moved in a train
from that location and would require a qualified inspector to determine
the safety of such a move. An alternative approach might include the
ability of the railroad to perform something less than a full Class I
brake test at the train's point of origin and permit the movement of
the train a very short distance (50 miles or less) to a designated
location where the train would receive a complete Class I brake test.
FRA believes that permitting some limited flexibility in this area
might have the potential of actually increasing the safety of trains
originating at some
[[Page 48330]]
outlying locations that lack the ability to effectuate brake system
repairs. It would likely reduce the amount of switching that occurs at
these locations as defective equipment could remain entrained until it
reaches a more conducive location for being repaired, inspected, or
set-out of the train. It might also reduce the percentage of defective
equipment which may move in any single train from some of these
location where run-through or local trains are used to move the
defective equipment to another location for repair as railroad's will
not let the number of cars with defects build-up. In addition, it would
reduce the distance that defective equipment is hauled before proper
repairs are made since any approach would limit the distance such cars
could be hauled before repairs or reinspection would be required.
Furthermore, a more flexible approach might have the potential for
increasing the quality of inspections since the restrictions for
handling a defective piece of equipment would be somewhat less and
trains would have the ability to be moved to a location where highly
experienced inspectors are available.
In light of the preceding discussion, FRA seeks comments from all
interested parties regarding the viability of permitting some
flexibility in the 100 percent requirement for train initiated at
outlying locations that lack repair capability and seeks
recommendations on potential approaches for permitting such
flexibility. Specifically, FRA seeks comment or information on the
following:
1. How many locations currently exist that are initial terminals
for some trains that lack the capability of effectuating any brake
system repairs? Partial repair ability? If so, what types of repairs
can generally be made?
2. How many trains are currently initiated at locations that lack
the capability to perform brake system repairs?
3. How do railroads currently handle equipment found with defective
brakes at initial terminals that lack the ability to effectuate the
necessary repairs?
4. What operational or record keeping requirements should be
imposed on trains if they were permitted to depart a point of origin
with a minimum number of cars with defective brakes entrained?
5. Are any of the potential safety benefits described above valid?
What are the potential safety hazards or concerns in permitting such
flexibility?
In paragraph (e), FRA proposes a clear and absolute prohibition on
train movement if more than 15 percent of the cars in a train have
their brakes cut out or have otherwise defective brakes. Although there
is no limit contained in the statute regarding the number of cars with
defective brake equipment that may be hauled in a train, the 15 percent
limitation is a longstanding industry and agency interpretation of the
hauling-for-repair provision currently codified at 49 U.S.C. 20303,
21302, and 21304, and has withstood the test of time. This
interpretation is extrapolated from another statutory requirement which
permits a railroad to use a train only if ``at least 50 percent of the
vehicles in the train are equipped with power or train brakes and the
engineer is using the power or train brakes on those vehicles and on
all other vehicles equipped with them that are associated with those
vehicles in a train.'' 49 U.S.C. 20302(a)(5)(B). As originally enacted
in 1903, section 20302 also granted the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) the authority to increase this percentage, and in 1910 the ICC
issued an order increasing the minimum percentage to 85 percent. See 49
CFR 232.1, which codified the ICC order. FRA proposed this same
restriction in the 1994 NPRM and no major objections to this limitation
were raised by any of the commenters. See 59 FR 47727. Consequently,
FRA will continue to require that equipment with defective or
inoperative air brakes makeup no more than 15 percent of any train.
As virtually all freight cars are presently equipped with power
brakes and are operated on an associated trainline, the statutory
requirement cited above is in essence a requirement that 100 percent of
the cars in a train have operative power brakes, unless being hauled
for repairs pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 20303. Consequently, in paragraph (f)
FRA makes clear that a train's air brakes shall be in effective and
operable condition unless a car is being hauled for repairs pursuant to
the conditions proposed in Sec. 232.15. This section also proposes the
standard for determining when a freight car's air brakes are not in
effective operating condition based on piston travel. The piston travel
limits for standard 12-inch stroke brake cylinders are the same as
currently required under Sec. 232.11(c). However, the experience of FRA
indicates a proliferation of equipment with other than standard 12-inch
stroke brake cylinders. As a result, mechanical forces and train crew
members performing brake system inspections often do not know the
acceptable range of brake piston travel for this non-standard
equipment. In an attempt to improve this situation and to ensure the
proper operation of a car's brakes after being inspected, FRA in
paragraph (g) intends to require badge plates, stickers or stenciling
of cars with the acceptable range of piston travel for all vehicles
equipped with other than standard 12-inch stroke brake cylinders. The
information on the badge plate, sticker, or stencil must include both
the permissible brake cylinder piston travel range for the vehicle at
Class I brake tests and the length at which the piston travel renders
the brake ineffective. FRA believes that this information is essential
in order for a person to properly perform the brake inspections
proposed in this rule due to the growing number of cars with other than
standard brake designs.
Paragraph (h) requires that all equipment ordered on or after
January 1, 1999, or placed in service for the first time on or after
January 1, 2001, be designed not to require an inspector to place
himself or herself on, under, or between components of the equipment to
observe brake actuation or release. The proposal allows railroads the
flexibility of using a reliable indicator in place of requiring direct
observation of the brake application or piston travel because the
current or future designs of some freight car brake systems make direct
observation extremely difficult without the inspector placing himself
or herself underneath the equipment. Brake system piston travel or
piston cylinder pressure indicators have been used with satisfactory
results for many years. Although indicators do not provide 100 percent
certainty that the brakes are effective, FRA believes that they have
proven themselves effective enough to be preferable to requiring an
inspector to assume a dangerous position.
This proposed requirement stems primarily from the brake system
design of double-stack equipment currently used by several larger
freight operations. Several commenters have indicated that the
functioning of the brakes on this type of equipment cannot be observed
without inspectors placing themselves in potentially dangerous
positions. In addition, a complete inspection of the brake equipment
and systems used on double-stack equipment is time consuming.
Consequently, inspectors are reluctant to conduct a complete brake
inspection test on departing trains that contain this type of
equipment. FRA feels that double-stack equipment is becoming a mainstay
of the freight railroad industry and that this design deficiency must
be corrected. Thus, FRA has attempted to make this a performance
requirement by simply specifying how the equipment must
[[Page 48331]]
function and allowing the industry to determine the method of
compliance.
Paragraph (i) proposes to require that an emergency brake
application feature be available at any time and that it produce an
irretrievable stop. This section merely codifies current industry
practice and ensures that all equipment will continue to be designed
with an emergency brake application feature. In the 1994 NPRM on power
brakes, FRA proposed a requirement that all trains be equipped with an
emergency application feature capable of increasing the train's
deceleration rate a minimum of 15 percent. See 59 FR 47729. This
proposed requirement merely restated the emergency specification
currently contained in Appendix B to part 232. Comments received in
response to that proposal indicated that some brake equipment currently
in use or being developed could provide a deceleration rate with a full
service application that is close to the emergency brake rate and that
the proposed requirement would require the lowering of full service
brake rates, thereby compromising safety and lowering train speeds.
Based on these comments, FRA proposes the current requirement which is
in accordance with suggestions made by several commenters.
Paragraph (j) proposes to require that the air brake components
that control brake application and release be adequately sealed to
prevent contamination by foreign material. This proposed requirement is
merely a reiteration of a general specification requirement currently
contained in Appendix B to part 232. It is intended to ensure that the
air brake components are not compromised due to contamination from
foreign materials which can cause premature failure of certain
components resulting in the loss of braking ability.
Paragraphs (k) and (l) impose on the railroads the responsibility
for determining maximum air brake system working pressure and maximum
brake pipe pressure. These proposed provisions were contained in the
1994 NPRM, and FRA received no comments objecting to their inclusion.
See 59 FR 47743. Thus, FRA intends to continue to allow individual
railroads the wide latitude currently permitted in determining these
pressures.
Paragraph (m) provides that except as provided by other provisions
of this part, all equipment used in freight or other non-passenger
trains shall, at a minimum, meet the performance specification for
freight brakes in AAR standard S-469-47. The AAR standard referenced in
this paragraph contains all the provisions currently contained in
Appendix B to part 232. FRA recognizes that the provisions contained in
the AAR standard have not been revised since 1947 and that some of the
requirements may be outdated due to technological data. Consequently,
FRA seeks comments from interested parties as to the necessity of
referencing these standards as well as any information on any updated
standards related to the performance of freight equipment that is
currently being used throughout the industry.
Paragraph (n) proposes to require that en route trains qualified by
the Air Flow Method that experience a brake pipe air flow of greater
than 60 CFM or brake pipe gradient of greater than 15 psi and the
movable pointer does not return to those limits within a reasonable
time be stopped at the next available location and inspected for leaks
in the brake system. This requirement was part of the general waiver
granted to the AAR allowing the use of the air flow method to qualify
train air brakes. FRA believes that this requirement is necessary to
prevent trains with excessive leakage from continuing to operate. If a
train has excessive leakage the engineer may lack the ability to stop
the train using the air brake system.
Paragraph (o) contains the requirements regarding the setting and
releasing of hand brakes prior to releasing the air brake and after the
air brake is charged. The requirements contained in this paragraph are
generally a reiteration of the guidance issued by FRA in Safety
Advisory 97-2 on September 15, 1997. See 62 FR 49046. The securement
guidance contained in Safety Advisory 97-2 is based upon FRA's review
of the Fort Worth incident that occurred on August 20, 1997, and its
awareness of other incidents involving the improper securement of
rolling equipment. The Safety Advisory was issued in order to provide
the industry with some assistance and guidance regarding securement
procedures and to provide information on current practices of the
industry related to the securement of rolling stock. See 62 FR 49046.
The Safety Advisory contains certain recommended procedures which FRA
believes will greatly reduce the likelihood of further accidents due to
improperly secured rail equipment.
On August 20, 1997, a fatal head-on collision between a Union
Pacific Railroad Company (UP) freight train and an unattended, runaway
UP locomotive consist near Fort Worth, Texas, has caused FRA to focus
on the effectiveness of certain railroad procedures for protection of
people and property from hazards caused by failure to properly secure
locomotives, cars, and other rolling equipment left unattended on
sidings or other tracks. Although FRA and NTSB are currently
investigating this incident, FRA's preliminary findings indicate that
the UP crew applied the hand brake on the lead locomotive of the
locomotive consist and then applied the independent air brake. The crew
then released the independent brake to verify that the hand brake would
hold, which it appeared to do. Sometime later, after the locomotive
consist was left unattended, it is believed that the air brakes
eventually leaked off and that the single hand brake did not, by
itself, sufficiently secure the locomotive consist, enabling it to roll
out of the siding eastward and onto the main track where it collided
head-on with a UP freight train.
An issue related to improperly secured rail equipment is the
practice known as ``bottling the air'' in a standing cut of cars. The
practice of ``bottling the air'' occurs when a train crew sets out cars
from a train with the air brakes applied and the angle cocks on both
ends of the train closed, thus trapping brake pipe pressure in the cut
of cars they intend to leave behind. This practice has the potential of
causing an unintentional release of brakes on these cars and the
potential for a runaway exist. Many railroad operating rules require
that a 20 pound reduction in brake pipe pressure be made when stopping
a train to remove a cut of cars from the train. Thus, if the trainman
closes the angle cock where the cut is to be made before pressure
equalizes in the trainline, an air wave action may form which can be of
sufficient amplitude to initiate an unintentional release of the
brakes.
Brake pipe gradient is another factor that makes bottling the air
dangerous. ``Normal Gradient'' is a term used to express the difference
between the higher pressure on the front end of the train and the lower
pressure on the rear end of the train, which is dependent upon brake
pipe leakage and train length. Each train establishes its own normal
gradient value. ``Inverse Gradients'' and ``False Gradients'' are
temporary gradients which are a result of brake operations. Inverse
gradients occur when a brake pipe reduction is made, temporarily making
the brake pipe pressure higher on the rear of the train. The false
gradient is created anytime the train brakes are set and released, thus
temporarily resulting in higher than normal pressure differential
between the front and rear end of the train as the brake pipe charges.
Therefore, if the engineer sets and
[[Page 48332]]
releases a train's brakes a sufficient number of times prior to
stopping to remove a cut of cars, a false gradient could be
established. Even if the engineer made a 20 pound brake pipe reduction
and listened for the air to stop exhausting at the automatic brake
valve before giving the signal to the trainman to cut off the cars, the
potential exists for an unintentional release of air brakes if the air
on the cars is bottled. The false gradient could be of such magnitude,
that as the trainline attempts to equalize, the higher pressure on the
front end flowing to the rear will exceed the 1\1/2\ pound differential
across the service piston and cause a release of air brakes. An inverse
gradient can also create an unintentional release of brakes. As brake
pipe pressure is reduced at the front of the train, the rear end
temporarily has a higher pressure. As the trainline attempts to
equalize, the front end will rise. In some circumstances, this rise
could be enough to initiate a release of air brakes.
On June 5, 1998, the NTSB issued the following recommendation to
FRA:
Issue a regulation that requires the brake pipe pressure to be
depleted to zero and an angle cock to remain open on standing
railroad equipment that is detached from a locomotive controlling
the brake pipe pressure. (R-98-17)
This recommendation was the result of NTSB's investigation of an
incident that occurred on January 27, 1997, on the Apache Railway near
Holbrook, Arizona. The incident involved the runaway of 77 cars down a
1.7 percent grade for 14 miles resulting in the eventual derailment of
46 cars and the release of hazardous materials. Although there were no
fatalities, 150 people were evacuated from nearby residential areas.
The NTSB determined that the 77 cars rolled away unattended because the
conductor of the train had trapped the air in the brake system, i.e.
``bottled the air,'' which resulted in an undesired release of the
brakes on the standing cars. In its recommendation the NTSB correctly
noted FRA statistics show that ten accidents occurred between 1994 and
1995 which were attributable to the practice of ``bottling the air.''
The procedures proposed in paragraph (o) regarding the securement
of standing equipment tend to address the issue of ``bottling air'' on
such standing equipment. Paragraph (o)(2)(iii) proposes to require that
when freight cars are left standing the locomotives shall be detached
from the cars to allow an emergency brake application to be initiated.
Thus, FRA intends to require that an emergency brake application be
initiated on standing equipment whenever locomotives are removed from
the consist. Consequently, the requirements proposed in this section
tend to address the recommendation issued by the NTSB but may need to
be further investigated when FRA begins the drafting of the final rule.
In light of NTSB's recent recommendation and based on FRA's recent
issuance of Safety Advisory 97-2 and its awareness of other incidents
involving improper securement of rolling equipment and the practice of
``bottling the air,'' FRA seeks comment and information regarding
railroads' experience with implementing the recommended practices
contained in Safety Advisory 97-2 and with regard to its procedures for
securing standing equipment. Consequently, FRA seeks comment and
information from all interested parties on the following:
(1) What has been the railroads' experience with implementing the
recommended procedures contained in Safety Advisory 97-2? Are railroads
implementing the recommendations?
(2) What operational or equipment costs would be incurred should
the recommended procedures contained in Safety Advisory 97-2 be
mandated in a final rule?
(3) Are there additional practices or procedures that should be
addressed related to the securement of unattended rolling stock?
(4) Are there alternative methods, practices, or procedures that
are currently in place or that could be implemented which would provide
an equivalent level of safety to the recommended procedures contained
in Safety Advisory 97-2?
(5) Are there situations where a railroad could justify not
depleting the brake pipe to zero when cars are left standing and
unattended?
(6) Do any railroads currently endorse the practice of ``bottling
the air?'' Under what circumstances?
Paragraph (p) proposes to require that air pressure regulating
devices be adjusted in accordance with the air pressures contained in
the chart contained in this paragraph. The chart is very similar to
that currently provided in Sec. 232.10(n), but has been updated to
include equipment that is not currently addressed by the existing chart
and has been modified in accordance with the provisions contained in
this proposal. FRA requests that interested parties inform FRA of any
existing air pressure regulating devices that have not been included or
addressed in the proposed updated chart.
Section 232.105 General Requirements for Locomotives
For the most part, this section contains general provisions related
to locomotives that are either currently contained in Sec. 232.10 or
that were previously proposed in the 1994 NPRM. As discussed in detail
in the general preamble portion of this document, FRA does not intend
to include provisions in this proposal related to the inspection and
maintenance of locomotive braking systems. FRA believes that these
requirements are adequately addressed in part 229 and would only add to
the complexity of this proposal and potentially cause confusion or
misunderstanding by members of the regulated community. Therefore,
while many of the requirements currently contained in Sec. 232.10 are
no longer necessary as they are adequately addressed in part 229,
paragraphs (a) and (c) are all provisions currently contained in
Sec. 232.10 which FRA believes need to be retained. See 49 CFR
232.10(b), (f)(2), and (g). The only change to these provisions is that
in paragraph (c) FRA proposes to require that the hand or parking brake
be inspected and repaired, if necessary, at least every 368 days. FRA
believes that this proposal will have little or no impact on railroads
as this inspection is intended to coincide with the annual locomotive
inspection required under Sec. 229.27 and many railroads currently
inspect these devices at this annual inspection. FRA believes that a
thorough inspection of these devices on an annual basis is sufficient
to ensure the proper and safe functioning of the devices.
Paragraph (b) proposes to require that, except for a locomotive
that is ordered before January 1, 1999, and placed in service for the
first time before January 1, 2001, all locomotives shall be equipped
with a hand or parking brake that can be set and released manually and
can hold the equipment on the maximum grade anticipated by the
operating railroad. A hand or parking brake is an important safety
feature that prevents the rolling or runaway of parked locomotives. The
proposed requirement represents current industry practice. In the 1994
NPRM on power brakes, FRA proposed requiring that a hand brake be
equipped on locomotives. See 59 FR 47729. FRA received several comments
to that proposal suggesting that the term ``parking brake'' be added to
the requirement since that is what is used on many newly built
locomotives. A parking brake generally can be applied other than by
hand such as spring pressure or air pressure when the
[[Page 48333]]
brake pipe air is depleted or by other means such as driven by an
electrical motor. Parking brakes usually incorporate some type of
manual application or release feature, although these features are
generally more difficult to operate. FRA believes that parking brakes
are the functional equivalent of a traditional handbrake and are
capable of providing a similar level of security to stationary
equipment. Consequently, FRA has added the term ``parking brake'' in
this proposal.
In paragraph (d), FRA proposes to require that the leakage on
equalizing reservoirs on locomotives and related piping be zero. The
equalizing reservoir contains the controlling volume of air pressure,
which is set to a desired pressure by the locomotive engineer by
setting the regulating valve (also known as the feed valve) on the
automatic air brake system. When the automatic brake valve handle is
moved to the release position, air supplied from the locomotive air
compressor and the main air reservoirs is supplied to the equalizing
reservoir through the regulating valve. The brake pipe pressure will
then charge to the air pressure contained in the equalizing reservoir.
When an application of the train brakes is desired, the engineer moves
the automatic brake valve handle into the application zone. The
movement of the brake valve handle into the application zone shuts off
the supply of air to the equalizing reservoir being supplied from the
regulating valve, leaving the volume of air contained in the equalizing
reservoir trapped in the equalizing reservoir. The trapped air pressure
can then be reduced to a desired amount by movement of the automatic
brake valve handle. This will result in the brake pipe pressure
responding and being reduced to a pressure equal to the pressure
contained in the equalizing reservoir. Furthermore, the air pressure in
the brake pipe on most freight equipment will be maintained at the
pressure in the equalizing reservoir due to the maintaining features of
the brake system. Consequently, any leakage from the equalizing
reservoir will effect the maintaining feature of the automatic air
brake resulting in the engineer losing his ability to effectively
maintain control of the brake pipe pressure and thus, affect the
ability of the engineer to safely control the train in some
circumstances.
In paragraph (e), FRA proposes to prohibit the use of ``feed or
regulating valve braking,'' in which reductions and increases in the
brake pipe pressure are effected by manually adjusting the feed valve.
``Feed valve braking'' has been recognized by both the railroad
industry and FRA as an unsafe practice. Most railroads already have
some type of operating rule prohibiting this type of braking.
In paragraph (f), FRA also proposes to prohibit the use of the
``passenger'' position on the locomotive brake control stand on
conventional freight trains when the trailing equipment is not designed
for graduated brake release. The ``passenger'' position was intended
only for use with equipment designed for graduated brake release.
Therefore, use of the ``passenger'' position with other equipment can
lead to potentially dangerous situations where undesired release of the
brakes can easily occur due to the slightest movement of the automatic
brake valve. In FRA's view, the only situation when the use of the
passenger position might become necessary to safely control a train is
when equalizing reservoir leakage occurs en route. If such a situation
arises the train may move only to the nearest forward location where
the equalizing reservoir leakage can be corrected.
Section 232.107 Air Source Requirements
This section contains proposed requirements directed at ensuring
that freight brake systems are devoid, to the maximum extent practical,
of water and other contaminates which could conceivably deteriorate
components of the brake system, and thus, negatively impact the ability
of the brake system to function as intended. As part of the Working
Group proceedings, a task force was formed and charged with identifying
the source of contaminates in the trainline and to determine the degree
to which these contaminates pose a safety, operational, and/or
maintenance problem. The task force performed tests on numerous
locomotives and yard air plants, with and without air dryers, to
determine the amount of dew point depression in the air lines. The
results of these tests confirmed the assumptions of the Working Group
members in that the vast majority of locomotives tested did not
contribute to moisture in the train air lines, but rather, the main
source of raw water came from yard charging devices. Further, the
majority of the yard devices which were tested were relatively old and
had not been properly maintained or upgraded in years. During the task
force tests, it was noted that all units equipped with properly
maintained air dryers produced minimal moisture in the system. Since a
large number of trains are charged by yard air sources (up to 80
percent by some estimations), the group provided a non-consensus
recommendation that yard air charging devices be given the greatest
priority.
Based on the work performed by the task force and on FRA field
experience, FRA agrees with the above conclusion and believes that
requiring locomotives to be equipped with air dryers would provide
minimal safety benefits and would impose an enormous and unwarranted
cost burden on the railroads. Further, FRA believes that simply
requiring that yard air sources be equipped with air dryers may not
alone necessarily effectuate the desired results unless the air dryers
are appropriately placed to sufficiently condition the air source. Many
yard air sources are configured such that a single air compressor
services several branch lines used to charge train air brake systems,
and as such, multiple air dryers may be required to eliminate the
introduction of wet air into the brake system. FRA believes that, as
with locomotives, requiring yard air sources to be equipped with air
dryers will likely impose a significant and unnecessary cost burden on
the railroads. Thus, FRA proposes in paragraphs (a)(1)-(5) to require a
monitoring program designed to ensure that yard air sources operate as
intended. FRA believes that implementation of this monitoring program
as proposed represents a method by which the industry can truly
maximize the benefits to be realized through air dryer technology,
which all parties acknowledge has been proven to reduce the level of
moisture introduced into the trainline, at a cost that is commensurate
with the subsequent benefits. This proposed program requires a railroad
to take remedial action with respect to any yard air sources that are
found not to be operating as intended, and further proposes to
establish a retention requirement with respect to records of these
deficient units to facilitate the tracking and resolution of continuing
problem areas.
FRA proposes additional measures to minimize the possibility of
moisture being introduced into the trainline. Paragraph (b) of this
section reiterates the current requirement contained at Sec. 232.11(d)
which requires that condensation be blown from the pipe or hose from
which compressed air is taken prior to connecting the yard air line or
motive power to the train. As an additional precaution, paragraph (d)
of this section proposes to require yard air reservoirs be equipped
with an operable automatic drain system, or be manually drained at
least once each day that the devices are used or more often when
moisture is detected in the system.
[[Page 48334]]
In paragraph (c) of this section, FRA proposes to ban the use of
anti-freeze chemicals in train air brake systems, reiterating the
position stated in the 1994 NPRM, in order to prevent the untimely
damage and wear to the brake system components. See 59 FR 47728. FRA
did not receive any adverse comments on this issue in response to the
previous NPRM, and both rail labor and management representatives had
agreed on this provision as a consensus item prior to the
discontinuance of Working Group deliberations in December 1996. FRA
intends to closely monitor compliance with this provision, as recent
field experience indicates that alcohol is still being used to combat
moisture build-up in brake pipes, especially in extremely cold weather
operations. As the majority of railroads providing comments on this
issue have stated that they are able to operate trains in cold weather
without resorting to the use of chemicals as an anti-freeze, railroads
are not expected to incur any operational or economic hardships as a
result of this requirement.
FRA recently published a final rule mandating the incorporation of
two-way EOTs on a variety of freight trains, specifically those
operating at speeds of 30 mph or greater or in heavy grade territories.
See 62 FR 278. Two-way EOTs provide locomotive engineers with the
capability of initiating an emergency brake application that commences
at the rear of the train in the event of a blockage or separation in
the train's brake pipe that would prevent the pneumatic transmission of
the emergency brake application throughout the entire train. These
devices consist of a front unit, located in the cab of the controlling
locomotive, and a rear unit, located in the rear of the train and
attached to the brake pipe. Radio communication between the front and
rear end units is continually monitored and confirmed at regular
intervals, and the rear unit is only activated when continuity of these
radio transmissions is not maintained over a specified time interval.
This discussion of two-way EOTs is particularly appropriate within the
context of the air source requirements. In the unlikely event that the
proposed requirements regarding dry air fail to sufficiently eliminate
moisture from the trainline, and a restriction or obstruction in the
form of ice forms as the result of freezing of this moisture during
cold weather operations, the two-way EOT device becomes a first order
safety device and will initiate an emergency application of the brakes
from the rear of train. As such, the vast majority of concerns
associated with moisture in the trainline freezing in cold weather
operations have been alleviated through the incorporation of this
technology in most freight operations.
Paragraph (e) proposes to require that railroads develop and
implement detailed written operating procedures tailored to the
equipment and territory of that railroad to cover safe train operations
during cold weather situations. In 1990, the NTSB in response to an
accident which occurred in Helena, Montana, recommended that FRA amend
the power brake regulations to require additional testing of air brake
systems when operating in extreme cold weather, especially when
operated in mountain grade territory. See NTSB Recommendation R-89-081
(February 12, 1990). In response to this recommendation and to various
petitions for rulemaking requesting similar action, FRA in the 1994
NPRM proposed various requirements regarding cold weather operations,
which included: Use of two-way EOTs; prohibition on the use of alcohol
in trainlines; air dryers on locomotives; and requirements for
railroads to develop operating procedures in cold weather and mountain
grade territories. As noted previously, a final rule regarding the use
of two-way EOTs has been issued and is in effect. The current proposal
reiterates the prohibition on the use of anti-freeze chemicals and
proposes other requirements to ensure that dry air is being added to
brake systems. This paragraph reiterates the previously proposed
requirement that railroads develop and implement operating requirements
for cold weather operations.
FRA recognizes that in the past there has been little support for
mandating additional brake system testing in cold weather territory.
FRA agrees that the development and use of welded pipe fittings, wide-
lip hose couplings, and ferrule clamps have greatly reduced the effects
of cold weather on the air brake system. However, FRA believes that
cold weather situations do involve added safety risks and need to be
further addressed. FRA believes that requiring the development of
written operating procedures will require railroads to go through the
thought process necessary to analyze their operations during cold
weather conditions in order to determine the inherent safety hazards
involved and develop procedures to minimize those hazards. Due to the
unique nature of each railroad and the difficulty in developing
specific requirements that are applicable to all operations, FRA does
not intend to mandate specific operating requirements at this time.
However, FRA might consider mandating specific operating requirements
that should be included in any railroad's cold weather operating
practices at the final rule stage based on the comments received and on
FRA's continuing review of cold weather operations by various
railroads.
FRA recognizes that some railroads have already developed certain
cold weather operating procedures which might be useful as models on
other similarly situated railroads. For example, BNSF has unilaterally
instituted a cold weather operating plan for certain trains at specific
locations in Montana. This plan requires trains with greater than 100
tons per operative brake to be inspected and/or operated in a certain
manner when temperatures fall below zero degrees. Part of the plan
requires that after the performance of a 1,000-mile or initial terminal
brake test on such trains, the brakes be reset and held for 30 minutes
after which time the train is to be reinspected to ensure that 100% of
the brakes remained applied. Brakes found not to have remained applied
must be set-out of the train or repaired. FRA believes procedures such
as these could greatly enhance the safety of the trains operated in
cold weather conditions. FRA recognizes that there may be other types
of operating or inspection criteria that could be implemented in
extreme cold weather conditions instead of or in addition to that noted
above; such as limits on the length or tonnage of such trains; limits
on the use of yard air sources; or other enhanced inspection criteria.
