[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 174 (Wednesday, September 9, 1998)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 48294-48370]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-23645]



[[Page 48293]]

_______________________________________________________________________

Part II





Department of Transportation





_______________________________________________________________________



Federal Railroad Administration



_______________________________________________________________________



49 CFR Parts 229, 231, and 232



Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Brake System Safety Standards for 
Freight and Other Non-Passenger Trains and Equipment

  Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 174 / Wednesday, September 9, 1998 / 
Proposed Rules  

[[Page 48294]]



DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Parts 229, 231, and 232

[FRA Docket No. PB-9; Notice No. 13]
RIN 2130--AB16


Brake System Safety Standards for Freight and Other Non-Passenger 
Trains and Equipment

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: FRA proposes revisions to the regulations governing the power 
braking systems and equipment used in freight and other non-passenger 
railroad train operations. The proposed revisions are designed to 
achieve safety by better adapting the regulations to the needs of 
contemporary railroad operations and facilitating the use of advanced 
technologies. These proposed revisions are being issued in order to 
comply with Federal legislation, to respond to petitions for 
rulemaking, and to address areas of concern derived from experience in 
the application of existing standards governing these operations.

DATES: (1) Written Comments: Written comments must be received by 
January 15, 1999. Comments received after that date will be considered 
to the extent possible without incurring additional expenses or delay.
    (2) Public Hearings: FRA is planning to conduct at least two public 
hearings with the first public hearing being held in Washington D.C. 
and one technical conference with interested parties in order to 
provide all interested parties the opportunity to comment on the 
proposed revisions contained in the NPRM. FRA will issue a separate 
document in the Federal Register in the very near future to inform all 
interested parties as to the exact dates and locations where the public 
hearings and technical conference will be held.

ADDRESSES: (1) Written Comments: Address comments to the Docket Clerk, 
Office of Chief Counsel, RCC-10, Federal Railroad Administration, 400 
Seventh Street, S.W., Stop 10, Washington, D.C. 20590. Comments should 
identify the docket and notice number, and five copies should be 
submitted. Persons wishing to receive confirmation of receipt of their 
comments should include a self-addressed, stamped postcard. The Docket 
Clerk will indicate on the postcard the date on which the comments were 
received and will return the card to the addressee. The dockets are 
housed in the Seventh Floor of 1120 Vermont Avenue, N.W., Washington 
D.C. Public dockets may be reviewed between the hours of 8:30 a.m. and 
5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except holidays.
    (2) Public Hearings: FRA is planning to conduct at least two public 
hearings with the first public hearing being held in Washington D.C. 
and one technical conference with interested parties in order to 
provide all interested parties the opportunity to comment on the 
proposed revisions contained in the NPRM. FRA will issue a separate 
document in the Federal Register in the very near future to inform all 
interested parties as to the exact dates and locations where the public 
hearings and technical conference will be held.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Leon Smith, Deputy Regional 
Administrator--Region 3, FRA Office of Safety, RRS-14, 400 Seventh 
Street, S.W., Stop 25, Washington, D.C. 20950 (telephone 404-562-3800), 
or Thomas Herrmann, Trial Attorney, Office of the Chief Counsel, RCC-
10, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Stop 10, Washington, D.C. 20950 
(telephone 202-493-6053).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    In 1992, Congress amended the Federal rail safety laws by adding 
certain statutory mandates related to power brake safety. See 49 U.S.C. 
20141. These amendments specifically address the revision of the power 
brake regulations by adding a new subsection which states:

    (r) POWER BRAKE SAFETY.--(1) The Secretary shall conduct a 
review of the Department of Transportation's rules with respect to 
railroad power brakes, and not later than December 31, 1993, shall 
revise such rules based on such safety data as may be presented 
during that review.
    (2) In carrying out paragraph (1), the Secretary shall, where 
applicable, prescribe standards regarding dynamic brake equipment. * 
* *

Pub. L. No. 102-365, Sec. 7; codified at 49 U.S.C. 20141, superseding 
45 U.S.C. 431(r).
    In response to the statutory mandate, the various recommendations 
and petitions for rulemaking, and due to its own determination that the 
power brake regulations were in need of revision, FRA published an 
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) on December 31, 1992 (57 
FR 62546), and conducted a series of public workshops in early 1993. 
The ANPRM provided background information and presented questions on 
various subjects including: the use and design of end-of-train (EOT) 
telemetry devices; the air flow method of train brake testing; the 
additional testing of train air brakes during extremely cold weather; 
the training of employees to perform train brake tests and inspections; 
computer-assisted braking systems; the operation of dynamic brakes on 
locomotives; and other miscellaneous subjects relating to conventional 
brake systems as well as information regarding high speed passenger 
train brakes. The questions presented in the ANPRM on the various 
topics were intended as fact-finding tools and were intended to elicit 
the views of those persons outside FRA charged with ensuring compliance 
with the power brake regulations on a day-to-day basis.
    Based on the comments and information received, FRA published a 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (1994 NPRM) regarding revisions to the 
power brake regulation. See 59 FR 47676 (September 16, 1994). In the 
1994 NPRM, FRA proposed a comprehensive revision of the power brake 
regulations which attempted to preserve the useful elements of the 
current regulatory system in the framework of an entirely new document. 
FRA attempted to delineate the requirements for conventional freight 
braking systems from the more diverse systems for various categories of 
passenger service. In developing the NPRM, FRA engaged in a systems 
approach to the power brake regulations. FRA considered all aspects of 
a railroad operation and the effects that the entire operation had on 
the train and locomotive power braking systems. Therefore, the proposed 
requirements not only addressed specific brake equipment and inspection 
requirements, but also attempted to encompass other aspects of a 
railroad's operation which directly affect the quality and performance 
of the braking system, such as: personnel qualifications; maintenance 
requirements; written procedures governing operation, maintenance, and 
inspection; record keeping requirements; and the development and 
integration of new technologies.
    Following publication of the 1994 NPRM in the Federal Register, FRA 
held a series of public hearings in 1994 to allow interested parties 
the opportunity to comment on specific issues addressed in the NPRM. 
Public hearings were held in Chicago, Illinois on November 1-2; in 
Newark, New Jersey on November 4; in Sacramento, California on November 
9; and in Washington, D.C. on December 13-14, 1994. These hearings were 
attended by numerous railroads, organizations representing railroads, 
labor

[[Page 48295]]

organizations, rail shippers, and State governmental agencies. Due to 
the strong objections raised by a large number of commenters at these 
public hearings, FRA announced by notice published on January 17, 1995 
that it would defer action on the NPRM and permit the submission of 
additional comments prior to making a determination as to how it would 
proceed in this matter. See 60 FR 3375. Although the comment period 
officially closed April 1, 1995, FRA continued to receive comments on 
the NPRM as well as other suggested alternatives well into October 
1995.
    Furthermore, beginning in mid-1995, FRA internally committed to the 
process of establishing the Rail Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC). The 
determination to develop the RSAC was based on FRA's belief that the 
continued use of ad hoc collaborative procedures for appropriate 
rulemakings was not the most effective means of accomplishing its goal 
of a more consensual regulatory program. FRA believed that the 
establishment of an advisory committee to address railroad safety 
issues would provide the best opportunity for creating a consensual 
regulatory program to benefit the Administrator in the conduct of her 
statutory responsibilities. FRA envisioned that the RSAC would allow 
representatives from management, labor, FRA and other interested 
parties to cooperatively address safety problems by identifying the 
best solutions based on agreed-upon facts, and, where regulation 
appears necessary, identify regulatory options to implement these 
solutions. The process of establishing the RSAC was not complete until 
March 1, 1996, and on March 11, 1996, FRA published a notice in the 
Federal Register that the Committee had been established. See 61 FR 
9740.
    In the interim, based on these considerations and after review of 
all the comments submitted, FRA published a notice in the Federal 
Register on February 21, 1996, stating that in order to limit the 
number of issues to be examined and developed in any one proceeding FRA 
would proceed with the revision of the power brake regulations via 
three separate processes. See 61 FR 6611. In light of the testimony and 
comments received on the 1994 NPRM, emphasizing the differences between 
passenger and freight operations and the brake equipment utilized by 
the two, FRA decided to separate passenger equipment power brake 
standards from freight equipment power brake standards. As passenger 
equipment power brake standards are a logical subset of passenger 
equipment safety standards, it was determined that the passenger 
equipment safety standards working group would assist FRA in developing 
a second NPRM covering passenger equipment power brake standards. See 
49 U.S.C. 20133(c). In addition, in the interest of public safety and 
due to statutory as well as internal commitments, FRA determined that 
it would separate the issues related to two-way EOTs from both the 
passenger and freight issues, address them in a public regulatory 
conference, and issue a final rule on the subject as soon as 
practicable. A final rule on two-way EOTs was issued on December 27, 
1996. See 62 FR 278 (January 2, 1997). Furthermore, it was announced 
that a second NPRM covering freight equipment power brake standards 
would be developed with the assistance of RSAC. At the Committee's 
inaugural meeting on April 1-2, 1996, the RSAC officially accepted the 
task of assisting FRA in development of revisions to the regulations 
governing power brake systems for freight equipment. See 61 FR 29164.
    Members of RSAC nominated individuals to be members of the Freight 
Power Brake Working Group (Working Group) tasked with making 
recommendations regarding revision of the power regulations applicable 
to freight operations. The Working Group was comprised of thirty-one 
voting members as well as a number of alternates and technical support 
personnel. The following organizations were represented by a voting 
member and/or an alternate on the Working Group:

Association of American Railroads (AAR)
American Short Line Railroad Association (ASLRA)
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE)
Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad (BNSF)
Canadian National Railroads (CN)
Canadian Pacific Rail Systems (CP)
Consolidated Rail Corporation (CR)
CSX Transportation (CSX)
Illinois Central Railroad (IC)
International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers (IAMAW)
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)(Advisor)
National Association of Regulatory Commissioners (NARUC)/California 
Public Utilities Commission (CAPUC)
Norfolk Southern Corporation (NS)
Railway Progress Institute (RPI)
Sheet Metal Workers International Association (SMWIA)
Southern Pacific Lines (SP)
Transportation Communications International Union/Brotherhood of 
Railway Carmen (TCU/BRC)
Transport Workers Union of America (TWU)
Union Pacific Railroad (UP)
United Transportation Union (UTU)

    The Working Group held seven multi-day sessions in which all 
members of the working group were invited. These sessions were held on 
the following dates:

May 15-17, 1996 in Washington D.C.;
June 11-13, 1996 in Chicago, Illinois;
July 31, 1996 in Chicago, Illinois;
August 21-23, 1996 in Annapolis, Maryland;
September 26-27, 1996 in Washington D.C.;
October 29-30, 1996 in Washington D.C.; and
December 4, 1996 in St. Louis, Missouri.

    General minutes of each of these meetings are contained in FRA 
Docket PB-9 and are available for public inspection during the times 
and at the location noted previously. In addition to these meetings, 
there were numerous meetings conducted by smaller task force groups 
designated by the Working Group to further develop various issues. All 
of these smaller task forces were made up of various members of the 
Working Group or their representatives, with each task force being 
represented by management, labor, FRA and other interested parties. The 
Working Group designated smaller task forces to address the following 
issues: dry air; dynamic brakes; periodic maintenance and testing; 
electronically controlled locomotive brakes; and inspection and testing 
requirements. These task forces were assigned the job of developing the 
issues related to the broad topics, presenting reports to the larger 
Working Group, and if possible making recommendations to the Working 
Group for addressing the issues (recommendations and reports of these 
task groups will be addressed in detail in the Discussion of Issues 
portion of the preamble to follow).
    Although the Working Group discussed, debated, and attempted to 
reach consensus on various issues related to freight power brakes, 
consensus could not be reached. However, the working group in 
conjunction with the various task forces developed a wealth of 
information on various issues and further clarified the parties' 
positions regarding how the issues could or should be addressed in any 
regulation. The major cluster of issues, upon which resolution of many 
of the other issues rested, were the requirements related to the 
inspection and testing of brake equipment. The inspection and testing 
task force met on numerous occasions, gathered and

[[Page 48296]]

reviewed data, and the labor and rail management representatives to the 
task force drafted various proposals and options related to the 
inspection and testing of freight brake equipment (these proposals are 
addressed in detail in the Discussion of Issues portion of the preamble 
to follow). Members of the inspection and testing task force presented 
their proposals to the larger Working Group as well as the underlying 
bases for the proposals. The Working Group discussed the proposals and 
investigated many of the costs and benefits related to the various 
proposals as well as the safety implications; however, the Working 
Group could not reach any type of consensus position. Consequently, FRA 
declared that an impasse had been reached and announced, at the 
December 4, 1996 meeting of the Working Group, that FRA would proceed 
unilaterally with the drafting of the NPRM.
    Subsequent to December 4, 1996, several members of the Working 
Group, including representatives from both rail management and labor, 
continued informal discussions of some of the issues related to the 
inspection and testing of freight equipment. These representatives 
informed FRA that a consensus proposal might be possible provided that 
the Working Group were permitted to continue deliberations. 
Consequently, FRA agreed to reconvene the Working Group and in April 
1997 three additional meetings were conducted on the following dates:

April 2-3, 1997 in Kansas City, Missouri;
April 10-11, 1997 in Phoenix, Arizona; and
April 23 in Jacksonville, Florida.
    Representatives of both rail management and rail labor presented 
the Working Group with inspection and testing proposals for 
consideration and review both before and during this period. Although 
the proposals were discussed and deliberated, the Working Group was 
once again unsuccessful in reaching consensus on any of the freight 
power brake inspection and testing issues. Consequently, by letter 
dated May 29, 1997, FRA informed the members of the Working Group that 
FRA would be withdrawing the freight power brake task from the Working 
Group at the next full RSAC meeting on June 24, 1997. FRA provided this 
notice to avoid any misunderstanding regarding the process by which the 
proposed rule would be drafted. FRA also informed the members of the 
Working Group that it would not invest further time in attempting to 
reach consensus unless all other members of the Working Group jointly 
indicated that they have reached consensus on a proposal and wanted to 
discuss it with FRA. FRA noted that if that were to occur prior to June 
24, 1997, it would reconsider withdrawing the task from RSAC. As no 
consensus proposal was presented to FRA prior to June 24, 1997, FRA 
withdrew the task from the Working Group and informed the members of 
RSAC that FRA would proceed unilaterally in the drafting of a freight 
power brake NPRM.
    Although FRA proceeded on its own in drafting this document, FRA 
believes that all members of the Freight Power Brake Working Group 
should be commended for their hard work and dedication in attempting to 
resolve and address some of the most difficult and complex issues with 
which FRA deals. FRA believes that the information and knowledge 
provided by these individuals has helped FRA draft a proposal that not 
only ensures the continued safety of railroad employees and the public, 
but also recognizes the needs of contemporary railroad operations.
    FRA has carefully considered the information, data, and proposals 
developed by the Freight Power Brake Working Group as well as all the 
oral and written comments offered by various parties regarding the 1994 
NPRM on power brakes. The resulting NPRM is based on this information 
as well as FRA's experience with enforcing the current power brake 
regulations.

Prologue

    FRA's institutional experience in locomotive and train braking 
safety extends backwards in time to the creation of the Department of 
Transportation in 1967 (at which time the Bureau of Railroad Safety and 
its functions were transferred from the Interstate Commerce 
Commission), to the passage of the Power or Train Brakes Safety 
Appliance Act of 1958, and ultimately to the passage of the original 
Safety Appliance Act over 100 years ago. Current FRA personnel have, 
during prior years, served in a variety of capacities on every major 
railroad. These railroad safety inspectors, supervisors, and managers 
contribute daily to the rulemaking judgments ultimately expressed by 
the Federal Railroad Administrator, and the agency has made a special 
effort in this proceeding to tap the knowledge that these individuals 
possess to ascertain the means by which public and employee safety may 
be secured.
    As evidenced by the preceding discussion, FRA has spent years 
attempting to develop new power brake regulations to ensure the safety 
of our nation's railroads while recognizing the wide variety of 
railroad operations and technologies that currently exist in the 
industry. In the 1994 NPRM, FRA proposed a comprehensive and innovative 
revision to the power brake regulations. At that time, FRA was 
attempting to develop a set of regulations that addressed freight, 
passenger, and tourist operations, and thus, required FRA to provide 
certain latitudes and restrictions that were not completely compatible 
with every type of operation covered by the proposal. Consequently, 
many segments of the industry adamantly objected to the proposal. FRA 
believes that many of these objections were due, at least in part, to 
the complexity of the proposal as well as to a misunderstanding of 
exactly what was being proposed.
    Since that time, as noted above, FRA has instituted rulemakings to 
address passenger and commuter operations and equipment, two-way end-
of-train devices, and has developed a channel of communication to 
address tourist and excursion operational concerns. The current 
proposal is focused solely on freight and other non-passenger 
operations. Furthermore, FRA is limiting this proposal to the 
operation, inspection, and maintenance of freight power brake systems. 
Thus, unlike the previous proposal, FRA will not, for the most part, 
attempt to include provisions related to the inspection and maintenance 
of locomotive braking systems or to the performance of other mechanical 
inspections that are currently addressed by other parts of the 
regulations. Although FRA believes these requirements are interrelated 
to the inspection, testing, and maintenance of freight power brakes, 
FRA believes that they are adequately addressed in other regulations 
and would only add to the complexity of this proposal causing confusion 
and misunderstanding by members of the regulated community. 
Furthermore, representatives of both rail labor and rail management 
have indicated that if a consensus proposal could not be developed 
within the RSAC process then FRA should proceed unilaterally with 
developing a proposal which tracks the current requirements, and that 
FRA should strictly enforce those requirements. Although FRA believes 
that the current regulatory scheme tends to create incentives to 
``overlook'' or fail to conduct vigorous inspections, FRA also believes 
that the current regulatory scheme is an effective and proven method of 
ensuring safety and that many of the ``negative incentives'' can be 
greatly reduced by

[[Page 48297]]

strict and aggressive enforcement and with moderate, although 
comprehensive, revision of the requirements. Consequently, the content 
of this proposal is far less complex than the previous proposal and 
more closely tracks the current requirements related to the inspection, 
testing, and maintenance of the braking systems used in freight 
operations.
    This proposal is intended to be a moderate revision of the current 
requirements related to the inspection, testing, and maintenance of the 
brake equipment used freight operations. These proposed changes are 
intended to balance the concerns of rail labor and management and would 
increase the effectiveness of the regulation. Since the passage of the 
Power or Train Brakes Safety Appliance Act of 1958, which required 
adoption of the AAR recommended practices as regulatory text, FRA has 
realized that improvements in clarity are badly needed. FRA believes 
that the current regulations need to be reorganized and updated, and 
that potential loopholes created by the current language need to be 
eliminated. Furthermore, FRA believes that completely new requirements 
are needed to address the qualifications of those individuals 
conducting brake inspections and tests. FRA also proposes to codify the 
statutory requirements related to the movement of freight equipment 
with defective or inoperative brakes. In addition, this proposal 
codifies and solidifies the maintenance requirements related to the 
brake system and its components and prevents unilateral changes to 
these provisions by the very party to which they apply.
    This proposal also contains various incentives to the railroads to 
encourage the performance of quality brake inspections, particularly at 
locations where trains originate. These include incentives to use 
qualified mechanical forces to conduct brake system tests at major 
terminals where long-distance trains originate in order to move these 
trains greater distances between brake inspections than currently 
permitted. Consequently, this proposal retains the basic inspection 
intervals and requirements contained in the current regulations and 
preserves the useful elements of the current system; however, FRA 
believes that the proposed additions, clarifications, and modifications 
increase the safety, effectiveness, and enforceability of the 
regulations.

Discussion of Issues and General FRA Conclusions

    The following discussions are grouped by major themes and primary 
issues addressed not only in the Freight Power Brake Working Group but 
also in the 1994 NPRM issued on power brakes and the oral and written 
comments submitted in relation to that document. In each of the major 
issue areas FRA has attempted to discuss previous proposals, the 
comments to those proposals, the information developed by the Working 
Group, and any proposals or recommendations made by members of the 
Working Group.

I. Accident/Incident History and Defective Equipment

    FRA considers many factors in attempting to determine the relative 
condition of the industry as it relates to the safety of train power 
brake systems. Two factors which figure prominently in this 
determination are the number of recent brake-related incidents and the 
amount of defective brake equipment recently discovered operating over 
the railroad system, both of which provide some indication as to the 
potential or likelihood of future brake-related incidents. For purposes 
of this discussion, a brake-related incident is one that was reported 
to FRA as being caused by one of the following: brake rigging down or 
dragging; air hose uncoupled or burst; broken brake pipe or 
connections; other brake components damaged, worn, broken or 
disconnected; brake valve malfunction (undesired emergency); brake 
valve malfunction (stuck brake); hand brake broken or defective; hand 
brake linkage and/or connections broken or defective. FRA did not 
consider brake pipe obstruction-related incidents because they were 
fully considered at the time that FRA promulgated the final rule 
relating to the use of two-way end-of-train devices.
    Table 1 below contains a compilation of the relevant brake-related 
incidents that have been reported to FRA over the past 5 years. The 
totals for 1997 reflect incidents through October 1997 and the incident 
rate reflects train miles for 1996 (latest available). Both the number 
of incidents and the number of train miles for 1997 will in all 
probability be higher when they are finalized. As the table clearly 
indicates, there were increases in both brake-related incidents and the 
incident rate between 1994 and 1996. The incident rate remains fairly 
low relative to other causes of derailments and collisions. However, it 
should be noted that the figures presented in Table 1 most likely do 
not accurately reflect the total number of incidents that are 
potentially linked, in some part, to brake-related causes and do not 
provide a complete picture of the costs associated with the identified 
incidents. FRA obtains information on most incidents directly from the 
railroads which generally identify the direct cause of an incident but 
may not sufficiently identify all of the contributory causes in a 
manner to permit FRA to conclude that the brake system played a part in 
the incident. Thus, FRA believes that there may be numerous incidents 
that occur in the industry which are at least partially due to brake-
related problems, but which are ultimately more closely linked to human 
error or other mechanical problems and thus, are reported to FRA under 
those cause codes. Furthermore, the damage costs noted in Table 1 for 
the identified incidents are based on the damage to railroad property 
or equipment together with the costs of the injuries or fatalities 
involved. Thus, the damages presented fail to consider the costs 
associated with such things as: loss of lading; wreck clearance; track 
delay; environmental clean-up; removal of damaged equipment; 
evacuations; or the impact on local traffic patterns. Consequently, the 
railroad property damages have been multiplied by a factor of 1.5625 in 
an effort to capture these non-reported damages.1
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ AAR surveyed its members and reported that, on average, 
these other costs constitute an additional 56.25 percent of the 
reported damages.

                                        Table 1.--Brake-Related Incidents                                       
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             Rate per                                           
                    Year                       Number of     million      Injured       Killed      Damages \2\ 
                                               accidents   train miles                                          
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
93..........................................           15        0.024            0            0      $1,298,109
94..........................................           33        0.050           17            1      $2,440,347
95..........................................           43        0.064            2            0      $6,710,280
96..........................................           52        0.077           12            1     $10,534,903
97 \3\......................................           29        0.043            1            0     $10,032,013
                                             -------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 48298]]

                                                                                                                
    Total...................................          172  ...........           32            2     $31,015,653
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A second factor that is considered by FRA, to some extent, in 
determining the relative condition of the industry in regard to the 
safety of power brake equipment is the percentage of equipment found 
with defective brakes during FRA inspections and special projects. The 
percentage of equipment with defective brakes was a contentious subject 
within the RSAC Power Brake Working Group. The problem of brake defect 
data and how it is collected and entered into the FRA database was 
debated at length. The issue is important for cost and benefit 
estimation of proposals put forth by labor and management and it is 
useful to examine the problem in detail. Data on brake defects is 
collected by FRA inspectors as they do rail equipment inspections. 
Defect data is also collected for special projects under the Safety 
Assurance and Compliance Program (SACP). In neither instance is the 
data collection procedure designed to be suitable for use in 
statistical analysis of brake defects.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ Increased by 56.25% to reflect unreported damages.
    \3\ Based on train miles for 1996 and accidents through October, 
1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In order to perform a statistically valid analysis, either all cars 
and locomotives must be inspected (prohibitively expensive), or a 
statistically valid sample must be collected. For the sample to be 
valid for the purpose of statistical analysis, the sample must be 
randomly selected so that it will represent the same characteristics as 
the universe of data. Random samples have several unique 
characteristics. They are unbiased, meaning that each unit has the same 
chance of being selected. Random samples are independent, or the 
selection of one unit has no influence on the selection of other units. 
Most statistical methods depend on independence and lack of bias. 
Without a randomized sample design there can be no dependable 
statistical analysis, and no way to measure sampling error, no matter 
how the data is modified. Random sampling ``statistically guarantees'' 
the accuracy of the results.
    The sampling method used for regular FRA inspections is not random. 
It is more of a combination between a judgement sample and an 
opportunity sample. The opportunity sample basically just takes the 
first sample population that comes along, while the judgement sample is 
based on ``expert'' opinion. The sampling method used for SACP 
inspections is also a judgement sample, where FRA is focusing its 
inspections on a specific safety concern. This method is extremely 
prone to bias, as FRA is typically investigating known problem areas. 
Furthermore, some SACP inspections are joint inspections with labor. 
Consequently, it is unknown whether the final reports reflect only FRA 
defects, as many of the joint inspections had both AAR and FRA defects 
recorded.
    Neither the regular FRA inspections nor the SACP inspections were 
designed for random data collection. Although both are very useful to 
FRA, they were not designed for this purpose and the data should be 
used carefully. FRA believes that data collected during routine 
inspections is the most likely data to accurately reflect the condition 
of the fleet. However, both FRA inspection data and SACP data lack any 
measuring device, a defect is a defect and no distinction is made 
between a critical defect versus a minor defect. Furthermore, there is 
no correspondence between defects and accidents (no estimated 
correlation coefficients were statistically significant). This does not 
mean that defects cannot lead to collisions or derailments as the lack 
of correlation could easily be a result of non-random sampling. 
Consequently, the data collected both during routine FRA inspections 
and under SACP cannot be used as a proxy for data collected by means of 
a random sample for the purpose of statistical analysis. The sample is 
not random, so no dependable statistical analysis may be performed.
    The defect ratios for brake and brake-related defects from the FRA 
inspection database are shown in Table 2 below. The five-year average 
brake defect ratio is 3.84 percent. SACP data (which focuses on known 
problem areas) indicates that brake defect ratios as high as 35 percent 
have been found during the course of some investigations. FRA believes 
that the reality lies between the two, and that it is more likely to 
resemble the data collected during routine FRA inspections as FRA 
examines almost a \1/2\ million freight cars and locomotives annually. 
However, brake defects may be more common than FRA inspection data 
indicates and the SACP data in all likelihood indicates that there are 
localized areas of concern or that some railroads have particular yards 
with persistent problems. For purposes of the cost/benefit analysis of 
this proposal only, the brake defect ratio is assumed to be the five-
year average brake defect ratio and rounding up to 4 percent. The data 
indicates that a slight increase in the percentage of cars with brake 
defects has been reported by FRA during routine inspections over the 
last five years. Due to the limitations of the available data, as 
discussed in detail above, FRA is unable to determine whether the 
defect ratio increase is the result of increased non-compliance with 
existing regulations or the result of sampling bias.

                      Table 2.--Brake Defect Ratio                      
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Ratio   
                                                              (defective
                            Year                              equipment/
                                                              equipment 
                                                              inspected)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1993.......................................................       0.0336
1994.......................................................       0.0347
1995.......................................................       0.0369
1996.......................................................       0.0419
1997.......................................................        0.045
Average....................................................       0.0384
------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. Inspection and Testing Requirements

    As noted in the preceding discussions, the issues related to the 
inspection and testing of the brake equipment on freight trains are 
some of the most complex and sensitive issues with which FRA deals on a 
daily basis. A majority of the comments received with regard to the 
1994 NPRM on power brakes issued in 1994 addressed the intervals and 
methods for performing the various proposed brake inspections and 
tests. Furthermore, the primary points of contention in the RSAC 
Working Group discussions centered on the performance of brake 
inspections and tests. Consequently, any proposed requirements related 
to the inspection and testing of freight power brakes must be viewed as 
the foundation on which

[[Page 48299]]

the rest of the proposed requirements are based.
A. Brake Inspections--General
    The current regulations are primarily designed around four 
different types of brake system inspections, these include: initial 
terminal; 1,000-mile; intermediate terminal; and a brake pipe 
continuity check. See 49 CFR 232.12 and 232.13. These brake system 
inspections differ in complexity and detail based on the location of 
the train or on some event that affects the composition of the train. 
Each of the inspections detail specific actions that are to be 
performed and identify the items that are to be observed by the person 
performing the inspection.
    The initial terminal inspection described in Sec. 232.12(c)-(j) is 
intended to be a comprehensive inspection of the brake equipment 
primarily required to be performed at the location where a train is 
originally assembled. This inspection requires the performance of a 
leakage test and an in-depth inspection of the brake equipment to 
ensure that it is properly secure and does not bind or foul. Piston 
travel must be checked during these inspections and must be adjusted to 
a specified length if found not to be within a certain range of 
movement. The brakes must also be inspected to ensure that they apply 
and release in response to a specified brake pipe reduction and 
increase. FRA recently issued enforcement guidance to its field 
inspectors clarifying that both sides of a car must be observed 
sometime during the inspection process in order to verify the condition 
of the brake equipment as required when performing an initial terminal 
inspection.
    The current regulations require intermediate brake inspections at 
points not more than 1,000 miles apart. These inspections are far more 
limited than the currently required initial terminal inspections in 
that the railroad is required only to determine that brake pipe leakage 
is not excessive, the brakes apply on each car, and the brake rigging 
is secure and does not bind or foul. See 49 CFR 232.12(b). In the 1982 
revisions to the power brake rules, FRA extended the distance between 
these inspections from 500 miles to 1,000 miles.
    The current regulations also mandate the performance of an 
intermediate terminal brake inspection on all cars added to a train en 
route unless they have been previously given an initial terminal 
inspection. This inspection requires the performance of a leakage test 
and verification that the brakes on each car added to the train and the 
rear car of the train apply and release. See 49 CFR 232.13(d). 
Railroads are permitted to use a gauge or device at the rear of the 
train to verify changes in brake pipe pressure in lieu of performing 
the rear car application and release. The current regulations also 
require that cars that are added to a train with only an intermediate 
terminal brake inspection that have not previously been provided an 
initial terminal inspection must be so inspected at the next location 
where facilities are available for performing such an inspection.
    The current regulations also require the performance of a brake 
pipe continuity test whenever minor changes to a train consist occur. 
This inspection requires that a brake pipe reduction be made and 
verification that the brakes on the rear car apply and release. 
Railroads are permitted to use a gauge or device at the rear of the 
train to verify changes in brake pipe pressure in lieu of visually 
verifying the rear car application and release. This inspection is to 
be performed when locomotive or caboose is changed, when a one or more 
consecutive cars are removed from the train, and when previously tested 
cars are added to a train.
    In the 1994 power brake NPRM issued in 1994, FRA proposed a power 
brake inspection scheme in which various stated factors determined the 
distance that a freight train would be allowed to travel without 
additional inspection. See 59 FR 47732-47736. These factors included: 
the qualifications of the employee performing the initial terminal 
brake inspection; the extent of performance of supervisory spot checks 
of maintenance and inspection activity; the presence or absence of a 
single car test program on the railroad; the power brake defect ratio 
on outbound trains for the railroad; and the type of equipment used and 
installed on the train. Based on the conditions that were satisfied by 
the railroad, a train would be allowed to travel anywhere between 500 
and 3,500 miles from the point of initial terminal without additional 
power brake tests or inspections. Thus, FRA proposed the elimination of 
the 1,000-mile inspection and replaced it with a sliding-scale 
performance-based inspection system. The inspection scheme proposed in 
the 1994 NPRM was an attempt to balance the competing views of rail 
management, which contended that trains can travel up to 5,000 miles 
between inspections, and rail labor, which contended that a 500 mile 
limit should be mandated as railroads are not living up to a commitment 
made in 1982 to perform quality initial terminal inspections. See 59 FR 
47692-47693.
    As noted above, railroad representatives and shippers of goods by 
rail vehemently opposed the 1994 NPRM. Many of these commenters 
objected to the possibility that most trains would be reduced to 500 
miles between brake inspections and that the incentives for moving 
extended distances were unobtainable. They claimed that the brake 
inspection scheme contained in the 1994 NPRM would increase not only 
operational and delivery costs but would also substantially increase 
delivery times. These commenters believed that the 1994 NPRM failed to 
recognize the industry's improving safety record. Many railroad 
representatives also objected to the use of power brake defect ratios 
as a benchmark for determining the distances trains may travel between 
brake inspections. These commenters believed that defect ratios were an 
inappropriate performance standard in that it was too subjective and 
included items that were not related to the safe operation of a train. 
Several railroads also commented that the potential for being reduced 
to 500 miles between brake inspections based on defect ratios each 
quarter would require railroads to maintain facilities every 500 miles 
in order to be prepared for a reduction in distance.
    Rail labor representatives also objected to the brake inspection 
scheme proposed in the 1994 NPRM. The primary objections these 
commenters raised involved the ability of railroads to continue to use 
train crews to conduct initial terminal brake inspections and the 
ability to move trains in excess of 1,000 miles between brake 
inspections. Most of these commenters believed that train crew 
personnel are not sufficiently trained to adequately perform initial 
terminal brake inspections. Several labor representatives also objected 
to the movement of a freight train beyond 1,000 miles without an 
additional inspection of the brake equipment. This objection was 
primarily based on their view that railroads have failed to abide by 
the commitment made in 1982, when the distance between such inspections 
was increased from 500 miles to 1,000 miles, that complete and perfect 
initial terminal inspections would be performed. These commenters also 
contended that the incentives proposed for permitting trains to travel 
extended distances were unenforceable and would result in extended 
movements of trains with no appreciable increase in the safety of those 
trains.
    In light of these objections, FRA held the 1994 NPRM in abeyance 
and requested that alternative approaches be

[[Page 48300]]

submitted by interested parties. The AAR and its member railroads 
submitted an alternative performance standard approach based on 
mechanically-caused accidents per million train miles (APMTM). AAR's 
approach required various types of brake inspections to be performed 
based on the mileage the train will travel, and based on the railroad's 
performance versus the established foundation APMTM, the railroad could 
potentially move trains up to 3,600 miles with fewer inspection 
requirements. AAR's proposal also addressed certain maintenance 
requirements and permitted maintenance levels to be determined based on 
the accident level of the industry as a whole. In addition, the 
proposal permitted trains to depart initial terminals with 95 percent 
operative brakes and in some instances less than 95 percent operative 
brakes. The proposal also set limits on the enforcement actions that 
FRA could initiate based on a railroad's poor performance.
    Several labor representatives strongly objected to AAR's 
alternative proposal claiming that the proposal was merely self-
regulation disguised as a performance standard. These commenters 
contended that AAR's proposal provided railroads the ability to 
continue to manipulate data and statistics in order to reduce their 
safety and regulatory responsibilities. The BRC submitted substantial 
comments to FRA's 1994 NPRM as an alternative approach. The BRC's 
submission suggested that many of the proposed provisions were 
insufficient to ensure adequate compliance by the railroads. 
Consequently, the BRC made numerous recommendations for strengthening 
certain provisions contained in the NPRM and included: more stringent 
requirements regarding the inspection of trains; additional limitations 
on trains permitted to travel greater than 1,000 miles between brake 
inspections; enhanced documentation of all inspections performed by the 
railroad; and further limitations on the inspection abilities of train 
crew members.
    At the time that alternative proposals were being submitted and 
reviewed, FRA was in the process of establishing RSAC. FRA believed 
that RSAC might be a good forum for addressing the issues and 
developing recommendations for revising the regulations governing power 
brake systems for freight equipment. Therefore, on April 1-2, 1996, the 
RSAC officially accepted the task of assisting FRA in development of 
revisions to the regulations governing power brake systems for freight 
equipment. See 61 FR 29164. As noted above, the RSAC Working Group met 
on numerous occasions to discuss various issues and proposals related 
to the inspection, testing and maintenance of freight power brake 
systems. As the meetings progressed it became clear that most of the 
issues being discussed by the Working Group were contingent on the 
outcome of the requirements related to the inspection and testing of 
the braking systems. Consequently, the Working Group created several 
smaller task forces composed of representatives of both rail labor and 
rail management to attempt to resolve these core issues.
    On several occasions it appeared as though these smaller task 
forces might reach resolution of at least a large portion of the 
inspection and testing issues; however, after the individuals involved 
in these meetings presented proposals based on the discussions of the 
smaller group it appeared that either there was no agreement within the 
task force, the parties did not understand what was agreed to, or the 
parties disagreed as to whether an agreement was actually reached. 
Representatives of both rail management and rail labor submitted 
numerous proposals related to the inspection and testing of brake 
equipment. Many of the proposals were revisions or amendments to 
previous proposals based on the discussions of the Working Group at 
that time. Rather than attempt to reiterate the various proposals 
submitted by management and labor representatives, this document will 
attempt to outline the major provisions and discuss the similarities 
and differences of the various proposals in order to delineate the 
general positions of the parties involved. In order to facilitate this 
discussion, the proposals will generally be grouped as either a 
management proposal or a labor proposal. It should be noted that the 
items outlined below were developed over the period of a year, were 
developed as part of a series of intense negotiation sessions, were 
generally presented as part of a package by various parties with all of 
the requirements of the package necessary for agreement, or were 
presented in order to facilitate additional discussion of the group.
    The proposals of both management and labor representatives 
addressed the need to have brake and other mechanical inspections 
performed by qualified inspectors. The proposals mandated that if 
certain inspections were performed in a specified manner by highly 
qualified inspectors then those trains could be moved either extended 
distances between brake inspections or with a certain minimum 
percentage of the brakes inoperative or both. However, the parties 
differed on what constitutes a qualified inspector. This issue became 
the key issue to resolving any of the other issues being debated within 
the Working Group. Rail management proposed the use of the term 
``mechanically qualified personnel'' (MQP) to describe those 
individuals they would consider highly qualified inspectors. It was 
unclear from the railroads' proposals exactly who could be designated 
as MQP and the extent of the knowledge or training that would be 
required to designate a person as MQP. It appeared that even train crew 
personnel could qualify as MQPs under certain circumstances. Labor 
representatives refused to accept any definition of MQP that would 
permit train crew members to meet the designation. These 
representatives were adamant that only carmen or individuals similarly 
trained and experienced were qualified to perform the quality brake and 
mechanical inspections contained in the proposals except in limited 
circumstances. At a minimum, labor representatives sought to have the 
railroads commit to using carmen or individuals similarly trained and 
experienced to perform the majority of the proposed inspections and 
tests. The railroads refused to agree to such a commitment. Railroad 
representatives objected to the designation of the carman craft in the 
rule text based on their belief that the discussion of such designation 
would violate existing collective bargaining agreements. Labor 
representatives disagreed that such discussion was a violation of any 
collective bargaining agreements. Due to the nature of these 
objections, several members of the Working Group believed they were 
unable to continue deliberations which led to an adjournment of the 
Working Group. Consequently, the Working Group was unable to resolve 
the issue of what qualifications a person must possess in order to 
adequately perform brake system inspections and tests.
    Both labor and management representatives proposed to limit the 
movement of trains inspected by train crews to at least 500 miles. The 
railroads proposed that trains inspected by train crews would be 
required to be inspected by an MQP within 500 miles of the train's 
departure. It should be noted that the railroads' proposal of this 
requirement was part of a package that permitted certain trains 
inspected by MQPs to travel to destination without additional 
inspection and that permitted all trains to be operated out of initial 
terminals and elsewhere with only 95

[[Page 48301]]

percent operative brakes. The railroads contended that the only way to 
economically justify a return to a 500-mile inspection would be to 
permit trains to move extended distances and to relax the requirements 
pertaining to the movement of defective equipment.
    Rail labor proposed that trains inspected by train crews be 
permitted to move only to the next yard, repair point, or crew change 
point not to exceed 500 miles where it would be inspected by carmen. 
This proposal permitted train crews to perform a ``cursory'' brake and 
mechanical inspection at the initial terminal. Labor representatives 
contended that train crews are not properly trained and do not possess 
the experience to adequately perform the initial terminal brake test 
and mechanical inspections required by the current regulations. These 
parties also contend that when the regulations were revised in 1982 to 
permit trains to travel 1,000 miles between brake inspections the 
carriers committed to perform quality initial terminal brake 
inspections, which they contend has not occurred and will not occur if 
train crews are permitted to perform initial terminal brake 
inspections. Consequently, the labor representatives contended that 
their proposal was an attempt to hold the railroads to their 1982 
commitment while permitting properly qualified train crews to perform 
the inspections they are capable of performing.
    The proposals of both rail labor and rail management also contained 
provisions regarding the performance of a 1,000-mile brake and 
mechanical inspection. The railroads proposed that all trains would 
receive a brake and mechanical inspection at 1,000 mile intervals 
performed by MQPs. However, the railroads' proposal also permitted 
certain trains that are inspected by MQPs at the initial terminal and 
which depart those locations with 100 percent operative brakes to 
travel to destination without additional inspection if labor jointly 
agreed to such operations. Labor's proposal required the performance of 
brake and mechanical inspections on every train at intervals of every 
1,000 miles regardless of the quality of the previous inspections. 
Labor's proposal permitted the movement of a train beyond 1,000 miles 
without inspection only through the filing of a joint labor/management 
waiver petition pursuant to a proposed waiver process.
    The proposals of both rail management and rail labor attempted to 
provide benefits to a railroad that conducted inbound brake and 
mechanical inspections. The railroads' proposals contained requirements 
for the performance of inbound brake and mechanical inspections by 
MQPs. The carriers proposed the requirements as an alternative to the 
complete inspection of the train when it is assembled and outbound. All 
cars found during the inbound inspection with cut-out or defective 
brakes were to be removed from the train and given a repair track air 
brake test. In addition, all cars found with mechanical or safety 
appliance defects were to be repaired or switched out of the train. The 
railroads' proposals permitted trains to depart these locations with 
only 95 percent operative brakes. The railroads' proposals did not 
require the performance of inbound inspections but were intended to 
alleviate some of the inspection requirements on outbound trains since 
they were performed inbound.
    Rail labor's proposals also included provisions for the performance 
of inbound brake and mechanical inspections. Labor proposed that these 
inspections must be performed by carmen. The basic requirements 
regarding the treatment of defective equipment were similar to those 
proposed by the railroads. Labor's proposal also contained provisions 
requiring dynamic brakes, event recorders, and two-way EOTs. Labor 
representatives attempted to provide an incentive to railroads that 
perform inbound brake and mechanical inspections by permitting 
railroads to depart with only 95 percent operative brakes from 
locations where these inbound inspections are performed. If a railroad 
performed all of the inspections on the outbound trains, however, then 
labor's proposal required 100 percent operative brakes from those 
locations.
    Both the labor and management proposals also addressed the method 
by which the various proposed inspections were to be performed. 
Railroad representatives proposed that mechanical inspections be 
conducted on both sides of each car where physically possible. These 
proposals also indicated that brake inspections could be conducted on 
one side of the cars during the set and one side during the release 
with a roll-by option if the design of the car permits the observation 
of the application and release from one side of the car. However, the 
proposals do not require a mechanical inspection at 1,000-mile brake 
inspections and fail to specify exactly how the brakes are to be 
observed during this inspection. Thus, the railroads' position 
regarding the precise method of performing a brake inspection when not 
combined with a mechanical inspection is somewhat unclear. The 
railroads also proposed that piston travel be observed on each car 
during every brake inspection except a continuity check, thereby 
mandating that inspectors cross over the cars if necessary to view the 
piston travel.
    Rail labor representatives proposed detailed requirements relating 
to the methods for performing a proper brake inspection. These 
individuals proposed that both sides of a train must be walked during 
both the application and release of the brakes. These representatives 
believed that the only way to view all of the equipment necessary to 
conduct a proper brake inspection is by walking the train. Labor's 
proposal did permit trains that receive a mechanical inspection 
pursuant to Part 215 by a carman to have its brakes inspected by a 
walking inspection of one side of the train with the option to use a 
vehicle on the other side during the application of the brakes. Such 
trains also had the option to use a vehicle or perform a roll-by 
inspection on both sides of the train to observe the release of the 
brakes. Labor's proposals also permitted carriers to conduct an 
inspection of the application of the brakes and its component parts 
from one side of the train and the release of the brakes from the other 
side of the train if the carrier could effectively demonstrate that the 
design of the cars is such to permit the brake application, brake 
release, and component parts to be observed from one side of the train.
    The proposals of both rail management and rail labor also addressed 
the inspection of cycle trains (i.e., trains that operate in a 
continuous cycle between two points, that remain intact, and that 
generally consist of cars of the same mechanical type). Both proposals 
required that cycle trains receive a mechanical and initial terminal 
brake inspection based on the distance the train has traveled. The 
railroads' proposal would require these inspections at 1,000 mile 
intervals. Whereas, the labor proposal required the inspections once 
every cycle for trains traveling between 500 and 1,000 miles between 
origination and destination, and once every other cycle for trains 
traveling less than 500 between origination and destination.
    FRA Conclusions. Based on consideration of the information and 
proposals outlined above as well as its experience in the enforcement 
of the current power brake regulations, FRA believes that the 
alternative proposals submitted in response to the 1994 NPRM, as well 
as the proposals developed as part of the RSAC process, are not viable 
models upon which a revision of the freight power brake

[[Page 48302]]

requirements can be based. The alternative approach submitted by AAR in 
response to the 1994 NPRM contains a performance standard based upon 
the number of mechanically-caused incidents per million train miles. 
FRA does not believe this is an appropriate standard on which to base 
the frequency of brake inspection and maintenance requirements. Such a 
standard is based on the occurrence of incidents rather than on a 
factor which could measure a railroad's performance prior to an 
accident occurring and thus, prevent incidents before they happen. In 
addition, the applicability of the standard to the entire industry 
would be difficult to calculate on a railroad-by-railroad basis, 
especially due to the large number of short line railroads currently 
operating in the country. The proposed performance standard is also 
very subjective as many incidents are due to a variety of causes only 
part of which may be a mechanical or brake related cause. Thus, 
identifying what actually constitutes a mechanically-caused incident 
would be very difficult, if not impossible in some circumstances. 
Furthermore, as the calculation of the performance standard would be 
based on incident information submitted to FRA by the railroad's 
themselves, the potential for data manipulation would exist which could 
cast doubt on the validity and accuracy of the performance standard.
    The AAR's alternative proposal also seriously limited FRA's ability 
to take necessary enforcement actions until a railroad's non-compliance 
resulted in a substantial increase in mechanically-caused incidents. In 
addition, the restrictions imposed on a railroad with poor performance 
would have permitted the railroad to operate under more lenient 
inspection requirements than the current power brake regulations. The 
proposal also permitted the operation of trains out of initial 
terminals with only 95 percent operative brakes and thus, would 
potentially permit cars with inoperative brakes to be moved past 
locations where the necessary repairs could be performed which would be 
contrary to the statutory provisions related to the movement of cars 
with defective brakes contained at 49 U.S.C. 20303. Consequently, FRA 
believes that the alternative approach submitted by the AAR in response 
to the 1994 NPRM is based on a very subjective performance standard, 
would be extremely difficult to enforce, is contrary to certain 
statutory requirements, and most likely would not achieve the same 
level of safety as the current regulations.
    Although the proposals submitted by both rail labor and rail 
management during the discussions of the RSAC Working Group meetings 
contain elements which FRA believes would increase the safety of 
railroad operations, both proposals also contain elements that cannot 
be sustained on either a safety, economic, or legal basis. As noted in 
the discussion above, the proposals submitted by both labor and 
management were presented as packages. The parties made clear that the 
various elements contained in the proposals could not be isolated and 
be acceptable, they had to be considered in conjunction with all of the 
elements contained in the proposals. Therefore, FRA is reluctant to use 
any of the proposals submitted during the RSAC process as a basis for 
any revision of the power brake regulations. Furthermore, 
representatives of both labor and management indicated that if they 
could not reach agreement on the revision of the power brake 
regulations, then any revision contemplated by FRA should track the 
current inspection requirements and intervals.
    Both proposals contained requirements restricting the movement of 
trains inspected by train crews to no more than 500 miles before the 
train would be reinspected by more highly qualified inspectors. 
However, railroad representatives stressed that their acceptance of a 
return to a 500 mile brake inspection was conditioned on and could only 
be economically justified if the railroads were provided the ability to 
move some trains to destination (i.e. 2,000 miles or more) as well as 
flexibility in the movement of defective equipment, both of which were 
included in their proposal. Whereas, labor representatives stated that 
the acceptance of permitting train crews to perform any inspections was 
conditioned on a commitment by the railroads to ensure that all other 
inspections would be performed by carmen or similarly trained personnel 
and that the current 1,000 mile interval between inspections be 
retained unless labor and management jointly agreed to an extension. 
Labor's proposal also would have permitted a ``cursory'' inspection to 
be performed by train crews at initial terminals in order to reduce the 
burden on railroads if a 500 mile inspection were adopted. 
Consequently, although both proposals contained a 500-mile restriction 
on trains inspected by train crews, both proposals also contained 
various other restrictions or conditions that were part of the 500-mile 
restriction that were very different and in FRA's view are 
irreconcilable.
    Although FRA believes that a 500-mile inspection interval would 
most likely increase the safety on today's railroads, FRA does not 
believe that the return to a 500-mile interval is the most efficient or 
most cost-effective method of achieving the desired result, as 
discussed below in more detail. In FRA's view, many of the items 
proposed by the parties in order to make a 500-mile inspection interval 
a viable approach would have the potential for increasing the safety 
risks that already exist. For example, FRA is not currently willing to 
permit trains to travel extended distances without strict operational 
conditions being imposed and without a means to obtain information on 
the condition of such trains at the time they arrive at destination. 
Furthermore, FRA is concerned that any safety gains acquired from a 
500-mile inspection interval would be negated by other provisions 
contained in the various proposals such as allowing the extended 
movement of defective equipment or the performance of ``cursory'' 
inspections by train crews at initial terminals.
    As noted above, both proposals also contained provisions extending 
some flexibility in the movement of defective brake equipment. The 
railroads' proposal permitted the movement of any train with only 95 
percent operative brakes and permitted the defective cars to be hauled 
as far as destination. Although the labor proposal limited the 
locations and trains where defective equipment could be hauled, the 
proposal did permit defective equipment to be hauled out of initial 
terminals and to destination if certain stringent inspection practices 
were implement by the railroad. Currently, 49 U.S.C. 20303 permits 
equipment with defective brakes to be moved only if the movement is 
necessary for conducting repairs and limits such movement to the 
nearest location where the necessary repairs can be effectuated. 
Therefore, both of the proposals were based, in part, on provisions 
designed to provide incentives to perform heightened inspections that 
are contrary to the statutory requirements regarding the movement of 
equipment with defective safety appliances. At the time these proposals 
were discussed by the members of the Working Group it was agreed that 
if a consensus could be achieved, then representatives of all parties 
involved would petition Congress in an attempt to change the current 
statutory requirements. As no consensus was reached, FRA is bound by 
the statutory requirements regarding

[[Page 48303]]

the movement of defective equipment and will not propose any 
requirements that are not in accordance with those provisions. (See 
discussion below titled ``Movement of Defective Equipment.'')
    In 1982, when FRA extended the 500-mile inspection interval to 
1,000 miles, FRA intended that quality initial terminal brake 
inspections would be performed by the railroads. FRA feels that 
railroads have not conducted the excellent initial terminal inspections 
that were contemplated in 1982. Furthermore, contrary to the railroads' 
contention, FRA feels that many initial terminal brake inspections are 
being performed by individuals who are not sufficiently qualified or 
trained. FRA recognizes that since 1982 new technology and improved 
equipment have been developed that allow trains to operate for longer 
distances with fewer defects. However, the key to achieving this 
improved capability is to ensure the proper operation and condition of 
the equipment at the location where the train is initially assembled.
    Although FRA agrees that many of the initial terminal inspections 
conducted by train crews are not of the quality anticipated in 1982 
when the inspection interval was increased from 500 miles to 1,000 
miles, FRA believes that properly trained and qualified train crew 
personnel could perform certain brake inspections and some have been 
performing such inspections for several years. FRA believes that a 
reversion to a 500 mile restriction on trains inspected by train crews 
does not adequately address the concerns regarding the safety of these 
trains and would impose an economic burden on the railroads that cannot 
be justified. Two of the major factors in ensuring the quality of brake 
inspections is the proper training of the persons performing the 
inspections and adequate enforcement of the requirements. Therefore, 
FRA believes that the current 1,000 mile inspection interval should be 
retained but intends to propose general training requirements for 
persons conducting brake inspections. These proposed training 
requirements will include general provisions requiring both classroom 
and ``hands-on'' training, general testing requirements, and annual 
refresher training provisions. FRA is also proposing to require that 
various training records be maintained by the railroads in order for 
FRA to determine the basis for a railroad's determination that a 
particular person is considered qualified to perform a brake 
inspection, test, or repair. FRA believes these general training and 
recordkeeping requirements will provide some assurances that qualified 
people are conducting the required brake system inspections and tests.
    FRA also intends to enhance and increase its enforcement activities 
with regard to the performance of the brake inspections and tests 
proposed in this NPRM, particularly those performed by train crews. FRA 
intends to make a concerted effort to focus on the qualifications of 
train crew members and will strictly scrutinize the method and length 
of time spent by these individuals in the performance of the required 
inspections. This may involve the review of event recorder tapes to 
ensure that a sufficient amount of time was afforded for conducting a 
proper inspection of the brake system. FRA will also focus its 
inspection activities to ensure that train crews are provided the 
proper equipment necessary to perform many of the required inspection.
    In addition to focusing its enforcement and to aid in that 
initiative, FRA proposes to clarify, update, and modify the current 
inspection requirements in order to close what are perceived to be 
existing loopholes and to incorporate what FRA believes to be the best 
practices currently existing in the industry while updating the 
requirements to recognize existing technology. FRA believes, and many 
representatives of rail labor and management agree, that the current 
inspection requirements are very good for the most part and are 
sufficient to ensure a high level of safety, but that they need to be 
strictly enforced, clarified, and updated to recognize existing and new 
technology. Therefore, FRA does not propose an extensive revision of 
the basic brake inspection intervals or requirements. Rather, FRA 
proposes a moderate revision of the requirements, with the intent of 
tightening, expanding, or clarifying those inspection or testing 
requirements which have created enforcement problems or inconsistencies 
in the past. FRA intends to recognize some of the technological 
improvements made in the industry such as the use of two-way EOTs 
during the brake tests and use of the air flow method of qualifying 
train air brake systems. FRA also recognizes that some trains are 
capable of moving extended distances between inspections provided that 
comprehensive inspections are performed at the locations where the 
trains are originated. (See discussion below titled ``Extended Haul 
Trains.'')
    In order to clarify the requirements regarding where and when 
various brake inspections and tests must be performed, FRA proposes to 
modify the terminology related to the power brake inspection and 
testing requirements contained in the current regulations, which is 
generally based on the locations where the inspections and tests are 
performed (i.e., initial terminal, intermediate locations). Instead, 
FRA proposes to identify various classes of inspections based on the 
duties and type of inspection required, such as: Class I; Class IA; and 
Class II. This is similar to the approach taken by FRA in the 1994 NPRM 
and in the proposed rulemaking on passenger equipment safety standards. 
See 59 FR 47736-40. FRA believes that this type of classification 
system will avoid some of the confusion that currently arises regarding 
when and where a certain brake inspection must be performed.
    Currently, the brake system inspection and testing requirements are 
interspersed within Sec. 232.12 and Sec. 232.13 and are not clearly 
delineated. Therefore, FRA believes that reorganizing the major types 
of brake inspections currently contained in the regulations into 
separate and distinct sections will provide the regulated community 
with a better understanding as to when and where each inspection or 
test is required. Although FRA proposes a change in the terminology 
used to describe the various power brake inspections and tests, the 
requirements of these inspections and tests will mirror the current 
requirements and are not intended to change or modify any of the 
voluminous case law that has been developed over the years regarding 
the inspections. Consequently, FRA proposes four major types of brake 
inspections to be performed by freight railroads some time during the 
operation of the equipment. FRA proposes the terms ``Class I,'' ``Class 
IA,'' ``Class II,'' and ``Class III'' to identify the four major types 
of brake inspections required by this proposal.
    The proposed Class I brake test generally contains the requirements 
currently contained in Sec. 232.12 (a) and (c)-(h). These requirements 
have been reorganized to clearly delineate when and how the inspection 
is to be performed based on current interpretations and comments 
received since the 1994 NPRM. The requirements have also been modified 
to require written notification that the test was performed and that 
this notification be retained in the train until it reaches 
destination. The proposed revisions also acknowledge the use of the air 
flow method for qualifying train brake systems and permits the use of 
end-of-train devices in the performance of the test. The proposal also 
provides some latitude to trains received in interchange

