[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 140 (Wednesday, July 22, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 39343-39357]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-19431]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration
[FRA Docket No. 87-2, Notice. No. 7]
RIN 2130-AB20


Automatic Train Control and Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement 
System; Northeast Corridor Railroads

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final order of particular applicability.

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SUMMARY: FRA issues an order of particular applicability (order) 
applying to certain trains operating on the track controlled by the 
National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) on the Northeast 
Corridor (NEC) between Washington, DC, and Boston, Massachusetts. The 
order requires all trains operating between New Haven, Connecticut and 
Boston (NEC-North End) to be controlled by locomotives equipped to 
respond to a new advanced civil speed enforcement system (ACSES) in 
addition to the automatic train control (ATC) system currently required 
on the NEC. On the NEC between Washington, DC and New York, New York 
(NEC-South End), where access to the high-speed track is prevented by 
switches locked in the normal position and a parallel route to the 
high-speed track is provided at crossovers from adjacent tracks, and 
where no junctions providing direct access exist, ACSES-equipped trains 
may operate to a maximum speed not to exceed 135 miles per hour (mph). 
This order also contains performance standards for the cab signal/ATC 
and ACSES systems on the NEC, and authorizes increases in certain 
maximum authorized train speeds and safety requirements supporting 
improved rail service.

DATES: This order becomes effective on August 21, 1998.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: W.E. Goodman, Staff Director, Signal 
and Train Control Division, Office of Safety, FRA, 400 Seventh Street, 
SW, Washington, DC, 20590 ((202) 632-3353), Paul Weber, Railroad Safety 
Specialist, Signal and Train Control Division, Office of Safety, FRA, 
400 Seventh Street, SW, Washington, DC, 20590 ((202) 632-3354), or 
Patricia V. Sun, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 400 Seventh Street, SW, 
Washington, DC 20590 ( (202) 632-3183).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Statutory Authority

    FRA has both discrete and plenary legal authority to require all 
trains operating on the NEC to be equipped with automatic train control 
devices. FRA has broad legal authority to ``prescribe regulations, and 
issue orders for every area of railroad safety * * *'' 49 U.S.C. 20103. 
Section 20502 of Title 49, United States Code specifically provides 
that ``[w]hen the Secretary of Transportation decides after an 
investigation that it is necessary in the public interest, the 
Secretary may order a railroad carrier to install * * * a signal system 
that complies with the requirements of the Secretary.'' As originally 
enacted and prior to formal codification, this provision referred to 
``automatic train stop, train control, and/or other similar appliances, 
methods, and systems intended to promote the safety of railroad 
operation * * .'' This authority has been previously invoked to require 
the installation of signal systems on 49 specific railroads and to 
require all railroads desiring to operate at high speeds to install 
signal systems of varying degrees of sophistication consonant with 
those higher speeds.

Proceedings to Date

    On November 20, 1997, FRA published a Proposed Order of Particular 
Applicability (proposed order) that would require all trains operating 
on the NEC-North End to be controlled by locomotives equipped to 
respond to a new advanced civil speed enforcement system in addition to 
the automatic train control system currently required on the NEC (62 FR 
62097).
    The proposed order called for written comments to be received by 
January 20, 1998, and requests for a public hearing to be received by 
December 22, 1997. On February 17, 1998, FRA held a public hearing at 
the request of several commentators.

Background--Development of the NEC

    Amtrak provides service over the NEC from Washington, DC, to 
Boston, Massachusetts. Amtrak owns or dispatches most of the NEC, which 
it shares with several commuter authorities and freight railroads. 
Current speeds on the NEC-North End range up to 110 mph.

[[Page 39344]]

    Amtrak is currently undertaking a major improvement project on the 
NEC, with particular emphasis on completion of electrification, 
installation of concrete ties and high-speed turnouts, elimination of 
some remaining highway-rail crossings, and other modifications 
concentrated between New Haven and Boston. These improvements are 
designed to facilitate service utilizing high-speed trains (HSTs) at 
speeds up to 150 mph. During 1999, Amtrak will begin taking delivery of 
HSTs expected to qualify for operation through curves at higher levels 
of unbalance (and thus higher speeds) than conventional trains.
    Through this order, FRA ensures that planning for high-speed 
service will not occur in isolation from measures that could reasonably 
address increased traffic densities, and drive future innovative 
technology.