In an effort to further develop and evaluate this proposal, FRA
seeks comments from all interested parties regarding the following
specific issues:
(1) How many yard sources are there that are used to charge train
air brake systems?
(2) What time period will be required to effectively institute the
monitoring program as prescribed?
(3) How many of these yard air sources are equipped with automatic
drain valves?
(4) If the yard air source is not equipped with an automatic drain
valve, how long does it take to drain manually?
(5) What operating procedures do railroads currently have in place
to address the added safety risks that are inherent to cold weather
operations?
(6) What has been the impact on the railroad operations that have
adopted cold weather procedures similar to those noted above?
(7) Are there certain cold weather operating practices and
procedures that
[[Page 48335]]
have been adopted by most segments of the industry?
(8) FRA is aware that at least one railroad is currently engaged in
the testing and tear-down of certain brake valves to ensure that the
valves operate properly in cold weather. What has been the results of
these tests?
Section 232.109 Dynamic Brake Requirements
This section contains the proposed operating requirements for
trains equipped with dynamic brakes. Most, if not all, of the railroads
have provided comments stating that they do not consider dynamic brakes
to be a safety device. However, these same commenters stated that they
promote and encourage the use of dynamic brakes for purposes of fuel
efficiency and to avoid wear to brake components. Due to this
encouragement, dynamic brakes are relied on to control train speed and
to provide assistance in controlling trains on heavy grades. Contrary
to continued comments of several labor representatives, FRA does not
feel that locomotives should be required to be equipped with dynamic
brakes. FRA believes that the decision to equip a locomotive with
dynamic brakes is mainly an economic one, best determined by each
individual railroad. However, in order to prevent accidents and
injuries that may result from an over-reliance on the dynamic brake,
which may fail at any time, FRA believes that if the devices are
available, engineers should be informed on their safe and proper use
and be provided with information regarding the amount of dynamic
braking power actually available on their respective trains. FRA
believes that by providing an engineer with as much information as
possible on the status of the dynamic brakes on a train, a railroad
better enables that engineer to operate the train in the safest and
most efficient manner.
Based on the preceding discussion, paragraphs (a) and (c) of this
section delineate specific proposed communication requirements
regarding the status of the dynamic brakes on all locomotive units in a
consist to ensure that locomotive engineers are provided with a clear
indication of the total available braking effort at their disposal. FRA
proposes to require written notification of the operational status of
the dynamic brakes on all locomotive units in the consist be provided
to the locomotive engineer at the initial terminal or point of origin
for a train or at other locations where a locomotive engineer first
takes charge of a train. Further, FRA believes that this information
should include a clear, written method of communicating to a locomotive
engineer that the locomotive or locomotives in his or her consist has
been discovered to have inoperative dynamic brakes. Accordingly, FRA
proposes that a tag bearing the words ``inoperative dynamic brake'' be
securely attached and displayed in a conspicuous location in the cab of
the locomotive at the point where the defective condition(s) are
discovered.
Locomotive engineers have long advocated the philosophy, ``If it is
equipped, then it should work'' with respect to dynamic brakes. There
are currently no requirements governing the maintenance and repair of
locomotives equipped with dynamic brakes. Experience has shown that,
since railroads do not consider dynamic brakes to be a critical safety
item, repairs are typically effectuated when it is convenient and
economical for the railroad with little regard for timeliness. FRA
believes that, as railroads have become increasingly dependent on the
use of dynamic brakes as an integral part of their published safe train
handling procedures, it is a reasonable expectation on behalf of
locomotive engineers to have operable dynamic brakes on those
locomotive units which are so equipped. Consequently, in paragraph (b)
FRA proposes to require that all inoperative or ineffective dynamic
brakes be repaired within 30 days of becoming inoperative or at the
locomotive's next periodic inspection, whichever occurs first. FRA
believes that this proposed maintenance requirement strikes an
appropriate balance between the operational considerations important to
the locomotive engineer and the logistical and repair considerations
that will be imposed on the railroads.
FRA acknowledges that some railroads, primarily short lines, may
own locomotives that are equipped with dynamic brakes but due to the
physical terrain over which the railroad operates or the operating
assignments of the particular locomotive, the railroad rarely, if ever,
has the need to employ the dynamic braking capabilities of the
individual locomotive. In these instances, the maintenance requirements
discussed above become unnecessarily burdensome. Therefore, FRA
believes relief is warranted in these situations provided a specified
set of parameters is developed and adhered to that prevents direct and
intentional circumvention of the proposed repair requirements.
Consequently, in paragraph (d) of this section, FRA proposes to permit
a railroad to declare a locomotive's dynamic brakes ``deactivated'' if
the following requirements are met: (i) the locomotive is clearly
stencilled on both the interior and exterior of the locomotive stating
that the dynamic brake has been deactivated; and (ii) the railroad has
taken appropriate action to ensure that the deactivated locomotive is
incapable of utilizing dynamic braking effort to retard or control
train speed. FRA does not intend to prescribe the specific manner in
which the locomotive is to be deactivated, so long as the unit is not
physically capable of employing its dynamic brakes to aid in train
handling. Although, FRA does not envision a significant number of
instances where a locomotive which has been declared ``deactivated''
would need to be ``reactivated,'' FRA does recognize that some
railroads may need to reactivate the dynamic brakes in some
circumstances, such as changes in a locomotive's operating environment
or situations where a locomotive with previously ``deactivated''
dynamic brakes is purchased by another railroad. However, FRA intends
to interpret the provision for ``deactivating'' a locomotive's dynamic
brakes rather literally to minimize contentions that railroads are
merely playing a cat and mouse game with the proposed maintenance
interval to avoid repairing the units.
The operating requirements contained in this section attempt to
address the controversy over the role of dynamic brakes in overall
train safety. Most railroads commented that dynamic brakes are a
secondary system that plays no role in train safety. However, many
railroads have become somewhat dependent on dynamic brakes for normal
train handling procedures, and this dependency gives rise to the
likelihood of overreliance. Therefore, in paragraph (e) FRA proposes to
require that railroads using dynamic brakes have written operating
requirements governing how dynamic brakes are to be used to safely
handle trains based on the operating conditions and the territory
covered by that railroad. FRA intends for these operating requirements
to sufficiently cover the loss of dynamic brakes or other non-friction
brakes and must be fundamentally based on the use of friction brakes to
safely stop a train under all operating conditions. Furthermore, in
paragraph (f) FRA proposes to require each railroad to ensure that its
locomotive engineers are fully trained in the operating rules
prescribed above by including them in the certification process
contained in the knowledge, skill, and ability requirements contained
in 49 CFR part 240.
[[Page 48336]]
FRA believes that the establishment of these comprehensive
operating rules and training plans is the most effective means by which
to minimize the possibility of future accidents caused by excessive
reliance on dynamic brakes by the train crew as a method of controlling
the speed of a train in its descent through a difficult grade, as was
the case in the San Bernardino incident. FRA views as unfortunate, and
potentially reckless, the increasing number of train handling and power
brake instructions issued by freight railroads that emphasize the use
of dynamic brakes without including prominent warnings that such
systems may not be relied upon to provide the margin of safety
necessary to stop short of obstructions and control points or to avoid
overspeed conditions. Such instructions, while not misleading to
seasoned locomotive engineers, threaten to overcome the good judgement
of safety critics and regulators by leading to excessive reliance upon
these systems. Given the ever-increasing weight and length of freight
trains, and the severe grades that they are often required to negotiate
en route, the need for locomotive engineers who are thoroughly trained
and knowledgeable in all aspects of train handling is paramount for
continued safety in the rail industry.
Only limited information regarding the technical feasibility,
availability, and cost of incorporating dynamic brake indicators and/or
displays in the locomotive cab has been provided to the FRA in response
to questions posed in the ANPRM and the 1994 NPRM. See 57 FR 62555 and
59 FR 47687. FRA recognizes that the technology for dynamic brake
displays with the ability to provide information regarding the total
train dynamic brake retarding force, at certain speed increments, in
the cab of the locomotive has not been developed for industry-wide
implementation on a cost-effective basis at this time. At the same
time, FRA maintains that such an indicator would provide great benefits
to engineers in alerting them to diminished or excessive dynamic
braking capabilities, thus permitting the engineer to control the
braking of their train in the safest possible manner. Previous
discussions regarding the capabilities and limitations of dynamic
brakes provided in the ANPRM, the 1994 NPRM, and the preamble to this
NPRM have clearly shown that in order to completely test the
functioning of dynamic brakes the train must be moving. However, these
discussions have also clearly concluded that while running tests of
dynamic brakes provide information to the locomotive engineer regarding
the availability of dynamic brakes, such tests are limited to the
specific moment they are performed. Thus, running tests do not provide
continuous information on the current status of the dynamic brakes to
the locomotive engineer. Because dynamic brakes could fail at any time,
FRA feels there is merit in the development of technology whereby
engineers are able to continuously monitor the operation of their
available dynamic brakes. FRA once again seeks comments from all
interested parties regarding the following specific issues:
1. What is the status on the future availability of dynamic brake
indicators capable of providing the information discussed above?
2. What are the current cost estimates associated with the
acquisition and installation of such indicators?
3. What quantitative and/or qualitative operational or safety
benefits can be derived from the use of these dynamic brake indicators?
4. What alternative methods are available for providing the same
information that a dynamic brake indicator would provide to a
locomotive engineer?
FRA also specifically solicits input regarding the placement of a
locomotive in a consist that has been declared ``permanently disabled''
in accordance with section 232.111(d) of this proposal. Some existing
railroad operating rules dictate that a locomotive which has been
determined to have inoperative dynamic brakes may be dispatched in a
train, but prohibit its placement in the lead position of the consist.
Are there technical reasons to prohibit a locomotive with inoperative
dynamic brakes from functioning as the lead locomotive, provided the
disabled locomotive still has the capability to fully control the
dynamic braking functions of all other locomotives in the consist that
are so equipped?
Section 232.111 Train Information Handling
This section contains the proposed requirements regarding the
handling of train information. The purpose of these train-information
handling requirements is to ensure that train crews are given accurate
information on the condition of the train brake system and other
factors that affect the performance of the train brake system when they
assume responsibility for the train. This section contains a list of
the specific information FRA proposes to require railroads to furnish
train crew members about the train and the train's brake system at the
time they take over the train. FRA believes that train crews need this
information in order to avoid potentially dangerous train handling
situations and to be able to comply with various Federal safety
standards. Most railroads already provide their train crews with most
of the information required in this proposal or have a process set-up
which is capable of transmitting such information, thus the impact of
this proposed requirement should be relatively minor.
It should be noted that, FRA has left the method in which railroads
will convey the required information to the train crews to the
discretion of the railroad since FRA feels that each individual
railroad is in the best position to determine the method in which to
dispense the required information based on the individual
characteristics of its operations. However, the means for conveying the
required information will be part of the written operating
requirements, and railroads will be required to follow their own
requirements.
Subpart C--Inspection and Testing Requirements
Section 232.201 Scope
This section contains the general statement regarding the scope of
this subpart, indicating that it contains the inspection and testing
requirements for brake systems used in freight and other non-passenger
trains. This section also indicates that this subpart contains the
general training requirements for railroad and contract personnel used
to perform the inspection and tests required by this part.
Section 232.203 Training Requirements
This section contains the proposed general training requirements
for railroad employees and contractors that are used to perform the
inspections required by this part. (See ``Discussion of Issues and
General FRA Conclusions'' portion of the preamble under the heading
``V. Training and Qualifications of Personnel'' for a detailed
discussion pertaining to the provisions contained in this section).
Paragraph (a) proposes that each railroad develop and implement a
training, qualification, and designation program for employees and
contractors that perform train air brake system tests and maintenance.
For purposes of this section, a ``contractor'' is defined as a person
under contract with the railroad or car owner or an employee of a
person under contract with the railroad or car owner. FRA intends for
the proposed training and qualification requirements to apply not only
to railroad personnel
[[Page 48337]]
but also to contract personnel that are responsible for performing
brake system inspections, maintenance, or tests required by this part.
FRA believes that railroads are in the best position to determine the
precise method of training that is required for the personnel they
elect to use to conduct the required brake system inspections, tests
and maintenance. Although FRA provides railroads with broad discretion
to develop training programs specifically tailored to the type of
equipment it operates and the personnel it employs, FRA will expect
railroads to fully comply with the training and qualification plans
they develop. A critical component of this training will be making
employees aware of specific Federal requirements that govern their
work. Currently, many railroad training programs fail to distinguish
Federal requirements from company policy.
Paragraph (b) proposes a series of general requirements or elements
which must be part of any training and qualification plan developed and
implemented by a railroad. FRA believes that the elements contained in
this section are specific enough to ensure high quality training while
being sufficiently broad to permit a railroad to develop a training
plan that is best suited to its particular operation. This paragraph
requires railroads to identify the specific tasks related to the
inspection, testing and maintenance of the brake systems operated by
that railroad, develop written procedures for performing those tasks,
identify the skills and knowledge necessary to perform those tasks, and
specifically identify and educate its employees on the Federal
requirements contained in this part related to the performance of those
tasks. FRA believes that these requirements will ensure that, at a
minimum, the railroad surveys its entire operation and has identified
the various activities its employees perform. FRA intends for these
written procedures and the identified skills and knowledge to be used
as the foundation for any training program developed by the railroad.
This paragraph also makes clear that railroads are permitted to
train employees only on those tasks that they will be responsible for
performing. FRA tends to agree with several railroad commenters that
there is no reason for individuals who solely perform pre-departure air
brake tests and inspections to be as highly trained as a carman or
other mechanical personnel since these individuals perform many other
duties which involve the maintenance and repair of equipment in
addition to brake inspections. This paragraph also permits railroads to
incorporate an already existing training program, such as an
apprenticeship program. Thus, railroads would most likely not need to
provide much additional training, except training specifically
addressing the requirements contained in this part and possibly
refresher training, to its carmen forces that have completed an
apprentice program for their craft.
This paragraph also contains requirements that any program
developed must include ``hands-on'' training as well as classroom
instruction. FRA believes that classroom training by itself is not
sufficient to ensure that an individual has retained or grasped the
concepts and duties explained in a classroom setting. In order to
adequately ensure that an individual actually understands the training
provided in the classroom, some sort of ``hands-on'' capability must be
demonstrated. FRA believes that the ``hands-on'' portion of the
training program would be an ideal place for railroads to fully involve
its labor forces in the training process. Appropriate trained and
skilled employees would be perfectly suited to provide much of the
``hands-on'' training envisioned by FRA. Consequently, FRA strongly
suggests that railroads work in partnership with their employees to
develop a training program which utilizes the knowledge, skills, and
experience of the employees to the greatest extent possible.
FRA does not intend to issue specific experience, classroom
training, or ``hands-on'' training guidelines. FRA agrees that many of
the guidelines contained in the preamble to the 1994 NPRM were overly
restrictive and may have impeded the implementation of certain training
protocols capable of achieving similar results with less emphasis on
solely the time spent in the training process. Furthermore, the
guidelines contained in the 1994 NPRM failed to adequately consider the
potentially narrow scope of training that might be required for some
employees, particularly some train crew personnel, that perform very
limited inspection functions on very limited types of equipment.
Although the training and qualification requirements currently proposed
continue to require that any training provided include classroom and
``hands-on'' training as well as verbal or written examinations and
``hands-on'' capability, they do not mandate a specific number of hours
that this training must encompass as that will vary depending on the
employee or employees involved, which is probably best determined by
the railroad.
This paragraph specifically proposes that employees pass either a
written or oral examination covering the equipment, tasks, and Federal
regulatory requirements for which they are responsible as well as
requiring that each individual deemed qualified demonstrate ``hands-
on'' capability. This paragraph makes clear that a person's ``hands-
on'' capability is to be demonstrated by having the person successfully
perform all of the tasks required to be performed as part of the duties
for which they are being qualified in the presence of a supervisor or a
designated instructor. FRA believes that in order for a person to be
adequately trained to perform a task that individual must not only
possess the knowledge of what is required to be performed but also must
possess the capability of applying that knowledge to the actual
performance of the task. Consequently, FRA proposes that the physical
capability to perform the task be demonstrated by the individual in the
presence of the person's supervisor or instructor.
This paragraph also contains proposed provisions for conducting
periodic refresher training and supervisor oversight of an employees
performance once training is provided. FRA believes both these
requirements are essential to ensure that an individual continues to
possess the knowledge and skills necessary to continue to perform the
tasks for which the individual is assigned responsibility. Furthermore,
employees must be periodically retrained in order to keep up with
technological advances relating to braking systems that are constantly
being made by the industry.
Paragraph (c) proposes to require that each railroad which operates
trains required to be equipped with two-way EOTs develop and implement
a training program which specifically addresses the testing, operation,
and maintenance of the devices. The final rule requiring the use of
two-way EOTs became effective on July 1, 1997. Since that time, FRA has
discovered numerous operating and mechanical employees which do not
fully understand when the devices are required or how the inspection
and testing of the devices is to be accomplished. Furthermore, FRA
believes that it is vital for those employees responsible for the use
of the devices (i.e. engineers and conductors) to be intimately
familiar with the use and operation of the devices to ensure that the
full safety potential of the devices is utilized and available.
Consequently, FRA believes that adequate training must be provided to
those employees responsible for the inspection, testing, operation and
use of two-way EOTs.
[[Page 48338]]
Paragraph (d) contains the proposed requirements related to
maintaining adequate records for establishing that individuals are
capable of performing the tasks for which they are assigned
responsibility. FRA believes that the proposed record keeping and
notification requirements contained in this paragraph are the
cornerstone of the training and qualification provisions. As FRA is not
proposing specific training curriculums or specific experience
thresholds, FRA believes that these record keeping provisions are vital
to ensuring that proper training is being provided to railroad
personnel. FRA believes these requirements provide the means by which
FRA will judge the effectiveness and appropriateness of a railroad's
training and qualification program. These provisions also provide FRA
with the ability to independently assess whether the training provided
to a specific individual adequately addresses the tasks for which the
individual is deemed capable of performing and will most likely prevent
potential abuses by railroads to use insufficiently trained individuals
to perform the necessary inspections, tests, and maintenance required
by this proposal. This paragraph makes clear that FRA intends to
require that railroads maintain specific personnel qualification
records for all personnel (including contract personnel) responsible
for the inspection, testing, and maintenance of train brake systems.
This paragraph also makes clear that the records maintained by a
railroad contain detailed information regarding the training provided
as well as detailed information on the types of equipment the
individual is qualified to inspect, test, or maintain and the duties
the individual is qualified to perform. Furthermore, this paragraph
requires that records maintained by the railroad contain a description
of the employee's ``hands-on'' performance of the tasks for which the
employee is assigned and the basis for finding that the tasks were
successfully completed. Most Class I and larger Class II railroads
already keep records of this type in some fashion; however, they are
not always easily obtained by FRA. As an additional means of ensuring
that only properly qualified individuals are performing only those
tasks for which they are qualified, FRA also proposes to require that
railroads promptly notify personnel of changes in their qualification
status and specifically identify the date that the employee's
qualification ends unless refresher training is provided.
Paragraph (e) proposes to require that each railroad adopt and
comply with an internal audit process of their training, qualification,
and designation program. The internal audit process should ensure that
all necessary training is being conducted and documented. The audit
process should be designed to evaluate the effectiveness of the
training program. FRA believes that the audit process should not only
review the completeness and accuracy of the certification but should
also review the content and presentation of materials, the testing and
grading of the employees, and the effectiveness of the classroom and
``hands-on'' portions of the training program. FRA further believes
that any auditing of a training program must involve all segments of
the workforce involved in the training. Thus, FRA believes it is vital
that labor be intrinsically involved in the auditing process, from
beginning to end. Evaluation of training techniques might best be
approached through a ``team'' method, where several observers,
including labor representatives, periodically evaluate course or
``hands-on'' training content and presentation. FRA believes that the
consistency, effectiveness, and quality of the classroom, ``hands-on'',
and refresher training should be an essential part of any internal
audit process developed by a railroad.
FRA recognizes that some railroads will be forced to place a
greater emphasis on training and qualifications than they have in the
past, and this requirement will result in additional costs for those
railroads. However, the proposed rule allows the railroads the
flexibility that they need to provide only that training which an
employee needs for a specific job. The proposed rule does not require
an employee who only performs brake inspections while en route (i.e.,
Class II brake tests) to receive the intensive training needed for an
employee who performs Class I brake tests or one who is charged with
the maintenance or repair of the equipment. The training can be
tailored to the specific needs of the railroad. Across the industry as
a whole, this proposal will not require extensive changes in the way
most railroads currently operate, but it will require some railroads to
invest more time in the training of their personnel and should prevent
railroads from using minimally trained and unqualified people to
perform crucial safety tasks. In order to further assess the impact
these proposed requirements will have, particularly on smaller
railroads, FRA requests comments from interested parties on the
following:
1. What is the potential impact of the proposed training and
qualification requirements on short line railroads (i.e., Class II and
Class III railroads)? How will these types of railroads meet the
proposed requirements?
2. What is the potential impact of the proposed record keeping
requirements to smaller railroads (i.e., Class III railroads)? Do these
railroads currently maintain some sort of training records?
3. As FRA believes these records are a key element of the proposed
training and qualification requirements, are there alternative methods
available to smaller railroads (i.e., Class III railroads) for
maintaining and developing the required information?
4. Currently, what percentage of employees will require additional
training?
5. With the exception of training directed specifically at the
provisions of these revised regulations, are there a sufficient number
of ``qualified'' employees at present to ensure that no operational
difficulty will result? What is a reasonable timeline for permitting
railroads (particularly smaller railroads) to reach full compliance
with regard to these requirements?
Section 232.205 Class I Brake Test--Initial Terminal Inspection
This section describes the circumstances that would mandate the
performance of a Class I brake test and outlines the tasks that must be
performed when performing this inspection. Most of the provisions
contained in this section are currently contained in Sec. 232.12(a) and
(c)-(h) but FRA has modified the provisions to some extent in order to
clarify existing requirements, to eliminate potential abuses, and to
standardize certain provisions. Basically a Class I brake test is
intended to be the functional equivalent to what is currently referred
to as an initial terminal brake inspection.
Paragraph (a) proposes to identify those trains that are required
to receive a Class I brake test prior to further movement. The
provisions contained in this paragraph are similar to those currently
contained in Sec. 232.12(a), but have been somewhat expanded upon.
Paragraph (a)(1) requires that trains receive a Class I brake test at
the location where they are originally assembled. For clarity purposes,
FRA will consider a location to be a place where a train is originally
assembled, to be the location where a vast majority of the cars in a
train are added to the train. FRA has discovered that some railroads
are assembling two or more locomotives together with only a few cars at
one location and performing an initial terminal inspection pursuant to
Sec. 232.12 on the train at that location. The train
[[Page 48339]]
is then moved a very short distance (less than 20 miles) where a large
number of cars are added to the train with the performance of only an
intermediate brake inspection being performed. FRA believes this
practice is clearly an attempt to circumvent the inspection
requirements currently contained in the regulations. FRA intends to
make clear that it will consider that location where the majority of
the cars are added to the train to be the point of origin or initial
terminal for that train, as that is the location where the train is in
fact assembled. FRA recognizes that such a standard will have to be
looked at on a case-by-case basis, but believes that the above
mentioned scenario is a clear case where a railroad is attempting to
avoid the comprehensive inspection requirements imposed on a train at
its point of origin.
FRA has also attempted to clarify the provision requiring the
performance of a Class I brake test when the train consist is changed
other than adding or removing a solid block of cars. Currently, there
appears to be some confusion over what constitutes a ``solid block of
cars.'' Therefore, FRA has included a definition of the term in this
proposal and references it in paragraph (a)(2). FRA believes that the
definition provided in this proposal is consistent with longstanding
agency interpretation and the clear intent of the regulations. This
definition makes clear that the phrase ``solid block of cars'' is
intended to describe a set of cars that were all a part of one train
and that have remained coupled together until added to another train.
The phrase was never intended, nor is it intended in this proposal, to
mean groups of cars removed from various different trains that are then
assembled into a block for addition into another train. In FRA's view,
the above described action constitutes the assembling of a new train
which would require the performance of a Class I brake test.
In paragraph (a)(3) incorporates FRA's longstanding administrative
interpretation which permits trains to remain disconnected from a
source of compressed air (``off air'') for a short length of time
without having to be retested. Currently, FRA only permits trains to
remain ``off air'' for a period of approximately 2 hours before an
initial terminal brake inspection must be performed. In this paragraph,
FRA proposes to extend the permissible time ``off air'' to 4 hours. FRA
agrees that our longstanding administrative interpretation was
established prior to the development of new equipment that has greatly
reduced leakage problems, such as welded brake piping and fittings and
ferrule-clamped air hoses. However, contrary to several railroads'
assertions FRA does not believe that cars should be allowed to be off
air for extended periods of time without being retested. FRA believes
that the longer cars sit without air attached the greater the chances
are that the integrity of the brake system will be compromised. The
longer cars sit the more susceptible they may be to weather conditions
or even vandalism, as some commenters suggested. Consequently, based on
today's equipment, operating practices, and overriding safety concerns,
FRA feels that cars should not be disconnected from a continuous supply
of pressurized air for longer than four hours without being retested.
FRA also believes that the source of compressed air must be sufficient
to maintain the integrity of the brake system. Consequently, FRA
proposes to require that the source of compressed air be maintained at
a minimum level of 60 psi.
Paragraph (a)(4) contains the proposed requirement that a train
receive a Class I brake test whenever it has traveled 3,000 miles since
receiving its last Class I brake test. This proposed revision is aimed
at ensuring that unit trains or captive service trains receive a
quality brake inspection at least every 3,000 miles. Under the current
regulations certain trains can operate almost indefinitely on only one
initial terminal brake inspection and then a continuing series of
1,000-mile brake inspections since the trains are rarely broken up and
are not interchanged with other railroads. FRA proposes this
requirement in order to ensure that these trains are not continuously
operated with only a series of Class IA brake tests being performed.
FRA believes that the 3,000 mile limit strikes an appropriate balance
as it will continue to permit railroads to operate trains distances
they currently operate without requiring the conduct of an additional
Class I brake test but will ensure that unit trains and captive service
operations are provided a comprehensive brake inspection on a periodic
basis.
Paragraph (a)(5) contains the proposed provision for when trains
received in interchange must receive a Class I brake test. These are
similar to what is currently contained in Sec. 232.12(a)(1)(iii);
however, the current proposal contains two new provisions. FRA proposes
to permit trains received in interchange to have a previously tested
solid block of cars added to the train without requiring the
performance of a Class I brake test. Currently, the addition of a these
types of cars to a train received in interchange would require the
performance of an initial terminal inspection. As long as the added
block of cars has been previously tested, FRA sees no safety hazard in
permitting the cars to be added to a train at an interchange location.
Furthermore, FRA also proposes to permit trains which are received in
interchange, and that will travel no more than 20 miles from the
interchange location, to have its consist changed other than provided
in paragraph (a)(5) without being required to receive a Class I brake
test; provided that, any cars added to the consist at the interchange
location receive at least a Class II brake test pursuant to
Sec. 232.209. Historically, FRA has not had a problem with these
shorter distance trains and believes that a Class II brake test on
those cars added to the train is sufficient to ensure the safety of
these operations.
Paragraph (b) details the required tasks comprising a Class I brake
test. A proper Class I brake test ensures that a train is in proper
working condition and is capable of traveling to its destination with
minimal problems en route. Specific tasks of the Class I brake test
include most of the tasks currently required in initial terminal brake
tests contained at Sec. 232.12 (c)-(h) with some modification in the
interest of standardization and clarity.
FRA again proposes a standardized brake-pipe reduction of 20 psi
for virtually all brake inspections and tests. FRA agrees with both
labor and management commenters that a standard brake-pipe reduction
will simplify train brake tests and will make it easier to train
workers. The 20-psi standardized reduction was suggested by both labor
and management representatives and was previously proposed in the 1994
NPRM.
The brake-pipe leakage test will continue to be a valid method of
qualifying brake systems. However, FRA proposes that the air flow
method of testing the condition of the brake pipe become an acceptable
alternate to the brake-pipe leakage test. The air flow method would
only be an alternative for trains having locomotives equipped with a
26-L brake valve or equivalent and outfitted with an EOT device. The
maximum allowable flow would be 60 CFM. FRA believes that the air flow
method is a much more comprehensive test than the leakage test.