[[Page 48304]]

that have a pre-tested car or solid block of cars added at the 
interchange point or that are moved less than 20 miles after being 
received in interchange based on the relative safety of permitting 
these types of trains to continue without the performance of a 
comprehensive Class I brake test.
    The proposed Class IA brake test clarifies the requirements for 
performing 1,000-mile brake inspections currently contained in 
Sec. 232.12(b). The proposal makes clear that the most restrictive car 
or block of cars in the train determines when this inspection must 
occur on the entire train. FRA also proposes to require that railroads 
designate the locations where these inspections will be conducted and 
does not permit a change in those designations without 30-day notice or 
the occurrence of an emergency situation. The proposed Class II and 
Class III brake tests essentially clarify the intermediate terminal 
inspection requirements currently contained in Sec. 232.13(c) and (d) 
regarding the performance of brake system inspections when cars are 
added en route or when the train consist is slightly altered en route.
    In addition to the modifications and clarifications proposed with 
regard to the four major types of brake system inspections, FRA also 
proposes to retain, with clarification and elaboration, the basic 
inspection requirements related to transfer trains currently contained 
at Sec. 232.13(e) as well as the requirements for performing brake 
system inspections using yard air sources currently contained at 
Sec. 232.12(i). FRA also proposes to retain the requirements related to 
the inspection and testing of locomotives when used in double heading 
and helper service currently contained at Sec. 232.15. FRA proposes 
some additional inspection requirements of locomotives when used in 
helper service or when used in distributed power operations to ensure 
the proper functioning of the brakes on these locomotives as these 
types of inspections are not adequately addressed in the current 
regulation. Furthermore, FRA does recognize in this proposal that 
trains, if properly inspected, can safely travel greater than 1,000 
miles between brake inspections. (See discussion below titled 
``Extended Haul Trains.'')
B. Extended Haul Trains
    In the 1994 NPRM, FRA recognized that since 1982 new technology and 
improved equipment have been developed that allow trains to operate for 
longer distances with fewer defects. However, FRA further acknowledged 
that the key to achieving this improved capability is to ensure the 
proper operation and condition of the equipment, and that the best way 
of ensuring the proper operation and condition of equipment is to 
perform quality initial terminal brake inspections and to conduct 
proper equipment maintenance. Therefore, in 1994 FRA proposed a 
sliding-scale approach that based the allowable distance a train may 
travel between brake inspections on a variety of factors and based on 
the conditions that were satisfied by the railroad. Consequently, a 
train would be allowed to travel anywhere between 500 and 3,500 miles 
from the point of initial terminal without additional power brake tests 
or inspections. See 59 FR 47735.
    As noted in the previous discussion, the AAR submitted an 
alternative proposal which would have permitted some trains to travel 
as far as 3,600 miles between brake inspections. Whereas, the BRC and 
other labor representatives objected to any movement beyond 1,000 miles 
based on the railroads' commitment to perform quality initial terminal 
inspections in 1982, which they claim has not happened. However, the 
proposals submitted by both rail labor and rail management during the 
RSAC Working Group deliberations provided provisions for the potential 
movement of trains greater than 1,000 miles between brake and 
mechanical inspections. (A detailed synopsis of these proposals is 
contained in the preceding discussion and will not be reiterated). 
Admittedly, the proposals differed greatly regarding exactly which 
trains would be permitted the extended movements and the process by 
which such movements would be sanctified by FRA. However, all of the 
proposals stressed the necessity that any train permitted to travel 
longer distances between brake inspections would be required to be 
thoroughly inspected by highly qualified inspectors at its point of 
origin or early in the life of the train. Consequently, it is clear 
from the submitted proposals and the presentations made at the time 
they were presented that virtually every member of the industry 
acknowledges that the key to permitting trains to move extended 
distances lies in the quality of the inspection the train receives at 
or near the beginning of its journey.
    FRA Conclusions. FRA continues to believe that if a train is 
properly and thoroughly inspected, with as many defective conditions 
being eliminated as possible, that the train is capable of traveling 
well over 1,000 miles between brake inspections. By this, FRA contends 
that not only must the brake system be in quality condition but that 
the mechanical components of the equipment must be in equally prime 
condition. As the distance a train is allowed to travel increases, the 
mechanical condition of the equipment is a key factor in ensuring the 
proper and safe operation of the train brake system throughout the 
entire trip. FRA also continues to believe that the best place to 
ensure the proper conduct of these inspections and to ensure that the 
train's brake system and mechanical components are in the best 
condition possible is at a train's point of origin (initial terminal).
    In 1994, FRA proposed a set of requirements that must be met by a 
railroad in order to move a train up to 1,500 miles without performing 
additional brake inspections. The requirements included such things as 
low defect ratios, maintenance programs, and the performance of quality 
brake and mechanical inspections at a train's point of origin. FRA 
agrees with several commenters that some of the proposed requirements 
were overly burdensome and were partially predicated on potentially 
subjective standards. However, FRA continues to believe that many of 
the inspection requirements and movement restrictions proposed in 1994 
are valid conditions that must be met in order to permit the extended 
movement of trains. These include: the performance of a quality in-
depth brake inspection by a highly qualified inspector; the performance 
of a quality mechanical inspection by a person qualified under 49 CFR 
215.11; and a restriction on the number of set-outs and pick-ups 
occurring en route. FRA also believes these trains must be closely 
monitored to ensure that both the brake system and mechanical 
components remain safely intact throughout the train's journey.
    FRA proposes to permit certain designated trains to move up to 
1,500 miles between brake and mechanical inspections provided the 
railroad meets various inspection and monitoring requirements, which 
FRA believes will ensure the safe and proper operation of these trains. 
As no trains are currently permitted to travel in excess of 1,000 miles 
between inspections, FRA is not willing to propose more than 1,500 
miles between such inspections until appropriate data is developed 
which establishes that equipment moved under the proposed criteria 
remains in proper condition throughout the train's trip. FRA believes 
that the proposed provision requiring the performance of an inbound 
inspection at destination or at 1,500 miles and the requirement that 
carriers maintain records of all defective

[[Page 48305]]

conditions discovered on these trains create the bases for developing 
such data. In order to ensure the accuracy of the data as well as 
ensure the proper and safe operation of these trains, FRA also proposes 
that these trains have 100 percent operative brakes and contain no cars 
with mechanical defects at their points of origin and at the time of 
departure from the 1,500 point, if moving an additional 1,500 miles 
from that location between brake inspections. FRA further proposes that 
these trains not conduct any pick-ups or set-outs en route, except for 
the removal of defective equipment, in order to minimize the 
disruptions made to the integrity of the train's brake system and 
reduce mechanical damage that may occur during switching operations. In 
addition, there is currently no reliable tracking system available to 
FRA to ensure that cars added to the train en route have been inspected 
in accordance with the proposed requirements.
    As noted earlier in the discussion, FRA believes that in order for 
a train to be permitted to travel 1,500 miles between inspections, the 
train must receive inspections that ensure the optimum condition of 
both the brake system and the mechanical components at the location 
where the train originates. In order to ensure that these quality 
inspections are being performed, FRA proposes to require that they be 
performed by highly qualified and experienced inspectors. As FRA 
intends the Class I brake test that is required to be performed on 
these trains at their point of origin to be as in-depth and 
comprehensive as possible, FRA believes that these inspections must be 
performed by individuals possessing the knowledge to not only identify 
and detect a defective condition in all of the brake equipment required 
to be inspected, but also possess the knowledge to recognize the 
interrelational workings of the equipment and the ability to trouble-
shoot and repair the equipment. Therefore, FRA proposes the term 
``qualified mechanical inspector'' to identify and describe those 
individuals it believes possess the necessary knowledge and experience 
to perform the proposed Class I brake tests on these trains.
    A ``qualified mechanical inspector'' is a person with training or 
instruction in the troubleshooting, inspection, testing, maintenance, 
or repair of the specific train brake systems the person is assigned 
responsibility and who's primary responsibilities include work 
generally consistent with those functions. (See Sec. 232.5 of the 
section-by-section for a more detailed discussion of ``qualified 
mechanical inspector.'') FRA further believes these same highly 
qualified inspectors must be the individuals performing the proposed 
inbound inspection on these extended haul trains in order to ensure 
that all defective conditions are identified at the train's destination 
or 1,500 mile location. Similarly, FRA proposes that all of the 
mechanical inspections required to be performed on these trains be 
conducted by inspectors designated pursuant to 49 CFR 215.11, rather 
than train crew members, in order to ensure that all mechanical 
components are in proper condition prior to the train's departure.
C. Air Flow Method
    The air flow method (AFM) of train air brake testing monitors the 
rate of air flow through the automatic brake valve to the brake pipe by 
the means of a brake pipe flow indicator. The AFM of brake testing is a 
more comprehensive test than the present leakage test. The leakage 
method only measures the amount of leakage from the brake and branch 
pipes, whereas the AFM tests the entire brake system including the 
reservoirs and control valves. In addition, the leakage method does not 
test the capability of the pressure-maintaining feature of the 26L 
brake equipment. The AFM, on the other hand, tests the brake system 
just as it is operated, with the pressure-maintaining feature cut in.
    The AFM of qualifying train air brake systems has been allowed in 
Canada as an alternative to the leakage test since 1984. In addition, 
several railroads in the United States have been using the AFM since 
1989 when the AAR's petition for a waiver of compliance was granted 
allowing the AFM as an alternative to the leakage test. In order to 
determine if the AFM of train air brake testing should be included as 
an alternative to the leakage test, FRA requested comments from 
interested parties in the ANPRM regarding the operating history of the 
AFM. See 57 FR 62552.
    The AAR and several railroads commented on the operating experience 
of using the AFM. These commenters reported that the AFM is an 
effective and reliable method of qualifying train brakes and that the 
greatest benefit of the method is the information it provides to the 
train crew. CP Rail reported that testing on the AFM started in Canada 
in 1975 and became an alternate method of qualifying train brakes in 
1984. CP Rail as well as several other railroads stated that they have 
experienced no problems with the method. Conrail commented that, 
although it initially experienced problems with sticking pointers, 
defective check valves, and protruding screws on the air flow meters, 
these problems have been eliminated. Conrail also stated that use of 
the AFM has indicated a slight reduction in undesired emergencies. 
Several railroads commented that the AFM provides information to the 
train crew regarding the brake pipe that is not provided by the leakage 
test. Two railroads responded that in all the years they have used the 
AFM they have experienced no instance where a train had to stop because 
the air flow could not be maintained. The AAR maintained that the 
failure rate of the air flow indicators is less than 1 percent. In 
fact, Conrail stated that it performed 9,000 air flow indicator 
calibrations in 1992 and found only 90 defective indicators. Several 
railroads commented that they currently calibrate the air flow meters 
on a 60-day to 92-day basis and have no problem with current 
calibration procedures. Two railroads noted that they initially had 
problems calibrating the devices due to orifice sizes but have since 
cured this problem. One railroad mentioned that it had problems 
calibrating the devices in extremely cold weather until it applied 
condition eight of FRA's waiver to the calibration of the gauge on the 
locomotive as well as the test orifices. (``The air flow indicator 
calibration test orifice shall be calibrated at temperatures of not 
less than 20 degrees Fahrenheit.'')
    Railroad representatives unanimously opposed any requirement that 
would make using the AFM mandatory or the sole method of qualifying 
brake systems. All railroad commenters supported the adoption of the 
AFM as an alternative to the leakage test for qualifying braking 
systems. Most of these commenters suggested that the use of either 
method is an economical or operational decision that should be made by 
each individual railroad. One railroad recommended that trains 
qualified under the AFM should be requalified with the leakage test if 
the air flow indicator fails en route. The cost figures presented by 
the AAR and several railroads for equipping locomotives with air flow 
meters range from $350 to $1,450 per unit.
    Both the Railway Labor Executives' Association (RLEA) and the BRC 
as well as several individual carmen opposed the adoption of the AFM as 
an alternative method of qualifying brake systems. The parties felt 
that the leakage test is the only reliable method for determining the 
integrity of the air brake system and for identifying leaks. These 
commenters stated that the AFM only determines whether the brake pipe 
is

[[Page 48306]]

compensating for existing leaks and does not identify the severity of 
the leak, and thus, trains would be allowed to operate with leaks over 
5-psi, which is dangerous especially in cold weather and could result 
in an emergency application or derailment.
    Westinghouse Air Brake Company (WABCO) responded stating that both 
the leakage test and the AFM combined with the 15-psi gradient 
restriction are effective and acceptable methods of qualifying braking 
systems. WABCO commented that the 60-CFM limit required by the AFM and 
the 5-psi limit required by the leakage test are both conservative 
figures in view of today's braking system capabilities, and that the 5-
psi limit was derived long before today's pressure maintaining feature 
which is an integral part of all locomotive brake valves. WABCO stated 
that front-to-rear gradient is the most important element of braking 
performance and that long trains with a 15-psi gradient can be operated 
with no problem. This commenter also mentioned that the 60-CFM limit of 
the AFM would allow higher leakage on shorter trains but nothing that 
would cause a problem in brake operations if the 15-psi gradient is 
maintained.
    Based on these comments, FRA proposed the air flow method as an 
alternative method for qualifying train brake systems in the 1994 NPRM. 
See 59 FR 47734. In response to this proposal, labor representatives 
continued to express opposition to the use of the air flow method as an 
alternative to the leakage test contending that it would not accurately 
measure the overall leakage in a train's air brake system. At a 
minimum, these commenters recommended that short freight trains not be 
allowed to use the air flow method as it may allow their operation with 
excessive leakage; however, these commenters did not provide an 
indication on what the size limitation should be. These commenters also 
urged FRA to adopt a 92-day calibration period as that is current 
practice. The proposals submitted by railroad management in the RSAC 
Working Group meetings included the option of using the air flow method 
when performing brake inspections. The Working Group did not address 
this portion of the carrier's proposal since the discussions were 
focused on more general requirements related to the inspection and 
testing of brake equipment.
    FRA Conclusions. FRA believes that if a train contains a locomotive 
equipped with 26L freight locomotive brake equipment and the train is 
equipped with an EOT device, that train should be allowed to be 
qualified using the AFM. The AFM would be an alternative to the leakage 
test for qualifying properly equipped freight train brake systems. FRA 
recognizes the concerns of several labor organization commenters 
opposing the adoption of the AFM; however, FRA believes these 
commenters' apprehension is based on their unfamiliarity with the 
method. As FRA pointed out in the ANPRM and the 1994 NPRM, and as 
several commenters confirmed, the AFM is a much more comprehensive test 
than the leakage test. See 57 FR 62551, 59 FR 47682-47683. The AFM 
tests the entire brake system just as it is used, with the pressure-
maintaining feature cut in. The method has been allowed in Canada since 
1984 without any problems. Based on the comments from several railroads 
and information obtained during the method's testing from 1981 to 1988, 
FRA feels the AFM is an effective and reliable alternative method of 
qualifying train brakes. Although FRA is not mandating the use of the 
AFM, FRA does encourage railroads to use the method on all trains, not 
necessarily for qualifying the brake systems, but as a means of 
providing additional information regarding the brake system to the 
train crew. FRA further believes that calibration of the air flow 
indicators should be performed at least every 92 days, based on the 
fact that it is the calibration period required by the current FRA 
waiver granted to the AAR and because most railroads stated that they 
already calibrate the air flow indicators every 60 to 92 days and gave 
no indication that the period should be altered. See 54 FR 5195 (Feb. 
1, 1989).
    FRA also shares the same concerns as some commenters in allowing 
the use of the AFM as a means of qualifying braking systems on 
relatively short freight trains. FRA tends to agree that due to the 
shorter length of these types of trains the use of the AFM to qualify 
their brake systems might allow these trains to operate with excessive 
brake pipe leakage. However, FRA also tends to agree that if the 
proposed 15-psi gradient is maintained then the leakage on these 
shorter freight trains should not cause a problem in brake operations. 
Furthermore, FRA is not currently able to adequately delineate those 
freight trains, if any, that should not be afforded the option of using 
the AFM. Consequently, FRA seeks comment from interested parties on the 
following:
    1. What is the current industry practice and experience regarding 
the use of the AFM on relatively short freight trains?
    2. Is there an identifiable train length at which the use of the 
AFM creates the potential for a train to operate with excessive 
leakage?
D. Brake Pipe Reduction
    Present regulations require brake-pipe reductions of either 15 
pounds, 20 pounds, or full service depending on which of the required 
train air brake test is being performed. See 49 CFR 232.12, 232.13. In 
the ANPRM, FRA sought comments from interested parties to determine if 
it is feasible and beneficial for FRA to establish one standard brake-
pipe reduction for all required train air brake tests. See 57 FR 62556.
    The AAR and several railroads recommended that some type of 
performance standard be established so that each railroad could 
determine the amount of reduction that best suits its operation. The 
AAR also suggested that if the reduction amounts were left in the 
discretion of the individual railroads, it would be receptive to a 
requirement that the railroad indicate what reduction rates it would 
use at different locations. Several railroads commented that one 
standard reduction should be required for all tests and inspections and 
that the standard should not require an increase to a full service 
reduction because such a practice could cause undesired releases. These 
commenters also noted that one standardized reduction for all tests 
would simplify air brake tests and make it easier for the railroads to 
train and instruct their employees. Most of the commenting railroads 
suggested a 20-psi reduction if a specific amount were established.
    Representatives of several labor organizations recommended that one 
standard reduction be established by FRA rather than allowing each 
individual railroad to determine their own reductions. This 
recommendation was based on the commenters' concern that varying 
reduction standards among the railroads would cause confusion for train 
crews since many railroads swap trains and operate crews over each 
other's lines. These commenters also felt that one standardized 
reduction would make training easier.
    In the 1994 NPRM, FRA proposed a standardized brake pipe reduction 
of 20-psi for all required brake inspections and tests. See 59 FR 
47688. The only response FRA received to this proposal was from the BRC 
which contended that a 20-psi reduction was not good for determining 
brake pipe leakage since the higher the pressure in the brake pipe, the 
greater the leakage. This commenter recommended that FRA retain a 15-
psi reduction requirement for the performance of the leakage test.
    FRA Conclusions. FRA intends to again propose a standardized brake 
pipe

[[Page 48307]]

reduction of 20-psi for all brake inspections except in regard to the 
brake inspection performed on a transfer train. Due to the lower air 
pressure at which the transfer train brake test is performed, FRA 
believes that requiring only a 15-psi reduction during this inspection 
is the most effective for ensuring the proper operation of the brake 
system on these train. FRA recognizes BRC's concerns regarding impact 
of an increased air pressure reduction on the performance of the 
leakage portion of a brake test; however, FRA believes that the 
concerns are addressed by FRA's proposal to increase the minimum 
pressure at the rear of the train from 60-psi to 75-psi. Furthermore, 
FRA agrees with many of the commenters that a standardized brake pipe 
reduction of 20-psi is sufficient for the performance of all other 
required brake inspections and tests. FRA believes that the adoption of 
one standard reduction will simplify both the performance of the 
required inspections and the training of employees charged with 
performing these inspections. Under the proposal, FRA would no longer 
require full service reductions for any of required inspections in 
order to avoid the possibility of undesired releases.
    FRA believes that the suggestion of several commenters to allow 
each railroad to determine its own brake pipe reduction is not viable. 
It is not uncommon to find train crews operating in several different 
locations or to find the train crew of one railroad operating the 
equipment belonging to another railroad or operating over the lines of 
another railroad. Thus, if various reductions were established by 
different railroads or by one railroad in different locations, it would 
cause further confusion in both the performance of the inspections and 
the training of personnel.
E. Charging of Air Brake System
    Present regulations for air brake testing basically require that 
cars that have previously been tested in accordance with the 
regulations either ``be kept charged until road motive power is 
attached'' or be retested. 49 CFR 232.12(i). Based on longstanding 
administrative interpretation and practice, FRA presumes that a brake 
system is no longer adequately charged if disconnected from the 
charging device (supply of pressurized air) for more than two hours 
before coupling of locomotives; otherwise, retesting is required. In 
the ANPRM, FRA requested comments from interested parties regarding the 
viability of this interpretation and sought information for developing 
alternative procedures that would not jeopardize safety. See 57 FR 
62556.
    The AAR and several railroads stated that there is no reason to 
assume that once a train is charged and tested and then left standing 
without being provided with a source of compressed air that the brake 
system would become defective. These parties suggested that leakage on 
standing trains has been greatly reduced through the use of welded 
brake piping and fittings and ferrule-clamped air hoses. These 
commenters felt that FRA's interpretation of allowing trains to sit 
without air for only two hours is from an era when this new equipment 
was not used. They also stated that FRA's current interpretation costs 
the industry money, fuel, and time and creates pollution because trains 
must either be reinspected or left with a locomotive attached and 
idling in order to avoid performing a full initial terminal test. 
Several railroads suggested that trains could be off air indefinitely 
if the consist is not altered, or at least as long as 24 hours, and 
remain in the same condition. Several commenters recommended that if a 
set of cars is off air for an extended period, all that should be 
required is a set-and-release test to assure the continuity of the 
brake pipe. CP Rail Services mentioned that there is no such two-hour 
rule in Canada and stated that in Canada if cars are off air for any 
length of time a set-and-release continuity test is required. Every 
commenting railroad felt the current two-hour interpretation is onerous 
and unrealistic.
    The BLE, BRC, and several individual carmen felt that the current 
interpretation is reasonable. Most of these commenters expressed 
concern for the integrity of the brake system if a consist were left 
standing for longer than two hours. These concerns were aimed at the 
effect that climate might have on the equipment and the increased 
possibility of vandalism to the equipment if consists sat without air 
for longer periods. One conductor recommended returning to a four-hour 
limit as a minimum.
    FRA Conclusions. In the 1994 NPRM, FRA proposed to permit trains to 
be removed from a continuous source of compressed air for up to four 
hours without requiring the re-performance of a comprehensive brake 
inspection. FRA received very few comments that directly addressed the 
safety implications of this proposal, thus, FRA intends to propose the 
four hour time limitation in this NPRM. FRA agrees that our 
longstanding administrative interpretation, that requires the retesting 
of cars disconnected from a charging device for longer than two hours, 
was established prior to the development of new equipment that has 
greatly reduced leakage problems, such as welded brake piping and 
fittings and ferrule-clamped air hoses. However, contrary to several 
railroads' assertions, FRA does not believe that cars should be allowed 
to be off air for extended periods of time without being retested. FRA 
believes that the longer cars sit without air attached the greater the 
chances are that the integrity of the brake system will be compromised. 
The longer cars sit the more susceptible they may be to weather 
conditions or even vandalism, as some commenters suggested. 
Consequently, based on today's equipment, operating practices, and 
overriding safety concerns, FRA feels that cars should not be 
disconnected from a continuous supply of pressurized air for longer 
than four hours without being retested. FRA also believes that the 
source of compressed air must be sufficient to maintain the integrity 
of the brake system. Consequently, FRA proposes to require that the 
source of compressed air be maintained at a minimum level of 60 psi.

III. Movement of Equipment With Defective Brakes.

    The current regulations do not contain requirements pertaining to 
the movement of equipment with defective power brakes. The movement of 
equipment with these types of defects is currently controlled by a 
specific statutory provision originally enacted in 1910, which states:

    (a) GENERAL.-- A vehicle that is equipped in compliance with 
this chapter whose equipment becomes defective or insecure 
nevertheless may be moved when necessary to make repairs, without a 
penalty being imposed under section 21302 of this title, from the 
place at which the defect or insecurity was first discovered to the 
nearest available place at which the repairs can be made--
    (1) on the railroad line on which the defect or insecurity was 
discovered; or
    (2) at the option of a connecting railroad carrier, on the 
railroad line of the connecting carrier, if not further than the 
place of repair described in clause (1) of this subsection.

49 U.S.C. 20303(a) (emphasis added).
    Although there is no limit contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303 as to the 
number of cars with defective equipment that may be hauled in a train, 
FRA has a longstanding interpretation which requires that, at a 
minimum, 85 percent of the cars in a train have operative brakes. FRA 
bases this interpretation on another statutory requirement which 
permits a railroad to use a train only if ``at least 50 percent of the 
vehicles in

[[Page 48308]]

the train are equipped with power or train brakes and the engineer is 
using the power or train brakes on those vehicles and on all other 
vehicles equipped with them that are associated with those vehicles in 
a train.'' 49 U.S.C. 20302(a)(5)(B). As originally enacted in 1903, 
section 20302 also granted the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) the 
authority to increase this percentage, and in 1910 the ICC issued an 
order increasing the minimum percentage to 85 percent. See 49 CFR 
232.1, which codified the ICC order.
    As virtually all freight cars are presently equipped with power 
brakes and are operated on an associated trainline, the statutory 
requirement is in essence a requirement that 100 percent of the cars in 
a train have operative power brakes, unless being hauled for repairs 
pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 20303. Consequently, FRA currently requires that 
equipment with defective or inoperative air brakes make up no more than 
15 percent of the train and that if it is necessary to move the 
equipment from where the railroad first discovered it to be defective, 
the defective equipment be moved no further than the nearest place on 
the railroad's line where the necessary repairs can be made or, at the 
option of the receiving carrier, to a repair location that is no 
further than the repair location on the delivering line.
    In addition to the general requirements relating to the movement of 
equipment with defective safety appliances, FRA requires 100 percent 
operative brakes on trains departing initial terminal locations. The 
100 percent at initial terminal requirement has been a standard by 
which the railroad industry has operated for decades and one which FRA 
has endorsed since its inception. The requirement is founded on 
Congress' incorporation of the AAR's rules, standards, and instructions 
as of April 11, 1958, regarding the installation, inspection, 
maintenance, and repair of train brakes. In 1958, Congress amended 
Sec. 9 of the Safety Appliance Acts by incorporating the inspection 
requirements of the AAR into the statute and permitting their change 
only for the purpose of achieving safety.4 Based on a review 
of the legislative history surrounding that amendment, FRA believes it 
is clear that Congress interpreted the AAR standards as requiring 100 
percent operative on all trains prior to departure from an initial 
terminal. As the current regulations regarding the performance of an 
initial terminal inspection contained at 49 CFR Sec. 232.12 (c)-(j) 
were basically an adoption of the AAR inspection and testing standards 
as they existed in 1958, FRA believes that the current regulations are 
intended and do require 100 percent operative brakes at initial 
terminals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ In 1994, Congress recodified the federal railroad safety 
laws and 45 U.S.C. Sec. 9 of the Safety Appliance Acts is currently 
codified at 49 U.S.C. Secs. 20301 and 20302. The reference to the 
AAR rules, standards, and instructions was removed during the 
recodification as being obsolete. See Pub. L. 103-272 (July 5, 
1994).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the 1994 NPRM, FRA proposed conditions for the movement of 
equipment with defective brakes without civil liability which 
incorporated the stringent conditions contained in the Safety Appliance 
Acts, presently codified at 49 U.S.C. 20302, 20303, 21302, and 21304. 
See 59 FR 47728. FRA proposed the codification of these requirements in 
order to clarify the duties of a railroad and to ensure the safe 
movement of this equipment. In 1994, FRA further proposed that all cars 
and locomotives found with defective brake equipment be required to be 
tagged as bad ordered and determined safe to move by a qualified person 
in order to be deemed as being hauled for repairs. FRA also attempted 
to delineate when a location would be considered a repair location by 
interpreting that locations where repair trucks or vehicles had visited 
within the last 365 days would be considered repair locations for 
purposes of the proposal. See 59 FR 47697.
    Several railroad representatives commented that FRA's 
interpretation of a repair location with regard to mobile repair trucks 
was inadequate, overly broad, and failed to consider many of the 
factors necessary for determining whether a location is a place where 
repairs can be effectuated. Labor representatives not only recommended 
that defective equipment not be allowed to move past a yard, siding, or 
other location accessible to a mobile repair truck, but also suggested 
a 125 mile limit on the movement of such equipment. In its alternative 
proposal to the 1994 NPRM, the AAR proposed that all trains could 
depart initial terminals with only 95 percent operative brakes, 
regardless of whether repairs could be effectuated at the location. 
This proposal was premised on the contention that there is not a safety 
risk posed by a train operating with 95 percent operative brakes and 
that FRA acknowledges this because it currently permits trains to 
operate with only 85 percent operative brakes. The AAR's alternative 
proposal also would have permitted some trains to operate with less 
than 85 percent operative brakes if appropriate operational measures 
were taken to move the train safely.
    The proposals submitted by both rail labor and rail management 
representatives as part of the RSAC Working Group deliberations 
contained provisions for permitting the movement of equipment with 
defective brakes to be hauled from or past locations where the 
necessary repairs could be effectuated. Similar to the AAR's 
alternative proposal, the carrier's proposal would have permitted all 
trains to operate with only 95 percent operative brakes but would have 
capped the percentage at 90 percent rather the current 85 percent. As 
noted previously, the railroad's proposal was part of a package that 
included 500-mile inspections and flexibility in the movement of 
defective equipment was considered essential by the railroads in order 
to accept the reduced inspection intervals. Although labor's proposal 
permitted some trains to operate out of initial terminals and to 
destination with only 95 percent operative brakes, the proposal limited 
the flexibility to trains that were thoroughly inspected by carmen. 
Furthermore, labor's proposal was also presented as a package which 
included many other requirements intended to ensure the safety of 
permitting some trains to operate with a few defective cars entrained.
    FRA Conclusions. It is clear from the preceding discussion that 
many of the proposals received by FRA since the issuance of the 1994 
NPRM are in direct conflict with various statutory requirements. As the 
RSAC Working Group was unable to reach a consensus on the inspection, 
testing, and maintenance requirements for freight train brake systems, 
FRA is not willing or able to propose provisions regarding the movement 
of equipment with defective brakes that would be contrary to existing 
statutory mandates. Therefore, FRA intends to propose provisions 
related to the movement of defective equipment which are very similar 
to the requirements proposed in the 1994 NPRM. See 59 FR 47728. 
However, the current proposal clarifies the tagging requirements, 
contains provisions regarding the placement of defective equipment, and 
provides a consistent method for calculating the percentage of 
operative brakes on a train. Consequently, in addition to being 
consistent with the statutory requirements, FRA believes that the 
proposed requirements will ensure the safe and proper movement of 
defective equipment and will clarify the duties imposed on a railroad 
when moving such equipment.
    FRA proposes that all cars or locomotives found with defective or

[[Page 48309]]

inoperative braking equipment be tagged as bad ordered with a 
designation of the location where the necessary repairs can and will be 
effectuated. FRA has again attempted to expressly clarify the 
requirement that equipment with defective brakes shall not depart from 
or be moved beyond a location where the necessary repairs to the 
equipment can be performed. Therefore, if a car or locomotive is found 
with defective brakes during any of the proposed brake inspections or 
while the piece of equipment is en route and the location where the 
defective equipment is discovered is a place where repairs of the type 
needed can be performed, that car or locomotive shall not be moved from 
that location until the necessary repairs are effectuated. However, if 
repairs to the defective condition cannot be performed at the location 
where the defect is discovered, or should have been discovered, this 
proposal makes clear that the railroad is permitted to move the 
equipment with the defective condition only to the nearest location 
where the necessary repairs can be performed.
    What constitutes the nearest location where the necessary repairs 
can be performed is an issue FRA has grappled with for decades and has 
become exceedingly more difficult with the growing use of mobile repair 
trucks. In the preamble to the 1994 NPRM, FRA attempted to clarify the 
issue by stating that any location visited in the last 365 days by a 
repair truck or vehicle, capable of making repairs of the type 
required, would be considered the nearest point where repairs could be 
effectuated. See 59 FR 47697. After consideration of all of the 
comments received and based upon FRA's enforcement experience, FRA 
believes that this statement does not sufficiently address the issue 
and may lead to undesired consequences. FRA believes that mobile repair 
trucks are a valuable asset, not only economically for the railroads 
but also from a safety perspective, as they provide the ability to 
conduct repairs at outlying locations and thus, reduce the movement of 
defective equipment. It became apparent to FRA that the statement made 
in the 1994 NPRM regarding mobile repair trucks, would lead to 
railroads contending that various repair trucks lacked the capability 
of making brake repairs because the railroad voluntarily removed spare 
brake equipment and air compressors from the trucks, thus, 
circumventing the trucks' usefulness. In addition, the statement would 
tend to create a potential repair location whenever a truck was used to 
effectuate a repair at a location where it has never conducted repairs 
in the past, thereby, decreasing a railroad's incentive for performing 
repairs on a particularly hazardous piece of equipment if it is not a 
certain location.
    Rather than attempt to develop a standard applicable to all 
situations, which FRA does not believe can be accomplished, FRA intends 
to approach the issue of what constitutes the nearest repair location 
based on a case-by-case analysis of each situation. FRA believes that 
its field inspectors are in the best position to determine whether a 
railroad exercised good faith in determining when and where to move a 
piece of defective equipment. In making these determinations both the 
railroad as well as FRA's inspectors must conduct a multi-factor 
analysis based on the facts of each case.
    The following discussion is based upon the voluminous case law 
which exists that establishes the guiding principles for determining 
whether a location constitutes the nearest location where the necessary 
repairs can be made as well as previous guidance provided by FRA 
regarding identification of repair locations. In determining whether a 
particular location is a location where necessary repairs can be made 
or whether a location is the nearest repair location, the accessibility 
of the location and the ability to safely make the repairs at that 
location are the two overriding factors that must be considered in any 
analysis. These two factors have a multitude of sub-factors which must 
be considered, such as: the type of repair required; the safety of 
employees responsible for conducting the repairs; the safety of 
employees responsible for getting the equipment to or from a particular 
location; the switching operations necessary to effectuate the move; 
the railroad's recent history and current practice of making repairs 
(brake and non-brake) at a particular location; and relevant weather 
conditions. Although the distance to a repair location is a key factor, 
distance alone is not the determining factor of whether a particular 
location is the nearest location for purposes of effectuating repairs 
and must be considered in conjunction with the factors noted above. 
Existing case law makes clear that neither the congestion of work at a 
particular location or convenience to the railroad are to be considered 
when conducting this analysis.
    FRA will continue to require 100 percent operative brakes on trains 
at their point of origin (initial terminal). As noted above, this has 
been a requirement in the railroad industry for decades and FRA 
believes it is not only wise from a safety standpoint, as it ensures 
the proper operation of a train's brake system at least once during its 
life, but it sets the proper tone for what FRA expects to be 
accomplished at these locations. FRA believes that requiring 100 
percent operative brakes on all trains at their inception provides the 
railroads with a margin for failure of some brakes while the train is 
in transit (up to 15 percent) and tends to ensure that defective 
equipment is being repaired in a timely fashion. In addition, FRA 
believes that the 100 percent requirement is consistent not only with 
Congress' understanding of the AAR inspection standards that were 
adopted in 1958, but also with the intent of FRA, rail management, and 
rail labor as to what was to occur at initial terminals when the 
inspection interval was increased from 500 miles to 1,000 miles in 
1982. At that time, carrier representatives committed to the 
performance of quality initial terminal inspections in exchange for an 
extension in the inspection interval, for which FRA intends to hold 
them accountable. In addition, the 100 percent requirement is 
consistent with the statutory requirements regarding the movement of 
defective equipment because a majority of the locations where trains 
are initiated have the capability of conducting virtually any brake 
system repair, and thus, the defective equipment could not be moved 
from those locations anyway.
    FRA recognizes that the 100 percent requirement at points of origin 
tends to be somewhat burdensome for some railroads at certain 
locations. However, FRA has made clear in its technical bulletins that 
railroads are free to petition for a waiver of this requirement upon 
showing that it is not capable of making repairs at these locations and 
that alternative means are provided to ensure a similar level of safety 
at those locations. To date, no railroad has filed such a petition. 
Therefore, it appears that there are very few locations where the 
requirement is a burden and railroads are either capable of repairing 
the cars at those locations or have devised alternative means for 
moving the cars from those locations.
    The latter portion of the preceding scenario is somewhat troubling 
to FRA. Currently, railroads are required to have 100 percent operative 
brakes at initial terminals, however, railroads are permitted to pick-
up defective cars at these same locations, if the necessary repairs 
cannot be performed, and haul them for repairs. Thus, a situation 
exists wherein the railroad is required to set defective cars out of a 
train if the train

[[Page 48310]]

is initiated at that location, but are then able to pick-up those same 
defective cars in an en route train and haul them to the nearest 
location where the necessary repairs can be performed. FRA recognizes 
that this creates a somewhat illogical situation; however, FRA believes 
that by retaining the 100 percent requirement at these locations the 
public is assured that a train's brake system is in near perfect 
condition at the beginning of its journey, train crews are more 
cognizant of the presence of defective cars in the train when they are 
picked-up en route, railroads are more likely to perform repairs at a 
location where trains are initiated in order to avoid breaking-up 
trains to set-out defective cars once the trains are assembled, and FRA 
retains a clear and consistent enforcement standard that can be easily 
understood by its inspectors and railroad industry employees.
    Although FRA has internally attempted to develop suitable industry-
wide criteria for permitting trains to depart points of origin with a 
minimum number of defective brakes if the location is one where the 
necessary repairs cannot be made, FRA is not willing to permit such 
flexibility without fully considering the safety hazards or potential 
abuses which may accompany such an approach. Therefore, FRA seeks 
comment from interested parties regarding the potential for permitting 
very limited flexibility in moving defective equipment from outlying 
points of origin which lack the capability of effectuating brake system 
repairs. Of major concern to FRA is the potential for railroads to 
designate a large number of locations, where trains are initiated, as 
being unable to effectuate brake system repairs by merely closing 
existing repair facilities or reducing the capability of mobile repair 
vehicles at the locations. Therefore, any potential flexibility must 
ensure that only those locations that are truly incapable of performing 
brake system repairs, due the physical geography or design of the 
location, are afforded the flexibility. In addition, FRA must have the 
ability to approve any designation made by a railroad to ensure that 
the location is truly one in need of the flexibility and that the 
designated repair location is actually the nearest location where 
proper repairs could be made. Furthermore, any approach must also 
ensure the adequate identification and tracking of the trains and 
defective equipment moved from the location.
    One potential method of ensuring limited designations is to require 
the designation of a location within a very short distance (50-100 
miles) of the outlying location where all repairs will be conducted. 
Under this approach, FRA would strictly limit the percentage of 
inoperative brakes (5 percent or less) that could be moved in a train 
from that location and would require a qualified inspector to determine 
the safety of such a move. An alternative approach might include the 
ability of the railroad to perform something less than a full Class I 
brake test at the train's point of origin and permit the movement of 
the train a very short distance (50 miles or less) to a designated 
location where the train would receive a complete Class I brake test.
    FRA believes that permitting some limited flexibility in this area 
might have the potential of actually increasing the safety of trains 
originating at some outlying locations that lack the ability to 
effectuate brake system repairs. It would likely reduce the amount of 
switching that occurs at these locations as defective equipment could 
remain entrained until it reaches a more conducive location for being 
repaired, inspected, or set-out of the train. It might also reduce the 
percentage of defective equipment which may move in any single train 
from some of these locations where run-through or local trains are used 
to move the defective equipment to another location for repair as 
railroads will not let the number of cars with defects build-up. In 
addition, it would reduce the distance that defective equipment is 
hauled before proper repairs are made since any approach would limit 
the distance such cars could be hauled before repairs or reinspection 
would be required. Furthermore, a more flexible approach might have the 
potential for increasing the quality of inspections since the 
restrictions for handling a defective piece of equipment would be 
somewhat less and trains would have the ability to be moved to a 
location where highly experienced inspectors are available.
    In light of the preceding discussion, FRA seeks comments from all 
interested parties regarding the viability of permitting some 
flexibility in the 100 percent requirement for trains initiated at 
outlying locations that lack repair capability and seeks 
recommendations on potential approaches for permitting such 
flexibility. Specifically, FRA seeks comment or information on the 
following:
    1. How many locations currently exist that are initial terminals 
for some trains that lack the capability of effectuating any brake 
system repairs? Partial repair ability? If so, what types of repairs 
can generally be made?
    2. How many trains are currently initiated at locations that lack 
the capability to perform brake system repairs?
    3. How do railroads currently handle equipment found with defective 
brakes at initial terminals that lack the ability to effectuate the 
necessary repairs?
    4. What operational or recordkeeping requirements should be imposed 
on trains if they were permitted to depart a point of origin with a 
minimum number of cars with defective brakes entrained?
    5. Are any of the potential safety benefits described above valid? 
What are the potential safety hazards or concerns in permitting such 
flexibility?

IV. Dynamic Brakes

    The issue of dynamic brakes, and the extent to which FRA should 
impose regulatory requirements governing their use, if at all, is one 
which has prompted lengthy and animated debate between all affected 
parties since the issuance of the ANPRM in December 1992. Coincident 
with the drafting of the ANPRM, the Rail Safety Enforcement and Review 
Act amended Section 202 of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 
(recodified at 49 U.S.C. 20141), and mandated, in part, that FRA, 
``where applicable, prescribe regulations that establish standards on 
dynamic braking equipment.'' This specific mandate is derived largely 
from two NTSB recommendations to FRA concerning dynamic brakes 
following the Southern Pacific Transportation Company (SP) accident at 
San Bernardino, California on May 25, 1989.
    In this accident, excessive tonnage and excessive speed cresting a 
2.2 percent grade, complicated by the fact that the train crew had been 
provided erroneous information regarding available and operative 
dynamic brakes, led to a train that was out of control and was 
ultimately unable to stop before derailing. While the NTSB determined 
the primary cause of the accident to be the excessive weight of the 
train as compared to that reported to the train crew, a secondary cause 
was determined to be the fact that the engineer had far less operable 
dynamic braking available for use than expected. The combination of 
these two conditions likely led to flawed decision making by the train 
crew in developing train handling strategies for negotiating the grade 
safely. In its final report, the Safety Board issued the following 
recommendations to the FRA regarding dynamic brakes:
    1. Study, in conjunction with the AAR, the feasibility of 
developing a positive method to indicate to the operating engineer in 
the cab of the controlling locomotive unit the

[[Page 48311]]

condition of the dynamic brakes on all units in the train.
    2. Revise regulations to require that if a locomotive unit is 
equipped with dynamic brakes that the dynamic brakes function.
    To reiterate the general explanation of the principles of dynamic 
braking, as provided in both the ANPRM (57 FR 62546) and 1994 NPRM (59 
FR 47676), dynamic brakes were developed as a ``free'' by-product of 
the diesel-electric drive train. By engaging the dynamic brake, the 
normally powered traction motors on each axle are changed to 
generators, and the power generated is dissipated through resistance 
grids. The effect is similar to that of shifting an automobile to a 
lower gear when descending a steep grade. The additional hardware 
needed to outfit a locomotive with dynamic brakes includes the grids 
and the controls and switches.
    The primary selling point of dynamic brakes has been the ability to 
reduce freight car brake shoe wear. The dynamic brake is also useful in 
controlling train slack in lieu of using the locomotive independent 
brake. Furthermore, use of the dynamic brake in controlling train speed 
in lieu of power braking, where the train brake is applied with the 
locomotive under power, is a major factor in fuel savings. Due to these 
benefits, railroads currently emphasize and encourage the use of 
dynamic brakes as evidenced through examination of numerous carriers' 
operating rules which dictate the use of dynamic braking as the 
preferred method of slowing and/or controlling a train, especially in 
heavy grade territory. Historically, dynamic brakes have been applied 
to locomotives at the individual railroad's option, primarily based on 
economic considerations. It is important to note that, at present, the 
vast majority of new locomotives procured by the railroads are equipped 
with dynamic brakes.
    In order to determine the types of requirements or standards that 
should be developed regarding the design and use of dynamic brakes, FRA 
requested comments from interested parties regarding the reliability, 
testing, and cost of dynamic brakes as well as the types of information 
that are or could be provided to the engineer regarding the 
availability and operation of the devices. See 57 FR 62555. Comments 
were received from numerous interested parties, and were discussed at 
length in the 1994 NPRM. See 59 FR 47686. Nearly all of these comments 
parallel discussions that transpired throughout the RSAC Working Group 
deliberations and negotiations, discussed later in this section, and as 
such, are not reiterated here in an effort to avoid redundancy. In 
summary, while FRA was not persuaded that dynamic brakes warrant 
emphasis as the primary safety system, the agency recognized that the 
statute communicates a valid safety concern, properly construed. That 
is, to the extent significant emphasis is placed on dynamic brakes, 
either by the railroads as a legitimate means of limiting fuel 
consumption, undesired emergency brake applications, and wear to 
freight car components, or by safety critics who do not foresee that 
hazard of reliance on such systems, engineers may in fact be encouraged 
to make errors in judgment that take them beyond prudent safety 
margins. At such a critical point, proper functioning of any secondary 
safety system, however subject to failure, is very desirable. Further, 
dynamic brakes offer a redundant safety feature should the engineer 
make a mistake in judgment leading to excessive speed under the 
prevailing conditions of grade, tonnage, and weather.
    Although FRA did not propose requiring that locomotives be equipped 
with dynamic brakes in the 1994 NPRM, FRA did acknowledge that 
Congress, in Sec. 20141, intended for FRA to develop meaningful and 
enforceable standards regarding the safe use and operation of dynamic 
brakes. Accordingly, and upon considering comments received in response 
to the ANPRM, FRA proposed the following general requirements for 
inclusion in the 1994 NPRM:
    (1) Engineers should be informed on the safe and proper use of 
dynamic brakes;
    (2) Engineers should be provided with information regarding the 
total dynamic brake retarding force available on all outbound trains 
equipped with dynamic brakes;
    (3) Railroads operating braking systems that include dynamic brakes 
should have written operating rules, tailored to the specific equipment 
and territory of each railroad, governing the safe handling procedures 
for the use of dynamic brakes under all operating conditions, including 
procedures covering the loss of dynamic brakes;
    (4) Running tests of the dynamic brake should be performed whenever 
the motive power or engine crew is changed so that the availability, or 
lack of availability, of the device can be rechecked; and
    (5) Locomotives built after January 1, 1996, and equipped with 
dynamic brakes, should be able to (i) test the electrical integrity of 
the dynamic brake at rest, and (ii) display the total train dynamic 
brake retarding force, at certain speed increments in the cab of the 
controlling locomotive.
    Comments received during both the public hearings and in writing, 
following issuance of the 1994 NPRM, predominately reiterated comments 
provided in response to the ANPRM. Specifically, railroads and 
suppliers emphasized their contention that dynamic brakes are not the 
primary braking system for a train, but rather are economical devices 
utilized to increase the efficiency of their operations. These 
commenters clearly stated that the decision to equip and operate 
locomotives with dynamic brakes is one dictated by economics, and as 
such, should be governed by specific operating rules and not by federal 
regulation. A number of railroads noted that the technology has not 
been developed to continuously monitor the status of available dynamic 
brakes on trailing locomotive units. These commenters further 
questioned FRA's inclusion of such a requirement in the NPRM, noting 
that dynamic brakes can fail at any time, and tend to fail while in 
use, rendering a real-time display of available dynamic braking 
capacity somewhat meaningless when relied upon to develop train 
handling strategies. Several railroads also noted that running tests as 
prescribed in the NPRM are unnecessary, impractical, and may increase 
safety risks at some locations.
    Railroad labor representatives commented that if locomotives are 
equipped with dynamic brakes, then they should be fully operative and 
functional at all times and they should be maintained on a regular 
basis. Rail labor provided comments in response to the ANPRM stating 
that they did not feel that dynamic brakes could be monitored, and even 
if they could, monitoring would probably not be that effective since 
dynamic brakes tend to fail in use. In contrast, however, rail labor 
testified during the public hearings and in written comments to the 
1994 NPRM that they fully support the use of whatever technology is 
available to continuously monitor the status of available dynamic 
braking.
    At the initial RSAC Power Brake Working Group meeting in May 1996, 
the working group members acknowledged the need for, and established a 
separate task force to specifically address the issue of dynamic 
brakes. The working group identified four broad areas relating to 
dynamic brakes to be further developed by the task force as follows: 
(1) Operational requirements; (2) available indicators; (3) en-route 
failures; and (4) testing and inspection. The task force

[[Page 48312]]

was comprised of representatives from FRA, labor, management, 
suppliers, and NTSB.
    The task force initially focused its efforts on identifying 
alternative technologies capable of providing a locomotive engineer 
with information regarding dynamic brakes on trailing units. Various 
methodologies, at differing levels of development and/or testing, were 
discussed as potentially viable options to provide such information 
including: placement of an accelerometer in the lead locomotive; 
incorporation of indicator lights to inform the engineer whether 
dynamic brakes set up on trailing units; utilization of intra-train 
communication links; and utilization of the ECP train brake system 
under development to transmit the desired information. However, these 
discussions quickly refocused on the larger and more fundamental 
question raised during the 1994 NPRM and subsequent comments; namely, 
even assuming that technology is or will be available in the near 
future to continuously monitor the status of available dynamic brakes, 
is this information somewhat meaningless to the engineer when 
formulating braking strategies given the nature of dynamic brake 
failures. The task force quickly lost focus and direction while 
contemplating this larger, more complex issue, and solicited guidance 
from the full Working Group to refine the broad issues established at 
the initial meeting of the full Working Group and further define the 
specific issues and information to be developed by the task force.
    The Working Group developed four specific issues for detailed 
review by the task force. First, if a locomotive is equipped with 
dynamic brakes, do or must they work. Railroad representatives on the 
task force maintained, consistent with previous comments, that an 
inoperative dynamic brake is not considered an impairment to train 
braking, and that the automatic brake is considered the primary brake 
capable of controlling the speed of the train under all conditions. 
These representatives noted that an engineer must be prepared to 
operate a train with only air brakes at all times since the dynamic 
brake may fail at any time without advance signs of deterioration. 
These commenters also stressed that it is not correct to speak of 
``stopping'' a train through use of the dynamic brake because the 
locomotive must be in motion before any retarding force is generated. 
Simply restated, these representatives did not feel that dynamic brakes 
are safety devices, but rather are economical devices whose operation 
should be governed by the railroads' operating procedures and not 
through federal regulations.
    Rail labor representatives on the task force countered by noting 
that many railroads have published operating rules which instruct 
engineers to utilize dynamic brakes as an integral part of their train 
handling techniques. More importantly, these task force members 
referenced an AAR research paper presented at the Air Brake Association 
Meeting in September 1991 which provided results from stopping distance 
tests performed in grade territory with double-stack equipment with 
approximately 101 tons per operating brake. Summarily, this report 
concluded that, ``From this it can be seen that trains such as this 
double-stack test train cannot be safely controlled on 3% grades with 
the service brake alone, and that dynamic brake failure on two or more 
units would require a train to be stopped with an emergency application 
on the grade.'' Given the current emphasis of many railroads' operating 
procedures regarding the utilization of dynamic brakes, labor 
representatives strongly recommended that the railroads be required to 
repair defective dynamic brakes within a specified interval. These task 
force representatives strongly believed that the failure of the current 
regulation to mandate the timely repair of locomotive units with 
inoperative dynamic brakes has resulted in the railroads being free to 
repair these units at their leisure based primarily on economics and 
convenience. Labor representatives contended that a requirement to 
repair inoperative dynamic brakes concurrent with the 92-day locomotive 
inspection interval would impose a minimal logistical burden on the 
railroad and would help ensure a locomotive fleet with operating and 
effective dynamic brakes.
    All members of the task force discussed methods by which to allow a 
railroad to declare a locomotive unit ``not equipped'' without 
physically removing the hardware necessary for operation of the dynamic 
brakes. There was general agreement within the task force that such a 
provision was necessary, specifically when considering the needs of 
short line railroads. These railroads typically have limited need or 
desire to utilize dynamic brakes within their operating environment, 
but tend to purchase locomotives from larger Class 1 carriers that are 
equipped with dynamic brakes. Although there was general agreement 
regarding the necessity for such a provision, the task force members 
were unable to reach consensus on the particulars that would ensure 
declarations of ``not equipped'' were not made to intentionally 
circumvent any prescribed maintenance requirements that might be 
imposed. Concerns were also raised regarding the perceived ability of a 
railroad under such a provision to declare a locomotive ``not 
equipped'' one day and ``equipped'' soon thereafter based primarily on 
operational considerations and/or economics.
    The second specific issue assigned to the task force by the Working 
Group centered on whether the level of dynamic brakes can or should be 
continuously monitored and conveyed to the engineer, and how the 
locomotive engineer is notified if the dynamic brakes do not work. 
Comments received in response to questions posed in the ANPRM, 
testimony provided in the public hearings, and discussions in both the 
Working Group and the task force deliberations have not identified an 
existing, accurate, and cost-effective means by which to provide the 
engineer a continuous, real-time status of dynamic braking availability 
and capacity. Absent such a real-time status indicator of dynamic 
brakes, rail labor representatives on the task force clearly advocated 
the need for engineers to be apprised of the status of the dynamic 
brakes on each unit in the locomotive consist, either verbally or in 
writing, prior to departing each initial terminal location and at each 
crew change location.
    The task force considered utilizing accelerometers as an interim or 
alternative solution to the current lack of technology. Accelerometers 
have become very common in the industry in the last several years, and 
several demonstrations of an accelerometer's ability to display braking 
effort were reviewed by the task force. Using various locomotive 
simulators, task force members observed examples of dynamic braking on 
both relatively flat and heavy grade conditions which demonstrated how, 
in some cases, an accelerometer can provide more information to the 
engineer than a display of the amperage from the trailing locomotives. 
During the simulation exercise, the amperage reading remained unchanged 
on all locomotives in the simulated consist during the slow down, but 
the accelerometer provided information as to the actual braking effort 
of the dynamic brake through changes in its rate of deceleration value 
(expressed in mph/minute) as the dynamic brake slowed the simulated 
train through the dynamic brake's effective range. While additional 
simulations further demonstrated advantages of using

