[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 171 (Thursday, September 3, 1998)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 46899-46900]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-23490]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

49 CFR Part 571


Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Denial of Petition for 
Rulemaking

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), 
Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Denial of petition for rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: This document denies a petition for rulemaking submitted by 
Dr. Richard H. McSwain to regulate the bottom of automotive fuel tanks 
to protect them from rupture by roadway hazards. Neither the 
information submitted by the petitioner nor information otherwise 
available to the agency indicate that the matter identified by the 
petitioner is a safety problem warranting regulatory action.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For non-legal issues: Dr. William J.J. 
Liu, Office of Crashworthiness Standards, National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW, Washington, DC 20590. 
Telephone: (202) 366-4923. Facsimile (202) 366-4329.
    For legal issues: Nicole Fradette, Office of Chief Counsel, NCC-20, 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW, 
Washington, DC 20590. Telephone: (202) 366-2992. Facsimile (202) 366-
3820.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: By petition dated July 17, 1997, Dr. Richard 
H. McSwain requested the agency to issue a regulation that would 
protect the bottom of automotive fuel tanks from roadway hazards. The 
petitioner asserted that, over the past five years, numerous deaths 
have occurred from vehicle fires caused by the rupture of the bottom of 
the vehicle's fuel tank by roadway hazards.1 Dr. McSwain did 
not quantify the number of those deaths, but did enclose news articles 
about several allegedly related crashes. He also stated that European 
motor vehicle standards require the protection of the fuel tank bottom 
and enclosed Volume 2 of the German ``Motor Vehicle Construction and 
Use Regulations'' (1995) and Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) 
Regulation No. 34, ``Uniform Provision Concerning the Approval of 
Vehicles with Regard to the Prevention of Fire Risks'' (01 Series, 
Addendum 33 to Amendment 1, January 18, 1979).
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    \1\ The petitioner did not define what he meant by ``roadway 
hazards.'' The agency understands the petitioner to be referring to 
roadway debris and not the roadway elements, such as guardrails and 
curbs.
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    The petitioner also stated that several U.S. government agencies 
have recognized the need for protection of fuel tank bottoms. In 
support of that claim, he enclosed a 1970 Multidisciplinary Accident 
Investigation report of a case involving a vehicle fire prepared for 
the U.S. National Highway Safety Bureau (NHSB), a predecessor of NHTSA. 
The NHSB study examined a major vehicle fire that occurred following a 
severe crash in which the vehicle's structure was severely deformed, 
compressing the fuel tank between the left and right frame rails. The 
tank ruptured at the seams, allowing fuel to escape. The fuel was 
ignited by the sparks created when the vehicle hit a concrete culvert. 
The NHSB study recommended incorporating additional protection in fuel 
tanks to prevent them from rupturing in a crash. The study also 
recommended installing a protective lining inside of the fuel tank to 
prevent fuel spillage in the event of a fuel tank rupture.
    The petitioner also submitted a 1984 National Transportation Safety 
Board (NTSB) Safety Recommendation directed to the Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturers Association (MVMA). The NTSB recommendations were the 
result of a study of a severe crash that occurred when 22 vehicles 
drove at speeds ranging from 5 to 50 mph into the dense smoke of a 
grass fire and were involved in multiple collisions. The fuel tanks of 
seven of the vehicles ruptured, spilling fuel. The fuel ignited and a 
major fire ensued. The NTSB study encouraged vehicle manufacturers to 
develop and apply more effective technology to ensure fuel system 
integrity during high speed crashes.
    To promulgate or amend a vehicle safety requirement, NHTSA must 
decide that a safety problem exists, that the problem is significant 
enough to warrant regulation, and that the requirement would reduce the 
problem and thus meet the need for motor vehicle safety. In this 
instance, NHTSA has found no basis for concluding that there is a 
safety problem warranting regulatory action with respect to the 
rupturing of the bottom of fuel tanks by roadway hazards.
    Although the petitioner enclosed several news accounts of vehicle 
fires caused by ruptured fuel tanks, specifically four news items of 
severe crashes, and two old case studies of severe crashes, he did not 
demonstrate that there was a significant safety problem with vehicle 
fuel tank ruptures by roadway hazards. Further, NHTSA is not aware of 
information from other sources, including its own, demonstrating the 
existence of a significant problem.
    Most of the information submitted by the petitioner does not appear 
to relate to the issue of the susceptibility of the bottom of fuel 
tanks to rupture by roadway hazards. The agency notes that the vehicle 
fire discussed in the NHSB study occurred when the fuel tank ruptured 
due to the intrusion of the vehicle frame into the sides, not the 
bottom, of the fuel tank. The NHSB study did not specifically recommend 
regulating the bottom of fuel tanks. Further, the 1984 NTSB study 
recommended that the MVMA develop and apply more effective technology 
to reduce breaches in the fuel system and to minimize any fuel loss if 
a breach occurs, particularly in crashes involving

