[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 156 (Thursday, August 13, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 43386-43392]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-21744]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY


Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice of an amended Record of Decision.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) prepared a final 
programmatic environmental impact statement, Storage and Disposition of 
Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials (Storage and Disposition PEIS) (DOE/
EIS-0229, December 1996) in accordance with the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA), Council on Environmental Quality NEPA implementing 
regulations, and DOE implementing procedures. The Storage and 
Disposition PEIS, among other things, assesses the potential 
environmental impacts of alternatives and locations for storing 
weapons-usable fissile materials (plutonium and highly enriched 
uranium).
    On January 14, 1997, DOE issued a Record of Decision (Storage and 
Disposition ROD), 62 FR 3014, (January 21, 1997), selecting weapons-
usable fissile materials storage and surplus plutonium disposition 
strategies. For plutonium storage, DOE decided to consolidate part of 
its weapons-usable plutonium storage by upgrading and expanding 
existing and planned facilities at the Pantex Plant (Pantex) near 
Amarillo, Texas and the Savannah River Site (SRS) near Aiken, South 
Carolina. For plutonium currently stored at the Hanford Site (Hanford) 
near Richland, Washington, and other DOE sites, DOE decided that 
surplus weapons-usable plutonium would remain at these sites until 
disposition (or move to lag storage at a disposition facility). The 
weapons-usable plutonium stored at the Rocky Flats Environmental 
Technology Site (RFETS), near Golden, Colorado, would be moved to 
Pantex and the SRS. However, the plutonium destined for the SRS, i.e., 
non-pit, weapons-usable surplus plutonium, would be moved only if: (1) 
the plutonium had been stabilized under corrective actions in response 
to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 
94-1 and packaged to meet the DOE storage Standard 3013-96, Criteria 
for Safe Storage of Plutonium Metals and Oxides, (2) the construction 
and expansion of the Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility (APSF) at 
the SRS had been completed, and (3) the SRS had been selected in the 
upcoming Record of Decision for the Surplus Plutonium Disposition 
Environmental Impact Statement as the immobilization disposition site 
for surplus weapons-usable plutonium.
    In order to support the early closure of the RFETS and the early 
deactivation of plutonium storage facilities at the Hanford site, DOE 
is modifying, contingent upon the satisfaction of certain conditions, 
some of the decisions made in its Storage and Disposition ROD 
associated with surplus plutonium storage pending disposition. Namely, 
DOE will take steps that allow: (1) the accelerated shipment of all 
non-pit surplus weapons-usable plutonium from the RFETS (about 7 metric 
tons) to the SRS beginning in about 2000, in advance of completion of 
the APSF in 2001, and (2) the relocation of all Hanford surplus 
weapons-usable plutonium (about 4.6 metric tons) to the SRS, between 
about 2002 and 2005, pending disposition. However, consistent with the 
Storage and Disposition PEIS ROD, DOE will only implement the movement 
of RFETS and Hanford non-pit, surplus weapons-usable plutonium 
inventories to the SRS if the SRS is selected as the immobilization 
disposition site. DOE is preparing the Surplus Plutonium Disposition 
Environmental Impact Statement (SPD EIS), draft issued July 1998, as 
part of the decision making process for determining an immobilization 
site.1
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ SRS has been identified by DOE as the preferred site for the 
immobilization disposition facility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To accommodate the storage of Hanford surplus weapons-usable 
plutonium, DOE will expand the APSF as planned in the Storage and 
Disposition ROD. In addition, to accommodate the early receipt and 
storage of the RFETS surplus plutonium, the Department will prepare 
additional suitable storage space in Building 105-K (i.e., K-Reactor) 
in the K-Area at the SRS. Portions of Building 105-K will be modified 
to provide safe and secure plutonium storage. Safeguards and security 
features will be upgraded, criticality monitoring devices will be 
installed, structural features will be inspected and repaired, roof 
vents will be added, and doors will be modified. Several areas in the 
facility will be decontaminated and excess equipment will be removed to 
provide additional floor space.
    Modifications will also include dismantling and removing unused 
process equipment in four building areas: Stack Area, Crane Maintenance 
Area, Crane Wash Area, and Process Room.
    Security systems in the four building areas will be reactivated and 
upgraded to support using them for plutonium storage. Existing systems 
including the K-Area security perimeter, security control system and 
building water/power ventilation support systems will be used. Building 
modifications will provide for truck loading and unloading, material 
conformation, shipping accountability measurements, and storage. The 
Department will also declassify (process the metal to produce 
unclassified ``buttons'') some of the RFETS plutonium materials using 
SRS's FB-Line (in the F-Area) and after declassification, package this 
material in the APSF to meet the DOE storage Standard 3013-96, Criteria 
for Safe Storage of Plutonium Metals and Oxides.
    All plutonium materials shipped to SRS will be stable and, except 
for classified metal and/or parts, will be packaged to meet the 
requirements of the DOE Standard 3013-96, Criteria for Safe Storage of 
Plutonium Metals and Oxides, before shipment. All shipments of 
plutonium to SRS will be by Safe Secure Transport (SST) in accordance 
with applicable DOE, U.S. Department of Transportation and U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission requirements and regulations. Some of the RFETS 
plutonium material packaged and shipped will be less than 50% plutonium 
by weight; as a result, there will be approximately 3% more total 
weight of material and a corresponding increase in the number of 
shipments than considered in the Storage and Disposition PEIS, although 
the total amount of plutonium in the material will remain about the 
same.
    Under the previous ROD, a maximum of 10 metric tons of surplus 
plutonium, including plutonium from RFETS and existing onsite 
plutonium, would be