[[Page 48313]]

accelerometers as opposed to amperage readings, the task force did not 
collectively endorse this equipment as a solution to the issue of 
dynamic brake monitoring.
    In addition to the uncertainty of available technology, the task 
force addressed the ancillary issue of ``information overload'' 
associated with an additional display being shown on the engineer's 
console. Task force members cited a parallel example of this phenomenon 
related to current radio-controlled distributive power equipment and 
its ability to display all conditions such as brake pipe, equalizing 
reservoir, amperage, throttle or dynamic brake position, and locomotive 
brake cylinder pressure on remote locomotives. Concerns have been 
expressed that the redundant information being provided via these 
screens is not being utilized by most locomotive engineers, and that 
such information simply clutters an already visually challenging 
control stand and may contribute to decreased levels of safety by 
drawing the engineer's attention away from other necessary duties.
    The task force contemplated the feasibility and benefits of 
incorporating a ``dynamic brake light'' outside the cab of a locomotive 
to provide the engineer with a status display of available dynamic 
brakes. A strobe light was recommended in order to offer visibility in 
foggy, rainy, and other inclement weather conditions. Upon further 
discussion, this option was considered questionable in that it could 
prove to be a distraction to the locomotive engineer by directing his/
her attention to the rear when critical braking decisions would require 
the attention of the engineer to be in the direction of travel. Several 
task force members also noted that the curvature of the track in 
certain locations could conceivably obscure visual contact with the 
light, while others maintained that a light alone offered little 
information about the actual performance of the dynamic brake and could 
simply mislead the engineer.
    The third specific issue assigned to the task force for resolution 
involved the establishment and maintenance of records concerning 
dynamic brakes on locomotive units. This issue was not fully developed 
by the task force, in that any specific recordkeeping requirements are 
somewhat predicated on resolution of the previously discussed issues 
regarding whether or not locomotives need to be equipped with operative 
dynamic brakes. The task force noted that appropriate records would be 
required if specific maintenance intervals were established (i.e. at 
the 92-day locomotive inspection as discussed earlier), but no 
consensus was reached on this issue.
    The last issue provided to the task force focused on en route 
failures of the dynamic brakes. Railroad representatives on the task 
force again stated that the dynamic brakes are not the primary braking 
system for the train, and that they are not used to actually stop the 
train. Based on this assertion, these representatives did not believe 
that any operating restrictions should be imposed on continued movement 
of the train should the dynamic brakes fail on a unit or units en 
route. Rail labor representatives on the task force refuted this 
position, and maintained that a railroad should implement a number of 
safeguards should a dynamic brake become inoperative en route. These 
representatives advocated a reduction in train speed if the defective 
dynamic brake is on the lead locomotive, and that no train be operated 
on certain grades (1 percent suggested) with inoperative dynamic brakes 
on the lead locomotive.
    A stated objective of any task force is to develop and/or gather 
specific information, facts, and data directly relating to the issue; 
in this case, dynamic brakes. The task force pursued this by 
formulating and distributing a questionnaire to a number of engineers 
soliciting their input regarding the use of dynamic brakes, the 
importance of a display showing available dynamic braking force, and 
other related issues as discussed above. The results of this 
questionnaire clearly support the positions stated and advocated by 
rail labor representatives throughout this process. Specifically, 86 
percent of the 138 respondents replied that operative dynamic brake is 
``very'' important to safely control a train in grade territory, 93 
percent of the respondents felt it to be ``very'' important that if a 
locomotive is equipped with dynamic brakes, they should be required to 
be operative, 86 percent of the respondents felt it to be ``very'' 
important the dynamic brakes should continue to function during 
emergency applications, 83 percent of the respondents are instructed to 
use dynamic brakes for fuel conservation, and a significant minority 
felt that a real-time display of available dynamic braking effort would 
``overload'' the information provided on the control stand. This 
questionnaire was not conducted scientifically, nor was it intended to 
be a statistically valid sampling of dynamic brake issues and 
locomotive engineers throughout the country. It did, however, provide 
support and confirmation of views that have been presented by rail 
labor over the past 5 years regarding the importance of, and reliance 
on, dynamic brakes in train handling by locomotive engineers.
    As illustrated in the discussions above, deliberations within the 
dynamic brake task force largely focused on the fundamental issues 
posed as early as 1992 in the ANPRM. The task force was unable to reach 
consensus on resolution of these issues, and ceased meeting as the 
negotiations within the inspection and testing task force dominated the 
RSAC proceeding. Dynamic brake issues were included in the subsequent 
negotiations and deliberations of the inspection and testing task 
force, but did not play an integral role in shaping the numerous 
proposals that were generated for discussion. At the completion of the 
Working Group activities, it was apparent that both labor and 
management representatives recognized that minimum standards need to be 
established for the operation, testing, and maintenance of dynamic 
brakes. Labor representatives continued to promote shorter maintenance 
and repair intervals, while management representatives were hesitant to 
jeopardize locomotive availability due to inoperability of a feature 
that they view as one which provides increased operational flexibility 
but which is not safety-critical.
    FRA Conclusions. A wealth of information has been gathered 
regarding the operation, testing, and maintenance of dynamic brakes in 
the five years since the publishing of the ANPRM. Based on the 
information provided, FRA proposes appropriate standards for dynamic 
brakes that are consistent with the statutory mandate, that take into 
consideration NTSB recommendations, that potentially promote 
progressive improvements in dynamic brake information systems through 
the phased introduction of technology, and that avoid excessive 
requirements that discourage the use of dynamic brakes. As should be 
evident from the preceding discussion, FRA has been confronted with 
issues not limited to equipping locomotives with dynamic brakes, 
development of standards for dynamic brakes, or implementation of 
technologies to advise the engineer on the condition of dynamic brakes. 
Rather, given the increased emphasis on dynamic brake usage as 
prescribed in operating rules, it is paramount to consider whether the 
current emphasis on the use of dynamic brakes to achieve fuel 
efficiency and avoid wear on power brake components has resulted in 
issuance of train handling instructions that can lure the engineer into 
a trap in those situations where dynamic brakes

[[Page 48314]]

must be relied upon to control speed within a zone of safety.
    The RSAC Working Group and task force deliberations provided no 
rationale to warrant a reconsideration of FRA's stated position that 
dynamic brakes do not offer the technical capability to serve as a 
primary train braking system since: (i) they provide braking force only 
on powered locomotive axles and are incapable of controlling in-train 
forces in the same manner as the automatic braking system; (ii) they 
are effective only within a narrow speed range and have no capability 
to actually stop a train; (iii) they can fail without prior warning; 
and (iv) their failure mode is characterized by loss of braking force 
(as opposed to the automatic brake, which, properly employed, initiates 
an emergency brake application upon loss of system integrity).
    Similarly, however, the RSAC working group and task force 
deliberations reinforced FRA's belief that dynamic brakes have become, 
de facto, a second-order safety system where employed. While from the 
point of view of logical priorities, dynamic brakes ``back up'' the 
automatic train brake system, in sequence of operational procedures the 
priority is reversed. Stated differently, either the proper functioning 
of these systems, or the provision of reliable information concerning 
degraded functioning of these systems, should prevent locomotive 
engineers from operating trains in a manner that might make recovery 
through use of the automatic brake impossible. As between these two 
alternatives, proper functioning is marginally preferred, since 
communication, perception, and comprehension of information is not a 
uniformly successful enterprise.
    In considering the entirety of the information available, FRA 
concludes that it is imperative that the locomotive engineer be 
informed in writing of the operational status of the dynamic brakes on 
all locomotives in the consist at the initial terminal or point of 
origin for a train or at other locations where a locomotive engineer 
first takes charge of a train. Therefore, FRA proposes to require that 
locomotive engineers be provided this information at these locations. 
This proposed provision directly addresses the foremost concern 
articulated by the NTSB following the San Bernardino accident. FRA also 
proposes to require visible identification of locomotive units with 
inoperative dynamic brakes. FRA is in full agreement that when 
locomotives are equipped with dynamic brakes, they should be in proper 
operating condition and be maintained on a regular basis, to the 
maximum extent practical, to enhance train handling. FRA does recognize 
that these maintenance requirements may be overly burdensome in some 
instances for railroads (primarily short lines) who do not utilize 
dynamic brakes in their respective operations, but yet own and operate 
locomotives equipped with dynamic brakes. Consequently, FRA further 
proposes provisions for deactivating a locomotive's dynamic brakes 
without physically removing the components. FRA also specifically 
solicits input regarding the placement of a locomotive in a consist 
that has been declared ``deactivated'' in accordance with this 
proposal. Some existing railroad operating rules dictate that a 
locomotive which has been determined to have inoperative dynamic brakes 
may be dispatched in a train, but prohibit its placement in the lead 
position of the consist. Are there technical reasons to prohibit a 
locomotive with inoperative dynamic brakes from functioning as the lead 
locomotive, providing the deactivated locomotive still has the 
capability to fully control the dynamic braking functions of all other 
locomotives in the consist that are so equipped?
    In addition to the information and maintenance requirements, FRA 
also proposes the development of operating rules and training programs 
to ensure the proper and safe use of dynamic brakes. For example, FRA 
proposes to require that railroads operating trains with brake systems 
that include dynamic brakes develop, implement, and make available to 
FRA upon request written operating rules governing safe train handling 
procedures using these dynamic brakes under all operating conditions, 
which shall be tailored to the specific equipment and territory of the 
railroad. More importantly, FRA also proposes to require that a 
railroad's operating rules be based on the ability of friction brakes 
alone to safely stop the train under all operating conditions. 
Furthermore, FRA also proposes to require a railroad operating a train 
with a brake system that includes dynamic brakes to develop, implement, 
and make available to FRA upon request a plan to ensure that its 
locomotive engineers are fully trained in the operating rules 
prescribed above and at a minimum includes classroom, hands-on, and 
annual refresher training.
    FRA views the establishment of these comprehensive operating rules 
and training plans as the most effective means by which to minimize the 
possibility of future incidents caused by excessive reliance on dynamic 
brakes by the train crew as a method of controlling the speed of a 
train in its descent through a difficult grade, as was the case in the 
San Bernardino incident. FRA views as unfortunate, and potentially 
reckless, the increasing number of train handling and power brake 
instructions issued by freight railroads that emphasize the use of 
dynamic brakes without including prominent warnings that such systems 
may not be relied upon to provide the margin of safety necessary to 
stop short of obstructions and control points or to avoid overspeed 
operation. Such instructions, while not yet affirmatively misleading to 
seasoned locomotive engineers, threaten to overcome the good judgement 
of safety critics and regulators by leading to excessive reliance upon 
these systems. Given the ever-increasing weight and length of freight 
trains, and the severe grades that they are often required to negotiate 
en route, the need for locomotive engineers who are thoroughly trained 
and knowledgeable in all aspects of train handling is paramount for 
continued safety in the rail industry.
    In both the ANPRM (57 FR 62555) and the 1994 NPRM (59 FR 47687), 
FRA requested comments from the industry on possible methods of 
providing information regarding the status of dynamic brakes to the 
engineer in the cab of the controlling locomotive. The only workable 
option presented to FRA in the comments received was the equipping of 
locomotives with a dynamic brake display. Although FRA recognizes that 
the technology for dynamic brake displays with the ability to provide 
the type of information sought by FRA in the 1994 NPRM is not readily 
available today, several commenters suggested that it is currently 
being developed. Consequently, FRA is not ready or willing to require 
the use of such indicators at this time. However, FRA believes that the 
benefit of such an indicator would be to alert engineers that they have 
diminished or excessive dynamic capabilities, thus permitting the 
engineer to control the braking of their train in the safest possible 
manner. In order to fully evaluate the viability and potential use of 
dynamic brake indicators designed to test the electrical integrity of 
the dynamic brakes at rest and to display the available total train 
dynamic brake retarding force at each speed in 5-mph increments in the 
cab of the controlling locomotive, FRA again seeks comments from all 
interested parties regarding the following specific issues:
    1. What is the status on the future availability of dynamic brake 
indicators

[[Page 48315]]

capable of providing the information discussed above?
    2. What are the current cost estimates associated with the 
acquisition and installation of such indicators?
    3. What quantitative and/or qualitative operational or safety 
benefits can be derived from the use of these dynamic brake indicators?
    4. What alternative methods are available for providing the same 
information that a dynamic brake indicator would provide to a 
locomotive engineer?

V. Training and Qualifications of Personnel

    Currently, the regulations contain no specific training 
requirements or standards for personnel who conduct brake system 
inspections. The regulations merely require that a ``qualified person'' 
perform certain inspections or tasks. See 49 CFR 232.12(a). 
Furthermore, the current regulations do not require that railroads 
maintain any type of records or information regarding the training or 
instruction it provides to its employees to ensure that they are 
capable of performing the brake inspections for which they are assigned 
responsibility. In several cases, FRA has found that a railroad's list 
of ``qualified persons'' is merely a roster of all of its operating and 
mechanical forces.
    In the 1994 NPRM, FRA proposed a series of broad qualification 
standards addressing various type of personnel engaged in the 
inspection, testing, and maintenance of brake equipment. See 59 FR 
47731-47732. These broad qualifications were separated into distinct 
subgroups which identified various types of personnel based on the type 
of work those individuals would be required to perform under the 
proposal. These included: supervisors; train crew members; mechanical 
inspectors; and electronic inspectors. Although not proposed in the 
rule text of the 1994 NPRM, the preamble contained various guidelines 
regarding specific hours of classroom and hands-on training as well as 
guidelines regard the level of experience each of these types of 
employees would be required to possess or be provided. See 59 FR 47702-
47703. The proposal also contained various requirements regarding the 
development and retention of records and information used by a railroad 
in determining the qualifications of its employees. See 59 FR 47732.
    FRA proposed these training and experience requirements and 
guidelines based on its belief that the current training provided to 
the individuals charged with performing brake maintenance, tests, and 
inspections should be greatly improved in order to ensure that train 
brake system maintenance, tests, and inspections are performed 
properly. During the technical workshops conducted in conjunction with 
the ANPRM, several labor organizations and their individual members 
explicitly commented that they are not sufficiently trained to perform 
the inspections and tests required of them. In addition, several 
railroads admitted that the training they currently provide could be 
improved. Although FRA recognized that many railroads were attempting 
to improve their training programs, FRA believed that minimum training 
qualifications needed to be established to assure that brake 
inspections and tests are being properly performed in order to protect 
both the public and railroad employees from the operation of equipment 
that does not meet Federal standards.
    Several railroads responded to the 1994 NPRM contending that the 
specific guidelines contained in the preamble to the proposal, 
regarding years of experience as well as hours of classroom and 
``hands-on'' training were unnecessary and overly broad. Many of these 
commenters believed that railroads were in the best position to 
determine the type of training that is necessary in any given 
circumstance based on the employee or employees involved. These 
commenters also indicated that many railroads are currently upgrading 
their training programs or already have training programs in place that 
could be fine tuned or slightly altered to provide sufficient training 
to its employees to accomplish the tasks for which they are assigned. 
Several commenters as well as the CAPUC recommended that it would be 
more appropriate for FRA to specify performance objectives rather than 
specific years of service or classroom hours. They believed that any 
training requirements should specify the training objectives and goals 
and refer to the employee's proficiency rather than the specific method 
used in reaching those objectives and proficiency. Several railroads 
also commented that an employee should only be required to receive 
training for those tasks which they are required to perform. Thus, an 
employee who performs only intermediate type brake inspections should 
not be required to receive training or instruction on the repair or 
maintenance of the equipment.
    Although several labor organizations objected to some of the 
specific provisions contained in the preamble to the proposal, such as 
the potential for train crew personnel to be deemed a mechanical 
inspector and the recognition of the potential use of contract 
employees, these commenters did not dismiss the approach as unworkable. 
However, several labor representatives continue to contend that all 
brake and mechanical inspections must be performed by carmen, or 
similarly qualified individuals, and that train crew members are not 
and can never be adequately trained to properly perform these types of 
inspections. Some commenters suggested that FRA would not have to 
propose any qualification standards if it would simply require that all 
brake inspections and tests be performed by a carman.
    Although the subject of employee training was a subject of concern 
during the RSAC Working Group deliberations, particularly as it relates 
to train crew members, there were no discussions which specifically 
addressed the training or knowledge that must be provided to employees 
responsible for conducting train brake inspections and tests. As noted 
in the above discussions, the Working Group discussions generally 
concentrated on instances when train crews would be permitted to 
perform and what distances such trains or cars could move after such 
inspections. However, it was clear that several railroad 
representatives on the Working Group believed better training needs to 
be provided to train crews to ensure the proper performance of quality 
brake inspections, particularly at initial terminals. Furthermore, all 
members of the Working Group appeared to recognize that a journeyman 
carman or other similarly trained individual possesses the knowledge 
and experience to conduct any of the required mechanical or brake 
inspections would be considered a qualified inspector without further 
training, with the exception of periodic refresher training.
    FRA Conclusions. FRA has noticed continued improvement in the 
training provided by railroads to individuals charged with performing 
brake system inspections, tests, and maintenance; however, FRA 
continues to believe that this training could be greatly improved and 
enhanced. Although there has been a decline in the number of train 
incidents, derailments, fatalities, and injuries over the last ten 
years, FRA believes that the number of these incidents will be further 
reduced if maintenance, inspections, and tests of the brake system are 
performed by individuals who have received proper training specifically 
targeting the activities for which an individual is assigned 
responsibility. As stated previously, FRA believes one of the

[[Page 48316]]

major factors in ensuring the quality of brake inspections and the 
proper operation of that equipment is the adequate training of those 
persons responsible for inspecting and maintaining that equipment.
    Railroads continue to consolidate mechanical work to fewer and 
fewer locations on the railroad. This trend places an increasing 
premium on the ability of train crews to conduct meaningful inspections 
and tests of the power brake system. Increases in train speeds and 
increased pressure on operating personnel due to growing traffic 
density will continue to make it critical for train crews and 
mechanical forces to discharge their duties with respect to power brake 
systems both diligently and effectively even under the most optimistic 
of scenarios with respect to the operation of incentives. FRA proposes 
to allow increases in the distances some trains may travel between 
brake system inspections where mechanical forces perform all of the 
inspection functions (including a complete inspection under 49 CFR part 
215). The latitude that would be provided to some trains under this 
proposal would result in fewer inspections per distance traveled and 
reduce the number of opportunities that will exist for a serious defect 
to be found before it could result in a train incident. It is 
imperative, therefore, that each inspection be of uniformly high 
quality. Consequently, FRA believes that at a minimum broad, yet 
enforceable, performance-based training and qualification requirements 
for personnel charged with conducting brake system inspections, tests, 
and maintenance will help raise the overall quality of these 
activities.
    Furthermore, as noted in the 1994 NPRM, technological change 
presents an additional reason for placing strong emphasis on 
qualifications of inspection personnel. Train crew and mechanical 
personnel alike are confronted with an increasing variety of power 
brake arrangements and features. The AAR has been intensifying its 
effort to develop and deploy electronic braking systems on freight 
equipment. This trend will make it important for personnel to be fully 
familiar with the systems that they are required to inspect and 
maintain. FRA recognizes that although technological advancements may 
increase the need for more qualified maintenance forces, they may also 
reduce the complexity and extent of the inspecting and testing 
requirements for certain equipment with the emergence of brake 
indicators and sensors or the development of more reliable equipment.
    Consequently, FRA proposes broad performance-based training and 
qualification requirements which permit railroads to develop programs 
specifically tailored to the type of equipment it operates and the 
employees designated by the railroad to perform the inspection, 
testing, and maintenance duties required in this proposal. FRA tends to 
agree with several railroad commenters that there is no reason for 
individuals who solely perform pre-departure air brake tests and 
inspections to be as highly trained as a carman since carmen perform 
many other duties which involve the maintenance and repair of equipment 
in addition to brake inspections. Therefore, the proposed training and 
qualification requirements permit railroads to tailor their training 
programs to ensure the capability of its employees to perform the tasks 
for which they are assigned. FRA intends for the proposed training and 
qualification requirements to apply not only to railroad personnel but 
also to contract personnel and personnel in plants that build cars and 
locomotives that are responsible for brake system inspections, 
maintenance, or tests.
    Contrary to the 1994 NPRM, FRA does not intend to issue specific 
experience, classroom training, or ``hands-on'' training guidelines. 
FRA agrees that many of the guidelines contained in the preamble to 
that proposal were overly restrictive and may have impeded the 
implementation of certain training protocols capable of achieving 
similar results with less emphasis on solely the time spent in the 
training process. Furthermore, the proposed guidelines failed to 
consider the potentially narrow scope of training that might be 
required for some employees, particularly some train crew personnel, 
that perform very limited inspection functions on very limited types of 
equipment. Consequently, although the training and qualification 
requirements currently proposed continue to require that any training 
provided include classroom and ``hands-on'' training as well as verbal 
or written examinations and ``hands-on'' proficiency, they do not 
mandate a specific number of hours that this training must encompass as 
that will vary depending on the employee or employees involved, which 
is probably best determined by the railroad. The proposed requirements 
also contain provisions for conducting periodic refresher training and 
supervisor oversight of an employee's performance once training is 
provided.
    FRA believes that the recordkeeping and notification requirements 
contained in this proposal are the cornerstone of the training and 
qualification provisions. As FRA is not proposing specific training 
curriculums or specific experience thresholds, FRA believes that these 
recordkeeping provisions are vital in ensuring that proper training is 
being provided to railroad personnel. FRA believes these requirements 
provide the means by which FRA will judge the effectiveness and 
appropriateness of a railroad's training and qualification program. 
These provisions also provide FRA with the ability to independently 
assess whether the training provided to a specific individual 
adequately addresses the tasks for which the individual is deemed 
capable of performing and will most likely prevent potential abuses by 
railroads to use insufficiently trained individuals to perform the 
necessary inspections, tests, and maintenance required by this 
proposal. FRA proposes to require that railroads maintain specific 
personnel qualification records for all personnel (including contract 
personnel) responsible for the inspection, testing, and maintenance of 
train brake systems. FRA proposes that these records contain detailed 
information regarding the training provided as well as detailed 
information on the types of equipment the individual is qualified to 
inspect, test, or maintain and the duties the individual is qualified 
to perform. Most Class I and larger Class II railroads already keep 
records of this type; however, they are not always easily obtained by 
FRA. As an additional means of ensuring that only properly qualified 
individuals are performing only those tasks for which they are 
qualified, FRA proposes to require that railroads promptly notify 
personnel of changes in their qualification status and specifically 
identify the date that the employee's qualification ends unless 
refresher training is provided.
    FRA recognizes that some railroads will be forced to place a 
greater emphasis on training and qualifications than they have in the 
past, and this requirement will result in additional costs for those 
railroads. However, the proposed rule allows the railroads the 
flexibility that they need to provide only that training which an 
employee needs for a specific job. The proposed rule does not require 
an employee who only performs brake inspections while en route (i.e., 
Class II brake tests) to receive the intensive training needed for an 
employee who performs Class I brake tests or one who is charged with 
the maintenance or repair of the equipment. The training can be 
tailored to the specific needs of the railroad. Across the industry as 
a whole, this proposal will

[[Page 48317]]

not require extensive changes in the way most railroads currently 
operate, but it will require some railroads to invest more time in the 
training of their personnel and should prevent railroads from using 
minimally trained and unqualified people to perform crucial safety 
tasks.
    FRA recognizes that the costs of the proposed training requirements 
are fairly substantial, however, FRA believes that most Class I 
railroads have already invested in training, routinely schedule 
training for their employees, and offer training to other interested 
parties. For example, the Union Pacific, Southern Pacific, CSX 
Transportation, and Norfolk Southern and all other Class I railroads 
have a training department, have training staff available, and have the 
knowledge to complete this proposed requirement. However, it is 
unlikely that Class I railroads have identified each task or the steps 
necessary to complete each task of inspection, testing, and maintenance 
of each type of freight car they operate. Furthermore, most railroads 
do not engage in the ``hands-on'' training and testing contained in 
this proposal nor do most railroads maintain the records required in 
this proposal. It should be noted that many Class I railroads have 
participated in a Safety Assurance and Compliance Program (SACP) with 
FRA and labor. Most of the SACP's have required additional training by 
the participating railroads. Many of the proposed training requirements 
would already be met by those railroads that have completed the 
training required under the SACP.
    Short line railroads, particularly Class II railroads may send 
employees to other railroads for training, participate in ASLRA and FRA 
training, and have on-the job training. Class III railroads are less 
likely to send employees to other railroads for training, most of the 
training would be on-the-job training, training by FRA, or through 
ASLRA programs. Typically on-the-job training on these smaller 
railroads involves having their employees work with a more experienced 
employee or an individual who may have been previously employed by a 
Class 1 railroad and received formal training with that railroad. 
Furthermore, Class III railroad employees are not likely to require 
extensive training on different types of brake equipment since most of 
the equipment used by Class III railroads have only one type of brake 
valve. Furthermore, the employees of these small railroads would likely 
not be required to receive any training in the areas of EPIC brakes, 
dynamic brakes, two-way EOT devices, or on some of the brake tests and 
maintenance mandated in the proposal due to the limited distances 
traveled by these trains, the low tonnages hauled, and because many of 
the maintenance functions are contracted out to larger railroads.
    Although FRA is proposing broad performance-based training 
requirements rather than specific experience, classroom training, or 
``hands-on training guidelines, FRA expects that railroads will incur a 
significant cost to comply with the requirements contained in this 
proposal. Training related costs have been identified as the most 
significant cost item contained in this proposal, accounting for nearly 
$77 million dollars of the approximate $98 million cost of this 
proposal. See Regulatory Impact Analysis and Regulatory Impact 
discussion below. However, virtually all of the safety related 
benefits, conservatively estimated at over $31 million, for this 
proposal are derived from the increase and improvement in the training 
of railroad personnel, which FRA believes will result in the reduction 
and prevention of accidents and the resulting fatalities, injuries, and 
property damage. There are also a number of unquantifiable safety and 
economic benefits which will be derived from the prevention of 
accidents such as: associated accident clean-up costs, evacuation and 
medical costs, road closures, and the environmental damage caused by 
hazardous materials releases. It should be noted that FRA also believes 
that there will be a significant unquantifiable operational benefit 
derived from the enhanced training of railroad personnel, particularly 
in the areas of increased equipment utilization, reduced train delays, 
repair costs, and debris removal. In order to further assess both the 
cost and benefits as well as other impacts the proposed training and 
qualification requirements will have, particularly on smaller 
railroads, FRA requests comments from interested parties on the 
following:
    1. What is the potential impact of the proposed training and 
qualification requirements on short line railroads (i.e., Class II and 
Class III railroads)? How will these types of railroads meet the 
proposed requirements?
    2. What is the potential impact of the proposed recordkeeping 
requirements to smaller railroads (i.e., Class III railroads)? Do these 
railroads currently maintain some sort of training records?
    3. As FRA believes these records are a key element of the proposed 
training and qualification requirements, are there alternative methods 
available to smaller railroads (i.e., Class III railroads) for 
maintaining and developing the required information?
    4. Currently, what percentage of employees will require additional 
training?
    5. Are there a sufficient number of ``qualified'' employees at 
present to ensure that no operational difficulty will result? If not, 
what is a reasonable timeline for permitting railroads (particularly 
smaller railroads) to reach full compliance with regard to these 
requirements?

VI. Air Source Requirements

    In the ANPRM, FRA provided background information and presented 
questions on the issue of requiring additional testing of train air 
brakes in extremely cold weather, especially in mountainous territory. 
See 57 FR 62552. Though it is acknowledged that cold temperatures may 
affect the train air brake system in many ways, the freezing of 
moisture that has accumulated in the trainline which potentially causes 
blockages or restrictions in air flow in the brake pipe and reduces 
braking effort is an obvious and major concern. As a means to combat 
this dangerous combination of factors that could lead to a loss of or a 
reduction in braking effort, the industry has historically utilized 
methanol and other alcohols in the trainline to act as an anti-freeze 
during these cold weather operations. However, based on FRA experience 
and the statements of several commenters, it is evident that the use of 
these chemicals in the trainline causes untimely wear and tear to brake 
system components and has a long-term detrimental effect on train air 
brakes. Comments provided to FRA indicated that air dryers on 
locomotives are very effective in improving the performance of train 
brake systems, particularly under cold weather conditions, and 
generally eliminate the need to use alcohol and other foreign 
substances in the trainline. Several railroads commented that they have 
already equipped their locomotives with air dryers in order to curb the 
use of chemicals in the trainline. Furthermore, several railroads 
frequently operating under extreme cold weather conditions commented 
that they have prohibited chemicals from being placed in brake air 
systems to prevent freeze-up. These railroads stated that they have 
been able to operate trains in cold weather without resorting to 
chemicals, such as alcohol.
    Based on these comments and experiences, FRA proposed in the 1994 
NPRM to ban the use of anti-freeze chemicals in train air brake 
systems. See 59 FR 47728. In addition, FRA proposed

[[Page 48318]]

that all new and rebuilt locomotives and all yard air sources be 
equipped with air dryers capable of achieving a 30  deg.F air dew point 
depression at a 100 cfm air flow rate, unless the new or rebuilt 
locomotive would not be operated in cold weather conditions, would 
power only trains limited to 30 mph or less, or would power only trains 
of 20 cars or less. FRA believed that an exception from the proposed 
requirements for these types of operations was warranted based on the 
comments received and on FRA's experience that moisture in the brake 
line in these types of operations has never been a problem.
    Many railroads commented that the proposed requirements for air 
dryers would be costly and ineffective if implemented. These commenters 
cited testimony provided by Canadian railroads, operating in extreme 
cold weather conditions, which indicated that none of their locomotives 
are currently equipped with air dryers, yet they have not experienced 
problems with frozen brake lines. Additional comments provided by 
Canadian railroads maintained that their experience shows that the 
prevention of brake pipe freeze-up is not a direct benefit of equipping 
air sources with air dryers. These commenters stated that freezing of 
the brake pipe is of much less concern when trains are operated with 
two-way end-of-train devices, in that any restriction or blockage in 
the brake pipe will be recognized and appropriate steps will be taken 
to stop the train safely. Commenters noted that the majority of 
railroads have adopted operating rules which prohibit the use of 
chemicals in the trainline as proposed in the NPRM. A supplier of air 
brake equipment commented that in order for air dryers to be effective, 
the temperature of the air going into the dryers must be controlled. 
This would typically be accomplished through equipping the air source 
with an aftercooler to get the input air to within 20 degrees of the 
ambient temperature. Railroad commenters supported the use of 
aftercoolers as advocated by this supplier representative, 
acknowledging that locomotives equipped with aftercoolers help reduce 
the relative humidity, ensuring moisture will not precipitate. These 
commenters noted that experience has shown aftercoolers to be much 
cheaper to install and maintain when compared to air dryers.
    At the initial meeting of the full Power Brake Working Group, 
members discussed the broad topic area of ``Design Requirements--
Locomotive Standards.'' The issue of air dryers on locomotives, and 
also on yard/ground air sources, was included in this discussion. 
Several members of the Working Group suggested that any requirements 
for air dryer or similar technology be expressed in terms of a 
performance standard for air dryness, and that such a standard should 
be developed by a separate task force. Consequently, a task force was 
formed and was comprised of representatives from FRA, labor, 
management, and suppliers (through the participation of the RPI). The 
Working Group articulated the task of this subgroup as follows: (1) 
Determine how dry the air should be, and subsequently, (2) what 
technology/hardware exists and is available to achieve these prescribed 
levels. The task force was also directed to consider and evaluate any 
economic implications that may impact prospective air dryer 
requirements.
    At the second meeting of the full Working Group, members of the 
task force presented a general discussion of the basic principles of 
air and the amount of water contained in air. This discussion provided 
detailed information regarding the weight or amount of water contained 
in air, the effect of water condensation when air pressure is 
increased, how temperature affects water condensation, and the quantity 
of air required to charge a train. Several methodologies and 
technologies capable of drying air and preventing condensation were 
described and discussed, including broad economic considerations 
associated with each. Several members of the Working Group noted that 
the discussions had centered predominately on locomotives, and that 
more information was needed regarding ground/yard air sources such as 
those used to charge the trainline prior to the addition of 
locomotives. These members indicated that they felt ground/yard air 
plants used in this capacity are the major cause of moisture in a 
train.
    Members of the task force addressed the issue of ``dew point 
depression'' in detail, defining dew point depression as the 
temperature reduction below ambient conditions at which moisture begins 
to form, describing how it is calculated, and identifying 
specifications utilized by other industries when considering dew point 
depression parameters. As the Working Group had emphasized their 
preference that any requirements developed for dry air be based on a 
performance-type standard, the group quickly focused task force efforts 
toward the development of a specific numerical value of dew point 
depression that would minimize the possibility of water being 
introduced into the brake system. One member of the task force 
recommended, based on information that had been presented and practical 
field experience, that a dew point depression of -6 deg. to -10 deg. 
Fahrenheit would be sufficient to prevent the development of 
condensation in train operations. This member noted that aftercoolers 
alone can achieve this level of dew point depression, and could be 
utilized in conjunction with air dryers to produce even lower levels. 
It is important to note that these conclusions and recommendations were 
made by one member of the task force, and did not represent consensus 
conclusions or recommendations of the task force. Numerous concerns 
were raised regarding the technical rationale employed in formulating 
this ``acceptable range'' of temperatures, and several members voiced 
apprehension regarding FRA's ability to effectively and uniformly 
enforce such a requirement, should it be imposed.
    Extended discussions ensued regarding the establishment of a 
performance standard for dry air which would serve to eliminate or 
minimize the introduction of moisture into the train brake system, 
using dew point depression as the defining parameter. The Working Group 
members were unwilling to unanimously and fully endorse the -6 deg. to 
-10 deg. Fahrenheit temperature range proposed by the task force leader 
given the lack of detailed, documented, and substantiated test data to 
support this conclusion. Noting that fact finding and data development 
are the major functions of a task force under the stated guiding 
principles of the RSAC process, the Working Group directed the task 
force to study, through instrumented testing, the appropriate value of 
dew point depression that is required to ensure safe operations for 
both locomotives and yard/ground air systems.
    In an effort to gather field data to either confirm the proposed 
parameters or to develop alternative measures, task force members 
visited two train yards and gathered data using a device specifically 
designed to measure dew points. The task force performed tests on 
numerous locomotives and yard air plants, with and without air dryers, 
to determine the amount of dew point depression in the air lines. The 
results of these tests confirmed the assumptions of the Working Group 
members in that the vast majority of locomotives did not contribute to 
moisture in the train air lines, but rather, the main source of raw 
water came from yard charging units. Further, the majority of the yard 
units which were tested were relatively old and had not been properly 
maintained or upgraded in years. During the task force tests, it was 
noted that all units

[[Page 48319]]

equipped with air dryers produced minimal moisture in the system. Based 
on these results, some member of the task force believed that both yard 
charging units and locomotives be equipped with a device which would 
assist in the reduction of moisture in the train air lines. Since a 
large number of trains are charged by yard air sources (up to 80 
percent by some estimations), it appeared that yard air charging units 
should be given the greatest priority. Several members of the task 
force suggested that all yard air sources be equipped with a device 
which will produce a minimum dew point depression of -25  deg.F and 
similarly equip locomotives to produce a minimum dew point depression 
of -8  deg.F. This was not a consensus recommendation from the task 
force, as some members of the task force felt that the issue of 
moisture in the trainline is not a safety issue, but more appropriately 
an item addressed through improved maintenance procedures. In addition, 
these members firmly believed that the installation of air dryers as 
proposed was cost prohibitive given the limited safety benefit to be 
realized, and that the task force had not adequately addressed the 
economic implications of requiring locomotives and yard air units to 
meet the recommendations as forwarded to the Working Group.
    FRA Conclusions. FRA intends to ban the use of anti-freeze 
chemicals in train air brake systems, reiterating the position stated 
in the 1994 NPRM, in order to prevent the untimely damage and wear to 
the brake system components. See 59 FR 47728. FRA did not receive any 
adverse comments on this issue in response to the 1994 NPRM, and based 
on the statements and considerations raised in various Working Group 
meetings it appears that both rail labor and management representatives 
believe that such a provision would be acceptable.
    Based on information gathered throughout the RSAC process, previous 
comments by industry parties, and agency experience, FRA firmly 
believes that the presence of moisture in the train air brake system 
poses potential safety, operational, and maintenance issues that 
require attention in this rulemaking. After completion of detailed, 
instrumented testing on both locomotives and yard test plants performed 
as part of the task force activities, FRA tends to believe that 
locomotives rarely contribute to moisture in the trainline. As such, 
FRA is not proposing that air dryers be installed on new locomotives, 
as was proposed in the 1994 NPRM (59 FR 47729).
    The results of this same testing clearly indicated that yard air 
plants often provide unacceptably high levels of moisture while 
charging the train air brake system due to the age of the system, 
improper design, inadequate maintenance, or a combination thereof. Task 
force efforts also estimated that upwards of 80 percent of train air 
brake systems are charged using yard/ground air plants. However, FRA 
believes that simply requiring that yard air sources be equipped with 
air dryers may not alone necessarily effectuate the desired results 
unless the air dryers are appropriately placed to sufficiently 
condition the air source. Many yard air sources are configured such 
that a single air compressor services several branch lines used to 
charge train air brake systems, and as such, multiple air dryers may be 
required to eliminate the introduction of wet air into the brake 
system. FRA believes that, as with locomotives, requiring yard air 
sources to be equipped with air dryers will likely impose a significant 
and unnecessary cost burden on the railroads.
    Based on the above discussion, FRA is proposing that each railroad 
develop and implement a system by which they monitor all yard air 
sources to ensure that they operate as intended and do not introduce 
contaminates into the brake system. FRA believes that implementation of 
this monitoring program as proposed represents a method by which the 
industry can truly maximize the benefits to be realized through air 
dryer technology, which all parties acknowledge has been proven to 
reduce the level of moisture introduced into the trainline, at a cost 
that is commensurate with the subsequent benefits. This proposed 
program requires a railroad to take remedial action with respect to any 
yard air sources that are found not to be operating as intended, and 
further proposes to establish a retention requirement with respect to 
records of these deficient units to facilitate the tracking and 
resolution of continuing problem areas. Further, FRA believes that yard 
air reservoirs should either be equipped with an operable automatic 
drain system or be manually drained at least once each day that the 
devices are used or when moisture is detected in the system. FRA 
believes that these provisions, in concert with assurances that 
condensation is blown from the pipe or hose from which compressed air 
is taken prior to connecting the yard air line or motive power to the 
train as currently prescribed in Sec. 232.11(d), will minimize the 
possibility of moisture being introduced into the train air brake 
system.
    It should be noted that FRA recently published a final rule 
mandating the incorporation of two-way end-of-train telemetry devices 
(two-way EOTs) on a variety of freight trains, specifically those 
operating at speeds of 30 mph or greater or in heavy grade territories. 
See 62 FR 278. Two-way EOTs provide locomotive engineers with the 
capability of initiating an emergency brake application that commences 
at the rear of the train in the event of a blockage or separation in 
the train's brake pipe that would prevent the pneumatic transmission of 
the emergency brake application throughout the entire train. These 
devices consist of a front unit, located in the cab of the controlling 
locomotive, and a rear unit, located in the rear of the train and 
attached to the brake pipe. Radio communication between the front and 
rear end units is continually monitored and confirmed at regular 
intervals, and the rear unit is only activated when continuity of these 
radio transmissions is not maintained over a specified time interval. 
This discussion of two-way EOTs is particularly appropriate within the 
context of the air source requirements and air dryers. In the unlikely 
event that the proposed requirements regarding air dryers fail to 
sufficiently eliminate moisture from the trainline, and a restriction 
or obstruction in the form of ice forms as the result of the freezing 
of this moisture during cold weather operations, the two-way EOT device 
becomes a first order safety device and will initiate an emergency 
application of the brakes from the rear of train. As such, the vast 
majority of concerns associated with moisture in the trainline freezing 
in cold weather operations have been alleviated through the 
incorporation of this technology in most freight operations.
    In an effort to further develop and evaluate this proposal, FRA 
seeks comments from all interested parties regarding the following 
specific issues:
    (1) How many yard sources are there that are used to charge train 
air brake systems?
    (2) What time period will be required to effectively institute the 
monitoring program as prescribed?
    (3) How many of these yard air sources are equipped with automatic 
drain valves?
    (4) If the yard air source is not equipped with an automatic drain 
valve, how long does it take to drain manually?

[[Page 48320]]

VII. Maintenance Requirements

    In the ANPRM, FRA solicited comments from interested parties 
regarding the elimination of cleaning, oiling, testing, and stencilling 
(COT&S) requirements for freight brake valves as a result of the AAR's 
adoption of enhanced single car and repair track air brake testing 
requirements in 1990. See 57 FR 62556. In response, all industry 
representatives, including rail management, labor, and suppliers, 
acknowledged that the improved single car test constituted a 
significant improvement over the previous time-based COT&S requirements 
in detecting and eliminating defective brake equipment and components. 
However, labor representatives contended that the railroads are 
circumventing the use of the new procedures by eliminating repair 
tracks all over the nation in order to avoid performing these single 
car tests. Several individuals presented examples of how the single car 
test and repair track test are being circumvented, such as making 
repairs in the field or moving cars to expediter tracks for repairs 
rather than to repair tracks. Therefore, these commenters recommended 
that some type of in-date testing or attention must be reinstated. The 
RLEA also recommended that periodic attention be reinstated, contending 
that acceptance of AAR's unilateral change in the maintenance 
requirements allows the AAR to unilaterally establish regulations 
without public comment. Labor representatives forwarded similar 
recommendations, stating that any changes made by the AAR in their 
recommended maintenance practices should be reviewed and approved by 
the FRA.
    Based on the comments received, FRA agreed that the new single car 
test established a better and more comprehensive method of detecting 
and eliminating defective brake equipment and components, but further 
agreed that cars must receive the test in order to fully benefit from 
the advantages of the enhanced single car test. Accordingly, in the 
1994 NPRM, FRA proposed to require the single car or repair track test 
be conducted on any car that is on a repair or shop track for various 
wheel or brake equipment defects, and that at a minimum, freight 
service equipment should receive the test every one or two years 
depending on whether the equipment is high-utilization or non-high-
utilization equipment (as defined in the 1994 NPRM). See 59 FR 47741. 
FRA did not feel that requiring the performance of the repair track or 
single car test at the proposed time periods would be overly burdensome 
on the industry since, according to studies conducted by the AAR 
showing that a car is typically on the repair track 1.7 times a year, 
most cars will be on a repair or shop track within the proposed time 
limits. The proposal further allowed parties to request a change in the 
time interval for performing the single car test by monitoring their 
single car tests and conducting a statistical analysis of the results. 
In order to ensure that the single car tests are properly performed, 
FRA proposed that only qualified brake system inspectors should conduct 
the tests and that the single car testing devices should be tested at 
least once a day and receive maintenance at least every 92 days. 
Furthermore, in order to ensure proper maintenance of brake equipment, 
FRA proposed that each railroad should develop and enforce written 
maintenance procedures for all types of brake systems it operates which 
meet or exceed current industry standards and all federal train brake 
system safety requirements. The maintenance required by these proposed 
procedures would be performed only by individuals qualified as 
mechanical or electronic brake system inspectors as designated in other 
sections of the 1994 NPRM. Spot checks of both the single car tests and 
the maintenance procedures would be conducted by qualified supervisory 
personnel to ensure the procedures are being followed and the tests are 
properly performed.
    In response to the 1994 NPRM, many railroads commented that car 
utilization would be significantly decreased if the proposed 
requirements were adopted. These commenters felt that this decline 
would be directly attributable to the proposed requirements regarding 
craft-specific designation for the conduct of the single car tests, 
periodic intervals for conduct of the tests that were viewed as overly 
burdensome, and stencilling requirements that were viewed as similarly 
burdensome and costly. Labor organizations countered, reiterating their 
comments provided in response to the ANPRM regarding a perception that 
the carriers are directly circumventing the single car and repair track 
test by moving cars to expediter tracks for repairs rather than to 
repair tracks, or simply by making repairs in the field. Therefore, 
these labor organizations strongly advocated that FRA require and 
enforce periodic testing and inspection to ensure the continued safety 
of both railroad employees and the general public through realization 
of brake equipment that will be in better and safer condition as a 
result.
    At the initial meeting of the Freight Power Brake Working Group, 
the specific issues of periodic maintenance and single car test 
requirements were identified as topics best addressed through formation 
of a separate task force. Thus, a task force was created and was 
charged with assembling and analyzing existing data pertaining to 
single car and repair track testing, and formulating appropriate 
recommendations based on an evaluation of this data. This task force 
was comprised of representatives from rail management, labor, and FRA. 
Task force deliberations commenced with a review of recent changes 
incorporated by the AAR with regard to single car and repair track test 
procedures, and a presentation of related data and statistics showing 
the direct benefits realized as a result of these revised procedures in 
terms of the number of defective brake system components detected and 
repaired. However, several members of the task force voiced strong 
objections regarding the accuracy and credibility of the data 
accumulated in the development of the presentation material. Beyond a 
fundamental questioning of the accuracy and credibility of this data, 
the group identified specific issues of concern to include incorrect 
data reported from the field, brake tests performed on defective cars, 
problems with accessibility to the AAR's UMLER reporting system, and 
questions regarding the service life of brake valves as reported.
    The task force related their reservations regarding reliability of 
the available data to the Working Group, specifically with respect to 
the manner in which it has been collected and analysed, and requested 
clarification regarding the definition of their specific assignment. 
Extensive discussions ensued regarding the source and accuracy of data 
that had been presented by each the FRA, AAR, and labor. Working Group 
members conceded that each respective database was likely biased to 
some extent due to variances in the way inspections are conducted and 
alternative methodologies used in collecting and evaluating the 
resulting data. Several members felt that FRA's database does not 
accurately reflect defect ratios since railroads are permitted to 
repair defects prior to the FRA taking exceptions, and others suggested 
that FRA's data is skewed toward problem areas, and that more random 
and unbiased data is necessary to formulate an accurate portrayal of 
the current state of the industry. Given the divergent views on the 
existing data, several members of the

[[Page 48321]]

Working Group suggested that the group consider the purposes for which 
the data is needed, and whether it is needed at all. The group agreed 
that a uniform understanding of the data and its relevance by all 
parties was necessary to validate current practices, and that there is 
great difficulty in detecting a systematic problem with the existing 
methodologies unless data is collected.
    The task force elected to continue discussions regarding the 
applicability and content of AAR's Rule 3, Chart A, which prescribes 
tests and attention required per AAR Specification S-486 (Code of Air 
Brake System Tests for Freight Equipment). In doing so, the Working 
Group instructed the task force to consider the extent to which an 
industry rule such as AAR's Rule 3, and specifically, Chart A, could be 
incorporated into a Federal regulation, and the necessary restrictions 
associated with publication date and subsequent changes that would need 
to be addressed. The task force continued its exhaustive review of 
AAR's Rule 3, Chart A, and made significant progress in reaching full 
consensus on the provisions contained therein. However, as the broad 
issues under consideration by this task force were directly tied to 
acceptance of the available data, continued progress was significantly 
impeded by the inability of the Inspection and Testing task force to 
reach resolution of what developed as a core issue of the working group 
proceeding in general; namely, data validity and reliability. 
Nonetheless, the task force continued efforts to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the AAR's UMLER reporting system, and examined 
possible modifications that would facilitate tracking maintenance and 
testing of equipment via this system as opposed to stencilling. Members 
of the task force also visited three facilities to view their 
approaches to periodic maintenance, single car testing, and repair 
track air tests. Ultimately, this task force was unable to provide 
consensus recommendations to the Working Group regarding periodic 
maintenance and testing requirements due to the Working Group members' 
collective unwillingness to agree on the issues relating to data 
collection, evaluation, and relevance as discussed in detail above.
    FRA Conclusions. Based on comments received in response to the 1994 
NPRM, deliberations of the Working Group and task force, and field 
experience, FRA remains confident that the ``new'' repair track and 
single car test, which have been used industry-wide since January of 
1992, are a much better and more comprehensive method of detecting and 
eliminating defective brake equipment and components than the old, 
time-based COT&S requirements. FRA believes that performance of the 
single car test significantly reduces the number of defective 
components and dramatically increases the reliability of brake 
equipment. Accordingly, FRA proposes to incorporate AAR Interchange 
Rule 3 and Chart A into this regulation, thus codifying the repair 
track air test requirements per Chart A such that a railroad is 
required to perform a repair track brake test on freight cars when: (i) 
A freight car is removed from a train due to an air brake related 
defect; (ii) a freight car has its brakes cut-out when removed from a 
train or when placed on a shop or repair track; (iii) a freight car is 
on a repair or shop track for any reason and has not received a repair 
track brake test within the previous 12 month period; (iv) a freight 
car is found with missing or incomplete repair track brake test 
information; (v) the brake reservoir(s), the control valve mounting 
gasket, and the pipe bracket stud is removed, repaired, or replaced; or 
(vi) a freight car is found with a wheel with built-up tread, slid 
flat, or thermally cracked. Further, FRA proposes that each freight car 
shall receive a repair track air test no less frequently than every 5 
years, and not less than 8 years from the date the car was built or 
rebuilt. Similarly, the single car test requirements of Chart A will be 
codified such that a railroad will perform a single car test on a 
freight car when one or more of the service portion, the emergency 
portion, or the pipe bracket is removed, repaired, or replaced.
    FRA recognizes that circumstances arise such that required repair 
track brake tests or single car tests cannot always be performed at the 
point where repairs can be made. In these instances, FRA proposes to 
allow a car, after repairs are effectuated, to be moved to the next 
forward location where the test can be performed. FRA intends to make 
clear that the inability to perform a repair track brake test or a 
single car test does not constitute an inability to effectuate the 
necessary repairs. At the same time, however, FRA recognizes rail 
labor's contention that some carriers often attempt to circumvent the 
requirements for single car and repair track testing through the 
elimination of repair tracks, by moving cars to expediter tracks for 
repair, or simply by making the repairs in the field. As a means to 
curtail these practices, FRA proposes to impose extensive tagging 
requirements on freight cars which, due to the nature of the defective 
condition(s) detected, require a repair track brake test or single car 
test but which are moved from the location where repairs are performed 
prior to receiving the required test. As an alternative to the tagging 
requirements, FRA proposes to permit a railroad to utilize an automated 
tracking system to monitor these cars and ensure they receive the 
requisite tests provided the automated system is approved by FRA. FRA 
also proposes to require stencilling requirements regarding the 
location and date of the last repair track or single car test. 
Alternatively, FRA intends to permit railroads to utilize an electronic 
record keeping system to accomplish this tracking requirement, provided 
such a system is approved by FRA. FRA believes these requirements are 
necessary to ensure the timely performance of these important tests. 
Without such information, there would be virtually no way for FRA to 
verify a railroad's compliance with the proposed repair track and 
single car test requirements.
    As in the 1994 NPRM, FRA continues to believe that single car 
testing devices should be tested at least once a day and receive 
routine maintenance at least every 92 days. Additionally, FRA feels 
that mechanical and electronic test devices should be regularly 
calibrated. FRA received no comments objecting to these requirements 
when previously proposed.
    FRA agrees that any changes to the AAR standards incorporated into 
regulation should be reviewed and approved by all affected parties, 
including FRA and rail labor. Consequently, FRA proposes to implement a 
Special Approval process, whereby the AAR will be required to submit 
any proposed changes to the FRA. FRA will review the proposed change to 
determine whether the change is ``safety-critical,'' to include, but 
not limited to (i) any changes to Chart A, (ii) changes to established 
maintenance intervals, and (iii) changes to UMLER reporting 
requirements. If the proposed change is deemed by FRA to be ``non 
safety-critical,'' FRA will permit the change to be implemented 
immediately. If the proposed change is deemed ``safety-critical,'' FRA 
proposes to publish a Federal Register Notice, conduct a Public Hearing 
if necessary, and act based on the information developed and submitted 
in regard to these proceedings.
    FRA proposes development of this Special Approval process in 
response to comments from several railroads and manufacturers, both in 
response to the 1994 NPRM and at the RSAC Working Group meetings, that 
FRA needed to

[[Page 48322]]

devise some sort of quick approval process in order to permit the 
industry to make modifications to existing standards or equipment based 
on the development of new technology. Thus, FRA has attempted to 
propose an approval process it believes should speed the process for 
taking advantage of new technologies over that which is currently 
available under the waiver process. However, in order to provide an 
opportunity for all interested parties to provide input for use by FRA 
in its decision-making process as required by the Administrative 
Procedure Act, FRA believes that any special approval provision must, 
at a minimum, provide proper notice to the public of any significant 
change or action being considered by the agency with regard to existing 
regulations.

VIII. Two-way End-of-Train Devices

    On January 2, 1997, FRA issued a final rule which contained design, 
performance, and testing requirements relating to end-of-train devices 
(EOTs), which became effective for all railroads on July 1, 1997, 
except for those for which the effective date was extended to December 
1, 1997 by notice issued on June 4, 1997. See 62 FR 278 and 62 FR 
30461. FRA intends to incorporate the provisions contained in that 
final rule into this proposal. As the provisions contained in that rule 
were just recently issued, there is little need to discuss these 
requirements in detail as they were fully discussed in the publications 
noted above. However, since their issuance, FRA has discovered that a 
few of the provisions are in need of minor modification for 
clarification purposes and to address some valid concerns that have 
been raised both internally by FRA inspectors and by outside parties. 
Consequently, FRA intends to propose a few specific modifications to 
the currently effective requirements which are discussed in detail in 
the ``Section-by-Section'' portion of this preamble regarding Subpart E 
of this part.
    Although FRA is proposing only a few specific changes to the 
current two-way EOT requirements, the following discussion details 
several issues which have arisen since the issuance of the final rule 
on EOTs. FRA seeks comment and information from all interested parties 
related to the issues discussed below in order to potentially take 
appropriate action on these issues at the final rule stage of this 
proceeding.
    The first issue of concern involves the ability of a railroad to 
test the ability of the devices to initiate an emergency brake 
application via a bench test. In the final rule, FRA elected to permit 
railroads some flexibility in determining that a device is capable of 
initiating an emergency brake application. Thus, FRA included a broad 
performance requirement and then discussed various methods of complying 
with the requirement in the preamble to the rule, one of which 
permitted a bench test of the devices. See 62 FR 287, 290, and 295. 
Based on information and questions received by FRA, it is obvious that 
the bench testing option needs further clarification. The reason FRA 
requires that the devices be tested at the initial terminal or other 
point of installation is to ensure that the front unit will transmit an 
emergency brake application signal to the rear device and that the rear 
device is capable of initiating an emergency brake application from the 
rear of the train. Thus, the test must include a testing of both the 
front and rear units (devices) that will be used on a train. The bench 
test allows railroads to perform the above test in a shop environment 
that may be more conducive to finding problems with the devices and 
making appropriate repairs as well as permitting railroads some 
efficiency in performing the test.
    In order to clarify what is required when a railroad performs a 
bench test, FRA issued guidance to its inspectors on July 28, 1997. See 
Technical Bulletin MP&E 97-8. In this guidance FRA made clear that a 
bench test could be performed on both the front and rear units, 
independent of each other, as long as the test is performed within the 
yard limits or location where the device will be installed on the 
train. In FRA's view, bench testing the rear unit requires applying air 
pressure to the device and then transmitting an emergency brake 
application from a front unit using the front unit manual switch. The 
individual performing the test would determine the emergency valve 
functions properly by either observing the emergency indicator pop out 
or observing brake pipe pressure at the rear device go to zero while 
hearing the exhaust of air from the device. Whereas, bench testing the 
front unit would entail transmitting an emergency brake application 
from the front unit, using the front unit manual switch, and observing 
that a rear device successfully receives the signal and activates the 
emergency air valve.
    FRA further believes that both tests must be performed within a 
reasonable time period prior to the device being armed and placed on 
the train. To determine a reasonable time period, the environment where 
the device is stored and the conditions the device is subjected to 
after completing a successful bench test have to be considered. If the 
devices are tested and stored in a controlled environment that is free 
from weather elements, excessive dust, grease, and dirt prior to the 
immediate installation on a train, then 4-8 hours would be acceptable. 
If the devices are tested and haphazardly thrown into a corner of a 
shop or are placed in the rear of a truck to be bounced around a yard, 
1 hour would likely be considered reasonable before installation. FRA 
also made clear that bench tests must be performed at the location or 
yard where the device will be installed on a train.
    To further develop the details of this issue, FRA seeks comments 
from all interested parties on the following:
    1. What procedures do railroads currently have in place regarding 
the performance of bench tests on two-way EOTs?
    2. How many railroads currently conduct bench testing of these 
devices? What number of devices are tested in this manner?
    3. As noted above, FRA believes that 8 hours is about the maximum 
time limit that should be permitted between the performance of a bench 
test and the installation of a device on a train. Is this reasonable?
    4. Should FRA specifically include provisions regarding the 
performance of a bench test in the regulations?
    Another subset of issues that has arisen regarding two-way devices, 
is the requirements related to handling trains on heavy grades. The two 
most prevalent issues involve the actions that must be taken when the 
devices fail en route on a heavy grade and situations where a train 
must be separated in order to traverse a grade. FRA does not intend for 
engineers to place themselves in an unsafe situation when they 
encounter an en route failure of the device when traversing a heavy 
grade. Although the rule prohibits the operation of a train over 
certain heavy grades when a failure of the device occurs en route, FRA 
did not intend that the train be immediately stopped when a failure of 
the device occurs while operating on a heavy grade. Rather, FRA intends 
for the locomotive engineer to conduct the movement in accordance with 
the railroad's operating rules for bringing the train safely to a stop 
at the first available location. Therefore, safety may require that the 
train continue down the grade or to a specific siding rather than to an 
immediate halt. Consequently, FRA expects railroads to develop 
appropriate procedures and train their engineers on those procedures 
related to the handling of trains on heavy grades when a two-way EOT 
fails during heavy grade operation.