[[Page 46900]]

high speed differentials. The NTSB study did not specifically recommend 
regulating the underside of fuel tanks.
    The agency notes that, contrary to the petitioner's statement, 
neither the 1979 ECE Reg. No. 34 nor the 1995 German ``Motor Vehicle 
Construction and Use Regulations'' specify tests for the bottom of fuel 
tanks. Moreover, NHTSA has compared Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 
Standard (FMVSS) No. 301, Fuel System Integrity, to several foreign 
fuel system integrity standards, including ECE Reg. No. 34, and 
determined that NHTSA's standard requires more stringent crash tests 
than the ECE standard (60 FR 18566; April 12, 1995). As to the media 
reports about particular crashes that the petitioner believes involved 
the rupturing of the bottom of fuel tanks, the agency notes that only 
one of the four news reports clearly stated that the vehicle fire was 
caused by the rupture of the underside of the vehicle's fuel tank by 
roadway debris. The other three reports simply stated that the 
vehicles' fuel tanks ruptured after the vehicles struck a guardrail 
and, in one case, rolled over. Although the three reports did not 
specify the location of the ruptures, the description of the crashes 
indicate that the ruptures did not occur in the underside of the 
vehicles.
    In addition to the information submitted by the petitioner, the 
agency considered its own information. As part of its research now 
underway relating to a possible upgrade of FMVSS No. 301, (49 CFR 
571.301), NHTSA has collected data regarding vehicle crash fires. The 
data do not show a significant problem with vehicle fires resulting 
from the rupture of fuel tanks by roadway debris. According to a review 
of 1993-1995 Fire Case Reports from the National Automotive Sampling 
System (NASS) 2, 74.1 percent of all vehicle fires originate 
in the vehicle's engine compartment and 18.9 percent originate in the 
fuel tank. According to the review, most of the fires associated with 
the fuel tank involved ignition of gasoline leaking from ruptures or 
punctures due to collisions with other vehicles or due to single 
vehicles hitting roadway curbs, sign posts, embankments, etc., not 
roadway debris. The review identified five cases of vehicle fires 
originating in the undercarriage area between 1993 and 1995. In the 
first case, the crash investigation report stated that the fire 
occurred in the engine compartment ``due to the undercarriage damage.'' 
The case was later reclassified as a ``front'' fire. In the second 
case, the crash investigation report stated that the fire occurred 
during the vehicle's rollover sequence, off the roadway, after the 
vehicle hit a roadway ``curbstone'' at 40-45 mph and ruptured its fuel 
tank. In this case, one occupant suffered a Maximum Abbreviated Injury 
Scale 6 burn injury. In the third case, the crash investigation report 
stated that the vehicle struck and ran over a roadway sign post. The 
report said that the fire occurred off the roadway when the ``stump'' 
of the sign post punctured the vehicle's fuel tank ``igniting the fumes 
and or fuel.'' In the fourth case, the crash investigation report 
stated that the vehicle went out of control and ``went off the left 
side of the roadway down a steep embankment.'' It added that the fire 
occurred when gasoline from a leaking or ruptured fuel tank ignited. In 
the fifth case, the crash investigation report stated that the fire 
occurred when the vehicle hit an open man-hole and its ``rear wheel 
sunk into the [hole] causing the gas tank to contact the roadway.'' No 
occupant suffered a burn injury in the third, fourth, and fifth cases. 
As previously stated, none of these fires occurred as a result of 
roadway debris striking the undercarriage of the vehicle. Even if the 
petitioner were referring in his petition to these types of events as 
well as fire occurrences due to roadway debris, any rulemaking action 
to only address this problem would be very limited in scope and would 
not be significant enough to warrant an amendment of FMVSS No. 301.
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    \2\ ``Clinical Review of NASS Fire Case Reports,'' Contract No. 
DTNH22-93-C-07034, January 24, 1997.
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    On April 12, 1995, NHTSA published an Advance Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (ANPRM) announcing the agency's plans to consider upgrading 
FMVSS No. 301 by making the crash requirements more stringent and by 
broadening the standard's focus to include mitigation concepts related 
to fuel system components and environmental and aging tests related to 
fuel system components (60 FR 18566). The notice announced a three-
phase approach to upgrade the standard: Phase 1, Component Level 
Performance; Phase 2, System Level Performance; and Phase 3, 
Environmental and Aging Effects.
    As part of its ongoing effort to upgrade the standard, the agency 
is conducting research and evaluation on high incidence cases of 
vehicle fires, including ones associated with rear impact crashes and 
with the engine compartment originated fires occurring in frontal 
crashes. Further, the agency is seriously pursuing an upgrade of the 
current rear impact requirements of FMVSS No. 301. This should result 
in improved vehicle fuel system protection, including improved fuel 
tank integrity. The agency conducted a series of rear impact tests on 
various vehicle sizes and is currently planning a series of 
repeatability tests. The results of this research program will serve as 
a basis for an agency decision as to whether to issue a proposal to 
amend the standard.
    In accordance with 49 CFR part 552, this completes the agency's 
review of the petition. The agency has concluded that there is no 
reasonable possibility that the amendment requested by the petitioner 
would be issued at the conclusion of a rulemaking proceeding. After 
considering all relevant factors, the agency has decided to deny the 
petition.

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30103, 30162; delegation of authority at 49 
CFR 1.50 and 501.8.

    Issued on: August 27, 1998.
L. Robert Shelton,
Associate Administrator for Safety Performance Standards.
[FR Doc. 98-23490 Filed 9-2-98; 8:45 am]
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