Although FRA is not proposing to mandate the use of the air flow
method, it does recommend that railroads use the method when possible,
not just to qualify brake systems, but in order to provide additional
information regarding the brake system to the train crew. The air
[[Page 48340]]
flow method has been approved for use by AAR member railroads after
extensive testing, and the method has been available in Canada as an
alternate means of qualifying train brakes since 1984.
The brake-pipe gradient of 15 psi has been retained for both the
leakage and air flow method of train brake testing; however, the
minimum rear-car pressure has been increased to 75 psi, which will
require a locomotive brake-pipe pressure of 90 psi. FRA feels that the
added margin of braking power justifies the increase in pressure.
Based on FRA's experience over the last several years and based on
numerous comments received by FRA verifying the high reliability of the
rear-car pressure transducers used in reporting brake-pipe pressure by
an end-of-train (EOT) device, FRA now feels comfortable and justified
in allowing the use of EOT devices in establishing the rear car
pressure for Class I brake tests. FRA currently has requirements in
place for the inspection and testing of EOT devices at the time of
installation, which have been incorporated into subpart E of this
proposal. However, in using an EOT to verify rear car pressure during a
Class I brake test, the reading of the rear car air pressure is only
permitted from the controlling or hauling locomotive of the train.
Under no circumstances will train air brake pressure be read from a
remote highway vehicle, another locomotive not attached to the train,
or at any other location such as a remote unit installed in an office
or shop.
FRA has proposed paragraph (b)(2) in order to clarify the duties of
individuals performing brake inspection contained in this proposal. The
language in this paragraph is reiterated in both the Class IA and Class
II brake tests contained in this proposal in order to ensure the proper
performance of brake inspections. Over the last few years there has
been extensive debate concerning what constitutes a proper train air
brake test under the current provisions contained in part 232,
particularly relating to the positioning of the person performing the
brake inspection. In early 1997, FRA issued a technical bulletin to its
field inspectors in an attempt to clarify what must be done in order to
properly perform a brake test. This technical bulletin stated that
inspectors must position themselves in such a manner so as to be able
to observe all of the movable parts of the brake system on each car. At
a minimum, this requires that the inspector observe both sides of the
equipment sometime during the inspection process. FRA further believes
that both sides of the equipment must be observed sometime after the
occurrence of activities that have the likelihood of compromising the
integrity of the brake components of the equipment, such as: hump
switching; multiple switching; loading; or unloading. FRA also agrees
with several railroad commenters to the technical bulletin, that if one
side of the equipment is inspected to ensure the proper attachment and
condition of brake components and the proper condition of brake shoes
on that side and the application of the brakes is observed from the
other side of the equipment, then based on the design of brake systems
today it can be safely assumed that in virtually every case an
application of the brakes is occurring on the other side of the
equipment. Consequently, FRA would like to make clear that both sides
of the equipment do not necessarily have to be inspected while the
brakes are applied if an adequate inspection of the brake components
was conducted on both sides of the equipment sometime during the
inspection process. However, FRA also intends to make clear that the
piston travel on each car must be inspected while the brakes are
applied; thus, an inspector must take appropriate steps to make this
observation.
Similarly, paragraph (b)(4) is also an attempt to clarify language
contained in the current regulation which requires that the brakes
``apply.'' This language has been misinterpreted by some to mean that
if the piston applies in response to a command from a controlling
locomotive or yard test device, and releases before the release signal
is given, the brake system on that car is in compliance with the
regulation because the brake simply applied. The intent of the
regulation has always been that the brakes apply and remain applied
until the release signal is initiated from the controlling locomotive
or yard test device. Therefore, clarifying language has been added in
this paragraph to eliminate all doubt as to what is required.
Consequently, the brakes on a car must remain applied until the
appropriate release signal is given. If it fails to do so the car must
either be removed from the train or repaired in the train and retested
as discussed below.
FRA recognizes that some defective train air brake conditions found
when performing a train air brake test, which may cause insufficient
application of the brakes on a piece of equipment, are of such an
obvious nature they can be quickly repaired in the train. For example,
a brake connection pin might be missing, a slack adjuster might be
disconnected, or some other minor part of the brake system might be
defective. FRA does not intend to mandate that these types of obvious
defective conditions require the car to be removed from the train, if
repaired. Rather, in paragraph (b)(4) FRA proposes to allow a retest
from the controlling locomotive or head end of the consist if the car
is repaired in the train. Furthermore, if a retest is conducted, the
brakes on the retested car shall remain applied for a minimum of five
(5) minutes. The five minute requirement is based on the leakage
parameters established for locomotives contained at Sec. 229.59(c).
In paragraph (b)(5), FRA will continue to require that piston
travel be adjusted during the performance of a Class I brake test if it
is found outside the nominal limits established for standard 8\1/2\
inch and 10-inch diameter brake cylinder or outside the limits
established for other types which will be contained on a stencil,
sticker, or badge plate. This provision is similar to the provision
currently contained at Sec. 232.12(f). The major difference is that FRA
has modified the provision to require that piston travel found to be
less than 7 inches or more than 9 inches must be adjusted nominally to
7\1/2\ inches. This change is based on a request by AAR to change the
adjustment to 7\1/2\ inches from 7 inches as its member railroads were
finding it extremely difficult to adjust the piston travel to precisely
7 inches and that in some cases the adjustment would be marginally less
than 7 inches, thus requiring a readjustment. Thus, AAR sought the
extra \1/2\ inch in order to provide a small measure for error when the
piston travel is adjusted. As FRA believes that AAR's concerns are
validly placed and would have no impact on safety, FRA has accommodated
the request.
In paragraph (b)(7), FRA makes clear that brake connection bottom
rod supports will no longer be required on bottom connection rods
secured with locking cotter keys. FRA recognizes that there is no need
for bottom rod safety supports in these incidents and intends to
relieve railroads of this unnecessary expense, which will provide the
industry a cost savings without compromising safety.
Paragraph (b)(8) contains the provisions relating to the
performance of ``roll-by'' inspections of the brake release. These
types of inspections have been conducted for years even though there is
nothing in the current regulation which specifically addresses the
conduct. The ability to perform this type of inspection of the brake
release permits railroads to expedite the
[[Page 48341]]
movement of trains and has not proven to be a safety hazard. Therefore,
FRA proposes this provision to clarify the ability to perform such an
inspection and to ensure that the inspection is performed properly.
This paragraph makes clear that when performing a ``roll-by''
inspection of the brake release the train's speed shall not exceed 10
mph, that the qualified person performing the ``roll-by'' inspection
shall notify the engineer when and if the ``roll-by'' has been
successfully completed, and that the operator of the train will note
successful completion of the release portion of the inspection on the
written or electronic notification required by this proposal. FRA
intends to make clear that the notification to the engineer could be
made via a hand held radio, a cellular telephone, or through
communication with a train dispatcher but that such information must be
provided to the engineer prior to the train's departure. Based on the
rationale provided for permitting only one side of a train to be
inspected during the application of the brakes, FRA intends to make
clear that only one side of the train needs be inspected during the
release portion of a brake test.
Paragraph (c) retains the language currently contained in
Sec. 232.12(a), with slight modification for clarity, stating that a
carman alone will be considered a qualified person if a railroad's
collective bargaining agreement provides that carmen are to perform the
inspections and tests required by this section. The original provision
was added to the regulations in 1982 when the distance between brake
inspections was increased from 500 miles to 1,000 miles. The provision
was included as part of an agreement between the railroads and rail
labor for permitting the distance between brake tests to be increased
and was presented to FRA at the time. The language contained in that
agreement was included in the 1982 regulatory revisions without change
by FRA. Consequently, due to the circumstances under which this
provision was added to the regulations and because it has existed for
over 16 years, FRA feels compelled to retain the language at this time.
However, FRA intends to make clear that it will interpret the language
contained in this provision to mean that only in circumstances where a
railroad's collective bargaining agreement specifically requires that
only a carman may perform the inspections and tests required by this
section, will a carman alone be considered a qualified person. FRA
believes that this interpretation clarifies the meaning of the
provision and provides the most reasonable, enforceable, and
understandable interpretation of the requirement and is consistent with
the approach to inspections envisioned in this proposal.
As FRA lacks the authority to issue binding interpretations of
collective bargaining agreements, FRA lacks the ability to settle a
dispute between a railroad and its employees as to which group of its
employees is to perform what work. FRA intends to make clear, that in
order for FRA to proceed with an enforcement action under this
provision, one of the parties to the collective bargaining agreement
would first have to obtain a decision from a duly authorized body
interpreting the relevant agreement, specifically identifying the
involved location, and adequately resolving all of the interpretative
issues necessary for FRA to conclude that the work belongs to a
particular group of employees.
This paragraph makes clear that in circumstances where a collective
bargaining agreement requires that only carmen are to perform the
inspections and tests required by this section that the railroad shall
ensure that those carmen responsible for performing these tasks are
properly trained and designated as qualified for the tasks they are to
perform. In these circumstances FRA believes that the railroad must
ensure that the employees with which they have collectively bargained
to exclusively perform the inspections and tests required by this
section are properly trained and designated to perform the task.
Furthermore, FRA believes that on virtually all railroads carmen will
be sufficiently trained and experienced to be considered ``qualified
persons'' and ``qualified mechanical inspectors'' as defined in this
proposal, except that they might need some additional training on the
specific requirements contained in this proposal.
Paragraph (d) contains a new proposed requirement regarding written
notification of the successful completion of a Class I brake test by a
qualified person. Labor organizations have commented for years that
when crews board trains at points of interchange, crew change points,
and on main lines where the hours of service has halted a train that
they have no information as to when or where the train last received a
brake inspection or test. FRA has encountered this same difficulty when
investigating train accidents and other incidents requiring FRA
attention. FRA has found that train symbols change when trains are
interchanged and that train crews do not know where their train
originated, how many miles it has mileage traveled, or when the last
tests and inspections were performed. Without this knowledge of a
train's history, railroads and train crews cannot possibly comply with
Federal regulations in many instances. Therefore, FRA has included
language in this paragraph in an attempt to eliminate some these
potential problems and further enhance the safety of train operations
by proposing to require that the qualified person conducting the Class
I brake test notify the locomotive engineer in writing, or place such
notification in the cab of the controlling locomotive that the Class I
brake test was successfully performed. FRA believes this information
could be provided to an engineer electronically via the computer
equipment currently installed on locomotives. If the information is
provided by this medium, the system must be capable of identifying the
qualified inspector entering the information, include all of the
information required on the written notification, and be available to
FRA upon request. FRA further proposes that the written or electronic
notification remain in the cab of the controlling locomotive until the
train reaches its destination. FRA believes that these proposed
provisions will ensure that train crews are aware of the condition of
their train throughout its trip and thereby enhance the safety of train
operations.
Paragraph (f) is included in order to clarify existing requirements
relating to the adding of cars or blocks of cars while a train is en
route. This proposed paragraph informs railroads that cars picked-up en
route that have not been previously tested and kept connected to a
source of compressed air are to receive a Class I brake test when added
to the train. Alternatively, a railroad may elect to perform only a
Class II brake test at the time that a car is added to the train en
route, but FRA intends to make clear that if this option is elected
then the cars added in this fashion must be given a Class I brake test
at the next forward location where facilities are available for
providing such attention.
Section 232.207 Class IA Brake Tests--1,000-mile Inspection
This section contains the proposed requirements related to the
performance of a Class IA brake test. Many of the proposed provisions
contained in this section are currently contained at Sec. 232.12(b)
regarding the performance of 1,000 mile inspections. FRA has modified
some of the current requirements for purposes of clarity and has added
a few additional requirements in order to make the inspection
requirement more
[[Page 48342]]
enforceable and to prevent some of the current abuses which FRA field
inspectors have experienced in their enforcement activities.
Paragraph (a) provides that each train shall receive a Class IA
brake test at a location that is not more than 1,000 miles from the
point where any car in the train last received a Class I or Class IA
brake test. FRA intends to make clear that the most restrictive car or
block of cars in the train will determine the location where this test
must be performed. For example, if a train departs point A and travels
to point B where it picks-up a previously tested block of cars en route
which has travelled 800 miles since its last Class I brake test and the
crew does not perform a Class I brake test when entraining the cars,
then the entire train must receive a Class IA brake test within 200
miles from point B even though that location may only be 600 miles from
point A.
Paragraph (b) contains the proposed tasks which must be performed
when conducting a Class IA brake test. These tasks are virtually
identical to some of the tasks required to be performed during a Class
I brake test. A leakage or air flow test must be performed. Thus, when
locomotives are equipped with a 26-L brake valve or equivalent, FRA
will permit the use of the air flow method as an alternative to the
brake pipe leakage test. This paragraph is also intended to make clear
that in order to properly perform an inspection under this section both
sides of the equipment must be observed sometime during the inspection
process. This paragraph also makes clear that the brakes shall apply on
each car in response to a 20-psi brake pipe reduction and shall remain
applied until a release is initiated and reiterates the parameters for
performing a retest on those cars found not to have sufficiently
applied that are proposed for Class I brake tests. It should be noted
that defective equipment may be moved from or past a location where a
Class IA brake test is performed only if all of the requirements
contained in Sec. 232.15 have been satisfied.
Paragraph (c) contains the proposed provision which would require
railroads to maintain a list of locations where Class IA inspection
will be performed and that FRA be notified at least 30 days in advance
of any change to that list of locations. The current regulations merely
require that railroads designate locations where intermediate 1,000-
mile brake inspections will be performed but places no limitation on
changing the locations. Therefore, FRA has found some railroads
changing the locations where these intermediate inspections are to
occur on a daily basis in order to prevent FRA from observing these
inspections being performed or to avoid full performance of the
required inspection by mechanical forces. Consequently, in order to
ensure that these types of inspections are being properly performed,
FRA must be able to determine where the railroad plans to conduct these
types of inspections. FRA recognizes that there may be occurrences or
emergencies, such as derailments, that make it impossible or unsafe for
a train to reach a location that the railroad has designated as a Class
IA inspection site. Consequently, FRA proposes to permit railroads to
bypass the 30-day written notification requirement in these instances
provided FRA is notified within 24 hours after a designation has been
changed. This paragraph also makes clear that failure to perform a
Class IA brake test at a designated location will constitute a failure
to properly perform the inspection.
Section 232.209 Class II Brake Tests--Intermediate Inspection
This section contains the proposed requirements related to the
performance of Class II brake tests. The requirements proposed in this
section mirror the requirements currently contained in Sec. 232.13(d)
but have been slightly modified for clarity and standardization. In
paragraph (a), FRA proposes that, at a minimum, a Class II brake test
be performed on all cars that are added to a train at a location that
is not the train's point of origin and that have not received a Class I
brake test or that have been off a source of compressed air for more
than four hours. In paragraph (d), FRA makes clear that if cars are
added in this fashion then they must receive a Class I brake test at
the next forward location where the facilities are available for
performing such an inspection.
Paragraph (b) contains the proposed tasks which must be performed
when conducting a Class II brake test. A Class II brake test is
intended to ensure that the brakes on those cars added apply and
release and that the added cars do not compromise the integrity of the
train's brake system. Therefore, a leakage or air flow test must be
performed when the cars are added to the train to ensure the integrity
of the train's brake system. This paragraph makes clear that in order
to properly perform an inspection under this section both sides of the
equipment must be observed sometime during the inspection process. This
paragraph also makes clear that the brakes shall apply on each car
added to the train and remain applied until a release is initiated and
reiterates the parameters for performing a retest on those cars found
not to have sufficiently applied that are proposed for Class I brake
tests. It should be noted that, defective equipment may be moved from
or past a location where a Class II brake test is performed only if all
of the requirements contained in Sec. 232.15 have been satisfied.
Paragraph (b) also requires that the release of the brakes on those
cars added to the train and on the rear car of the train be verified
and allows railroads to conduct ``roll-by'' inspections for this
purpose.
Paragraph (c) permits an alternative to the rear car application
and release portion of this test. This alternative permits the
locomotive engineer to rely on a rear car gauge or end-of-train device
to determine that the train's brake pipe pressure is being reduced by
at least 5-psi and then restored by at least 5-psi in lieu of direct
observation of the rear car application and release. This alternative
has been permitted for years under the current regulations without any
degradation to safety, and thus, FRA intends to permit the practice to
continue.
Section 232.211 Class III Brake Tests--Trainline Continuity Inspection
This section contains the proposed requirements related to the
performance of Class III brake tests. The requirements proposed in this
section incorporate the requirements currently contained in
Sec. 232.13(c) but have been slightly modified for clarity and
standardization. The purpose of a Class III brake test is to ensure the
integrity of the trainline when minor changes in the train consist
occur. Basically, a Class III brake test ensures that the train brake
pipe is properly delivering air to the rear of the train. FRA intends
to make clear that this inspection is designed to be performed whenever
the continuity of the brake system is broken or interrupted. For
example, if a railroad disconnects a locomotive from a train consist to
perform switching duties for a short period and then reattaches the
locomotive to the consist, without any other change being made in the
consist, the railroad would be required to perform a Class III brake
test prior to the train's departure. Similarly, a Class III brake test
would be required if a railroad disconnects a locomotive from the train
and adds a different locomotive to the train, only to discover that the
added locomotive is not operating properly, and thus, adds the original
locomotive back into the consist. Because the continuity of the
trainline was interrupted when the
[[Page 48343]]
locomotive was removed and then placed back in the train, even though
the same cars and locomotives remained in the consist, a Class III
brake test must be performed. Paragraphs (b) and (c) contain the tasks
related to the performance of this brake test. The proposed tasks
require an application of the brakes on the rear car of the train in
response to a 20-psi brake pipe reduction and a subsequent release of
the brakes on that car when initiated. Similar to Class II brake tests,
paragraph (c) permits an alternative to direct observation of the
application and release of the rear car's brakes by permitting the
operator to rely on a rear car gauge or end-of-train device to
determine that the brake pipe pressure is being reduced and restored in
response to the controlling locomotive.
Section 232.213 Extended Haul Trains
This section contains the proposed provisions which would permit an
extension of the allowable distance a train may travel between train
brake system tests. Currently, trains are not permitted to travel more
than 1,000 miles without receiving an intermediate brake inspection.
See 49 CFR 232.12(b). FRA believes that if a train is properly and
thoroughly inspected, with as many defective conditions being
eliminated as possible, that the train is capable of traveling well
over 1,000 miles between brake inspections. By this, FRA contends that
not only must the brake system be in quality condition but that the
mechanical components of the equipment must be in equally prime
condition. As the distance a train is allowed to travel increases, the
mechanical condition of the equipment is a key factor in ensuring the
proper and safe operation of the train brake system throughout the
entire trip. FRA also continues to believe that the best place to
ensure the proper conduct of these inspections and to ensure that the
train's brake system and mechanical components are in the best
condition possible is at a train's point of origin (initial terminal).
In paragraph (a), FRA proposes to permit railroads to designate
specific trains which will be permitted to move up to 1,500 miles
between brake and mechanical inspections provided the railroad meets
various stringent inspection and monitoring requirements, which FRA
believes will ensure the safe and proper operation of these trains. FRA
intends to make clear that a railroad must meet all of the requirements
contained in this paragraph in order to designate a train as an
extended haul train. Paragraph (a)(1) proposes that railroads must
designate specific trains it intends to move in accordance with this
section. This paragraph sets forth the information that must be
provided to FRA in writing when designating a train for such operation.
The information required to be submitted is necessary to facilitate
FRA's ability to independently monitor a railroad's operation of these
extended haul trains.
FRA believes that in order for a train to be permitted to travel
1,500 miles between inspections, the train must receive inspections
that ensure the optimum condition of both the brake system and the
mechanical components. In paragraphs (a)(2), (a)(3), and (a)(8), FRA
proposes to require that these inspections be performed by highly
qualified and experienced inspectors in order to ensure that quality
inspections are being performed. As FRA intends the Class I brake tests
that are required to be performed on these trains to be as in-depth and
comprehensive as possible, FRA believes that these inspections must be
performed by individuals possessing the knowledge to not only identify
and detect a defective condition in all of the brake equipment required
to be inspected but also possess the knowledge to recognize the
interrelational workings of the equipment and the ability to trouble-
shoot and repair the equipment. Therefore, in paragraphs (a)(2) and
(a)(8) FRA proposes the term ``qualified mechanical inspector'' to
identify and describe those individuals it believes possess the
necessary knowledge and experience to perform the proposed Class I
brake tests on these trains. A ``qualified mechanical inspector'' is a
person with training or instruction in the troubleshooting, inspection,
testing, maintenance, or repair of the specific train brake systems the
person is assigned responsibility and whose primary responsibilities
include work generally consistent with those functions. (See Sec. 232.5
of the section-by-section for a more detailed discussion of ``qualified
mechanical inspector.'') FRA further believes these same highly
qualified inspectors must be the individuals performing the proposed
inbound inspection, contained in paragraph (a)(6), on these extended
haul trains in order to ensure that all defective conditions are
identified at the train's destination or 1,500 mile location.
Similarly, in paragraph (a)(3), FRA proposes that all of the mechanical
inspections required to be performed on these trains be conducted by
inspectors designated pursuant to 49 CFR 215.11, rather than train crew
members, in order to ensure that all mechanical components are in
proper condition prior to the trains departure.
As no trains are currently permitted to travel in excess of 1,000
miles between inspections, FRA is not willing to propose more than
1,500 miles between such inspections until appropriate data is
developed which establishes that equipment moved under the proposed
criteria remains in proper condition throughout the train's journey.
FRA believes that the proposed provisions contained in paragraphs
(a)(6)and (a)(7), requiring the performance of an inbound inspection at
destination or at 1,500 miles and requiring carriers to maintain
records of all defective conditions discovered on these trains for a
period of one year creates the basis for developing such data. FRA
believes the information generated from these inbound inspections will
be extremely useful in assessing the quality of a railroad's inspection
practices and will help FRA identify any systematic brake or mechanical
problems that may result in these types of operations.
In paragraphs (a)(4) and (a)(8), FRA proposes that these trains
have 100 percent operative brakes and contain no cars with mechanical
defects under part 215 at either the train's point of origin or at the
time of departure from a 1,500 point, if moving in excess of 1,000
miles from that location. Furthermore, in paragraph (a)(5) FRA proposes
that these trains not conduct any pick-ups or set-outs en route, except
for the removal of defective equipment. FRA believes that these two
provisions are essential to ensuring the accuracy of the data being
collected by the railroads as well as ensuring the proper and safe
operation of these trains. FRA also believes that prohibiting pick-ups
and set-out on these trains will significantly minimize the disruptions
made to the integrity of the trains brake system and reduce mechanical
damage that may occur during switching operations. Furthermore, there
is currently no reliable tracking system available to FRA to ensure
that cars added to the train en route have been inspected in accordance
with the provisions contained in this section.
Paragraph (b) makes clear that failure to comply with any of the
restrictions contained in this section will be considered an improper
movement of a designated priority train for which appropriate civil
penalties may be assessed. Thus, FRA would list specific civil
penalties in the final rule pertaining to the improper movement of
these types of trains. In addition to the imposition of civil
penalties, FRA also makes clear in this paragraph that it reserves the
right to revoke a railroad's
[[Page 48344]]
ability to designate any or all trains for repeated or willful
noncompliance with any of the provisions contained in this section.
Section 232.215 Transfer Train Brake Tests
This section contains the proposed requirements related to the
performance of transfer train brake tests. The requirements proposed in
this section incorporate the requirements currently contained in
Sec. 232.13(e) but have been slightly modified for clarity and
standardization. ``Transfer train'' is defined in Sec. 232.5 as a train
that travels between a point of origin and a point of destination,
located not more than 20 miles apart, and which is not performing
switching service. The new definitions, in Sec. 232.5, would clearly
define ``yard trains'' and would exclude them from the definition of
``transfer train.'' ``Yard train'' would be defined as a train that
only performs switching service within a single yard complex. Switching
movements by ``yard trains'' would not require a transfer train air
brake test. However, as noted previously, a yard train or other train
engaged in switching service carries the potential of becoming a
transfer train, subject to a transfer train's testing requirements if
the movement engaged in is considered a ``train movement'' rather than
a ``switching movement.'' FRA's determination of whether the movement
of cars is a ``train movement,'' subject to the requirements of this
section, or a ``switching movement'' is and will be based on the
voluminous case law developed by various courts of the United States.
(See section-by-section for Sec. 232.5 for a more detailed discussion
of the terms ``train movement'' and ``switching movements.'')
FRA intends to make clear that a train will only be considered a
transfer train if there is no more than 20 miles between the train's
point of origin and point of final destination. If the train will move
greater than 20 miles between the point of origin and point of final
destination it cannot be considered a transfer train and a Class I
brake test must be performed on the train prior to departure from its
point of origin. Although cars may be added to a transfer train while
the train is en route, with a transfer train brake test being performed
on the cars added, the train is limited to a total of 20 miles from its
point of origin, not from the location where new cars are added. The
distance the entire train will move between its point of origin and
point of final destination is the determinative factor in determining
whether the train is a transfer train, cars dropped-off or picked-up en
route do not affect this distance.
Paragraph (a) contains the proposed tasks that are required to be
performed when conducting a transfer train brake test. Due to the short
distance these types of trains will travel FRA will continue to permit
the brake system to be charged to only 60-psi but will make clear that
this must be verified by an accurate gauge or end-of-train device.
Although the current regulations do not require the use of a gauge or
device, FRA is at a loss to understand how an inspector can know the
pressure in the brake system without getting a reading from the rear of
the train. FRA will also continue to require that the brakes apply in
response to a 15-psi reduction. This section contains modifications for
performing a transfer train brake test. FRA believes that the reduced
pressure at which this test is performed (i.e., 60-psi rather than 75-
psi) requires that an application be obtained with a smaller pressure
reduction than proposed for other brake tests. FRA also intends to make
clear that an inspection be made to determine that the brakes on each
car apply and remain applied until the release is initiated by the
controlling locomotive.
This paragraph permits cars found with readily identifiable
problems which causes the brakes not to remain applied, to be retested.
The retest must be conducted from the controlling locomotive or head of
the consist and the cars brakes must remain applied for at least 5
minutes. The reasoning for this is to assure safe train operation and
handling by requiring a mandatory time frame for which the brakes shall
remain applied on each car in the train. Consequently, cars whose
brakes release prior to an initiation by the controlling locomotive
shall either be repaired and retested or may be moved pursuant to the
provisions proposed in Sec. 232.15, if applicable.
Section 232.217 Train Brake System Tests Conducted Using Yard Air
This section proposes the requirements for performing train brake
system tests when using yard air and are basically identical to the
requirements currently contained in Sec. 232.12(i) with slight
modification for clarity and standardization with other provisions
contained in this proposal. In paragraph (a), FRA will continue to
require that the testing device be connected to the end of the train or
cut of cars that will be nearest the controlling locomotive. FRA
believes that if the yard test plant was connected to the rear of the
train or cut of cars being tested, the possibility of an overcharge
condition will exist which presents safety concerns. An overcharge
condition describes a situation in which the brake equipment of cars
and/or locomotives is charged to a higher pressure than the maximum
brake pipe pressure that can normally be achieved in that part of the
train, this may result in the locomotive engineer lacking the ability
to control the application or release of the brakes at the rear of the
train. FRA recognizes that some currently existing yards are designed
in such a manner so that performance of a test from the front of the
consist is extremely difficult or impossible. Consequently, FRA seeks
comment from all interested parties addressing the following:
1. Are there potential operating or procedural restrictions that
could be required which would permit the connection of the testing
device to some location in the train other than the front of the
consist that would alleviate overcharge concerns?
2. Are there other potential safety hazards created by permitting
yard test devices to be connected to the consist at other than the end
nearest the controlling locomotive?
Paragraph (b) proposes to make clear that a Class III brake test as
proposed in Sec. 232.211 must be performed on the cars at the time that
the road locomotive is attached. This paragraph also remains consistent
with other provisions of this proposal by requiring the yard test plant
air pressure to be 80-psi, and by requiring the retesting of cars that
remain disconnected from a source of compressed air for more than four
hours.
Paragraph (c) proposes to require that mechanical yard test devices
and gauges be calibrated every 92 days and that electronic yard test
devices and gauges be calibrated annually. Based on observations made
by FRA's field inspectors, FRA has some concerns regarding the
condition of many yard test devices and gauges. FRA has found numerous
mechanical gauges the condition of which creates serious doubt as to
the accuracy of the gauge. Mechanical gauges have been found with
broken or missing glass which would allow moisture and other
contaminates to be present in the gauge. As many of the yard test
plants being used today are portable, they are exposed to a wide array
of handling and environmental hazards while being transported from
location to location. Therefore, FRA proposes that mechanical devices
and gauges be tested and calibrated every 92 days. Whereas, electronic
gauges and devices appear to have much less exposure to many of the
[[Page 48345]]
hazards encountered by mechanical devices and gauges and tend to be
much more reliable and accurate for a longer period of time.