[[Page 48323]]

    A second issue related to heavy grades involves situations where a 
train must be divided in two in order to traverse a particularly heavy 
grade due to the lack of sufficient motive power to haul the entire 
train up the grade. This practice is referred to in the industry as 
``doubling a hill.'' Initially, FRA felt that the two-way EOT should be 
connected to that portion of the train traversing the grade. However, 
such an approach creates a multitude of operational as well as safety 
concerns. Such an approach would require train crews to repeatedly 
switch the rear unit from one portion of the train to another, which 
would require these individuals to repeatedly walk sections of the 
train at locations where it may not be safe to do so. Alternatively, 
such an approach might require some trains to carry extra devices while 
in transit. Both options tend to compromise the proper operation of the 
rear devices. Consequently, FRA is seeking information and suggestions 
on how to handle these types of situations that most effectively deal 
with all of the safety hazards involved in these types of operations.
    In order to further develop the two issues discussed above, FRA 
seeks comment and information from all interested parties on the 
following:
    1. What procedures do railroads currently have in place concerning 
the handling of a train that experiences a failure of the two-way EOT 
while operating on a heavy grade?
    2. Should trains be permitted to continue down a heavy grade if a 
failure of the two-way EOT occurs while descending the grade? For what 
distance or to what type of location?
    3. How many railroads currently engage in the practice of having 
trains ``double a hill?'' How many trains engage in this activity? At 
what locations?
    4. Are there helper locomotives stationed near the locations where 
trains engage in the practice of ``doubling a hill?'
    5. Is safety better served by permitting railroads to leave the 
rear unit on the rear of the train and proceeding with the front 
section of the train over the grade? What safety hazards are created by 
permitting such operation? Are there operational restrictions that 
could be imposed to limit the potential safety hazards?

Section-by-section analysis

Amendments to 49 CFR Part 229

    The amendments to part 229 contained in this proposal principally 
concern the testing of electronic gauges commonly used in 
electronically controlled locomotive brake systems. Currently, there 
are two electronically controlled locomotive brake systems in use on 
the nation's railroads, the Electro-Pneumatic Integrated Control (EPIC) 
system supplied by Westinghouse Air Brake Company and the Computer 
Controlled Brake (CCB) system developed by New York Air Brake Company. 
It is projected that by the end of 1997 there will be over 1,000 
locomotives in service equipped with the CCB system and over 1,400 
locomotives in service equipped with the EPIC system.
    In May of 1996, the RSAC Working Group decided to form a task force 
to consider issues related to electronically controlled locomotive 
brake systems. Rather than create an entirely new task force, the 
Working Group assigned the task to a group of individuals that were 
members of the previously established ``New Technology Joint 
Information Committee'' created to address issues related to the 
operation of these types of brake systems as well as the training of 
those individuals using this new technology. This task force addressed 
several issues related to these braking systems including: design; 
training; inspection and testing; and maintenance. The task force 
concluded that additional regulation of these types of locomotive 
braking systems was unnecessary since the current regulations or 
waivers sufficiently address the training, inspection, and maintenance 
of these systems and any additional design requirement would most 
likely not enhance safety and would probably restrict the advancement 
of new technology.
    The task force did recommend that some changes be made to language 
contained in part 229 to permit an extension in the testing cycles for 
the electronic gauges used in these types of locomotive brake systems. 
The task force recommended that part 229 be revised to increase the 
testing interval for these electronic gauges from 92 days to an annual 
cycle. The task force believed that such an extension was warranted 
based on the technology incorporated into these types of electronic 
gauges, which has significantly increased their reliability over 
standard mechanical gauges. Some of the items noted by the task force 
which create greater reliability of these gauges included the 
following: the electronic components have longer life cycles than those 
in mechanical gauges; the accuracy and durability of the transducer has 
been extended; and internal computer diagnostics detect inaccuracies 
prior to gauges becoming defective under federal regulations. FRA 
concluded from facts and judgements expressed by individual members of 
the Working Group that the recommendations of the task force would be 
acceptable. Furthermore, FRA agrees with the findings of the task 
force, and thus, proposes the changes to part 229 recommended by the 
task force.
    FRA also proposes to amend part 229 by adding a new provision to 
the annual test required by Sec. 229.27 to require that the locomotive 
compressor or compressors be tested for capacity by orifice test at 
this interval. This requirement is currently contained in 
Sec. 232.10(c) but does not currently specify a time frame within which 
the testing must occur. Thus, in order to clarify the requirement FRA 
believes that the performance of this test on an annual basis will 
ensure the proper operation of these compressors. FRA believes that the 
specification of a time frame for performance of this test will have 
little or no impact on the railroads as many railroads currently 
perform this test at this interval and because the test is fairly 
simple to perform.

Amendments to 49 CFR Part 231

    FRA proposes minor clarifying changes in the applicability section 
of this part. These changes are intended to make the regulatory 
exceptions consistent with the exceptions contained in the statute. The 
added exceptions are taken directly from 49 U.S.C. 20301 (previously 
codified at 45 U.S.C. 6). It is noted that the word ``freight'' has 
been added to the exceptions in order to remain consistent with 
Congress' intent when the statutory exceptions were created. At the 
time Congress provided an exception from the requirements of the Acts, 
Congress did not and could not envision that the equipment used in 
these operations would be modified for the purposes of hauling 
passengers, which FRA has discovered with regard to four-wheel coal 
cars. Consequently, FRA will only except freight operations which 
employ the types of equipment contained in these amendments.
    FRA also proposes to move the provisions related to drawbars from 
part 232 where they are currently contained to this part. FRA believes 
that part 231 is a more logical place for the drawbar provisions to be 
located as they are more of a safety appliance-type component than a 
brake system component. Although FRA has redrafted the provisions for 
clarity and readability, FRA does not intend to change any of the basic 
drawbar provisions currently contained in Sec. 232.2.

[[Page 48324]]

49 CFR Part 232

Subpart A--General

Section 232.1  Purpose and Scope
    This section contains a formal statement of the proposed rules' 
purpose and scope. FRA intends the proposed rules to cover all brakes 
systems and brake components used in any freight train operation or any 
other non-passenger train operation.
Section 232.3  Applicability
    As a general matter, in paragraph (a), FRA proposes that this rule 
apply to all railroads that operate freight or other non-passenger 
train service on standard gage track which is part of the general 
railroad system of transportation. In paragraph (b) of this section, 
FRA makes clear that Subpart E of this proposal applies to all trains 
that operate on the general system regardless of the commodity it 
hauls, unless it is specifically excepted by the provisions contained 
in Subpart E. Subpart E contains the requirements regarding the use of 
two-way end-of-train devices which were issued on January 2, 1997 and 
became effective on July 1, 1997. Although FRA proposes some minor 
changes to these requirements, principally for clarification, the 
provisions contained in Subpart E are virtually identical to the 
existing requirements.
    Paragraph (c) of this section contains a listing of those 
operations and equipment for which FRA does not intend this proposed 
rule to apply. These include: rapid transit operations not connected to 
the general system; commuter, intercity, and other short-haul passenger 
operations; and tourist, scenic, historic, or excursion operations. In 
1994, FRA issued a power brake NPRM in which FRA attempted to draft a 
proposal covering all railroad operations. FRA received a multitude of 
comments suggesting that similar treatment of passenger and freight 
operations was not a viable approach due to the significant differences 
in the operating environment and equipment used in these operations. 
Based on these comments, FRA decided to separate passenger and freight 
operations and FRA is currently addressing the power brake issues 
related to passenger and commuter operations in a separate rulemaking 
specifically tailored to those types of operations. Similarly, the 
Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1994 directs FRA to 
examine the unique circumstances of tourist and historic railroads when 
establishing safety regulations. The Act, which amended 49 U.S.C. 
20103, states that:

    In prescribing regulations that pertain to railroad safety that 
affect tourist, historic, scenic, or excursion railroad carriers, 
the Secretary of Transportation shall take into consideration any 
financial, operational, or other factors that may be unique to such 
railroad carriers. The Secretary shall submit a report to Congress 
not later than September 30, 1995, on actions taken under this 
subsection.

Pub. L. No. 103-440, Sec. 217, 108 Stat. 4619, 4624, November 2, 1994. 
In response to this mandate, FRA has established a Tourist and Historic 
Railroads Working Group formed under RSAC to specifically address the 
applicability of FRA's regulations to these unique types of operations. 
Consequently, any requirements proposed by FRA for these types of 
operations will be part of a separate rulemaking proceeding. However, 
FRA may retain existing provisions of part 232 as applicable to such 
operations to the extent part 232 currently applies in order to avoid 
regulatory gaps while power brake provisions for such service are 
finalized.
    Similar to the amendments proposed for part 231, paragraph (c)(6)-
(c)(8) of this section also contains the expressed exceptions currently 
contained in the statute for certain coal cars and logging cars. These 
proposed provisions are intended to make the regulatory exceptions 
consistent with the exceptions contained in the statute. The added 
exceptions are taken directly from 49 U.S.C. 20301 (previously codified 
at 45 U.S.C. 6). It is noted that the word ``freight'' has been added 
to the exceptions in order to remain consistent with Congress' intent 
when the statutory exceptions were created. At the time Congress 
provided an exception from the requirements of the Acts, Congress did 
not and could not envision that the equipment used in these operations 
would be modified for the purposes of hauling passengers, which FRA has 
discovered with regard to four-wheel coal cars. Consequently, FRA will 
only except freight operations which employ the types of equipment 
contained in these amendments.
    Proposed paragraph (d) and (e) of this section revokes the 
Interstate Commerce Commission Order 13528, of May 30, 1945, as amended 
(codified in existing Sec. 232.3 and Appendix B to part 232), and 
codifies some of the relevant provisions of that Order. Thus, paragraph 
(e) of this section contains a list of equipment which were excepted 
from the Order's specifications and requirements for operating power-
brake systems for freight service and to which the proposed 
requirements are not applicable. FRA believes that the Order is no 
longer completely relevant or necessary and believes that the relevant 
provisions should be incorporated into this section. In addition, FRA 
intends to reference current industry standards containing performance 
specifications for freight power brakes in other portions of this 
proposal which mirror the provisions contained in the Order.
    It should be noted that this section contains no specific reference 
to private cars or circus trains. As private cars are designed to carry 
passengers and are generally hauled in both freight and passenger 
trains, FRA intends that these types of cars be covered by both the 
recently proposed Passenger Equipment Safety Standards and these 
proposed requirements. For example, these types of cars will be subject 
to the maintenance and equipment standards applicable to passenger 
equipment but will be covered by the inspection requirements contained 
in this proposal when hauled in a freight train. With regard to circus 
trains, FRA intends that these operations be covered by this proposal 
due to the unique nature of this equipment and operations. Although 
circus trains carry some employees, the majority of the train is 
composed of freight-type equipment and are operated in manner similar 
to a freight train. Thus, for consistency purposes, FRA intends that 
the proposed rules apply to circus train operations.
Section 232.5  Definitions
    This section contains an extensive set of definitions to introduce 
the regulations. FRA intends these definitions to clarify the meaning 
of important terms as they are used in the text of the proposed rule. 
The proposed definitions are carefully worded in an attempt to minimize 
the potential for misinterpretation of the rule. Several of the 
definitions introduce new concepts or new terminologies which require 
further discussion.
    ``Brake indicator'' means a device, actuated by brake cylinder 
pressure, which indicates whether brakes are applied or released on a 
car. The use of brake indicators in the performance of brake tests is a 
controversial subject. Rail labor organizations correctly maintain that 
brake indicators are not fully reliable indicators of brake application 
and release on each car in the train. Further, railroads correctly 
maintain that reliance on brake indicators is necessary because 
inspectors cannot always safely observe brake application and release. 
FRA believes that brake indicators can serve an important role in the 
performance of brake tests, particularly in those

[[Page 48325]]

instances where the design of the equipment requires inspectors to 
place themselves in potentially dangerous position in order to observe 
the brake actuation or release.
    The concept of ``ordered'' or ``date ordered'' is vital to the 
correct application of this proposed rule. The terms mean the date on 
which notice to proceed is given by a procuring railroad to a 
contractor or supplier for new equipment. Some of the provisions of the 
proposed rule will apply only to newly constructed equipment. When FRA 
proposes to apply requirements only to equipment ordered on or after 
January 1, 1999, or placed in service for the first time on or after 
January 1, 2001, FRA intends to grandfather any piece of equipment that 
is both ordered before January 1, 1999, and placed in service for the 
first time before January 1, 2001. FRA believes this approach will 
allow railroads to avoid any costs associated with changes to existing 
orders and yet limit the delay in realizing the safety benefits of the 
requirements proposed in this rule.
    The definition of ``point of origin'' is intended to encompass 
those locations traditionally considered initial terminals, that is the 
location where a train is originally assembled. For clarity purposes, 
FRA will consider a location to be a place where a train is originally 
assembled, to be the location where a vast majority of the cars in a 
train are added to the train. FRA has discovered that some railroads 
are assembling two or more locomotives together with only a few cars at 
one location and performing an initial terminal inspection pursuant to 
Sec. 232.12 on the train at that location. The train is then moved a 
very short distance (less than 20 miles) where forty or more cars are 
added to the train with the performance of only an intermediate brake 
inspection being performed. FRA believes this practice is clearly an 
attempt to circumvent the inspection requirements currently contained 
in the regulations. Consequently, FRA intends to make clear that it 
will consider that location where the majority of cars are added to the 
train to be the point of origin or initial terminal for that train, as 
that is the location where the train is in fact assembled. FRA 
recognizes that such a standard will have to be looked at on a case-by-
case basis, but believes that the above mentioned scenario is a clear 
case where a railroad is attempting to avoid the comprehensive 
inspection requirements imposed on a train at its point of origin.
    The definitions of ``qualified person'' and ``qualified mechanical 
inspector'' are vital to interpreting the proposed inspection, testing, 
and maintenance provisions of the rule. A ``qualified person'' is a 
person determined by the railroad to have the knowledge and skills 
necessary to perform one or more functions required under this part. 
With the proper training, a train crewmember could be a qualified 
person. Whereas, a ``qualified mechanical inspector'' is a ``qualified 
person'' who as a part of the training, qualification, and designation 
program required under Sec. 232.203 has received instruction and 
training that includes ``hands-on'' experience (under appropriate 
supervision or apprenticeship) in one or more of the following 
functions: trouble-shooting, inspection, testing, maintenance, or 
repair of the specific train brake and other components and systems for 
which the inspector is assigned responsibility. Further, the mechanical 
inspector must be a person whose primary responsibility includes work 
generally consistent with those functions. Consequently, a train 
crewmember would likely not be a qualified mechanical inspector.
    FRA includes a clear definition of ``qualified person'' to allow 
railroads the flexibility of having train crews continue to perform 
various brake tests. A qualified person must be trained and designated 
as able to perform the types of brake inspections and tests that the 
railroad assigns to him or her. However, a qualified person need not 
have the extensive knowledge of brake systems or components or be able 
to trouble-shoot and repair them. The qualified person is the 
``checker.'' He or she must have the knowledge and experience necessary 
to be able to identify brake system problems.
    FRA provides a clear definition of qualified mechanical inspector 
so that a differentiation can be made between the comprehensive 
knowledge and training possessed by a professional mechanical employee, 
and the more specialized training and general knowledge possessed by 
train crews. This definition largely rules out the possibility of train 
crewmembers becoming a qualified mechanical inspector. Part of the 
definition requires the primary job of a qualified mechanical inspector 
to be inspection, testing, or maintenance of freight brake equipment. 
FRA intends the definition to allow the members of the trades 
associated with testing and maintenance of equipment such as carmen, 
machinists, and electricians to become qualified mechanical inspectors. 
However, membership in labor organizations or completion of 
apprenticeship programs associated with these crafts is not required to 
be a qualified mechanical inspector. The two primary qualifications are 
possession of the knowledge required to do the job and a primary work 
assignment inspecting, testing, or maintaining the equipment.
    Discussions conducted in the Working Group meetings revealed that 
railroad operators believe these definitions are too restrictive and 
will require training beyond the minimum needed for many employees to 
do their jobs. On the other hand, the representatives of labor 
organizations maintain that this approach will allow unqualified train 
crewmembers to conduct tests and inspections that should be performed 
only by mechanical employees.
    FRA believes the proposed rule strikes the correct balance between 
these conflicting points of view. FRA agrees with labor representatives 
that mechanical employees generally conduct a more thorough inspection 
than train crewmembers. As a result, FRA will only permit trains which 
have been inspected by mechanically qualified inspectors to move beyond 
the currently permitted 1,000 mile limit without an additional brake 
inspection. At the same time, FRA agrees with railroad operators that 
properly trained train crewmembers are capable of performing brake 
tests and have been doing so effectively for years. As a result, the 
proposed rule grants flexibility to railroads to continue to use 
properly trained train crewmembers to perform certain brake tests, 
while providing the incentive of extended movements to railroads that 
use more highly qualified mechanical inspectors to perform other brake 
tests.
    The definition of ``solid block of cars'' is included in order to 
clarify some serious misunderstandings currently existing in various 
segments of the industry. FRA believes that the definition provided in 
this proposal is consistent with longstanding agency interpretation and 
the clear intent of the regulations. This definition makes clear that 
the phase ``solid block of cars'' is intended to describe a set of cars 
that were all a part of one train and that have remained coupled 
together until added to another train. The phrase was never intended, 
nor is it intended in this proposal, to mean groups of cars removed 
from various different trains that are then assembled into a block for 
addition into another train. In FRA's view, the above described action 
constitutes the assembling of a new train which would require the 
performance of an appropriate brake test and inspection.

[[Page 48326]]

    The definitions of ``transfer train,'' ``yard train,'' and 
``switching service'' are somewhat interrelated since the determination 
as to whether, at a minimum, a transfer train brake test is required is 
based on whether the movement is a switching movement or a train 
movement. A ``transfer train'' is defined as a train that travels 
between a point of origin and a point of destination, located no more 
than 20 miles apart, and which is not performing switching service. A 
``yard train'' is defined as a train that only performs switching 
service within a single yard complex. ``Switching service'' is defined 
as the classification of cars according to commodity or destination; 
assembling of cars for train movements; changing the position of cars 
for purposes of loading, unloading, or weighing; placing of locomotives 
or cars for repair or storage; or moving of rail equipment in 
connection with work service that does not constitute a train movement. 
Thus, a train engaged in switching service carries the potential of 
becoming a transfer train, subject to a transfer train's testing 
requirements, if the movement it will be engaged in is considered a 
``train movement'' rather than a ``switching movement.'' FRA's 
determination of whether the movement of cars is a ``train movement,'' 
subject to the requirements of this section, or a ``switching 
movement'' is and will be based on the voluminous case law developed by 
various courts of the United States.
    FRA's general rule of thumb as to whether a trip constitutes a 
``train movement'' requires five or more cars traveling a distance of 
at least one mile without a stop to set off or pick up a car and not 
moving for the purpose of assembling or disassembling a train. However, 
FRA may consider movements of less than one mile ``train movements'' if 
various circumstances exist. In determining whether a particular 
movement constitutes a ``train movement,'' FRA conducts a multi-factor 
analysis based upon the discussions contained in various court 
decisions on the subject. See e.g. United States v. Seaboard Air Line 
R. R. Co., 361 U.S. 78 (1959); Louisville & Jeffersonville Bridge Co. 
v. United States, 249 U.S. 543 (1919). The following factors are taken 
into consideration by FRA: the purpose of the movement; the distance 
traveled without a stop to set out or pick up cars; the number of cars 
hauled; and the hazards associated with the particular route traveled 
(e.g., the existence of public or private crossings with or without 
crossing protection, the steepness of the grade, the existence of 
curves, any other conditions that minimize the locomotive engineer's 
sight distance, and any other conditions that may create a greater need 
for power brakes during the movement). The existence of any of these 
hazards would tend to weigh towards the finding of a ``train 
movement,'' since these are the types of hazards against which the 
power brake provisions of the Federal rail safety laws were designed to 
give protection.
Section 232.7  Waivers
    This section sets forth the procedures for seeking waivers of 
compliance with the requirements of this rule. Requests for such 
waivers may be filed by any interested party. In reviewing such 
requests, FRA conducts investigations to determine if a deviation from 
the general criteria can be made without compromising or diminishing 
rail safety.
Section 232.9  Responsibility for Compliance
    General compliance requirements are contained in this section. In 
accordance with the ``use'' or ``haul'' language previously contained 
in the Safety Appliance Acts (49 U.S.C. chapter 203), and with FRA's 
general rulemaking authority under the Federal railroad safety laws, 
FRA proposes that any train, railroad car, or locomotive covered by 
this part will be considered ``in use'' prior to departure but after it 
receives or should have received the necessary tests and inspections 
required for movement. FRA would no longer necessarily wait for a piece 
of equipment with a power brake defect to be hauled before issuing a 
violation, a practice frequently criticized by the railroads. FRA 
believes that this approach will increase FRA's ability to prevent the 
movement of defective equipment that creates a potential safety hazard 
to both the public and railroad employees. FRA does not feel that this 
approach increases the railroads' burden since equipment should not be 
operated if it is found in defective condition in the pre-departure 
tests and inspections, unless permitted by the regulations. In fact, 
this modification of FRA's perspectives as to when a piece of equipment 
will be considered ``in use'' was fully discussed by members of the 
Working Group and based upon the opinions and judgments expressed by 
individual members of the group, FRA has concluded that the proposal is 
an appropriate approach. Both rail labor and rail management 
representatives supported the approach contained in this proposal 
agreeing that the current practice of waiting for a defective piece of 
equipment to depart from a location does very little to promote or 
ensure the safety of trains.
    This section also clarifies FRA's position that the requirements 
contained in the proposed rules are applicable to any ``person,'' as 
broadly defined in Sec. 232.11, that performs any function required by 
the proposed rules. Although various sections of the proposed rule 
address the duties of a railroad, FRA intends that any person who 
performs any action on behalf of a railroad or any person who performs 
any action covered by the proposed rule is required to perform that 
action in the same manner as required of a railroad or be subject to 
FRA enforcement action. For example, private car owners and contract 
shippers that perform duties covered by these proposed regulations 
would be required to perform those duties in the same manner as 
required by a railroad.
    Paragraph (c) proposes that any person as broadly defined in 
Sec. 232.11 that performs any function or task required by this part 
will be deemed to have consented to FRA inspection of their operation 
to the extent necessary to ensure that the function or task is being 
performed in accordance with the requirements of this part. This 
proposed provision is intended to put railroads, contractors, and 
manufacturers which elect to perform tasks required by this part on 
notice that they are consenting to FRA's inspection of that portion of 
their operation which is performing the function or task required by 
this part. In most cases, this involves a contractor's performance of 
certain required brake inspections or the performance of specified 
maintenance on cars, such as, conducting single car or repair track 
tests on behalf of a railroad. FRA believes that if a person is going 
to perform a task required by this part, FRA must have the ability to 
view the performance of such tasks to ensure that they are conducted in 
compliance with federal regulations. Without such oversight, FRA 
believes that the requirements contained in the regulations would 
become illusionary and could be easily circumvented by some railroads. 
FRA believes that it has the statutory authority pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 
20107 to inspect any facility or operation which performs functions or 
tasks required under this part, and this provision is merely intended 
to make that authority clear to all persons performing such tasks or 
functions.
Section 232.11  Penalties
    This section identifies the civil penalties that FRA may impose 
upon

[[Page 48327]]

any person, including a railroad or an independent contractor providing 
goods or services to a railroad, that violates any requirement of this 
part. These penalties are authorized by 49 U.S.C. 21301, 21302, and 
21304. The penalty provision parallels penalty provisions included in 
numerous other safety regulations issued by FRA. Essentially, any 
person who violates any requirement of this part or causes the 
violation of any such requirement will be subject to a civil penalty of 
at least $500 and not more than $11,000 per violation. Civil penalties 
may be assessed against individuals only for willful violations, and 
where a grossly negligent violation or a pattern of repeated violations 
creates an imminent hazard of death or injury to persons, or causes 
death or injury, a penalty not to exceed $22,000 per violation may be 
assessed. In addition, each day a violation continues will constitute a 
separate offense. It should be noted that, the Federal Civil Penalties 
Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-410 Stat. 890, 28 U.S.C. 
2461 note, as amended by the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 
Pub. L. 104-134, April 26, 1996 required agencies to adjust for 
inflation the maximum civil monetary penalties within the agencies 
jurisdiction. The resulting $11,000 and $22,000 maximum penalties noted 
in this section were determined by applying the criteria set forth in 
sections 4 and 5 of the statute to the maximum penalties otherwise 
provided for in the Federal railroad safety laws. Finally, paragraph 
(b) makes clear that a person may be subject to criminal penalties 
under 49 U.S.C. 21311 for knowingly and willfully falsifying reports 
required by these regulations. FRA believes that the inclusion of 
penalty provisions for failure to comply with the regulations is 
important in ensuring that compliance is achieved.
    The final rule will include a schedule of civil penalties as 
appendix A to this part. Because such penalty schedules are statements 
of policy, notice and comment are not required prior to their issuance. 
See 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(A). Nevertheless, commenters are invited to 
submit suggestions to FRA describing the types of actions or omissions 
under each regulatory section that would subject a person to the 
assessment of a civil penalty. Commenters are also invited to recommend 
what penalties may be appropriate, based upon the relative seriousness 
of each type of violation.
Section 232.13  Preemptive Effect
    This section informs the public as to FRA's views regarding what 
will be the preemptive effect of the final rule. While the presence or 
absence of such a section does not in itself affect the preemptive 
effect of a final rule, it informs the public concerning the statutory 
provision which governs the preemptive effect of the rule. Section 
20106 of title 49 of the United States Code provides that all 
regulations prescribed by the Secretary relating to railroad safety 
preempt any State law, regulation, or order covering the same subject 
matter, except a provision necessary to eliminate or reduce an 
essentially local safety hazard that is not incompatible with a Federal 
law, regulation, or order and that does not unreasonably burden 
interstate commerce. With the exception of a provision directed at an 
essentially local safety hazard, 49 U.S.C. 20106 will preempt any State 
regulatory agency rule covering the same subject matter as the 
regulations proposed today when issued as final rules. This section 
further informs the public that FRA does not intend to preempt 
provisions of State criminal law that impose sanctions for reckless 
conduct that leads to actual loss of life, injury, or damage to 
property, whether such provisions apply specifically to railroad 
employees or generally to the public at large.
Section 232.15  Movement of Defective Equipment
    This section contains the provisions regarding the movement of 
equipment with defective brakes without civil penalty liability. The 
proposed provisions contained in this section are almost identical to 
the provisions proposed in the 1994 NPRM and incorporate the stringent 
conditions currently contained in 49 U.S.C. 20302, 20303, 21302, and 
21304 (previously codified at 45 U.S.C. 13). As pointed out in the 
previous discussion, most of the alternative proposals received by FRA 
in response to the 1994 NPRM and the subsequent RSAC Working Group 
meetings all contained provisions regarding the movement of equipment 
with defective brakes which are in direct conflict with the statutory 
requirements. See Discussion of Issues and General FRA Conclusions 
portion of the preamble under the heading ``Movement of Equipment with 
Defective Brakes.'' Therefore, FRA intends to propose provisions 
related to the movement of defective equipment which are very similar 
to the requirements proposed in the 1994 NPRM. See 59 FR 47728. 
However, the current proposal clarifies the tagging requirements, 
contains provisions regarding the placement of defective equipment, and 
provides a consistent method for calculating the percentage of 
operative brakes on a train. Consequently, in addition to being 
consistent with the statutory requirements, FRA believes that the 
proposed requirements will ensure the safe and proper movement of 
defective equipment and will clarify the duties imposed on a railroad 
when moving such equipment.
    Paragraph (a) of this section proposes various parameters which 
must exist in order for a railroad to be deemed to be hauling a piece 
of equipment with defective brakes for repairs. The majority of the 
proposed requirements in this paragraph should pose absolutely no 
burden to railroads as they are merely a codification of existing 
statutory requirements. The only new requirement being proposed by FRA 
in this paragraph is that all cars or locomotives found with defective 
or inoperative braking equipment be tagged as bad ordered with a 
designation of the location where the necessary repairs can and will be 
effectuated and that a qualified person determine the safety parameters 
for moving a piece of defective equipment. Although these are new 
requirements, most railroads already tag defective brake equipment upon 
its discovery. In paragraph (a), FRA has again attempted to expressly 
clarify the requirement that equipment with defective brakes shall not 
depart from or be moved beyond a location where the necessary repairs 
to the equipment can be performed. Therefore, if a car or locomotive is 
found with defective brakes during any of the proposed brake 
inspections or while the piece of equipment is en route and the 
location where the defective equipment is discovered is a place where 
repairs of the type needed can be performed, that car or locomotive 
shall not be moved from that location until the necessary repairs are 
effectuated. However, if repairs to the defective condition cannot be 
performed at the location where the defect is discovered, or should 
have been discovered, this proposal makes clear that the railroad is 
permitted to move the equipment with the defective condition only to 
the nearest location where the necessary repairs can be performed.
    Paragraph (a) also codifies and clarifies the statutory 
restrictions on the movement of equipment with defective brakes onto 
the line of a connecting railroad. Hence, the delivery of defective 
equipment in interchange would be covered by these restrictions. In 
addition to fulfilling the other requirements set out in this section, 
the railroad seeking relief from civil penalty liability must show that 
the connecting

[[Page 48328]]

railroad has elected to accept the non-complying equipment and that the 
point of repair on the connecting railroad's line, where the equipment 
will be repaired, is no further than the point where the repairs could 
have been made on the line where the equipment was first found to be 
defective.
    What constitutes the nearest location where the necessary repairs 
can be performed is an issue FRA has grappled with for decades and has 
become exceedingly more difficult with the growing use of mobile repair 
trucks. As discussed in detail above, FRA does not believe that one 
standard can be adequately developed which would be applicable to all 
situations. Thus, FRA intends to approach the issue of what constitutes 
the nearest repair location based on a case-by-case analysis of each 
situation. FRA believes that its field inspectors are in the best 
position to determine whether a railroad exercised good faith in 
determining when and where to move a piece of defective equipment. In 
making these determinations both the railroad as well as FRA's 
inspectors must conduct a multi-factor analysis based on the facts of 
each case.
    In determining whether a particular location is a location where 
necessary repairs can be made or whether a location is the nearest 
repair location, the accessibility of the location and the ability to 
safely make the repairs at that location are the two overriding factors 
that must be considered in any analysis. These two factors have a 
multitude of sub-factors which must be considered, such as: the type of 
repair required; the safety of employees responsible for conducting the 
repairs; the safety of employees responsible for getting the equipment 
to or from a particular location; the switching operations necessary to 
effectuate the move; the railroads recent history and current practice 
of making repairs (brake and non-brake) at a particular location; and 
relevant weather conditions. Although the distance to a repair location 
is a key factor, distance alone is not the determining factor of 
whether a particular location is the nearest location for purposes of 
effectuating repairs and must be considered in conjunction with the 
factors noted above. Existing case law makes clear that neither the 
congestion of work at a particular location or convenience to the 
railroad are to be considered when conducting this analysis.
    Paragraph (b) of this section contains the specific requirements 
regarding the tagging of equipment found with defective brake 
components. The requirements proposed in this paragraph are very 
similar to the tagging requirements currently contained in part 215, 
regarding the movement of equipment not in compliance with the Freight 
Car Safety Standards, and are generally consistent with how most 
railroads currently tag equipment found with defective brakes. FRA 
recognizes that the industry is attempting to develop some type of 
automated tracking system capable of retaining the information required 
by this section and tracking defective equipment electronically, which 
FRA envisions would be used on an industry-wide level. Consequently, 
FRA has expressly provided the option to use an automated tracking 
system if it is approved by FRA. Currently, FRA has several concerns 
regarding the accessibility, reliability, and security of the system 
being considered by the industry and would not approve such a system 
without having those concerns addressed.
    Paragraph (c) contains the proposed provision restricting the 
movement of a vehicle with defective brakes for the purpose of 
unloading or purging only if it is necessary for the safe repair of the 
car. This proposed restriction is fully consistent with the statutory 
provisions regarding the movement of equipment with defective safety 
appliances.
    Paragraph (d) explains the term ``inoperative power brakes'' and 
proposes a new method for calculating the percentage of operative power 
brakes (operative primary brakes) in a train. Regarding the term 
itself, a cut-out power brake is an inoperative power brake, but the 
failure or cutting out of a secondary brake system does not result in 
inoperative power brakes; for example, failure of the dynamic brake 
does not render a power brake inoperative. FRA also intends to make 
clear that inoperative handbrakes or power brakes overdue for 
maintenance or stenciling should not be considered inoperative for 
purposes of calculation. Furthermore, although a car may be found with 
piston travel which is in excess of the Class I brake test limits, it 
should not be considered inoperative until it exceeds the outside 
limits established for that particular type of piston design. However, 
a car found with piston travel that exceeds its Class I brake test 
limits would be considered a defective condition if the piston travel 
were not adjusted at the time that a Class I brake test were performed.
    Although the statute discusses the percentage of operative brakes 
in terms of a percentage of vehicles, the statute was written nearly a 
century ago and at that time the only way to cut out the brakes on a 
car or locomotive was to cut out the entire unit. See 49 U.S.C. 
20302(a)(5)(B). Today, many types of freight equipment can have the 
brakes cut out on a per-truck basis and FRA expects this tend to 
increase as the technology is applied to newly acquired equipment. 
Consequently, FRA merely proposes a method of calculating the 
percentage of operative brakes based on the design of equipment used 
today, and thus, a means to more accurately reflect the true braking 
ability of the train as a whole. FRA believes that the proposed method 
of calculation is consistent with the intent of Congress when it 
drafted the statutory requirement and simply recognizes the 
technological advancements made in braking systems over the last 
century. Consequently, FRA proposes to permit the percentage of 
operative brakes to be determined by dividing the number of control 
valves that are cut-in by the total number of control valves in the 
train.
    Paragraph (e) contains the proposed requirements regarding the 
placement of cars in a train that have inoperative brakes. The proposed 
restrictions are consistent with current industry practice and are part 
of almost every major railroad's operating rule. The proposed provision 
would prohibit the placing of a vehicle with inoperative brakes at the 
rear of the train. In addition, the proposal would prohibit the 
consecutive placing of more than two vehicles with inoperative brakes 
as test rack demonstrations have indicated that when three consecutive 
cars have their brakes cut-out it is not always possible to obtain an 
emergency brake application on trailing cars. FRA has extrapolated the 
restriction on the consecutive placing of defective cars to multi-unit 
articulated equipment, prohibiting the placement in a train of such 
equipment if it has consecutive individual control valves cut-out or 
inoperative, which is consistent with current industry practice.
Section 232.17  Special Approval Process
    This section contains the procedures to be followed when seeking to 
obtain FRA approval of a pre-revenue service acceptance plan under 
Sec. 232.505 for completely new brake system technologies or major 
upgrades to existing systems or when seeking to change one of the 
established industry maintenance standards referenced in Secs. 232.303, 
232.305, or 232.307. Several railroads and manufacturers contended, 
both in response to the 1994 NPRM and at the RSAC Working Group 
meetings, that FRA needed to devise some sort of quick approval process 
in order to permit the industry to make

[[Page 48329]]

modifications to existing standards or equipment based on the 
development of new technology. Thus, FRA has attempted to propose an 
approval process it believes should speed the process for taking 
advantage of new technologies over that which is currently available 
under the waiver process. However, in order to provide an opportunity 
for all interested parties to provide input for use by FRA in its 
decision making process, as required by the Administrative Procedure 
Act, FRA believes that any special approval provision must, at a 
minimum, provide proper notice to the public of any significant change 
or action being considered by the agency with regard to existing 
regulations.

Subpart B--General Requirements

Section 232.101  Scope
    This section contains a formal statement of the scope of this 
specific subpart of the proposal. This subpart is intended to provide 
general operating, performance, and design standards for railroads that 
operate freight or other non-passenger trains and further contains 
specific requirements for equipment used in these types of operations.
Section 232.103  General Requirements for All Train Brake Systems
    This section contains general requirements that are applicable to 
all freight and non-passenger train brake systems. FRA proposes to 
specifically include basic train brake system practices and procedures 
that form the foundation for the safe operation of all types of trains. 
Some of these basic principles are so obvious that they have not been 
specifically included in past rules. For example, in paragraphs (a)-(c) 
FRA has included the most basic safety requirements for all train brake 
systems which include having the ability to stop a train within the 
existing signal spacing, maintaining and monitoring the integrity of 
the train brake communication line, and having the train brake system 
respond as intended to signals from the brake communication line.
    In paragraph (d), FRA proposes to continue the requirement that 
prior to use or departure from a point of origin (initial terminal) all 
trains shall have 100 percent operative and effective brake systems. 
This has been a requirement in the railroad industry for decades and 
FRA believes it is not only wise from a safety standpoint, as it 
ensures the proper operation of a train's brake system at least once 
during its life, but it sets the proper tone for what FRA expects to be 
accomplished at these locations. FRA believes that requiring 100 
percent operative brakes on all trains at their inception provides the 
railroads with a margin for failure of some brakes while the train is 
in transit (up to 15 percent) and tends to ensure that defective 
equipment is being repaired in a timely fashion. In addition, FRA 
believes that the 100 percent requirement is consistent not only with 
Congress' understanding of the AAR inspection standards that were 
adopted in 1958, but also with the intent of FRA, rail management, and 
rail labor as to what was to occur at initial terminals when the 
inspection interval was increased from 500 miles to 1,000 miles in 
1982. At that time, carrier representatives committed to the 
performance of quality initial terminal inspections in exchange for an 
extension in the inspection interval, for which FRA intends to hold 
them accountable. In addition, the 100 percent requirement is 
consistent with the statutory requirements regarding the movement of 
defective equipment because a majority of the locations where trains 
are initiated have the capability of conducting virtually any brake 
system repair, and thus, the defective equipment could not be moved 
from those locations anyway.
    FRA recognizes that the 100 percent requirement at points of origin 
tends to be somewhat burdensome for some railroads at certain 
locations. Although railroads are required to have 100 percent 
operative brakes at initial terminals, railroads are currently 
permitted to pick-up defective cars at these same locations, if the 
necessary repairs cannot be performed, and haul them for repairs. Thus, 
a situation exists wherein the railroad is required to set a defective 
car out of a train if the train is initiated at that location, but are 
then able to pick-up that same defective car in an en route train and 
haul it to the nearest location where the necessary repairs can be 
performed. FRA recognizes that this creates a somewhat illogical 
situation; however, FRA believes that by retaining the 100 percent 
requirement at these locations the public is assured that a train's 
brake system is in near perfect condition at the beginning of its 
journey, train crews are more cognizant of the presence of defective 
cars in the train when they are picked-up en route, railroads are more 
likely to perform repairs at a location where trains are initiated in 
order to avoid breaking-up trains to set-out defective cars once the 
trains are assembled, and FRA retains a clear and consistent 
enforcement standard that can be easily understood by its inspectors 
and railroad industry employees.
    Although FRA has internally attempted to develop suitable industry-
wide criteria for permitting trains to depart points of origin with a 
minimum number of defective brakes if the location is one where the 
necessary repairs cannot be made, FRA is not willing to permit such 
flexibility without fully considering the safety hazards or potential 
abuses which may accompany such an approach. Therefore, FRA seeks 
comment from interested parties regarding the potential for permitting 
very limited flexibility in moving defective equipment from outlying 
points of origin which lack the capability of effectuating brake system 
repairs. Of major concern to FRA is the potential for railroads to 
designate a large number of locations, where trains are initiated, as 
being unable to effectuate brake system repairs by merely closing 
existing repair facilities or reducing the capability of mobile repair 
vehicles at the locations. Therefore, any potential flexibility must 
ensure that only those locations that are truly incapable of performing 
brake system repairs, due to the physical geography or design of the 
location, are afforded the flexibility. In addition, FRA must have to 
have the ability to approve any designation made by a railroad to 
ensure that the location is truly one in need of the flexibility and 
that the designated repair location is actually the nearest location 
where proper repairs could be made. Furthermore, any approach must also 
ensure the adequate identification and tracking of the trains and 
defective equipment moved from the location.
    One potential method of ensuring limited designations is to require 
the designation of a location within a very short distance (50-100 
miles) of the outlying location where all repairs will be conducted. 
Under this approach, FRA would strictly limit the percentage of 
inoperative brakes (5 percent or less) that could be moved in a train 
from that location and would require a qualified inspector to determine 
the safety of such a move. An alternative approach might include the 
ability of the railroad to perform something less than a full Class I 
brake test at the train's point of origin and permit the movement of 
the train a very short distance (50 miles or less) to a designated 
location where the train would receive a complete Class I brake test.
    FRA believes that permitting some limited flexibility in this area 
might have the potential of actually increasing the safety of trains 
originating at some

[[Page 48330]]

outlying locations that lack the ability to effectuate brake system 
repairs. It would likely reduce the amount of switching that occurs at 
these locations as defective equipment could remain entrained until it 
reaches a more conducive location for being repaired, inspected, or 
set-out of the train. It might also reduce the percentage of defective 
equipment which may move in any single train from some of these 
location where run-through or local trains are used to move the 
defective equipment to another location for repair as railroad's will 
not let the number of cars with defects build-up. In addition, it would 
reduce the distance that defective equipment is hauled before proper 
repairs are made since any approach would limit the distance such cars 
could be hauled before repairs or reinspection would be required. 
Furthermore, a more flexible approach might have the potential for 
increasing the quality of inspections since the restrictions for 
handling a defective piece of equipment would be somewhat less and 
trains would have the ability to be moved to a location where highly 
experienced inspectors are available.
    In light of the preceding discussion, FRA seeks comments from all 
interested parties regarding the viability of permitting some 
flexibility in the 100 percent requirement for train initiated at 
outlying locations that lack repair capability and seeks 
recommendations on potential approaches for permitting such 
flexibility. Specifically, FRA seeks comment or information on the 
following:
    1. How many locations currently exist that are initial terminals 
for some trains that lack the capability of effectuating any brake 
system repairs? Partial repair ability? If so, what types of repairs 
can generally be made?
    2. How many trains are currently initiated at locations that lack 
the capability to perform brake system repairs?
    3. How do railroads currently handle equipment found with defective 
brakes at initial terminals that lack the ability to effectuate the 
necessary repairs?
    4. What operational or record keeping requirements should be 
imposed on trains if they were permitted to depart a point of origin 
with a minimum number of cars with defective brakes entrained?
    5. Are any of the potential safety benefits described above valid? 
What are the potential safety hazards or concerns in permitting such 
flexibility?
    In paragraph (e), FRA proposes a clear and absolute prohibition on 
train movement if more than 15 percent of the cars in a train have 
their brakes cut out or have otherwise defective brakes. Although there 
is no limit contained in the statute regarding the number of cars with 
defective brake equipment that may be hauled in a train, the 15 percent 
limitation is a longstanding industry and agency interpretation of the 
hauling-for-repair provision currently codified at 49 U.S.C. 20303, 
21302, and 21304, and has withstood the test of time. This 
interpretation is extrapolated from another statutory requirement which 
permits a railroad to use a train only if ``at least 50 percent of the 
vehicles in the train are equipped with power or train brakes and the 
engineer is using the power or train brakes on those vehicles and on 
all other vehicles equipped with them that are associated with those 
vehicles in a train.'' 49 U.S.C. 20302(a)(5)(B). As originally enacted 
in 1903, section 20302 also granted the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(ICC) the authority to increase this percentage, and in 1910 the ICC 
issued an order increasing the minimum percentage to 85 percent. See 49 
CFR 232.1, which codified the ICC order. FRA proposed this same 
restriction in the 1994 NPRM and no major objections to this limitation 
were raised by any of the commenters. See 59 FR 47727. Consequently, 
FRA will continue to require that equipment with defective or 
inoperative air brakes makeup no more than 15 percent of any train.
    As virtually all freight cars are presently equipped with power 
brakes and are operated on an associated trainline, the statutory 
requirement cited above is in essence a requirement that 100 percent of 
the cars in a train have operative power brakes, unless being hauled 
for repairs pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 20303. Consequently, in paragraph (f) 
FRA makes clear that a train's air brakes shall be in effective and 
operable condition unless a car is being hauled for repairs pursuant to 
the conditions proposed in Sec. 232.15. This section also proposes the 
standard for determining when a freight car's air brakes are not in 
effective operating condition based on piston travel. The piston travel 
limits for standard 12-inch stroke brake cylinders are the same as 
currently required under Sec. 232.11(c). However, the experience of FRA 
indicates a proliferation of equipment with other than standard 12-inch 
stroke brake cylinders. As a result, mechanical forces and train crew 
members performing brake system inspections often do not know the 
acceptable range of brake piston travel for this non-standard 
equipment. In an attempt to improve this situation and to ensure the 
proper operation of a car's brakes after being inspected, FRA in 
paragraph (g) intends to require badge plates, stickers or stenciling 
of cars with the acceptable range of piston travel for all vehicles 
equipped with other than standard 12-inch stroke brake cylinders. The 
information on the badge plate, sticker, or stencil must include both 
the permissible brake cylinder piston travel range for the vehicle at 
Class I brake tests and the length at which the piston travel renders 
the brake ineffective. FRA believes that this information is essential 
in order for a person to properly perform the brake inspections 
proposed in this rule due to the growing number of cars with other than 
standard brake designs.
    Paragraph (h) requires that all equipment ordered on or after 
January 1, 1999, or placed in service for the first time on or after 
January 1, 2001, be designed not to require an inspector to place 
himself or herself on, under, or between components of the equipment to 
observe brake actuation or release. The proposal allows railroads the 
flexibility of using a reliable indicator in place of requiring direct 
observation of the brake application or piston travel because the 
current or future designs of some freight car brake systems make direct 
observation extremely difficult without the inspector placing himself 
or herself underneath the equipment. Brake system piston travel or 
piston cylinder pressure indicators have been used with satisfactory 
results for many years. Although indicators do not provide 100 percent 
certainty that the brakes are effective, FRA believes that they have 
proven themselves effective enough to be preferable to requiring an 
inspector to assume a dangerous position.
    This proposed requirement stems primarily from the brake system 
design of double-stack equipment currently used by several larger 
freight operations. Several commenters have indicated that the 
functioning of the brakes on this type of equipment cannot be observed 
without inspectors placing themselves in potentially dangerous 
positions. In addition, a complete inspection of the brake equipment 
and systems used on double-stack equipment is time consuming. 
Consequently, inspectors are reluctant to conduct a complete brake 
inspection test on departing trains that contain this type of 
equipment. FRA feels that double-stack equipment is becoming a mainstay 
of the freight railroad industry and that this design deficiency must 
be corrected. Thus, FRA has attempted to make this a performance 
requirement by simply specifying how the equipment must

[[Page 48331]]

function and allowing the industry to determine the method of 
compliance.
    Paragraph (i) proposes to require that an emergency brake 
application feature be available at any time and that it produce an 
irretrievable stop. This section merely codifies current industry 
practice and ensures that all equipment will continue to be designed 
with an emergency brake application feature. In the 1994 NPRM on power 
brakes, FRA proposed a requirement that all trains be equipped with an 
emergency application feature capable of increasing the train's 
deceleration rate a minimum of 15 percent. See 59 FR 47729. This 
proposed requirement merely restated the emergency specification 
currently contained in Appendix B to part 232. Comments received in 
response to that proposal indicated that some brake equipment currently 
in use or being developed could provide a deceleration rate with a full 
service application that is close to the emergency brake rate and that 
the proposed requirement would require the lowering of full service 
brake rates, thereby compromising safety and lowering train speeds. 
Based on these comments, FRA proposes the current requirement which is 
in accordance with suggestions made by several commenters.
    Paragraph (j) proposes to require that the air brake components 
that control brake application and release be adequately sealed to 
prevent contamination by foreign material. This proposed requirement is 
merely a reiteration of a general specification requirement currently 
contained in Appendix B to part 232. It is intended to ensure that the 
air brake components are not compromised due to contamination from 
foreign materials which can cause premature failure of certain 
components resulting in the loss of braking ability.
    Paragraphs (k) and (l) impose on the railroads the responsibility 
for determining maximum air brake system working pressure and maximum 
brake pipe pressure. These proposed provisions were contained in the 
1994 NPRM, and FRA received no comments objecting to their inclusion. 
See 59 FR 47743. Thus, FRA intends to continue to allow individual 
railroads the wide latitude currently permitted in determining these 
pressures.
    Paragraph (m) provides that except as provided by other provisions 
of this part, all equipment used in freight or other non-passenger 
trains shall, at a minimum, meet the performance specification for 
freight brakes in AAR standard S-469-47. The AAR standard referenced in 
this paragraph contains all the provisions currently contained in 
Appendix B to part 232. FRA recognizes that the provisions contained in 
the AAR standard have not been revised since 1947 and that some of the 
requirements may be outdated due to technological data. Consequently, 
FRA seeks comments from interested parties as to the necessity of 
referencing these standards as well as any information on any updated 
standards related to the performance of freight equipment that is 
currently being used throughout the industry.
    Paragraph (n) proposes to require that en route trains qualified by 
the Air Flow Method that experience a brake pipe air flow of greater 
than 60 CFM or brake pipe gradient of greater than 15 psi and the 
movable pointer does not return to those limits within a reasonable 
time be stopped at the next available location and inspected for leaks 
in the brake system. This requirement was part of the general waiver 
granted to the AAR allowing the use of the air flow method to qualify 
train air brakes. FRA believes that this requirement is necessary to 
prevent trains with excessive leakage from continuing to operate. If a 
train has excessive leakage the engineer may lack the ability to stop 
the train using the air brake system.
    Paragraph (o) contains the requirements regarding the setting and 
releasing of hand brakes prior to releasing the air brake and after the 
air brake is charged. The requirements contained in this paragraph are 
generally a reiteration of the guidance issued by FRA in Safety 
Advisory 97-2 on September 15, 1997. See 62 FR 49046. The securement 
guidance contained in Safety Advisory 97-2 is based upon FRA's review 
of the Fort Worth incident that occurred on August 20, 1997, and its 
awareness of other incidents involving the improper securement of 
rolling equipment. The Safety Advisory was issued in order to provide 
the industry with some assistance and guidance regarding securement 
procedures and to provide information on current practices of the 
industry related to the securement of rolling stock. See 62 FR 49046. 
The Safety Advisory contains certain recommended procedures which FRA 
believes will greatly reduce the likelihood of further accidents due to 
improperly secured rail equipment.
    On August 20, 1997, a fatal head-on collision between a Union 
Pacific Railroad Company (UP) freight train and an unattended, runaway 
UP locomotive consist near Fort Worth, Texas, has caused FRA to focus 
on the effectiveness of certain railroad procedures for protection of 
people and property from hazards caused by failure to properly secure 
locomotives, cars, and other rolling equipment left unattended on 
sidings or other tracks. Although FRA and NTSB are currently 
investigating this incident, FRA's preliminary findings indicate that 
the UP crew applied the hand brake on the lead locomotive of the 
locomotive consist and then applied the independent air brake. The crew 
then released the independent brake to verify that the hand brake would 
hold, which it appeared to do. Sometime later, after the locomotive 
consist was left unattended, it is believed that the air brakes 
eventually leaked off and that the single hand brake did not, by 
itself, sufficiently secure the locomotive consist, enabling it to roll 
out of the siding eastward and onto the main track where it collided 
head-on with a UP freight train.
    An issue related to improperly secured rail equipment is the 
practice known as ``bottling the air'' in a standing cut of cars. The 
practice of ``bottling the air'' occurs when a train crew sets out cars 
from a train with the air brakes applied and the angle cocks on both 
ends of the train closed, thus trapping brake pipe pressure in the cut 
of cars they intend to leave behind. This practice has the potential of 
causing an unintentional release of brakes on these cars and the 
potential for a runaway exist. Many railroad operating rules require 
that a 20 pound reduction in brake pipe pressure be made when stopping 
a train to remove a cut of cars from the train. Thus, if the trainman 
closes the angle cock where the cut is to be made before pressure 
equalizes in the trainline, an air wave action may form which can be of 
sufficient amplitude to initiate an unintentional release of the 
brakes.
    Brake pipe gradient is another factor that makes bottling the air 
dangerous. ``Normal Gradient'' is a term used to express the difference 
between the higher pressure on the front end of the train and the lower 
pressure on the rear end of the train, which is dependent upon brake 
pipe leakage and train length. Each train establishes its own normal 
gradient value. ``Inverse Gradients'' and ``False Gradients'' are 
temporary gradients which are a result of brake operations. Inverse 
gradients occur when a brake pipe reduction is made, temporarily making 
the brake pipe pressure higher on the rear of the train. The false 
gradient is created anytime the train brakes are set and released, thus 
temporarily resulting in higher than normal pressure differential 
between the front and rear end of the train as the brake pipe charges. 
Therefore, if the engineer sets and

[[Page 48332]]

releases a train's brakes a sufficient number of times prior to 
stopping to remove a cut of cars, a false gradient could be 
established. Even if the engineer made a 20 pound brake pipe reduction 
and listened for the air to stop exhausting at the automatic brake 
valve before giving the signal to the trainman to cut off the cars, the 
potential exists for an unintentional release of air brakes if the air 
on the cars is bottled. The false gradient could be of such magnitude, 
that as the trainline attempts to equalize, the higher pressure on the 
front end flowing to the rear will exceed the 1\1/2\ pound differential 
across the service piston and cause a release of air brakes. An inverse 
gradient can also create an unintentional release of brakes. As brake 
pipe pressure is reduced at the front of the train, the rear end 
temporarily has a higher pressure. As the trainline attempts to 
equalize, the front end will rise. In some circumstances, this rise 
could be enough to initiate a release of air brakes.
    On June 5, 1998, the NTSB issued the following recommendation to 
FRA:

    Issue a regulation that requires the brake pipe pressure to be 
depleted to zero and an angle cock to remain open on standing 
railroad equipment that is detached from a locomotive controlling 
the brake pipe pressure. (R-98-17)

This recommendation was the result of NTSB's investigation of an 
incident that occurred on January 27, 1997, on the Apache Railway near 
Holbrook, Arizona. The incident involved the runaway of 77 cars down a 
1.7 percent grade for 14 miles resulting in the eventual derailment of 
46 cars and the release of hazardous materials. Although there were no 
fatalities, 150 people were evacuated from nearby residential areas. 
The NTSB determined that the 77 cars rolled away unattended because the 
conductor of the train had trapped the air in the brake system, i.e. 
``bottled the air,'' which resulted in an undesired release of the 
brakes on the standing cars. In its recommendation the NTSB correctly 
noted FRA statistics show that ten accidents occurred between 1994 and 
1995 which were attributable to the practice of ``bottling the air.''
    The procedures proposed in paragraph (o) regarding the securement 
of standing equipment tend to address the issue of ``bottling air'' on 
such standing equipment. Paragraph (o)(2)(iii) proposes to require that 
when freight cars are left standing the locomotives shall be detached 
from the cars to allow an emergency brake application to be initiated. 
Thus, FRA intends to require that an emergency brake application be 
initiated on standing equipment whenever locomotives are removed from 
the consist. Consequently, the requirements proposed in this section 
tend to address the recommendation issued by the NTSB but may need to 
be further investigated when FRA begins the drafting of the final rule.
    In light of NTSB's recent recommendation and based on FRA's recent 
issuance of Safety Advisory 97-2 and its awareness of other incidents 
involving improper securement of rolling equipment and the practice of 
``bottling the air,'' FRA seeks comment and information regarding 
railroads' experience with implementing the recommended practices 
contained in Safety Advisory 97-2 and with regard to its procedures for 
securing standing equipment. Consequently, FRA seeks comment and 
information from all interested parties on the following:
    (1) What has been the railroads' experience with implementing the 
recommended procedures contained in Safety Advisory 97-2? Are railroads 
implementing the recommendations?
    (2) What operational or equipment costs would be incurred should 
the recommended procedures contained in Safety Advisory 97-2 be 
mandated in a final rule?
    (3) Are there additional practices or procedures that should be 
addressed related to the securement of unattended rolling stock?
    (4) Are there alternative methods, practices, or procedures that 
are currently in place or that could be implemented which would provide 
an equivalent level of safety to the recommended procedures contained 
in Safety Advisory 97-2?
    (5) Are there situations where a railroad could justify not 
depleting the brake pipe to zero when cars are left standing and 
unattended?
    (6) Do any railroads currently endorse the practice of ``bottling 
the air?'' Under what circumstances?
    Paragraph (p) proposes to require that air pressure regulating 
devices be adjusted in accordance with the air pressures contained in 
the chart contained in this paragraph. The chart is very similar to 
that currently provided in Sec. 232.10(n), but has been updated to 
include equipment that is not currently addressed by the existing chart 
and has been modified in accordance with the provisions contained in 
this proposal. FRA requests that interested parties inform FRA of any 
existing air pressure regulating devices that have not been included or 
addressed in the proposed updated chart.
Section 232.105  General Requirements for Locomotives
    For the most part, this section contains general provisions related 
to locomotives that are either currently contained in Sec. 232.10 or 
that were previously proposed in the 1994 NPRM. As discussed in detail 
in the general preamble portion of this document, FRA does not intend 
to include provisions in this proposal related to the inspection and 
maintenance of locomotive braking systems. FRA believes that these 
requirements are adequately addressed in part 229 and would only add to 
the complexity of this proposal and potentially cause confusion or 
misunderstanding by members of the regulated community. Therefore, 
while many of the requirements currently contained in Sec. 232.10 are 
no longer necessary as they are adequately addressed in part 229, 
paragraphs (a) and (c) are all provisions currently contained in 
Sec. 232.10 which FRA believes need to be retained. See 49 CFR 
232.10(b), (f)(2), and (g). The only change to these provisions is that 
in paragraph (c) FRA proposes to require that the hand or parking brake 
be inspected and repaired, if necessary, at least every 368 days. FRA 
believes that this proposal will have little or no impact on railroads 
as this inspection is intended to coincide with the annual locomotive 
inspection required under Sec. 229.27 and many railroads currently 
inspect these devices at this annual inspection. FRA believes that a 
thorough inspection of these devices on an annual basis is sufficient 
to ensure the proper and safe functioning of the devices.
    Paragraph (b) proposes to require that, except for a locomotive 
that is ordered before January 1, 1999, and placed in service for the 
first time before January 1, 2001, all locomotives shall be equipped 
with a hand or parking brake that can be set and released manually and 
can hold the equipment on the maximum grade anticipated by the 
operating railroad. A hand or parking brake is an important safety 
feature that prevents the rolling or runaway of parked locomotives. The 
proposed requirement represents current industry practice. In the 1994 
NPRM on power brakes, FRA proposed requiring that a hand brake be 
equipped on locomotives. See 59 FR 47729. FRA received several comments 
to that proposal suggesting that the term ``parking brake'' be added to 
the requirement since that is what is used on many newly built 
locomotives. A parking brake generally can be applied other than by 
hand such as spring pressure or air pressure when the

[[Page 48333]]

brake pipe air is depleted or by other means such as driven by an 
electrical motor. Parking brakes usually incorporate some type of 
manual application or release feature, although these features are 
generally more difficult to operate. FRA believes that parking brakes 
are the functional equivalent of a traditional handbrake and are 
capable of providing a similar level of security to stationary 
equipment. Consequently, FRA has added the term ``parking brake'' in 
this proposal.
    In paragraph (d), FRA proposes to require that the leakage on 
equalizing reservoirs on locomotives and related piping be zero. The 
equalizing reservoir contains the controlling volume of air pressure, 
which is set to a desired pressure by the locomotive engineer by 
setting the regulating valve (also known as the feed valve) on the 
automatic air brake system. When the automatic brake valve handle is 
moved to the release position, air supplied from the locomotive air 
compressor and the main air reservoirs is supplied to the equalizing 
reservoir through the regulating valve. The brake pipe pressure will 
then charge to the air pressure contained in the equalizing reservoir. 
When an application of the train brakes is desired, the engineer moves 
the automatic brake valve handle into the application zone. The 
movement of the brake valve handle into the application zone shuts off 
the supply of air to the equalizing reservoir being supplied from the 
regulating valve, leaving the volume of air contained in the equalizing 
reservoir trapped in the equalizing reservoir. The trapped air pressure 
can then be reduced to a desired amount by movement of the automatic 
brake valve handle. This will result in the brake pipe pressure 
responding and being reduced to a pressure equal to the pressure 
contained in the equalizing reservoir. Furthermore, the air pressure in 
the brake pipe on most freight equipment will be maintained at the 
pressure in the equalizing reservoir due to the maintaining features of 
the brake system. Consequently, any leakage from the equalizing 
reservoir will effect the maintaining feature of the automatic air 
brake resulting in the engineer losing his ability to effectively 
maintain control of the brake pipe pressure and thus, affect the 
ability of the engineer to safely control the train in some 
circumstances.
    In paragraph (e), FRA proposes to prohibit the use of ``feed or 
regulating valve braking,'' in which reductions and increases in the 
brake pipe pressure are effected by manually adjusting the feed valve. 
``Feed valve braking'' has been recognized by both the railroad 
industry and FRA as an unsafe practice. Most railroads already have 
some type of operating rule prohibiting this type of braking.
    In paragraph (f), FRA also proposes to prohibit the use of the 
``passenger'' position on the locomotive brake control stand on 
conventional freight trains when the trailing equipment is not designed 
for graduated brake release. The ``passenger'' position was intended 
only for use with equipment designed for graduated brake release. 
Therefore, use of the ``passenger'' position with other equipment can 
lead to potentially dangerous situations where undesired release of the 
brakes can easily occur due to the slightest movement of the automatic 
brake valve. In FRA's view, the only situation when the use of the 
passenger position might become necessary to safely control a train is 
when equalizing reservoir leakage occurs en route. If such a situation 
arises the train may move only to the nearest forward location where 
the equalizing reservoir leakage can be corrected.


