[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 164 (Tuesday, August 25, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 45233-45236]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-22780]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY


Nevada Operations Office; Notice Inviting Research Grant 
Applications

AGENCY: Nevada Operations Office, Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice inviting research grant applications under Financial 
Assistance Program Notice 98-01.

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SUMMARY: The Office of Research and Development (NN-20), of the Office 
of Nonproliferation and National Security (NN), U.S. Department of 
Energy, in keeping with its mission to strengthen the Nation's 
capabilities in the areas of nonproliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and national security through the support of science, 
engineering, and mathematics, announces its interest in receiving grant 
applications from academic researchers, preferably in a corroborative 
partnership with one of the DOE National Laboratories. The purpose of 
this program is to enhance our national capability to detect illicit 
proliferation activities and our national capabilities to protect 
critical information and materials through research and development.

DATES: All applications, referencing Program Notice NN-98-01, should be 
received not later than 4:30 PM, PST, on or before September 24, 1998 
in order to be accepted for merit review and to permit timely 
consideration for award.

ADDRESSES: Applications should be sent to U.S Department of Energy, 
Nevada Operations Office, Contracts Management Division, ATTN: Darby A. 
Dieterich, P.O. Box 98518, Las Vegas, NV 89193-8518.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Questions of a technical nature should 
be addressed to the following personnel: Peter G. Mueller, DOE/NV 
Emergency Management Division, (702) 295-1777; or Carolyn R. Roberts, 
DOE/NV Emergency Management Division, (702) 295-2611. Other questions 
should be addressed to Darby A. Dieterich, Contracts Management 
Division, (702) 295-1560.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION--RESEARCH TOPIC AREAS: It is anticipated that 
awards resulting from this notice will be made in the November 1998 
timeframe. Another notice will be published in the near future setting 
forth a schedule for future submittals and associated reviews. In 
addition, an Internet address will be established containing Office of 
Research and Development (NN-20) program information for use in 
preparing and submitting future applications.
    If the academic research entity does not have a current 
relationship with a National Laboratory, this partnership may be set up 
after the award of the grant with the aid of NN-20 at Office of 
Nonproliferation and National Security, NN-20, Office of Research and 
Development, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue SW, 
Washington, DC 20585. General research program and related topic areas 
include, but are not limited to the following:

[[Page 45234]]

Radiation Detection Technology Program

    The Radiation Detection Technology Program (RDTP) provides for 
basic research on new detectors and technology, advanced applications, 
prototype demonstrations, and field testing to analyze signatures 
associated with Special Nuclear Materials (SNM), nuclear weapons and 
weapon components and radioactive materials. The focus areas include 
Improved Instrumentation for Man-portable Analysis Systems, Development 
of New Materials as Detectors, and Advances in Algorithms and Onboard 
Decision-Making.
    Improved instrumentation performance for man-portable analysis 
systems is focused on reducing the size, cost, and dependence on the 
skill of the operator; providing sensor selectivity; improving the 
quality of detectors; increasing sensitivity of detection; improving 
the selectivity and automating the analyses; and increasing the speed 
and accuracy of detection. R&D programs should also exploit advances in 
all emerging technologies to incorporate the flexibility of fieldable 
systems, e.g., advanced micro circuitry and thin film batteries.
    Development of new materials as detectors seeks to improve 
detection capability through the utilization of new sensor materials. 
Classical efforts to detect radiation relied on ionization (e.g., 
Geiger counter) or reactions such as fission (fission counter) or 
absorption (boron trifluoride). Relatively recent advances in materials 
have resulted in breakthroughs in sensitivity and accuracy (e.g., 
lithium drifted germanium) at the expense of the requirement to cool 
the crystal to liquid nitrogen temperatures. New work is aimed at 
employing materials such as cadmium zinc telluride (CdZnTe), bismuth 
iodide, and lead iodide which offer the possibility of increased 
sensitivity and accurate spectral analysis without the need for 
external cooling. In addition to the use of these new materials to 
achieve a room temperature capability, the use of miniature mechanical 
coolers offers another route to the goal of improved sensitivity with 
portability.
    Advances in algorithms and onboard decision making are focused on 
providing analytical capabilities in real time. Advances in computer 
technology, reduction of the size and power requirements, and micro 
miniaturization provide the capability to incorporate advanced 
algorithms for real time data analysis into fieldable instruments. 
These capabilities are becoming essential to effective SNM detection 
and control.