[[Page 43387]]

stored at SRS in the APSF, pending disposition, provided that SRS is 
selected as the immobilization site following completion of the Surplus 
Plutonium Disposition EIS. Transfer of plutonium from RFETS to SRS 
would begin when the APSF is completed in 2001.
    With this amended ROD, a total of approximately 11.6 metric tons of 
surplus weapons-usable plutonium from Hanford and RFETS (in addition to 
existing onsite SRS surplus plutonium, for a total of approximately 14 
metric tons of surplus plutonium) could be stored at SRS in the APSF 
and Building 105-K, pending disposition, provided that SRS is selected 
as the immobilization site. Transfer of plutonium from RFETS to SRS 
would begin when the modifications to Building 105-K are completed, 
i.e., in about 2000; shipments of plutonium from Hanford to SRS would 
begin in about 2002.
    This amended ROD only alters DOE's previous decision (Storage and 
Disposition ROD) for the storage of non-pit, surplus weapons-usable 
plutonium currently located at the RFETS and Hanford sites. No changes 
are being made to other storage decisions or any decisions associated 
with surplus fissile material disposition.
    In accordance with 10 CFR 1021.314, DOE has prepared a Supplement 
Analysis to determine if these changes require a supplement to the 
Storage and Disposition PEIS under the Council on Environmental Quality 
Regulations at 40 CFR 1502.9(c). The Supplement Analysis shows that the 
new proposed action does not result in a substantial change to 
environmental concerns evaluated in the Storage and Disposition PEIS. 
Also, the Supplement Analysis shows that the proposed action does not 
present significant new circumstances or information relevant to the 
environmental concerns evaluated in the Storage and Disposition PEIS. 
Therefore, based on the Supplement Analysis, DOE has determined that a 
supplement to the Storage and Disposition PEIS is not required, and DOE 
has decided not to prepare such a supplement.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on the long-
term storage or the disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials, or 
to receive a copy of the final Storage and Disposition PEIS, the 
Storage and Disposition EIS ROD or the Supplement Analysis, contact: G. 
Bert Stevenson, NEPA Compliance Officer, Office of Fissile Materials 
Disposition (MD-4), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence 
Avenue, SW., 1Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-5368.
    For further information on the DOE NEPA process, contact: Carol M. 
Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Assistance (EH-42), U.S. 
Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 
20585, (202) 586-4600, or leave a message at (800) 472-2756.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

A. Current Storage Program and Original Decision for Surplus Weapons-
Usable Plutonium

    DOE is currently phasing out the storage of all weapons-usable 
plutonium at RFETS. The phaseout involves shipping all RFETS pits to 
Pantex, and shipping all RFETS surplus non-pit, weapons-usable 
plutonium to the SRS (subject to certain conditions) starting in about 
2001. As decided in the January 1997 Storage and Disposition PEIS ROD, 
the stabilized non-pit, surplus weapons-usable plutonium would not be 
moved unless and until: expansion of the APSF 2 at the SRS 
had been completed; the RFETS material had been stabilized and packaged 
to meet the Criteria for Safe Storage of Plutonium Metals and Oxides 
for long-term storage under corrective actions in response to the 
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 94-1; and DOE 
had decided to immobilize plutonium at the SRS. The Department also 
decided to continue the current storage of surplus plutonium at 
Hanford, the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory 
(INEEL), and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) pending disposition 
(or movement to lag storage); and to pursue a strategy for plutonium 
disposition that would immobilize surplus weapons-usable plutonium in 
glass or ceramic forms and would allow the burning of some of the 
surplus weapons-usable plutonium (mostly from pits) as mixed oxide fuel 
in existing commercial light-water reactors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\  The APSF has been designed but not built. Construction is 
scheduled to start in October 1998 and the facility is scheduled to 
be in operation by October 2001. Expansion of the APSF refers to 
increasing the vault capacity of the facility to the current design 
of 5,000 storage positions (sufficient storage space for current SRS 
materials and RFETS materials).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Need to Change Storage Program