Section 232.107  Air Source Requirements

    This section contains proposed requirements directed at ensuring 
that freight brake systems are devoid, to the maximum extent practical, 
of water and other contaminates which could conceivably deteriorate 
components of the brake system, and thus, negatively impact the ability 
of the brake system to function as intended. As part of the Working 
Group proceedings, a task force was formed and charged with identifying 
the source of contaminates in the trainline and to determine the degree 
to which these contaminates pose a safety, operational, and/or 
maintenance problem. The task force performed tests on numerous 
locomotives and yard air plants, with and without air dryers, to 
determine the amount of dew point depression in the air lines. The 
results of these tests confirmed the assumptions of the Working Group 
members in that the vast majority of locomotives tested did not 
contribute to moisture in the train air lines, but rather, the main 
source of raw water came from yard charging devices. Further, the 
majority of the yard devices which were tested were relatively old and 
had not been properly maintained or upgraded in years. During the task 
force tests, it was noted that all units equipped with properly 
maintained air dryers produced minimal moisture in the system. Since a 
large number of trains are charged by yard air sources (up to 80 
percent by some estimations), the group provided a non-consensus 
recommendation that yard air charging devices be given the greatest 
priority.
    Based on the work performed by the task force and on FRA field 
experience, FRA agrees with the above conclusion and believes that 
requiring locomotives to be equipped with air dryers would provide 
minimal safety benefits and would impose an enormous and unwarranted 
cost burden on the railroads. Further, FRA believes that simply 
requiring that yard air sources be equipped with air dryers may not 
alone necessarily effectuate the desired results unless the air dryers 
are appropriately placed to sufficiently condition the air source. Many 
yard air sources are configured such that a single air compressor 
services several branch lines used to charge train air brake systems, 
and as such, multiple air dryers may be required to eliminate the 
introduction of wet air into the brake system. FRA believes that, as 
with locomotives, requiring yard air sources to be equipped with air 
dryers will likely impose a significant and unnecessary cost burden on 
the railroads. Thus, FRA proposes in paragraphs (a)(1)-(5) to require a 
monitoring program designed to ensure that yard air sources operate as 
intended. FRA believes that implementation of this monitoring program 
as proposed represents a method by which the industry can truly 
maximize the benefits to be realized through air dryer technology, 
which all parties acknowledge has been proven to reduce the level of 
moisture introduced into the trainline, at a cost that is commensurate 
with the subsequent benefits. This proposed program requires a railroad 
to take remedial action with respect to any yard air sources that are 
found not to be operating as intended, and further proposes to 
establish a retention requirement with respect to records of these 
deficient units to facilitate the tracking and resolution of continuing 
problem areas.
    FRA proposes additional measures to minimize the possibility of 
moisture being introduced into the trainline. Paragraph (b) of this 
section reiterates the current requirement contained at Sec. 232.11(d) 
which requires that condensation be blown from the pipe or hose from 
which compressed air is taken prior to connecting the yard air line or 
motive power to the train. As an additional precaution, paragraph (d) 
of this section proposes to require yard air reservoirs be equipped 
with an operable automatic drain system, or be manually drained at 
least once each day that the devices are used or more often when 
moisture is detected in the system.

[[Page 48334]]

    In paragraph (c) of this section, FRA proposes to ban the use of 
anti-freeze chemicals in train air brake systems, reiterating the 
position stated in the 1994 NPRM, in order to prevent the untimely 
damage and wear to the brake system components. See 59 FR 47728. FRA 
did not receive any adverse comments on this issue in response to the 
previous NPRM, and both rail labor and management representatives had 
agreed on this provision as a consensus item prior to the 
discontinuance of Working Group deliberations in December 1996. FRA 
intends to closely monitor compliance with this provision, as recent 
field experience indicates that alcohol is still being used to combat 
moisture build-up in brake pipes, especially in extremely cold weather 
operations. As the majority of railroads providing comments on this 
issue have stated that they are able to operate trains in cold weather 
without resorting to the use of chemicals as an anti-freeze, railroads 
are not expected to incur any operational or economic hardships as a 
result of this requirement.
    FRA recently published a final rule mandating the incorporation of 
two-way EOTs on a variety of freight trains, specifically those 
operating at speeds of 30 mph or greater or in heavy grade territories. 
See 62 FR 278. Two-way EOTs provide locomotive engineers with the 
capability of initiating an emergency brake application that commences 
at the rear of the train in the event of a blockage or separation in 
the train's brake pipe that would prevent the pneumatic transmission of 
the emergency brake application throughout the entire train. These 
devices consist of a front unit, located in the cab of the controlling 
locomotive, and a rear unit, located in the rear of the train and 
attached to the brake pipe. Radio communication between the front and 
rear end units is continually monitored and confirmed at regular 
intervals, and the rear unit is only activated when continuity of these 
radio transmissions is not maintained over a specified time interval. 
This discussion of two-way EOTs is particularly appropriate within the 
context of the air source requirements. In the unlikely event that the 
proposed requirements regarding dry air fail to sufficiently eliminate 
moisture from the trainline, and a restriction or obstruction in the 
form of ice forms as the result of freezing of this moisture during 
cold weather operations, the two-way EOT device becomes a first order 
safety device and will initiate an emergency application of the brakes 
from the rear of train. As such, the vast majority of concerns 
associated with moisture in the trainline freezing in cold weather 
operations have been alleviated through the incorporation of this 
technology in most freight operations.
    Paragraph (e) proposes to require that railroads develop and 
implement detailed written operating procedures tailored to the 
equipment and territory of that railroad to cover safe train operations 
during cold weather situations. In 1990, the NTSB in response to an 
accident which occurred in Helena, Montana, recommended that FRA amend 
the power brake regulations to require additional testing of air brake 
systems when operating in extreme cold weather, especially when 
operated in mountain grade territory. See NTSB Recommendation R-89-081 
(February 12, 1990). In response to this recommendation and to various 
petitions for rulemaking requesting similar action, FRA in the 1994 
NPRM proposed various requirements regarding cold weather operations, 
which included: Use of two-way EOTs; prohibition on the use of alcohol 
in trainlines; air dryers on locomotives; and requirements for 
railroads to develop operating procedures in cold weather and mountain 
grade territories. As noted previously, a final rule regarding the use 
of two-way EOTs has been issued and is in effect. The current proposal 
reiterates the prohibition on the use of anti-freeze chemicals and 
proposes other requirements to ensure that dry air is being added to 
brake systems. This paragraph reiterates the previously proposed 
requirement that railroads develop and implement operating requirements 
for cold weather operations.
    FRA recognizes that in the past there has been little support for 
mandating additional brake system testing in cold weather territory. 
FRA agrees that the development and use of welded pipe fittings, wide-
lip hose couplings, and ferrule clamps have greatly reduced the effects 
of cold weather on the air brake system. However, FRA believes that 
cold weather situations do involve added safety risks and need to be 
further addressed. FRA believes that requiring the development of 
written operating procedures will require railroads to go through the 
thought process necessary to analyze their operations during cold 
weather conditions in order to determine the inherent safety hazards 
involved and develop procedures to minimize those hazards. Due to the 
unique nature of each railroad and the difficulty in developing 
specific requirements that are applicable to all operations, FRA does 
not intend to mandate specific operating requirements at this time. 
However, FRA might consider mandating specific operating requirements 
that should be included in any railroad's cold weather operating 
practices at the final rule stage based on the comments received and on 
FRA's continuing review of cold weather operations by various 
railroads.
    FRA recognizes that some railroads have already developed certain 
cold weather operating procedures which might be useful as models on 
other similarly situated railroads. For example, BNSF has unilaterally 
instituted a cold weather operating plan for certain trains at specific 
locations in Montana. This plan requires trains with greater than 100 
tons per operative brake to be inspected and/or operated in a certain 
manner when temperatures fall below zero degrees. Part of the plan 
requires that after the performance of a 1,000-mile or initial terminal 
brake test on such trains, the brakes be reset and held for 30 minutes 
after which time the train is to be reinspected to ensure that 100% of 
the brakes remained applied. Brakes found not to have remained applied 
must be set-out of the train or repaired. FRA believes procedures such 
as these could greatly enhance the safety of the trains operated in 
cold weather conditions. FRA recognizes that there may be other types 
of operating or inspection criteria that could be implemented in 
extreme cold weather conditions instead of or in addition to that noted 
above; such as limits on the length or tonnage of such trains; limits 
on the use of yard air sources; or other enhanced inspection criteria.
    In an effort to further develop and evaluate this proposal, FRA 
seeks comments from all interested parties regarding the following 
specific issues:
    (1) How many yard sources are there that are used to charge train 
air brake systems?
    (2) What time period will be required to effectively institute the 
monitoring program as prescribed?
    (3) How many of these yard air sources are equipped with automatic 
drain valves?
    (4) If the yard air source is not equipped with an automatic drain 
valve, how long does it take to drain manually?
    (5) What operating procedures do railroads currently have in place 
to address the added safety risks that are inherent to cold weather 
operations?
    (6) What has been the impact on the railroad operations that have 
adopted cold weather procedures similar to those noted above?
    (7) Are there certain cold weather operating practices and 
procedures that

[[Page 48335]]

have been adopted by most segments of the industry?
    (8) FRA is aware that at least one railroad is currently engaged in 
the testing and tear-down of certain brake valves to ensure that the 
valves operate properly in cold weather. What has been the results of 
these tests?
Section 232.109  Dynamic Brake Requirements
    This section contains the proposed operating requirements for 
trains equipped with dynamic brakes. Most, if not all, of the railroads 
have provided comments stating that they do not consider dynamic brakes 
to be a safety device. However, these same commenters stated that they 
promote and encourage the use of dynamic brakes for purposes of fuel 
efficiency and to avoid wear to brake components. Due to this 
encouragement, dynamic brakes are relied on to control train speed and 
to provide assistance in controlling trains on heavy grades. Contrary 
to continued comments of several labor representatives, FRA does not 
feel that locomotives should be required to be equipped with dynamic 
brakes. FRA believes that the decision to equip a locomotive with 
dynamic brakes is mainly an economic one, best determined by each 
individual railroad. However, in order to prevent accidents and 
injuries that may result from an over-reliance on the dynamic brake, 
which may fail at any time, FRA believes that if the devices are 
available, engineers should be informed on their safe and proper use 
and be provided with information regarding the amount of dynamic 
braking power actually available on their respective trains. FRA 
believes that by providing an engineer with as much information as 
possible on the status of the dynamic brakes on a train, a railroad 
better enables that engineer to operate the train in the safest and 
most efficient manner.
    Based on the preceding discussion, paragraphs (a) and (c) of this 
section delineate specific proposed communication requirements 
regarding the status of the dynamic brakes on all locomotive units in a 
consist to ensure that locomotive engineers are provided with a clear 
indication of the total available braking effort at their disposal. FRA 
proposes to require written notification of the operational status of 
the dynamic brakes on all locomotive units in the consist be provided 
to the locomotive engineer at the initial terminal or point of origin 
for a train or at other locations where a locomotive engineer first 
takes charge of a train. Further, FRA believes that this information 
should include a clear, written method of communicating to a locomotive 
engineer that the locomotive or locomotives in his or her consist has 
been discovered to have inoperative dynamic brakes. Accordingly, FRA 
proposes that a tag bearing the words ``inoperative dynamic brake'' be 
securely attached and displayed in a conspicuous location in the cab of 
the locomotive at the point where the defective condition(s) are 
discovered.
    Locomotive engineers have long advocated the philosophy, ``If it is 
equipped, then it should work'' with respect to dynamic brakes. There 
are currently no requirements governing the maintenance and repair of 
locomotives equipped with dynamic brakes. Experience has shown that, 
since railroads do not consider dynamic brakes to be a critical safety 
item, repairs are typically effectuated when it is convenient and 
economical for the railroad with little regard for timeliness. FRA 
believes that, as railroads have become increasingly dependent on the 
use of dynamic brakes as an integral part of their published safe train 
handling procedures, it is a reasonable expectation on behalf of 
locomotive engineers to have operable dynamic brakes on those 
locomotive units which are so equipped. Consequently, in paragraph (b) 
FRA proposes to require that all inoperative or ineffective dynamic 
brakes be repaired within 30 days of becoming inoperative or at the 
locomotive's next periodic inspection, whichever occurs first. FRA 
believes that this proposed maintenance requirement strikes an 
appropriate balance between the operational considerations important to 
the locomotive engineer and the logistical and repair considerations 
that will be imposed on the railroads.
    FRA acknowledges that some railroads, primarily short lines, may 
own locomotives that are equipped with dynamic brakes but due to the 
physical terrain over which the railroad operates or the operating 
assignments of the particular locomotive, the railroad rarely, if ever, 
has the need to employ the dynamic braking capabilities of the 
individual locomotive. In these instances, the maintenance requirements 
discussed above become unnecessarily burdensome. Therefore, FRA 
believes relief is warranted in these situations provided a specified 
set of parameters is developed and adhered to that prevents direct and 
intentional circumvention of the proposed repair requirements. 
Consequently, in paragraph (d) of this section, FRA proposes to permit 
a railroad to declare a locomotive's dynamic brakes ``deactivated'' if 
the following requirements are met: (i) the locomotive is clearly 
stencilled on both the interior and exterior of the locomotive stating 
that the dynamic brake has been deactivated; and (ii) the railroad has 
taken appropriate action to ensure that the deactivated locomotive is 
incapable of utilizing dynamic braking effort to retard or control 
train speed. FRA does not intend to prescribe the specific manner in 
which the locomotive is to be deactivated, so long as the unit is not 
physically capable of employing its dynamic brakes to aid in train 
handling. Although, FRA does not envision a significant number of 
instances where a locomotive which has been declared ``deactivated'' 
would need to be ``reactivated,'' FRA does recognize that some 
railroads may need to reactivate the dynamic brakes in some 
circumstances, such as changes in a locomotive's operating environment 
or situations where a locomotive with previously ``deactivated'' 
dynamic brakes is purchased by another railroad. However, FRA intends 
to interpret the provision for ``deactivating'' a locomotive's dynamic 
brakes rather literally to minimize contentions that railroads are 
merely playing a cat and mouse game with the proposed maintenance 
interval to avoid repairing the units.
    The operating requirements contained in this section attempt to 
address the controversy over the role of dynamic brakes in overall 
train safety. Most railroads commented that dynamic brakes are a 
secondary system that plays no role in train safety. However, many 
railroads have become somewhat dependent on dynamic brakes for normal 
train handling procedures, and this dependency gives rise to the 
likelihood of overreliance. Therefore, in paragraph (e) FRA proposes to 
require that railroads using dynamic brakes have written operating 
requirements governing how dynamic brakes are to be used to safely 
handle trains based on the operating conditions and the territory 
covered by that railroad. FRA intends for these operating requirements 
to sufficiently cover the loss of dynamic brakes or other non-friction 
brakes and must be fundamentally based on the use of friction brakes to 
safely stop a train under all operating conditions. Furthermore, in 
paragraph (f) FRA proposes to require each railroad to ensure that its 
locomotive engineers are fully trained in the operating rules 
prescribed above by including them in the certification process 
contained in the knowledge, skill, and ability requirements contained 
in 49 CFR part 240.

[[Page 48336]]

    FRA believes that the establishment of these comprehensive 
operating rules and training plans is the most effective means by which 
to minimize the possibility of future accidents caused by excessive 
reliance on dynamic brakes by the train crew as a method of controlling 
the speed of a train in its descent through a difficult grade, as was 
the case in the San Bernardino incident. FRA views as unfortunate, and 
potentially reckless, the increasing number of train handling and power 
brake instructions issued by freight railroads that emphasize the use 
of dynamic brakes without including prominent warnings that such 
systems may not be relied upon to provide the margin of safety 
necessary to stop short of obstructions and control points or to avoid 
overspeed conditions. Such instructions, while not misleading to 
seasoned locomotive engineers, threaten to overcome the good judgement 
of safety critics and regulators by leading to excessive reliance upon 
these systems. Given the ever-increasing weight and length of freight 
trains, and the severe grades that they are often required to negotiate 
en route, the need for locomotive engineers who are thoroughly trained 
and knowledgeable in all aspects of train handling is paramount for 
continued safety in the rail industry.
    Only limited information regarding the technical feasibility, 
availability, and cost of incorporating dynamic brake indicators and/or 
displays in the locomotive cab has been provided to the FRA in response 
to questions posed in the ANPRM and the 1994 NPRM. See 57 FR 62555 and 
59 FR 47687. FRA recognizes that the technology for dynamic brake 
displays with the ability to provide information regarding the total 
train dynamic brake retarding force, at certain speed increments, in 
the cab of the locomotive has not been developed for industry-wide 
implementation on a cost-effective basis at this time. At the same 
time, FRA maintains that such an indicator would provide great benefits 
to engineers in alerting them to diminished or excessive dynamic 
braking capabilities, thus permitting the engineer to control the 
braking of their train in the safest possible manner. Previous 
discussions regarding the capabilities and limitations of dynamic 
brakes provided in the ANPRM, the 1994 NPRM, and the preamble to this 
NPRM have clearly shown that in order to completely test the 
functioning of dynamic brakes the train must be moving. However, these 
discussions have also clearly concluded that while running tests of 
dynamic brakes provide information to the locomotive engineer regarding 
the availability of dynamic brakes, such tests are limited to the 
specific moment they are performed. Thus, running tests do not provide 
continuous information on the current status of the dynamic brakes to 
the locomotive engineer. Because dynamic brakes could fail at any time, 
FRA feels there is merit in the development of technology whereby 
engineers are able to continuously monitor the operation of their 
available dynamic brakes. FRA once again seeks comments from all 
interested parties regarding the following specific issues:
    1. What is the status on the future availability of dynamic brake 
indicators capable of providing the information discussed above?
    2. What are the current cost estimates associated with the 
acquisition and installation of such indicators?
    3. What quantitative and/or qualitative operational or safety 
benefits can be derived from the use of these dynamic brake indicators?
    4. What alternative methods are available for providing the same 
information that a dynamic brake indicator would provide to a 
locomotive engineer?
    FRA also specifically solicits input regarding the placement of a 
locomotive in a consist that has been declared ``permanently disabled'' 
in accordance with section 232.111(d) of this proposal. Some existing 
railroad operating rules dictate that a locomotive which has been 
determined to have inoperative dynamic brakes may be dispatched in a 
train, but prohibit its placement in the lead position of the consist. 
Are there technical reasons to prohibit a locomotive with inoperative 
dynamic brakes from functioning as the lead locomotive, provided the 
disabled locomotive still has the capability to fully control the 
dynamic braking functions of all other locomotives in the consist that 
are so equipped?
Section 232.111  Train Information Handling
    This section contains the proposed requirements regarding the 
handling of train information. The purpose of these train-information 
handling requirements is to ensure that train crews are given accurate 
information on the condition of the train brake system and other 
factors that affect the performance of the train brake system when they 
assume responsibility for the train. This section contains a list of 
the specific information FRA proposes to require railroads to furnish 
train crew members about the train and the train's brake system at the 
time they take over the train. FRA believes that train crews need this 
information in order to avoid potentially dangerous train handling 
situations and to be able to comply with various Federal safety 
standards. Most railroads already provide their train crews with most 
of the information required in this proposal or have a process set-up 
which is capable of transmitting such information, thus the impact of 
this proposed requirement should be relatively minor.
    It should be noted that, FRA has left the method in which railroads 
will convey the required information to the train crews to the 
discretion of the railroad since FRA feels that each individual 
railroad is in the best position to determine the method in which to 
dispense the required information based on the individual 
characteristics of its operations. However, the means for conveying the 
required information will be part of the written operating 
requirements, and railroads will be required to follow their own 
requirements.

Subpart C--Inspection and Testing Requirements

Section 232.201  Scope
    This section contains the general statement regarding the scope of 
this subpart, indicating that it contains the inspection and testing 
requirements for brake systems used in freight and other non-passenger 
trains. This section also indicates that this subpart contains the 
general training requirements for railroad and contract personnel used 
to perform the inspection and tests required by this part.
Section 232.203  Training Requirements
    This section contains the proposed general training requirements 
for railroad employees and contractors that are used to perform the 
inspections required by this part. (See ``Discussion of Issues and 
General FRA Conclusions'' portion of the preamble under the heading 
``V. Training and Qualifications of Personnel'' for a detailed 
discussion pertaining to the provisions contained in this section).
    Paragraph (a) proposes that each railroad develop and implement a 
training, qualification, and designation program for employees and 
contractors that perform train air brake system tests and maintenance. 
For purposes of this section, a ``contractor'' is defined as a person 
under contract with the railroad or car owner or an employee of a 
person under contract with the railroad or car owner. FRA intends for 
the proposed training and qualification requirements to apply not only 
to railroad personnel

[[Page 48337]]

but also to contract personnel that are responsible for performing 
brake system inspections, maintenance, or tests required by this part. 
FRA believes that railroads are in the best position to determine the 
precise method of training that is required for the personnel they 
elect to use to conduct the required brake system inspections, tests 
and maintenance. Although FRA provides railroads with broad discretion 
to develop training programs specifically tailored to the type of 
equipment it operates and the personnel it employs, FRA will expect 
railroads to fully comply with the training and qualification plans 
they develop. A critical component of this training will be making 
employees aware of specific Federal requirements that govern their 
work. Currently, many railroad training programs fail to distinguish 
Federal requirements from company policy.
    Paragraph (b) proposes a series of general requirements or elements 
which must be part of any training and qualification plan developed and 
implemented by a railroad. FRA believes that the elements contained in 
this section are specific enough to ensure high quality training while 
being sufficiently broad to permit a railroad to develop a training 
plan that is best suited to its particular operation. This paragraph 
requires railroads to identify the specific tasks related to the 
inspection, testing and maintenance of the brake systems operated by 
that railroad, develop written procedures for performing those tasks, 
identify the skills and knowledge necessary to perform those tasks, and 
specifically identify and educate its employees on the Federal 
requirements contained in this part related to the performance of those 
tasks. FRA believes that these requirements will ensure that, at a 
minimum, the railroad surveys its entire operation and has identified 
the various activities its employees perform. FRA intends for these 
written procedures and the identified skills and knowledge to be used 
as the foundation for any training program developed by the railroad.
    This paragraph also makes clear that railroads are permitted to 
train employees only on those tasks that they will be responsible for 
performing. FRA tends to agree with several railroad commenters that 
there is no reason for individuals who solely perform pre-departure air 
brake tests and inspections to be as highly trained as a carman or 
other mechanical personnel since these individuals perform many other 
duties which involve the maintenance and repair of equipment in 
addition to brake inspections. This paragraph also permits railroads to 
incorporate an already existing training program, such as an 
apprenticeship program. Thus, railroads would most likely not need to 
provide much additional training, except training specifically 
addressing the requirements contained in this part and possibly 
refresher training, to its carmen forces that have completed an 
apprentice program for their craft.
    This paragraph also contains requirements that any program 
developed must include ``hands-on'' training as well as classroom 
instruction. FRA believes that classroom training by itself is not 
sufficient to ensure that an individual has retained or grasped the 
concepts and duties explained in a classroom setting. In order to 
adequately ensure that an individual actually understands the training 
provided in the classroom, some sort of ``hands-on'' capability must be 
demonstrated. FRA believes that the ``hands-on'' portion of the 
training program would be an ideal place for railroads to fully involve 
its labor forces in the training process. Appropriate trained and 
skilled employees would be perfectly suited to provide much of the 
``hands-on'' training envisioned by FRA. Consequently, FRA strongly 
suggests that railroads work in partnership with their employees to 
develop a training program which utilizes the knowledge, skills, and 
experience of the employees to the greatest extent possible.
    FRA does not intend to issue specific experience, classroom 
training, or ``hands-on'' training guidelines. FRA agrees that many of 
the guidelines contained in the preamble to the 1994 NPRM were overly 
restrictive and may have impeded the implementation of certain training 
protocols capable of achieving similar results with less emphasis on 
solely the time spent in the training process. Furthermore, the 
guidelines contained in the 1994 NPRM failed to adequately consider the 
potentially narrow scope of training that might be required for some 
employees, particularly some train crew personnel, that perform very 
limited inspection functions on very limited types of equipment. 
Although the training and qualification requirements currently proposed 
continue to require that any training provided include classroom and 
``hands-on'' training as well as verbal or written examinations and 
``hands-on'' capability, they do not mandate a specific number of hours 
that this training must encompass as that will vary depending on the 
employee or employees involved, which is probably best determined by 
the railroad.
    This paragraph specifically proposes that employees pass either a 
written or oral examination covering the equipment, tasks, and Federal 
regulatory requirements for which they are responsible as well as 
requiring that each individual deemed qualified demonstrate ``hands-
on'' capability. This paragraph makes clear that a person's ``hands-
on'' capability is to be demonstrated by having the person successfully 
perform all of the tasks required to be performed as part of the duties 
for which they are being qualified in the presence of a supervisor or a 
designated instructor. FRA believes that in order for a person to be 
adequately trained to perform a task that individual must not only 
possess the knowledge of what is required to be performed but also must 
possess the capability of applying that knowledge to the actual 
performance of the task. Consequently, FRA proposes that the physical 
capability to perform the task be demonstrated by the individual in the 
presence of the person's supervisor or instructor.
    This paragraph also contains proposed provisions for conducting 
periodic refresher training and supervisor oversight of an employees 
performance once training is provided. FRA believes both these 
requirements are essential to ensure that an individual continues to 
possess the knowledge and skills necessary to continue to perform the 
tasks for which the individual is assigned responsibility. Furthermore, 
employees must be periodically retrained in order to keep up with 
technological advances relating to braking systems that are constantly 
being made by the industry.
    Paragraph (c) proposes to require that each railroad which operates 
trains required to be equipped with two-way EOTs develop and implement 
a training program which specifically addresses the testing, operation, 
and maintenance of the devices. The final rule requiring the use of 
two-way EOTs became effective on July 1, 1997. Since that time, FRA has 
discovered numerous operating and mechanical employees which do not 
fully understand when the devices are required or how the inspection 
and testing of the devices is to be accomplished. Furthermore, FRA 
believes that it is vital for those employees responsible for the use 
of the devices (i.e. engineers and conductors) to be intimately 
familiar with the use and operation of the devices to ensure that the 
full safety potential of the devices is utilized and available. 
Consequently, FRA believes that adequate training must be provided to 
those employees responsible for the inspection, testing, operation and 
use of two-way EOTs.

[[Page 48338]]

    Paragraph (d) contains the proposed requirements related to 
maintaining adequate records for establishing that individuals are 
capable of performing the tasks for which they are assigned 
responsibility. FRA believes that the proposed record keeping and 
notification requirements contained in this paragraph are the 
cornerstone of the training and qualification provisions. As FRA is not 
proposing specific training curriculums or specific experience 
thresholds, FRA believes that these record keeping provisions are vital 
to ensuring that proper training is being provided to railroad 
personnel. FRA believes these requirements provide the means by which 
FRA will judge the effectiveness and appropriateness of a railroad's 
training and qualification program. These provisions also provide FRA 
with the ability to independently assess whether the training provided 
to a specific individual adequately addresses the tasks for which the 
individual is deemed capable of performing and will most likely prevent 
potential abuses by railroads to use insufficiently trained individuals 
to perform the necessary inspections, tests, and maintenance required 
by this proposal. This paragraph makes clear that FRA intends to 
require that railroads maintain specific personnel qualification 
records for all personnel (including contract personnel) responsible 
for the inspection, testing, and maintenance of train brake systems. 
This paragraph also makes clear that the records maintained by a 
railroad contain detailed information regarding the training provided 
as well as detailed information on the types of equipment the 
individual is qualified to inspect, test, or maintain and the duties 
the individual is qualified to perform. Furthermore, this paragraph 
requires that records maintained by the railroad contain a description 
of the employee's ``hands-on'' performance of the tasks for which the 
employee is assigned and the basis for finding that the tasks were 
successfully completed. Most Class I and larger Class II railroads 
already keep records of this type in some fashion; however, they are 
not always easily obtained by FRA. As an additional means of ensuring 
that only properly qualified individuals are performing only those 
tasks for which they are qualified, FRA also proposes to require that 
railroads promptly notify personnel of changes in their qualification 
status and specifically identify the date that the employee's 
qualification ends unless refresher training is provided.
    Paragraph (e) proposes to require that each railroad adopt and 
comply with an internal audit process of their training, qualification, 
and designation program. The internal audit process should ensure that 
all necessary training is being conducted and documented. The audit 
process should be designed to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
training program. FRA believes that the audit process should not only 
review the completeness and accuracy of the certification but should 
also review the content and presentation of materials, the testing and 
grading of the employees, and the effectiveness of the classroom and 
``hands-on'' portions of the training program. FRA further believes 
that any auditing of a training program must involve all segments of 
the workforce involved in the training. Thus, FRA believes it is vital 
that labor be intrinsically involved in the auditing process, from 
beginning to end. Evaluation of training techniques might best be 
approached through a ``team'' method, where several observers, 
including labor representatives, periodically evaluate course or 
``hands-on'' training content and presentation. FRA believes that the 
consistency, effectiveness, and quality of the classroom, ``hands-on'', 
and refresher training should be an essential part of any internal 
audit process developed by a railroad.
    FRA recognizes that some railroads will be forced to place a 
greater emphasis on training and qualifications than they have in the 
past, and this requirement will result in additional costs for those 
railroads. However, the proposed rule allows the railroads the 
flexibility that they need to provide only that training which an 
employee needs for a specific job. The proposed rule does not require 
an employee who only performs brake inspections while en route (i.e., 
Class II brake tests) to receive the intensive training needed for an 
employee who performs Class I brake tests or one who is charged with 
the maintenance or repair of the equipment. The training can be 
tailored to the specific needs of the railroad. Across the industry as 
a whole, this proposal will not require extensive changes in the way 
most railroads currently operate, but it will require some railroads to 
invest more time in the training of their personnel and should prevent 
railroads from using minimally trained and unqualified people to 
perform crucial safety tasks. In order to further assess the impact 
these proposed requirements will have, particularly on smaller 
railroads, FRA requests comments from interested parties on the 
following:
    1. What is the potential impact of the proposed training and 
qualification requirements on short line railroads (i.e., Class II and 
Class III railroads)? How will these types of railroads meet the 
proposed requirements?
    2. What is the potential impact of the proposed record keeping 
requirements to smaller railroads (i.e., Class III railroads)? Do these 
railroads currently maintain some sort of training records?
    3. As FRA believes these records are a key element of the proposed 
training and qualification requirements, are there alternative methods 
available to smaller railroads (i.e., Class III railroads) for 
maintaining and developing the required information?
    4. Currently, what percentage of employees will require additional 
training?
    5. With the exception of training directed specifically at the 
provisions of these revised regulations, are there a sufficient number 
of ``qualified'' employees at present to ensure that no operational 
difficulty will result? What is a reasonable timeline for permitting 
railroads (particularly smaller railroads) to reach full compliance 
with regard to these requirements?
Section 232.205  Class I Brake Test--Initial Terminal Inspection
    This section describes the circumstances that would mandate the 
performance of a Class I brake test and outlines the tasks that must be 
performed when performing this inspection. Most of the provisions 
contained in this section are currently contained in Sec. 232.12(a) and 
(c)-(h) but FRA has modified the provisions to some extent in order to 
clarify existing requirements, to eliminate potential abuses, and to 
standardize certain provisions. Basically a Class I brake test is 
intended to be the functional equivalent to what is currently referred 
to as an initial terminal brake inspection.
    Paragraph (a) proposes to identify those trains that are required 
to receive a Class I brake test prior to further movement. The 
provisions contained in this paragraph are similar to those currently 
contained in Sec. 232.12(a), but have been somewhat expanded upon. 
Paragraph (a)(1) requires that trains receive a Class I brake test at 
the location where they are originally assembled. For clarity purposes, 
FRA will consider a location to be a place where a train is originally 
assembled, to be the location where a vast majority of the cars in a 
train are added to the train. FRA has discovered that some railroads 
are assembling two or more locomotives together with only a few cars at 
one location and performing an initial terminal inspection pursuant to 
Sec. 232.12 on the train at that location. The train

[[Page 48339]]

is then moved a very short distance (less than 20 miles) where a large 
number of cars are added to the train with the performance of only an 
intermediate brake inspection being performed. FRA believes this 
practice is clearly an attempt to circumvent the inspection 
requirements currently contained in the regulations. FRA intends to 
make clear that it will consider that location where the majority of 
the cars are added to the train to be the point of origin or initial 
terminal for that train, as that is the location where the train is in 
fact assembled. FRA recognizes that such a standard will have to be 
looked at on a case-by-case basis, but believes that the above 
mentioned scenario is a clear case where a railroad is attempting to 
avoid the comprehensive inspection requirements imposed on a train at 
its point of origin.
    FRA has also attempted to clarify the provision requiring the 
performance of a Class I brake test when the train consist is changed 
other than adding or removing a solid block of cars. Currently, there 
appears to be some confusion over what constitutes a ``solid block of 
cars.'' Therefore, FRA has included a definition of the term in this 
proposal and references it in paragraph (a)(2). FRA believes that the 
definition provided in this proposal is consistent with longstanding 
agency interpretation and the clear intent of the regulations. This 
definition makes clear that the phrase ``solid block of cars'' is 
intended to describe a set of cars that were all a part of one train 
and that have remained coupled together until added to another train. 
The phrase was never intended, nor is it intended in this proposal, to 
mean groups of cars removed from various different trains that are then 
assembled into a block for addition into another train. In FRA's view, 
the above described action constitutes the assembling of a new train 
which would require the performance of a Class I brake test.
    In paragraph (a)(3) incorporates FRA's longstanding administrative 
interpretation which permits trains to remain disconnected from a 
source of compressed air (``off air'') for a short length of time 
without having to be retested. Currently, FRA only permits trains to 
remain ``off air'' for a period of approximately 2 hours before an 
initial terminal brake inspection must be performed. In this paragraph, 
FRA proposes to extend the permissible time ``off air'' to 4 hours. FRA 
agrees that our longstanding administrative interpretation was 
established prior to the development of new equipment that has greatly 
reduced leakage problems, such as welded brake piping and fittings and 
ferrule-clamped air hoses. However, contrary to several railroads' 
assertions FRA does not believe that cars should be allowed to be off 
air for extended periods of time without being retested. FRA believes 
that the longer cars sit without air attached the greater the chances 
are that the integrity of the brake system will be compromised. The 
longer cars sit the more susceptible they may be to weather conditions 
or even vandalism, as some commenters suggested. Consequently, based on 
today's equipment, operating practices, and overriding safety concerns, 
FRA feels that cars should not be disconnected from a continuous supply 
of pressurized air for longer than four hours without being retested. 
FRA also believes that the source of compressed air must be sufficient 
to maintain the integrity of the brake system. Consequently, FRA 
proposes to require that the source of compressed air be maintained at 
a minimum level of 60 psi.
    Paragraph (a)(4) contains the proposed requirement that a train 
receive a Class I brake test whenever it has traveled 3,000 miles since 
receiving its last Class I brake test. This proposed revision is aimed 
at ensuring that unit trains or captive service trains receive a 
quality brake inspection at least every 3,000 miles. Under the current 
regulations certain trains can operate almost indefinitely on only one 
initial terminal brake inspection and then a continuing series of 
1,000-mile brake inspections since the trains are rarely broken up and 
are not interchanged with other railroads. FRA proposes this 
requirement in order to ensure that these trains are not continuously 
operated with only a series of Class IA brake tests being performed. 
FRA believes that the 3,000 mile limit strikes an appropriate balance 
as it will continue to permit railroads to operate trains distances 
they currently operate without requiring the conduct of an additional 
Class I brake test but will ensure that unit trains and captive service 
operations are provided a comprehensive brake inspection on a periodic 
basis.
    Paragraph (a)(5) contains the proposed provision for when trains 
received in interchange must receive a Class I brake test. These are 
similar to what is currently contained in Sec. 232.12(a)(1)(iii); 
however, the current proposal contains two new provisions. FRA proposes 
to permit trains received in interchange to have a previously tested 
solid block of cars added to the train without requiring the 
performance of a Class I brake test. Currently, the addition of a these 
types of cars to a train received in interchange would require the 
performance of an initial terminal inspection. As long as the added 
block of cars has been previously tested, FRA sees no safety hazard in 
permitting the cars to be added to a train at an interchange location. 
Furthermore, FRA also proposes to permit trains which are received in 
interchange, and that will travel no more than 20 miles from the 
interchange location, to have its consist changed other than provided 
in paragraph (a)(5) without being required to receive a Class I brake 
test; provided that, any cars added to the consist at the interchange 
location receive at least a Class II brake test pursuant to 
Sec. 232.209. Historically, FRA has not had a problem with these 
shorter distance trains and believes that a Class II brake test on 
those cars added to the train is sufficient to ensure the safety of 
these operations.
    Paragraph (b) details the required tasks comprising a Class I brake 
test. A proper Class I brake test ensures that a train is in proper 
working condition and is capable of traveling to its destination with 
minimal problems en route. Specific tasks of the Class I brake test 
include most of the tasks currently required in initial terminal brake 
tests contained at Sec. 232.12 (c)-(h) with some modification in the 
interest of standardization and clarity.
    FRA again proposes a standardized brake-pipe reduction of 20 psi 
for virtually all brake inspections and tests. FRA agrees with both 
labor and management commenters that a standard brake-pipe reduction 
will simplify train brake tests and will make it easier to train 
workers. The 20-psi standardized reduction was suggested by both labor 
and management representatives and was previously proposed in the 1994 
NPRM.
    The brake-pipe leakage test will continue to be a valid method of 
qualifying brake systems. However, FRA proposes that the air flow 
method of testing the condition of the brake pipe become an acceptable 
alternate to the brake-pipe leakage test. The air flow method would 
only be an alternative for trains having locomotives equipped with a 
26-L brake valve or equivalent and outfitted with an EOT device. The 
maximum allowable flow would be 60 CFM. FRA believes that the air flow 
method is a much more comprehensive test than the leakage test. 
Although FRA is not proposing to mandate the use of the air flow 
method, it does recommend that railroads use the method when possible, 
not just to qualify brake systems, but in order to provide additional 
information regarding the brake system to the train crew. The air

[[Page 48340]]

flow method has been approved for use by AAR member railroads after 
extensive testing, and the method has been available in Canada as an 
alternate means of qualifying train brakes since 1984.
    The brake-pipe gradient of 15 psi has been retained for both the 
leakage and air flow method of train brake testing; however, the 
minimum rear-car pressure has been increased to 75 psi, which will 
require a locomotive brake-pipe pressure of 90 psi. FRA feels that the 
added margin of braking power justifies the increase in pressure.
    Based on FRA's experience over the last several years and based on 
numerous comments received by FRA verifying the high reliability of the 
rear-car pressure transducers used in reporting brake-pipe pressure by 
an end-of-train (EOT) device, FRA now feels comfortable and justified 
in allowing the use of EOT devices in establishing the rear car 
pressure for Class I brake tests. FRA currently has requirements in 
place for the inspection and testing of EOT devices at the time of 
installation, which have been incorporated into subpart E of this 
proposal. However, in using an EOT to verify rear car pressure during a 
Class I brake test, the reading of the rear car air pressure is only 
permitted from the controlling or hauling locomotive of the train. 
Under no circumstances will train air brake pressure be read from a 
remote highway vehicle, another locomotive not attached to the train, 
or at any other location such as a remote unit installed in an office 
or shop.
    FRA has proposed paragraph (b)(2) in order to clarify the duties of 
individuals performing brake inspection contained in this proposal. The 
language in this paragraph is reiterated in both the Class IA and Class 
II brake tests contained in this proposal in order to ensure the proper 
performance of brake inspections. Over the last few years there has 
been extensive debate concerning what constitutes a proper train air 
brake test under the current provisions contained in part 232, 
particularly relating to the positioning of the person performing the 
brake inspection. In early 1997, FRA issued a technical bulletin to its 
field inspectors in an attempt to clarify what must be done in order to 
properly perform a brake test. This technical bulletin stated that 
inspectors must position themselves in such a manner so as to be able 
to observe all of the movable parts of the brake system on each car. At 
a minimum, this requires that the inspector observe both sides of the 
equipment sometime during the inspection process. FRA further believes 
that both sides of the equipment must be observed sometime after the 
occurrence of activities that have the likelihood of compromising the 
integrity of the brake components of the equipment, such as: hump 
switching; multiple switching; loading; or unloading. FRA also agrees 
with several railroad commenters to the technical bulletin, that if one 
side of the equipment is inspected to ensure the proper attachment and 
condition of brake components and the proper condition of brake shoes 
on that side and the application of the brakes is observed from the 
other side of the equipment, then based on the design of brake systems 
today it can be safely assumed that in virtually every case an 
application of the brakes is occurring on the other side of the 
equipment. Consequently, FRA would like to make clear that both sides 
of the equipment do not necessarily have to be inspected while the 
brakes are applied if an adequate inspection of the brake components 
was conducted on both sides of the equipment sometime during the 
inspection process. However, FRA also intends to make clear that the 
piston travel on each car must be inspected while the brakes are 
applied; thus, an inspector must take appropriate steps to make this 
observation.
    Similarly, paragraph (b)(4) is also an attempt to clarify language 
contained in the current regulation which requires that the brakes 
``apply.'' This language has been misinterpreted by some to mean that 
if the piston applies in response to a command from a controlling 
locomotive or yard test device, and releases before the release signal 
is given, the brake system on that car is in compliance with the 
regulation because the brake simply applied. The intent of the 
regulation has always been that the brakes apply and remain applied 
until the release signal is initiated from the controlling locomotive 
or yard test device. Therefore, clarifying language has been added in 
this paragraph to eliminate all doubt as to what is required. 
Consequently, the brakes on a car must remain applied until the 
appropriate release signal is given. If it fails to do so the car must 
either be removed from the train or repaired in the train and retested 
as discussed below.
    FRA recognizes that some defective train air brake conditions found 
when performing a train air brake test, which may cause insufficient 
application of the brakes on a piece of equipment, are of such an 
obvious nature they can be quickly repaired in the train. For example, 
a brake connection pin might be missing, a slack adjuster might be 
disconnected, or some other minor part of the brake system might be 
defective. FRA does not intend to mandate that these types of obvious 
defective conditions require the car to be removed from the train, if 
repaired. Rather, in paragraph (b)(4) FRA proposes to allow a retest 
from the controlling locomotive or head end of the consist if the car 
is repaired in the train. Furthermore, if a retest is conducted, the 
brakes on the retested car shall remain applied for a minimum of five 
(5) minutes. The five minute requirement is based on the leakage 
parameters established for locomotives contained at Sec. 229.59(c).
    In paragraph (b)(5), FRA will continue to require that piston 
travel be adjusted during the performance of a Class I brake test if it 
is found outside the nominal limits established for standard 8\1/2\ 
inch and 10-inch diameter brake cylinder or outside the limits 
established for other types which will be contained on a stencil, 
sticker, or badge plate. This provision is similar to the provision 
currently contained at Sec. 232.12(f). The major difference is that FRA 
has modified the provision to require that piston travel found to be 
less than 7 inches or more than 9 inches must be adjusted nominally to 
7\1/2\ inches. This change is based on a request by AAR to change the 
adjustment to 7\1/2\ inches from 7 inches as its member railroads were 
finding it extremely difficult to adjust the piston travel to precisely 
7 inches and that in some cases the adjustment would be marginally less 
than 7 inches, thus requiring a readjustment. Thus, AAR sought the 
extra \1/2\ inch in order to provide a small measure for error when the 
piston travel is adjusted. As FRA believes that AAR's concerns are 
validly placed and would have no impact on safety, FRA has accommodated 
the request.
    In paragraph (b)(7), FRA makes clear that brake connection bottom 
rod supports will no longer be required on bottom connection rods 
secured with locking cotter keys. FRA recognizes that there is no need 
for bottom rod safety supports in these incidents and intends to 
relieve railroads of this unnecessary expense, which will provide the 
industry a cost savings without compromising safety.
    Paragraph (b)(8) contains the provisions relating to the 
performance of ``roll-by'' inspections of the brake release. These 
types of inspections have been conducted for years even though there is 
nothing in the current regulation which specifically addresses the 
conduct. The ability to perform this type of inspection of the brake 
release permits railroads to expedite the

[[Page 48341]]

movement of trains and has not proven to be a safety hazard. Therefore, 
FRA proposes this provision to clarify the ability to perform such an 
inspection and to ensure that the inspection is performed properly. 
This paragraph makes clear that when performing a ``roll-by'' 
inspection of the brake release the train's speed shall not exceed 10 
mph, that the qualified person performing the ``roll-by'' inspection 
shall notify the engineer when and if the ``roll-by'' has been 
successfully completed, and that the operator of the train will note 
successful completion of the release portion of the inspection on the 
written or electronic notification required by this proposal. FRA 
intends to make clear that the notification to the engineer could be 
made via a hand held radio, a cellular telephone, or through 
communication with a train dispatcher but that such information must be 
provided to the engineer prior to the train's departure. Based on the 
rationale provided for permitting only one side of a train to be 
inspected during the application of the brakes, FRA intends to make 
clear that only one side of the train needs be inspected during the 
release portion of a brake test.
    Paragraph (c) retains the language currently contained in 
Sec. 232.12(a), with slight modification for clarity, stating that a 
carman alone will be considered a qualified person if a railroad's 
collective bargaining agreement provides that carmen are to perform the 
inspections and tests required by this section. The original provision 
was added to the regulations in 1982 when the distance between brake 
inspections was increased from 500 miles to 1,000 miles. The provision 
was included as part of an agreement between the railroads and rail 
labor for permitting the distance between brake tests to be increased 
and was presented to FRA at the time. The language contained in that 
agreement was included in the 1982 regulatory revisions without change 
by FRA. Consequently, due to the circumstances under which this 
provision was added to the regulations and because it has existed for 
over 16 years, FRA feels compelled to retain the language at this time. 
However, FRA intends to make clear that it will interpret the language 
contained in this provision to mean that only in circumstances where a 
railroad's collective bargaining agreement specifically requires that 
only a carman may perform the inspections and tests required by this 
section, will a carman alone be considered a qualified person. FRA 
believes that this interpretation clarifies the meaning of the 
provision and provides the most reasonable, enforceable, and 
understandable interpretation of the requirement and is consistent with 
the approach to inspections envisioned in this proposal.
    As FRA lacks the authority to issue binding interpretations of 
collective bargaining agreements, FRA lacks the ability to settle a 
dispute between a railroad and its employees as to which group of its 
employees is to perform what work. FRA intends to make clear, that in 
order for FRA to proceed with an enforcement action under this 
provision, one of the parties to the collective bargaining agreement 
would first have to obtain a decision from a duly authorized body 
interpreting the relevant agreement, specifically identifying the 
involved location, and adequately resolving all of the interpretative 
issues necessary for FRA to conclude that the work belongs to a 
particular group of employees.
    This paragraph makes clear that in circumstances where a collective 
bargaining agreement requires that only carmen are to perform the 
inspections and tests required by this section that the railroad shall 
ensure that those carmen responsible for performing these tasks are 
properly trained and designated as qualified for the tasks they are to 
perform. In these circumstances FRA believes that the railroad must 
ensure that the employees with which they have collectively bargained 
to exclusively perform the inspections and tests required by this 
section are properly trained and designated to perform the task. 
Furthermore, FRA believes that on virtually all railroads carmen will 
be sufficiently trained and experienced to be considered ``qualified 
persons'' and ``qualified mechanical inspectors'' as defined in this 
proposal, except that they might need some additional training on the 
specific requirements contained in this proposal.
    Paragraph (d) contains a new proposed requirement regarding written 
notification of the successful completion of a Class I brake test by a 
qualified person. Labor organizations have commented for years that 
when crews board trains at points of interchange, crew change points, 
and on main lines where the hours of service has halted a train that 
they have no information as to when or where the train last received a 
brake inspection or test. FRA has encountered this same difficulty when 
investigating train accidents and other incidents requiring FRA 
attention. FRA has found that train symbols change when trains are 
interchanged and that train crews do not know where their train 
originated, how many miles it has mileage traveled, or when the last 
tests and inspections were performed. Without this knowledge of a 
train's history, railroads and train crews cannot possibly comply with 
Federal regulations in many instances. Therefore, FRA has included 
language in this paragraph in an attempt to eliminate some these 
potential problems and further enhance the safety of train operations 
by proposing to require that the qualified person conducting the Class 
I brake test notify the locomotive engineer in writing, or place such 
notification in the cab of the controlling locomotive that the Class I 
brake test was successfully performed. FRA believes this information 
could be provided to an engineer electronically via the computer 
equipment currently installed on locomotives. If the information is 
provided by this medium, the system must be capable of identifying the 
qualified inspector entering the information, include all of the 
information required on the written notification, and be available to 
FRA upon request. FRA further proposes that the written or electronic 
notification remain in the cab of the controlling locomotive until the 
train reaches its destination. FRA believes that these proposed 
provisions will ensure that train crews are aware of the condition of 
their train throughout its trip and thereby enhance the safety of train 
operations.
    Paragraph (f) is included in order to clarify existing requirements 
relating to the adding of cars or blocks of cars while a train is en 
route. This proposed paragraph informs railroads that cars picked-up en 
route that have not been previously tested and kept connected to a 
source of compressed air are to receive a Class I brake test when added 
to the train. Alternatively, a railroad may elect to perform only a 
Class II brake test at the time that a car is added to the train en 
route, but FRA intends to make clear that if this option is elected 
then the cars added in this fashion must be given a Class I brake test 
at the next forward location where facilities are available for 
providing such attention.
Section 232.207  Class IA Brake Tests--1,000-mile Inspection
    This section contains the proposed requirements related to the 
performance of a Class IA brake test. Many of the proposed provisions 
contained in this section are currently contained at Sec. 232.12(b) 
regarding the performance of 1,000 mile inspections. FRA has modified 
some of the current requirements for purposes of clarity and has added 
a few additional requirements in order to make the inspection 
requirement more