Consequently, FRA proposes to only require electronic yard test devices
and gauges to be tested and/or calibrated on an annual basis.
Section 232.219 Double Heading and Helper Service
This section proposes the requirements related to double heading
and helper service. The provisions proposed in paragraphs (a) and (b)
are identical to the provisions currently contained in Sec. 232.15, the
only difference being that paragraph (a) has been slightly modified in
order to clearly identify that a Class III brake test must be performed
when a new locomotive is placed in control of the train. FRA believes
these provisions are necessary and have been in place for years in
order to ensure that locomotives taking control of a train have the
ability to actually control the brakes on the train. Paragraph (c)
proposes a new requirement aimed at ensuring that the brake systems on
helper locomotives respond as intended to brake commands from the
controlling locomotive at the time it is placed in the train. Failure
of a helper locomotive to respond to the command of the controlling
locomotive could result in a very serious safety hazard in that a
helper locomotive may continue to push the rear of the train while the
brakes are applied potentially resulting in an incident or derailment.
FRA intends to make clear in this paragraph that a helper locomotive
found with inoperative or ineffective brakes be repaired prior to use
or removed from the train.
FRA also seeks information and comment from interested parties
regarding a device being used on locomotives used in helper service on
a few railroads. The device is referred to as a ``Helper Link.'' The
Helper Link is an electronic device, mounted on the front end of the
lead helper locomotive and is used to control the automatic air brakes
on helper locomotive consists. When this device is used the train's
brake pipe is not connected between the rear car of the train being
pushed and the helper locomotives. The end-of-train device, attached to
the rear car of the train, sends a radio signal which is received by
the Helper Link device. The Helper Link device is connected to the
brake pipe of the helper locomotives and an electronic command from the
EOT device causes the air pressure in the helper locomotive brake pipe
to be reduced or increased, thus, applying or releasing the brakes on
the helper locomotives. A signal is transmitted from the EOT device to
the Helper Link device at 60 second intervals to ensure communication.
The Helper Link is also used to operate the uncoupling lever to detach
the helper locomotives from the rear of the train without stopping the
train.
Based on information currently available to FRA, it appears that
when there is a loss of communication between the EOT device and the
Helper Link device, the engineer of the helper locomotive consist is
not immediately aware of the failure. If the communication between the
EOT device and the Helper Link is not reestablished within the next 60
second communication cycle the Helper Link device will automatically
disable itself. Consequently, if the train experiences an emergency
application of the air brakes while the Helper Link device is disabled,
the brakes on the helper locomotives would not apply and would result
in the helper locomotives continuing to push under power. Furthermore,
in order for communications to be reestablished between the EOT and
Helper Link the engineer must leave the locomotive controls, exit the
locomotive cab, and proceed to the front of the locomotive to manually
press the reset buttons located on the Helper Link device itself. In
addition, there are currently no regulations which address the use,
testing, or calibration of these Helper Link devices.
On August 22, 1996, the UTU submitted a Petition for Rulemaking
with FRA regarding Helper Link devices raising many of the concerns
noted above. See Petition for Proposed Rulemaking Docket 96-1. In order
to address the UTU petition in this rulemaking and to address the
concerns of FRA noted above, FRA seeks information and comment from all
interested parties on the following:
1. How many railroads are currently utilizing Helper Link devices
in their operations? On how many trains?
2. What has been the operating history of the Helper Link devices
on those railroads currently using the devices?
3. Is the discussion of the use and operation of the Helper Link
device contained above accurate? Have technological improvements been
made to the devices recently?
4. What testing, calibration, or operational procedures have been
voluntarily implemented by railroads currently using Helper Link
devices?
5. Can or should an audible or visual warning be provided to the
engineer in the event that communication is lost between the EOT device
and the Helper Link device?
6. What are the recommended testing and calibration requirements
for Helper Link devices currently being used in the industry?
7. Is the technology available to permit the resetting of the
Helper Link device by the engineer from his or her normal operating
position, if communication is lost between the EOT and the Helper Link
device?
Subpart D--Periodic Maintenance and Testing Requirements
This proposed subpart provides the proposed periodic brake system
maintenance and testing requirements for equipment used in freight and
other non-passenger trains. As stated in the 1994 NPRM and in the
``General Discussion of Issues'' portion of the preamble to this NPRM,
FRA firmly believes that the new repair track test and single car test,
which have been used industry-wide since January of 1992, are a much
better and more comprehensive method of detecting and eliminating
defective brake equipment and components than the old, time-based COT&S
requirements. FRA believes that performance of these tests has
significantly reduced the number of defective components found and has
dramatically increased the reliability of brake equipment. Through the
implementation of the repair track and single car tests, the safety of
both railroad employees and the public has greatly improved due to
brake equipment being in better and safer condition. At the same time,
however, FRA is cognizant that contentions by rail labor regarding the
carrier's direct and intentional circumvention of these revised
requirements through the elimination of repair tracks, by moving cars
to expediter tracks for repair, or simply by making repairs in the
field is a legitimate concern that needs to be addressed to ensure the
industry fully benefits from the advantages of the improved tests. This
subpart proposes to incorporate AAR Interchange Rule 3 and Chart A into
this regulation, and codify existing repair track and single car test
requirements, while also imposing additional requirements that are
intended to eliminate the circumvention of the requirements as
discussed above.
Section 232.303 General Requirements
This section contains the general requirements regarding the
maintenance, repair, and test of freight cars. Prior to the termination
of Working Group deliberations, the periodic maintenance and single car
test task force had conducted extensive
[[Page 48346]]
discussions regarding the requirements of AAR Rule 3, Chart A,
specifically as they relate to the circumstances that trigger the
performance of a repair track or single car test. The task force was
ultimately unable to provide consensus recommendations to the Working
Group on all aspects of periodic maintenance and testing requirements,
due to the Working Group's inability to agree on the issues relating to
data collection, evaluation, and relevance. However, based on these
efforts and the discussions provided above, FRA proposes in paragraph
(a) of this section to require that each freight car be maintained,
repaired, and tested in accordance with the AAR's Rule 3 ``Testing of
Air Brakes'' and accompanying Chart A, contained in the AAR ``Field
Manual on Interchange Rules'' (January 1, 1998).
Paragraphs (b)-(d) reiterate existing general requirements
currently prescribed at 49 CFR 232.17 with minor revisions for purposes
of clarification and standardization. Paragraph (b) clarifies that the
air brakes must remain applied until the release signal is initiated to
maintain consistency with the proposed requirements stated at
Sec. 232.205(b)(4). Paragraph 232.205(b)(4) is an attempt to clarify
language contained in the current regulation which require that the
brakes ``apply.'' This language has been misinterpreted by some to mean
that if the piston applies in response to a command from a controlling
locomotive or yard test device, and releases before the release signal
is given, the brake system on that car is in compliance with the
regulation because the brake simply applied. The intent of the
regulation has always been that the brakes apply and remain applied
until the release signal is initiated from the controlling locomotive
or yard test device. Therefore, clarifying language has been added in
this paragraph to eliminate all doubt as to what is required.
Consequently, this paragraph makes clear that the brakes on a car must
remain applied until the appropriate release signal is given. If it
fails to do so, the car must be repaired and retested.
Paragraph (c) proposes to require that if piston travel is found to
be less than 7 inches or more than 9 inches, it must be adjusted to
nominally 7\1/2\ inches, which is a change from the 7 inches as
currently required, in order to maintain consistency with the
requirement proposed at Sec. 232.205(b)(5). This change is based on a
request by AAR to change the adjustment to 7\1/2\ inches from 7 inches
as its member railroads were finding it extremely difficult to adjust
the piston travel to precisely 7 inches and that in some cases the
adjustment would be marginally less than 7 inches, thus requiring a
readjustment. Therefore, AAR sought the extra \1/2\ inch in order to
provide a small measure for error when the piston travel is adjusted.
As FRA believes that AAR's concerns are validly placed and would have
no impact on safety, FRA has accommodated the request. Paragraph (d)(2)
proposes enhanced safety assurances with respect to the proper
functioning of angle cocks by additionally requiring that they be
inspected to ensure they are properly positioned to allow maximum air
flow. This is a clarification regarding the normal functioning of the
angle cock, and should pose little, if any, additional inspection
burden on the railroads.
FRA recognizes that circumstances arise where required repair track
brake tests or single car tests cannot always be performed at the point
where repairs can be made. Therefore, in paragraph (e), FRA proposes to
allow a car, after repairs are effectuated, to be moved to the next
forward location where the test can be performed. FRA intends to make
clear that the inability to perform a repair track brake test or a
single car test does not constitute an inability to effectuate the
necessary repairs. At the same time, however, FRA recognizes rail
labor's contention that some carriers often attempt to circumvent the
requirements for performing single car and repair track tests by
eliminating repair tracks, by moving cars to expediter tracks for
repair, or by simply making the repairs in the field. As a means to
curtail these practices, FRA proposes to impose extensive tagging
requirements on freight cars which, due to the nature of the defective
condition(s) detected, require a repair track brake test or single car
test but which are moved from the location where repairs are performed
prior to receiving the required test. As an alternative to the tagging
requirements, FRA proposes to permit a railroad to utilize an automated
tracking system to monitor these cars and ensure they receive the
requisite tests as prescribed in Sec. 232.303 provided the automated
system is approved by FRA.
In paragraph (f) of this section, FRA proposes that cars be
stencilled or marked with the location and date of the last repair
track or single car test. Alternatively, FRA intends to permit
railroads to utilize an electronic record keeping system to accomplish
this tracking requirement, provided such a system is approved by FRA.
FRA believes these requirements are necessary to ensure the timely
performance of these important tests. Without such information, there
would be virtually no way for FRA to verify a railroad's compliance
with the proposed repair track and single car test requirements.
Section 232.305 Repair Track Brake Tests
This section contains the proposed requirements related to the
performance of repair track brake tests. Paragraph (a) of this section
proposes to require that repair track brake tests be performed in
accordance with AAR Standard S-486, ``Code of Air Brake System Tests
for Freight Equipment,'' Section 3.0, contained in AAR's ``Manual of
Standards and Recommended Practices'' as revised in November of 1992.
This standard delineates the procedural requirements for performing the
repair track brake tests, and is directly incorporated into AAR's
Interchange Rule 3, Chart A. Repair track tests are currently performed
to these specifications, and FRA sees no reason to alter the
requirements at this time.
Paragraphs (b) (1)-(6) require that a railroad perform a repair
track brake test on freight cars when: (i) A freight car is removed
from a train due to an air brake related defect; (ii) a freight car has
its brakes cut-out when removed from a train or when placed on a shop
or repair track; (iii) a freight car is on a repair or shop track for
any reason and has not received a repair track brake test within the
previous 12 month period; (iv) a freight car is found with missing or
incomplete repair track brake test information; (v) one or more of the
brake reservoir, the control valve mounting gasket, and the pipe
bracket stud is removed, repaired, or replaced; or (vi) a freight car
is found with a wheel with built-up tread, slid flat, or thermally
cracked. The specific conditions identified above are generally based
on the discussions and positions presented by representatives of rail
labor, rail management, and FRA during task force deliberations that
were part of the RSAC process.
Paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section propose to require that each
freight car receive a repair track air test no less frequently than
every 5 years, and not less than 8 years from the date the car was
built or rebuilt. FRA strongly believes that these minimum attention
periods are sufficient to ensure the safety of the freight car fleet
when considered in conjunction with the increased attention that
freight cars receive when these types of tests are performed. FRA is
confident that this, together with the implementation of the stringent
proposed tagging requirements
[[Page 48347]]
detailed above, will prevent many of the perceived abuses of these test
requirements cited by some commenters.
Section 232.307 Single Car Tests
This section contains the proposed requirements related to the
performance of single car tests on freight and other non-passenger
equipment. Paragraph (a) of this section proposes to require that
freight single car tests to be performed in accordance with AAR
Standard S-486, ``Code of Air Brake System Tests for Freight
Equipment,'' Section 4.0, contained in AAR's ``Manual of Standards and
Recommended Practices'' as revised in November of 1992. This standard
delineates the procedural requirements for performing single car air
brake tests, and is directly referenced in AAR's Interchange Rule 3,
Chart A. Specifically, paragraphs (b)(1)-(3) of this section
incorporates the single car test requirements of Chart A by requiring a
railroad to perform a single car test on a freight car whenever the
service portion, the emergency portion, or the pipe bracket is removed,
repaired, or replaced.
Paragraph (c) specifically requires that a single car test be
conducted by a qualified person prior to a new or rebuilt car being
placed in or returned to revenue service. FRA believes that it is
essential for new and rebuilt cars receive this test prior to being
placed in revenue service in order to ensure the proper operation of
the brake system on the vehicle. Most railroads already require this
attention to be given to new and rebuilt cars; thus, the cost of this
requirement is minimal and merely incorporates the best practices
currently in place in the industry.
Section 232.309 Repair Track Test and Single Car Test Equipment and
Devices
This section contains the proposed requirements for maintaining the
equipment and devices used in performing repair track and single car
air brake tests. The devices and equipment used to perform these tests
are safety-critical items. FRA believes that these devices must be kept
accurate and functioning properly in order to ensure that repair track
and single car tests are properly performed. The calibration and test
requirements proposed in this section are based on past experience with
test equipment used in the railroad operating environment. FRA believes
that the requirements contained in this section are the minimum
necessary to keep the equipment in good working order.
Section 232.311 Process for Changing Maintenance Requirements
This section contains the proposed procedural requirements relating
to the ability of outside parties to change the proposed maintenance
requirements contained in this subpart. FRA acknowledges, and agrees
with concerns raised by the RLEA, which contended that FRA's acceptance
of AAR's unilateral change in the maintenance requirements allows the
AAR to unilaterally establish regulations without public comment. Labor
representatives forwarded similar recommendations, stating that any
changes made by the AAR in their recommended maintenance practices
should be reviewed and approved by the FRA. Prior actions by the AAR
led to excessive extension of COT&S intervals without compensating
action. This resulted in the need for the current repair and single car
test program, which initially led to many failures of brake valves
during testing. Repetition of this kind of cycle should not be
permitted. Accordingly, paragraph (a) of this section proposes to
restrict AAR changes to the maintenance standards referenced in this
subpart by requiring such proposed changes to be submitted and reviewed
in accordance with the requirements outlined in paragraphs (b)-(d) of
this section. Specifically, FRA intends to review any proposed change
to determine whether the change is ``safety-critical,'' which includes
but is not limited to (i) changes to Chart A, (ii) changes to
established maintenance intervals, and (iii) changes to UMLER reporting
requirements. If the proposed change is deemed ``safety-critical,'' FRA
proposes to address the change pursuant to the Special Approval process
proposed in Sec. 232.17, which involves the publishing of a Federal
Register Notice, conducting a Public Hearing if necessary, and acting
based on the information developed and submitted in regard to these
proceedings. Whereas, if the proposed change is determined by FRA to be
``non safety-critical,'' FRA will permit the change to be implemented
immediately. FRA proposes the process contained in this section in
order to respond to the concerns raised by AAR and its' member
railroads that FRA devise some sort of quick approval process in order
to permit the industry to make minor modifications to existing
standards. Thus, FRA has attempted to propose a process it believes
should speed the process for making both safety-critical and nonsafety-
critical changes.
Subpart E--End-of-Train Devices
This subpart incorporates the design, performance, and testing
requirements relating to end-of-train devices (EOTs) that were issued
on January 2, 1997, which became effective for all railroads on July 1,
1997, except for those for which the effective date was extended to
December 1, 1997 by notice issued on June 4, 1997. See 62 FR 278 and 62
FR 30461. This subpart also incorporates the recent modifications made
to the two-way EOT requirements to clarify the applicability of the
requirements to certain passenger train operations where multiple units
of freight-type equipment, material handling cars, or express cars are
part of a passenger train's consist. See 63 FR 24130.
As noted in the discussion of the applicability provisions
contained in Sec. 232.3 of this proposal, this subpart applies to all
trains unless specifically excepted by the provisions contained in this
subpart. As the provisions contained in this subpart were just recently
issued, there is little need to discuss these requirements in detail as
they were fully discussed in the publications noted above. However,
since their issuance, FRA has discovered that a few of the provisions
are in need of minor modification for clarification purposes and to
address some valid concerns that have been raised both internally by
FRA inspectors and by outside parties. Consequently, in this discussion
FRA intends to address only the specific modifications that are being
made to the currently effective requirements.
Section 232.405(d) contains a proposed modification of the
requirement relating to the diameter of the valve opening and hose on
two-way EOTs, which is currently contained in Sec. 232.21(d). The
current regulation requires that the valve opening and hose have a
minimum diameter of \3/4\ inch to effect an emergency application. FRA
has discovered that sometime prior to the issuance of the final rule on
two-way EOTs, Pulse Electronics began manufacturing their two-way EOT
with the internal diameter of the hose being \5/8\ inch. Testing of the
devices manufactured with these smaller diameter hoses showed that they
met all criteria for emergency application capability based on
standards and guidelines set forth by the AAR. Furthermore, testing of
the devices at the Westinghouse facility in Wilmerding, Pennsylvania,
demonstrated that the \5/8\ inch diameter hose permitted 14 consecutive
50 foot cars with cut-out control valves or 750 feet of brake pipe to
be jumped. This is
[[Page 48348]]
more than double the AAR standard for control valve requirements.
Consequently, FRA proposes to modify Sec. 232.405(d) to permit the use
of a \5/8\ inch internal diameter hose in the design of the devices.
Based on concerns raised by FRA inspectors and after consideration
of the data related to the braking ability of locomotives. FRA proposes
to modify the exception currently contained in Sec. 232.23(e)(1) which
grants an exception from the two-way EOT requirements to trains
operating with a locomotive capable of effectuating an emergency
application, located in the rear third of the train. In
Sec. 232.407(e)(1), FRA proposes to modify this exception so that it is
only applicable to trains operating with a locomotive on the rear of
the train. Data supplied by VOLPE demonstrates that stopping distances
are greatly increased, and could potentially result in a runaway train
or derailment depending on the length of the train, if an obstruction
of the brake pipe were to occur directly behind a locomotive located in
the rear third of the train. Therefore, FRA proposes that trains with a
locomotive located in the rear third of the train no longer be excepted
from the two-way EOT requirements, unless the train qualifies for
relief under one of the other specific exceptions contained in
Sec. 232.407(e). FRA believes that this modification will pose little
burden on the railroads since virtually all trains currently operating
with a locomotive located in the rear third of the train are equipped
with a two-way EOT anyway due to the operational benefits gained from
the devices as well as its usefulness in conducting required brake
inspection en route.
Based on the above discussion, FRA also proposes to modify the
requirements for operating a train that experiences an en route failure
of the two-way EOT over a section of track with an average grade of two
percent or greater over a distance of two continuous miles. FRA
proposes to modify the alternative measure currently contained at
Sec. 232.23(g)(1)(iii) which permits the operation over such a grade if
a radio-controlled locomotive is placed in the rear third of the train
consist and under the continuous of the engineer in the head end of the
train. In Sec. 232.407(g)(1)(iii), FRA proposes to modify this
alternative measure to permit such operation only if the radio-
controlled locomotive is placed at the rear of the train consist. This
modification is proposed in order that the alternative methods of
operation over a heavy grade remains consistent with the exception from
the two-way EOT requirements contained in Sec. 232.407(e) as discussed
in the preceding paragraph.
In Sec. 232.407(f)(3), FRA proposes to require that if a train is
required to use a two-way EOT, the device shall be activated to
effectuate an emergency brake application either by using the manual
toggle switch or through automatic activation, whenever it becomes
necessary for the locomotive engineer to place the train air brakes in
emergency using either the automatic brake valve or the conductor's
emergency brake valve or whenever an undesired emergency application of
the train air brakes occurs. On June 1, 1998, FRA issued Safety
Advisory 98-2 which recommended that railroads adopt the procedure
being proposed in this paragraph. See 63 FR 30808. FRA issued Safety
Advisory 98-2 in response to several recent freight train incidents
potentially involving the improper use of a train's air brakes which
caused FRA to focus on railroad air brake and train handling procedures
related to the initiation of an emergency air brake application,
particularly as they pertain to the activation of the two-way EOT from
the locomotive. Based on FRA's review of the incidents noted below, and
its awareness of other incidents involving non-use of two-way EOTs
under similar circumstances, FRA believes that the guidance contained
in Safety Advisory 98-2 must be incorporated into the regulations to
ensure that the safety benefits of two-way EOTs are fully realized.
FRA and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) are
currently investigating four incidents in which a train was placed into
emergency braking by use of the normal emergency brake valve handles on
the locomotive, and although the train in each instance was equipped
with an armed and operable two-way EOT, the device was not activated by
the locomotive engineer. These incidents include:
A March 30, 1997 incident occurring near Ridgecrest, North
Carolina, involving Norfolk Southern train No. P32, resulting in 42
cars derailed and two crewmembers injured;
An October 25, 1997 incident occurring in Houston, Texas,
involving Union Pacific train Nos. IHOLB-25 and MTUHO-21, resulting in
five locomotives derailed and totally destroyed, and two crewmembers
injured;
A November 3, 1997 incident occurring near Alvord, Texas,
involving Burlington Northern Santa Fe train Nos. HALTBAR 1-03 and
ESLPCAM 3-11, resulting in three locomotives and seven cars derailed,
and two crewmembers injured;
A March 23, 1998 incident occurring near Herington,
Kansas, involving Union Pacific train Nos. MKSTUX-23 and IESLB-21,
resulting in one locomotive and 6 cars derailed, and one crewmember
injured.
FRA's preliminary findings indicate that in all of the incidents
noted above, there was evidence of an obstruction somewhere in the
train line, caused by either a closed or partially closed angle cock or
a kinked air hose. This obstruction prevented an emergency brake
application from being propagated throughout the entire train, front to
rear, after such an application was initiated from the locomotive using
either the engineer's automatic brake valve handle or the conductor's
emergency brake valve. Furthermore, the locomotive engineers in each of
the incidents stated that they did not think to use the two-way EOT,
when asked why they failed to activate the device.
FRA believes that the operational requirement proposed in this
section must be stressed by the railroads when conducting the two-way
EOT training proposed in Sec. 232.203. FRA believes that the likelihood
of future incidents, such as the ones described above, would be greatly
reduced if the proposed train handling procedure is made part of a
train crew's training and followed by members of the crew in emergency
situations. FRA believes that this additional procedure, together with
the proposed training, will not only ensure that an emergency brake
application is commenced from both the front and rear of the train in
emergency situations, but will familiarize the engineer with the
activation and operation of the devices and will educate the engineer
to react in the safest possible manner whenever circumstances require
the initiation of an emergency brake application.
FRA recognizes that a number of railroads have already adopted
procedures similar to that proposed in this section and commends such
actions. Although FRA proposes that the device to be activated either
manually or automatically, FRA intends to make clear that the front
unit of the device is still required to be equipped with a manually
operated switch. See Sec. 232.405(e). FRA recognizes that some
railroads have developed a means in which the rear unit is
automatically activated when an engineer makes an emergency application
with the brake handle and FRA endorses such innovation. However, FRA
believes that an engineer should also be provided a separate, manually
operated switch which is independent of any automatic system in order
to ensure the activation
[[Page 48349]]
of the rear unit in the event that the automatic system fails.
In section 232.409(c), FRA proposes to modify the requirement
regarding notification to the locomotive engineer when the device is
tested by someone other than a train crew member currently contained at
Sec. 232.25(c). Since the rule has been in effect, numerous locomotive
engineers have informed FRA that they are not being properly notified
when successful completion of the testing and inspection requirements
contained in this section are performed by other than train crew
members. Many engineers claim that they are not confident that the
proper tests and inspections have been conducted on the devices, or
that the devices will even operate, when they get verbal confirmation
of the test from a dispatcher, especially when the dispatcher does not
know who performed the test or when it was performed. Consequently, in
order to ensure that the proper tests and inspections are being
performed on the devices and to provide locomotive engineers with a
measure of confidence that the devices will work as intended, FRA
proposes to require that written notification be provided to the
engineer when the required tests and inspections are performed by a
person other than a train crew member. FRA proposes that the written
notification include the date and time of the test, the location where
the test was performed, and the name of the person performing the test.
In section 232.409(d), FRA proposes to modify the language related
to the annual calibration and testing of EOT devices currently
contained at Sec. 232.25(d). The regulation currently states that the
devices shall be ``calibrated'' annually. FRA intends to make clear
that it intended for railroads' to perform whatever tests or checks are
necessary to ensure that the devices are operating within the
parameters established by the manufacturers of the devices. Several
railroads have attempted to sharp shoot the language currently
contained in the regulation, claiming that the manufacturer states that
front units do not need to be calibrated on an annual basis, in order
to avoid doing any testing of the devices. Although FRA agrees that the
front units may not have to be calibrated every year, the devices must
be tested in some fashion to verify that they are operating within the
manufacturer's specification with regard to radio frequency, signal
strength, and modulation and do not require recalibration. FRA has been
provided written instructions from the manufacturers' of the devices
which contain procedures for testing of both the front and rear units.
Furthermore, railroads using the devices in Canada acknowledge that the
radio functions of the front and rear units are tested periodically.
Consequently, in this paragraph FRA proposes clarifying language in
order to avoid any misconceptions as to what actions are required to be
performed on these devices on an annual basis.
One issue which has recently arisen, which FRA believes must be
addressed, relates to the ability of a railroad to dispatch a train
with an inoperative two-way EOT. FRA believes that some clarification
is necessary with regard to this issue. The issue has arisen in
circumstances where a railroad is aware that a certain location
experiences communication problems, and thus, permits trains to depart
limiting their speed to 30 mph until communication between the front
and rear unit is established. Section 232.23(f)(1) of the current
regulations, Sec. 232.407(f)(1) of this proposal, requires that; ``the
device shall be armed and operable from the time the train departs from
the point where the device is installed until the train reaches its
destination.'' Therefore, FRA intends to make clear that a train
required to be equipped with a two-way EOT may not be dispatched from a
location where a device is installed unless the device is armed and
operable. Consequently, railroads may have to install repeater stations
at locations where communication problems are prevalent.
Although FRA is not proposing any other specific changes to the
requirements incorporated into this subpart, FRA has provided a
detailed discussion of several issues that have arisen since the
issuance of the final rule on two-way EOTs. This detail discussion is
contained in the ``Discussion of Issues and General FRA Conclusions''
portion of this preamble under the heading ``Two-way End-of-Train
Devices.'' FRA seeks comment and information from all interested
parties related to the issues contained in that discussion in order to
potentially take appropriate action at the final rule stage of this
proceeding to address those issues.
Subpart F--Introduction of New Brake System Technology
This proposed subpart contains the tests and procedures required to
introduce new train brake system technology into revenue service.
Several parties commented that the technology necessary for the
introduction of advanced braking systems is quickly developing. These
new technologies include various forms of electronic braking systems, a
variety of braking sensors, and computer-controlled braking systems. In
order to allow for and encourage the development of new technology, FRA
proposes guidelines regarding the tests and procedures required for
introducing new brake system technology. These proposed guidelines
require the submission to FRA of a pre-revenue service acceptance
testing plan.
FRA intends to make clear that this proposed subpart would only be
applicable to new train brake system technology that comply with the
statutory mandates contained in 49 U.S.C. 20102, 20301-20304, 20701-
20703, 21302, and 21304, but which are not specifically covered by
these proposed regulations. Any type of new train brake system which
requires an exemption from the Federal railroad safety laws in order to
be operated in revenue service cannot be introduced into service
pursuant to this section. In order to grant a waiver of the Federal
railroad safety laws, FRA is limited by the specific statutory
provisions contained in 49 U.S.C. 20306 as well as any FRA procedural
requirements contained in this chapter.
Section 232.503 Process To Introduce New Brake System Technology
This section contains the proposed procedural requirements which
must be met when a railroad intends to introduce new brake system
technology into its system. This section makes clear that the approval
of FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety must be obtained by a
railroad prior to the railroad's implementation of a pre-revenue
service acceptance test plan and before introduction of new brake
system technology into revenue service. This section requires that such
approval be obtained pursuant to the Special Approval process proposed
in Sec. 232.17. Several railroads and manufacturers contended, both in
response to the 1994 NPRM and at the RSAC Working Group meetings, that
FRA needed to devise some sort of quick approval process in order to
permit the industry to rapidly introduce new brake system technologies
into revenue service. Thus, FRA has attempted to propose an approval
process it believes should speed the process for taking advantage of
new technologies over that which is currently available under the
waiver process. However, in order to provide an opportunity for all
interested parties to provide input for use by FRA in its decision
making process, as required by the Administrative Procedure Act, FRA
believes that any special approval
[[Page 48350]]
provision must, at a minimum, provide proper notice to the public of
any significant change or action being considered by the agency with
regard to existing regulations.