    Recently, DOE has estimated that accelerating the closure of RFETS 
from 2010 to 2006 could save as much as $1.3 billion. Integral to 
achieving an accelerated closure of the site would be removal of the 
non-pit, surplus weapons-usable plutonium to SRS two years earlier than 
the current plan. Removal of the surplus plutonium at RFETS is only one 
of several steps to realize the savings. Other steps are proposed or 
ongoing pursuant to separate NEPA review. DOE also expects that the 
transfer of non-pit, surplus weapons-useable plutonium from Hanford to 
Savannah River could save as much as $150 million in upgrade and 
operating costs for plutonium storage facilities at the Hanford Site. 
As with the RFETS plutonium, the transfer would not be accomplished 
unless DOE decided to locate the plutonium immobilization facility at 
the Savannah River Site. The implementation cost for the proposed 
action is estimated to be approximately $93 million.
    Closing RFETS by 2006 would, among other things, require the 
removal of non-pit, surplus weapons-usable plutonium metal and oxide 
from RFETS by 2002. In order to remove all the non-pit, surplus 
weapons-usable plutonium from RFETS by 2002, DOE would have to begin 
transferring the material to the SRS by January 2000, prior to 
completing the construction of the APSF.
    DOE has also reevaluated plutonium storage operations at Hanford 
and determined that transferring all (about 4.6 metric tons) non-pit, 
surplus weapons-usable plutonium from that site for storage could save 
the Department as much as $150 million by avoiding upgrade and 
operating costs for plutonium storage facilities at the Hanford Site. 
DOE is considering the early transfer of plutonium from Hanford to the 
SRS as a means of achieving this savings.
    These transfers would not occur unless DOE decides to immobilize 
plutonium at the SRS. A ROD to select the immobilization site is 
anticipated in early 1999 in the SPD EIS.

C. Proposed Action

    The Department of Energy is proposing to accelerate the movement of 
all (about 7 metric tons) of non-pit, surplus weapons-usable plutonium 
at the RFETS and to move all (about 4.6 metric tons) of the surplus 
weapons-usable plutonium at Hanford to the SRS for storage pending 
disposition. The RFETS plutonium would be shipped to the SRS from about 
January 2000 through 2002. The Hanford plutonium would be shipped to 
the SRS from about 2002 through 2005.
    The plutonium would not be moved to SRS unless the Department 
decides to disposition (immobilize) the non-pit,

[[Page 43388]]

surplus weapons-usable plutonium at SRS, after completion of the final 
Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement. In 
addition, the plutonium would not be shipped until it were stabilized 
and packaged to meet DOE Standard 3013-96, Criteria for Safe Storage of 
Plutonium Metals and Oxides in response to Defense Nuclear Facilities 
Safety Board Recommendation 94-1. This proposed action is consistent 
with DOE's objective, as explained in the ROD for the Storage and 
Disposition PEIS, to reduce over time the number of locations where 
plutonium is stored in the DOE complex.
    Starting in about January 2000, all non-pit, surplus weapons-usable 
plutonium (except for classified plutonium) would be shipped to 
Building 105-K. At Building 105-K, the shipping containers \3\ would be 
unloaded using a battery powered fork-lift truck. Material control and 
accountability measurements would be made at Building 105-K. The 
shipping containers would then be loaded onto metal pallets and 
transferred to a storage location in the building. DOE would not open 
any of the shipping containers in Building 105-K. While in storage, the 
containers would be inspected on a regular basis to assure external 
container integrity.3 DOE has successfully used (and 
continues to use) shipping containers for plutonium storage at the SRS. 
No problems with a loss of material confinement have been experienced 
to date.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ To support the proposed action, DOE would purchase 
additional Type 9975 shipping containers, which are Type B 
containers and would also be used for storage. This would be done so 
that storing the RFETS materials in shipping containers pending 
disposition will not impact the Department's supply of Type B 
shipping containers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Portions of Building 105-K will be modified to facilitate plutonium 
storage. Safeguards and security features will be upgraded, criticality 
monitoring devices will be installed, structural features will be 
inspected and repaired, and roof vents will be added and doors will be 
modified. Several areas in the facility will be decontaminated and 
excess equipment will be removed to provide additional floor 
space.4
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ A portion of these activities could be completed as part of 
maintenance, clean-up, and decontamination activities at SRS that 
DOE has determined are categorically excluded from further NEPA 
review.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Modifications will include dismantling and removing unused process 
equipment in four building areas: Stack Area, Crane Maintenance Area, 
Crane Wash Area, and Process Room. These areas total approximately 
30,000 square feet, are within the security areas that existed for 
reactor operations, and are adjacent to a currently active highly 
enriched uranium storage area. Security systems in the four building 
areas will be reactivated and upgraded to support using them for 
plutonium storage. Existing systems including the K-Area security 
perimeter, security control system and building water/power ventilation 
support systems will be used. Building modifications will provide for 
truck loading and unloading, material conformation, shipping 
accountability measurements, and storage.
    Some of the RFETS plutonium is in a classified form, which would 
restrict the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from access to 
the material. DOE intends to make the APSF vault, and potentially 
Building 105-K, available for IAEA inspection. As a result, the RFETS 
plutonium needs to be declassified. To accomplish this objective, DOE 
would transfer the classified RFETS plutonium to F-Area for processing 
(declassifying) in the FB-Line facility at SRS. In the FB-Line 
facility, the plutonium would be melted using existing facilities and 
equipment that are part of the plutonium metal production process for 
which the FB-Line facility was designed. The declassification work 
would not be done on a continuous basis, but rather whenever processing 
capabilities were available. The RFETS plutonium would be fashioned 
into metal ``buttons'' that are the traditional FB-Line product. After 
the ``buttons'' are fabricated, the material would be transferred to 
the APSF and packaged to meet the requirements of DOE's plutonium 
storage standard. Then, the material would be placed in type B shipping 
containers and transported to Building 105-K for storage. 
Alternatively, the material could remain in the APSF vault, if space is 
available to allow for operational flexibility.
    Some of the RFETS plutonium materials would be less than 50% 
plutonium by weight and would involve approximately 3% more total 
weight of material and a corresponding increase in the number of 
shipments than considered in the S&D PEIS.
    Beginning in about 2002, SRS would begin to receive from Hanford 
stabilized plutonium packaged to meet DOE's long-term standard for 
placement in the APSF. Once APSF is operating, DOE could transfer a 
portion of the RFETS material from Building 105-K to the APSF in order 
to provide for operational flexibility. The plutonium from RFETS and 
Hanford would remain in storage at the APSF and Building 105-K pending 
disposition along with existing SRS surplus plutonium.
    The plutonium would be transferred in type B shipping containers by 
truck using methods and routes described in the Storage and Disposition 
PEIS (i.e., the Department of Energy's Safe Secure Transport System).
    If DOE decides to pursue the No Action alternative for the 
disposition of surplus plutonium in the SPD EIS Record of Decision, the 
SRS, RFETS, and Hanford materials would remain in storage at their 
current sites in accordance with the No Action alternative. If the DOE 
decides to immobilize surplus plutonium at Hanford, the SRS and RFETS 
materials would be shipped to Hanford in accordance with the decisions 
reached in the SPD EIS Record of Decision.