[[Page 48342]]

enforceable and to prevent some of the current abuses which FRA field 
inspectors have experienced in their enforcement activities.
    Paragraph (a) provides that each train shall receive a Class IA 
brake test at a location that is not more than 1,000 miles from the 
point where any car in the train last received a Class I or Class IA 
brake test. FRA intends to make clear that the most restrictive car or 
block of cars in the train will determine the location where this test 
must be performed. For example, if a train departs point A and travels 
to point B where it picks-up a previously tested block of cars en route 
which has travelled 800 miles since its last Class I brake test and the 
crew does not perform a Class I brake test when entraining the cars, 
then the entire train must receive a Class IA brake test within 200 
miles from point B even though that location may only be 600 miles from 
point A.
    Paragraph (b) contains the proposed tasks which must be performed 
when conducting a Class IA brake test. These tasks are virtually 
identical to some of the tasks required to be performed during a Class 
I brake test. A leakage or air flow test must be performed. Thus, when 
locomotives are equipped with a 26-L brake valve or equivalent, FRA 
will permit the use of the air flow method as an alternative to the 
brake pipe leakage test. This paragraph is also intended to make clear 
that in order to properly perform an inspection under this section both 
sides of the equipment must be observed sometime during the inspection 
process. This paragraph also makes clear that the brakes shall apply on 
each car in response to a 20-psi brake pipe reduction and shall remain 
applied until a release is initiated and reiterates the parameters for 
performing a retest on those cars found not to have sufficiently 
applied that are proposed for Class I brake tests. It should be noted 
that defective equipment may be moved from or past a location where a 
Class IA brake test is performed only if all of the requirements 
contained in Sec. 232.15 have been satisfied.
    Paragraph (c) contains the proposed provision which would require 
railroads to maintain a list of locations where Class IA inspection 
will be performed and that FRA be notified at least 30 days in advance 
of any change to that list of locations. The current regulations merely 
require that railroads designate locations where intermediate 1,000-
mile brake inspections will be performed but places no limitation on 
changing the locations. Therefore, FRA has found some railroads 
changing the locations where these intermediate inspections are to 
occur on a daily basis in order to prevent FRA from observing these 
inspections being performed or to avoid full performance of the 
required inspection by mechanical forces. Consequently, in order to 
ensure that these types of inspections are being properly performed, 
FRA must be able to determine where the railroad plans to conduct these 
types of inspections. FRA recognizes that there may be occurrences or 
emergencies, such as derailments, that make it impossible or unsafe for 
a train to reach a location that the railroad has designated as a Class 
IA inspection site. Consequently, FRA proposes to permit railroads to 
bypass the 30-day written notification requirement in these instances 
provided FRA is notified within 24 hours after a designation has been 
changed. This paragraph also makes clear that failure to perform a 
Class IA brake test at a designated location will constitute a failure 
to properly perform the inspection.
Section 232.209  Class II Brake Tests--Intermediate Inspection
    This section contains the proposed requirements related to the 
performance of Class II brake tests. The requirements proposed in this 
section mirror the requirements currently contained in Sec. 232.13(d) 
but have been slightly modified for clarity and standardization. In 
paragraph (a), FRA proposes that, at a minimum, a Class II brake test 
be performed on all cars that are added to a train at a location that 
is not the train's point of origin and that have not received a Class I 
brake test or that have been off a source of compressed air for more 
than four hours. In paragraph (d), FRA makes clear that if cars are 
added in this fashion then they must receive a Class I brake test at 
the next forward location where the facilities are available for 
performing such an inspection.
    Paragraph (b) contains the proposed tasks which must be performed 
when conducting a Class II brake test. A Class II brake test is 
intended to ensure that the brakes on those cars added apply and 
release and that the added cars do not compromise the integrity of the 
train's brake system. Therefore, a leakage or air flow test must be 
performed when the cars are added to the train to ensure the integrity 
of the train's brake system. This paragraph makes clear that in order 
to properly perform an inspection under this section both sides of the 
equipment must be observed sometime during the inspection process. This 
paragraph also makes clear that the brakes shall apply on each car 
added to the train and remain applied until a release is initiated and 
reiterates the parameters for performing a retest on those cars found 
not to have sufficiently applied that are proposed for Class I brake 
tests. It should be noted that, defective equipment may be moved from 
or past a location where a Class II brake test is performed only if all 
of the requirements contained in Sec. 232.15 have been satisfied. 
Paragraph (b) also requires that the release of the brakes on those 
cars added to the train and on the rear car of the train be verified 
and allows railroads to conduct ``roll-by'' inspections for this 
purpose.
    Paragraph (c) permits an alternative to the rear car application 
and release portion of this test. This alternative permits the 
locomotive engineer to rely on a rear car gauge or end-of-train device 
to determine that the train's brake pipe pressure is being reduced by 
at least 5-psi and then restored by at least 5-psi in lieu of direct 
observation of the rear car application and release. This alternative 
has been permitted for years under the current regulations without any 
degradation to safety, and thus, FRA intends to permit the practice to 
continue.
Section 232.211  Class III Brake Tests--Trainline Continuity Inspection
    This section contains the proposed requirements related to the 
performance of Class III brake tests. The requirements proposed in this 
section incorporate the requirements currently contained in 
Sec. 232.13(c) but have been slightly modified for clarity and 
standardization. The purpose of a Class III brake test is to ensure the 
integrity of the trainline when minor changes in the train consist 
occur. Basically, a Class III brake test ensures that the train brake 
pipe is properly delivering air to the rear of the train. FRA intends 
to make clear that this inspection is designed to be performed whenever 
the continuity of the brake system is broken or interrupted. For 
example, if a railroad disconnects a locomotive from a train consist to 
perform switching duties for a short period and then reattaches the 
locomotive to the consist, without any other change being made in the 
consist, the railroad would be required to perform a Class III brake 
test prior to the train's departure. Similarly, a Class III brake test 
would be required if a railroad disconnects a locomotive from the train 
and adds a different locomotive to the train, only to discover that the 
added locomotive is not operating properly, and thus, adds the original 
locomotive back into the consist. Because the continuity of the 
trainline was interrupted when the

[[Page 48343]]

locomotive was removed and then placed back in the train, even though 
the same cars and locomotives remained in the consist, a Class III 
brake test must be performed. Paragraphs (b) and (c) contain the tasks 
related to the performance of this brake test. The proposed tasks 
require an application of the brakes on the rear car of the train in 
response to a 20-psi brake pipe reduction and a subsequent release of 
the brakes on that car when initiated. Similar to Class II brake tests, 
paragraph (c) permits an alternative to direct observation of the 
application and release of the rear car's brakes by permitting the 
operator to rely on a rear car gauge or end-of-train device to 
determine that the brake pipe pressure is being reduced and restored in 
response to the controlling locomotive.
Section 232.213  Extended Haul Trains
    This section contains the proposed provisions which would permit an 
extension of the allowable distance a train may travel between train 
brake system tests. Currently, trains are not permitted to travel more 
than 1,000 miles without receiving an intermediate brake inspection. 
See 49 CFR 232.12(b). FRA believes that if a train is properly and 
thoroughly inspected, with as many defective conditions being 
eliminated as possible, that the train is capable of traveling well 
over 1,000 miles between brake inspections. By this, FRA contends that 
not only must the brake system be in quality condition but that the 
mechanical components of the equipment must be in equally prime 
condition. As the distance a train is allowed to travel increases, the 
mechanical condition of the equipment is a key factor in ensuring the 
proper and safe operation of the train brake system throughout the 
entire trip. FRA also continues to believe that the best place to 
ensure the proper conduct of these inspections and to ensure that the 
train's brake system and mechanical components are in the best 
condition possible is at a train's point of origin (initial terminal).
    In paragraph (a), FRA proposes to permit railroads to designate 
specific trains which will be permitted to move up to 1,500 miles 
between brake and mechanical inspections provided the railroad meets 
various stringent inspection and monitoring requirements, which FRA 
believes will ensure the safe and proper operation of these trains. FRA 
intends to make clear that a railroad must meet all of the requirements 
contained in this paragraph in order to designate a train as an 
extended haul train. Paragraph (a)(1) proposes that railroads must 
designate specific trains it intends to move in accordance with this 
section. This paragraph sets forth the information that must be 
provided to FRA in writing when designating a train for such operation. 
The information required to be submitted is necessary to facilitate 
FRA's ability to independently monitor a railroad's operation of these 
extended haul trains.
    FRA believes that in order for a train to be permitted to travel 
1,500 miles between inspections, the train must receive inspections 
that ensure the optimum condition of both the brake system and the 
mechanical components. In paragraphs (a)(2), (a)(3), and (a)(8), FRA 
proposes to require that these inspections be performed by highly 
qualified and experienced inspectors in order to ensure that quality 
inspections are being performed. As FRA intends the Class I brake tests 
that are required to be performed on these trains to be as in-depth and 
comprehensive as possible, FRA believes that these inspections must be 
performed by individuals possessing the knowledge to not only identify 
and detect a defective condition in all of the brake equipment required 
to be inspected but also possess the knowledge to recognize the 
interrelational workings of the equipment and the ability to trouble-
shoot and repair the equipment. Therefore, in paragraphs (a)(2) and 
(a)(8) FRA proposes the term ``qualified mechanical inspector'' to 
identify and describe those individuals it believes possess the 
necessary knowledge and experience to perform the proposed Class I 
brake tests on these trains. A ``qualified mechanical inspector'' is a 
person with training or instruction in the troubleshooting, inspection, 
testing, maintenance, or repair of the specific train brake systems the 
person is assigned responsibility and whose primary responsibilities 
include work generally consistent with those functions. (See Sec. 232.5 
of the section-by-section for a more detailed discussion of ``qualified 
mechanical inspector.'') FRA further believes these same highly 
qualified inspectors must be the individuals performing the proposed 
inbound inspection, contained in paragraph (a)(6), on these extended 
haul trains in order to ensure that all defective conditions are 
identified at the train's destination or 1,500 mile location. 
Similarly, in paragraph (a)(3), FRA proposes that all of the mechanical 
inspections required to be performed on these trains be conducted by 
inspectors designated pursuant to 49 CFR 215.11, rather than train crew 
members, in order to ensure that all mechanical components are in 
proper condition prior to the trains departure.
    As no trains are currently permitted to travel in excess of 1,000 
miles between inspections, FRA is not willing to propose more than 
1,500 miles between such inspections until appropriate data is 
developed which establishes that equipment moved under the proposed 
criteria remains in proper condition throughout the train's journey. 
FRA believes that the proposed provisions contained in paragraphs 
(a)(6)and (a)(7), requiring the performance of an inbound inspection at 
destination or at 1,500 miles and requiring carriers to maintain 
records of all defective conditions discovered on these trains for a 
period of one year creates the basis for developing such data. FRA 
believes the information generated from these inbound inspections will 
be extremely useful in assessing the quality of a railroad's inspection 
practices and will help FRA identify any systematic brake or mechanical 
problems that may result in these types of operations.
    In paragraphs (a)(4) and (a)(8), FRA proposes that these trains 
have 100 percent operative brakes and contain no cars with mechanical 
defects under part 215 at either the train's point of origin or at the 
time of departure from a 1,500 point, if moving in excess of 1,000 
miles from that location. Furthermore, in paragraph (a)(5) FRA proposes 
that these trains not conduct any pick-ups or set-outs en route, except 
for the removal of defective equipment. FRA believes that these two 
provisions are essential to ensuring the accuracy of the data being 
collected by the railroads as well as ensuring the proper and safe 
operation of these trains. FRA also believes that prohibiting pick-ups 
and set-out on these trains will significantly minimize the disruptions 
made to the integrity of the trains brake system and reduce mechanical 
damage that may occur during switching operations. Furthermore, there 
is currently no reliable tracking system available to FRA to ensure 
that cars added to the train en route have been inspected in accordance 
with the provisions contained in this section.
    Paragraph (b) makes clear that failure to comply with any of the 
restrictions contained in this section will be considered an improper 
movement of a designated priority train for which appropriate civil 
penalties may be assessed. Thus, FRA would list specific civil 
penalties in the final rule pertaining to the improper movement of 
these types of trains. In addition to the imposition of civil 
penalties, FRA also makes clear in this paragraph that it reserves the 
right to revoke a railroad's

[[Page 48344]]

ability to designate any or all trains for repeated or willful 
noncompliance with any of the provisions contained in this section.
Section 232.215  Transfer Train Brake Tests
    This section contains the proposed requirements related to the 
performance of transfer train brake tests. The requirements proposed in 
this section incorporate the requirements currently contained in 
Sec. 232.13(e) but have been slightly modified for clarity and 
standardization. ``Transfer train'' is defined in Sec. 232.5 as a train 
that travels between a point of origin and a point of destination, 
located not more than 20 miles apart, and which is not performing 
switching service. The new definitions, in Sec. 232.5, would clearly 
define ``yard trains'' and would exclude them from the definition of 
``transfer train.'' ``Yard train'' would be defined as a train that 
only performs switching service within a single yard complex. Switching 
movements by ``yard trains'' would not require a transfer train air 
brake test. However, as noted previously, a yard train or other train 
engaged in switching service carries the potential of becoming a 
transfer train, subject to a transfer train's testing requirements if 
the movement engaged in is considered a ``train movement'' rather than 
a ``switching movement.'' FRA's determination of whether the movement 
of cars is a ``train movement,'' subject to the requirements of this 
section, or a ``switching movement'' is and will be based on the 
voluminous case law developed by various courts of the United States. 
(See section-by-section for Sec. 232.5 for a more detailed discussion 
of the terms ``train movement'' and ``switching movements.'')
    FRA intends to make clear that a train will only be considered a 
transfer train if there is no more than 20 miles between the train's 
point of origin and point of final destination. If the train will move 
greater than 20 miles between the point of origin and point of final 
destination it cannot be considered a transfer train and a Class I 
brake test must be performed on the train prior to departure from its 
point of origin. Although cars may be added to a transfer train while 
the train is en route, with a transfer train brake test being performed 
on the cars added, the train is limited to a total of 20 miles from its 
point of origin, not from the location where new cars are added. The 
distance the entire train will move between its point of origin and 
point of final destination is the determinative factor in determining 
whether the train is a transfer train, cars dropped-off or picked-up en 
route do not affect this distance.
    Paragraph (a) contains the proposed tasks that are required to be 
performed when conducting a transfer train brake test. Due to the short 
distance these types of trains will travel FRA will continue to permit 
the brake system to be charged to only 60-psi but will make clear that 
this must be verified by an accurate gauge or end-of-train device. 
Although the current regulations do not require the use of a gauge or 
device, FRA is at a loss to understand how an inspector can know the 
pressure in the brake system without getting a reading from the rear of 
the train. FRA will also continue to require that the brakes apply in 
response to a 15-psi reduction. This section contains modifications for 
performing a transfer train brake test. FRA believes that the reduced 
pressure at which this test is performed (i.e., 60-psi rather than 75-
psi) requires that an application be obtained with a smaller pressure 
reduction than proposed for other brake tests. FRA also intends to make 
clear that an inspection be made to determine that the brakes on each 
car apply and remain applied until the release is initiated by the 
controlling locomotive.
    This paragraph permits cars found with readily identifiable 
problems which causes the brakes not to remain applied, to be retested. 
The retest must be conducted from the controlling locomotive or head of 
the consist and the cars brakes must remain applied for at least 5 
minutes. The reasoning for this is to assure safe train operation and 
handling by requiring a mandatory time frame for which the brakes shall 
remain applied on each car in the train. Consequently, cars whose 
brakes release prior to an initiation by the controlling locomotive 
shall either be repaired and retested or may be moved pursuant to the 
provisions proposed in Sec. 232.15, if applicable.
Section 232.217  Train Brake System Tests Conducted Using Yard Air
    This section proposes the requirements for performing train brake 
system tests when using yard air and are basically identical to the 
requirements currently contained in Sec. 232.12(i) with slight 
modification for clarity and standardization with other provisions 
contained in this proposal. In paragraph (a), FRA will continue to 
require that the testing device be connected to the end of the train or 
cut of cars that will be nearest the controlling locomotive. FRA 
believes that if the yard test plant was connected to the rear of the 
train or cut of cars being tested, the possibility of an overcharge 
condition will exist which presents safety concerns. An overcharge 
condition describes a situation in which the brake equipment of cars 
and/or locomotives is charged to a higher pressure than the maximum 
brake pipe pressure that can normally be achieved in that part of the 
train, this may result in the locomotive engineer lacking the ability 
to control the application or release of the brakes at the rear of the 
train. FRA recognizes that some currently existing yards are designed 
in such a manner so that performance of a test from the front of the 
consist is extremely difficult or impossible. Consequently, FRA seeks 
comment from all interested parties addressing the following:
    1. Are there potential operating or procedural restrictions that 
could be required which would permit the connection of the testing 
device to some location in the train other than the front of the 
consist that would alleviate overcharge concerns?
    2. Are there other potential safety hazards created by permitting 
yard test devices to be connected to the consist at other than the end 
nearest the controlling locomotive?
    Paragraph (b) proposes to make clear that a Class III brake test as 
proposed in Sec. 232.211 must be performed on the cars at the time that 
the road locomotive is attached. This paragraph also remains consistent 
with other provisions of this proposal by requiring the yard test plant 
air pressure to be 80-psi, and by requiring the retesting of cars that 
remain disconnected from a source of compressed air for more than four 
hours.
    Paragraph (c) proposes to require that mechanical yard test devices 
and gauges be calibrated every 92 days and that electronic yard test 
devices and gauges be calibrated annually. Based on observations made 
by FRA's field inspectors, FRA has some concerns regarding the 
condition of many yard test devices and gauges. FRA has found numerous 
mechanical gauges the condition of which creates serious doubt as to 
the accuracy of the gauge. Mechanical gauges have been found with 
broken or missing glass which would allow moisture and other 
contaminates to be present in the gauge. As many of the yard test 
plants being used today are portable, they are exposed to a wide array 
of handling and environmental hazards while being transported from 
location to location. Therefore, FRA proposes that mechanical devices 
and gauges be tested and calibrated every 92 days. Whereas, electronic 
gauges and devices appear to have much less exposure to many of the

[[Page 48345]]

hazards encountered by mechanical devices and gauges and tend to be 
much more reliable and accurate for a longer period of time. 
Consequently, FRA proposes to only require electronic yard test devices 
and gauges to be tested and/or calibrated on an annual basis.
Section 232.219  Double Heading and Helper Service
    This section proposes the requirements related to double heading 
and helper service. The provisions proposed in paragraphs (a) and (b) 
are identical to the provisions currently contained in Sec. 232.15, the 
only difference being that paragraph (a) has been slightly modified in 
order to clearly identify that a Class III brake test must be performed 
when a new locomotive is placed in control of the train. FRA believes 
these provisions are necessary and have been in place for years in 
order to ensure that locomotives taking control of a train have the 
ability to actually control the brakes on the train. Paragraph (c) 
proposes a new requirement aimed at ensuring that the brake systems on 
helper locomotives respond as intended to brake commands from the 
controlling locomotive at the time it is placed in the train. Failure 
of a helper locomotive to respond to the command of the controlling 
locomotive could result in a very serious safety hazard in that a 
helper locomotive may continue to push the rear of the train while the 
brakes are applied potentially resulting in an incident or derailment. 
FRA intends to make clear in this paragraph that a helper locomotive 
found with inoperative or ineffective brakes be repaired prior to use 
or removed from the train.
    FRA also seeks information and comment from interested parties 
regarding a device being used on locomotives used in helper service on 
a few railroads. The device is referred to as a ``Helper Link.'' The 
Helper Link is an electronic device, mounted on the front end of the 
lead helper locomotive and is used to control the automatic air brakes 
on helper locomotive consists. When this device is used the train's 
brake pipe is not connected between the rear car of the train being 
pushed and the helper locomotives. The end-of-train device, attached to 
the rear car of the train, sends a radio signal which is received by 
the Helper Link device. The Helper Link device is connected to the 
brake pipe of the helper locomotives and an electronic command from the 
EOT device causes the air pressure in the helper locomotive brake pipe 
to be reduced or increased, thus, applying or releasing the brakes on 
the helper locomotives. A signal is transmitted from the EOT device to 
the Helper Link device at 60 second intervals to ensure communication. 
The Helper Link is also used to operate the uncoupling lever to detach 
the helper locomotives from the rear of the train without stopping the 
train.
    Based on information currently available to FRA, it appears that 
when there is a loss of communication between the EOT device and the 
Helper Link device, the engineer of the helper locomotive consist is 
not immediately aware of the failure. If the communication between the 
EOT device and the Helper Link is not reestablished within the next 60 
second communication cycle the Helper Link device will automatically 
disable itself. Consequently, if the train experiences an emergency 
application of the air brakes while the Helper Link device is disabled, 
the brakes on the helper locomotives would not apply and would result 
in the helper locomotives continuing to push under power. Furthermore, 
in order for communications to be reestablished between the EOT and 
Helper Link the engineer must leave the locomotive controls, exit the 
locomotive cab, and proceed to the front of the locomotive to manually 
press the reset buttons located on the Helper Link device itself. In 
addition, there are currently no regulations which address the use, 
testing, or calibration of these Helper Link devices.
    On August 22, 1996, the UTU submitted a Petition for Rulemaking 
with FRA regarding Helper Link devices raising many of the concerns 
noted above. See Petition for Proposed Rulemaking Docket 96-1. In order 
to address the UTU petition in this rulemaking and to address the 
concerns of FRA noted above, FRA seeks information and comment from all 
interested parties on the following:
    1. How many railroads are currently utilizing Helper Link devices 
in their operations? On how many trains?
    2. What has been the operating history of the Helper Link devices 
on those railroads currently using the devices?
    3. Is the discussion of the use and operation of the Helper Link 
device contained above accurate? Have technological improvements been 
made to the devices recently?
    4. What testing, calibration, or operational procedures have been 
voluntarily implemented by railroads currently using Helper Link 
devices?
    5. Can or should an audible or visual warning be provided to the 
engineer in the event that communication is lost between the EOT device 
and the Helper Link device?
    6. What are the recommended testing and calibration requirements 
for Helper Link devices currently being used in the industry?
    7. Is the technology available to permit the resetting of the 
Helper Link device by the engineer from his or her normal operating 
position, if communication is lost between the EOT and the Helper Link 
device?

Subpart D--Periodic Maintenance and Testing Requirements

    This proposed subpart provides the proposed periodic brake system 
maintenance and testing requirements for equipment used in freight and 
other non-passenger trains. As stated in the 1994 NPRM and in the 
``General Discussion of Issues'' portion of the preamble to this NPRM, 
FRA firmly believes that the new repair track test and single car test, 
which have been used industry-wide since January of 1992, are a much 
better and more comprehensive method of detecting and eliminating 
defective brake equipment and components than the old, time-based COT&S 
requirements. FRA believes that performance of these tests has 
significantly reduced the number of defective components found and has 
dramatically increased the reliability of brake equipment. Through the 
implementation of the repair track and single car tests, the safety of 
both railroad employees and the public has greatly improved due to 
brake equipment being in better and safer condition. At the same time, 
however, FRA is cognizant that contentions by rail labor regarding the 
carrier's direct and intentional circumvention of these revised 
requirements through the elimination of repair tracks, by moving cars 
to expediter tracks for repair, or simply by making repairs in the 
field is a legitimate concern that needs to be addressed to ensure the 
industry fully benefits from the advantages of the improved tests. This 
subpart proposes to incorporate AAR Interchange Rule 3 and Chart A into 
this regulation, and codify existing repair track and single car test 
requirements, while also imposing additional requirements that are 
intended to eliminate the circumvention of the requirements as 
discussed above.
Section 232.303  General Requirements
    This section contains the general requirements regarding the 
maintenance, repair, and test of freight cars. Prior to the termination 
of Working Group deliberations, the periodic maintenance and single car 
test task force had conducted extensive

[[Page 48346]]

discussions regarding the requirements of AAR Rule 3, Chart A, 
specifically as they relate to the circumstances that trigger the 
performance of a repair track or single car test. The task force was 
ultimately unable to provide consensus recommendations to the Working 
Group on all aspects of periodic maintenance and testing requirements, 
due to the Working Group's inability to agree on the issues relating to 
data collection, evaluation, and relevance. However, based on these 
efforts and the discussions provided above, FRA proposes in paragraph 
(a) of this section to require that each freight car be maintained, 
repaired, and tested in accordance with the AAR's Rule 3 ``Testing of 
Air Brakes'' and accompanying Chart A, contained in the AAR ``Field 
Manual on Interchange Rules'' (January 1, 1998).
    Paragraphs (b)-(d) reiterate existing general requirements 
currently prescribed at 49 CFR 232.17 with minor revisions for purposes 
of clarification and standardization. Paragraph (b) clarifies that the 
air brakes must remain applied until the release signal is initiated to 
maintain consistency with the proposed requirements stated at 
Sec. 232.205(b)(4). Paragraph 232.205(b)(4) is an attempt to clarify 
language contained in the current regulation which require that the 
brakes ``apply.'' This language has been misinterpreted by some to mean 
that if the piston applies in response to a command from a controlling 
locomotive or yard test device, and releases before the release signal 
is given, the brake system on that car is in compliance with the 
regulation because the brake simply applied. The intent of the 
regulation has always been that the brakes apply and remain applied 
until the release signal is initiated from the controlling locomotive 
or yard test device. Therefore, clarifying language has been added in 
this paragraph to eliminate all doubt as to what is required. 
Consequently, this paragraph makes clear that the brakes on a car must 
remain applied until the appropriate release signal is given. If it 
fails to do so, the car must be repaired and retested.
    Paragraph (c) proposes to require that if piston travel is found to 
be less than 7 inches or more than 9 inches, it must be adjusted to 
nominally 7\1/2\ inches, which is a change from the 7 inches as 
currently required, in order to maintain consistency with the 
requirement proposed at Sec. 232.205(b)(5). This change is based on a 
request by AAR to change the adjustment to 7\1/2\ inches from 7 inches 
as its member railroads were finding it extremely difficult to adjust 
the piston travel to precisely 7 inches and that in some cases the 
adjustment would be marginally less than 7 inches, thus requiring a 
readjustment. Therefore, AAR sought the extra \1/2\ inch in order to 
provide a small measure for error when the piston travel is adjusted. 
As FRA believes that AAR's concerns are validly placed and would have 
no impact on safety, FRA has accommodated the request. Paragraph (d)(2) 
proposes enhanced safety assurances with respect to the proper 
functioning of angle cocks by additionally requiring that they be 
inspected to ensure they are properly positioned to allow maximum air 
flow. This is a clarification regarding the normal functioning of the 
angle cock, and should pose little, if any, additional inspection 
burden on the railroads.
    FRA recognizes that circumstances arise where required repair track 
brake tests or single car tests cannot always be performed at the point 
where repairs can be made. Therefore, in paragraph (e), FRA proposes to 
allow a car, after repairs are effectuated, to be moved to the next 
forward location where the test can be performed. FRA intends to make 
clear that the inability to perform a repair track brake test or a 
single car test does not constitute an inability to effectuate the 
necessary repairs. At the same time, however, FRA recognizes rail 
labor's contention that some carriers often attempt to circumvent the 
requirements for performing single car and repair track tests by 
eliminating repair tracks, by moving cars to expediter tracks for 
repair, or by simply making the repairs in the field. As a means to 
curtail these practices, FRA proposes to impose extensive tagging 
requirements on freight cars which, due to the nature of the defective 
condition(s) detected, require a repair track brake test or single car 
test but which are moved from the location where repairs are performed 
prior to receiving the required test. As an alternative to the tagging 
requirements, FRA proposes to permit a railroad to utilize an automated 
tracking system to monitor these cars and ensure they receive the 
requisite tests as prescribed in Sec. 232.303 provided the automated 
system is approved by FRA.
    In paragraph (f) of this section, FRA proposes that cars be 
stencilled or marked with the location and date of the last repair 
track or single car test. Alternatively, FRA intends to permit 
railroads to utilize an electronic record keeping system to accomplish 
this tracking requirement, provided such a system is approved by FRA. 
FRA believes these requirements are necessary to ensure the timely 
performance of these important tests. Without such information, there 
would be virtually no way for FRA to verify a railroad's compliance 
with the proposed repair track and single car test requirements.
Section 232.305  Repair Track Brake Tests
    This section contains the proposed requirements related to the 
performance of repair track brake tests. Paragraph (a) of this section 
proposes to require that repair track brake tests be performed in 
accordance with AAR Standard S-486, ``Code of Air Brake System Tests 
for Freight Equipment,'' Section 3.0, contained in AAR's ``Manual of 
Standards and Recommended Practices'' as revised in November of 1992. 
This standard delineates the procedural requirements for performing the 
repair track brake tests, and is directly incorporated into AAR's 
Interchange Rule 3, Chart A. Repair track tests are currently performed 
to these specifications, and FRA sees no reason to alter the 
requirements at this time.
    Paragraphs (b) (1)-(6) require that a railroad perform a repair 
track brake test on freight cars when: (i) A freight car is removed 
from a train due to an air brake related defect; (ii) a freight car has 
its brakes cut-out when removed from a train or when placed on a shop 
or repair track; (iii) a freight car is on a repair or shop track for 
any reason and has not received a repair track brake test within the 
previous 12 month period; (iv) a freight car is found with missing or 
incomplete repair track brake test information; (v) one or more of the 
brake reservoir, the control valve mounting gasket, and the pipe 
bracket stud is removed, repaired, or replaced; or (vi) a freight car 
is found with a wheel with built-up tread, slid flat, or thermally 
cracked. The specific conditions identified above are generally based 
on the discussions and positions presented by representatives of rail 
labor, rail management, and FRA during task force deliberations that 
were part of the RSAC process.
    Paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section propose to require that each 
freight car receive a repair track air test no less frequently than 
every 5 years, and not less than 8 years from the date the car was 
built or rebuilt. FRA strongly believes that these minimum attention 
periods are sufficient to ensure the safety of the freight car fleet 
when considered in conjunction with the increased attention that 
freight cars receive when these types of tests are performed. FRA is 
confident that this, together with the implementation of the stringent 
proposed tagging requirements

[[Page 48347]]

detailed above, will prevent many of the perceived abuses of these test 
requirements cited by some commenters.
Section 232.307  Single Car Tests
    This section contains the proposed requirements related to the 
performance of single car tests on freight and other non-passenger 
equipment. Paragraph (a) of this section proposes to require that 
freight single car tests to be performed in accordance with AAR 
Standard S-486, ``Code of Air Brake System Tests for Freight 
Equipment,'' Section 4.0, contained in AAR's ``Manual of Standards and 
Recommended Practices'' as revised in November of 1992. This standard 
delineates the procedural requirements for performing single car air 
brake tests, and is directly referenced in AAR's Interchange Rule 3, 
Chart A. Specifically, paragraphs (b)(1)-(3) of this section 
incorporates the single car test requirements of Chart A by requiring a 
railroad to perform a single car test on a freight car whenever the 
service portion, the emergency portion, or the pipe bracket is removed, 
repaired, or replaced.
    Paragraph (c) specifically requires that a single car test be 
conducted by a qualified person prior to a new or rebuilt car being 
placed in or returned to revenue service. FRA believes that it is 
essential for new and rebuilt cars receive this test prior to being 
placed in revenue service in order to ensure the proper operation of 
the brake system on the vehicle. Most railroads already require this 
attention to be given to new and rebuilt cars; thus, the cost of this 
requirement is minimal and merely incorporates the best practices 
currently in place in the industry.
Section 232.309  Repair Track Test and Single Car Test Equipment and 
Devices
    This section contains the proposed requirements for maintaining the 
equipment and devices used in performing repair track and single car 
air brake tests. The devices and equipment used to perform these tests 
are safety-critical items. FRA believes that these devices must be kept 
accurate and functioning properly in order to ensure that repair track 
and single car tests are properly performed. The calibration and test 
requirements proposed in this section are based on past experience with 
test equipment used in the railroad operating environment. FRA believes 
that the requirements contained in this section are the minimum 
necessary to keep the equipment in good working order.
Section 232.311  Process for Changing Maintenance Requirements
    This section contains the proposed procedural requirements relating 
to the ability of outside parties to change the proposed maintenance 
requirements contained in this subpart. FRA acknowledges, and agrees 
with concerns raised by the RLEA, which contended that FRA's acceptance 
of AAR's unilateral change in the maintenance requirements allows the 
AAR to unilaterally establish regulations without public comment. Labor 
representatives forwarded similar recommendations, stating that any 
changes made by the AAR in their recommended maintenance practices 
should be reviewed and approved by the FRA. Prior actions by the AAR 
led to excessive extension of COT&S intervals without compensating 
action. This resulted in the need for the current repair and single car 
test program, which initially led to many failures of brake valves 
during testing. Repetition of this kind of cycle should not be 
permitted. Accordingly, paragraph (a) of this section proposes to 
restrict AAR changes to the maintenance standards referenced in this 
subpart by requiring such proposed changes to be submitted and reviewed 
in accordance with the requirements outlined in paragraphs (b)-(d) of 
this section. Specifically, FRA intends to review any proposed change 
to determine whether the change is ``safety-critical,'' which includes 
but is not limited to (i) changes to Chart A, (ii) changes to 
established maintenance intervals, and (iii) changes to UMLER reporting 
requirements. If the proposed change is deemed ``safety-critical,'' FRA 
proposes to address the change pursuant to the Special Approval process 
proposed in Sec. 232.17, which involves the publishing of a Federal 
Register Notice, conducting a Public Hearing if necessary, and acting 
based on the information developed and submitted in regard to these 
proceedings. Whereas, if the proposed change is determined by FRA to be 
``non safety-critical,'' FRA will permit the change to be implemented 
immediately. FRA proposes the process contained in this section in 
order to respond to the concerns raised by AAR and its' member 
railroads that FRA devise some sort of quick approval process in order 
to permit the industry to make minor modifications to existing 
standards. Thus, FRA has attempted to propose a process it believes 
should speed the process for making both safety-critical and nonsafety-
critical changes.

Subpart E--End-of-Train Devices

    This subpart incorporates the design, performance, and testing 
requirements relating to end-of-train devices (EOTs) that were issued 
on January 2, 1997, which became effective for all railroads on July 1, 
1997, except for those for which the effective date was extended to 
December 1, 1997 by notice issued on June 4, 1997. See 62 FR 278 and 62 
FR 30461. This subpart also incorporates the recent modifications made 
to the two-way EOT requirements to clarify the applicability of the 
requirements to certain passenger train operations where multiple units 
of freight-type equipment, material handling cars, or express cars are 
part of a passenger train's consist. See 63 FR 24130.
    As noted in the discussion of the applicability provisions 
contained in Sec. 232.3 of this proposal, this subpart applies to all 
trains unless specifically excepted by the provisions contained in this 
subpart. As the provisions contained in this subpart were just recently 
issued, there is little need to discuss these requirements in detail as 
they were fully discussed in the publications noted above. However, 
since their issuance, FRA has discovered that a few of the provisions 
are in need of minor modification for clarification purposes and to 
address some valid concerns that have been raised both internally by 
FRA inspectors and by outside parties. Consequently, in this discussion 
FRA intends to address only the specific modifications that are being 
made to the currently effective requirements.
    Section 232.405(d) contains a proposed modification of the 
requirement relating to the diameter of the valve opening and hose on 
two-way EOTs, which is currently contained in Sec. 232.21(d). The 
current regulation requires that the valve opening and hose have a 
minimum diameter of \3/4\ inch to effect an emergency application. FRA 
has discovered that sometime prior to the issuance of the final rule on 
two-way EOTs, Pulse Electronics began manufacturing their two-way EOT 
with the internal diameter of the hose being \5/8\ inch. Testing of the 
devices manufactured with these smaller diameter hoses showed that they 
met all criteria for emergency application capability based on 
standards and guidelines set forth by the AAR. Furthermore, testing of 
the devices at the Westinghouse facility in Wilmerding, Pennsylvania, 
demonstrated that the \5/8\ inch diameter hose permitted 14 consecutive 
50 foot cars with cut-out control valves or 750 feet of brake pipe to 
be jumped. This is

[[Page 48348]]

more than double the AAR standard for control valve requirements. 
Consequently, FRA proposes to modify Sec. 232.405(d) to permit the use 
of a \5/8\ inch internal diameter hose in the design of the devices.
    Based on concerns raised by FRA inspectors and after consideration 
of the data related to the braking ability of locomotives. FRA proposes 
to modify the exception currently contained in Sec. 232.23(e)(1) which 
grants an exception from the two-way EOT requirements to trains 
operating with a locomotive capable of effectuating an emergency 
application, located in the rear third of the train. In 
Sec. 232.407(e)(1), FRA proposes to modify this exception so that it is 
only applicable to trains operating with a locomotive on the rear of 
the train. Data supplied by VOLPE demonstrates that stopping distances 
are greatly increased, and could potentially result in a runaway train 
or derailment depending on the length of the train, if an obstruction 
of the brake pipe were to occur directly behind a locomotive located in 
the rear third of the train. Therefore, FRA proposes that trains with a 
locomotive located in the rear third of the train no longer be excepted 
from the two-way EOT requirements, unless the train qualifies for 
relief under one of the other specific exceptions contained in 
Sec. 232.407(e). FRA believes that this modification will pose little 
burden on the railroads since virtually all trains currently operating 
with a locomotive located in the rear third of the train are equipped 
with a two-way EOT anyway due to the operational benefits gained from 
the devices as well as its usefulness in conducting required brake 
inspection en route.
    Based on the above discussion, FRA also proposes to modify the 
requirements for operating a train that experiences an en route failure 
of the two-way EOT over a section of track with an average grade of two 
percent or greater over a distance of two continuous miles. FRA 
proposes to modify the alternative measure currently contained at 
Sec. 232.23(g)(1)(iii) which permits the operation over such a grade if 
a radio-controlled locomotive is placed in the rear third of the train 
consist and under the continuous of the engineer in the head end of the 
train. In Sec. 232.407(g)(1)(iii), FRA proposes to modify this 
alternative measure to permit such operation only if the radio-
controlled locomotive is placed at the rear of the train consist. This 
modification is proposed in order that the alternative methods of 
operation over a heavy grade remains consistent with the exception from 
the two-way EOT requirements contained in Sec. 232.407(e) as discussed 
in the preceding paragraph.
    In Sec. 232.407(f)(3), FRA proposes to require that if a train is 
required to use a two-way EOT, the device shall be activated to 
effectuate an emergency brake application either by using the manual 
toggle switch or through automatic activation, whenever it becomes 
necessary for the locomotive engineer to place the train air brakes in 
emergency using either the automatic brake valve or the conductor's 
emergency brake valve or whenever an undesired emergency application of 
the train air brakes occurs. On June 1, 1998, FRA issued Safety 
Advisory 98-2 which recommended that railroads adopt the procedure 
being proposed in this paragraph. See 63 FR 30808. FRA issued Safety 
Advisory 98-2 in response to several recent freight train incidents 
potentially involving the improper use of a train's air brakes which 
caused FRA to focus on railroad air brake and train handling procedures 
related to the initiation of an emergency air brake application, 
particularly as they pertain to the activation of the two-way EOT from 
the locomotive. Based on FRA's review of the incidents noted below, and 
its awareness of other incidents involving non-use of two-way EOTs 
under similar circumstances, FRA believes that the guidance contained 
in Safety Advisory 98-2 must be incorporated into the regulations to 
ensure that the safety benefits of two-way EOTs are fully realized.
    FRA and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) are 
currently investigating four incidents in which a train was placed into 
emergency braking by use of the normal emergency brake valve handles on 
the locomotive, and although the train in each instance was equipped 
with an armed and operable two-way EOT, the device was not activated by 
the locomotive engineer. These incidents include:
     A March 30, 1997 incident occurring near Ridgecrest, North 
Carolina, involving Norfolk Southern train No. P32, resulting in 42 
cars derailed and two crewmembers injured;
     An October 25, 1997 incident occurring in Houston, Texas, 
involving Union Pacific train Nos. IHOLB-25 and MTUHO-21, resulting in 
five locomotives derailed and totally destroyed, and two crewmembers 
injured;
     A November 3, 1997 incident occurring near Alvord, Texas, 
involving Burlington Northern Santa Fe train Nos. HALTBAR 1-03 and 
ESLPCAM 3-11, resulting in three locomotives and seven cars derailed, 
and two crewmembers injured;
     A March 23, 1998 incident occurring near Herington, 
Kansas, involving Union Pacific train Nos. MKSTUX-23 and IESLB-21, 
resulting in one locomotive and 6 cars derailed, and one crewmember 
injured.
    FRA's preliminary findings indicate that in all of the incidents 
noted above, there was evidence of an obstruction somewhere in the 
train line, caused by either a closed or partially closed angle cock or 
a kinked air hose. This obstruction prevented an emergency brake 
application from being propagated throughout the entire train, front to 
rear, after such an application was initiated from the locomotive using 
either the engineer's automatic brake valve handle or the conductor's 
emergency brake valve. Furthermore, the locomotive engineers in each of 
the incidents stated that they did not think to use the two-way EOT, 
when asked why they failed to activate the device.
    FRA believes that the operational requirement proposed in this 
section must be stressed by the railroads when conducting the two-way 
EOT training proposed in Sec. 232.203. FRA believes that the likelihood 
of future incidents, such as the ones described above, would be greatly 
reduced if the proposed train handling procedure is made part of a 
train crew's training and followed by members of the crew in emergency 
situations. FRA believes that this additional procedure, together with 
the proposed training, will not only ensure that an emergency brake 
application is commenced from both the front and rear of the train in 
emergency situations, but will familiarize the engineer with the 
activation and operation of the devices and will educate the engineer 
to react in the safest possible manner whenever circumstances require 
the initiation of an emergency brake application.
    FRA recognizes that a number of railroads have already adopted 
procedures similar to that proposed in this section and commends such 
actions. Although FRA proposes that the device to be activated either 
manually or automatically, FRA intends to make clear that the front 
unit of the device is still required to be equipped with a manually 
operated switch. See Sec. 232.405(e). FRA recognizes that some 
railroads have developed a means in which the rear unit is 
automatically activated when an engineer makes an emergency application 
with the brake handle and FRA endorses such innovation. However, FRA 
believes that an engineer should also be provided a separate, manually 
operated switch which is independent of any automatic system in order 
to ensure the activation

[[Page 48349]]

of the rear unit in the event that the automatic system fails.
    In section 232.409(c), FRA proposes to modify the requirement 
regarding notification to the locomotive engineer when the device is 
tested by someone other than a train crew member currently contained at 
Sec. 232.25(c). Since the rule has been in effect, numerous locomotive 
engineers have informed FRA that they are not being properly notified 
when successful completion of the testing and inspection requirements 
contained in this section are performed by other than train crew 
members. Many engineers claim that they are not confident that the 
proper tests and inspections have been conducted on the devices, or 
that the devices will even operate, when they get verbal confirmation 
of the test from a dispatcher, especially when the dispatcher does not 
know who performed the test or when it was performed. Consequently, in 
order to ensure that the proper tests and inspections are being 
performed on the devices and to provide locomotive engineers with a 
measure of confidence that the devices will work as intended, FRA 
proposes to require that written notification be provided to the 
engineer when the required tests and inspections are performed by a 
person other than a train crew member. FRA proposes that the written 
notification include the date and time of the test, the location where 
the test was performed, and the name of the person performing the test.
    In section 232.409(d), FRA proposes to modify the language related 
to the annual calibration and testing of EOT devices currently 
contained at Sec. 232.25(d). The regulation currently states that the 
devices shall be ``calibrated'' annually. FRA intends to make clear 
that it intended for railroads' to perform whatever tests or checks are 
necessary to ensure that the devices are operating within the 
parameters established by the manufacturers of the devices. Several 
railroads have attempted to sharp shoot the language currently 
contained in the regulation, claiming that the manufacturer states that 
front units do not need to be calibrated on an annual basis, in order 
to avoid doing any testing of the devices. Although FRA agrees that the 
front units may not have to be calibrated every year, the devices must 
be tested in some fashion to verify that they are operating within the 
manufacturer's specification with regard to radio frequency, signal 
strength, and modulation and do not require recalibration. FRA has been 
provided written instructions from the manufacturers' of the devices 
which contain procedures for testing of both the front and rear units. 
Furthermore, railroads using the devices in Canada acknowledge that the 
radio functions of the front and rear units are tested periodically. 
Consequently, in this paragraph FRA proposes clarifying language in 
order to avoid any misconceptions as to what actions are required to be 
performed on these devices on an annual basis.
    One issue which has recently arisen, which FRA believes must be 
addressed, relates to the ability of a railroad to dispatch a train 
with an inoperative two-way EOT. FRA believes that some clarification 
is necessary with regard to this issue. The issue has arisen in 
circumstances where a railroad is aware that a certain location 
experiences communication problems, and thus, permits trains to depart 
limiting their speed to 30 mph until communication between the front 
and rear unit is established. Section 232.23(f)(1) of the current 
regulations, Sec. 232.407(f)(1) of this proposal, requires that; ``the 
device shall be armed and operable from the time the train departs from 
the point where the device is installed until the train reaches its 
destination.'' Therefore, FRA intends to make clear that a train 
required to be equipped with a two-way EOT may not be dispatched from a 
location where a device is installed unless the device is armed and 
operable. Consequently, railroads may have to install repeater stations 
at locations where communication problems are prevalent.
    Although FRA is not proposing any other specific changes to the 
requirements incorporated into this subpart, FRA has provided a 
detailed discussion of several issues that have arisen since the 
issuance of the final rule on two-way EOTs. This detail discussion is 
contained in the ``Discussion of Issues and General FRA Conclusions'' 
portion of this preamble under the heading ``Two-way End-of-Train 
Devices.'' FRA seeks comment and information from all interested 
parties related to the issues contained in that discussion in order to 
potentially take appropriate action at the final rule stage of this 
proceeding to address those issues.

Subpart F--Introduction of New Brake System Technology

    This proposed subpart contains the tests and procedures required to 
introduce new train brake system technology into revenue service. 
Several parties commented that the technology necessary for the 
introduction of advanced braking systems is quickly developing. These 
new technologies include various forms of electronic braking systems, a 
variety of braking sensors, and computer-controlled braking systems. In 
order to allow for and encourage the development of new technology, FRA 
proposes guidelines regarding the tests and procedures required for 
introducing new brake system technology. These proposed guidelines 
require the submission to FRA of a pre-revenue service acceptance 
testing plan.
    FRA intends to make clear that this proposed subpart would only be 
applicable to new train brake system technology that comply with the 
statutory mandates contained in 49 U.S.C. 20102, 20301-20304, 20701-
20703, 21302, and 21304, but which are not specifically covered by 
these proposed regulations. Any type of new train brake system which 
requires an exemption from the Federal railroad safety laws in order to 
be operated in revenue service cannot be introduced into service 
pursuant to this section. In order to grant a waiver of the Federal 
railroad safety laws, FRA is limited by the specific statutory 
provisions contained in 49 U.S.C. 20306 as well as any FRA procedural 
requirements contained in this chapter.
Section 232.503  Process To Introduce New Brake System Technology
    This section contains the proposed procedural requirements which 
must be met when a railroad intends to introduce new brake system 
technology into its system. This section makes clear that the approval 
of FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety must be obtained by a 
railroad prior to the railroad's implementation of a pre-revenue 
service acceptance test plan and before introduction of new brake 
system technology into revenue service. This section requires that such 
approval be obtained pursuant to the Special Approval process proposed 
in Sec. 232.17. Several railroads and manufacturers contended, both in 
response to the 1994 NPRM and at the RSAC Working Group meetings, that 
FRA needed to devise some sort of quick approval process in order to 
permit the industry to rapidly introduce new brake system technologies 
into revenue service. Thus, FRA has attempted to propose an approval 
process it believes should speed the process for taking advantage of 
new technologies over that which is currently available under the 
waiver process. However, in order to provide an opportunity for all 
interested parties to provide input for use by FRA in its decision 
making process, as required by the Administrative Procedure Act, FRA 
believes that any special approval

[[Page 48350]]

provision must, at a minimum, provide proper notice to the public of 
any significant change or action being considered by the agency with 
regard to existing regulations.
Section 232.505  Pre-revenue Service Acceptance Testing Plan
    This section provides the proposed requirements for pre-revenue 
service testing of new brake system technology. These tests are 
extremely important in that they intended to prove that the new brake 
system can be operated safely in its intended environment. For 
equipment that has not previously been used in revenue service in the 
United States, paragraph (a) requires the operating railroad to develop 
a pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan and obtain FRA approval 
of the plan under the procedures stated in Sec. 238.17 before beginning 
testing. Previous testing of the equipment at the Transportation Test 
Center, on another railroad, or elsewhere will be considered by FRA in 
approving the test plan. Paragraph (b) requires the railroad to fully 
execute the tests required by the plan, to correct any safety 
deficiencies identified by FRA, and to obtain FRA's approval to place 
the equipment in revenue service prior to introducing the equipment in 
revenue service. Paragraph (c) requires the railroad to comply with any 
operational limitations imposed by FRA. Paragraph (d) requires the 
railroad to make the plan available to FRA for inspection and copying. 
Paragraph (e) enumerates the elements that must be included in the 
plan. FRA believes this set of steps and the documentation required by 
this section are necessary to ensure that all safety risks have been 
reduced to a level that permits the new brake system technology to be 
used in revenue service.
    In lieu of the requirements of paragraphs (a) through (e), 
paragraph (f) provides for an abbreviated testing procedure for new 
brake system technology that has previously been used in revenue 
service in the United States. The railroad need not submit a test plan 
to FRA; however, a description of the testing shall be maintained by 
the railroad and made available to FRA for inspection and copying.

Regulatory Impact

Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

    This proposed rule has been evaluated in accordance with existing 
policies and procedures and is considered to be significant under both 
Executive Order 12866 and DOT policies and procedures (44 FR 11034, 
Feb. 26, 1979). FRA has prepared and placed in the docket a regulatory 
evaluation of the proposed rule. This evaluation estimates the costs 
and consequences of the proposed rule as well as its anticipated 
economic and safety benefits. It may be inspected and photocopied 
during normal business hours by visiting the FRA Docket Clerk at the 
Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, Seventh Floor, 1120 Vermont Avenue, N.W., 
in Washington, D.C. Photocopies may also be obtained by submitting a 
written request by mail to the FRA Docket Clerk at the Office of Chief 
Counsel, Federal Railroad Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., 
Washington, D.C. 20590.
    The estimated benefits of this proposed rule exceed the estimated 
costs over a 20-year period at a 7% discount rate. The estimated Net 
Present Value (NPV) of the total 20-year costs associated with the 
proposed rule is approximately $98 million; whereas the total 20-year 
benefits (safety and economic) have been estimated at approximately 
$106 million. For some freight rail operations the total costs incurred 
will exceed the benefit savings. For others, the benefit savings will 
outweigh the costs. The following tables contains the estimated 20-year 
costs and benefits associated with the proposed rule.