Section 232.505 Pre-revenue Service Acceptance Testing Plan
This section provides the proposed requirements for pre-revenue
service testing of new brake system technology. These tests are
extremely important in that they intended to prove that the new brake
system can be operated safely in its intended environment. For
equipment that has not previously been used in revenue service in the
United States, paragraph (a) requires the operating railroad to develop
a pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan and obtain FRA approval
of the plan under the procedures stated in Sec. 238.17 before beginning
testing. Previous testing of the equipment at the Transportation Test
Center, on another railroad, or elsewhere will be considered by FRA in
approving the test plan. Paragraph (b) requires the railroad to fully
execute the tests required by the plan, to correct any safety
deficiencies identified by FRA, and to obtain FRA's approval to place
the equipment in revenue service prior to introducing the equipment in
revenue service. Paragraph (c) requires the railroad to comply with any
operational limitations imposed by FRA. Paragraph (d) requires the
railroad to make the plan available to FRA for inspection and copying.
Paragraph (e) enumerates the elements that must be included in the
plan. FRA believes this set of steps and the documentation required by
this section are necessary to ensure that all safety risks have been
reduced to a level that permits the new brake system technology to be
used in revenue service.
In lieu of the requirements of paragraphs (a) through (e),
paragraph (f) provides for an abbreviated testing procedure for new
brake system technology that has previously been used in revenue
service in the United States. The railroad need not submit a test plan
to FRA; however, a description of the testing shall be maintained by
the railroad and made available to FRA for inspection and copying.
Regulatory Impact
Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
This proposed rule has been evaluated in accordance with existing
policies and procedures and is considered to be significant under both
Executive Order 12866 and DOT policies and procedures (44 FR 11034,
Feb. 26, 1979). FRA has prepared and placed in the docket a regulatory
evaluation of the proposed rule. This evaluation estimates the costs
and consequences of the proposed rule as well as its anticipated
economic and safety benefits. It may be inspected and photocopied
during normal business hours by visiting the FRA Docket Clerk at the
Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, Seventh Floor, 1120 Vermont Avenue, N.W.,
in Washington, D.C. Photocopies may also be obtained by submitting a
written request by mail to the FRA Docket Clerk at the Office of Chief
Counsel, Federal Railroad Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20590.
The estimated benefits of this proposed rule exceed the estimated
costs over a 20-year period at a 7% discount rate. The estimated Net
Present Value (NPV) of the total 20-year costs associated with the
proposed rule is approximately $98 million; whereas the total 20-year
benefits (safety and economic) have been estimated at approximately
$106 million. For some freight rail operations the total costs incurred
will exceed the benefit savings. For others, the benefit savings will
outweigh the costs. The following tables contains the estimated 20-year
costs and benefits associated with the proposed rule.
Table 3.--Estimated Costs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category NPV costs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Training................................................ $76,929,903
Two-way EOT Training.................................... 1,421,731
Retest.................................................. 4,385,922
Piston Travel Stickers.................................. 1,163,062
Air Quality............................................. 3,219,072
Dynamic Brake........................................... 1,757,621
Cycle Trains............................................ 3,972,596
Written Procedures...................................... 4,938,929
---------------
Total............................................... 97,787,837
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 4.--Estimated Benefits
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category NPV benefits
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Extended Haul........................................... $66,389,112
Safety Improvements..................................... 31,585,909
Two-way EOT Training.................................... 5,270,840
Bottom Rod Safety Supports.............................. 3,239,650
---------------
Total............................................... 106,485,510
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The estimates contained in the tables above are somewhat
preliminary as FRA does not have detailed data relating to the costs of
some of the dynamic brake or dry air requirements. FRA seeks comment
and additional information from railroads, contractors, and other
interested parties regarding choices they may have to make so that a
more complete estimate of the costs and benefits of this rule may be
made prior to the issuance of the final rule. For purposes of the
regulatory impact analysis, FRA has made certain assumptions pertinent
to cost elements when it lacked specific data and asks for comments and
information on those assumptions from all interested parties.
The estimated benefits are derived primarily through the extended
haul provision and a reduction in brake related incidents. FRA has
proposed extremely restrictive requirements related to the inspection
and movement of trains which will be permitted to travel in excess of
1,000 miles between brake inspections. FRA also anticipates that
enhancements to safety will be obtained through the proposed training
requirements and through the proposed requirements relating to the
retesting of cars failing to apply during a brake inspection. The
estimated safety benefits of this proposed rule are derived from the
prevention of accidents and the resulting fatalities, injuries, and
property damage. FRA has employed an effectiveness rate of 20 percent
in an effort to measure the anticipated improvements in safety.
Benefits also exist for railroads in terms of reduced train delay,
debris removal and repairs which are not estimated. Benefits are also
not estimated for the operational benefits which may be derived from
permitting the use of a two-way EOT during the performance of a Class I
brake test; such as, the time that may be saved when an en route pick-
up is made and a Class I brake test is performed. FRA does not
currently have an estimate of how many en route pick-ups take place
annually.
Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.)
requires an assessment of the impacts of proposed rules on small
entities. FRA has conducted a regulatory flexibility assessment of this
rule's impact on small entities, and the assessment has been placed in
the public docket for this rulemaking.
1. Why Action by the Agency is Being Considered
In 1992, Congress amended the Federal rail safety laws by adding
certain statutory mandates related to power brake safety. See 49 U.S.C.
20141. These amendments specifically address the revision of the power
brake regulations by adding a new subsection which states:
[[Page 48351]]
(r) POWER BRAKE SAFETY.--(1) The Secretary shall conduct a
review of the Department of Transportation's rules with respect to
railroad power brakes, and not later than December 31, 1993, shall
revise such rules based on such safety data as may be presented
during that review.
(2) In carrying out paragraph (1), the Secretary shall, where
applicable, prescribe standards regarding dynamic brake equipment. *
* *
Pub. L. No. 102-365, Sec. 7; codified at 49 U.S.C. 20141, superseding
45 U.S.C. 431(r).
In addition to this statutory mandate, FRA received various
recommendations and petitions for rulemaking, and determined on its own
that the power brake regulations were in need of revision. FRA has been
in the process of revising the power brake regulations since 1992. An
ANPRM and an NPRM revising the power brake regulations were previously
issued on December 31, 1992 and September 16, 1994, respectively. See
57 FR 62546 and 59 FR 47676. A detailed discussion of the history
leading up to this NPRM is contained in the preamble. The reasons for
the actual provisions of the action considered by the agency are
explained in the body of the preamble and the section-by-section
analysis.
2. The Objectives and Legal Basis for The Rule
The objective of the rule is to enhance the safety of rail
transportation, protecting both those people traveling and working on
the system, and those people off the system who might be affected by a
rail incident by revising the regulations related to the braking
systems used and operated in freight and other non-passenger trains to
address potential deficiencies in the existing regulations, better
address the needs of contemporary railroad operations, and facilitate
the use of advanced technologies. The legal basis for this action is
reflected in the response to 1. above and in the preamble.
3. A Description of and an Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to
Which the Proposed Rule Would Apply
The Small Business Administration (SBA) uses an industry wide
definition of ``small entity'' based on employment. Railroads are
considered small by SBA definition if they employ fewer than 1,500
people. An agency may establish one or more other definitions of this
term, in consultation with the SBA and after an opportunity for public
comment, that are appropriate to the agency's activities.
The classification system used in this analysis is that of the FRA.
Prior to the SBA regulations establishing size categories, the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) developed a classification system
for freight railroads as Class I, II, or III, based on annual operating
revenue. A Class II railroad has operating revenue greater or equal to
$40 million dollars but less than $253.7 million and a Class III
railroad has operating revenue below $39 million. The Department of
Transportation's Surface Transportation Board, which succeeded the ICC,
has not changed these classifications. The ICC classification system
has been used pervasively by FRA and the railroad industry to identify
entities by size. After consultation with the Office of Advocacy of the
SBA and as explained in detail in the ``Interim Policy Statement
Concerning Small Entities Subject to the Railroad Safety Laws,''
published August 11, 1997 at 62 Fed. Reg. 43024, FRA has decided to
define ``small entity,'' on an interim basis, to include only those
entities whose revenues would bring them within the Class III
definition. As this is an alternative definition, FRA requests comment
from interested parties on its use.
All of the small entities directly affected by this rule are Class
III railroads. FRA certifies that this proposed rule is expected to
have a significant impact on a substantial number of Class III
railroads. FRA did not quantify the estimated annual cost or benefit to
the average Class III railroad, annual costs for all non-Class I
railroads are shown in Appendix A of the Regulatory Impact Analysis.
Class III railroads have about 15 percent of the employees of all Class
II and III railroads. As most the costs of this proposed rule on Class
III railroads are related to the number and types of employees
(training, refresher training, qualification, and internal audit plans)
a rough estimate of the costs to Class III railroads is taken as about
15 percent of the training related costs or about $2.1 million
discounted at 7 percent over 20 years. It should be noted that this
cost figure is a very rough estimate and includes only an estimate of
the costs related to training as noted above. Consequently, FRA is
seeking comment and information from all interested parties on the
costs to these small entities so this estimate can be further refined
and developed for the final rule.
4. A Description of the Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping and Other
Compliance Requirements of the Proposed Rule, Including an Estimate of
the Classes of Small Entities Which Will Be Subject to the Requirements
and the Type of Professional Skills Necessary for Preparation of the
Report or Record
See the Paperwork Reduction Act analysis.
5. Federal Rules Which May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict With the
Rule
None.
Significant Alternatives
1. Differing compliance or reporting requirements or timetables
which take into account the resources available to small entities:
2. Clarification, consolidation, or simplification of compliance
and reporting requirements under the rule for such small entities:
3. Exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for
such small entities:
FRA considered the role that shortline railroads (Class II and III
railroads) have in today's freight industry. FRA believes that the
current marketplace requires Class I railroads and shortline railroads
to operate as an integrated system. Many of today's shortlines rely on
Class I railroads for the training of their employees and the
maintenance of their equipment. In addition, many shortline railroads
and Class I railroads interchange and operate each others equipment.
Therefore, except in limited circumstances, it is impossible, from a
regulatory standpoint, to separate shortline railroads from Class I
railroads. Therefore, in order to ensure the safety and quality of
train and locomotive power braking systems throughout the entire
freight industry, this proposal generally imposes a consistent set of
requirements on shortline and Class I railroads as a group. Although
FRA recognizes that many of the operational benefits created by this
proposal are not available to most shortline operations, FRA feels that
the integrated nature of the freight industry requires that universally
consistent requirements be imposed on both shortline and Class I
railroads.
Where possible, efforts were taken in this proposal to minimize the
impact on shortline railroads. The proposed requirements related to
dynamic brakes provide shortline railroads with the option of declaring
the dynamic brake portion of a locomotive disabled, so that they will
not needlessly incur the cost of maintaining equipment that they do not
choose to employ. FRA also
[[Page 48352]]
proposes to permit railroads to perform Class II brake tests on cars
added to a train received in interchange, if the train will travel a
distance not to exceed 20 miles from the point at which it was received
in interchange. The current regulations require the performance of at
least a transfer train brake test on the entire train, rather than
testing only those cars added. FRA believes this will provide a cost
savings to short line railroads and seeks comment from interested
parties on the number of transfer train brake tests and initial
terminal brake tests that are conducted when trains are received in
interchange. FRA also seeks comments and suggestions from all
interested parties with regard to any requirement proposed as to
alternative approaches that might reduce the impact of the proposal on
shortlines, particularly Class III railroads.
4. Use of Performance, Rather Than Design Standards
Where possible, especially with regard to advanced technologies and
certain brake system components, an attempt was made to tie the
proposed requirements to performance.
Paperwork Reduction Act
The information collection requirements in this proposed rule have
been submitted for approval to the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.
The sections that contain the new information collection requirements
and the estimated time to fulfill each requirement are as follows:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Average time per Total annual burden Total annual
49 CFR section Respondent universe Total annual responses response hours burden cost
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
229.27--Annual tests......... 20,000 locomotives............... 18,000 tests.............. 15 minutes.......... 4,500 hours......... $157,500
232.7--Waivers............... 545 railroads.................... 10 petitions.............. 40 hours............ 400 hours........... 18,000
232.15--Movement of Defective
Equipment:
Tags..................... 1,220,000 cars................... 48,200 tags............... 5 minutes........... 4,017 hours......... 140,595
Written Notification..... 1,220,000 cars................... 16,000 notices............ 3 minutes........... 800 hours........... 28,000
232.17--Special Approval
Procedure:
Petitions for special 545 railroads.................... 1 petition................ 100 hours........... 100 hours........... 4,500
approval of safety-
critical revision.
Petitions for special 545 railroads.................... 2 petitions............... 100 hours........... 200 hours........... 9,000
approval of pre-revenue
service acceptance plan.
Service of petitions..... 545 railroads.................... 3 petitions............... 40 hours............ 120 hours........... 5,400
Statement of interest.... Public/railroads................. 15 comments............... 4 hours............. 60 hours............ 2,700
CommentPublic/railroads.. 15 comments...................... 4 hours................... 60 hours............ 2,700...............
232.103--Gen'l requirements-- 1,200,000 cars................... 140,000 stickers.......... 10 minutes.......... 23,333 hours........ 816,655
all train brake systems.
Locomotives--1st Year.... 545 railroads.................... 50 procedures............. 4 hours............. 200 hours........... 9,000
Locomotives--Subquent 25 new railroads................. 1 procedure............... 4 hours............. 4 hours............. 180
Years.
232.105--Gen'l requirements 545 railroads.................... 20,000 inspections........ 5 minutes........... 1,667 hours......... 58,345
for locomotives.
232.107--Air source 545 railroads.................... 50 plans.................. 40 hours............ 2,000 hours......... 90,000
requirements--1st Year.
Subsequent Years......... 25 new railroads................. 1 plan.................... 40 hours............ 40 hours............ 1,800
Amendments to Plan....... 50 existing plans................ 10 amendments............. 20 hours............ 200 hours........... 9,000
Recordkeeping............ 50 existing plans................ 2,000 records............. 20 hours............ 40,000 hours........ 1,800,000
Cold weather situations.. 545 railroads.................... 37 plans.................. 20 hours............ 740 hours........... 33,300
232.109--Dynamic brake 545 railroads.................... 1,656,000................. 5 minutes........... 138,000 hours....... 4,830,000
requirements--status.
Inoperative dynamic 8,000 locomotives................ records................... 4 minutes........... 27 hours............ 945
brakes.
Permanently disabled 8,000 locomotives................ 400 tags.................. 5 minutes........... 233 hours........... 8,155
dynamic brakes--1st Year.
Subsequent Years......... 8,000 locomotives................ 2,800 stencilings......... 5 minutes........... 2 hours............. 70
Operating rules--1st Year 545 railroads.................... 20 stencilings............ 4 hours............. 1,200 hours......... 54,000
Subsequent Years......... 5 new railroads.................. 300 oper. rules........... 4 hours............. 20 hours............ 900
Amendments............... 545 railroads.................... 5 operating rules......... 1 hour.............. 15 hours............ 675
Knowledge criteria-- 545 railroads.................... 15 amendments............. 16 hours............ 4,800 hours......... 216,000
locomotive engineers--
1st Year.
5 new railroads.................. 300 amendments............ 16 hours............ 80 hours............ 3,600
232.111--Train information 545 railroads.................... 545 procedures............ 50 hours............ 27,250 hours........ 1,226,250
handling--1st Year.
Subsequent Years......... 10 new railroads................. 10 procedures............. 40 hours............ 400 hours........... 18,000
Amendments............... 100 railroads.................... 100 amendments............ 20 hours............ 2,000 hours......... 90,000
Report requirements to 545 railroads.................... 2,112,000 reports......... 10 minutes.......... 352,000 hours....... 12,320,000
train crew.
232.203--Training 545 railroads.................... 300 programs.............. 80 hours............ 24,000 hours........ 1,080,000
requirements--Tr. Prog.--1st
Year.
Subsequent Years......... 15 railroads..................... 1 program................. 100 hours........... 100 hours........... 4,500
Amendments to written 545 railroads.................... 545 amendments............ 8 hours............. 4,360 hours......... 196,200
program.
[[Page 48353]]
Training records......... 545 railroads.................... 67,000 records............ 10 minutes.......... 11,167 hours........ 390,845
Training modifications... 545 railroads.................... 67,000 notific............ 3 minutes........... 3,350 hours......... 117,250
Audit program............ 545 railroads.................... 545 programs.............. 40 hours............ 21,800 hours........ 981,000
Amendments to audit 545 railroads.................... 50 amendments............. 20 hours............ 1,000 hours......... 45,000
program.
232.205--Class 1 brake test.. 545 railroads.................... 1,656,000 notices......... 45 seconds.......... 20,700 hours........ 724,500
232.207--Class 1A brake 545 railroads.................... 15 lists.................. 30 minutes.......... 8 hours............. 360
tests--1st Year.
Subsequent Years......... 545 railroads.................... 1 list.................... 1 hour.............. 1 hour.............. 45
Notification............. 545 railroads.................... 5 amendments.............. 1 hour.............. 5 hours............. 225
232.209--Class II brake tests- 545 railroads.................... 1,920,000 comnts.......... 3 seconds........... 1,600 hours......... 56,000
intermediate inspection.
Operator of train........ 545 railroads.................... comnts.................... 2 seconds........... 1,067 hours......... 37,345
Electronic communication 545 railroads.................... 1,920,000................. 2 seconds........... 18 hours............ 630
link. comm......................
32,000 messages...........
232.211--Class II brake test- 545 railroads.................... 500,000................... 5 seconds........... 694 hours........... 24,290
trainline continuity insp.
Electronic communication 545 railroads.................... commun.................... 5 seconds........... 7 hours............. 245
link. 5,000 messages............
232.213--Extended haul trains 84,000 long dist. mvmts.......... 70 letters................ 15 minutes.......... 18 hours............ 810
Record of all defective/ 84,000 long dist. mvmts.......... 25,200 records............ 30 minutes.......... 12,600 hours........ 441,000
inoperative brakes.
232.303--Gen'l requirements-- 1,200,000 frgt. cars............. 24,000 tags............... 10 minutes.......... 4,000 hours......... 140,000
single car test.
Last repair track brake 1,200,000 frgt. cars............. 240,000 stncl............. 5 minutes........... 20,000 hours........ 700,000
test/single car test.
232.309--Repair track brake 640 shops........................ 960 tests................. 30 minutes.......... 480 hours........... 16,800
test.
232.311--Process for changing Assoc. Am. Railroads............. 1 revision................ 100 hours........... 100 hours........... 4,500
maintenance reqmnts.
232.403--Design stds--1-way 545 railroads.................... 4 billion mess............ 1/186,000 sec....... 6 hours............. 0
end-of-train (EOTs) dev.
Unique Code.............. 545 railroads.................... 12 requests............... 5 minutes........... 1 hour.............. 35
232.405--Design + Performance 545 railroads.................... 8 billion mess............ 1/186,000 sec....... 12 hours............ 0
stds.--2-way EOTs.
232.407--Operations requiring 545 railroads.................... 50,000 comm............... 30 seconds.......... 417 hours........... 14,595
2-way EOTs.
232.409--Insp. and Testing of 245 railroads.................... 450,000 comm.............. 30 seconds.......... 3,750 hours......... 168,750
EOTs.
Telemetry Equipment-- 245 railroads.................... 32,708 units.............. 1 minute............ 545 hours........... 24,525
Testing and Calibration.
232.503--Process to introduce 545 railroads.................... 1 letter.................. 1 hour.............. 1 hour.............. 45
new brake technology.
Special approval......... 545 railroads.................... 1 request................. 2 hours............. 2 hours............. 90
232.505--Pre-revenue service 545 railroads.................... 1 main.................... 160 hours........... 160 hours........... 7,200
accept. test plan--1st Yr..
Subsequent Years......... 545 railroads.................... 1 main procedure.......... 160 hours........... 160 hours........... 7,200
Amendments............... 545 railroads.................... 1 main procedure.......... 40 hours............ 40 hours............ 1,800
Design description....... 545 railroads.................... 1 petition................ 40 hours............ 40 hours............ 1,800
Report to FRA Assoc. 545 railroads.................... 1 report.................. 8 hours............. 8 hours............. 360 hours
Admin. for Safety.
Brake system technology 545 railroads.................... 5 descriptions............ 40 hours............ 200 hours........... 9,000
testing.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
All estimates include the time for reviewing instructions;
searching existing data sources; gathering or maintaining the needed
data; and reviewing the information. Pursuant to 44 U.S.C.
3506(c)(2)(B), FRA solicits comments concerning: whether these
information collection requirements are necessary for the proper
performance of the function of FRA, including whether the information
has practical utility; the accuracy of FRA's estimates of the burden of
the information collection requirements; the quality, utility, and
clarity of the information to be collected; and whether the burden of
collection of information on those who are to respond, including
through the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of
information technology, may be minimized. For information or a copy of
the paperwork package submitted to OMB, contact Robert Brogan at 202-
493-6292.
Organizations and individuals desiring to submit comments on the
collection of information requirements should direct them to Robert
Brogan, Federal Railroad Administration, RRS-21, Mail Stop 25, 400 7th
Street, S.W., Washington. D.C. 20590. An advance copy of the
information collection package for this proposed rule has been
forwarded to the Office of Management and Budget for review and
approval.
OMB is required to make a decision concerning the collection of
information requirements contained in this proposed rule between 30 and
60 days after publication of this document in the Federal Register.
Therefore, a comment to OMB is best assured of having its full effect
if OMB receives it within 30 days of publication. The final rule will
respond to any OMB or public
[[Page 48354]]
comments on the information collection requirements contained in this
proposal.
FRA is not authorized to impose a penalty on persons for violating
information collection requirements which do not display a current OMB
control number, if required. FRA intends to obtain current OMB control
numbers for any new information collection requirements resulting from
this rulemaking action prior to the effective date of a final rule. The
valid OMB control number for this information collection is 2130-0008.
Environmental Impact
FRA has evaluated these proposed regulations in accordance with its
procedures for ensuring full consideration of the environmental impact
of FRA actions, as required by the National Environmental Policy Act
(42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.), and related directives. This notice meets the
criteria that establish this as a non-major action for environmental
purposes.
Federalism Implications
This proposed rule has been analyzed in accordance with the
principles and criteria contained in Executive Order 12612, and it has
been determined that the proposed rule does not have sufficient
federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism
Assessment.
Request for Public Comments
FRA proposes to adopt a new part 232 and amend parts 229 and 231 of
title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, as set forth below. FRA solicits
comments on all aspects of the proposed rules whether through written
submissions, or participation in the public hearings, or both. FRA may
make changes in the final rules based on comments received in response
to this notice.
List of Subjects
49 CFR Part 229
Penalties, Railroad safety, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
49 CFR Part 231
Penalties, Railroad safety.
49 CFR Part 232
Penalties, Railroad safety.
The Proposal
In consideration of the following, FRA proposes to amend chapter
II, subtitle B of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations as follows:
PART 229--[AMENDED]
1. The authority citation for part 229 is revised to read as
follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102-20103, 20133, 20137-20138, 20143,
20701-20703, 21301-21302, 21304; 49 CFR 1.49(c), (m).
2. Section 229.5 is amended by adding a new paragraph (p) to read
as follows:
Sec. 229.5 Definitions.
* * * * *
(p) Electronic air brake means a computer based system which
provides the means for control of the locomotive brakes or train brakes
or both.
3. Section 229.25 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as
follows:
Sec. 229.25 Tests: Every periodic inspection.
* * * * *
(a) All mechanical gauges used by the engineer for braking the
train or locomotive, except load meters used in conjunction with an
auxiliary brake system, shall be tested by comparison with a dead-
weight tester or a test gauge designed for this purpose.
* * * * *
4. Section 229.27 is amended by redesignating paragraphs (a)(3) and
(a)(4) as paragraphs (a)(4) and (a)(5), by adding a new paragraph
(a)(3), and by revising paragraph (b) to read as follows:
Sec. 229.27 Annual tests.
* * * * *
(a) * * *
(3) The compressor or compressors shall be tested for capacity by
orifice test.
* * * * *
(b) The load meter shall be tested. Each device used by the
engineer for braking the train or locomotive that provides an
indication of air pressure electronically shall be tested by comparison
with a test gauge or self-test designed for this purpose. Errors of
greater than five percent or three pounds per square inch, whichever is
less, shall be corrected. The date and place of the test shall be
recorded on Form FRA F 6180-49A, and the person conducting the test and
that person's supervisor shall sign the form.
* * * * *
5. Section 229.53 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 229.53 Brake gauges.
All mechanical gauges and all devices providing indication of air
pressure electronically that are used by the engineer for braking the
train or locomotive shall be located so that they may be conveniently
read from the engineer's usual position during operation. A gauge or
device shall not be more than three pounds per square inch in error.
PART 231--[AMENDED]
6. The authority citation for part 231 is revised to read as
follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102-20103, 20131, 20301-20303, 21301-
21302, 21304; 49 CFR 1.49(c), (m).
7. Section 231.0 is amended by adding paragraphs (b)(3) through (5)
and paragraph (f) to read as follows:
Sec. 231.0 Applicability and penalties.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(3) A freight train of four-wheel coal cars.
(4) A freight train of eight-wheel standard logging cars if the
height of each car from the top of the rail to the center of the
coupling is not more than 25 inches.
(5) A locomotive used in hauling a train referred to in paragraph
(b)(4) of this section when the locomotive and cars of the train are
used only to transport logs.
* * * * *
(f) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section,
Sec. 231.31 also applies to an operation on a 24-inch, 36-inch, or
other narrow gage railroad.
8. Part 231 is further amended by adding Sec. 231.31 to read as
follows:
Sec. 231.31 Drawbars for freight cars; standard height.
(a) Except on cars specified in paragraph (b) of this section--
(1) On standard gage (56\1/2\-inch gage) railroads, the maximum
height of drawbars for freight cars (measured perpendicularly from the
level of the tops of the rails to the centers of the drawbars) shall be
34\1/2\ inches, and the minimum height of drawbars for freight cars on
such standard gage railroads (measured in the same manner) shall be
31\1/2\ inches.
(2) On 36-inch gage railroads, the maximum height of drawbars for
freight cars (measured from the level of the tops of rails to the
centers of the drawbars) shall be 26 inches, and the minimum height of
drawbars for freight cars on such 36-inch gage railroads (measured in
the same manner) shall be 23 inches.
(3) On 24-inch gage railroads, the maximum height of drawbars for
freight cars (measured from the level of the tops of rails to the
centers of drawbars) shall be 17\1/2\ inches, and the minimum height of
drawbars for freight cars on 24-inch gage railroads (measured in the
same manner) shall be 14\1/2\ inches.
(4) On railroads operating on track with a gage other than those
contained in paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(3), the maximum and minimum
height of drawbars for freight cars operating on
[[Page 48355]]
those railroads shall be established upon written approval of FRA.
(b) This section shall not apply to a railroad all of whose track
is less than 24 inches in gage.
9. Appendix A of Part 231 is amended by adding an entry for
Sec. 231.31 to the end of the Schedule of Civil Penalties to read as
follows:
Appendix A to Part 231--Schedule of Civil Penalties
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FRA safety
appliance defect Violation Willful
code section violation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * *
231.31......................... Drawbars, 2,500 5,000
standard height.
* * * * *
------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. Part 232 is revised to read as follows:
PART 232--BRAKE SYSTEM SAFETY STANDARDS FOR FREIGHT AND OTHER NON-
PASSENGER TRAINS AND EQUIPMENT
Subpart A--General
Sec.