Regulatory Approvals Required

    In general, new signal and train control systems must comply with 
FRA's Rules, Standards and Instructions Governing the Installation, 
Inspection, Maintenance, and Repair of Signal and Train Control 
Systems, Devices, and Appliances (49 CFR Part 236). FRA will implement 
any exceptions on a case-by-case basis through the waiver process as 
provided by 49 CFR Part 235. Train operations in excess of 110 mph must 
be authorized by FRA after examination of pertinent safety 
considerations in accordance with 49 CFR 213.9(c) (operating speed 
limits). Metroliner service on the NEC is already conducted in 
accordance with such an authorization.
    In addition, NEC operations are subject to special requirements of 
the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 1988, which mandated that all NEC 
trains be equipped with ``automatic train control systems designed to 
slow or stop a train in response to external signals.'' Sec. 9, Pub. L. 
No. 100-342, implemented at 52 FR 44510 (Nov. 19, 1987), 53 FR 1433 
(Jan. 19, 1988), and 53 FR 39834 (Oct. 12, 1988).

Summary of the Proposed Order

    The proposed order would implement ACSES on the NEC-North End by 
October 1, 1999, allowing Amtrak to increase its maximum operating 
speed on this segment of the NEC from 105 mph to 150 mph. In addition 
to Amtrak, the Connecticut Department of Transportation (ConnDOT), 
Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail), the Massachusetts Bay 
Transportation Authority (MBTA), and the Providence and Worcester 
Railroad Company (P&W), which also operate on this territory, would be 
required to equip their locomotives and cab cars with ACSES. (On July 
23, 1998, the Surface Transportation Board is expected to approve the 
division of Conrail between the Norfolk Southern Corporation (NS) and 
the CSX Corporation (CSX); NS and CSX have yet to announce a date for 
this division. NS and CSX, as successors to Conrail, will be subject to 
this order to the extent that they operate on this segment of the NEC.)
    FRA initially discussed the features and functions of ACSES with 
the Northeast Corridor Safety Committee in September of 1994, and 
Amtrak continued to brief the affected railroads as system development 
proceeded. ACSES would enforce permanent speed restrictions caused by 
curves, bridges and other factors, positive stops at interlocking home 
signals and control points, work limits, and temporary slow orders, 
through transponders similar to those used by European railroads. 
Transponders are devices containing encoded information on such factors 
as location and distance to the beginning of a speed restriction, type 
of speed restriction, target speed, average grade, distance to the next 
transponder, and message verification information. Transponders would 
be installed at all approaches to interlockings within high speed 
territory, including those where trains could mistakenly pass an 
interlocking signal and encroach onto high speed track, as part of a 
train control system which would be independent of the on-board cab 
signal/automatic train control system, but would interface with it to 
provide displays to train crews on factors such as civil speed 
restrictions, trains located ahead, and interlocking conditions. A data 
radio network would be used to download temporary movement 
restrictions, among other functions.
    Equipped rail vehicles would continuously transmit a signal which, 
when received by a transponder, would cause the transponder to transmit 
back its encoded message. Those messages, including speed and braking 
conditions, would be received in the train's cab, interpreted by an on-
board computer, and passed along to the train's engineer for 
appropriate action. If necessary, automatic braking would take place.
    Amtrak would also expand its existing 4-aspect cab signal system, 
which provides for ``restricted speed'', 30 mph, 45 mph, and the 
maximum authorized speed for the equipment on which it is installed, to 
a 9-aspect system, which provides for additional aspects of 60 mph, 80 
mph, 100 mph, 125 mph, and 150 mph. The current 4-aspect system employs 
a 100 Hz carrier frequency coded at the rates of 75, 120, and 180 
pulses per minute; the 9-aspect system would employ an additional 
carrier frequency of 250 Hz, and an additional code rate of 270 pulses 
per minute. Amtrak developed this 9-aspect system to provide four 
independent functions: (1) Operation of high-speed trainsets at a new 
maximum speed of 150 mph; (2) higher speed diverging signal aspects, 
upgrading the previous 45 mph diverging aspect; (3) an enforced 30 mph 
diverging aspect; and (4) closer headways by adding three enforced 
speeds between the existing 45 mph and 125 mph enforced speeds.
    On the NEC-South End, the proposed order would require ACSES 
wherever speeds exceeded 125 mph (the current maximum speed), with only 
high speed trains equipped where crossovers could be locked to avoid 
incursion. The proposed order contemplated, but did not require, 
implementation of ACSES by all NEC users (except possibly the Metro-
North Commuter Railroad Company), including Amtrak, commuter railroads, 
and freight carriers. To minimize the impact on users, ACSES would be 
implemented incrementally as funding became available, so that 
operational benefits could begin immediately as each portion of line 
and each vehicle became equipped.