Cooperative Monitoring Program

    The Cooperative Monitoring Program is focused in the topic areas of 
chemical sensors, arrays, and networks for detection of signature 
species in environmental samples indicative of nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons activities; data fusion methodologies to interpret 
large quantities of data from heterogeneous sensor networks; 
microanalytical technologies for chemical analyses of signature 
species; and tags and seals for arms control applications. The 
applications emphasis is on a cooperative and collaborative environment 
in which stakeholders are participating appropriately in the monitoring 
to enhance confidence, trust, and transparency.
    Advanced Chemical Sensors, Arrays, and Networks are required for 
cooperative monitoring of facilities for treaty verification, IAEA 
safeguards, personnel protection, etc. These may be used either in a 
permanent system of monitor sensors or in periodic on-site inspections 
of declared activities. Both approaches require rugged and sensitive 
chemical instruments that will analyze the environment for specific 
signature compounds to verify that the facility (e.g., a chemical 
manufacturing plant or a nuclear fuel storage repository) is performing 
as declared. In other non-cooperative instances, it may be desirable to 
determine if signature compounds are present for illicit or undeclared 
operations at an industrial facility. Both qualitative identification 
of signature species and quantitative amounts of the species are 
needed. Chemical signature species must be detectable at trace levels 
such as ppb or ppt, and near-real-time analysis is desirable. 
Biochemical and metabolic phenomena offer opportunities for innovative 
sensors, both in terms of the receptor side of the sensor and the 
potential suite of analytes that can be monitored.
    Data Fusion Methodologies are vital to the analysis of data from 
arrays and networks of sensors. Such systems are capable of generating 
huge quantities of data, most of which portray normal events and 
conditions. When a rare event or a potential threat condition occurs, 
it is critical to be able to recognize this occurrence in near-real 
time.
    Therefore, data analysis techniques are needed that can manage 
large quantities of differing types of data and can subject these data 
to complex filters and algorithms to detect abnormal or threat 
conditions with very low incidences of false alarms. Data management 
systems that can learn the patterns of normal data by analysis of real 
(noisy) data and continually update the definition of normal through 
self-learning processes are desirable.
    Microtechnologies for Chemical Analyses are needed to make routine 
laboratory analysis methods available in the field. Conventional 
workhorse tools for chemical analysis such as gas chromatography, mass 
spectrometry, and various other spectroscopic methods are powerful and 
well accepted in a laboratory environment, but usually are not amenable 
in their laboratory format for flexible monitoring and surveillance 
activities in a field environment.
    In recent years, the technologies used to make microelectronic 
devices are being adapted to make miniature analogs of classical 
laboratory instruments for chemical analysis. Biochemical phenomena and 
analytical techniques are also amenable to miniaturization via 
microtechnologies. This revolution in chemical analysis instrumentation 
is in its relative infancy, and there appear to be many opportunities 
to miniaturize the bench-and laboratory-scale instruments. The benefits 
of miniaturization for chemical analysis are similar to the benefits 
for electronics products--low power requirements, lightweight for 
portability, and enhanced ruggedness and reliability. New sampling 
technologies are needed to take advantage of the real-time potential of 
miniaturized instruments.
    Tags and Seals are enjoying a renewed interest as a result of 
domestic and international arms control applications.

Broad Area Search and Analysis Program

    The Broad Area Search and Analysis (BASA) program addresses the 
difficulties associated with the detection and classification of 
proliferation facilities, particularly those that are located 
underground. Sensor development and analysis activities fall into 
several research topic areas: Multispectral/Hyperspectral/Ultraspectral 
imaging, Synthetic Aperture Radar, Advanced Airborne Systems, Power 
Line Monitoring, and Geophysical Methods. The potential for false 
alarms as a result of any single technique may be quite high. Hence, 
the final BASA research area is Data Fusion to optimize the facility 
characterization while minimizing the false alarm probability.