II. NEPA Process for Amending ROD

A. Supplement Analysis

    Pursuant to DOE regulations in 10 CFR 1021.314, DOE has prepared a 
Supplement Analysis, Supplement Analysis for Storing Plutonium in the 
Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility and Building 105-K at the 
Savannah River Site (July 1998), to help determine whether a supplement 
to the Storage and Disposition PEIS is required under the Council on 
Environmental Quality Regulations, 40 CFR 1502.9(c). The Supplement 
Analysis compares the potential impacts of the new proposed action to 
the impacts discussed for the plutonium storage alternatives in the 
Storage and Disposition PEIS. The Supplement Analysis shows that the 
new proposed action does not make a substantial change to environmental 
concerns evaluated in the Storage and Disposition PEIS. Furthermore, 
the Supplement Analysis shows that there are no new significant 
circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and 
bearing on the proposed action or its impact.

B. Comparison of Potential Impacts

    The facilities involved (i.e, Building 105-K and the APSF) are or 
will be located in existing industrial areas at the SRS.
     Land Resources, Site Infrastructure, Geology and Soils, 
Biology Resources and Cultural and Paleontological Resources. There are 
no aquatic habitats or wetlands in these areas nor are there any 
threatened or endangered species. None of the affected facilities have 
been nominated for inclusion in the National Register of Historic 
Places, and there are no plans for such nominations.
    Based on evaluations in the Storage and Disposition PEIS and 
information

[[Page 43389]]