                        Table 3.--Estimated Costs                       
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        Category                             NPV costs  
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Training................................................     $76,929,903
Two-way EOT Training....................................       1,421,731
Retest..................................................       4,385,922
Piston Travel Stickers..................................       1,163,062
Air Quality.............................................       3,219,072
Dynamic Brake...........................................       1,757,621
Cycle Trains............................................       3,972,596
Written Procedures......................................       4,938,929
                                                         ---------------
    Total...............................................      97,787,837
------------------------------------------------------------------------


                      Table 4.--Estimated Benefits                      
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        Category                           NPV benefits 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Extended Haul...........................................     $66,389,112
Safety Improvements.....................................      31,585,909
Two-way EOT Training....................................       5,270,840
Bottom Rod Safety Supports..............................       3,239,650
                                                         ---------------
    Total...............................................     106,485,510
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The estimates contained in the tables above are somewhat 
preliminary as FRA does not have detailed data relating to the costs of 
some of the dynamic brake or dry air requirements. FRA seeks comment 
and additional information from railroads, contractors, and other 
interested parties regarding choices they may have to make so that a 
more complete estimate of the costs and benefits of this rule may be 
made prior to the issuance of the final rule. For purposes of the 
regulatory impact analysis, FRA has made certain assumptions pertinent 
to cost elements when it lacked specific data and asks for comments and 
information on those assumptions from all interested parties.
    The estimated benefits are derived primarily through the extended 
haul provision and a reduction in brake related incidents. FRA has 
proposed extremely restrictive requirements related to the inspection 
and movement of trains which will be permitted to travel in excess of 
1,000 miles between brake inspections. FRA also anticipates that 
enhancements to safety will be obtained through the proposed training 
requirements and through the proposed requirements relating to the 
retesting of cars failing to apply during a brake inspection. The 
estimated safety benefits of this proposed rule are derived from the 
prevention of accidents and the resulting fatalities, injuries, and 
property damage. FRA has employed an effectiveness rate of 20 percent 
in an effort to measure the anticipated improvements in safety. 
Benefits also exist for railroads in terms of reduced train delay, 
debris removal and repairs which are not estimated. Benefits are also 
not estimated for the operational benefits which may be derived from 
permitting the use of a two-way EOT during the performance of a Class I 
brake test; such as, the time that may be saved when an en route pick-
up is made and a Class I brake test is performed. FRA does not 
currently have an estimate of how many en route pick-ups take place 
annually.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) 
requires an assessment of the impacts of proposed rules on small 
entities. FRA has conducted a regulatory flexibility assessment of this 
rule's impact on small entities, and the assessment has been placed in 
the public docket for this rulemaking.
1. Why Action by the Agency is Being Considered
    In 1992, Congress amended the Federal rail safety laws by adding 
certain statutory mandates related to power brake safety. See 49 U.S.C. 
20141. These amendments specifically address the revision of the power 
brake regulations by adding a new subsection which states:


[[Page 48351]]


    (r) POWER BRAKE SAFETY.--(1) The Secretary shall conduct a 
review of the Department of Transportation's rules with respect to 
railroad power brakes, and not later than December 31, 1993, shall 
revise such rules based on such safety data as may be presented 
during that review.
    (2) In carrying out paragraph (1), the Secretary shall, where 
applicable, prescribe standards regarding dynamic brake equipment. * 
* *

Pub. L. No. 102-365, Sec. 7; codified at 49 U.S.C. 20141, superseding 
45 U.S.C. 431(r).
    In addition to this statutory mandate, FRA received various 
recommendations and petitions for rulemaking, and determined on its own 
that the power brake regulations were in need of revision. FRA has been 
in the process of revising the power brake regulations since 1992. An 
ANPRM and an NPRM revising the power brake regulations were previously 
issued on December 31, 1992 and September 16, 1994, respectively. See 
57 FR 62546 and 59 FR 47676. A detailed discussion of the history 
leading up to this NPRM is contained in the preamble. The reasons for 
the actual provisions of the action considered by the agency are 
explained in the body of the preamble and the section-by-section 
analysis.
2. The Objectives and Legal Basis for The Rule
    The objective of the rule is to enhance the safety of rail 
transportation, protecting both those people traveling and working on 
the system, and those people off the system who might be affected by a 
rail incident by revising the regulations related to the braking 
systems used and operated in freight and other non-passenger trains to 
address potential deficiencies in the existing regulations, better 
address the needs of contemporary railroad operations, and facilitate 
the use of advanced technologies. The legal basis for this action is 
reflected in the response to 1. above and in the preamble.
3. A Description of and an Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to 
Which the Proposed Rule Would Apply
    The Small Business Administration (SBA) uses an industry wide 
definition of ``small entity'' based on employment. Railroads are 
considered small by SBA definition if they employ fewer than 1,500 
people. An agency may establish one or more other definitions of this 
term, in consultation with the SBA and after an opportunity for public 
comment, that are appropriate to the agency's activities.
    The classification system used in this analysis is that of the FRA. 
Prior to the SBA regulations establishing size categories, the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) developed a classification system 
for freight railroads as Class I, II, or III, based on annual operating 
revenue. A Class II railroad has operating revenue greater or equal to 
$40 million dollars but less than $253.7 million and a Class III 
railroad has operating revenue below $39 million. The Department of 
Transportation's Surface Transportation Board, which succeeded the ICC, 
has not changed these classifications. The ICC classification system 
has been used pervasively by FRA and the railroad industry to identify 
entities by size. After consultation with the Office of Advocacy of the 
SBA and as explained in detail in the ``Interim Policy Statement 
Concerning Small Entities Subject to the Railroad Safety Laws,'' 
published August 11, 1997 at 62 Fed. Reg. 43024, FRA has decided to 
define ``small entity,'' on an interim basis, to include only those 
entities whose revenues would bring them within the Class III 
definition. As this is an alternative definition, FRA requests comment 
from interested parties on its use.
    All of the small entities directly affected by this rule are Class 
III railroads. FRA certifies that this proposed rule is expected to 
have a significant impact on a substantial number of Class III 
railroads. FRA did not quantify the estimated annual cost or benefit to 
the average Class III railroad, annual costs for all non-Class I 
railroads are shown in Appendix A of the Regulatory Impact Analysis. 
Class III railroads have about 15 percent of the employees of all Class 
II and III railroads. As most the costs of this proposed rule on Class 
III railroads are related to the number and types of employees 
(training, refresher training, qualification, and internal audit plans) 
a rough estimate of the costs to Class III railroads is taken as about 
15 percent of the training related costs or about $2.1 million 
discounted at 7 percent over 20 years. It should be noted that this 
cost figure is a very rough estimate and includes only an estimate of 
the costs related to training as noted above. Consequently, FRA is 
seeking comment and information from all interested parties on the 
costs to these small entities so this estimate can be further refined 
and developed for the final rule.
4. A Description of the Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping and Other 
Compliance Requirements of the Proposed Rule, Including an Estimate of 
the Classes of Small Entities Which Will Be Subject to the Requirements 
and the Type of Professional Skills Necessary for Preparation of the 
Report or Record
    See the Paperwork Reduction Act analysis.
5. Federal Rules Which May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict With the 
Rule
    None.
Significant Alternatives
    1. Differing compliance or reporting requirements or timetables 
which take into account the resources available to small entities:
    2. Clarification, consolidation, or simplification of compliance 
and reporting requirements under the rule for such small entities:
    3. Exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for 
such small entities:
    FRA considered the role that shortline railroads (Class II and III 
railroads) have in today's freight industry. FRA believes that the 
current marketplace requires Class I railroads and shortline railroads 
to operate as an integrated system. Many of today's shortlines rely on 
Class I railroads for the training of their employees and the 
maintenance of their equipment. In addition, many shortline railroads 
and Class I railroads interchange and operate each others equipment. 
Therefore, except in limited circumstances, it is impossible, from a 
regulatory standpoint, to separate shortline railroads from Class I 
railroads. Therefore, in order to ensure the safety and quality of 
train and locomotive power braking systems throughout the entire 
freight industry, this proposal generally imposes a consistent set of 
requirements on shortline and Class I railroads as a group. Although 
FRA recognizes that many of the operational benefits created by this 
proposal are not available to most shortline operations, FRA feels that 
the integrated nature of the freight industry requires that universally 
consistent requirements be imposed on both shortline and Class I 
railroads.
    Where possible, efforts were taken in this proposal to minimize the 
impact on shortline railroads. The proposed requirements related to 
dynamic brakes provide shortline railroads with the option of declaring 
the dynamic brake portion of a locomotive disabled, so that they will 
not needlessly incur the cost of maintaining equipment that they do not 
choose to employ. FRA also

[[Page 48352]]

proposes to permit railroads to perform Class II brake tests on cars 
added to a train received in interchange, if the train will travel a 
distance not to exceed 20 miles from the point at which it was received 
in interchange. The current regulations require the performance of at 
least a transfer train brake test on the entire train, rather than 
testing only those cars added. FRA believes this will provide a cost 
savings to short line railroads and seeks comment from interested 
parties on the number of transfer train brake tests and initial 
terminal brake tests that are conducted when trains are received in 
interchange. FRA also seeks comments and suggestions from all 
interested parties with regard to any requirement proposed as to 
alternative approaches that might reduce the impact of the proposal on 
shortlines, particularly Class III railroads.
4. Use of Performance, Rather Than Design Standards
    Where possible, especially with regard to advanced technologies and 
certain brake system components, an attempt was made to tie the 
proposed requirements to performance.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    The information collection requirements in this proposed rule have 
been submitted for approval to the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. 
The sections that contain the new information collection requirements 
and the estimated time to fulfill each requirement are as follows:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                Average time per     Total annual burden   Total annual 
        49 CFR section                Respondent universe           Total annual responses          response                hours           burden cost 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
229.27--Annual tests.........  20,000 locomotives...............  18,000 tests..............  15 minutes..........  4,500 hours.........        $157,500
232.7--Waivers...............  545 railroads....................  10 petitions..............  40 hours............  400 hours...........          18,000
232.15--Movement of Defective                                                                                                                           
 Equipment:                                                                                                                                             
    Tags.....................  1,220,000 cars...................  48,200 tags...............  5 minutes...........  4,017 hours.........         140,595
    Written Notification.....  1,220,000 cars...................  16,000 notices............  3 minutes...........  800 hours...........          28,000
232.17--Special Approval                                                                                                                                
 Procedure:                                                                                                                                             
    Petitions for special      545 railroads....................  1 petition................  100 hours...........  100 hours...........           4,500
     approval of safety-                                                                                                                                
     critical revision.                                                                                                                                 
    Petitions for special      545 railroads....................  2 petitions...............  100 hours...........  200 hours...........           9,000
     approval of pre-revenue                                                                                                                            
     service acceptance plan.                                                                                                                           
    Service of petitions.....  545 railroads....................  3 petitions...............  40 hours............  120 hours...........           5,400
    Statement of interest....  Public/railroads.................  15 comments...............  4 hours.............  60 hours............           2,700
    CommentPublic/railroads..  15 comments......................  4 hours...................  60 hours............  2,700...............                
232.103--Gen'l requirements--  1,200,000 cars...................  140,000 stickers..........  10 minutes..........  23,333 hours........         816,655
 all train brake systems.                                                                                                                               
    Locomotives--1st Year....  545 railroads....................  50 procedures.............  4 hours.............  200 hours...........           9,000
    Locomotives--Subquent      25 new railroads.................  1 procedure...............  4 hours.............  4 hours.............             180
     Years.                                                                                                                                             
232.105--Gen'l requirements    545 railroads....................  20,000 inspections........  5 minutes...........  1,667 hours.........          58,345
 for locomotives.                                                                                                                                       
232.107--Air source            545 railroads....................  50 plans..................  40 hours............  2,000 hours.........          90,000
 requirements--1st Year.                                                                                                                                
    Subsequent Years.........  25 new railroads.................  1 plan....................  40 hours............  40 hours............           1,800
    Amendments to Plan.......  50 existing plans................  10 amendments.............  20 hours............  200 hours...........           9,000
    Recordkeeping............  50 existing plans................  2,000 records.............  20 hours............  40,000 hours........       1,800,000
    Cold weather situations..  545 railroads....................  37 plans..................  20 hours............  740 hours...........          33,300
232.109--Dynamic brake         545 railroads....................  1,656,000.................  5 minutes...........  138,000 hours.......       4,830,000
 requirements--status.                                                                                                                                  
    Inoperative dynamic        8,000 locomotives................  records...................  4 minutes...........  27 hours............             945
     brakes.                                                                                                                                            
    Permanently disabled       8,000 locomotives................  400 tags..................  5 minutes...........  233 hours...........           8,155
     dynamic brakes--1st Year.                                                                                                                          
    Subsequent Years.........  8,000 locomotives................  2,800 stencilings.........  5 minutes...........  2 hours.............              70
    Operating rules--1st Year  545 railroads....................  20 stencilings............  4 hours.............  1,200 hours.........          54,000
    Subsequent Years.........  5 new railroads..................  300 oper. rules...........  4 hours.............  20 hours............             900
    Amendments...............  545 railroads....................  5 operating rules.........  1 hour..............  15 hours............             675
    Knowledge criteria--       545 railroads....................  15 amendments.............  16 hours............  4,800 hours.........         216,000
     locomotive engineers--                                                                                                                             
     1st Year.                                                                                                                                          
                               5 new railroads..................  300 amendments............  16 hours............  80 hours............           3,600
232.111--Train information     545 railroads....................  545 procedures............  50 hours............  27,250 hours........       1,226,250
 handling--1st Year.                                                                                                                                    
    Subsequent Years.........  10 new railroads.................  10 procedures.............  40 hours............  400 hours...........          18,000
    Amendments...............  100 railroads....................  100 amendments............  20 hours............  2,000 hours.........          90,000
    Report requirements to     545 railroads....................  2,112,000 reports.........  10 minutes..........  352,000 hours.......      12,320,000
     train crew.                                                                                                                                        
232.203--Training              545 railroads....................  300 programs..............  80 hours............  24,000 hours........       1,080,000
 requirements--Tr. Prog.--1st                                                                                                                           
 Year.                                                                                                                                                  
    Subsequent Years.........  15 railroads.....................  1 program.................  100 hours...........  100 hours...........           4,500
    Amendments to written      545 railroads....................  545 amendments............  8 hours.............  4,360 hours.........         196,200
     program.                                                                                                                                           

[[Page 48353]]

                                                                                                                                                        
    Training records.........  545 railroads....................  67,000 records............  10 minutes..........  11,167 hours........         390,845
    Training modifications...  545 railroads....................  67,000 notific............  3 minutes...........  3,350 hours.........         117,250
    Audit program............  545 railroads....................  545 programs..............  40 hours............  21,800 hours........         981,000
    Amendments to audit        545 railroads....................  50 amendments.............  20 hours............  1,000 hours.........          45,000
     program.                                                                                                                                           
232.205--Class 1 brake test..  545 railroads....................  1,656,000 notices.........  45 seconds..........  20,700 hours........         724,500
232.207--Class 1A brake        545 railroads....................  15 lists..................  30 minutes..........  8 hours.............             360
 tests--1st Year.                                                                                                                                       
    Subsequent Years.........  545 railroads....................  1 list....................  1 hour..............  1 hour..............              45
    Notification.............  545 railroads....................  5 amendments..............  1 hour..............  5 hours.............             225
232.209--Class II brake tests- 545 railroads....................  1,920,000 comnts..........  3 seconds...........  1,600 hours.........          56,000
 intermediate inspection.                                                                                                                               
    Operator of train........  545 railroads....................  comnts....................  2 seconds...........  1,067 hours.........          37,345
    Electronic communication   545 railroads....................  1,920,000.................  2 seconds...........  18 hours............             630
     link.                                                        comm......................                                                            
                                                                  32,000 messages...........                                                            
232.211--Class II brake test-  545 railroads....................  500,000...................  5 seconds...........  694 hours...........          24,290
 trainline continuity insp.                                                                                                                             
    Electronic communication   545 railroads....................  commun....................  5 seconds...........  7 hours.............             245
     link.                                                        5,000 messages............                                                            
232.213--Extended haul trains  84,000 long dist. mvmts..........  70 letters................  15 minutes..........  18 hours............             810
    Record of all defective/   84,000 long dist. mvmts..........  25,200 records............  30 minutes..........  12,600 hours........         441,000
     inoperative brakes.                                                                                                                                
232.303--Gen'l requirements--  1,200,000 frgt. cars.............  24,000 tags...............  10 minutes..........  4,000 hours.........         140,000
 single car test.                                                                                                                                       
    Last repair track brake    1,200,000 frgt. cars.............  240,000 stncl.............  5 minutes...........  20,000 hours........         700,000
     test/single car test.                                                                                                                              
232.309--Repair track brake    640 shops........................  960 tests.................  30 minutes..........  480 hours...........          16,800
 test.                                                                                                                                                  
232.311--Process for changing  Assoc. Am. Railroads.............  1 revision................  100 hours...........  100 hours...........           4,500
 maintenance reqmnts.                                                                                                                                   
232.403--Design stds--1-way    545 railroads....................  4 billion mess............  1/186,000 sec.......  6 hours.............               0
 end-of-train (EOTs) dev.                                                                                                                               
    Unique Code..............  545 railroads....................  12 requests...............  5 minutes...........  1 hour..............              35
232.405--Design + Performance  545 railroads....................  8 billion mess............  1/186,000 sec.......  12 hours............               0
 stds.--2-way EOTs.                                                                                                                                     
232.407--Operations requiring  545 railroads....................  50,000 comm...............  30 seconds..........  417 hours...........          14,595
 2-way EOTs.                                                                                                                                            
232.409--Insp. and Testing of  245 railroads....................  450,000 comm..............  30 seconds..........  3,750 hours.........         168,750
 EOTs.                                                                                                                                                  
    Telemetry Equipment--      245 railroads....................  32,708 units..............  1 minute............  545 hours...........          24,525
     Testing and Calibration.                                                                                                                           
232.503--Process to introduce  545 railroads....................  1 letter..................  1 hour..............  1 hour..............              45
 new brake technology.                                                                                                                                  
    Special approval.........  545 railroads....................  1 request.................  2 hours.............  2 hours.............              90
232.505--Pre-revenue service   545 railroads....................  1 main....................  160 hours...........  160 hours...........           7,200
 accept. test plan--1st Yr..                                                                                                                            
    Subsequent Years.........  545 railroads....................  1 main procedure..........  160 hours...........  160 hours...........           7,200
    Amendments...............  545 railroads....................  1 main procedure..........  40 hours............  40 hours............           1,800
    Design description.......  545 railroads....................  1 petition................  40 hours............  40 hours............           1,800
    Report to FRA Assoc.       545 railroads....................  1 report..................  8 hours.............  8 hours.............       360 hours
     Admin. for Safety.                                                                                                                                 
    Brake system technology    545 railroads....................  5 descriptions............  40 hours............  200 hours...........           9,000
     testing.                                                                                                                                           
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    All estimates include the time for reviewing instructions; 
searching existing data sources; gathering or maintaining the needed 
data; and reviewing the information. Pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 
3506(c)(2)(B), FRA solicits comments concerning: whether these 
information collection requirements are necessary for the proper 
performance of the function of FRA, including whether the information 
has practical utility; the accuracy of FRA's estimates of the burden of 
the information collection requirements; the quality, utility, and 
clarity of the information to be collected; and whether the burden of 
collection of information on those who are to respond, including 
through the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of 
information technology, may be minimized. For information or a copy of 
the paperwork package submitted to OMB, contact Robert Brogan at 202-
493-6292.
    Organizations and individuals desiring to submit comments on the 
collection of information requirements should direct them to Robert 
Brogan, Federal Railroad Administration, RRS-21, Mail Stop 25, 400 7th 
Street, S.W., Washington. D.C. 20590. An advance copy of the 
information collection package for this proposed rule has been 
forwarded to the Office of Management and Budget for review and 
approval.
    OMB is required to make a decision concerning the collection of 
information requirements contained in this proposed rule between 30 and 
60 days after publication of this document in the Federal Register. 
Therefore, a comment to OMB is best assured of having its full effect 
if OMB receives it within 30 days of publication. The final rule will 
respond to any OMB or public

[[Page 48354]]

comments on the information collection requirements contained in this 
proposal.
    FRA is not authorized to impose a penalty on persons for violating 
information collection requirements which do not display a current OMB 
control number, if required. FRA intends to obtain current OMB control 
numbers for any new information collection requirements resulting from 
this rulemaking action prior to the effective date of a final rule. The 
valid OMB control number for this information collection is 2130-0008.

Environmental Impact

    FRA has evaluated these proposed regulations in accordance with its 
procedures for ensuring full consideration of the environmental impact 
of FRA actions, as required by the National Environmental Policy Act 
(42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.), and related directives. This notice meets the 
criteria that establish this as a non-major action for environmental 
purposes.

Federalism Implications

    This proposed rule has been analyzed in accordance with the 
principles and criteria contained in Executive Order 12612, and it has 
been determined that the proposed rule does not have sufficient 
federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism 
Assessment.

Request for Public Comments

    FRA proposes to adopt a new part 232 and amend parts 229 and 231 of 
title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, as set forth below. FRA solicits 
comments on all aspects of the proposed rules whether through written 
submissions, or participation in the public hearings, or both. FRA may 
make changes in the final rules based on comments received in response 
to this notice.

List of Subjects

49 CFR Part 229

    Penalties, Railroad safety, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements.

49 CFR Part 231

    Penalties, Railroad safety.

49 CFR Part 232

    Penalties, Railroad safety.

The Proposal

    In consideration of the following, FRA proposes to amend chapter 
II, subtitle B of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations as follows:

PART 229--[AMENDED]

    1. The authority citation for part 229 is revised to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102-20103, 20133, 20137-20138, 20143, 
20701-20703, 21301-21302, 21304; 49 CFR 1.49(c), (m).

    2. Section 229.5 is amended by adding a new paragraph (p) to read 
as follows:


Sec. 229.5  Definitions.

* * * * *
    (p) Electronic air brake means a computer based system which 
provides the means for control of the locomotive brakes or train brakes 
or both.
    3. Section 229.25 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as 
follows:


Sec. 229.25  Tests: Every periodic inspection.

* * * * *
    (a) All mechanical gauges used by the engineer for braking the 
train or locomotive, except load meters used in conjunction with an 
auxiliary brake system, shall be tested by comparison with a dead-
weight tester or a test gauge designed for this purpose.
* * * * *
    4. Section 229.27 is amended by redesignating paragraphs (a)(3) and 
(a)(4) as paragraphs (a)(4) and (a)(5), by adding a new paragraph 
(a)(3), and by revising paragraph (b) to read as follows:


Sec. 229.27  Annual tests.

* * * * *
    (a) * * *
    (3) The compressor or compressors shall be tested for capacity by 
orifice test.
* * * * *
    (b) The load meter shall be tested. Each device used by the 
engineer for braking the train or locomotive that provides an 
indication of air pressure electronically shall be tested by comparison 
with a test gauge or self-test designed for this purpose. Errors of 
greater than five percent or three pounds per square inch, whichever is 
less, shall be corrected. The date and place of the test shall be 
recorded on Form FRA F 6180-49A, and the person conducting the test and 
that person's supervisor shall sign the form.
* * * * *
    5. Section 229.53 is revised to read as follows:


Sec. 229.53  Brake gauges.

    All mechanical gauges and all devices providing indication of air 
pressure electronically that are used by the engineer for braking the 
train or locomotive shall be located so that they may be conveniently 
read from the engineer's usual position during operation. A gauge or 
device shall not be more than three pounds per square inch in error.

PART 231--[AMENDED]

    6. The authority citation for part 231 is revised to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102-20103, 20131, 20301-20303, 21301-
21302, 21304; 49 CFR 1.49(c), (m).

    7. Section 231.0 is amended by adding paragraphs (b)(3) through (5) 
and paragraph (f) to read as follows:


Sec. 231.0  Applicability and penalties.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (3) A freight train of four-wheel coal cars.
    (4) A freight train of eight-wheel standard logging cars if the 
height of each car from the top of the rail to the center of the 
coupling is not more than 25 inches.
    (5) A locomotive used in hauling a train referred to in paragraph 
(b)(4) of this section when the locomotive and cars of the train are 
used only to transport logs.
* * * * *
    (f) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, 
Sec. 231.31 also applies to an operation on a 24-inch, 36-inch, or 
other narrow gage railroad.
    8. Part 231 is further amended by adding Sec. 231.31 to read as 
follows:


Sec. 231.31  Drawbars for freight cars; standard height.

    (a) Except on cars specified in paragraph (b) of this section--
    (1) On standard gage (56\1/2\-inch gage) railroads, the maximum 
height of drawbars for freight cars (measured perpendicularly from the 
level of the tops of the rails to the centers of the drawbars) shall be 
34\1/2\ inches, and the minimum height of drawbars for freight cars on 
such standard gage railroads (measured in the same manner) shall be 
31\1/2\ inches.
    (2) On 36-inch gage railroads, the maximum height of drawbars for 
freight cars (measured from the level of the tops of rails to the 
centers of the drawbars) shall be 26 inches, and the minimum height of 
drawbars for freight cars on such 36-inch gage railroads (measured in 
the same manner) shall be 23 inches.
    (3) On 24-inch gage railroads, the maximum height of drawbars for 
freight cars (measured from the level of the tops of rails to the 
centers of drawbars) shall be 17\1/2\ inches, and the minimum height of 
drawbars for freight cars on 24-inch gage railroads (measured in the 
same manner) shall be 14\1/2\ inches.
    (4) On railroads operating on track with a gage other than those 
contained in paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(3), the maximum and minimum 
height of drawbars for freight cars operating on

[[Page 48355]]

those railroads shall be established upon written approval of FRA.
    (b) This section shall not apply to a railroad all of whose track 
is less than 24 inches in gage.
    9. Appendix A of Part 231 is amended by adding an entry for 
Sec. 231.31 to the end of the Schedule of Civil Penalties to read as 
follows:

           Appendix A to Part 231--Schedule of Civil Penalties          
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                     FRA safety                         
                                  appliance defect  Violation   Willful 
                                    code section               violation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                        
                  *        *        *        *        *                 
231.31.........................  Drawbars,             2,500      5,000 
                                  standard height.                      
                                                                        
                  *        *        *        *        *                 
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    10. Part 232 is revised to read as follows:

PART 232--BRAKE SYSTEM SAFETY STANDARDS FOR FREIGHT AND OTHER NON-
PASSENGER TRAINS AND EQUIPMENT

Subpart A--General

Sec.
232.1  Purpose and scope.
232.3  Applicability.
232.5  Definitions.
232.7  Waivers.
232.9  Responsibility for compliance.
232.11  Penalties.
232.13  Preemptive effect.
232.15  Movement defective equipment.
232.17  Special approval procedure.

Subpart B--General Requirements

232.101  Scope.
232.103  General requirements for all train brake systems.
232.105  General requirements for locomotives.
232.107  Air source requirements and cold weather operations.
232.109  Dynamic brake requirements.
232.111  Train handling information.

Subpart C--Inspection and Testing Requirements

232.201  Scope.
232.203  Training requirements.
232.205  Class I brake tests--Initial terminal inspection.
232.207  Class IA brake tests--1,000-mile inspection.
232.209  Class II brake tests--Intermediate inspection.
232.211  Class III brake tests--Trainline continuity inspection.
232.213  Extended haul trains.
232.215  Transfer train brake test.
232.217  Train brake system tests conducted using yard air.
232.219  Double heading, helper service, and distributed power.

Subpart D--Periodic Maintenance and Testing Requirements

232.301  Scope.
232.303  General requirements.
232.305  Repair track brake tests.
232.307  Single car tests.
232.309  Repair track brake test and single car test equipment and 
devices.
232.311  Process for changing maintenance requirements.

Subpart E--End-of-Train Devices

232.401  Scope.
232.403  Design standards for one-way end-of-train devices.
232.405  Design and performance standards for two-way end-of-train 
devices.
232.407  Operations requiring use of two-way end-of-train devices; 
prohibition on purchase of nonconforming devices.
232.409  Inspection and testing of end-of-train devices.

Subpart F--Introduction of New Brake System Technology

232.501  Scope.
232.503  Process to introduce new brake system technology.
232.505  Pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan.

Appendix A--Schedule of Civil Penalties [Reserved]

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102-20103, 20133, 20141, 20301-20303, 
20306, 21301-21302, 21304; 49 CFR 1.49 (c), (m).

Subpart A--General


Sec. 232.1  Purpose and scope.

    This part prescribes the minimum Federal safety standards for all 
freight and other non-passenger train brake systems and equipment. This 
part does not restrict a railroad from adopting or enforcing additional 
or more stringent requirements not inconsistent with this part.


Sec. 232.3  Applicability.

    (a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section, 
this part applies to all railroads that operate freight or other non-
passenger train service on standard gage track which is part of the 
general railroad system of transportation.
    (b) Subpart E of this part applies to all trains operating on track 
which is part of the general railroad system of transportation unless 
specifically excepted in that subpart.
    (c) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, this part 
does not apply to:
    (1) A railroad that operates only on track inside an installation 
that is not part of the general railroad system of transportation.
    (2) Intercity or commuter passenger train operations on standard 
gage track which is part of the general railroad system of 
transportation;
    (3) Commuter or other short-haul rail passenger train operations in 
a metropolitan or suburban area (as described by 49 U.S.C. 20102(1)), 
including public authorities operating passenger train service;
    (4) Rapid transit operations in an urban area that are not 
connected with the general railroad system of transportation;
    (5) Tourist, scenic, historic, or excursion operations, whether on 
or off the general railroad system;
    (6) A freight train of four-wheel coal cars;
    (7) A freight train of eight-wheel standard logging cars if the 
height of each car from the top of the rail to the center of the 
coupling is not more than 25 inches; or
    (8) A locomotive used in hauling a train referred to in paragraph 
(b)(6) of this section when the locomotive and cars of the train are 
used only to transport logs.
    (d) The provisions formerly contained in Interstate Commerce 
Commission Order 13528, of May 30, 1945, as amended, now revoked, are 
codified in this paragraph. This part is not applicable to the 
following equipment:
    (1) Scale test weight cars;
    (2) Locomotive cranes, steam shovels, pile drivers, and machines of 
similar construction, and maintenance machines built prior to September 
21, 1945;
    (3) Export, industrial, and other cars not owned by a railroad 
which are not to be used in service, except for movement as shipments 
on their own wheels to given destinations. Such cars shall be properly 
identified by a card attached to each side of the car, signed by the 
shipper, stating that such movement is being made under the authority 
of this paragraph.
    (4) Industrial and other than railroad-owned cars which are not to 
be used in service except for movement within the limits of a single 
switching district (i.e., within the limits of an industrial facility);
    (5) Narrow-gage cars; and
    (6) Cars used exclusively in switching operations and not used in 
train movements within the meaning of the Federal safety appliance laws 
(49 U.S.C. 20301-20306).


Sec. 232.5  Definitions.

    For purposes of this part--
    AAR means the Association of American Railroads.
    Air brake means a combination of devices operated by compressed 
air, arranged in a system, and controlled manually, electrically, 
electronically, or pneumatically, by means of which the

[[Page 48356]]

motion of a railroad car or locomotive is retarded or arrested.
    Air Flow Indicator, AFM means a specific air flow indicator 
required by the air flow method of qualifying train air brakes (AFM). 
The AFM Air Flow Indicator is a calibrated air flow measuring device 
which is clearly visible and legible in daylight and darkness from the 
engineer's normal operating position. The indicator face displays
    (1) Markings from 10 cubic feet per minute (CFM) to 80 CFM, in 
increments of 10 CFM or less, and
    (2) Numerals indicating 20, 40, 60, and 80 CFM for continuous 
monitoring of air flow.
    Bind means restrict the intended movement of one or more brake 
system components by reduced clearance, by obstruction, or by increased 
friction.
    Brake, dynamic means a train braking system whereby the kinetic 
energy of a moving train is used to generate electric current at the 
locomotive traction motors, which is then dissipated through resistor 
grids or into the catenary or third rail system.
    Brake, effective means a brake that is capable of producing its 
required designed retarding force on the train. A car's air brake is 
not considered effective if its piston travel exceeds:
    (1) 10\1/2\ inches for cars equipped with nominal 12-inch stroke 
brake cylinders; or
    (2) The piston travel limits indicated on the stencil, sticker, or 
badge plate for that brake cylinder.
    Brake, hand means a brake that can be applied and released by hand 
to prevent or retard the movement of a locomotive.
    Brake indicator means a device which indicates the brake 
application range and indicates whether brakes are applied and 
released.
    Brake, inoperative means a primary brake that, for any reason, no 
longer applies or releases as intended.
    Brake, parking means a brake that can be applied by means other 
than by hand, such as spring, hydraulic, or air pressure when the brake 
pipe air is depleted, or by an electrical motor.
    Brake pipe means the system of piping (including branch pipes, 
angle cocks, cutout cocks, dirt collectors, hoses, and hose couplings) 
used for connecting locomotives and all railroad cars for the passage 
of compressed air.
    Brake, primary means those components of the train brake system 
necessary to stop the train within the signal spacing distance without 
thermal damage to friction braking surfaces.
    Brake, secondary means those components of the train brake system 
which develop supplemental brake retarding force that is not needed to 
stop the train within signal spacing distances or to prevent thermal 
damage to wheels.
    Emergency application means an irretrievable brake application 
resulting in the maximum retarding force available from the train brake 
system.
    End-of-train device, one-way means two pieces of equipment linked 
by radio that meet the requirements of Sec. 232.403.
    End-of-train device, two-way means two pieces of equipment linked 
by radio that meet the requirements of Secs. 232.403 and 232.405.
    Foul means any condition which restricts the intended movement of 
one or more brake system components because the component is snagged, 
entangled, or twisted.
    Freight car means a vehicle designed to carry freight, or railroad 
personnel, by rail and a car designed for use in a work or wreck train 
or other non-passenger train.
    Locomotive means a piece of railroad on-track equipment, other than 
hi-rail, specialized maintenance, or other similar equipment, which may 
consist of one or more units operated from a single control stand--
    (1) With one or more propelling motors designed for moving other 
railroad equipment;
    (2) With one or more propelling motors designed to transport 
freight or passenger traffic or both; or
    (3) Without propelling motors but with one or more control stands.
    Locomotive cab means that portion of the superstructure designed to 
be occupied by the crew operating the locomotive.
    Locomotive, controlling means the locomotive from which the 
engineer exercises control over the train.
    Off air means equipment that is not connected to a continuous 
source of compressed air of at least 60 pounds per square inch (psi).
    Ordered or date ordered means the date on which notice to proceed 
is given by a procuring railroad to a contractor or supplier for new 
equipment.
    Piston travel means the amount of linear movement of the air brake 
hollow rod (or equivalent) or piston rod when forced outward by 
movement of the piston in the brake cylinder or actuator and limited by 
the brake shoes being forced against the wheel or disc.
    Point of origin means the location where a train is originally 
assembled; it is also referred to as the initial terminal.
    Pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan means a document, as 
further specified in Sec. 232.505, prepared by a railroad that explains 
in detail how pre-revenue service tests of certain equipment 
demonstrate that the equipment meets Federal safety standards and the 
railroad's own safety design requirements.
    Previously tested equipment means equipment that has received a 
Class I brake test pursuant to Sec. 232.205 and has not been off air 
for more than four hours.
    Qualified mechanical inspector means a qualified person who has 
received, as a part of the training, qualification, and designation 
program required under Sec. 232.203, instruction and training that 
includes ``hands-on'' experience (under appropriate supervision or 
apprenticeship) in one or more of the following functions: 
troubleshooting, inspection, testing, maintenance or repair of the 
specific train brake and other components and systems for which the 
inspector is assigned responsibility. Further, the mechanical inspector 
shall be a person whose primary responsibility includes work generally 
consistent with the functions referenced in this definition.
    Qualified person means a person determined by a railroad to have 
the knowledge and skills necessary to perform one or more functions 
required under this part. The railroad determines the qualifications 
and competencies for employees designated to perform various functions 
in the manner set forth in this part.
    Railroad means any form of non-highway ground transportation that 
runs on rails or electromagnetic guideways, including:
    (1) Commuter or short-haul rail passenger service in a metropolitan 
or suburban area and commuter railroad service that was operated by the 
Consolidated Rail Corporation on January 1, 1979; and
    (2) High speed ground transportation systems that connect 
metropolitan areas, without regard to whether those systems use new 
technologies not associated with traditional railroads. The term 
``railroad'' is also intended to mean a person that provides railroad 
transportation, whether directly or by contracting out operation of the 
railroad to another person. The term does not include rapid transit 
operations in an urban area that are not connected to the general 
railroad system of transportation.
    Rebuilt equipment means equipment that has undergone overhaul 
identified by the railroad as a capital expense under the Surface 
Transportation Board's accounting standards.
    Refresher training means periodic retraining required for employees 
or contractors to remain qualified to perform specific equipment

[[Page 48357]]

troubleshooting, inspection, testing, maintenance, or repair functions.
    Respond as intended means to produce the result that a device or 
system is designed to produce.
    Service application means a brake application that results from one 
or more service reductions or the equivalent.
    Service reduction means a decrease in brake pipe pressure, usually 
from 5 to 25 psi at a rate sufficiently rapid to move the operating 
valve to service position, but at a rate not rapid enough to move the 
operating valve to emergency position.
    Solid block of cars means two or more freight cars continuously and 
consecutively coupled together in a train which, when removed from the 
train, remain intact and coupled together with the train line remaining 
connected and open within the block.
    State inspector means an inspector of a participating State rail 
safety program under part 212 of this chapter.
    Switching service means the classification of freight cars 
according to commodity or destination; assembling of cars for train 
movements; changing the position of cars for purposes of loading, 
unloading, or weighing; placing of locomotives and cars for repair or 
storage; or moving of rail equipment in connection with work service 
that does not constitute a train movement.
    Tourist, scenic, historic, or excursion operations are railroad 
operations that carry passengers, often using antiquated equipment, 
with the conveyance of the passengers to a particular destination not 
being the principal purpose.
    Train means one or more locomotives coupled with one or more 
freight cars, except during switching service.
    Train line means the brake pipe or any other non-pneumatic system 
used to transmit the signal that controls the locomotive and freight 
car brakes.
    Transfer train means a train that travels between a point of origin 
and a point of final destination not exceeding 20 miles and is not 
performing switching service.
    Yard air means a source of compressed air other than from a 
locomotive.
    Yard train means a train used only to perform switching service 
within a single yard.


Sec. 232.7  Waivers.

    (a) Any person subject to a requirement of this part may petition 
the Administrator for a waiver of compliance with such requirement. The 
filing of such a petition does not affect that person's responsibility 
for compliance with that requirement while the petition is being 
considered.
    (b) Each petition for waiver must be filed in the manner and 
contain the information required by part 211 of this chapter.
    (c) If the Administrator finds that a waiver of compliance is in 
the public interest and is consistent with railroad safety, the 
Administrator may grant the waiver subject to any conditions the 
Administrator deems necessary. Where a waiver is granted, the 
Administrator publishes a notice in the Federal Register containing the 
reasons for granting the waiver.


Sec. 232.9  Responsibility for compliance.

    (a) A railroad subject to this part shall not use, haul, permit to 
be used or hauled on its line, offer in interchange, or accept in 
interchange any train, railroad car, or locomotive with one or more 
conditions not in compliance with this part; however, a railroad shall 
not be liable for a civil penalty for such action if such action is in 
accordance with Sec. 232.15. For purposes of this part, a train, 
railroad car, or locomotive will be considered in use prior to 
departure but after it has received, or should have received, the 
inspection required for movement and is deemed ready for service.
    (b) Although many of the requirements of this part are stated in 
terms of the duties of a railroad, when any person performs any 
function required by this part, that person (whether or not a railroad) 
is required to perform that function in accordance with this part.
    (c) Any person performing any function or task required by this 
part will be deemed to have consented to FRA inspection of their 
operation to the extent necessary to ensure that the function or task 
is being performed in accordance with the requirements of this part.


Sec. 232.11  Penalties.

    (a) Any person (including but not limited to a railroad; any 
manager, supervisor, official, or other employee or agent of a 
railroad; any owner, manufacturer, lessor, or lessee of railroad 
equipment, track, or facilities; any employee of such owner, 
manufacturer, lessor, lessee, or independent contractor) who violates 
any requirement of this part or causes the violation of any such 
requirement is subject to a civil penalty of at least $500, but not 
more than $11,000 per violation, except that: Penalties may be assessed 
against individuals only for willful violations, and, where a grossly 
negligent violation or a pattern of repeated violations has created an 
imminent hazard of death or injury to persons, or has caused death or 
injury, a penalty not to exceed $22,000 per violation may be assessed. 
Each day a violation continues shall constitute a separate offense. 
Appendix A contains a schedule of civil penalty amounts used in 
connection with this part.
    (b) Any person who knowingly and willfully falsifies a record or 
report required by this part may be subject to criminal penalties under 
49 U.S.C. 21311.


Sec. 232.13  Preemptive effect.

    (a) Under 49 U.S.C. 20106, issuance of the regulations in this part 
preempts any State law, rule, regulation, order, or standard covering 
the same subject matter, except for a provision directed at an 
essentially local safety hazard if that provision is consistent with 
this part and does not impose an undue burden on interstate commerce.
    (b) FRA does not intend by issuance of the regulations in this part 
to preempt provisions of State criminal law that impose sanctions for 
reckless conduct that leads to actual loss of life, injury, or damage 
to property, whether such provisions apply specifically to railroad 
employees or generally to the public at large.


Sec. 232.15  Movement of defective equipment.

    (a) General provision. Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this 
section, a railroad car or locomotive with one or more conditions not 
in compliance with this part may be used or hauled without civil 
penalty liability under this part only if all of the following 
conditions are met:
    (1) The defective car or locomotive is properly equipped in 
accordance with the applicable provisions of 49 U.S.C. chapter 203 and 
the requirements of this part.
    (2) The car or locomotive becomes defective while it is being used 
by the railroad on its line or becomes defective on the line of a 
connecting railroad and is properly accepted in interchange for repairs 
in accordance with paragraph (a)(7) of this section.
    (3) The railroad first discovers the defective condition of the car 
or locomotive prior to moving it for repairs.
    (4) The movement of the defective car or locomotive for repairs is 
from the location where the car or locomotive is first discovered 
defective by the railroad.
    (5) The defective car or locomotive could not be repaired at the 
place where the railroad first discovers it to be defective.

[[Page 48358]]

    (6) The movement of the car or locomotive is necessary to make 
repairs to the defective condition.
    (7) The repair location to which the car or locomotive is being 
taken is the nearest available repair location on the line of the 
railroad where the car or locomotive was first found to be defective or 
is the nearest available repair location on the line of a connecting 
railroad if:
    (i) The connecting railroad elects to accept the defective car or 
locomotive for such repair; and
    (ii) The nearest available repair location on the line of the 
connecting railroad is no farther than the nearest available repair 
location on the line of the railroad where the car or locomotive was 
found defective.
    (8) The movement of the defective car or locomotive for repairs is 
not by a train required to receive a Class I brake test at that 
location pursuant to Sec. 232.205.
    (9) The movement of the defective car or locomotive for repairs is 
not in a train in which more than 15 percent of the cars have 
inoperative brakes.
    (10) The defective car or locomotive is tagged, or information is 
recorded, as prescribed in paragraph (b) of this section.
    (11) Except for cars or locomotives with brakes cut out en route, 
the following additional requirements are met:
    (i) A qualified inspector shall determine--
    (A) That it is safe to move the car or locomotive; and
    (B) The maximum safe speed and other restrictions necessary for 
safely conducting the movement.
    (ii) The person in charge of the train in which the car or 
locomotive is to be moved shall be notified in writing and inform all 
other crew members of the presence of the defective car or locomotive 
and the maximum speed and other restrictions determined under paragraph 
(a)(11)(i)(B) of this section. A copy of the tag or card described in 
paragraph (b) of this section may be used to provide the notification 
required by this paragraph.
    (12) The defective car or locomotive is not subject to a Special 
Notice for Repair under part 216 of this chapter, unless the movement 
of the defective car is made in accordance with the restrictions 
contained in the Special Notice.
    (b) Tagging of defective equipment. (1) At the place where the 
railroad first discovers the defect, a tag or card shall be placed on 
both sides of the defective equipment or locomotive and in the cab of 
the locomotive, or an automated tracking system approved for use by FRA 
shall be provided with the following information about the defective 
equipment:
    (i) The reporting mark and car or locomotive number;
    (ii) The name of the inspecting railroad;
    (iii) The name and job title of the inspector;
    (iv) The inspection location and date;
    (v) The nature of each defect;
    (vi) A description of any movement restrictions;
    (vii) The destination of the equipment where it will be repaired; 
and
    (viii) The signature, if possible, of the person reporting the 
defective condition.
    (2) The tag or card required by paragraph (b)(1) of this section 
shall remain affixed to the defective equipment until the necessary 
repairs have been performed.
    (3) A record or copy of each tag or card attached to or removed 
from a car or locomotive shall be retained for 90 days and, upon 
request, shall be made available within 15 calendar days for inspection 
by FRA or State inspectors.
    (4) Each tag or card removed from a car or locomotive shall contain 
the date, location, reason for its removal, and the signature of the 
person who removed it from the piece of equipment.
    (c) Movement for unloading or purging of defective cars. If the 
defective freight car is loaded with a hazardous material or contains 
residue of a hazardous material, the car may not be placed for 
unloading or purging unless unloading or purging is consistent with 
determinations made and restrictions imposed under paragraph (a)(11)(i) 
of this section and the unloading or purging is necessary for the safe 
repair of the car.
    (d) Computation of percent operative power brakes. (1) The 
percentage of operative power brakes in a train shall be based on the 
number of control valves in the train. The percentage shall be 
determined by dividing the number of control valves that are cut-in by 
the total number of control valves in the train.
    (2) The following brake conditions not in compliance with this part 
are not considered inoperative power brakes for purposes of this 
section:
    (i) Failure or cutting out of secondary brake systems;
    (ii) Inoperative or otherwise defective handbrakes or parking 
brakes;
    (iii) Piston travel that is in excess of the Class I brake test 
limits required in Sec. 232.205 but that does not exceed the outside 
limits contained on the stencil, sticker, or badge plate required by 
Sec. 232.103(g) for considering the power brakes to be effective; and
    (iv) Power brakes overdue for inspection, testing, maintenance, or 
stenciling under this part.
    (e) Placement of equipment with inoperative brakes. (1) A freight 
car or locomotive with inoperative brakes shall not be placed as the 
rear car of the train.
    (2) No more than two freight cars with inoperative brakes shall be 
consecutively placed in a train.
    (3) Multi-unit articulated equipment shall not be placed in a train 
if the equipment has consecutive individual control valves cut-out or 
inoperative.


Sec. 232.17  Special approval procedure.

    (a) General. The following procedures govern consideration and 
action upon requests for special approval of safety-critical revisions 
to the maintenance standards contained in subpart D of this part and 
for special approval of pre-revenue service acceptance testing plans 
under subpart F of this part.
    (b) Petitions for special approval of safety-critical revision. 
Each petition for special approval of a safety-critical revision to the 
periodic maintenance standards contained in subpart D shall contain--
    (1) The name, title, address, and telephone number of the primary 
person to be contacted with regard to review of the petition;
    (2) The alternative proposed, in detail, to be substituted for the 
particular requirements of this part;
    (3) Appropriate data or analysis, or both, for FRA to consider in 
determining whether the alternative will provide an equivalent level of 
safety; and
    (4) A statement affirming that the railroad has served a copy of 
the petition on designated representatives of its employees, together 
with a list of the names and addresses of the persons served.
    (c) Petitions for special approval of pre-revenue service 
acceptance testing plan. Each petition for special approval of a pre-
revenue service acceptance testing plan shall contain--
    (1) The name, title, address, and telephone number of the primary 
person to be contacted with regard to review of the petition; and
    (2) The elements prescribed in Sec. 232.505.
    (d) Service. (1) Each petition for special approval under paragraph 
(b) or (c) of this section shall be submitted in triplicate to the 
Associate Administrator for Safety, Federal Railroad Administration, 
400 7th Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590.

[[Page 48359]]

    (2) (i) Service of each petition for special approval of a safety-
critical revision to the maintenance standards under paragraph (b) of 
this section shall be made on the following:
    (A) Designated employee representatives responsible for the 
equipment's operation, inspection, testing, and maintenance under this 
part;
    (B) Any organizations or bodies that either issued the standard 
incorporated in the section(s) of the rule to which the special 
approval pertains or issued the alternative standard that is proposed 
in the petition; and
    (C) Any other person who has filed with FRA a current statement of 
interest in reviewing special approvals under the particular 
requirement of this part at least 30 days but not more than 5 years 
prior to the filing of the petition.
    (ii) If filed, a statement of interest shall be filed with FRA's 
Associate Administrator for Safety and shall reference the specific 
section(s) of this part in which the person has an interest.
    (e) Federal Register notice. FRA will publish a notice in the 
Federal Register concerning each petition under paragraph (b) of this 
section.
    (f) Comment. Not later than 30 days from the date of publication of 
the notice in the Federal Register concerning a petition under 
paragraph (b) of this section, any person may comment on the petition.
    (1) A comment shall set forth specifically the basis upon which it 
is made, and contain a concise statement of the interest of the 
commenter in the proceeding.
    (2) The comment shall be submitted in triplicate to the Associate 
Administrator for Safety, Federal Railroad Administration, 400 7th 
Street, S.W., Washington, D. C. 20590.
    (3) The commenter shall certify that a copy of the comment was 
served on each petitioner.
    (g) Disposition of petitions. (1) If FRA finds that the petition 
complies with the requirements of this section and that the proposed 
safety-critical revision or pre-revenue service plan is acceptable and 
justified, the petition will be granted, normally within 90 days of its 
receipt. If the petition is neither granted nor denied within 90 days, 
the petition remains pending for decision. FRA may attach special 
conditions to the approval of any petition. Following the approval of a 
petition, FRA may reopen consideration of the petition for cause.
    (2) If FRA finds that the petition does not comply with the 
requirements of this section and that the proposed safety-critical 
revision or pre-revenue service plan is not acceptable or justified, 
the petition will be denied, normally within 90 days of its receipt.
    (3) When FRA grants or denies a petition, or reopens consideration 
of the petition, written notice is sent to the petitioner and other 
interested parties.

Subpart B--General Requirements


Sec. 232.101  Scope.

    This subpart contains general operating, performance, and design 
requirements for each railroad that operates freight or other non-
passenger trains and for specific equipment used in those operations.


Sec. 232.103  General requirements for all train brake systems.

    (a) A train's primary brake system shall be capable of stopping the 
train with a service application from its maximum operating speed 
within the signal spacing existing on the track over which the train is 
operating.
    (b) If the integrity of the pneumatic communication line of a train 
brake system is broken, the train shall be stopped. If a train brake 
communication line uses other than solely pneumatic technology, the 
integrity of the train line shall be monitored by the brake control 
system.
    (c) A train brake system shall respond as intended to signals from 
the train line.
    (d) A train shall have 100-percent effective and operative brakes 
prior to departure from its point of origin (initial terminal).
    (e) From points other than those described in paragraph (d) of this 
section, a train shall not move if more than 15 percent of the cars in 
that train have inoperative or ineffective brakes.
    (f) Each car in a train shall have its air brakes in effective 
operating condition unless the car is being moved for repairs in 
accordance with Sec. 232.15. A car's air brakes are not in effective 
operating condition if its brakes are cut-out or otherwise inoperative 
or if the piston travel exceeds:
    (1) 10\1/2\ inches for cars equipped with nominal 12-inch stroke 
brake cylinders; or
    (2) The piston travel limits indicated on the stencil, sticker, or 
badge plate for that brake cylinder.
    (g) Except for cars equipped with nominal 12-inch stroke (8\1/2\ 
and 10-inch diameters) brake cylinders, all cars shall have a legible 
stencil or sticker affixed to the car or shall be equipped with a badge 
plate displaying the permissible brake cylinder piston travel range for 
the car at Class I brake tests and the length at which the piston 
travel renders the brake ineffective. The stencil, sticker, or badge 
plate shall be located so that it may be easily read and understood by 
a person positioned safely beside the car.
    (h) All equipment ordered on or after January 1, 1999, or placed in 
service for the first time on or after January 1, 2001, shall have 
train brake systems designed so that an inspector can observe from a 
safe position the piston travel, an accurate indicator which shows 
piston travel, or any other means by which the brake system is 
actuated. The design shall not require the inspector to place himself/
herself on, under, or between components of the equipment to observe 
brake actuation or release.
    (i) All trains shall be equipped with an emergency application 
feature that produces an irretrievable stop, using a brake rate 
consistent with prevailing adhesion, train safety, and brake system 
thermal capacity. An emergency application shall be available at all 
times, and shall be initiated by an unintentional parting of the train 
or loss of train brake communication.
    (j) The air brake system components that control brake application 
and release shall be adequately sealed to prevent contamination by 
foreign material.
    (k) A railroad shall set the maximum main reservoir working 
pressure.
    (l) The maximum brake pipe pressure shall not be greater than 15 
psi less than the air compressor governor starting or loading pressure.
    (m) Except as otherwise provided in this part, all equipment used 
in freight or other non-passenger trains shall, at a minimum, meet the 
performance specification for freight brakes in Association of American 
Railroads standard S-469-47 contained in the AAR ``Manual of Standards 
and Recommended Practices'' (revised 1947).
    (n) If a train qualified by the Air Flow Method as provided for in 
subpart C of this part experiences a brake pipe air flow of greater 
than 60 CFM or brake pipe gradient of greater than 15 psi while en 
route and the movable pointer does not return to those limits within a 
reasonable time, the train shall be stopped at the next available 
location and be inspected for leaks in the brake system.
    (o) Securement of standing equipment. A train's air brake shall not 
be depended upon to hold equipment standing on a grade (including a 
locomotive, a car, or a train whether or not locomotive is attached). 
Trains and other railroad equipment shall be secured in accordance with 
the following requirements:

[[Page 48360]]

    (1) Consistent with the railroad's rules and procedures, place each 
locomotive, car, or train on a track that is protected by a permanent 
derail or apply a portable derail, if available.
    (2) Freight and other non-powered rail cars. (i) A sufficient 
number of hand brakes shall be applied to hold such equipment before 
the air brakes are released. Railroads shall develop and implement a 
process or procedure, such as a matrix, that would provide specific 
guidance in determining the appropriate number of hand brakes to apply, 
considering grade, tonnage, and other local conditions prevalent at the 
time of securement;
    (ii) Where appropriate, slack shall be removed from the train, or 
as commonly referred to in the industry, ``bunch the slack''; and
    (iii) Locomotives shall be detached from the cars to allow an 
emergency brake application.
    (3) Locomotives. (i) All hand brakes shall be fully applied on all 
unattended locomotives in the consist;
    (ii) If the grade on which the locomotives are left standing 
exceeds one percent, or whenever it is otherwise required by railroad 
rules, the front and back of at least one pair of wheels in the 
locomotive consist shall be chocked or chained; and
    (iii) Railroads shall adopt and comply with a process or procedures 
to verify that the available hand brakes will sufficiently hold the 
locomotive consist. Railroads shall also develop and implement 
instructions to address throttle position, status of the reverse lever, 
position of the generator field switch, status of the independent 
brakes, position of the isolation switch, and position of the automatic 
brake valve on all locomotives. The procedures in this paragraph shall 
take into account winter weather conditions as they relate to throttle 
position and reverser handle.
    (4) Any hand brakes applied to hold the equipment shall not be 
released until it is known that the air brake system is properly 
charged.
    (p) Air pressure regulating devices shall be adjusted for the 
following pressures:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                PSI     
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                       LOCOMOTIVES                                      
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Minimum brake pipe air pressure:                                    
    Road Service........................................         9060   
    Switch Service......................................  ..............
(2) Minimum differential between brake pipe and main                    
 reservoir air pressures, with brake valve in running                   
 position...............................................           15   
(3) Safety valve for straight air brake.................        30-55   
(4) Safety valve for LT, ET, No. 8-EL, No. 14 El, No. 6-                
 DS, No. 6-BL and No. 6-SL equipment....................        30-68   
(5) Safety valve for HSC and No. 24-RL equipment........        30-75   
(6) Reducing valve for independent or straight air brake        30-50   
(7) Self-lapping portion for electro-pneumatic brake                    
 (minimum full application pressure)....................           50   
(8) Self-lapping portion for independent air brake (full                
 application pressure)..................................        30-72   
(9) Reducing valve for air signal.......................        40-60   
(10) Reducing valve for high-speed brake (minimum)......           50   
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          CARS                                          
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(11) Reducing valve for high-speed brake................        58-62   
(12) Safety valve for PS, LN, UC, AML, AMU and AB-1-B                   
 air brakes.............................................        58-62   
(13) Safety valve for HSC air brake.....................        58-77   
(14) Governor valve for water raising system............           60   
(15) Reducing valve for water raising system............        20-30   
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 232.105  General requirements for locomotives.

    (a) The air brake equipment on locomotives shall be in safe and 
suitable condition for service.
    (b) Except for locomotives ordered before January 1, 1999, or 
placed in service for the first time before January 1, 2001, all 
locomotives shall be equipped with a hand or parking brake that shall 
be:
    (1) Capable of application or activation by hand;
    (2) Capable of release by hand; and
    (3) Capable of holding the loaded unit on the maximum grade 
anticipated by the operating railroad.
    (c) On locomotives so equipped, the hand or parking brake as well 
as its parts and connections shall be inspected, and necessary repairs 
made as often as service requires but no less frequently than every 368 
days. The locomotive shall be suitably stenciled or tagged with the 
date of the last inspection.
    (d) The equalizing reservoir on locomotives and related piping 
leakage shall be zero. If such leakage occurs en route, the train may 
be moved only to the nearest forward location where the equalizing 
reservoir leakage can be corrected.
    (e) Use of the feed or regulating valve to control braking is 
prohibited.
    (f) The passenger position on the locomotive brake control stand 
shall only be used if the trailing equipment is designed for graduated 
brake release or if equalizing reservoir leakage occurs en route and 
its use is necessary to safely control the movement of the train until 
the next forward location where the reservoir leakage can be corrected.


Sec. 232.107  Air source requirements and cold weather operations.

    (a) Monitoring plans for yard air sources. (1) Each railroad shall 
adopt, comply with, and make available to FRA upon request a plan to 
monitor all yard air sources, other than locomotives, to ensure that 
they operate as intended and do not introduce contaminants into the 
brake system of freight equipment.
    (2) This plan shall require the railroad to:
    (i) Routinely inspect each yard air source to ensure it operates as 
intended and does not introduce contaminants into the brake system of 
the equipment it services.
    (ii) Identify yard air sources found not to be operating as 
intended or found to have the potential of introducing contaminants 
into the brake system of the equipment it services.
    (iii) Repair or take other remedial action regarding any yard air 
source identified under paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of this section.
    (iv) Assess the effectiveness of the remedial action described in 
paragraph (a)(2)(iii) of this section.

[[Page 48361]]

    (v) Record detailed information about the actions required by 
paragraphs (a)(2)(i) through (a)(2)(iv) of this section.
    (3) The records required by paragraph (a)(2) shall be maintained 
for a period of at least one year from the date of creation.
    (b) Condensation and other contaminants shall be blown from the 
pipe or hose from which compressed air is taken prior to connecting the 
yard air line or motive power to the train.
    (c) No chemicals shall be placed in the train air brake system.
    (d) Yard air reservoirs shall either be equipped with an operable 
automatic drain system or shall be manually drained at least once each 
day that the devices are used or more often if moisture is detected in 
the system.
    (e) A railroad shall adopt, comply with, and make available to FRA 
upon request detailed written operating procedures tailored to the 
equipment and territory of that railroad to cover safe train operations 
during cold weather situations. For purposes of this provision cold 
weather means when the ambient temperature drops below 10 degrees 
Fahrenheit (F)(minus 12.2 degrees Celsius).


Sec. 232.109  Dynamic brake requirements.