232.1 Purpose and scope.
232.3 Applicability.
232.5 Definitions.
232.7 Waivers.
232.9 Responsibility for compliance.
232.11 Penalties.
232.13 Preemptive effect.
232.15 Movement defective equipment.
232.17 Special approval procedure.
Subpart B--General Requirements
232.101 Scope.
232.103 General requirements for all train brake systems.
232.105 General requirements for locomotives.
232.107 Air source requirements and cold weather operations.
232.109 Dynamic brake requirements.
232.111 Train handling information.
Subpart C--Inspection and Testing Requirements
232.201 Scope.
232.203 Training requirements.
232.205 Class I brake tests--Initial terminal inspection.
232.207 Class IA brake tests--1,000-mile inspection.
232.209 Class II brake tests--Intermediate inspection.
232.211 Class III brake tests--Trainline continuity inspection.
232.213 Extended haul trains.
232.215 Transfer train brake test.
232.217 Train brake system tests conducted using yard air.
232.219 Double heading, helper service, and distributed power.
Subpart D--Periodic Maintenance and Testing Requirements
232.301 Scope.
232.303 General requirements.
232.305 Repair track brake tests.
232.307 Single car tests.
232.309 Repair track brake test and single car test equipment and
devices.
232.311 Process for changing maintenance requirements.
Subpart E--End-of-Train Devices
232.401 Scope.
232.403 Design standards for one-way end-of-train devices.
232.405 Design and performance standards for two-way end-of-train
devices.
232.407 Operations requiring use of two-way end-of-train devices;
prohibition on purchase of nonconforming devices.
232.409 Inspection and testing of end-of-train devices.
Subpart F--Introduction of New Brake System Technology
232.501 Scope.
232.503 Process to introduce new brake system technology.
232.505 Pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan.
Appendix A--Schedule of Civil Penalties [Reserved]
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102-20103, 20133, 20141, 20301-20303,
20306, 21301-21302, 21304; 49 CFR 1.49 (c), (m).
Subpart A--General
Sec. 232.1 Purpose and scope.
This part prescribes the minimum Federal safety standards for all
freight and other non-passenger train brake systems and equipment. This
part does not restrict a railroad from adopting or enforcing additional
or more stringent requirements not inconsistent with this part.
Sec. 232.3 Applicability.
(a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section,
this part applies to all railroads that operate freight or other non-
passenger train service on standard gage track which is part of the
general railroad system of transportation.
(b) Subpart E of this part applies to all trains operating on track
which is part of the general railroad system of transportation unless
specifically excepted in that subpart.
(c) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, this part
does not apply to:
(1) A railroad that operates only on track inside an installation
that is not part of the general railroad system of transportation.
(2) Intercity or commuter passenger train operations on standard
gage track which is part of the general railroad system of
transportation;
(3) Commuter or other short-haul rail passenger train operations in
a metropolitan or suburban area (as described by 49 U.S.C. 20102(1)),
including public authorities operating passenger train service;
(4) Rapid transit operations in an urban area that are not
connected with the general railroad system of transportation;
(5) Tourist, scenic, historic, or excursion operations, whether on
or off the general railroad system;
(6) A freight train of four-wheel coal cars;
(7) A freight train of eight-wheel standard logging cars if the
height of each car from the top of the rail to the center of the
coupling is not more than 25 inches; or
(8) A locomotive used in hauling a train referred to in paragraph
(b)(6) of this section when the locomotive and cars of the train are
used only to transport logs.
(d) The provisions formerly contained in Interstate Commerce
Commission Order 13528, of May 30, 1945, as amended, now revoked, are
codified in this paragraph. This part is not applicable to the
following equipment:
(1) Scale test weight cars;
(2) Locomotive cranes, steam shovels, pile drivers, and machines of
similar construction, and maintenance machines built prior to September
21, 1945;
(3) Export, industrial, and other cars not owned by a railroad
which are not to be used in service, except for movement as shipments
on their own wheels to given destinations. Such cars shall be properly
identified by a card attached to each side of the car, signed by the
shipper, stating that such movement is being made under the authority
of this paragraph.
(4) Industrial and other than railroad-owned cars which are not to
be used in service except for movement within the limits of a single
switching district (i.e., within the limits of an industrial facility);
(5) Narrow-gage cars; and
(6) Cars used exclusively in switching operations and not used in
train movements within the meaning of the Federal safety appliance laws
(49 U.S.C. 20301-20306).
Sec. 232.5 Definitions.
For purposes of this part--
AAR means the Association of American Railroads.
Air brake means a combination of devices operated by compressed
air, arranged in a system, and controlled manually, electrically,
electronically, or pneumatically, by means of which the
[[Page 48356]]
motion of a railroad car or locomotive is retarded or arrested.
Air Flow Indicator, AFM means a specific air flow indicator
required by the air flow method of qualifying train air brakes (AFM).
The AFM Air Flow Indicator is a calibrated air flow measuring device
which is clearly visible and legible in daylight and darkness from the
engineer's normal operating position. The indicator face displays
(1) Markings from 10 cubic feet per minute (CFM) to 80 CFM, in
increments of 10 CFM or less, and
(2) Numerals indicating 20, 40, 60, and 80 CFM for continuous
monitoring of air flow.
Bind means restrict the intended movement of one or more brake
system components by reduced clearance, by obstruction, or by increased
friction.
Brake, dynamic means a train braking system whereby the kinetic
energy of a moving train is used to generate electric current at the
locomotive traction motors, which is then dissipated through resistor
grids or into the catenary or third rail system.
Brake, effective means a brake that is capable of producing its
required designed retarding force on the train. A car's air brake is
not considered effective if its piston travel exceeds:
(1) 10\1/2\ inches for cars equipped with nominal 12-inch stroke
brake cylinders; or
(2) The piston travel limits indicated on the stencil, sticker, or
badge plate for that brake cylinder.
Brake, hand means a brake that can be applied and released by hand
to prevent or retard the movement of a locomotive.
Brake indicator means a device which indicates the brake
application range and indicates whether brakes are applied and
released.
Brake, inoperative means a primary brake that, for any reason, no
longer applies or releases as intended.
Brake, parking means a brake that can be applied by means other
than by hand, such as spring, hydraulic, or air pressure when the brake
pipe air is depleted, or by an electrical motor.
Brake pipe means the system of piping (including branch pipes,
angle cocks, cutout cocks, dirt collectors, hoses, and hose couplings)
used for connecting locomotives and all railroad cars for the passage
of compressed air.
Brake, primary means those components of the train brake system
necessary to stop the train within the signal spacing distance without
thermal damage to friction braking surfaces.
Brake, secondary means those components of the train brake system
which develop supplemental brake retarding force that is not needed to
stop the train within signal spacing distances or to prevent thermal
damage to wheels.
Emergency application means an irretrievable brake application
resulting in the maximum retarding force available from the train brake
system.
End-of-train device, one-way means two pieces of equipment linked
by radio that meet the requirements of Sec. 232.403.
End-of-train device, two-way means two pieces of equipment linked
by radio that meet the requirements of Secs. 232.403 and 232.405.
Foul means any condition which restricts the intended movement of
one or more brake system components because the component is snagged,
entangled, or twisted.
Freight car means a vehicle designed to carry freight, or railroad
personnel, by rail and a car designed for use in a work or wreck train
or other non-passenger train.
Locomotive means a piece of railroad on-track equipment, other than
hi-rail, specialized maintenance, or other similar equipment, which may
consist of one or more units operated from a single control stand--
(1) With one or more propelling motors designed for moving other
railroad equipment;
(2) With one or more propelling motors designed to transport
freight or passenger traffic or both; or
(3) Without propelling motors but with one or more control stands.
Locomotive cab means that portion of the superstructure designed to
be occupied by the crew operating the locomotive.
Locomotive, controlling means the locomotive from which the
engineer exercises control over the train.
Off air means equipment that is not connected to a continuous
source of compressed air of at least 60 pounds per square inch (psi).
Ordered or date ordered means the date on which notice to proceed
is given by a procuring railroad to a contractor or supplier for new
equipment.
Piston travel means the amount of linear movement of the air brake
hollow rod (or equivalent) or piston rod when forced outward by
movement of the piston in the brake cylinder or actuator and limited by
the brake shoes being forced against the wheel or disc.
Point of origin means the location where a train is originally
assembled; it is also referred to as the initial terminal.
Pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan means a document, as
further specified in Sec. 232.505, prepared by a railroad that explains
in detail how pre-revenue service tests of certain equipment
demonstrate that the equipment meets Federal safety standards and the
railroad's own safety design requirements.
Previously tested equipment means equipment that has received a
Class I brake test pursuant to Sec. 232.205 and has not been off air
for more than four hours.
Qualified mechanical inspector means a qualified person who has
received, as a part of the training, qualification, and designation
program required under Sec. 232.203, instruction and training that
includes ``hands-on'' experience (under appropriate supervision or
apprenticeship) in one or more of the following functions:
troubleshooting, inspection, testing, maintenance or repair of the
specific train brake and other components and systems for which the
inspector is assigned responsibility. Further, the mechanical inspector
shall be a person whose primary responsibility includes work generally
consistent with the functions referenced in this definition.
Qualified person means a person determined by a railroad to have
the knowledge and skills necessary to perform one or more functions
required under this part. The railroad determines the qualifications
and competencies for employees designated to perform various functions
in the manner set forth in this part.
Railroad means any form of non-highway ground transportation that
runs on rails or electromagnetic guideways, including:
(1) Commuter or short-haul rail passenger service in a metropolitan
or suburban area and commuter railroad service that was operated by the
Consolidated Rail Corporation on January 1, 1979; and
(2) High speed ground transportation systems that connect
metropolitan areas, without regard to whether those systems use new
technologies not associated with traditional railroads. The term
``railroad'' is also intended to mean a person that provides railroad
transportation, whether directly or by contracting out operation of the
railroad to another person. The term does not include rapid transit
operations in an urban area that are not connected to the general
railroad system of transportation.
Rebuilt equipment means equipment that has undergone overhaul
identified by the railroad as a capital expense under the Surface
Transportation Board's accounting standards.
Refresher training means periodic retraining required for employees
or contractors to remain qualified to perform specific equipment
[[Page 48357]]
troubleshooting, inspection, testing, maintenance, or repair functions.
Respond as intended means to produce the result that a device or
system is designed to produce.
Service application means a brake application that results from one
or more service reductions or the equivalent.
Service reduction means a decrease in brake pipe pressure, usually
from 5 to 25 psi at a rate sufficiently rapid to move the operating
valve to service position, but at a rate not rapid enough to move the
operating valve to emergency position.
Solid block of cars means two or more freight cars continuously and
consecutively coupled together in a train which, when removed from the
train, remain intact and coupled together with the train line remaining
connected and open within the block.
State inspector means an inspector of a participating State rail
safety program under part 212 of this chapter.
Switching service means the classification of freight cars
according to commodity or destination; assembling of cars for train
movements; changing the position of cars for purposes of loading,
unloading, or weighing; placing of locomotives and cars for repair or
storage; or moving of rail equipment in connection with work service
that does not constitute a train movement.
Tourist, scenic, historic, or excursion operations are railroad
operations that carry passengers, often using antiquated equipment,
with the conveyance of the passengers to a particular destination not
being the principal purpose.
Train means one or more locomotives coupled with one or more
freight cars, except during switching service.
Train line means the brake pipe or any other non-pneumatic system
used to transmit the signal that controls the locomotive and freight
car brakes.
Transfer train means a train that travels between a point of origin
and a point of final destination not exceeding 20 miles and is not
performing switching service.
Yard air means a source of compressed air other than from a
locomotive.
Yard train means a train used only to perform switching service
within a single yard.
Sec. 232.7 Waivers.
(a) Any person subject to a requirement of this part may petition
the Administrator for a waiver of compliance with such requirement. The
filing of such a petition does not affect that person's responsibility
for compliance with that requirement while the petition is being
considered.
(b) Each petition for waiver must be filed in the manner and
contain the information required by part 211 of this chapter.
(c) If the Administrator finds that a waiver of compliance is in
the public interest and is consistent with railroad safety, the
Administrator may grant the waiver subject to any conditions the
Administrator deems necessary. Where a waiver is granted, the
Administrator publishes a notice in the Federal Register containing the
reasons for granting the waiver.
Sec. 232.9 Responsibility for compliance.
(a) A railroad subject to this part shall not use, haul, permit to
be used or hauled on its line, offer in interchange, or accept in
interchange any train, railroad car, or locomotive with one or more
conditions not in compliance with this part; however, a railroad shall
not be liable for a civil penalty for such action if such action is in
accordance with Sec. 232.15. For purposes of this part, a train,
railroad car, or locomotive will be considered in use prior to
departure but after it has received, or should have received, the
inspection required for movement and is deemed ready for service.
(b) Although many of the requirements of this part are stated in
terms of the duties of a railroad, when any person performs any
function required by this part, that person (whether or not a railroad)
is required to perform that function in accordance with this part.
(c) Any person performing any function or task required by this
part will be deemed to have consented to FRA inspection of their
operation to the extent necessary to ensure that the function or task
is being performed in accordance with the requirements of this part.
Sec. 232.11 Penalties.
(a) Any person (including but not limited to a railroad; any
manager, supervisor, official, or other employee or agent of a
railroad; any owner, manufacturer, lessor, or lessee of railroad
equipment, track, or facilities; any employee of such owner,
manufacturer, lessor, lessee, or independent contractor) who violates
any requirement of this part or causes the violation of any such
requirement is subject to a civil penalty of at least $500, but not
more than $11,000 per violation, except that: Penalties may be assessed
against individuals only for willful violations, and, where a grossly
negligent violation or a pattern of repeated violations has created an
imminent hazard of death or injury to persons, or has caused death or
injury, a penalty not to exceed $22,000 per violation may be assessed.
Each day a violation continues shall constitute a separate offense.
Appendix A contains a schedule of civil penalty amounts used in
connection with this part.
(b) Any person who knowingly and willfully falsifies a record or
report required by this part may be subject to criminal penalties under
49 U.S.C. 21311.
Sec. 232.13 Preemptive effect.
(a) Under 49 U.S.C. 20106, issuance of the regulations in this part
preempts any State law, rule, regulation, order, or standard covering
the same subject matter, except for a provision directed at an
essentially local safety hazard if that provision is consistent with
this part and does not impose an undue burden on interstate commerce.
(b) FRA does not intend by issuance of the regulations in this part
to preempt provisions of State criminal law that impose sanctions for
reckless conduct that leads to actual loss of life, injury, or damage
to property, whether such provisions apply specifically to railroad
employees or generally to the public at large.
Sec. 232.15 Movement of defective equipment.
(a) General provision. Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this
section, a railroad car or locomotive with one or more conditions not
in compliance with this part may be used or hauled without civil
penalty liability under this part only if all of the following
conditions are met:
(1) The defective car or locomotive is properly equipped in
accordance with the applicable provisions of 49 U.S.C. chapter 203 and
the requirements of this part.
(2) The car or locomotive becomes defective while it is being used
by the railroad on its line or becomes defective on the line of a
connecting railroad and is properly accepted in interchange for repairs
in accordance with paragraph (a)(7) of this section.
(3) The railroad first discovers the defective condition of the car
or locomotive prior to moving it for repairs.
(4) The movement of the defective car or locomotive for repairs is
from the location where the car or locomotive is first discovered
defective by the railroad.
(5) The defective car or locomotive could not be repaired at the
place where the railroad first discovers it to be defective.
[[Page 48358]]
(6) The movement of the car or locomotive is necessary to make
repairs to the defective condition.
(7) The repair location to which the car or locomotive is being
taken is the nearest available repair location on the line of the
railroad where the car or locomotive was first found to be defective or
is the nearest available repair location on the line of a connecting
railroad if:
(i) The connecting railroad elects to accept the defective car or
locomotive for such repair; and
(ii) The nearest available repair location on the line of the
connecting railroad is no farther than the nearest available repair
location on the line of the railroad where the car or locomotive was
found defective.
(8) The movement of the defective car or locomotive for repairs is
not by a train required to receive a Class I brake test at that
location pursuant to Sec. 232.205.
(9) The movement of the defective car or locomotive for repairs is
not in a train in which more than 15 percent of the cars have
inoperative brakes.
(10) The defective car or locomotive is tagged, or information is
recorded, as prescribed in paragraph (b) of this section.
(11) Except for cars or locomotives with brakes cut out en route,
the following additional requirements are met:
(i) A qualified inspector shall determine--
(A) That it is safe to move the car or locomotive; and
(B) The maximum safe speed and other restrictions necessary for
safely conducting the movement.
(ii) The person in charge of the train in which the car or
locomotive is to be moved shall be notified in writing and inform all
other crew members of the presence of the defective car or locomotive
and the maximum speed and other restrictions determined under paragraph
(a)(11)(i)(B) of this section. A copy of the tag or card described in
paragraph (b) of this section may be used to provide the notification
required by this paragraph.
(12) The defective car or locomotive is not subject to a Special
Notice for Repair under part 216 of this chapter, unless the movement
of the defective car is made in accordance with the restrictions
contained in the Special Notice.
(b) Tagging of defective equipment. (1) At the place where the
railroad first discovers the defect, a tag or card shall be placed on
both sides of the defective equipment or locomotive and in the cab of
the locomotive, or an automated tracking system approved for use by FRA
shall be provided with the following information about the defective
equipment:
(i) The reporting mark and car or locomotive number;
(ii) The name of the inspecting railroad;
(iii) The name and job title of the inspector;
(iv) The inspection location and date;
(v) The nature of each defect;
(vi) A description of any movement restrictions;
(vii) The destination of the equipment where it will be repaired;
and
(viii) The signature, if possible, of the person reporting the
defective condition.
(2) The tag or card required by paragraph (b)(1) of this section
shall remain affixed to the defective equipment until the necessary
repairs have been performed.
(3) A record or copy of each tag or card attached to or removed
from a car or locomotive shall be retained for 90 days and, upon
request, shall be made available within 15 calendar days for inspection
by FRA or State inspectors.
(4) Each tag or card removed from a car or locomotive shall contain
the date, location, reason for its removal, and the signature of the
person who removed it from the piece of equipment.
(c) Movement for unloading or purging of defective cars. If the
defective freight car is loaded with a hazardous material or contains
residue of a hazardous material, the car may not be placed for
unloading or purging unless unloading or purging is consistent with
determinations made and restrictions imposed under paragraph (a)(11)(i)
of this section and the unloading or purging is necessary for the safe
repair of the car.
(d) Computation of percent operative power brakes. (1) The
percentage of operative power brakes in a train shall be based on the
number of control valves in the train. The percentage shall be
determined by dividing the number of control valves that are cut-in by
the total number of control valves in the train.
(2) The following brake conditions not in compliance with this part
are not considered inoperative power brakes for purposes of this
section:
(i) Failure or cutting out of secondary brake systems;
(ii) Inoperative or otherwise defective handbrakes or parking
brakes;
(iii) Piston travel that is in excess of the Class I brake test
limits required in Sec. 232.205 but that does not exceed the outside
limits contained on the stencil, sticker, or badge plate required by
Sec. 232.103(g) for considering the power brakes to be effective; and
(iv) Power brakes overdue for inspection, testing, maintenance, or
stenciling under this part.
(e) Placement of equipment with inoperative brakes. (1) A freight
car or locomotive with inoperative brakes shall not be placed as the
rear car of the train.
(2) No more than two freight cars with inoperative brakes shall be
consecutively placed in a train.
(3) Multi-unit articulated equipment shall not be placed in a train
if the equipment has consecutive individual control valves cut-out or
inoperative.
Sec. 232.17 Special approval procedure.
(a) General. The following procedures govern consideration and
action upon requests for special approval of safety-critical revisions
to the maintenance standards contained in subpart D of this part and
for special approval of pre-revenue service acceptance testing plans
under subpart F of this part.
(b) Petitions for special approval of safety-critical revision.
Each petition for special approval of a safety-critical revision to the
periodic maintenance standards contained in subpart D shall contain--
(1) The name, title, address, and telephone number of the primary
person to be contacted with regard to review of the petition;
(2) The alternative proposed, in detail, to be substituted for the
particular requirements of this part;
(3) Appropriate data or analysis, or both, for FRA to consider in
determining whether the alternative will provide an equivalent level of
safety; and
(4) A statement affirming that the railroad has served a copy of
the petition on designated representatives of its employees, together
with a list of the names and addresses of the persons served.
(c) Petitions for special approval of pre-revenue service
acceptance testing plan. Each petition for special approval of a pre-
revenue service acceptance testing plan shall contain--
(1) The name, title, address, and telephone number of the primary
person to be contacted with regard to review of the petition; and
(2) The elements prescribed in Sec. 232.505.
(d) Service. (1) Each petition for special approval under paragraph
(b) or (c) of this section shall be submitted in triplicate to the
Associate Administrator for Safety, Federal Railroad Administration,
400 7th Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590.
[[Page 48359]]
(2) (i) Service of each petition for special approval of a safety-
critical revision to the maintenance standards under paragraph (b) of
this section shall be made on the following:
(A) Designated employee representatives responsible for the
equipment's operation, inspection, testing, and maintenance under this
part;
(B) Any organizations or bodies that either issued the standard
incorporated in the section(s) of the rule to which the special
approval pertains or issued the alternative standard that is proposed
in the petition; and
(C) Any other person who has filed with FRA a current statement of
interest in reviewing special approvals under the particular
requirement of this part at least 30 days but not more than 5 years
prior to the filing of the petition.
(ii) If filed, a statement of interest shall be filed with FRA's
Associate Administrator for Safety and shall reference the specific
section(s) of this part in which the person has an interest.
(e) Federal Register notice. FRA will publish a notice in the
Federal Register concerning each petition under paragraph (b) of this
section.
(f) Comment. Not later than 30 days from the date of publication of
the notice in the Federal Register concerning a petition under
paragraph (b) of this section, any person may comment on the petition.
(1) A comment shall set forth specifically the basis upon which it
is made, and contain a concise statement of the interest of the
commenter in the proceeding.
(2) The comment shall be submitted in triplicate to the Associate
Administrator for Safety, Federal Railroad Administration, 400 7th
Street, S.W., Washington, D. C. 20590.
(3) The commenter shall certify that a copy of the comment was
served on each petitioner.
(g) Disposition of petitions. (1) If FRA finds that the petition
complies with the requirements of this section and that the proposed
safety-critical revision or pre-revenue service plan is acceptable and
justified, the petition will be granted, normally within 90 days of its
receipt. If the petition is neither granted nor denied within 90 days,
the petition remains pending for decision. FRA may attach special
conditions to the approval of any petition. Following the approval of a
petition, FRA may reopen consideration of the petition for cause.
(2) If FRA finds that the petition does not comply with the
requirements of this section and that the proposed safety-critical
revision or pre-revenue service plan is not acceptable or justified,
the petition will be denied, normally within 90 days of its receipt.
(3) When FRA grants or denies a petition, or reopens consideration
of the petition, written notice is sent to the petitioner and other
interested parties.
Subpart B--General Requirements
Sec. 232.101 Scope.
This subpart contains general operating, performance, and design
requirements for each railroad that operates freight or other non-
passenger trains and for specific equipment used in those operations.
Sec. 232.103 General requirements for all train brake systems.
(a) A train's primary brake system shall be capable of stopping the
train with a service application from its maximum operating speed
within the signal spacing existing on the track over which the train is
operating.
(b) If the integrity of the pneumatic communication line of a train
brake system is broken, the train shall be stopped. If a train brake
communication line uses other than solely pneumatic technology, the
integrity of the train line shall be monitored by the brake control
system.
(c) A train brake system shall respond as intended to signals from
the train line.
(d) A train shall have 100-percent effective and operative brakes
prior to departure from its point of origin (initial terminal).
(e) From points other than those described in paragraph (d) of this
section, a train shall not move if more than 15 percent of the cars in
that train have inoperative or ineffective brakes.
(f) Each car in a train shall have its air brakes in effective
operating condition unless the car is being moved for repairs in
accordance with Sec. 232.15. A car's air brakes are not in effective
operating condition if its brakes are cut-out or otherwise inoperative
or if the piston travel exceeds:
(1) 10\1/2\ inches for cars equipped with nominal 12-inch stroke
brake cylinders; or
(2) The piston travel limits indicated on the stencil, sticker, or
badge plate for that brake cylinder.
(g) Except for cars equipped with nominal 12-inch stroke (8\1/2\
and 10-inch diameters) brake cylinders, all cars shall have a legible
stencil or sticker affixed to the car or shall be equipped with a badge
plate displaying the permissible brake cylinder piston travel range for
the car at Class I brake tests and the length at which the piston
travel renders the brake ineffective. The stencil, sticker, or badge
plate shall be located so that it may be easily read and understood by
a person positioned safely beside the car.
(h) All equipment ordered on or after January 1, 1999, or placed in
service for the first time on or after January 1, 2001, shall have
train brake systems designed so that an inspector can observe from a
safe position the piston travel, an accurate indicator which shows
piston travel, or any other means by which the brake system is
actuated. The design shall not require the inspector to place himself/
herself on, under, or between components of the equipment to observe
brake actuation or release.
(i) All trains shall be equipped with an emergency application
feature that produces an irretrievable stop, using a brake rate
consistent with prevailing adhesion, train safety, and brake system
thermal capacity. An emergency application shall be available at all
times, and shall be initiated by an unintentional parting of the train
or loss of train brake communication.
(j) The air brake system components that control brake application
and release shall be adequately sealed to prevent contamination by
foreign material.
(k) A railroad shall set the maximum main reservoir working
pressure.
(l) The maximum brake pipe pressure shall not be greater than 15
psi less than the air compressor governor starting or loading pressure.
(m) Except as otherwise provided in this part, all equipment used
in freight or other non-passenger trains shall, at a minimum, meet the
performance specification for freight brakes in Association of American
Railroads standard S-469-47 contained in the AAR ``Manual of Standards
and Recommended Practices'' (revised 1947).
(n) If a train qualified by the Air Flow Method as provided for in
subpart C of this part experiences a brake pipe air flow of greater
than 60 CFM or brake pipe gradient of greater than 15 psi while en
route and the movable pointer does not return to those limits within a
reasonable time, the train shall be stopped at the next available
location and be inspected for leaks in the brake system.
(o) Securement of standing equipment. A train's air brake shall not
be depended upon to hold equipment standing on a grade (including a
locomotive, a car, or a train whether or not locomotive is attached).
Trains and other railroad equipment shall be secured in accordance with
the following requirements:
[[Page 48360]]
(1) Consistent with the railroad's rules and procedures, place each
locomotive, car, or train on a track that is protected by a permanent
derail or apply a portable derail, if available.
(2) Freight and other non-powered rail cars. (i) A sufficient
number of hand brakes shall be applied to hold such equipment before
the air brakes are released. Railroads shall develop and implement a
process or procedure, such as a matrix, that would provide specific
guidance in determining the appropriate number of hand brakes to apply,
considering grade, tonnage, and other local conditions prevalent at the
time of securement;
(ii) Where appropriate, slack shall be removed from the train, or
as commonly referred to in the industry, ``bunch the slack''; and
(iii) Locomotives shall be detached from the cars to allow an
emergency brake application.
(3) Locomotives. (i) All hand brakes shall be fully applied on all
unattended locomotives in the consist;
(ii) If the grade on which the locomotives are left standing
exceeds one percent, or whenever it is otherwise required by railroad
rules, the front and back of at least one pair of wheels in the
locomotive consist shall be chocked or chained; and
(iii) Railroads shall adopt and comply with a process or procedures
to verify that the available hand brakes will sufficiently hold the
locomotive consist. Railroads shall also develop and implement
instructions to address throttle position, status of the reverse lever,
position of the generator field switch, status of the independent
brakes, position of the isolation switch, and position of the automatic
brake valve on all locomotives. The procedures in this paragraph shall
take into account winter weather conditions as they relate to throttle
position and reverser handle.
(4) Any hand brakes applied to hold the equipment shall not be
released until it is known that the air brake system is properly
charged.
(p) Air pressure regulating devices shall be adjusted for the
following pressures:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PSI
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LOCOMOTIVES
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Minimum brake pipe air pressure:
Road Service........................................ 9060
Switch Service...................................... ..............
(2) Minimum differential between brake pipe and main
reservoir air pressures, with brake valve in running
position............................................... 15
(3) Safety valve for straight air brake................. 30-55
(4) Safety valve for LT, ET, No. 8-EL, No. 14 El, No. 6-
DS, No. 6-BL and No. 6-SL equipment.................... 30-68
(5) Safety valve for HSC and No. 24-RL equipment........ 30-75
(6) Reducing valve for independent or straight air brake 30-50
(7) Self-lapping portion for electro-pneumatic brake
(minimum full application pressure).................... 50
(8) Self-lapping portion for independent air brake (full
application pressure).................................. 30-72
(9) Reducing valve for air signal....................... 40-60
(10) Reducing valve for high-speed brake (minimum)...... 50
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CARS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(11) Reducing valve for high-speed brake................ 58-62
(12) Safety valve for PS, LN, UC, AML, AMU and AB-1-B
air brakes............................................. 58-62
(13) Safety valve for HSC air brake..................... 58-77
(14) Governor valve for water raising system............ 60
(15) Reducing valve for water raising system............ 20-30
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 232.105 General requirements for locomotives.