incorporated in the Supplement Analysis from the Final Environmental 
Impact Statements on the Interim Management of Nuclear Materials (DOE/
EIS-0220, October, 1995)(IMNMS EIS) there would be little or no impact 
to land resources, site infrastructure, geology and soils, biology 
resources and cultural and Paleontological resources by the 
construction, operation and expansion of the APSF. This is equally true 
for Building 105-K since all storage operations would occur within the 
existing Building 105-K structure.
     It is expected that declassification of the RFETS material 
would require 100 Mw hrs/yr of electricity. This work would not require 
modification to the FB-line's electrical system and is well within the 
capacity of the facility and the site.
     Packaging and Transportation. The transportation routes to 
the SRS would be the same as those assumed in the Storage and 
Disposition PEIS (i.e., overland truck routes on interstate highways 
and state roads). Transportation operations would not change. DOE 
estimates that the total inter-site transportation impact associated 
with transferring plutonium from the RFETS and Hanford to the SRS would 
be 0.07 potential latent cancer fatalities, which would be 
approximately the same as for the Preferred Alternative in the Storage 
and Disposition PEIS.5 DOE estimates that the intra-site 
transportation activities could add an additional 0.01 latent cancer 
fatalities to the worker population.6
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ The impact is the sum of the impact of transportation of 
RFETS non-pit plutonium under the Preferred Alternative in the 
Storage and Disposition PEIS and the incremental impact for shipping 
the Hanford plutonium.
    \6\ In inter-site transportation analyses, non-radiological 
accidents would be the greatest contributor to fatalities. In the 
case of intra-site transportation, impacts would be due primarily to 
radiation doses received from normal transportation operations. 
Effects from intra-site accidents, if any, would likely be 
negligible. Historically, certified containers maintain their 
integrity in accident situations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Air Quality and Noise. Storage: Accomplishing the proposed 
action, including the modifications to Building 105-K, would add no 
significant air quality and noise impacts above the existing site 
baseline. Therefore, air quality and noise impacts from the plutonium 
storage aspects of the proposed action would be essentially the same as 
the air quality and noise impacts from the Preferred Alternative of the 
Storage and Disposition PEIS (i.e., the Upgrade With RFETS Non-Pit 
Material alternative).
    Declassification/Repackaging: DOE estimates there would be a small 
increase in non-radiological air emissions for declassification 
operations (i.e., metal conversion operations in FB-Line) above the 
non-radiological air emissions estimated for the No Action and the 
Upgrade alternatives in the Storage and Disposition PEIS. Non-
radiological air emissions would be well within State and Federal 
regulatory limits. Repackaging activities are not expected to involve 
the use of chemicals, beyond a very small amount of decontamination 
liquid.
     Water Resources. Storage: The maximum impact to water 
resources, above existing site baseline usage and discharges, expected 
from plutonium storage aspects of DOE's proposed action would be about 
the same as presented in the Upgrade With RFETS and LANL Material 
alternative of the Storage and Disposition PEIS,7 i.e., 
there would be a 0.01% increase in water use and a 0.1% increase in 
waste water discharges. The water impacts from the proposed action 
would have a negligible effect on site water or waste treatment 
capacity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\  Table 4.2.6.4-1 of the Storage and Disposition PEIS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The impacts of radiological liquid discharges from Building 105-K 
are included as part of the No Action alternative in the Storage and 
Disposition PEIS. DOE expects there would be no significant increase 
above the No Action alternative discharge levels since, during normal 
operations, water is not in contact with plutonium storage containers.
    Declassification/Repackaging: DOE estimates declassification 
operations would cause a small and insignificant increase in water 
usage beyond the water requirement estimated for other site operations.
    Repackaging activities in the APSF are expected to have essentially 
no impact to water resources beyond the site base line operations 
presented in the No Action alternative of the Storage and Disposition 
PEIS. 8 Repackaging operations would not significantly 
increase the use of water resources beyond that required to operate the 
industrial systems associated with the APSF, e.g., chillers for air 
conditioning, sanitary sewer, potable water, etc., because additional 
water is not used in repackaging operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\  Table 4.2.6.4-1 of the Storage and Disposition PEIS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Socioeconomics. Storage: The socioeconomic impact of 
operating Building 105-K for plutonium storage would be essentially the 
same as the impact described for the Preferred Alternative of the 
Storage and Disposition PEIS. The socioeconomic impact of modifying 
Building 105-K and operating both APSF and Building 105-K would be well 
within the impacts described for the Consolidation alternative of the 
Storage and Disposition PEIS.
    The socioeconomic impacts at RFETS and Hanford of moving surplus 
plutonium to SRS were analyzed in the Storage and Disposition PEIS. The 
analysis concluded that this action would phase out plutonium storage 
at RFETS and Hanford. Approximately 200 direct job losses at Hanford, 
in addition to the 2000 at RFETS, would result. Compared to the total 
employment in those areas, the loss of these jobs and the impacts to 
the regional economies would not be significant. The proposed action 
would not change the magnitude of these impacts at RFETS, but cause 
them to occur sooner.
    Declassification/Repackaging: DOE estimates there would be 
negligible additional socioeconomic effects due to operating the APSF 
for repackaging of RFETS plutonium or operating FB-Line for 
declassification purposes because the existing site workforce would be 
used.
     Public and Occupational Health and Safety (normal 
operations). Storage. Public and Non-Involved Workers: Plutonium 
storage operations in Building 105-K would not result in any additional 
air or water radiological impacts (beyond those currently associated 
with other operations in Building 105-K) because no shipping containers 
or storage containers would be opened in Building 105-K. Since air and 
water emissions create impacts that affect the non-involved workers and 
the public, there would be no significant additional radiological 
impact to the public or non-involved workers from normal operations in 
Building 105-K. Therefore, the impact from the proposed action to the 
public and non-involved workers would be essentially the same as the 
impact from the Preferred Alternative in the Storage and Disposition 
PEIS.
    Involved Workers: DOE estimated that the potential health impact 
from 50 years of APSF storage to individual involved workers for the 
Preferred Alternative in the Storage and Disposition PEIS was a latent 
cancer fatality risk of 5x10-3 and that 1.5x10-1 
latent cancer fatalities could occur in the involved worker population. 
DOE estimates that the potential health impacts from 10 years of 
operating Building 105-K to store plutonium could result in a risk of 
latent cancer

[[Page 43390]]