Summary of Modifications to the Proposed Order

    In response to comments and technical changes in the proposed order 
FRA has made modifications in this final order, the more significant of 
which are highlighted below. The proposed order stated that comments 
received after the close of the comment period would be considered to 
the extent possible. Amtrak has continued to refine and adapt its 
design specifications, as proposed in Amtrak's February 17, 1998 
supplemental comments, May 8, 1998 letter (copies of both are in the 
docket), and subsequent conversations with FRA (memorializations of 
which are also in the docket). This order contains modifications 
responsive to Amtrak's proposed design specification changes, which are 
discussed below. A detailed analysis of the comments appears elsewhere 
in this order.

Major Modifications

(1) Use of Temporary Transponders in Lieu of Loading Temporary 
Restrictions

    Under ACSES, temporary restrictions flow directly from the computer 
assisted dispatch center into the data radio channel and thus into the 
on-board computer, virtually eliminating errors in transmission or 
recordation and

[[Page 39345]]

ensuring that information is acted upon. Were train crew members to 
enter this data, they could make errors and then be tempted to rely on 
the ``system'' to provide the required speed reductions on the cab 
display in lieu of relying on a paper copy.
    In a letter dated May 8, 1998, Amtrak requested permission to use 
temporary transponders (placed in the gage of the rail) as an 
alternative to inputting temporary restrictions by direct data radio 
link into the on-board computer. Typically, Amtrak would place these at 
locations approaching work zones and other slow order zones. Although 
FRA considers temporary transponder placement acceptable for last 
minute slow orders in emergencies where reliable communication to the 
en route train cannot be assured, FRA believes the better practice is 
to require temporary restrictions to be automatically loaded into the 
on-board computer. FRA will allow Amtrak to use temporary transponders 
as an alternative routinely for the first 12 months after 
implementation of this order in order to ease transition to this new 
system. After this period, temporary transponders may be deployed only 
on an emergency basis unless they are being used as an additional 
safety measure.

(2) Availability of Data Radio Release at Interlockings

    FRA proposed to require, and Amtrak expects to provide, a 
capability that would automatically permit movement of a train past an 
interlocking signal displaying a stop and proceed or restricting aspect 
without the necessity of the engineer leaving his or her normal 
position in the cab to press a release button. To ensure that this 
capability is in place and fully operational, FRA requires data radio 
transmitters to be located at interlockings and interfaced with 
interlocking controllers not less than 12 months following activation 
(cut in) of ACSES.
    Elimination of recurring acknowledgment. Amtrak's original plan 
included a recurring 15 second audible alarm and a 20 second 
acknowledgment while operating at restricted speed. In a May 8, 1998 
letter, Amtrak proposed to modify this ATC feature, disliked by many 
locomotive engineers. The modified feature would sound a warning 
immediately and require acknowledgment within 5 seconds whenever 
initial movement is detected while the cab signal displays 
``restricting,'' in order to prevent a penalty brake application. (FRA 
assumes that the one-time acknowledgment would be required on downgrade 
to restricting as well.) Through the use of data radio at the 
interlockings, this feature would automatically permit movement of a 
train past an interlocking signal displaying a stop and proceed or 
restricting aspect without the necessity of the engineer leaving his or 
her normal position in the cab to press a release button. FRA has 
agreed to this proposed feature, which Amtrak suggests would be 
particularly useful when a train is starting from a stop at a station 
close to an interlocking home signal.