(a) The air brake equipment on locomotives shall be in safe and
suitable condition for service.
(b) Except for locomotives ordered before January 1, 1999, or
placed in service for the first time before January 1, 2001, all
locomotives shall be equipped with a hand or parking brake that shall
be:
(1) Capable of application or activation by hand;
(2) Capable of release by hand; and
(3) Capable of holding the loaded unit on the maximum grade
anticipated by the operating railroad.
(c) On locomotives so equipped, the hand or parking brake as well
as its parts and connections shall be inspected, and necessary repairs
made as often as service requires but no less frequently than every 368
days. The locomotive shall be suitably stenciled or tagged with the
date of the last inspection.
(d) The equalizing reservoir on locomotives and related piping
leakage shall be zero. If such leakage occurs en route, the train may
be moved only to the nearest forward location where the equalizing
reservoir leakage can be corrected.
(e) Use of the feed or regulating valve to control braking is
prohibited.
(f) The passenger position on the locomotive brake control stand
shall only be used if the trailing equipment is designed for graduated
brake release or if equalizing reservoir leakage occurs en route and
its use is necessary to safely control the movement of the train until
the next forward location where the reservoir leakage can be corrected.
Sec. 232.107 Air source requirements and cold weather operations.
(a) Monitoring plans for yard air sources. (1) Each railroad shall
adopt, comply with, and make available to FRA upon request a plan to
monitor all yard air sources, other than locomotives, to ensure that
they operate as intended and do not introduce contaminants into the
brake system of freight equipment.
(2) This plan shall require the railroad to:
(i) Routinely inspect each yard air source to ensure it operates as
intended and does not introduce contaminants into the brake system of
the equipment it services.
(ii) Identify yard air sources found not to be operating as
intended or found to have the potential of introducing contaminants
into the brake system of the equipment it services.
(iii) Repair or take other remedial action regarding any yard air
source identified under paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of this section.
(iv) Assess the effectiveness of the remedial action described in
paragraph (a)(2)(iii) of this section.
[[Page 48361]]
(v) Record detailed information about the actions required by
paragraphs (a)(2)(i) through (a)(2)(iv) of this section.
(3) The records required by paragraph (a)(2) shall be maintained
for a period of at least one year from the date of creation.
(b) Condensation and other contaminants shall be blown from the
pipe or hose from which compressed air is taken prior to connecting the
yard air line or motive power to the train.
(c) No chemicals shall be placed in the train air brake system.
(d) Yard air reservoirs shall either be equipped with an operable
automatic drain system or shall be manually drained at least once each
day that the devices are used or more often if moisture is detected in
the system.
(e) A railroad shall adopt, comply with, and make available to FRA
upon request detailed written operating procedures tailored to the
equipment and territory of that railroad to cover safe train operations
during cold weather situations. For purposes of this provision cold
weather means when the ambient temperature drops below 10 degrees
Fahrenheit (F)(minus 12.2 degrees Celsius).
Sec. 232.109 Dynamic brake requirements.
(a) A locomotive engineer shall be informed in writing of the
operational status of the dynamic brakes on all locomotive units in the
consist at the initial terminal or point of origin for a train and at
other locations where a locomotive engineer first takes charge of a
train.
(b) Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, all
inoperative or ineffective dynamic brakes shall be repaired within 30
calendar days of becoming inoperative or at the locomotive's next
periodic inspection pursuant to Sec. 229.23 of this chapter, whichever
occurs first.
(c) Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, a
locomotive discovered with inoperative dynamic brakes shall have a tag
bearing the words ``inoperative dynamic brake'' securely attached and
displayed in a conspicuous location in the cab of the locomotive. This
tag shall contain the following information:
(1) The locomotive number;
(2) The name of the discovering carrier;
(3) The location and date where condition was discovered; and
(4) The signature of the person discovering the condition.
(d) A railroad may elect to declare the dynamic brakes on a
locomotive deactivated without removing the dynamic brake components
from the locomotive, only if all of the following conditions are met:
(1) The locomotive is clearly stenciled with the words ``dynamic
brake deactivated'' in a conspicuous location on the outside of the
locomotive and in the cab of the locomotive;
(2) The railroad has taken appropriate action to ensure that the
deactivated locomotive is incapable of utilizing dynamic brake effort
to retard or control train speed; however, if the subject locomotive is
placed in the controlling (lead) position of the consist, that
locomotive must be capable of controlling dynamic braking effort in
trailing locomotives in the consist that are so equipped.
(e) Each railroad operating a train with a brake system that
includes dynamic brakes shall adopt, comply with, and make available to
FRA upon request written operating rules governing safe train handling
procedures using these dynamic brakes under all operating conditions,
which shall be tailored to the specific equipment and territory of the
railroad. The railroad's operating rules shall be based on the premise
that the friction brakes are sufficient by themselves, without the aid
of dynamic brakes, to stop the train safely under all operating
conditions.
(f) Each railroad operating a train with a brake system that
includes dynamic brakes shall adopt, comply with, and incorporate into
its locomotive engineer certification program pursuant to part 240 of
this chapter, specific knowledge, skill, and ability criteria to ensure
that its locomotive engineers are fully trained in the operating rules
prescribed by paragraph (e) of this section.
Sec. 232.111 Train information handling.
(a) Each railroad shall adopt, comply with, and make available to
FRA upon request written procedures to ensure that a train crew
employed by the railroad is given accurate information on the condition
of the train brake system and train factors affecting brake system
performance and testing when the crew takes over responsibility for the
train.
(b) The procedures shall provide that each train crew coming on
duty be informed of:
(1) The total weight and length of the train;
(2) Any special weight distribution that would require special
train handling procedures;
(3) The number and location of cars with cut-out or otherwise
ineffective brakes and the location where they will be repaired;
(4) If a Class I or Class IA brake test is required prior to the
next crew change point, the location at which that test shall be
performed;
(5) A record of train configuration changes since the last Class I
brake test; and
(6) Any train brake system problems encountered by the previous
crew of the train.
Subpart C--Inspection and Testing Requirements
Sec. 232.201 Scope.
This subpart contains the inspection and testing requirements for
brake systems used in freight and other non-passenger trains. This
subpart also contains general training requirements for railroad and
contract personnel used to perform the required inspections and tests.
Sec. 232.203 Training requirements.
(a) Each railroad shall adopt, comply with, and make available to
FRA upon request a training, qualification, and designation program for
employees and contractors that perform brake system inspections, tests,
or maintenance. For purposes of this section, a ``contractor'' is
defined as a person under contract with the railroad or car owner or an
employee of a person under contract with the railroad or car owner.
(b) As part of this program, the railroad shall:
(1) Identify the tasks related to the inspection, testing, and
maintenance of the brake system required by this part that must be
performed on each type of equipment that the railroad operates;
(2) Develop written procedures for the performance of the tasks
identified;
(3) Identify the skills and knowledge necessary to perform each
task;
(4) Develop or incorporate a training curriculum that includes both
classroom and ``hands-on'' lessons designed to impart the skills and
knowledge identified as necessary to perform each task. The developed
or incorporated training curriculum shall specifically address the
Federal regulatory requirements contained in this part that are related
to the performance of the tasks identified;
(5) Require all employees and contractors to successfully complete
the training course that covers the equipment and tasks for which they
are responsible as well as the specific Federal regulatory requirements
contained in this part related to equipment and tasks for which they
are responsible;
(6) Require all employees and contractors to pass a written or oral
[[Page 48362]]
examination covering the equipment and tasks for which they are
responsible as well as the specific Federal regulatory requirements
contained in this part related to equipment and tasks for which they
are responsible;
(7) Require all employees and contractors to individually
demonstrate ``hands-on'' capability by successfully performing all of
the tasks required to be performed as part of their duties on the type
equipment to which they are assigned to the satisfaction of their
supervisor or designated instructor;
(8) Require supervisors to exercise oversight to ensure that all
the identified tasks are performed in accordance with the railroad's
written procedures;
(9) Require periodic refresher training at an interval not to
exceed three years that includes classroom and ``hands-on'' training,
as well as testing; and (10) Add new equipment to the training,
qualification and designation program prior to its introduction to
revenue service.
(c) Each railroad that operates trains required to be equipped with
a two-way end-of-train telemetry device pursuant to subpart E of this
part, shall adopt, comply with, and make available to FRA upon request
a training program which specifically addresses the testing, operation,
and maintenance of two-way end-of-train devices for employees and
contractors that are responsible for the testing, operation, and
maintenance of the devices.
(d) A railroad shall maintain adequate records to demonstrate the
current qualification status of all of its personnel--including
contract personnel--assigned to inspect, test, or maintain a train
brake system. These records shall include the following information
concerning each such employee of the railroad or of a contractor for
the railroad:
(1) The name of the railroad employee or contractor employee;
(2) The dates that each training course was completed;
(3) The content of each training course successfully completed;
(4) The scores on each test taken to demonstrate proficiency;
(5) A description of the employees ``hands-on'' performance of the
tasks for which the employee is assigned and the basis for finding that
the tasks were successfully completed.
(6) A record that the railroad employee or contractor employee was
notified of his or her current qualification status and of any
subsequent changes to that status;
(7) The type of equipment the person is qualified to inspect, test,
or maintain;
(8) A statement signed by the railroad's chief mechanical officer,
chief operating officer, or their designee, that the person meets the
minimum qualification standards as set forth in this subpart; and
(9) The date that the person's status as qualified expires due to
the need for refresher training.
(e) Each railroad shall adopt, comply with, and make available to
FRA upon request an internal audit process to periodically review and
evaluate the effectiveness of the training, qualification, and
designation program required by this section.
(f) Railroad or contract supervisors shall be held jointly
responsible with inspectors and train crew members for the condition
and proper functioning of train brake systems.
Sec. 232.205 Class I brake test--Initial terminal inspection.
(a) Each train and each car in the train shall receive a Class I
brake test as described in paragraph (b) of this section by a qualified
person, as defined in Sec. 232.5, at the following points:
(1) The location where the train is originally assembled ``initial
terminal'' or ``point of origin';
(2) A location where the train consist is changed other than by:
(i) Adding a single car or a solid block of cars;
(ii) Removing a single car or a solid block of cars; or (iii) A
combination of the changes listed in paragraphs (a)(2)(i) and
(a)(2)(ii) (See Secs. 232.209 and 232.211 for requirements related to
the pick-up of cars en route.)
(3) A location where the train is off air for a period of more than
four hours;
(4) A point where a train has traveled 3,000 miles since its last
Class I brake test; and (5) A location where the train is received in
interchange if the train consist is changed other than by:
(i) Removing a car or a solid block of cars from the train;
(ii) Adding a previously tested car or a previously tested solid
block of cars to the train;
(iii) Changing motive power;
(iv) Removing or changing the caboose; or
(v) Any combination of the changes listed in paragraph (a)(5).
(A) If changes other than those contained in paragraph (a)(5) are
made to the train consist when it is received in interchange and the
train will move 20 miles or less, then the railroad may conduct a brake
test pursuant to Sec. 232.209 on those cars added to the train.
(B) [Reserved]
(b) A Class I brake test shall consist of the following tasks and
requirements:
(1) Brake pipe leakage shall not exceed 5 psi per minute or air
flow shall not exceed 60 cubic feet per minute (CFM).
(i) Leakage Test. The brake pipe leakage test shall be conducted as
follows:
(A) Charge the air brake system to within 15 psi of the setting of
the feed or regulating valve on the locomotive, but to not less than 75
psi, as indicated by an accurate gauge or end-of-train device at the
rear end of train;
(B) Upon receiving the signal to apply brakes for test, make a 20-
psi brake pipe service reduction;
(C) If the locomotive used to perform the brake test is equipped
with a means for maintaining brake pipe pressure at a constant level
during a 20-psi brake pipe service reduction, this feature shall be cut
out during the brake test; and
(D) With the brake valve lapped and the pressure maintaining
feature cut out (if so equipped) and after waiting 45-60 seconds, note
the brake pipe leakage as indicated by the brake-pipe gauge in the
locomotive, which shall not exceed 5 psi per minute.
(ii) Air Flow Method Test. When locomotives are equipped with a 26-
L brake valve or equivalent, a railroad may use the Air Flow Method
Test as an alternate to the brake pipe leakage test. The Air Flow
Method (AFM) Test shall be performed as follows:
(A) Charge the air brake system to within 15 psi of the setting of
the feed or regulating valve, but to not less than 75 psi, as indicated
by an accurate gauge or end-of-train device at rear end of train; and
(B) Measure air flow as indicated by a calibrated AFM indicator,
which shall not exceed 60 cubic feet per minute (CFM).
(iii) The AFM indicator shall be calibrated for accuracy at
periodic intervals not to exceed 92 days. The AFM indicator calibration
test orifices shall be calibrated at temperatures of not less than 20
degrees Fahrenheit. AFM indicators shall be accurate to within
3 standard cubic feet per minute (cfm).
(2) The inspector shall position himself/herself, taking positions
on each side of each car sometime during the inspection process, so as
to be able to examine and observe the functioning of all moving parts
of the brake system on each car in order to make the determinations and
inspections required by this section. A ``roll-by'' inspection of the
brake release as provided for in paragraph (b)(8) of this section shall
not constitute an inspection of that side of the train for purposes of
this requirement.
[[Page 48363]]
(3) The train brake system shall be charged to within 15 psi of the
setting of the feed-regulating valve, but to not less than 75 psi,
angle cocks and cutout cocks shall be properly positioned, air hoses
shall be properly coupled and shall not kink, bind, or foul or be in
any other condition that restricts air flow. An examination must be
made for leaks and necessary repairs made to reduce leakage to a
minimum. Retaining valves and retaining valve pipes shall be inspected
and known to be in condition for service.
(4) The brakes on each car shall apply in response to a 20-psi
brake pipe service reduction and shall remain applied until a release
of the air brakes has been initiated by the controlling locomotive or
yard test device. The brakes shall not be applied or released until the
proper signal is given. Freight cars found with brakes that fail to
remain applied due to a readily identifiable condition or problem may
be retested and remain in the train if the retest is conducted from the
controlling locomotive or head end of the consist and the brakes remain
applied for a period of at least five minutes.
(5) Piston travel shall be within 7 to 9 inches for 8\1/2\-inch and
10-inch diameter brake cylinders or within the piston travel stenciled
or marked on car or badge plate for other types. If piston travel is
found to be less than 7 inches or more than 9 inches, it must be
adjusted to nominally 7\1/2\ inches. Minimum brake cylinder piston
travel of truck-mounted brake cylinders must be sufficient to provide
proper brake shoe clearance when the brakes are released. Piston travel
must be inspected on each freight car while the brakes are applied.
(6) Brake rigging shall be properly secured and shall not bind or
foul or otherwise adversely affect the operation of the brake system.
(7) All parts of the brake equipment shall be properly secured. On
freight cars where the bottom rod passes through the truck bolster or
is secured with cotter keys equipped with a locking device to prevent
their accidental removal, bottom rod safety supports are not required.
(8) When the release is initiated by the controlling locomotive or
yard test device, the brakes on each freight car shall be inspected to
verify that it did release; this may be performed by a ``roll-by''
inspection. If a ``roll-by'' inspection of the brake release is
performed, train speed shall not exceed 10 MPH and the qualified person
performing the ``roll-by'' inspection shall communicate the results of
the inspection to the operator of the train. The operator of the train
will note successful completion of the release portion of the
inspection on the written notification required in paragraph (c) of
this section.
(c) Where a railroad's collective bargaining agreement provides
that only a carman is to perform the inspections and tests required by
this section, a carman alone will be considered a qualified person. In
these circumstances, the railroad shall ensure that the carman is
properly trained and designated as a qualified person or qualified
mechanical inspector pursuant to the requirements of this part.
(d) A qualified person participating in the test and inspection
required by this section shall notify the locomotive engineer in
writing or place such notification in the cab of the controlling
locomotive that the Class I brake test has been satisfactorily
performed. The written or electronic notification shall be retained in
the cab of the controlling locomotive until the train until reaches its
destination and shall contain the date, time, number of freight cars
inspected, and location where the Class I brake test was performed.
(e) Before adjusting piston travel or working on brake rigging,
cutout cock in brake pipe branch must be closed and air reservoirs must
be voided of all air. When cutout cocks are provided in brake cylinder
pipes, these cutout cocks only may be closed and air reservoirs need
not be voided of all air.
(f) Except as provided in Sec. 232.209, each car or solid block of
cars, as defined in Sec. 232.5, that has not received a Class I brake
test or that has been off air for more than four hours and that is
added to a train shall receive a Class I test when added to a train. A
Class III brake test as described in Sec. 232.211 shall then be
performed on the entire new train.
Sec. 232.207 Class IA brake tests--1,000-mile inspection.
(a) Except as provided in Sec. 232.213, each train shall receive a
Class IA brake test performed by a qualified person, as defined in
Sec. 232.5, at a location that is not more than 1,000 miles from the
point where any freight car in the train last received a Class I or
Class IA brake test. The most restrictive car or block of cars in the
train shall determine the location of this test.
(b) A Class IA brake test shall consist of the following tasks and
requirements:
(1) Brake pipe leakage shall not exceed 5 psi per minute or air
flow shall not exceed 60 cubic feet per minute (CFM). The brake pipe
leakage test or air flow method test shall be conducted pursuant to the
requirements contained in Sec. 232.205(b)(1);
(2) The inspector shall position himself/herself, taking positions
on each side of each car sometime during the inspection process, so as
to be able to examine and observe the functioning of all moving parts
of the brake system on each car in order to make the determinations and
inspections required by this section;
(3) The air brake system shall be charged to within 15 psi of the
setting of the feed or regulating valve, but to not less than 75 psi,
as indicated by an accurate gauge or end-of-train device at rear end of
train.
(4) The brakes on each car shall apply in response to a 20-psi
brake pipe service reduction and shall remain applied until the release
is initiated by the controlling locomotive. Cars found with brakes that
fail to remain applied due to a readily identifiable condition or
problem may be retested and remain in the train if the retest is
conducted from the controlling locomotive or head end of the consist
and the brakes remain applied for a period of at least five minutes;
otherwise, the defective equipment may only be moved pursuant to the
provisions contained in Sec. 232.15, if applicable;
(5) Brake rigging shall be properly secured and shall not bind or
foul or otherwise adversely affect the operation of the brake system;
and
(6) All parts of the brake equipment shall be properly secured.
(c) Each railroad shall designate the locations where Class IA
brake tests will be performed and the carrier shall furnish to the
Federal Railroad Administration upon request a description of each
location designed, and shall notify in writing FRA's Associate
Administrator for Safety 30 days prior to any change in the locations
designated for such tests and inspections.
(1) Failure to perform a Class IA brake test at a location
designated pursuant to this paragraph will constitute a failure to
perform a proper Class IA brake test.
(2) In the event of an emergency that alters normal train
operations such as a derailment or other unusual circumstance that
reflects on the safe operation of the train, the railroad would not be
required to provide prior written notification of a change in the
location where a Class IA brake test is performed, provided; that the
railroad notifies FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety and the
pertinent FRA Regional Administrator within 24 hours after the
designation has been changed and the reason for that change.
[[Page 48364]]
Sec. 232.209 Class II brake tests--Intermediate inspection.
(a) At a location other than the point of origin (initial terminal)
of a train, each car or solid block of cars, as defined in Sec. 232.5,
that has not received a Class I brake test or that has been off air for
more than four hours and that is added to a train shall receive a Class
II brake test when added to the train.
(b) A Class II brake test shall consist of the following tasks and
requirements:
(1) Brake pipe leakage shall not exceed 5 psi per minute or air
flow shall not exceed 60 cubic feet per minute (CFM). The brake pipe
leakage test or air flow method test shall be conducted pursuant to the
requirements contained in Sec. 232.205(b)(1);
(2) The air brake system shall be charged to within 15 psi of the
setting of the feed or regulating valve, but to not less than 75 psi,
as indicated by an accurate gauge or end-of-train device at rear end of
train.
(3) The brakes on each car added to the train and on the rear car
of the train shall apply in response to a 20-psi brake pipe service
reduction and shall remain applied until the release is initiated from
the controlling locomotive. Cars found with brakes that fail to remain
applied due to a readily identifiable condition or problem may be
retested and remain in the train if the retest is conducted from the
controlling locomotive or head end of the consist and the brakes remain
applied for a period of at least five minutes; otherwise, the defective
equipment may only be moved pursuant to the provisions contained in
Sec. 232.15, if applicable;
(4) When the release is initiated, the brakes on each car added to
the train and on the rear car of the train shall be inspected to verify
that it did release; this may be performed by a ``roll-by'' inspection.
If a ``roll-by'' inspection of the brake release is performed, train
speed shall not exceed 10 MPH and the qualified person performing the
``roll-by'' inspection shall communicate the results of the inspection
to the operator of the train.
(5) Before the train proceeds the operator of the train shall know
that the brake pipe pressure at the rear of the train is being
restored.
(c) As an alternative to the rear car brake application and release
portion of the test, the operator of the train shall determine that
brake pipe pressure of the train is being reduced as indicated by a
rear car gauge or end-of-train telemetry device and then that brake
pipe pressure of the train is being restored as indicated by a rear car
gauge or end-of-train telemetry device. (When an end-of-train telemetry
device is used to comply with any test requirement in this part, the
phrase ``brake pipe pressure of the train is being reduced'' means a
pressure reduction of at least 5 psi, and the phrase ``brake pipe
pressure of the train is being restored'' means a pressure increase of
at least 5 psi). If an electronic communication link between a
controlling locomotive and a remotely controlled locomotive attached to
the rear end of a train is utilized to determine that brake pipe
pressure is being restored, the operator of the train shall know that
the air brakes function as intended on the remotely controlled
locomotive.
(d) Each car or solid block of cars, as defined in Sec. 232.5, that
has not received a Class I brake test or that has been off air for more
than four hours that receives a Class II brake test when added to the
train shall receive a Class I brake test at the next forward location
where facilities are available for performing such a test. A Class III
brake test as described in Sec. 232.211 shall then be performed on the
entire train.
Sec. 232.211 Class III brake tests--Trainline continuity inspection.
(a) A Class III brake test shall be performed on a train to test
the train brake system when a train has changed configuration. A Class
III brake test shall be performed when any of the following occur:
(1) Where a locomotive or a caboose is changed;
(2) Where a car or a block of cars is removed from the train with
the consist otherwise remaining intact;
(3) At a point other than the point of origin (initial terminal)
for a train, where a car or a solid block of cars that has received a
Class I brake test and that has not been off air for more than four
hours is added to a train; or
(4) Whenever the continuity of the brake pipe is broken or
interrupted.
(b) A Class III brake test shall consist of the following tasks and
requirements:
(1) The train brake system shall be charged to within 15 psi of the
feed-valve setting on the locomotive, but not less than 75 psi, as
indicated at the rear of the train by an accurate gauge or end-of-train
device;
(2) The brakes on the rear car of the train shall apply in response
to a 20-psi brake pipe service reduction and shall remain applied until
the release is initiated by the controlling locomotive;
(3) When the release is initiated, the brakes on the rear car of
the train shall be inspected to verify that it did release;
(4) Before proceeding the operator of the train shall know that the
brake pipe pressure at the rear of freight train is being restored.
(c) As an alternative to the rear car brake application and release
portion of the test, it shall be determined that brake pipe pressure of
the train is being reduced as indicated by a rear car gauge or end-of-
train telemetry device and then that brake pipe pressure of the train
is being restored as indicated by a rear car gauge or end-of-train
telemetry device. If an electronic or radio communication link between
a controlling locomotive and a remotely controlled locomotive attached
to the rear end of a train is utilized to determine that brake pipe
pressure is being restored, the operator of the train shall know that
the air brakes function as intended on the remotely controlled
locomotive.
Sec. 232.213 Extended haul trains.
(a) A railroad may be permitted to move a train up to, but not
exceeding, 1,500 miles between brake tests and inspections if the
railroad designates a train as a priority train. In order for a
railroad to designate a train as an extended haul train, all of the
following requirements must be met:
(1) The railroad must designate the train in writing to FRA's
Associate Administrator for Safety. This designation must include the
following:
(i) The train identification symbol;
(ii) The origination and destination points for the train;
(iii) The type or types of equipment the train will haul; and
(iv) The locations where all train brake and mechanical inspections
and tests will be performed.
(2) A Class I brake test pursuant to Sec. 232.205 shall be
performed at the train's point of origin by a qualified mechanical
inspector as defined in Sec. 232.5.
(3) A freight car inspection pursuant to part 215 of this chapter
shall be performed at the train's point of origin and shall be
performed by an inspector designated under Sec. 215.11 of this chapter.
(4) All cars containing non-complying conditions under part 215 of
this chapter at the train's point of origin shall either be repaired or
removed from the train. Except for cars developing conditions en route,
no car shall be moved pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 215.9 of this
chapter in the train.
(5) The train shall have no pick-ups or set-outs en route, except
for the set-out of defective equipment pursuant to the requirements of
this chapter.
(6) At the point of destination, if less than 1,500 miles, or at
the point designated by the railroad pursuant to
[[Page 48365]]
paragraph (a)(1)(iv) of this section, not to exceed 1,500 miles, an
inbound inspection of the train shall be conducted by a qualified
mechanical inspector to identify any defective, inoperative, or
ineffective brakes or any other condition not in compliance with this
part as well as any conditions not in compliance with part 215 and part
231 of this chapter.
(7) The railroad shall maintain a record of all defective,
inoperative, or ineffective brakes as well as any conditions not in
compliance with part 215 and part 231 of this chapter discovered at
anytime during the movement of the train. These records shall be
retained for a period of one year and made available to FRA upon
request.
(8) In order for an extended haul train to proceed beyond 1,500
miles, the following requirements shall be met:
(i) If the train will move 1,000 miles or less from that location
before receiving a Class IA brake test or reaching destination, a Class
I brake test shall be conducted pursuant to Sec. 232.205 to ensure 100
percent effective and operative brakes. The inbound inspection required
by paragraph (a)(6) of this section may be used to meet this
requirement provided it encompasses all the inspection elements
contained in Sec. 232.205.
(ii) If the train will move greater than 1,000 miles from that
location without another brake inspection, the train must be identified
as an extended haul train for that movement and shall meet all the
requirements contained in paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(7) of this
section. Such trains shall receive a Class I brake test pursuant to
Sec. 232.205 by a qualified mechanical inspector to ensure 100 percent
effective and operative brakes, a freight car inspection pursuant to
part 215 of this chapter by an inspector designated under Sec. 215.11
of this chapter, and all cars containing non-complying conditions under
part 215 of this chapter shall either be repaired or removed from the
train. The inbound inspection required by paragraph (a)(6) of this
section may be used to meet these inspection requirements provided it
encompasses all the inspection elements contained in paragraphs (a)(2)
through (a)(4) of this section.
(9) FRA inspectors shall have physical access to visually observe
all brake and freight car inspections and tests required by this
section.
(b) Failure to comply with any of the requirements contained in
paragraph (a) of this section will be considered an improper movement
of a designated priority train for which appropriate civil penalties
may be assessed as outlined in Appendix A to this part. Furthermore,
FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety may revoke a railroad's
ability to designate any or all trains as extended haul trains for
repeated or willful noncompliance with any of the requirements
contained in this section. Such a determination will be made in writing
and will state the basis for such action.
Sec. 232.215 Transfer train brake tests.
(a) A transfer train, as defined in Sec. 232.5, shall receive a
test that includes the following:
(1) The air brake hoses shall be coupled between all freight cars.
(2) After the brake system is charged to not less than 60 psi as
indicated by an accurate gauge or end-of-train device at the rear of
the train, a 15-psi service brake pipe reduction shall be made.
(3) An inspection shall be made to determine that the brakes on
each car apply and remain applied until the release is initiated by the
controlling locomotive. Cars found with brakes that fail to remain
applied due to a readily identifiable condition or problem may be
retested and remain in the train if the retest is conducted from the
controlling locomotive or head end of the consist and the brakes remain
applied for a period of at least five minutes; otherwise, the defective
equipment may only be moved pursuant to the provisions contained in
Sec. 232.15, if applicable;
(b) If a train's movement will exceed 20 miles or is not a transfer
train as defined in Sec. 232.5, the train shall receive a Class I brake
test in accordance with Sec. 232.205 prior to departure.