[[Page 45235]]

    Multispectral/Hyperspectral/Ultraspectral Systems include imaging 
throughout the visible, infrared, and ultraviolet spectral bands. 
Nominally, multispectral systems contain 2-19 bands of data and are 
relatively mature. Hyperspectral systems include 20-299 bands and are 
relatively new sensors. Ultraspectral systems have 300 or more bands. 
Correspondingly, data from the multispectral systems have been used for 
decades and is mature while the exploitation of the data from 
hyperspectral is in its adolescence and ultraspectral data analysis is 
in its infancy.
    The thrust of the research in this area is in algorithm development 
for new exploration tools to interpret alterations of the natural 
patterns that occur as the result of man's activities. The alterations 
may be the result of perturbations in drainage patterns, development of 
vegetation stress, deposition of effluents and their effects, overt or 
covert construction, etc. Such alterations can often be observed from 
great distances such as satellite orbits. Thus there is great potential 
for exploiting alterations by systems that cover large or nationwide 
areas. Significant issues include calibration, removal of atmospheric 
effects and the ability to find information of interest. The algorithms 
must be able to distill large quantities of data to the essential, 
proliferation-relevant information for data transmission and effective 
visualization by decision-makers.
    New concepts are also welcome for 1) specialized, deployable, 
adaptive or reconfigurable processor hardware; 2) combined passive/
active optical systems; or 3) self-unfolding/adjusting optics to 
package large systems in small satellites.
    Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) technology is advancing rapidly as 
we develop the systems and the processing means to utilize this 
technology. The Interferometric SAR has shown great potential for 
digital terrain mapping, coherent change detection, motion detection, 
and other uses. The thrust of research in this area for the future will 
be in increasing our processing capabilities, particularly near-real 
time processing, so that we can then push forward with plans for 
increased systems capabilities. The great advantage which radar systems 
have over optical systems is their ability to image under any weather 
conditions. The primary disadvantage is that they provide a 
monochromatic image of reflective surfaces rather than a full or false 
color imaging. However, future dual or multiband SAR systems offer the 
potential of textural or polarization information that may correlate 
with surface types.
    New concepts for using passive microwave sensors and imaging arrays 
are also welcome.
    Power Line Monitoring includes several technology thrusts that 
utilize data either obtained from or derived from power line systems. 
Engineering principles and grid modeling of power line configurations 
may be used together with observable line configurations to determine 
the likelihood of missing or buried elements. Transient pulses may be 
introduced into the lines to confirm or refute the modeled behavior. 
The passive electromagnetic fields emanating from the power lines may 
be mapped, modeled, and analyzed.
    Geophysical Methods include gravity, magnetics, and electromagnetic 
induction (EMI). Gravity and magnetics look for variations in the 
earth's natural fields due to the presence of clandestine facilities. 
The deficiency of mass due to excavation of an underground facility 
generates a gravity low and the presence of ferromagnetic materials 
such as iron in the reinforced concrete and machinery of the facility 
generates a magnetic high. Thus one may look for a localized 
perturbation of the normal fields as an indication of an underground 
facility. The field perturbations generated by such facilities decay 
rapidly and generally must be observed within a few thousand meters. 
Effective use of these technologies may require the development of both 
improved instruments and stabilized airborne platforms. These 
development tasks are formidable and require a demonstration of the 
utility of the techniques, modeling to show the potential at extended 
distances, and an evaluation of the merits of such technology.
    Data Fusion is needed to merge the information from the disparate 
technologies cited in the previous sections. Each individual sensor 
measures some phenomenology that may be indicative of proliferation 
activity. The false alarm rate for any given technique may be quite 
high. e.g. there are numerous reasons why there may be a gravity low or 
why vegetation may be stressed, etc. But combined with other 
techniques, the false positive rate is expected to be significantly 
lower.

Remote Chemical Detection Program

    The goal of the Remote Chemical Detection Program is to be able to 
detect chemicals from a stack/vent plume at a distance. Innovative 
algorithms which can quickly analyze large volumes of hyperspectral or 
ultraspectral data are needed. The goal is to process data from passive 
and/or active sensors into usable information. Key issues include 
removal of atmospheric effects, backgrounds and other interferences in 
the mid-wave infrared (3-5 microns) or in the long-wave infrared (8-14 
micron) regions. Algorithms which require a pixel-by-pixel removal of 
these effects are too computationally intensive and will not be 
considered. Proposals should be tied to specific sensors and contain 
benchmarks for how new algorithms improve on the state-of-the-art.