(3) Speeds Over Highway-Rail Crossings

    In the proposed order, FRA suggested a speed limit over any 
highway-rail crossing of 80 mph, for the following reasons:

    Speeds over highway-rail crossings will be limited to 80 mph, 
the maximum speed planned under the NEC program until very recently. 
This limit is lower than the 110 mph cap included in current 
guidelines for high-speed corridors (absent barrier and presence 
detection systems tied into the signal system), because of the 
density of NEC operations and the increased possibility that a 
collision with a motor vehicle might cause a secondary collision 
between trains operating at very high combined closing speeds. FRA 
reserves the right to allow higher speeds over individual highway-
rail crossings after demonstration by Amtrak that appropriate safety 
measures have been implemented.

    Dense operations on the NEC-North End present special safety 
concerns, particularly since both intercity and commuter trains will be 
operating with improved acceleration as electric locomotives and HSTs 
are deployed--driving up average speeds. This is a two-track railroad 
throughout its length, with 13 crossings between New Haven and Boston. 
Although the crossings in question are generally low-volume, most are 
subject to the movement of large vehicles such as flatbed trucks 
carrying boats, garbage trucks, fire trucks, and other substantial 
vehicles known to be capable of derailing a train. The likelihood of a 
derailment may increase to some extent, even in the case of collision 
with a relatively light vehicle, if the crossing in question is on a 
curve and Amtrak is successful in qualifying its HSTs for levels of 
unbalance up to 9 inches, as provided in a previously issued waiver.
    Therefore, in this order, FRA sets a maximum operating speed of 80 
mph over any highway-rail crossing where only conventional warning 
systems are in place, and a maximum operating speed of 95 mph where 4-
quadrant gates and presence detection are provided and tied into the 
signal system. FRA also requires Amtrak to submit for approval plans 
for site-specific improvements with timetables for each of the 13 
crossings on the NEC-North End by January 1, 1999.

(4) Signal and Train Control Enhancements

    Providing signalization for high-speed intercity service requires 
implementation of an enhanced cab signal/speed control system that 
allows for higher train speeds while providing sufficient gradations of 
intermediate speeds to allow efficient movement of other scheduled 
trains operating in the conventional speed range. Reasonable 
interoperability of existing and up-graded on-board equipment is also 
necessary to allow for the continued use of existing on-board equipment 
at conventional speeds only.
    9-Aspect Cab Signal System. The cab signal/ATC portion of the 
upgraded system will employ two carrier frequencies, 100 Hz, compatible 
with existing equipment, and 250 Hz. Both frequencies will be coded at 
standard rates of 75, 120, 180, and 270 cycles per minute. Upgraded 
equipment will be able to take advantage of the 150 mph code rate for 
maximum authorized speed, the 80 mph code rate for high speed diverging 
moves, and separate 45/40 and 30 mph speed commands for limited and 
medium speed turnouts.
    ACSES. In contrast to the modified cab signal system, ACSES will 
provide new safety functions that, with limited exceptions, are not 
currently provided. For purposes of civil speed control, permanent 
wayside transponders will be placed in sets (normally two to a set) at 
convenient, accessible locations in the center of the track approaching 
speed restriction zones. Most of these transponders will be passive 
devices requiring no energy source other than that transmitted from a 
passing train. Each permanent transponder set will contain encoded 
information about speed restrictions ahead, including: (i) The distance 
to the beginning of the speed restriction; (ii) The target speed; (iii) 
The type of speed restriction; (iv) The average grade between the 
location where the speed reduction must begin and the location where 
the reduced speed must be reached; (v) The distance to the next 
permanent transponder set location; and (vi) Necessary sync and check 
bytes to allow for message verification.
    Improvements that Amtrak will gain with the new systems are:

     Train speeds of up to 150 mph;
     A high speed diverging aspect (80 mph);
     The efficient handling of both high speed and conventional 
trains;

[[Page 39346]]