fatality for the average Building 105-K involved worker of 
1.5x10-3 and 2.6x10-2 latent cancer fatalities in 
the Building 105-K involved worker population. Since the Storage and 
Disposition PEIS bases health impacts on 50 years of storage, for 
comparison purposes, the impacts from 50 years of plutonium storage in 
the APSF are added to the impacts from 10 years of plutonium storage in 
Building 105-K. Using this approach, the health impacts from storing 
plutonium in the APSF and in Building 105-K would be 0.18 latent cancer 
fatalities in the involved worker population of both facilities.
    Health impacts to involved workers for the plutonium storage 
aspects of the proposed action in this Supplement Analysis (0.18 latent 
cancer fatalities) would be essentially the same as the health impact 
estimated in the Preferred Alternative of the Storage and Disposition 
PEIS (0.15 latent cancer fatalities).
    Declassification/Repackaging Radiological Impacts. Public, Non-
involved Workers, Involved Workers: For declassification operations the 
potential health effect from the postulated radiation dose to the 
maximally exposed member of the public at the Site boundary would be 
1.7x10-6 latent cancer fatalities. The potential health 
effect from the postulated radiation dose to the population surrounding 
the SRS and to workers would be 0.068 latent cancer fatalities and 
0.078 latent cancer fatalities, respectively, above those predicted in 
the Preferred Alternative in the Storage and Disposition PEIS.
    For repackaging operations (i.e., repackaging all plutonium from 
the RFETS in the APSF for 2 years) the potential health effect from the 
postulated radiation dose to the maximally exposed member of the public 
at the site boundary would be 7.5x10-12 latent cancer 
fatalities. The potential health effect from the postulated radiation 
dose to the population surrounding the SRS and to workers would be 
1.5x10-7 latent cancer fatalities and 2.5x10-2 
latent cancer fatalities, respectively, above those predicted in the 
Preferred Alternative in the Storage and Disposition PEIS. The impacts 
from repackaging, only the RFETS plutonium that would be declassified 
in the FB-Line would be less.
    Building 105-K Modification. Public, Non-Involved Workers, Involved 
Workers: No impacts to non-involved workers or the public would be 
expected from the decontamination, modification, removal, and 
construction work because this work is not expected to generate 
significant air or water emissions. Work activities are confined to the 
interior of Building 105-K and airborne radioactivity levels are 
routinely monitored during work. Liquid sources would not be released 
from the building during normal decontamination, removal, or 
construction work. The potential health impact to workers, in the form 
of the risk of latent cancer fatality, would be 4x10-4 for 
18 months of decontamination and construction work and the number of 
latent cancer fatalities that could be expected in the worker 
population was estimated to be 2x10-2. The risks associated 
with the modification of Building 105-K are approximately ten percent 
of the risks estimated for storage of the plutonium in the Preferred 
Alternative of the Storage and Disposition PEIS.
Summary
    Public: In the Storage and Disposition PEIS, DOE estimated the 
potential health impact to the population surrounding the SRS from 
existing site operations and for the Upgrade Alternative over 50 years 
was 1.1 latent cancer fatalities. Accomplishing the new proposed action 
would slightly increase that potential health impact to about 1.2 
latent cancer fatalities. Emissions would remain within the limits of 
the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants permits 
for the APSF and Building 105-K.
    Workers: In the Storage and Disposition PEIS, DOE estimated that 
the potential health impact to the total site workforce from existing 
site operations over 50 years would be 5.3 latent cancer fatalities. 
Accomplishing the proposed action would increase the potential health 
impact to the site workforce by 0.3 to 5.6 latent cancer fatalities. 
This new estimate in total site workforce health impact is slightly 
greater than the health impact of 5.3 latent cancer fatalities 
estimated for the Preferred Alternative in the Storage and Disposition 
PEIS and is slightly lower than the health impact of 5.7 latent cancer 
fatalities that DOE estimated for the Consolidation alternative in the 
Storage and Disposition PEIS.
    Storage Chemical Impacts. There would be no significant impact to 
the public or workers from hazardous chemicals due to plutonium storage 
operations in Building 105-K. There are no industrial systems or other 
operations involved in the plutonium storage operations that would add 
to existing Building 105-K chemical impacts.
     Waste Management. Modifications to Building 105-K: DOE 
estimates that decontamination and removal activities which would make 
Building 105-K available for storage operations would generate 750 
cubic meters of low level waste, which is less than 1% of the low-level 
waste DOE expects to be generated by SRS activities as described in the 
No Action alternative of the Storage and Disposition PEIS. DOE does not 
expect to generate any significant quantities of other wastes in order 
to modify Building 105-K. No high-level radioactive waste would be 
generated.
    Storage: DOE estimated that storing plutonium in the APSF, as 
described in the Preferred Alternative of the Storage and Disposition 
PEIS, would not generate any of the following radioactive wastes: high-
level, transuranic, mixed transuranic, low-level, mixed low-level or 
hazardous (other than minor quantities). DOE estimates that storing 
plutonium in Building 105-K would not significantly change the estimate 
for the Preferred Alternative in the Storage and Disposition PEIS.
    Declassification/Repackaging: DOE estimates that declassifying 
RFETS plutonium would generate about: 88 m\3\ of transuranic waste; 4 
m\3\ of mixed waste; and 44 m\3\ of low-level radioactive waste. No 
high-level waste is expected. These additional amounts of waste 
represent a small fraction of these types of waste that are generated 
at the site by other operations. The site has sufficient capacity to 
accommodate this increase in waste volume.
     Accidents. Storage: For the Building 105-K design basis 
accidents, DOE estimated that the maximum impact to the population 
surrounding the SRS could be 0.34 latent cancer fatalities in the 
unlikely event that plutonium were released to the 105-K Building as a 
result of corrosion of a storage container. This risk is greater than 
the risk estimated for storage of plutonium in the Preferred 
Alternative and other alternatives of the S&D PEIS; however, the risk 
would be comparable to the same type of accident for the storage of 
plutonium at SRS in existing storage vaults as analyzed in the 
Continuing Storage Alternative for the Storage of Plutonium and Uranium 
in the IMNM EIS. (The IMNM accident analysis showed 0.31 latent cancer 
fatalities for the population surrounding SRS.) DOE will implement 
administrative controls (including scheduled surveillances) to limit 
actions or conditions that might lead to a release of radioactive 
materials under accident conditions. The risk to the maximally exposed 
member of the public and non-involved worker would also be greater than 
the risk for storage