Counter Nuclear Smuggling Program

    The primary technical goals of the Counter Nuclear Smuggling 
Program are to improve capabilities to detect and intercept diverted 
nuclear materials, and to provide improved analytical tools to aid 
forensics and attribution assessment. The primary technical challenges 
that arise from these goals are: to develop operationally useful, 
automated and cost-effective nuclear material detectors; to develop 
robust techniques to detect highly enriched uranium; to develop systems 
to detect nuclear materials in transit; to develop technologies to 
search for nuclear material; and to develop the tools and the data 
bases for forensic and attribution assessment of foreign nuclear 
material. To address these challenges the Counter Nuclear Smuggling R&D 
program is organized into the following program elements: Fundamental 
Detection Technology; Highly Enriched Uranium Detection; Nuclear 
Material Tracking and Search; and Forensics and Attribution Assessment.
    Fundamental Detection Technology is aimed at means for detecting 
the intrinsic and/or stimulated radiation from concealed Special 
Nuclear Materials (SNM). This type of technology would allow technical 
barriers to be employed for detecting and deterring illicit movement of 
nuclear materials. The overall objective is to develop new sensors that 
are intelligent, provide automated response, operate at room 
temperature, consume little power, have good resolution, are cost 
effective, and have a low false alarm rate. This can be accomplished at 
many levels including basic and applied research on detection 
materials, integration of current high resolution room temperature 
materials (in particular cadmium zinc telluride) into fieldable 
detector systems, development of alternative cooling systems for high 
resolution detectors, and miniaturization by exploiting Application 
Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) and microfabrication technology.

[[Page 45236]]

    Highly Enriched Uranium Detection is extremely difficult in a 
passive mode, and HEU is the most likely material a terrorist would use 
for a nuclear device. For this reason, there is interest in advancing 
active interrogation technologies into prototype HEU detection systems. 
The primary emphasis is on developing systems for choke point 
monitoring of luggage, small packages, large containers, trucks, rail 
cars and sea-going containers. Novel techniques to improve passive or 
active detection of HEU are encouraged.
    Nuclear Material Tracking and Search capabilities need to be 
improved for materials and/or weapons in transit. Possible methods to 
improve material tracking include data fusion techniques to improve the 
capability of integrated networks of sensors and the tagging of 
materials. The goal is to develop systems which can be deployed in 
areas around key facilities to detect and track in-coming or out-going 
nuclear materials to facilitate interception. Tagging techniques to 
improve the ability to monitor the movement of nuclear materials are 
also feasible. These measures are typically expected to be extrinsic 
devices, e.g. RF transmitters integrated into storage or shipping 
containers to track material while in transit or moving inside storage/
handling facilities.
    Nuclear material search is extremely important and difficult when 
diversion is suspected or known but location and recovery have not yet 
occurred. Search requires cueing, e.g. by INTEL or tip-off, to reduce 
the search region to a feasible size. DOE Emergency Response, 
Radiological Assistance Program and Nuclear Emergency Search Teams have 
the pre-eminent nuclear search capability. This program element 
involves the development of techniques, systems, and devices to improve 
the capabilities of this community. Both passive and active techniques 
will be explored.
    Forensics and Attribution Assessment focuses on the development of 
relevant databases and forensics tools to aid in attribution 
assessment. The goal of attribution assessment is to identify the 
diversion point, the original source of the material, and the 
perpetrators. Recently, a laboratory exercise on a blind sample of 
seized nuclear material indicated that the DOE laboratories have 
extensive analytical capabilities to characterize such materials. 
Lacking is the ability to identify the diversion point, the original 
source of the material, and the perpetrator. To improve these 
capabilities, research on trace detection and attribution assessment is 
needed. This will require research into potential unique 
characteristics (isotopes, isotope ratios, etc.) and the relevant 
databases to attribute the nuclear material to the original source, 
which in turn will help identify the perpetrator.

    Issuance: Issued in Las Vegas, Nevada, on August 13, 1998.
G. W. Johnson,
Head of Contracting Activity.
[FR Doc. 98-22780 Filed 8-24-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P