     New intermediate speeds between 45 mph and 150 mph;
     The capability for headway improvement in congested 
commuter areas; and
     Practical staging from present wayside and on-board 
equipment.
    Commuter and freight railroads will both benefit from enhanced 
safety of Amtrak operations, given the common operating environment, 
since Amtrak's implementation of the 9-aspect cab signal system will 
provide increased flexibility to schedule high speed intercity service 
in a way that does not conflict with commuter operations. In addition, 
as ACSES is implemented on commuter and freight trains, the safety of 
those operations will be enhanced by ensuring that those trains do not 
pass absolute stop signals or operate at excessive speed approaching 
stations or bridges. To the extent equipment design permits, commuter 
operators may take advantage of higher speeds on curves without 
diminished safety margins with the new flexibility for operation at 
higher cant deficiencies in FRA's revised Track Safety Standards (63 FR 
33992; June 22, 1998).
    Amtrak will phase-in installation in order to obtain the maximum 
benefit from the positive stop and civil speed enforcement system prior 
to its installation on the Amtrak-dispatched portions of the NEC. The 
initial installations will protect entry to and operations along the 
high speed territory. During this initial phase, transponders will not 
be installed on non-high speed tracks where flanking protection 
protects against possible encroachment into adjacent high speed tracks. 
The transponder system will be extended to the balance of the NEC after 
all installations are in place on high speed tracks and on adjacent 
tracks where flanking protection does not exist. (This description in 
no way pre-decides the issue of whether trains of other operators on 
other portions of the NEC will be required to be equipped.)

(5) Nighttime Operations

    As an interim measure to allow for gradual equipping of a 
railroad's locomotive fleet, FRA had proposed to allow unequipped 
freight operations to enter the NEC-North End during low-volume night 
hours. After considering the comments (discussed in more detail below), 
FRA is not adopting this proposal for two reasons. First, train delays 
could cause fast trains to invade the window or unequipped trains to 
fail to clear the window in time. Second, Amtrak expects to conduct 
most production track work at night, and unequipped trains would not be 
prevented from entering work zones or passing work groups at excessive 
speed, resulting in reduced safety benefits. Instead of the proposed 
time window, FRA will handle any exceptions to this order through 
waivers or spot amendments to the order.

Proceedings on This Order

    FRA sought public comment on the proposed order and related 
matters, including any authorization that may be required for Amtrak to 
implement a modified cab signal system on the NEC. FRA has placed in 
the docket of this proceeding copies of Amtrak's program description 
for the ACSES system, proposed operating rules for use in conjunction 
with the system, and other related information, including current 
Amtrak projections for operating speeds over highway-rail crossings on 
the NEC-North End. FRA has reviewed the comments and hearing testimony, 
which have been extremely helpful in resolving these issues.
    The following parties testified at the February 17 hearing: The 
American Public Transit Association (APTA), the Brotherhood of 
Locomotive Engineers-American Train Dispatchers Division (BLE-ATTD), 
ConnDOT, Conrail, MBTA, P&W, and Southeastern Pennsylvania 
Transportation Authority (SEPTA).
    In addition, written comments were submitted by the following: 
Amtrak, APTA, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE), ConnDOT, 
Conrail, Long Island Railroad (LIRR), MBTA, Metro-North Commuter 
Railroad Company (Metro-North), National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB or Board), P&W, Representative Patrick J. Kennedy, Senator Edward 
M. Kennedy, Senator Jack Reed, and SEPTA.
    The following also submitted comments in support of P&W's concerns:
    Arnold Lumber Co., Atlantic Wire, BB&S Treated Lumber of New 
England, Colfax Inc., Dominion Rebar, Fortune Plastics Inc., The 
Narragansett Bay Commission, Seaview Transportation Company, Inc., 
Ring's End, and Unilever.
    While many commentators spoke or wrote on more than one issue, and 
while most of the comments supported the position(s) of at least one 
other commentator, the issues themselves were grouped around a few key 
points, which are discussed below.