    (a) A locomotive engineer shall be informed in writing of the 
operational status of the dynamic brakes on all locomotive units in the 
consist at the initial terminal or point of origin for a train and at 
other locations where a locomotive engineer first takes charge of a 
train.
    (b) Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, all 
inoperative or ineffective dynamic brakes shall be repaired within 30 
calendar days of becoming inoperative or at the locomotive's next 
periodic inspection pursuant to Sec. 229.23 of this chapter, whichever 
occurs first.
    (c) Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, a 
locomotive discovered with inoperative dynamic brakes shall have a tag 
bearing the words ``inoperative dynamic brake'' securely attached and 
displayed in a conspicuous location in the cab of the locomotive. This 
tag shall contain the following information:
    (1) The locomotive number;
    (2) The name of the discovering carrier;
    (3) The location and date where condition was discovered; and
    (4) The signature of the person discovering the condition.
    (d) A railroad may elect to declare the dynamic brakes on a 
locomotive deactivated without removing the dynamic brake components 
from the locomotive, only if all of the following conditions are met:
    (1) The locomotive is clearly stenciled with the words ``dynamic 
brake deactivated'' in a conspicuous location on the outside of the 
locomotive and in the cab of the locomotive;
    (2) The railroad has taken appropriate action to ensure that the 
deactivated locomotive is incapable of utilizing dynamic brake effort 
to retard or control train speed; however, if the subject locomotive is 
placed in the controlling (lead) position of the consist, that 
locomotive must be capable of controlling dynamic braking effort in 
trailing locomotives in the consist that are so equipped.
    (e) Each railroad operating a train with a brake system that 
includes dynamic brakes shall adopt, comply with, and make available to 
FRA upon request written operating rules governing safe train handling 
procedures using these dynamic brakes under all operating conditions, 
which shall be tailored to the specific equipment and territory of the 
railroad. The railroad's operating rules shall be based on the premise 
that the friction brakes are sufficient by themselves, without the aid 
of dynamic brakes, to stop the train safely under all operating 
conditions.
    (f) Each railroad operating a train with a brake system that 
includes dynamic brakes shall adopt, comply with, and incorporate into 
its locomotive engineer certification program pursuant to part 240 of 
this chapter, specific knowledge, skill, and ability criteria to ensure 
that its locomotive engineers are fully trained in the operating rules 
prescribed by paragraph (e) of this section.


Sec. 232.111  Train information handling.

    (a) Each railroad shall adopt, comply with, and make available to 
FRA upon request written procedures to ensure that a train crew 
employed by the railroad is given accurate information on the condition 
of the train brake system and train factors affecting brake system 
performance and testing when the crew takes over responsibility for the 
train.
    (b) The procedures shall provide that each train crew coming on 
duty be informed of:
    (1) The total weight and length of the train;
    (2) Any special weight distribution that would require special 
train handling procedures;
    (3) The number and location of cars with cut-out or otherwise 
ineffective brakes and the location where they will be repaired;
    (4) If a Class I or Class IA brake test is required prior to the 
next crew change point, the location at which that test shall be 
performed;
    (5) A record of train configuration changes since the last Class I 
brake test; and
    (6) Any train brake system problems encountered by the previous 
crew of the train.

Subpart C--Inspection and Testing Requirements


Sec. 232.201  Scope.

    This subpart contains the inspection and testing requirements for 
brake systems used in freight and other non-passenger trains. This 
subpart also contains general training requirements for railroad and 
contract personnel used to perform the required inspections and tests.


Sec. 232.203  Training requirements.

    (a) Each railroad shall adopt, comply with, and make available to 
FRA upon request a training, qualification, and designation program for 
employees and contractors that perform brake system inspections, tests, 
or maintenance. For purposes of this section, a ``contractor'' is 
defined as a person under contract with the railroad or car owner or an 
employee of a person under contract with the railroad or car owner.
    (b) As part of this program, the railroad shall:
    (1) Identify the tasks related to the inspection, testing, and 
maintenance of the brake system required by this part that must be 
performed on each type of equipment that the railroad operates;
    (2) Develop written procedures for the performance of the tasks 
identified;
    (3) Identify the skills and knowledge necessary to perform each 
task;
    (4) Develop or incorporate a training curriculum that includes both 
classroom and ``hands-on'' lessons designed to impart the skills and 
knowledge identified as necessary to perform each task. The developed 
or incorporated training curriculum shall specifically address the 
Federal regulatory requirements contained in this part that are related 
to the performance of the tasks identified;
    (5) Require all employees and contractors to successfully complete 
the training course that covers the equipment and tasks for which they 
are responsible as well as the specific Federal regulatory requirements 
contained in this part related to equipment and tasks for which they 
are responsible;
    (6) Require all employees and contractors to pass a written or oral

[[Page 48362]]

examination covering the equipment and tasks for which they are 
responsible as well as the specific Federal regulatory requirements 
contained in this part related to equipment and tasks for which they 
are responsible;
    (7) Require all employees and contractors to individually 
demonstrate ``hands-on'' capability by successfully performing all of 
the tasks required to be performed as part of their duties on the type 
equipment to which they are assigned to the satisfaction of their 
supervisor or designated instructor;
    (8) Require supervisors to exercise oversight to ensure that all 
the identified tasks are performed in accordance with the railroad's 
written procedures;
    (9) Require periodic refresher training at an interval not to 
exceed three years that includes classroom and ``hands-on'' training, 
as well as testing; and (10) Add new equipment to the training, 
qualification and designation program prior to its introduction to 
revenue service.
    (c) Each railroad that operates trains required to be equipped with 
a two-way end-of-train telemetry device pursuant to subpart E of this 
part, shall adopt, comply with, and make available to FRA upon request 
a training program which specifically addresses the testing, operation, 
and maintenance of two-way end-of-train devices for employees and 
contractors that are responsible for the testing, operation, and 
maintenance of the devices.
    (d) A railroad shall maintain adequate records to demonstrate the 
current qualification status of all of its personnel--including 
contract personnel--assigned to inspect, test, or maintain a train 
brake system. These records shall include the following information 
concerning each such employee of the railroad or of a contractor for 
the railroad:
    (1) The name of the railroad employee or contractor employee;
    (2) The dates that each training course was completed;
    (3) The content of each training course successfully completed;
    (4) The scores on each test taken to demonstrate proficiency;
    (5) A description of the employees ``hands-on'' performance of the 
tasks for which the employee is assigned and the basis for finding that 
the tasks were successfully completed.
    (6) A record that the railroad employee or contractor employee was 
notified of his or her current qualification status and of any 
subsequent changes to that status;
    (7) The type of equipment the person is qualified to inspect, test, 
or maintain;
    (8) A statement signed by the railroad's chief mechanical officer, 
chief operating officer, or their designee, that the person meets the 
minimum qualification standards as set forth in this subpart; and
    (9) The date that the person's status as qualified expires due to 
the need for refresher training.
    (e) Each railroad shall adopt, comply with, and make available to 
FRA upon request an internal audit process to periodically review and 
evaluate the effectiveness of the training, qualification, and 
designation program required by this section.
    (f) Railroad or contract supervisors shall be held jointly 
responsible with inspectors and train crew members for the condition 
and proper functioning of train brake systems.


Sec. 232.205  Class I brake test--Initial terminal inspection.

    (a) Each train and each car in the train shall receive a Class I 
brake test as described in paragraph (b) of this section by a qualified 
person, as defined in Sec. 232.5, at the following points:
    (1) The location where the train is originally assembled ``initial 
terminal'' or ``point of origin';
    (2) A location where the train consist is changed other than by:
    (i) Adding a single car or a solid block of cars;
    (ii) Removing a single car or a solid block of cars; or (iii) A 
combination of the changes listed in paragraphs (a)(2)(i) and 
(a)(2)(ii) (See Secs. 232.209 and 232.211 for requirements related to 
the pick-up of cars en route.)
    (3) A location where the train is off air for a period of more than 
four hours;
    (4) A point where a train has traveled 3,000 miles since its last 
Class I brake test; and (5) A location where the train is received in 
interchange if the train consist is changed other than by:
    (i) Removing a car or a solid block of cars from the train;
    (ii) Adding a previously tested car or a previously tested solid 
block of cars to the train;
    (iii) Changing motive power;
    (iv) Removing or changing the caboose; or
    (v) Any combination of the changes listed in paragraph (a)(5).
    (A) If changes other than those contained in paragraph (a)(5) are 
made to the train consist when it is received in interchange and the 
train will move 20 miles or less, then the railroad may conduct a brake 
test pursuant to Sec. 232.209 on those cars added to the train.
    (B) [Reserved]
    (b) A Class I brake test shall consist of the following tasks and 
requirements:
    (1) Brake pipe leakage shall not exceed 5 psi per minute or air 
flow shall not exceed 60 cubic feet per minute (CFM).
    (i) Leakage Test. The brake pipe leakage test shall be conducted as 
follows:
    (A) Charge the air brake system to within 15 psi of the setting of 
the feed or regulating valve on the locomotive, but to not less than 75 
psi, as indicated by an accurate gauge or end-of-train device at the 
rear end of train;
    (B) Upon receiving the signal to apply brakes for test, make a 20-
psi brake pipe service reduction;
    (C) If the locomotive used to perform the brake test is equipped 
with a means for maintaining brake pipe pressure at a constant level 
during a 20-psi brake pipe service reduction, this feature shall be cut 
out during the brake test; and
    (D) With the brake valve lapped and the pressure maintaining 
feature cut out (if so equipped) and after waiting 45-60 seconds, note 
the brake pipe leakage as indicated by the brake-pipe gauge in the 
locomotive, which shall not exceed 5 psi per minute.
    (ii) Air Flow Method Test. When locomotives are equipped with a 26-
L brake valve or equivalent, a railroad may use the Air Flow Method 
Test as an alternate to the brake pipe leakage test. The Air Flow 
Method (AFM) Test shall be performed as follows:
    (A) Charge the air brake system to within 15 psi of the setting of 
the feed or regulating valve, but to not less than 75 psi, as indicated 
by an accurate gauge or end-of-train device at rear end of train; and
    (B) Measure air flow as indicated by a calibrated AFM indicator, 
which shall not exceed 60 cubic feet per minute (CFM).
    (iii) The AFM indicator shall be calibrated for accuracy at 
periodic intervals not to exceed 92 days. The AFM indicator calibration 
test orifices shall be calibrated at temperatures of not less than 20 
degrees Fahrenheit. AFM indicators shall be accurate to within 
3 standard cubic feet per minute (cfm).
    (2) The inspector shall position himself/herself, taking positions 
on each side of each car sometime during the inspection process, so as 
to be able to examine and observe the functioning of all moving parts 
of the brake system on each car in order to make the determinations and 
inspections required by this section. A ``roll-by'' inspection of the 
brake release as provided for in paragraph (b)(8) of this section shall 
not constitute an inspection of that side of the train for purposes of 
this requirement.

[[Page 48363]]

    (3) The train brake system shall be charged to within 15 psi of the 
setting of the feed-regulating valve, but to not less than 75 psi, 
angle cocks and cutout cocks shall be properly positioned, air hoses 
shall be properly coupled and shall not kink, bind, or foul or be in 
any other condition that restricts air flow. An examination must be 
made for leaks and necessary repairs made to reduce leakage to a 
minimum. Retaining valves and retaining valve pipes shall be inspected 
and known to be in condition for service.
    (4) The brakes on each car shall apply in response to a 20-psi 
brake pipe service reduction and shall remain applied until a release 
of the air brakes has been initiated by the controlling locomotive or 
yard test device. The brakes shall not be applied or released until the 
proper signal is given. Freight cars found with brakes that fail to 
remain applied due to a readily identifiable condition or problem may 
be retested and remain in the train if the retest is conducted from the 
controlling locomotive or head end of the consist and the brakes remain 
applied for a period of at least five minutes.
    (5) Piston travel shall be within 7 to 9 inches for 8\1/2\-inch and 
10-inch diameter brake cylinders or within the piston travel stenciled 
or marked on car or badge plate for other types. If piston travel is 
found to be less than 7 inches or more than 9 inches, it must be 
adjusted to nominally 7\1/2\ inches. Minimum brake cylinder piston 
travel of truck-mounted brake cylinders must be sufficient to provide 
proper brake shoe clearance when the brakes are released. Piston travel 
must be inspected on each freight car while the brakes are applied.
    (6) Brake rigging shall be properly secured and shall not bind or 
foul or otherwise adversely affect the operation of the brake system.
    (7) All parts of the brake equipment shall be properly secured. On 
freight cars where the bottom rod passes through the truck bolster or 
is secured with cotter keys equipped with a locking device to prevent 
their accidental removal, bottom rod safety supports are not required.
    (8) When the release is initiated by the controlling locomotive or 
yard test device, the brakes on each freight car shall be inspected to 
verify that it did release; this may be performed by a ``roll-by'' 
inspection. If a ``roll-by'' inspection of the brake release is 
performed, train speed shall not exceed 10 MPH and the qualified person 
performing the ``roll-by'' inspection shall communicate the results of 
the inspection to the operator of the train. The operator of the train 
will note successful completion of the release portion of the 
inspection on the written notification required in paragraph (c) of 
this section.
    (c) Where a railroad's collective bargaining agreement provides 
that only a carman is to perform the inspections and tests required by 
this section, a carman alone will be considered a qualified person. In 
these circumstances, the railroad shall ensure that the carman is 
properly trained and designated as a qualified person or qualified 
mechanical inspector pursuant to the requirements of this part.
    (d) A qualified person participating in the test and inspection 
required by this section shall notify the locomotive engineer in 
writing or place such notification in the cab of the controlling 
locomotive that the Class I brake test has been satisfactorily 
performed. The written or electronic notification shall be retained in 
the cab of the controlling locomotive until the train until reaches its 
destination and shall contain the date, time, number of freight cars 
inspected, and location where the Class I brake test was performed.
    (e) Before adjusting piston travel or working on brake rigging, 
cutout cock in brake pipe branch must be closed and air reservoirs must 
be voided of all air. When cutout cocks are provided in brake cylinder 
pipes, these cutout cocks only may be closed and air reservoirs need 
not be voided of all air.
    (f) Except as provided in Sec. 232.209, each car or solid block of 
cars, as defined in Sec. 232.5, that has not received a Class I brake 
test or that has been off air for more than four hours and that is 
added to a train shall receive a Class I test when added to a train. A 
Class III brake test as described in Sec. 232.211 shall then be 
performed on the entire new train.


Sec. 232.207  Class IA brake tests--1,000-mile inspection.

    (a) Except as provided in Sec. 232.213, each train shall receive a 
Class IA brake test performed by a qualified person, as defined in 
Sec. 232.5, at a location that is not more than 1,000 miles from the 
point where any freight car in the train last received a Class I or 
Class IA brake test. The most restrictive car or block of cars in the 
train shall determine the location of this test.
    (b) A Class IA brake test shall consist of the following tasks and 
requirements:
    (1) Brake pipe leakage shall not exceed 5 psi per minute or air 
flow shall not exceed 60 cubic feet per minute (CFM). The brake pipe 
leakage test or air flow method test shall be conducted pursuant to the 
requirements contained in Sec. 232.205(b)(1);
    (2) The inspector shall position himself/herself, taking positions 
on each side of each car sometime during the inspection process, so as 
to be able to examine and observe the functioning of all moving parts 
of the brake system on each car in order to make the determinations and 
inspections required by this section;
    (3) The air brake system shall be charged to within 15 psi of the 
setting of the feed or regulating valve, but to not less than 75 psi, 
as indicated by an accurate gauge or end-of-train device at rear end of 
train.
    (4) The brakes on each car shall apply in response to a 20-psi 
brake pipe service reduction and shall remain applied until the release 
is initiated by the controlling locomotive. Cars found with brakes that 
fail to remain applied due to a readily identifiable condition or 
problem may be retested and remain in the train if the retest is 
conducted from the controlling locomotive or head end of the consist 
and the brakes remain applied for a period of at least five minutes; 
otherwise, the defective equipment may only be moved pursuant to the 
provisions contained in Sec. 232.15, if applicable;
    (5) Brake rigging shall be properly secured and shall not bind or 
foul or otherwise adversely affect the operation of the brake system; 
and
    (6) All parts of the brake equipment shall be properly secured.
    (c) Each railroad shall designate the locations where Class IA 
brake tests will be performed and the carrier shall furnish to the 
Federal Railroad Administration upon request a description of each 
location designed, and shall notify in writing FRA's Associate 
Administrator for Safety 30 days prior to any change in the locations 
designated for such tests and inspections.
    (1) Failure to perform a Class IA brake test at a location 
designated pursuant to this paragraph will constitute a failure to 
perform a proper Class IA brake test.
    (2) In the event of an emergency that alters normal train 
operations such as a derailment or other unusual circumstance that 
reflects on the safe operation of the train, the railroad would not be 
required to provide prior written notification of a change in the 
location where a Class IA brake test is performed, provided; that the 
railroad notifies FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety and the 
pertinent FRA Regional Administrator within 24 hours after the 
designation has been changed and the reason for that change.

[[Page 48364]]

Sec. 232.209  Class II brake tests--Intermediate inspection.

    (a) At a location other than the point of origin (initial terminal) 
of a train, each car or solid block of cars, as defined in Sec. 232.5, 
that has not received a Class I brake test or that has been off air for 
more than four hours and that is added to a train shall receive a Class 
II brake test when added to the train.
    (b) A Class II brake test shall consist of the following tasks and 
requirements:
    (1) Brake pipe leakage shall not exceed 5 psi per minute or air 
flow shall not exceed 60 cubic feet per minute (CFM). The brake pipe 
leakage test or air flow method test shall be conducted pursuant to the 
requirements contained in Sec. 232.205(b)(1);
    (2) The air brake system shall be charged to within 15 psi of the 
setting of the feed or regulating valve, but to not less than 75 psi, 
as indicated by an accurate gauge or end-of-train device at rear end of 
train.
    (3) The brakes on each car added to the train and on the rear car 
of the train shall apply in response to a 20-psi brake pipe service 
reduction and shall remain applied until the release is initiated from 
the controlling locomotive. Cars found with brakes that fail to remain 
applied due to a readily identifiable condition or problem may be 
retested and remain in the train if the retest is conducted from the 
controlling locomotive or head end of the consist and the brakes remain 
applied for a period of at least five minutes; otherwise, the defective 
equipment may only be moved pursuant to the provisions contained in 
Sec. 232.15, if applicable;
    (4) When the release is initiated, the brakes on each car added to 
the train and on the rear car of the train shall be inspected to verify 
that it did release; this may be performed by a ``roll-by'' inspection. 
If a ``roll-by'' inspection of the brake release is performed, train 
speed shall not exceed 10 MPH and the qualified person performing the 
``roll-by'' inspection shall communicate the results of the inspection 
to the operator of the train.
    (5) Before the train proceeds the operator of the train shall know 
that the brake pipe pressure at the rear of the train is being 
restored.
    (c) As an alternative to the rear car brake application and release 
portion of the test, the operator of the train shall determine that 
brake pipe pressure of the train is being reduced as indicated by a 
rear car gauge or end-of-train telemetry device and then that brake 
pipe pressure of the train is being restored as indicated by a rear car 
gauge or end-of-train telemetry device. (When an end-of-train telemetry 
device is used to comply with any test requirement in this part, the 
phrase ``brake pipe pressure of the train is being reduced'' means a 
pressure reduction of at least 5 psi, and the phrase ``brake pipe 
pressure of the train is being restored'' means a pressure increase of 
at least 5 psi). If an electronic communication link between a 
controlling locomotive and a remotely controlled locomotive attached to 
the rear end of a train is utilized to determine that brake pipe 
pressure is being restored, the operator of the train shall know that 
the air brakes function as intended on the remotely controlled 
locomotive.
    (d) Each car or solid block of cars, as defined in Sec. 232.5, that 
has not received a Class I brake test or that has been off air for more 
than four hours that receives a Class II brake test when added to the 
train shall receive a Class I brake test at the next forward location 
where facilities are available for performing such a test. A Class III 
brake test as described in Sec. 232.211 shall then be performed on the 
entire train.


Sec. 232.211  Class III brake tests--Trainline continuity inspection.

    (a) A Class III brake test shall be performed on a train to test 
the train brake system when a train has changed configuration. A Class 
III brake test shall be performed when any of the following occur:
    (1) Where a locomotive or a caboose is changed;
    (2) Where a car or a block of cars is removed from the train with 
the consist otherwise remaining intact;
    (3) At a point other than the point of origin (initial terminal) 
for a train, where a car or a solid block of cars that has received a 
Class I brake test and that has not been off air for more than four 
hours is added to a train; or
    (4) Whenever the continuity of the brake pipe is broken or 
interrupted.
    (b) A Class III brake test shall consist of the following tasks and 
requirements:
    (1) The train brake system shall be charged to within 15 psi of the 
feed-valve setting on the locomotive, but not less than 75 psi, as 
indicated at the rear of the train by an accurate gauge or end-of-train 
device;
    (2) The brakes on the rear car of the train shall apply in response 
to a 20-psi brake pipe service reduction and shall remain applied until 
the release is initiated by the controlling locomotive;
    (3) When the release is initiated, the brakes on the rear car of 
the train shall be inspected to verify that it did release;
    (4) Before proceeding the operator of the train shall know that the 
brake pipe pressure at the rear of freight train is being restored.
    (c) As an alternative to the rear car brake application and release 
portion of the test, it shall be determined that brake pipe pressure of 
the train is being reduced as indicated by a rear car gauge or end-of-
train telemetry device and then that brake pipe pressure of the train 
is being restored as indicated by a rear car gauge or end-of-train 
telemetry device. If an electronic or radio communication link between 
a controlling locomotive and a remotely controlled locomotive attached 
to the rear end of a train is utilized to determine that brake pipe 
pressure is being restored, the operator of the train shall know that 
the air brakes function as intended on the remotely controlled 
locomotive.


Sec. 232.213  Extended haul trains.

    (a) A railroad may be permitted to move a train up to, but not 
exceeding, 1,500 miles between brake tests and inspections if the 
railroad designates a train as a priority train. In order for a 
railroad to designate a train as an extended haul train, all of the 
following requirements must be met:
    (1) The railroad must designate the train in writing to FRA's 
Associate Administrator for Safety. This designation must include the 
following:
    (i) The train identification symbol;
    (ii) The origination and destination points for the train;
    (iii) The type or types of equipment the train will haul; and
    (iv) The locations where all train brake and mechanical inspections 
and tests will be performed.
    (2) A Class I brake test pursuant to Sec. 232.205 shall be 
performed at the train's point of origin by a qualified mechanical 
inspector as defined in Sec. 232.5.
    (3) A freight car inspection pursuant to part 215 of this chapter 
shall be performed at the train's point of origin and shall be 
performed by an inspector designated under Sec. 215.11 of this chapter.
    (4) All cars containing non-complying conditions under part 215 of 
this chapter at the train's point of origin shall either be repaired or 
removed from the train. Except for cars developing conditions en route, 
no car shall be moved pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 215.9 of this 
chapter in the train.
    (5) The train shall have no pick-ups or set-outs en route, except 
for the set-out of defective equipment pursuant to the requirements of 
this chapter.
    (6) At the point of destination, if less than 1,500 miles, or at 
the point designated by the railroad pursuant to

[[Page 48365]]

paragraph (a)(1)(iv) of this section, not to exceed 1,500 miles, an 
inbound inspection of the train shall be conducted by a qualified 
mechanical inspector to identify any defective, inoperative, or 
ineffective brakes or any other condition not in compliance with this 
part as well as any conditions not in compliance with part 215 and part 
231 of this chapter.
    (7) The railroad shall maintain a record of all defective, 
inoperative, or ineffective brakes as well as any conditions not in 
compliance with part 215 and part 231 of this chapter discovered at 
anytime during the movement of the train. These records shall be 
retained for a period of one year and made available to FRA upon 
request.
    (8) In order for an extended haul train to proceed beyond 1,500 
miles, the following requirements shall be met:
    (i) If the train will move 1,000 miles or less from that location 
before receiving a Class IA brake test or reaching destination, a Class 
I brake test shall be conducted pursuant to Sec. 232.205 to ensure 100 
percent effective and operative brakes. The inbound inspection required 
by paragraph (a)(6) of this section may be used to meet this 
requirement provided it encompasses all the inspection elements 
contained in Sec. 232.205.
    (ii) If the train will move greater than 1,000 miles from that 
location without another brake inspection, the train must be identified 
as an extended haul train for that movement and shall meet all the 
requirements contained in paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(7) of this 
section. Such trains shall receive a Class I brake test pursuant to 
Sec. 232.205 by a qualified mechanical inspector to ensure 100 percent 
effective and operative brakes, a freight car inspection pursuant to 
part 215 of this chapter by an inspector designated under Sec. 215.11 
of this chapter, and all cars containing non-complying conditions under 
part 215 of this chapter shall either be repaired or removed from the 
train. The inbound inspection required by paragraph (a)(6) of this 
section may be used to meet these inspection requirements provided it 
encompasses all the inspection elements contained in paragraphs (a)(2) 
through (a)(4) of this section.
    (9) FRA inspectors shall have physical access to visually observe 
all brake and freight car inspections and tests required by this 
section.
    (b) Failure to comply with any of the requirements contained in 
paragraph (a) of this section will be considered an improper movement 
of a designated priority train for which appropriate civil penalties 
may be assessed as outlined in Appendix A to this part. Furthermore, 
FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety may revoke a railroad's 
ability to designate any or all trains as extended haul trains for 
repeated or willful noncompliance with any of the requirements 
contained in this section. Such a determination will be made in writing 
and will state the basis for such action.


Sec. 232.215  Transfer train brake tests.

    (a) A transfer train, as defined in Sec. 232.5, shall receive a 
test that includes the following:
    (1) The air brake hoses shall be coupled between all freight cars.
    (2) After the brake system is charged to not less than 60 psi as 
indicated by an accurate gauge or end-of-train device at the rear of 
the train, a 15-psi service brake pipe reduction shall be made.
    (3) An inspection shall be made to determine that the brakes on 
each car apply and remain applied until the release is initiated by the 
controlling locomotive. Cars found with brakes that fail to remain 
applied due to a readily identifiable condition or problem may be 
retested and remain in the train if the retest is conducted from the 
controlling locomotive or head end of the consist and the brakes remain 
applied for a period of at least five minutes; otherwise, the defective 
equipment may only be moved pursuant to the provisions contained in 
Sec. 232.15, if applicable;
    (b) If a train's movement will exceed 20 miles or is not a transfer 
train as defined in Sec. 232.5, the train shall receive a Class I brake 
test in accordance with Sec. 232.205 prior to departure.


Sec. 232.217  Train brake system tests conducted using yard air.

    (a) When a train air brake system is tested from a yard air, an 
engineer's brake valve or a suitable test device shall be used to 
provide any increase or reduction of brake pipe air pressure at the 
same, or slower, rate as an engineer's brake valve, and the yard air 
must be connected to the end of the train or cut of cars that will be 
nearest to the controlling locomotive.
    (b) When a yard air is used, the train air brake system must be 
charged and tested as prescribed by Sec. 232.205(b) and when 
practicable should be kept charged until road motive power is coupled 
to train, after which, a Class III brake test shall be performed as 
prescribed by Sec. 232.211.
    (1) If the cars are off air for more than four hours, these cars 
shall be retested in accordance with Sec. 232.205 (b) through (e).
    (2) Yard air pressure shall be 80 psi.
    (c) Mechanical yard air test devices and gauges shall be calibrated 
every 92 days. Electronic yard test devices and gauges shall be 
calibrated annually. Gauges or other devices providing air-pressure 
control shall be accurate to within  3 psi.
    (d) If used to test a train, a yard air test device and any yard 
air test equipment shall be accurate and function as intended.


Sec. 232.219  Double heading, helper service, and distributed power.

    (a) When more than one locomotive is attached to a train, the 
engineer of the controlling locomotive shall operate the brakes. On all 
other motive power units in the train the brake pipe cutout cock to the 
brake valve must be closed, the maximum main reservoir pressure 
maintained and brake valve handles kept in the prescribed position. In 
case it becomes necessary for the controlling locomotive to give up 
control of the train short of the destination of the train, a Class III 
brake test pursuant to Sec. 232.211 shall be made to ensure that the 
brakes are operative from the automatic brake valve of the locomotive 
taking control of the train.
    (b) The electro-pneumatic brake valve on all motive power units 
other than that which is handling the train shall be cut out, the 
handle of brake valve kept in the prescribed position, and the air 
compressors kept running if practicable.
    (c) When one or more helper locomotives are placed in a train, a 
visual inspection shall be made of each helper locomotive brake system 
to determine that the brake system operates as intended in response to 
a 20-psi reduction initiated from the controlling locomotive of the 
train. A helper locomotive with inoperative or ineffective brakes shall 
be repaired prior to use or removed from the train.

Subpart D--Periodic Maintenance and Testing Requirements


Sec. 232.301  Scope.

    This subpart contains the periodic brake system maintenance and 
testing requirements for equipment used in freight and other non-
passenger trains.


Sec. 232.303  General requirements.

    (a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) through (d) of this 
section, Sec. 232.305, and Sec. 232.307, each car shall be maintained, 
repaired, and tested in accordance with Association of American 
Railroads Rule 3 ``Testing of Air Brakes'' and accompanying Chart A, 
contained in the AAR ``Field Manual on Interchange Rules'' (January 1, 
1998).
    (b) All cars on a shop or repair track shall be tested to determine 
that the air

[[Page 48366]]

brakes apply and remain apply applied until a release is initiated.
    (c) All cars on a shop or repair track shall have piston travel 
inspected to ensure it is within 7 to 9 inches for 8-\1/2\-inch and 10-
inch diameter brake cylinders or within the piston travel stenciled or 
marked on car or badge plate for other types. If piston travel is found 
to be less than 7 inches or more than 9 inches it must be adjusted to 
nominally 7\1/2\ inches. Piston travel for cars equipped with other 
than 8-\1/2\-inch and 10-inch diameter brake cylinders shall be 
adjusted as indicated on the badge plate, stencil, or sticker on the 
car.
    (d) Before a car is released from a shop or repair track, a 
qualified person shall know:
    (1) The brake pipe is securely clamped;
    (2) Angle cocks are properly located with suitable clearance and 
properly positioned to allow maximum air flow; and (3) Valves, 
reservoirs, and cylinders are tight on supports and the supports are 
securely attached to the car.
    (e) If the repair track brake test or single car test required in 
Secs. 232.305 and 232.307 cannot be conducted at the point where 
repairs can be made to the car, the car may be moved after the repairs 
are effectuated to the next forward location where the test can be 
performed. Inability to perform a repair track brake test or single car 
test does not constitute an inability to effectuate the necessary 
repairs.
    (1) If it is necessary to move a car from the location where the 
repairs are performed in order to perform a repair track brake test or 
a single car test required by this part, a tag or card shall be placed 
on both sides of the equipment, or an automated tracking system 
approved for use by FRA, with the following information about the 
equipment:
    (i) The reporting mark and car number;
    (ii) The name of the inspecting railroad;
    (iii) The location where repairs were performed and date;
    (iv) Indication whether the car requires a repair track brake test 
or single car test;
    (v) The location where the appropriate test is to be performed; and 
(vi) The name, signature, if possible, and job title of the qualified 
person approving the move.
    (2) The tag or card required by paragraph (e)(1) of this section 
shall remain affixed to the equipment until the necessary test has been 
performed.
    (3) A record or copy of each tag or card attached to or removed 
from a car or locomotive shall be retained for 90 days and, upon 
request, shall be made available within 15 calendar days for inspection 
by FRA or State inspectors.
    (4) Each tag or card removed from a car or locomotive shall contain 
the date, location, and the signature of the person who removed it from 
the piece of equipment.
    (f) The location and date of the last repair track brake test or 
single car test required by Secs. 232.305 and 232.307 shall be clearly 
stenciled, marked, or labeled in two-inch high letters or numerals on 
the side of the equipment. Alternatively, the railroad may use an 
electronic record keeping system approved for use by FRA's Associate 
Administrator for Safety in writing.


Sec. 232.305  Repair track brake tests.

    (a) Repair track brake tests shall be performed by a qualified 
person in accordance with the Association of American Railroads 
standard S-486, Section 3.0, contained in the AAR ``Manual of Standards 
and Recommended Practices, Section E, Part II'' (November 1992).
    (b) Except as provided in Sec. 232.303 (e), a railroad shall 
perform a repair track brake test on a car when:
    (1) A car is removed from a train due to an air brake related 
defect;
    (2) A car has its brakes cut-out when removed from a train or when 
placed on a shop or repair track;
    (3) A car is on a repair or shop track for any reason and has not 
received a repair track brake test within the previous 12 month period;
    (4) A car is found with missing or incomplete repair track brake 
test information;
    (5) One or more of the following conventional air brake equipment 
items is removed, repaired, or replaced:
    (i) Brake reservoir;
    (ii) Control valve mounting gasket; or
    (iii) Pipe bracket stud.
    (6) A car is found with one or more of the following wheel defects:
    (i) Built-up tread;
    (ii) Slid flat wheel; or
    (iii) Thermal cracks.
    (c) Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section each car 
shall receive a repair track brake test no less than every 5 years.
    (d) Each car shall receive a repair track brake test no less than 8 
years from the date the car was built or rebuilt.


Sec. 232.307  Single car tests.

    (a) Single car tests shall be performed by a qualified person in 
accordance with the Association of American Railroads standard S-486, 
Section 4.0, contained in the AAR ``Manual of Standards and Recommended 
Practices, Section E, Part II'' (November 1992).
    (b) Except as provided in Sec. 232.303(e), a railroad shall perform 
a single car test on a car when one or more of the following 
conventional air brake equipment items is removed, repaired or 
replaced:
    (1) Service portion;
    (2) Emergency portion; or
    (3) Pipe bracket.
    (c) A single car test pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section 
shall be performed on a new or rebuilt car prior to placing or using 
the car in revenue service.


Sec. 232.309  Repair track brake test and single car test equipment and 
devices.

    (a) All test equipment and devices used to perform repair track 
brake tests or single car tests shall be tested for correct operation 
at least once each calendar day of use.
    (b) Mechanical test devices such as pressure gauges, flow meters, 
orifices, etc. shall be calibrated once every 92 days.
    (c) Electronic test devices shall be calibrated at least once every 
365 days.
    (d) All test equipment and devices shall be tagged or labeled with 
the date its next calibration is due.
    (e) The single car test device must be tested not less frequently 
than every 92 days.
    (f) The single car test device must be disassembled and cleaned not 
less frequently than every 365 days.


Sec. 232.311  Process for changing maintenance requirements.

    (a) The Association of American Railroads standards incorporated by 
reference in subpart D of this part may only be changed if the 
provisions contained in this section are followed.
    (b) The AAR shall submit a petition for proposed revision of the 
standards and any supporting documentation to FRA's Associate 
Administrator for Safety.
    (c) The petition for proposed revision submitted by AAR shall 
contain a recommendation as to whether the proposed revision should be 
considered ``safety-critical'' or nonsafety-critical.
    (1) For purposes of this section, safety-critical revisions include 
but are not limited to the following:
    (i) Changes to Chart A contained in Rule 3 of AAR ``Field Manual on 
Interchange Rules'' (January 1, 1998);
    (ii) Changes that extend the intervals for performing specified 
maintenance or repair; and
    (iii) Changes that reduce the quality or quantity of maintenance 
provided.

[[Page 48367]]

    (2) For purposes of this section, nonsafety-critical revisions 
include but are not limited to the following:
    (i) Clarifying amendments;
    (ii) Changes that shorten the intervals at which maintenance or 
repairs are performed; and
    (iii) Procedural changes that do not reduce the quality or quantity 
of the maintenance provided.
    (d) Within 30 days after the submission of a petition for proposed 
revision, FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety will issue a 
determination in writing as to whether the proposed change is ``safety 
critical'' or ``non-safety critical.''
    (1) If FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety determines that the 
proposed change is ``safety critical,'' the petition for proposed 
revision will be treated as a ``petition for special approval'' 
pursuant to Sec. 232.17.
    (2) If FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety determines that the 
proposed change is ``nonsafety-critical,'' the petition for proposed 
revision may be incorporated by AAR immediately.

Subpart E--End-of-Train Devices


Sec. 232.401  Scope.

    This subpart contains the requirements related to the performance, 
operation, and testing of end-of-train devices. Unless expressly 
excepted in this subpart, the requirements of this subpart apply to all 
trains operating on track which is part of the general railroad system 
of transportation.


Sec. 232.403  Design standards for one-way end-of-train devices.

    (a) A one-way end-of-train device shall be comprised of a rear-of-
train unit (rear unit) located on the last car of a train and a front-
of-train unit (front unit) located in the cab of the locomotive 
controlling the train.
    (b) Rear unit. The rear unit shall be capable of determining the 
rear car brake pipe pressure and transmitting that information to the 
front unit for display to the locomotive engineer. The rear unit shall 
be--
    (1) Capable of measuring the rear car brake pipe pressure with an 
accuracy of 3 psig and brake pipe pressure variations of 
1 psig;
    (2) Equipped with a ``bleeder valve'' that permits the release of 
any air under pressure from the rear of train unit or the associated 
air hoses prior to detaching the rear unit from the brake pipe;
    (3) Designed so that an internal failure will not cause an 
undesired emergency brake application;
    (4) Equipped with either an air gauge or a means of visually 
displaying the rear unit's brake pipe pressure measurement; and
    (5) Equipped with a pressure relief safety valve to prevent 
explosion from a high pressure air leak inside the rear unit.
    (c) Reporting rate. Multiple data transmissions from the rear unit 
shall occur immediately after a variation in the rear car brake pipe 
pressure of 2 psig and at intervals of not greater than 70 
seconds when the rear car brake pipe pressure variation over the 70-
second interval is less than 2 psig.
    (d) Operating environment. The rear unit shall be designed to meet 
the performance requirements of paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section 
under the following environmental conditions:
    (1) At temperatures from -40  deg.C to 60  deg.C;
    (2) At a relative humidity of 95% noncondensing at 50  deg.C;
    (3) At altitudes of zero to 12,000 feet mean sea level;
    (4) During vertical and lateral vibrations of 1 to 15 Hz., with 0.5 
g. peak to peak, and 15 to 500 Hz., with 5 g. peak to peak;
    (5) During the longitudinal vibrations of 1 to 15 Hz., with 3 g. 
peak to peak, and 15 to 500 Hz., with 5 g. peak to peak; and (6) During 
a shock of 10 g. peak for 0.1 second in any axis.
    (e) Unique code. Each rear unit shall have a unique and permanent 
identification code that is transmitted along with the pressure message 
to the front-of-train unit. A code obtained from the Association of 
American Railroads, 50 F Street, NW., Washington, DC 20036 shall be 
deemed to be a unique code for purposes of this section. A unique code 
also may be obtained from the Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance 
(RRS-10), Federal Railroad Administration, Washington, DC 20590.
    (f) Front unit. (1) The front unit shall be designed to receive 
data messages from the rear unit and shall be capable of displaying the 
rear car brake pipe pressure in not more than one-pound increments.
    (2) The display shall be clearly visible and legible in daylight 
and darkness from the engineer's normal operating position.
    (3) The front device shall have a means for entry of the unique 
identification code of the rear unit being used. The front unit shall 
be designed so that it will display a message only from the rear unit 
with the same code as entered into the front unit.
    (4) The front unit shall be designed to meet the requirements of 
paragraphs (d) (2), (3), (4), and (5) of this section. It shall also be 
designed to meet the performance requirements in this paragraph--
    (i) At temperatures from 0  deg.C to 60  deg.C;
    (ii) During a vertical or lateral shock of 2 g. peak for 0.1 
second; and
    (iii) During a longitudinal shock of 5 g. peak for 0.1 second.
    (g) Radio equipment. (1) The radio transmitter in the rear unit and 
the radio receiver in the front unit shall comply with the applicable 
regulatory requirements of the FCC and use of a transmission format 
acceptable to the FCC.
    (2) If power is supplied by one or more batteries, the operating 
life shall be a minimum of 36 hours at 0  deg.C.


Sec. 232.405  Design and performance standards for two-way-end-of-train 
devices.

    Two-way end-of-train devices shall be designed and perform with the 
features applicable to one-way end-of-train devices described in 
Sec. 232.403, except those included in Sec. 232.403(b)(3). In addition, 
a two-way end-of-train device shall be designed and perform with the 
following features:
    (a) An emergency brake application command from the front unit of 
the device shall activate the emergency air valve at the rear of the 
train within one second.
    (b) The rear unit of the device shall send an acknowledgment 
message to the front unit immediately upon receipt of an emergency 
brake application command. The front unit shall listen for this 
acknowledgment and repeat the brake application command if the 
acknowledgment is not correctly received.
    (c) The rear unit, on receipt of a properly coded command, shall 
open a valve in the brake line and hold it open for a minimum of 15 
seconds. This opening of the valve shall cause the brake line to vent 
to the exterior.
    (d) The valve opening shall have a minimum diameter of \3/4\ inch 
and the internal diameter of the hose shall be \5/8\ inch to effect an 
emergency brake application.
    (e) The front unit shall have a manually operated switch which, 
when activated, shall initiate an emergency brake transmission command 
to the rear unit. The switch shall be labeled ``Emergency'' and shall 
be protected so that there will exist no possibility of accidental 
activation.
    (f) The availability of the front-to-rear communications link shall 
be checked automatically at least every 10 minutes.
    (g) Means shall be provided to confirm the availability and proper 
functioning of the emergency valve.
    (h) Means shall be provided to arm the front and rear units to 
ensure the

[[Page 48368]]

rear unit responds to an emergency command only from a properly 
associated front unit.


Sec. 232.407  Operations requiring use of two-way end-of-train devices; 
prohibition on purchase of nonconforming devices.

    (a) The following definitions are intended solely for the purpose 
of identifying those operations subject to the requirements for the use 
of two-way end-of-train devices.
    (1) Heavy grade means:
    (i) For a train operating with 4,000 trailing tons or less, a 
section of track with an average grade of two percent or greater over a 
distance of two continuous miles; and
    (ii) For a train operating with greater than 4,000 trailing tons, a 
section of track with an average grade of one percent or greater over a 
distance of three continuous miles.
    (2) Train means one or more locomotives coupled with one or more 
rail cars, except during switching operations or where the operation is 
that of classifying cars within a railroad yard for the purpose of 
making or breaking up trains.
    (3) Local train means a train assigned to perform switching en 
route which operates with 4,000 trailing tons or less and travels 
between a point of origin and a point of final destination, for a 
distance that is no greater than that which can normally be operated by 
a single crew in a single tour of duty.
    (4) Work train means a non-revenue service train of 4,000 trailing 
tons or less used for the administration and upkeep service of the 
railroad.
    (5) Trailing tons means the sum of the gross weights--expressed in 
tons--of the cars and the locomotives in a train that are not providing 
propelling power to the train.
    (b) All trains not specifically excepted in paragraph (e) of this 
section shall be equipped with and shall use either a two-way end-of-
train device meeting the design and performance requirements contained 
in Sec. 232.405 or a device using an alternative technology to perform 
the same function.
    (c) Each newly manufactured end-of-train device purchased by a 
railroad after January 2, 1998 shall be a two-way end-of-train device 
meeting the design and performance requirements contained in 
Sec. 232.405 or a device using an alternative technology to perform the 
same function.
    (d) Each two-way end-of-train device purchased by any person prior 
to July 1, 1997 shall be deemed to meet the design and performance 
requirements contained in Sec. 232.405.
    (e) Exceptions. The following types of trains are excepted from the 
requirement for the use of a two-way end-of-train device:
    (1) Trains with a locomotive located at the rear of the train that 
is capable of making an emergency brake application, through a command 
effected by telemetry or by a crew member in radio contact with the 
lead (controlling) locomotive;
    (2) Trains operating in the push mode with the ability to 
effectuate an emergency brake application from the rear of the train;
    (3) Trains with an operational caboose placed at the rear of the 
train, carrying one or more crew members, that is equipped with an 
emergency brake valve;
    (4) Trains operating with a secondary, fully independent braking 
system capable of safely stopping the train in the event of failure of 
the primary system;
    (5) Trains that do not operate over heavy grades and do not exceed 
30 mph;
    (6) Local trains as defined in paragraph (a)(3) of this section 
that do not operate over heavy grades;
    (7) Work trains as defined in paragraph (a)(4) of this section that 
do not operate over heavy grades;
    (8) Trains that operate exclusively on track that is not part of 
the general railroad system;
    (9) Passenger trains in which all of the cars in the train are 
equipped with an emergency brake valve readily accessible to a crew 
member;
    (10) Passenger trains that have a car at the rear of the train, 
readily accessible to one or more crew members in radio contact with 
the engineer, that is equipped with an emergency brake valve readily 
accessible to such a crew member; and
    (11) Passenger trains that have twenty-four (24) or fewer cars (not 
including locomotives) in the consist and that are equipped and 
operated in accordance with the following train-configuration and 
operating requirements:
    (i) If the total number of cars in a passenger train consist is 
twelve (12) or fewer, a car located no less than halfway through the 
consist (counting from the first car in the train) must be equipped 
with an emergency brake valve readily accessible to a crew member;
    (ii) If the total number of cars in a passenger train consist is 
thirteen (13) to twenty-four (24), a car located no less than two-
thirds (\2/3\) of the way through the consist (counting from the first 
car in the train) must be equipped with an emergency brake valve 
readily accessible to a crew member;
    (iii) Prior to descending a section of track with an average grade 
of two percent or greater over a distance of two continuous miles, the 
engineer of the train shall communicate with the conductor, to ensure 
that a member of the crew with a working two-way radio is stationed in 
the car with the rearmost readily accessible emergency brake valve on 
the train when the train begins its descent; and
    (iv) While the train is descending a section of track with an 
average grade of two percent or greater over a distance of two 
continuous miles, a member of the train crew shall occupy the car that 
contains the rearmost readily accessible emergency brake valve on the 
train and be in constant radio communication with the locomotive 
engineer. The crew member shall remain in this car until the train has 
completely traversed the heavy grade.
    (f) If a train is required to use a two-way end-of-train device:
    (1) That device shall be armed and operable from the time a train 
departs from the point where the device is installed until the train 
reaches its destination.
    (2) The rear unit batteries shall be sufficiently charged at the 
initial terminal or other point where the device is installed and 
throughout the train's trip to ensure that the end-of train-device will 
remain operative until the train reaches its destination.
    (3) The device shall be activated to effectuate an emergency brake 
application either by using the manual toggle switch or through 
automatic activation, whenever it becomes necessary for the locomotive 
engineer to place the train air brakes in emergency using either the 
automatic brake valve or the conductor's emergency brake valve or 
whenever an undesired emergency application of the train air brakes 
occurs.
    (g) En route failure of device on a freight or other non-passenger 
train. Except on passenger trains required to be equipped with a two-
way end-of-train device (which are provided for in paragraph (h) of 
this section), en route failures of a two-way end-of-train device shall 
be handled in accordance with this paragraph. If a two-way end-of-train 
device or equivalent device fails en route (i.e., is unable to initiate 
an emergency brake application from the rear of the train due to 
certain losses of communication (front to rear) or due to other 
reasons), the speed of the train on which it is installed shall be 
limited to 30 mph until the ability of the device to initiate an 
emergency brake application from the rear of the train is restored. 
This limitation shall apply to a train using any device that uses an 
alternative technology to serve the purpose of a

[[Page 48369]]

two-way end-of-train device. With regard to two-way end-of-train 
devices, a loss of communication between the front and rear units will 
be considered an en route failure only if the loss of communication is 
for a period greater than 16 minutes and 30 seconds.
    (1) If a two-way end-of-train device fails en route, the train on 
which it is installed, in addition to observing the 30-mph speed 
limitation, shall not operate over a section of track with an average 
grade of two percent or greater over a distance of two continuous 
miles, unless one of the following alternative measures is provided:
    (i) Use of an occupied helper locomotive at the end of the train. 
This alternative may be used only if the following requirements are 
met:
    (A) The helper locomotive engineer will initiate and maintain two-
way voice radio communication with the engineer on the head end of the 
train; this contact shall be verified just prior to passing the crest 
the grade.
    (B) If there is a loss of communication prior to passing the crest 
of the grade, the helper locomotive engineer and the head-end engineer 
shall act immediately to stop the train until voice communication is 
resumed, if this can be done safely.
    (C) If there is a loss of communication once the descent has begun, 
the helper locomotive engineer and the head-end engineer shall act to 
stop the train if the train has reached a predetermined rate of speed 
that indicates the need for emergency braking.
    (D) The brake pipe of the helper locomotive shall be connected and 
cut into the train line and tested to ensure operation.
    (ii) Use of an occupied caboose at the end of the train with a 
tested, functioning brake valve capable of initiating an emergency 
brake application from the caboose. This alternative may be used only 
if the train service employee in the caboose and the engineer on the 
head end of the train establish and maintain two-way voice radio 
communication and respond appropriately to the loss of such 
communication in the same manner as prescribed for helper locomotives 
in paragraph (g)(1)(i).
    (iii) Use of a radio-controlled locomotive at the rear of the train 
under continuous control of the engineer in the head end by means of 
telemetry, but only if such radio-controlled locomotive is capable of 
initiating an emergency application on command from the lead 
(controlling) locomotive.
    (2) [Reserved]
    (h) En route failure of device on a passenger train. (1) A 
passenger train required to be equipped with a two-way end-of-train 
device that develops an en route failure of the device (as explained in 
paragraph (g) of this section) shall not operate over a section of 
track with an average grade of two percent or greater over a distance 
of two continuous miles until an operable two-way end-of-train device 
is installed on the train or an alternative method of initiating an 
emergency brake application from the rear of the train is achieved.
    (2) Except as provided in paragraph (h)(1) of this section, a 
passenger train required to be equipped with a two-way end-of-train 
device that develops an en route failure of the device (as explained in 
paragraph (g) of this section) shall be operated in accordance with the 
following:
    (i) A member of the train crew shall be immediately positioned in 
the car which contains the rearmost readily accessible emergency brake 
valve on the train and shall be equipped with an operable two-way radio 
that communicates with the locomotive engineer; and
    (ii) The locomotive engineer shall periodically make running tests 
of the train's air brakes until the failure is corrected; and
    (3) Each en route failure shall be corrected at the next location 
where the necessary repairs can be conducted or at the next location 
where a required brake test is to be performed, whichever is reached 
first.


Sec. 232.409  Inspection and testing of end-of-train devices.

    (a) After each installation of either the front or rear unit of an 
end-of-train device, or both, on a train and before the train departs, 
the railroad shall determine that the identification code entered into 
the front unit is identical to the unique identification code on the 
rear-of-train unit.
    (b) After each installation of either the front or rear unit of an 
end-of-train device, or both, the functional capability of the device 
shall be determined, after charging the train, by comparing the 
quantitative value displayed on the front unit with the quantitative 
value displayed on the rear unit or on a properly calibrated air gauge. 
The end-of-train device shall not be used if the difference between the 
two readings exceeds three pounds per square inch.
    (c) A two-way end-of-train device shall be tested at the initial 
terminal or other point of installation to ensure that the device is 
capable of initiating an emergency power brake application from the 
rear of the train. If this test is conducted by a person other than a 
member of the train crew, the locomotive engineer shall be notified in 
writing that a successful test was performed. The written notification 
shall include the date and time of the test, the location where the 
test was performed, and the name of person conducting the test.
    (d) The telemetry equipment shall be tested for accuracy and 
calibrated if necessary according to the manufacturer's specifications 
and procedures at least every 365 days. This shall include testing 
radio frequencies and modulation of the device. The date and location 
of the last calibration or test as well as the name of the person 
performing the calibration or test shall be legibly displayed on a 
weather-resistant sticker or other marking device affixed to the 
outside of both the front unit and the rear unit. If the front unit is 
an integral part of the locomotive, then the information may be 
recorded on Form FRA F6180-49A.

Subpart F--Introduction of New Brake System Technology


Sec. 232.501  Scope.

    (a) This subpart contains general requirements for introducing new 
brake system technologies. This subpart is intended to facilitate the 
introduction of new complete brake system technologies or major up-
grades to existing systems which the current regulations do not 
adequately address (i.e., electronic brake systems). This subpart is 
not intended for use in the introduction of a new brake component or 
material.


Sec. 232.503  Process to introduce new brake system technology.

    (a) Pursuant to the procedures contained in Sec. 232.17, each 
railroad shall obtain special approval from the FRA Associate 
Administrator for Safety of a pre-revenue service acceptance testing 
plan, developed pursuant to Sec. 232.505, for the new brake system 
technology, prior to implementing the plan.
    (b) Each railroad shall complete a pre-revenue service 
demonstration of the new brake system technology in accordance with the 
approved plan, shall fulfill all of the other requirements prescribed 
in Sec. 232.505, and shall obtain special approval from the FRA 
Associate Administrator for Safety under the procedures of Sec. 232.17 
prior to using such brake system technology in revenue service.


Sec. 232.505  Pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan.

    (a) Except as provided in paragraph (f) of this section, before 
using a new brake system technology for the first time on

[[Page 48370]]

its system the operating railroad or railroads shall submit a pre-
revenue service acceptance testing plan containing the information 
required by paragraph (e) of this section and obtain the approval of 
the FRA Associate Administrator for Safety, under the procedures 
specified in Sec. 232.17.
    (b) After receiving FRA approval of the pre-revenue service testing 
plan and before introducing the new brake system technology into 
revenue service, the operating railroad or railroads shall:
    (1) Adopt and comply with such FRA-approved plan, including fully 
executing the tests required by the plan;
    (2) Report to the FRA Associate Administrator for Safety the 
results of the pre-revenue service acceptance tests;
    (3) Correct any safety deficiencies identified by FRA in the design 
of the equipment or in the inspection, testing, and maintenance 
procedures or, if safety deficiencies cannot be corrected by design 
changes, agree to comply with any operational limitations that may be 
imposed by the Associate Administrator for Safety on the revenue 
service operation of the equipment; and
    (4) Obtain FRA approval to place the new brake system technology in 
revenue service.
    (c) The operating railroad shall comply with any such operational 
limitations imposed by the Associate Administrator for Safety.
    (d) The plan shall be made available to FRA for inspection and 
copying upon request.
    (e) The plan shall include all of the following elements:
    (1) An identification of any waivers of FRA or other Federal safety 
regulations required for the tests or for revenue service operation of 
the equipment.
    (2) A clear statement of the test objectives. One of the principal 
test objectives shall be to demonstrate that the equipment meets the 
safety design and performance requirements specified in this part when 
operated in the environment in which it is to be used.
    (3) A planned schedule for conducting the tests.
    (4) A description of the railroad property or facilities to be used 
to conduct the tests.
    (5) A detailed description of how the tests are to be conducted. 
This description shall include:
    (i) An identification of the equipment to be tested;
    (ii) The method by which the equipment is to be tested;
    (iii) The criteria to be used to evaluate the equipment's 
performance; and
    (iv) The means by which the test results are to be reported to FRA.
    (6) A description of any special instrumentation to be used during 
the tests.
    (7) A description of the information or data to be obtained.
    (8) A description of how the information or data obtained is to be 
analyzed or used.
    (9) A clear description of any criteria to be used as safety limits 
during the testing.
    (10) A description of the criteria to be used to measure or 
determine the success or failure of the tests. If acceptance is to be 
based on extrapolation of less than full level testing results, the 
analysis to be done to justify the validity of the extrapolation shall 
be described.
    (11) A description of any special safety precautions to be observed 
during the testing.
    (12) A written set of standard operating procedures to be used to 
ensure that the testing is done safely.
    (13) Quality control procedures to ensure that the inspection, 
testing, and maintenance procedures are followed.
    (14) Criteria to be used for the revenue service operation of the 
equipment.
    (15) A description of any testing of the equipment that has 
previously been performed.
    (f) For brake system technologies that have previously been used in 
revenue service in the United States, the railroad shall test the 
equipment on its system, prior to placing it in revenue service, to 
ensure the compatibility of the equipment with the operating system 
(track, signals, etc.) of the railroad. A description of such testing 
shall be retained by the railroad and made available to FRA for 
inspection and copying upon request.

Appendix A--Schedule of Civil Penalties [Reserved]

    Issued in Washington, D.C., on August 27, 1998.
Jolene M. Molitoris,
Federal Railroad Administrator.
[FR Doc. 98-23645 Filed 9-8-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-62-P