[[Page 43391]]

of plutonium estimated in the Preferred Alternative and other 
alternatives of the Storage and Disposition PEIS but would be low (less 
than 3x10-3 latent cancer fatalities).
    For the postulated beyond design basis accidents, DOE estimated 
that the maximum impact to the population could be 2.7x10-4 
latent cancer fatalities in the event of a vault fire. This risk is 
greater than the risk estimated for storage of plutonium in the 
Preferred Alternative of the Storage and Disposition PEIS, but low. The 
risks to the maximally exposed public and the non-involved worker would 
also be greater than the risks for the storage of plutonium estimated 
in the Preferred Alternative of the Storage and Disposition PEIS but 
would be extremely small (less than 2x10-8 latent cancer 
fatalities). DOE estimated that the involved worker may be subject to 
injury and, in some cases, fatality as a result of potential beyond 
design basis accidents.
    Declassification/Repackaging: DOE estimates that for 
declassification operation in the FB-Line, the risk to the public would 
be 1.2x10-3 latent cancer fatalities, 2.6x10-4 
latent cancer fatalities to the maximally exposed off-site individual 
and 4.5x10-3 latent cancer fatalities/yr to the non-involved 
worker. These risks are slightly greater than the risks for storage of 
plutonium estimated in the Upgrade Alternative of the Storage and 
Disposition PEIS, but are low. For repackaging operations in the APSF, 
the risks are low and similar to the impacts presented for storage of 
plutonium in the Preferred Alternative of the Storage and Disposition 
PEIS (less than 2x10-4 latent cancer fatalities).
     Environmental Justice. For environmental justice impacts 
to occur, there must be significant and adverse human health or 
environmental impacts that disproportionately affect minority 
populations and/or low-income populations. The Supplement Analysis 
shows that accomplishing the proposed action would be within regulatory 
limits and the impacts would be very low during routine operations.
    The same Supplement Analyses also shows that accidents would not 
result in a significant risk of adverse human health or environmental 
impacts to the population who reside within 80 kilometers of the SRS. 
Therefore, such accidents would not have disproportionately high or 
adverse risk of impacts on minority or low-income populations.
    Based on the analysis in this supplement analysis, no 
disproportionate, high or adverse impact would be expected on minority 
or low-income populations.

C. Environmentally Preferable Alternative

    The environmental analyses in Chapter 4 of the Storage and 
Disposition PEIS indicate that the environmentally preferable 
alternative (the alternative with the lowest environmental impacts over 
the 50 years considered in the PEIS) for storage of weapons-usable 
fissile materials would be the Storage and Disposition PEIS Preferred 
Alternative, which consists of No Action at Hanford, Idaho National 
Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, Los Alamos National 
Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, and Nevada Test Site (NTS) (no 
fissile materials are or would be stored at the NTS) pending 
disposition, phaseout of storage at RFETS, and upgrades at the Oak 
Ridge Reservation, SRS, and Pantex. The proposed action as modified by 
this amended decision is still the environmentally preferred 
alternative.

III. Non-Environmental Considerations

A. Economic Analysis

    DOE has estimated that accelerating the closure of RFETS from 2010 
to 2006 in accordance with the DOE Closure 2006 Rocky Flats Closure 
Project Management Plan could save as much as $1.3 billion. Closing 
RFETS by 2006 would require the removal of non-pit, surplus weapons-
usable plutonium metal and oxide from RFETS by 2002. The early removal 
of the RFETS non-pit, surplus weapons-usable plutonium supports the 
early deactivation, decontamination, and decommissioning of the RFETS 
plutonium storage and packaging facilities.
    DOE also expects that the transfer of non-pit, surplus weapons-
usable plutonium from Hanford to the SRS, could save as much as $150 
million in upgrade and operating costs for plutonium storage facilities 
at the Hanford Site. As with the RFETS plutonium, the transfer would 
not be accomplished unless DOE decided to locate the plutonium 
immobilization disposition facility at the SRS.
    The implementation cost for the proposed action is estimated to be 
approximately $93 million.

B. Nonproliferation

    From a nonproliferation standpoint, the highest standards for 
safeguards and security will be employed during transportation and 
storage. There is no change in this regard from the original PEIS ROD.