Sec. 232.217 Train brake system tests conducted using yard air.
(a) When a train air brake system is tested from a yard air, an
engineer's brake valve or a suitable test device shall be used to
provide any increase or reduction of brake pipe air pressure at the
same, or slower, rate as an engineer's brake valve, and the yard air
must be connected to the end of the train or cut of cars that will be
nearest to the controlling locomotive.
(b) When a yard air is used, the train air brake system must be
charged and tested as prescribed by Sec. 232.205(b) and when
practicable should be kept charged until road motive power is coupled
to train, after which, a Class III brake test shall be performed as
prescribed by Sec. 232.211.
(1) If the cars are off air for more than four hours, these cars
shall be retested in accordance with Sec. 232.205 (b) through (e).
(2) Yard air pressure shall be 80 psi.
(c) Mechanical yard air test devices and gauges shall be calibrated
every 92 days. Electronic yard test devices and gauges shall be
calibrated annually. Gauges or other devices providing air-pressure
control shall be accurate to within 3 psi.
(d) If used to test a train, a yard air test device and any yard
air test equipment shall be accurate and function as intended.
Sec. 232.219 Double heading, helper service, and distributed power.
(a) When more than one locomotive is attached to a train, the
engineer of the controlling locomotive shall operate the brakes. On all
other motive power units in the train the brake pipe cutout cock to the
brake valve must be closed, the maximum main reservoir pressure
maintained and brake valve handles kept in the prescribed position. In
case it becomes necessary for the controlling locomotive to give up
control of the train short of the destination of the train, a Class III
brake test pursuant to Sec. 232.211 shall be made to ensure that the
brakes are operative from the automatic brake valve of the locomotive
taking control of the train.
(b) The electro-pneumatic brake valve on all motive power units
other than that which is handling the train shall be cut out, the
handle of brake valve kept in the prescribed position, and the air
compressors kept running if practicable.
(c) When one or more helper locomotives are placed in a train, a
visual inspection shall be made of each helper locomotive brake system
to determine that the brake system operates as intended in response to
a 20-psi reduction initiated from the controlling locomotive of the
train. A helper locomotive with inoperative or ineffective brakes shall
be repaired prior to use or removed from the train.
Subpart D--Periodic Maintenance and Testing Requirements
Sec. 232.301 Scope.
This subpart contains the periodic brake system maintenance and
testing requirements for equipment used in freight and other non-
passenger trains.
Sec. 232.303 General requirements.
(a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) through (d) of this
section, Sec. 232.305, and Sec. 232.307, each car shall be maintained,
repaired, and tested in accordance with Association of American
Railroads Rule 3 ``Testing of Air Brakes'' and accompanying Chart A,
contained in the AAR ``Field Manual on Interchange Rules'' (January 1,
1998).
(b) All cars on a shop or repair track shall be tested to determine
that the air
[[Page 48366]]
brakes apply and remain apply applied until a release is initiated.
(c) All cars on a shop or repair track shall have piston travel
inspected to ensure it is within 7 to 9 inches for 8-\1/2\-inch and 10-
inch diameter brake cylinders or within the piston travel stenciled or
marked on car or badge plate for other types. If piston travel is found
to be less than 7 inches or more than 9 inches it must be adjusted to
nominally 7\1/2\ inches. Piston travel for cars equipped with other
than 8-\1/2\-inch and 10-inch diameter brake cylinders shall be
adjusted as indicated on the badge plate, stencil, or sticker on the
car.
(d) Before a car is released from a shop or repair track, a
qualified person shall know:
(1) The brake pipe is securely clamped;
(2) Angle cocks are properly located with suitable clearance and
properly positioned to allow maximum air flow; and (3) Valves,
reservoirs, and cylinders are tight on supports and the supports are
securely attached to the car.
(e) If the repair track brake test or single car test required in
Secs. 232.305 and 232.307 cannot be conducted at the point where
repairs can be made to the car, the car may be moved after the repairs
are effectuated to the next forward location where the test can be
performed. Inability to perform a repair track brake test or single car
test does not constitute an inability to effectuate the necessary
repairs.
(1) If it is necessary to move a car from the location where the
repairs are performed in order to perform a repair track brake test or
a single car test required by this part, a tag or card shall be placed
on both sides of the equipment, or an automated tracking system
approved for use by FRA, with the following information about the
equipment:
(i) The reporting mark and car number;
(ii) The name of the inspecting railroad;
(iii) The location where repairs were performed and date;
(iv) Indication whether the car requires a repair track brake test
or single car test;
(v) The location where the appropriate test is to be performed; and
(vi) The name, signature, if possible, and job title of the qualified
person approving the move.
(2) The tag or card required by paragraph (e)(1) of this section
shall remain affixed to the equipment until the necessary test has been
performed.
(3) A record or copy of each tag or card attached to or removed
from a car or locomotive shall be retained for 90 days and, upon
request, shall be made available within 15 calendar days for inspection
by FRA or State inspectors.
(4) Each tag or card removed from a car or locomotive shall contain
the date, location, and the signature of the person who removed it from
the piece of equipment.
(f) The location and date of the last repair track brake test or
single car test required by Secs. 232.305 and 232.307 shall be clearly
stenciled, marked, or labeled in two-inch high letters or numerals on
the side of the equipment. Alternatively, the railroad may use an
electronic record keeping system approved for use by FRA's Associate
Administrator for Safety in writing.
Sec. 232.305 Repair track brake tests.
(a) Repair track brake tests shall be performed by a qualified
person in accordance with the Association of American Railroads
standard S-486, Section 3.0, contained in the AAR ``Manual of Standards
and Recommended Practices, Section E, Part II'' (November 1992).
(b) Except as provided in Sec. 232.303 (e), a railroad shall
perform a repair track brake test on a car when:
(1) A car is removed from a train due to an air brake related
defect;
(2) A car has its brakes cut-out when removed from a train or when
placed on a shop or repair track;
(3) A car is on a repair or shop track for any reason and has not
received a repair track brake test within the previous 12 month period;
(4) A car is found with missing or incomplete repair track brake
test information;
(5) One or more of the following conventional air brake equipment
items is removed, repaired, or replaced:
(i) Brake reservoir;
(ii) Control valve mounting gasket; or
(iii) Pipe bracket stud.
(6) A car is found with one or more of the following wheel defects:
(i) Built-up tread;
(ii) Slid flat wheel; or
(iii) Thermal cracks.
(c) Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section each car
shall receive a repair track brake test no less than every 5 years.
(d) Each car shall receive a repair track brake test no less than 8
years from the date the car was built or rebuilt.
Sec. 232.307 Single car tests.
(a) Single car tests shall be performed by a qualified person in
accordance with the Association of American Railroads standard S-486,
Section 4.0, contained in the AAR ``Manual of Standards and Recommended
Practices, Section E, Part II'' (November 1992).
(b) Except as provided in Sec. 232.303(e), a railroad shall perform
a single car test on a car when one or more of the following
conventional air brake equipment items is removed, repaired or
replaced:
(1) Service portion;
(2) Emergency portion; or
(3) Pipe bracket.
(c) A single car test pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section
shall be performed on a new or rebuilt car prior to placing or using
the car in revenue service.
Sec. 232.309 Repair track brake test and single car test equipment and
devices.
(a) All test equipment and devices used to perform repair track
brake tests or single car tests shall be tested for correct operation
at least once each calendar day of use.
(b) Mechanical test devices such as pressure gauges, flow meters,
orifices, etc. shall be calibrated once every 92 days.
(c) Electronic test devices shall be calibrated at least once every
365 days.
(d) All test equipment and devices shall be tagged or labeled with
the date its next calibration is due.
(e) The single car test device must be tested not less frequently
than every 92 days.
(f) The single car test device must be disassembled and cleaned not
less frequently than every 365 days.
Sec. 232.311 Process for changing maintenance requirements.
(a) The Association of American Railroads standards incorporated by
reference in subpart D of this part may only be changed if the
provisions contained in this section are followed.
(b) The AAR shall submit a petition for proposed revision of the
standards and any supporting documentation to FRA's Associate
Administrator for Safety.
(c) The petition for proposed revision submitted by AAR shall
contain a recommendation as to whether the proposed revision should be
considered ``safety-critical'' or nonsafety-critical.
(1) For purposes of this section, safety-critical revisions include
but are not limited to the following:
(i) Changes to Chart A contained in Rule 3 of AAR ``Field Manual on
Interchange Rules'' (January 1, 1998);
(ii) Changes that extend the intervals for performing specified
maintenance or repair; and
(iii) Changes that reduce the quality or quantity of maintenance
provided.
[[Page 48367]]
(2) For purposes of this section, nonsafety-critical revisions
include but are not limited to the following:
(i) Clarifying amendments;
(ii) Changes that shorten the intervals at which maintenance or
repairs are performed; and
(iii) Procedural changes that do not reduce the quality or quantity
of the maintenance provided.
(d) Within 30 days after the submission of a petition for proposed
revision, FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety will issue a
determination in writing as to whether the proposed change is ``safety
critical'' or ``non-safety critical.''
(1) If FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety determines that the
proposed change is ``safety critical,'' the petition for proposed
revision will be treated as a ``petition for special approval''
pursuant to Sec. 232.17.
(2) If FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety determines that the
proposed change is ``nonsafety-critical,'' the petition for proposed
revision may be incorporated by AAR immediately.
Subpart E--End-of-Train Devices
Sec. 232.401 Scope.
This subpart contains the requirements related to the performance,
operation, and testing of end-of-train devices. Unless expressly
excepted in this subpart, the requirements of this subpart apply to all
trains operating on track which is part of the general railroad system
of transportation.
Sec. 232.403 Design standards for one-way end-of-train devices.
(a) A one-way end-of-train device shall be comprised of a rear-of-
train unit (rear unit) located on the last car of a train and a front-
of-train unit (front unit) located in the cab of the locomotive
controlling the train.
(b) Rear unit. The rear unit shall be capable of determining the
rear car brake pipe pressure and transmitting that information to the
front unit for display to the locomotive engineer. The rear unit shall
be--
(1) Capable of measuring the rear car brake pipe pressure with an
accuracy of 3 psig and brake pipe pressure variations of
1 psig;
(2) Equipped with a ``bleeder valve'' that permits the release of
any air under pressure from the rear of train unit or the associated
air hoses prior to detaching the rear unit from the brake pipe;
(3) Designed so that an internal failure will not cause an
undesired emergency brake application;
(4) Equipped with either an air gauge or a means of visually
displaying the rear unit's brake pipe pressure measurement; and
(5) Equipped with a pressure relief safety valve to prevent
explosion from a high pressure air leak inside the rear unit.
(c) Reporting rate. Multiple data transmissions from the rear unit
shall occur immediately after a variation in the rear car brake pipe
pressure of 2 psig and at intervals of not greater than 70
seconds when the rear car brake pipe pressure variation over the 70-
second interval is less than 2 psig.
(d) Operating environment. The rear unit shall be designed to meet
the performance requirements of paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section
under the following environmental conditions:
(1) At temperatures from -40 deg.C to 60 deg.C;
(2) At a relative humidity of 95% noncondensing at 50 deg.C;
(3) At altitudes of zero to 12,000 feet mean sea level;
(4) During vertical and lateral vibrations of 1 to 15 Hz., with 0.5
g. peak to peak, and 15 to 500 Hz., with 5 g. peak to peak;
(5) During the longitudinal vibrations of 1 to 15 Hz., with 3 g.
peak to peak, and 15 to 500 Hz., with 5 g. peak to peak; and (6) During
a shock of 10 g. peak for 0.1 second in any axis.
(e) Unique code. Each rear unit shall have a unique and permanent
identification code that is transmitted along with the pressure message
to the front-of-train unit. A code obtained from the Association of
American Railroads, 50 F Street, NW., Washington, DC 20036 shall be
deemed to be a unique code for purposes of this section. A unique code
also may be obtained from the Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance
(RRS-10), Federal Railroad Administration, Washington, DC 20590.
(f) Front unit. (1) The front unit shall be designed to receive
data messages from the rear unit and shall be capable of displaying the
rear car brake pipe pressure in not more than one-pound increments.
(2) The display shall be clearly visible and legible in daylight
and darkness from the engineer's normal operating position.
(3) The front device shall have a means for entry of the unique
identification code of the rear unit being used. The front unit shall
be designed so that it will display a message only from the rear unit
with the same code as entered into the front unit.
(4) The front unit shall be designed to meet the requirements of
paragraphs (d) (2), (3), (4), and (5) of this section. It shall also be
designed to meet the performance requirements in this paragraph--
(i) At temperatures from 0 deg.C to 60 deg.C;
(ii) During a vertical or lateral shock of 2 g. peak for 0.1
second; and
(iii) During a longitudinal shock of 5 g. peak for 0.1 second.
(g) Radio equipment. (1) The radio transmitter in the rear unit and
the radio receiver in the front unit shall comply with the applicable
regulatory requirements of the FCC and use of a transmission format
acceptable to the FCC.
(2) If power is supplied by one or more batteries, the operating
life shall be a minimum of 36 hours at 0 deg.C.
Sec. 232.405 Design and performance standards for two-way-end-of-train
devices.
Two-way end-of-train devices shall be designed and perform with the
features applicable to one-way end-of-train devices described in
Sec. 232.403, except those included in Sec. 232.403(b)(3). In addition,
a two-way end-of-train device shall be designed and perform with the
following features:
(a) An emergency brake application command from the front unit of
the device shall activate the emergency air valve at the rear of the
train within one second.
(b) The rear unit of the device shall send an acknowledgment
message to the front unit immediately upon receipt of an emergency
brake application command. The front unit shall listen for this
acknowledgment and repeat the brake application command if the
acknowledgment is not correctly received.
(c) The rear unit, on receipt of a properly coded command, shall
open a valve in the brake line and hold it open for a minimum of 15
seconds. This opening of the valve shall cause the brake line to vent
to the exterior.
(d) The valve opening shall have a minimum diameter of \3/4\ inch
and the internal diameter of the hose shall be \5/8\ inch to effect an
emergency brake application.
(e) The front unit shall have a manually operated switch which,
when activated, shall initiate an emergency brake transmission command
to the rear unit. The switch shall be labeled ``Emergency'' and shall
be protected so that there will exist no possibility of accidental
activation.
(f) The availability of the front-to-rear communications link shall
be checked automatically at least every 10 minutes.
(g) Means shall be provided to confirm the availability and proper
functioning of the emergency valve.
(h) Means shall be provided to arm the front and rear units to
ensure the
[[Page 48368]]
rear unit responds to an emergency command only from a properly
associated front unit.
Sec. 232.407 Operations requiring use of two-way end-of-train devices;
prohibition on purchase of nonconforming devices.
(a) The following definitions are intended solely for the purpose
of identifying those operations subject to the requirements for the use
of two-way end-of-train devices.
(1) Heavy grade means:
(i) For a train operating with 4,000 trailing tons or less, a
section of track with an average grade of two percent or greater over a
distance of two continuous miles; and
(ii) For a train operating with greater than 4,000 trailing tons, a
section of track with an average grade of one percent or greater over a
distance of three continuous miles.
(2) Train means one or more locomotives coupled with one or more
rail cars, except during switching operations or where the operation is
that of classifying cars within a railroad yard for the purpose of
making or breaking up trains.
(3) Local train means a train assigned to perform switching en
route which operates with 4,000 trailing tons or less and travels
between a point of origin and a point of final destination, for a
distance that is no greater than that which can normally be operated by
a single crew in a single tour of duty.
(4) Work train means a non-revenue service train of 4,000 trailing
tons or less used for the administration and upkeep service of the
railroad.
(5) Trailing tons means the sum of the gross weights--expressed in
tons--of the cars and the locomotives in a train that are not providing
propelling power to the train.
(b) All trains not specifically excepted in paragraph (e) of this
section shall be equipped with and shall use either a two-way end-of-
train device meeting the design and performance requirements contained
in Sec. 232.405 or a device using an alternative technology to perform
the same function.
(c) Each newly manufactured end-of-train device purchased by a
railroad after January 2, 1998 shall be a two-way end-of-train device
meeting the design and performance requirements contained in
Sec. 232.405 or a device using an alternative technology to perform the
same function.
(d) Each two-way end-of-train device purchased by any person prior
to July 1, 1997 shall be deemed to meet the design and performance
requirements contained in Sec. 232.405.
(e) Exceptions. The following types of trains are excepted from the
requirement for the use of a two-way end-of-train device:
(1) Trains with a locomotive located at the rear of the train that
is capable of making an emergency brake application, through a command
effected by telemetry or by a crew member in radio contact with the
lead (controlling) locomotive;
(2) Trains operating in the push mode with the ability to
effectuate an emergency brake application from the rear of the train;
(3) Trains with an operational caboose placed at the rear of the
train, carrying one or more crew members, that is equipped with an
emergency brake valve;
(4) Trains operating with a secondary, fully independent braking
system capable of safely stopping the train in the event of failure of
the primary system;
(5) Trains that do not operate over heavy grades and do not exceed
30 mph;
(6) Local trains as defined in paragraph (a)(3) of this section
that do not operate over heavy grades;
(7) Work trains as defined in paragraph (a)(4) of this section that
do not operate over heavy grades;
(8) Trains that operate exclusively on track that is not part of
the general railroad system;
(9) Passenger trains in which all of the cars in the train are
equipped with an emergency brake valve readily accessible to a crew
member;
(10) Passenger trains that have a car at the rear of the train,
readily accessible to one or more crew members in radio contact with
the engineer, that is equipped with an emergency brake valve readily
accessible to such a crew member; and
(11) Passenger trains that have twenty-four (24) or fewer cars (not
including locomotives) in the consist and that are equipped and
operated in accordance with the following train-configuration and
operating requirements:
(i) If the total number of cars in a passenger train consist is
twelve (12) or fewer, a car located no less than halfway through the
consist (counting from the first car in the train) must be equipped
with an emergency brake valve readily accessible to a crew member;
(ii) If the total number of cars in a passenger train consist is
thirteen (13) to twenty-four (24), a car located no less than two-
thirds (\2/3\) of the way through the consist (counting from the first
car in the train) must be equipped with an emergency brake valve
readily accessible to a crew member;
(iii) Prior to descending a section of track with an average grade
of two percent or greater over a distance of two continuous miles, the
engineer of the train shall communicate with the conductor, to ensure
that a member of the crew with a working two-way radio is stationed in
the car with the rearmost readily accessible emergency brake valve on
the train when the train begins its descent; and
(iv) While the train is descending a section of track with an
average grade of two percent or greater over a distance of two
continuous miles, a member of the train crew shall occupy the car that
contains the rearmost readily accessible emergency brake valve on the
train and be in constant radio communication with the locomotive
engineer. The crew member shall remain in this car until the train has
completely traversed the heavy grade.
(f) If a train is required to use a two-way end-of-train device:
(1) That device shall be armed and operable from the time a train
departs from the point where the device is installed until the train
reaches its destination.
(2) The rear unit batteries shall be sufficiently charged at the
initial terminal or other point where the device is installed and
throughout the train's trip to ensure that the end-of train-device will
remain operative until the train reaches its destination.
(3) The device shall be activated to effectuate an emergency brake
application either by using the manual toggle switch or through
automatic activation, whenever it becomes necessary for the locomotive
engineer to place the train air brakes in emergency using either the
automatic brake valve or the conductor's emergency brake valve or
whenever an undesired emergency application of the train air brakes
occurs.
(g) En route failure of device on a freight or other non-passenger
train. Except on passenger trains required to be equipped with a two-
way end-of-train device (which are provided for in paragraph (h) of
this section), en route failures of a two-way end-of-train device shall
be handled in accordance with this paragraph. If a two-way end-of-train
device or equivalent device fails en route (i.e., is unable to initiate
an emergency brake application from the rear of the train due to
certain losses of communication (front to rear) or due to other
reasons), the speed of the train on which it is installed shall be
limited to 30 mph until the ability of the device to initiate an
emergency brake application from the rear of the train is restored.
This limitation shall apply to a train using any device that uses an
alternative technology to serve the purpose of a
[[Page 48369]]
two-way end-of-train device. With regard to two-way end-of-train
devices, a loss of communication between the front and rear units will
be considered an en route failure only if the loss of communication is
for a period greater than 16 minutes and 30 seconds.
(1) If a two-way end-of-train device fails en route, the train on
which it is installed, in addition to observing the 30-mph speed
limitation, shall not operate over a section of track with an average
grade of two percent or greater over a distance of two continuous
miles, unless one of the following alternative measures is provided:
(i) Use of an occupied helper locomotive at the end of the train.
This alternative may be used only if the following requirements are
met:
(A) The helper locomotive engineer will initiate and maintain two-
way voice radio communication with the engineer on the head end of the
train; this contact shall be verified just prior to passing the crest
the grade.
(B) If there is a loss of communication prior to passing the crest
of the grade, the helper locomotive engineer and the head-end engineer
shall act immediately to stop the train until voice communication is
resumed, if this can be done safely.
(C) If there is a loss of communication once the descent has begun,
the helper locomotive engineer and the head-end engineer shall act to
stop the train if the train has reached a predetermined rate of speed
that indicates the need for emergency braking.
(D) The brake pipe of the helper locomotive shall be connected and
cut into the train line and tested to ensure operation.
(ii) Use of an occupied caboose at the end of the train with a
tested, functioning brake valve capable of initiating an emergency
brake application from the caboose. This alternative may be used only
if the train service employee in the caboose and the engineer on the
head end of the train establish and maintain two-way voice radio
communication and respond appropriately to the loss of such
communication in the same manner as prescribed for helper locomotives
in paragraph (g)(1)(i).
(iii) Use of a radio-controlled locomotive at the rear of the train
under continuous control of the engineer in the head end by means of
telemetry, but only if such radio-controlled locomotive is capable of
initiating an emergency application on command from the lead
(controlling) locomotive.
(2) [Reserved]
(h) En route failure of device on a passenger train. (1) A
passenger train required to be equipped with a two-way end-of-train
device that develops an en route failure of the device (as explained in
paragraph (g) of this section) shall not operate over a section of
track with an average grade of two percent or greater over a distance
of two continuous miles until an operable two-way end-of-train device
is installed on the train or an alternative method of initiating an
emergency brake application from the rear of the train is achieved.
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (h)(1) of this section, a
passenger train required to be equipped with a two-way end-of-train
device that develops an en route failure of the device (as explained in
paragraph (g) of this section) shall be operated in accordance with the
following:
(i) A member of the train crew shall be immediately positioned in
the car which contains the rearmost readily accessible emergency brake
valve on the train and shall be equipped with an operable two-way radio
that communicates with the locomotive engineer; and
(ii) The locomotive engineer shall periodically make running tests
of the train's air brakes until the failure is corrected; and
(3) Each en route failure shall be corrected at the next location
where the necessary repairs can be conducted or at the next location
where a required brake test is to be performed, whichever is reached
first.
Sec. 232.409 Inspection and testing of end-of-train devices.
(a) After each installation of either the front or rear unit of an
end-of-train device, or both, on a train and before the train departs,
the railroad shall determine that the identification code entered into
the front unit is identical to the unique identification code on the
rear-of-train unit.
(b) After each installation of either the front or rear unit of an
end-of-train device, or both, the functional capability of the device
shall be determined, after charging the train, by comparing the
quantitative value displayed on the front unit with the quantitative
value displayed on the rear unit or on a properly calibrated air gauge.
The end-of-train device shall not be used if the difference between the
two readings exceeds three pounds per square inch.
(c) A two-way end-of-train device shall be tested at the initial
terminal or other point of installation to ensure that the device is
capable of initiating an emergency power brake application from the
rear of the train. If this test is conducted by a person other than a
member of the train crew, the locomotive engineer shall be notified in
writing that a successful test was performed. The written notification
shall include the date and time of the test, the location where the
test was performed, and the name of person conducting the test.
(d) The telemetry equipment shall be tested for accuracy and
calibrated if necessary according to the manufacturer's specifications
and procedures at least every 365 days. This shall include testing
radio frequencies and modulation of the device. The date and location
of the last calibration or test as well as the name of the person
performing the calibration or test shall be legibly displayed on a
weather-resistant sticker or other marking device affixed to the
outside of both the front unit and the rear unit. If the front unit is
an integral part of the locomotive, then the information may be
recorded on Form FRA F6180-49A.
Subpart F--Introduction of New Brake System Technology
Sec. 232.501 Scope.
(a) This subpart contains general requirements for introducing new
brake system technologies. This subpart is intended to facilitate the
introduction of new complete brake system technologies or major up-
grades to existing systems which the current regulations do not
adequately address (i.e., electronic brake systems). This subpart is
not intended for use in the introduction of a new brake component or
material.
Sec. 232.503 Process to introduce new brake system technology.
(a) Pursuant to the procedures contained in Sec. 232.17, each
railroad shall obtain special approval from the FRA Associate
Administrator for Safety of a pre-revenue service acceptance testing
plan, developed pursuant to Sec. 232.505, for the new brake system
technology, prior to implementing the plan.
(b) Each railroad shall complete a pre-revenue service
demonstration of the new brake system technology in accordance with the
approved plan, shall fulfill all of the other requirements prescribed
in Sec. 232.505, and shall obtain special approval from the FRA
Associate Administrator for Safety under the procedures of Sec. 232.17
prior to using such brake system technology in revenue service.
Sec. 232.505 Pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (f) of this section, before
using a new brake system technology for the first time on
[[Page 48370]]
its system the operating railroad or railroads shall submit a pre-
revenue service acceptance testing plan containing the information
required by paragraph (e) of this section and obtain the approval of
the FRA Associate Administrator for Safety, under the procedures
specified in Sec. 232.17.
(b) After receiving FRA approval of the pre-revenue service testing
plan and before introducing the new brake system technology into
revenue service, the operating railroad or railroads shall:
(1) Adopt and comply with such FRA-approved plan, including fully
executing the tests required by the plan;
(2) Report to the FRA Associate Administrator for Safety the
results of the pre-revenue service acceptance tests;
(3) Correct any safety deficiencies identified by FRA in the design
of the equipment or in the inspection, testing, and maintenance
procedures or, if safety deficiencies cannot be corrected by design
changes, agree to comply with any operational limitations that may be
imposed by the Associate Administrator for Safety on the revenue
service operation of the equipment; and
(4) Obtain FRA approval to place the new brake system technology in
revenue service.
(c) The operating railroad shall comply with any such operational
limitations imposed by the Associate Administrator for Safety.
(d) The plan shall be made available to FRA for inspection and
copying upon request.
(e) The plan shall include all of the following elements:
(1) An identification of any waivers of FRA or other Federal safety
regulations required for the tests or for revenue service operation of
the equipment.
(2) A clear statement of the test objectives. One of the principal
test objectives shall be to demonstrate that the equipment meets the
safety design and performance requirements specified in this part when
operated in the environment in which it is to be used.
(3) A planned schedule for conducting the tests.
(4) A description of the railroad property or facilities to be used
to conduct the tests.
(5) A detailed description of how the tests are to be conducted.
This description shall include:
(i) An identification of the equipment to be tested;
(ii) The method by which the equipment is to be tested;
(iii) The criteria to be used to evaluate the equipment's
performance; and
(iv) The means by which the test results are to be reported to FRA.
(6) A description of any special instrumentation to be used during
the tests.
(7) A description of the information or data to be obtained.
(8) A description of how the information or data obtained is to be
analyzed or used.
(9) A clear description of any criteria to be used as safety limits
during the testing.
(10) A description of the criteria to be used to measure or
determine the success or failure of the tests. If acceptance is to be
based on extrapolation of less than full level testing results, the
analysis to be done to justify the validity of the extrapolation shall
be described.
(11) A description of any special safety precautions to be observed
during the testing.
(12) A written set of standard operating procedures to be used to
ensure that the testing is done safely.
(13) Quality control procedures to ensure that the inspection,
testing, and maintenance procedures are followed.
(14) Criteria to be used for the revenue service operation of the
equipment.
(15) A description of any testing of the equipment that has
previously been performed.
(f) For brake system technologies that have previously been used in
revenue service in the United States, the railroad shall test the
equipment on its system, prior to placing it in revenue service, to
ensure the compatibility of the equipment with the operating system
(track, signals, etc.) of the railroad. A description of such testing
shall be retained by the railroad and made available to FRA for
inspection and copying upon request.
Appendix A--Schedule of Civil Penalties [Reserved]
Issued in Washington, D.C., on August 27, 1998.
Jolene M. Molitoris,
Federal Railroad Administrator.
[FR Doc. 98-23645 Filed 9-8-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-62-P