IV. Amended Decision

    Consistent with the Preferred Alternative in the Storage and 
Disposition PEIS, and the Supplement Analysis, Storing Plutonium in the 
Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility and Building 105-K at the 
Savannah River Site (July 1998), the Department has decided to reduce, 
over time, the number of locations where the various forms of plutonium 
are stored, through a combination of storage alternatives in 
conjunction with a combination of disposition alternatives.
    The Department has decided to modify those aspects of the Storage 
and Disposition ROD (62 FR 3014) concerning the storage of weapons-
usable plutonium at RFETS and Hanford, pending disposition. Other 
aspects of the Storage and Disposition ROD remain unaltered. DOE has 
decided to:
     Modify an existing building (105-K) at SRS to allow the 
receipt and storage of RFETS non-pit, surplus weapons-usable plutonium.
    If the Department decides to select SRS as the immobilization site 
in the SPD EIS ROD, then the Department will:
     Ship all RFETS non-pit, surplus weapons-usable plutonium 
(about 7 MT) to SRS beginning in about 2000 through about 2002;
     Store RFETS non-classified plutonium metal and/or parts in 
shipping containers in Building 105-K at SRS beginning in about 2000;
     For RFETS classified surplus metal and/or parts, 
declassify the material in the FB-Line facility and repackage the 
material in the APSF (after construction of the APSF in about 2001). In 
the FB-Line, the plutonium will be melted using existing facilities and 
equipment that are part of the plutonium metal production process for 
which FB-Line was designed;
     Store the declassified material in Building 105-K in 
shipping containers or the APSF vault if space is available;
     Ship all Hanford non-pit, surplus weapons-usable plutonium 
(approximately 4.6 metric tons) from about 2002 through 2005 and store 
this material in the APSF;
     Before shipment, all plutonium transported from RFETS 
(except for the classified metal and/or parts) and Hanford will be 
stabilized 9 and packaged in accordance with DOE Standard-
3013-96, Criteria for Safe Storage of Plutonium Metals and Oxides for 
long-term storage. All shipments of plutonium, including the classified 
metal and parts, will be by SST in

[[Page 43392]]

accordance with applicable DOE, U.S. Department of Transportation and 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements and regulations. 
Plutonium will be packaged in certified Type B accident resistant 
packages for transport; and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ Hanford plutonium fuel that is stable would not need to be 
stabilized.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     The RFETS and Hanford Material stored at SRS may be moved 
between Building 105-K and the APSF to allow for operational 
flexibility.
    Some of the surplus plutonium at RFETS and Hanford, approximately 1 
metric ton at each site, is currently under International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) safeguards as a component of the United States 
nonproliferation policy to remove weapons-usable fissile materials from 
use for defense purposes. DOE has designed the APSF for IAEA safeguards 
and intends that plutonium stored in the APSF will be available for 
IAEA safeguards. Surplus plutonium under IAEA safeguards at RFETS and 
Hanford that may be shipped to the SRS, will remain available for IAEA 
safeguards in the APSF. Since plutonium that may be stored in Building 
105-K will remain in shipping containers and not be accessible for full 
IAEA safeguards controls (e.g., physical sampling, destructive 
analyses), DOE is considering, with the IAEA, the application of IAEA 
verification controls to ensure the plutonium stored in Building 105-K 
is not diverted for defense purposes. In addition, DOE intends, as 
indicated in the Storage and Disposition ROD, that DOE's program for 
surplus plutonium disposition will include IAEA verification as 
appropriate.
    If the DOE decides to pursue the No Action alternative for the 
disposition of surplus plutonium, the SRS, RFETS, and Hanford materials 
would remain in storage at their current sites in accordance with the 
No Action alternative in the Storage and Disposition PEIS ROD. If the 
DOE decides to immobilize surplus plutonium at Hanford, the SRS and 
RFETS materials would be shipped to Hanford in accordance with the 
decisions reached in the SPD EIS ROD.

V. Conclusion

    Under the previous ROD, a maximum of 10 metric tons of surplus 
plutonium, including plutonium from RFETS and existing onsite 
plutonium, would be stored at SRS in the APSF, pending disposition, 
provided that SRS is selected as the immobilization site following 
completion of the SPD EIS. Transfer of plutonium from RFETS to SRS 
would begin when the APSF is completed in 2001.
    With this amended ROD, a total of approximately 11.6 metric tons of 
surplus plutonium from both Hanford and RFETS (in addition to existing 
onsite SRS surplus plutonium, for a total of approximately 14 metric 
tons of surplus plutonium) would be stored at SRS in the APSF and 
Building 105-K, pending disposition, provided SRS is selected as the 
immobilization site. Transfer of plutonium from RFETS to SRS would 
begin when the modifications to Building 105-K are completed, i.e., in 
about 2000; shipments of plutonium from Hanford to SRS would begin in 
about 2002.
    DOE has decided to implement a revised program to provide for safe 
and secure storage of weapons-usable fissile materials. DOE will 
prepare to advance the consolidation of the storage of weapons-usable 
plutonium by modifying existing facilities at the SRS in South 
Carolina, and phasing out surplus plutonium storage at RFETS in 
Colorado and Hanford in Washington. Consistent with the Storage and 
Disposition PEIS ROD, this Amended ROD supports the Department's 
objectives to phase out the storage of all weapons-usable plutonium at 
the RFETS and Hanford as soon as possible and to reduce the number of 
sites where surplus weapons-usable plutonium is stored.
    The decision process reflected in this Notice complies with the 
requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 
4321 et seq.) and its implementing regulations in 40 CFR Parts 1500-
1508 and 10 CFR Part 1021.

    Issued in Washington, D.C., August 6, 1998.
Laura S. H. Holgate,
Director, Office of Fissile Materials Disposition.
[FR Doc. 98-21744 Filed 8-12-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P