General Issues

(1) Scope of Order

    Several commentators stated that the proposed order did not define 
its applicability clearly. SEPTA commented that the proposed order did 
not specify its applicability south of New Haven, and APTA also 
requested additional clarification on the order's scope and 
applicability on the NEC-South End.
    As proposed by Amtrak, implementation of the ACSES system would 
impact all NEC users including Amtrak, commuter railroads, and freight 
carriers, with the exception of the NEC segment operated by the New 
York Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) and Metro-North. ACSES 
would be implemented incrementally as funding becomes available, so 
that operational benefits would begin immediately as each portion of 
line and each vehicle becomes equipped.
    At this time, FRA mandates that all trains operating on the NEC-
North End be equipped with operative on-board equipment that responds 
to ACSES, as proposed. This order also authorizes higher speeds for 
such equipped trains on high-speed tracks on the NEC-South End, but 
other trains utilizing those tracks or adjacent tracks are not required 
to be equipped. FRA will continue to study the reliability and safety 
benefits of ACSES as implementation on the NEC-North End is completed, 
and may later propose to require ACSES on the rest of the NEC as 
traffic densities increase.
    ConnDOT commented that the proposed order contained errors 
regarding the ownership of the New Haven, Connecticut-New Rochelle, New 
York section of NEC track. FRA agrees that Metro-North does not own any 
segment of the NEC, that ConnDOT owns the track between New Haven and 
the Connecticut-New York border, and that MTA owns the track between 
that border and New Rochelle. Thus, this order does not address the 
territory owned by MTA between the Connecticut/New York State line and 
New Rochelle, or the area owned by ConnDOT between the Connecticut/New 
York State line and New Haven, both of which are dispatched by Metro-
North.

(2) Implementation Schedule

    Several commentators felt that the proposed implementation date of 
October 1, 1999 did not provide sufficient time for financing and 
equipment installation. MBTA recommended a longer time period to 
provide sufficient time for responsible design, engineering and 
prototyping. MBTA also commented that modifications to safety critical 
systems should not be made on a high speed schedule, and that the 
proposed

[[Page 39347]]

implementation date was unrealistic and would impose premium costs. 
Conrail commented that the proposed order failed to indicate any target 
dates or deadlines, which are necessary to determine the migration 
plan. ConnDOT requested to be removed from the scope and applicability 
of the order unless full funding is provided and compliance is delayed 
until 2001. P&W commented that compliance with the proposed October 
1999 implementation deadline would be impossible unless Amtrak supplied 
substitute power and assistance in accomplishing the required 
retrofits.
    The NTSB, however, while recognizing the need for an interim period 
to allow equipping of locomotives, strongly urged that FRA set a fixed 
time for compliance.
    FRA recognizes that completion of all steps required to implement 
ACSES by October 1, 1999 depends upon Amtrak rigorously adhering to a 
well-crafted timetable that allows adequate time for installation of 
on-board units on all affected operators without depriving those 
operators of equipment necessary to provide normal service. This should 
be achievable by combining required inspections and tests with the 
installation process, provided production runs of on-board equipment 
commence in a timely way and deliveries are sequenced properly. 
However, thus far Amtrak has provided FRA with a very limited amount of 
information concerning its test program and key milestones. 
Accordingly, this order requires early delivery of a very specific 
timetable for initial testing and qualification, for installation of 
on-board equipment on Amtrak, ConnDOT, MBTA, and P&W locomotives, and 
for final acceptance testing for the system. FRA will evaluate this 
timetable for reasonableness. To the extent the timetable indicates 
unacceptable impacts on third parties, or to the extent milestones in 
this schedule slip, FRA will defer the implementation date as 
necessary. FRA will keep open the docket of this proceeding to receive 
any petitions for adjustment of the compliance date.

(3) Financial Responsibility

    Commentators expressed the most concern about the overall cost of 
ACSES, and the related issue of who would bear the cost of equipping 
non-Amtrak equipment. In addition to the implementation costs of 
locomotive retrofitting, passive transponders and other related 
expenses, commentators were concerned about maintenance, equipment 
down-time, schedule disruptions, and life-cycle expense. Many 
commentators submitted preliminary estimates of their anticipated 
costs. MBTA, for instance, has already budgeted the estimated $11 
million cost of retrofitting its locomotives with the 9-aspect system 
into its current locomotive procurement and planned overhaul.
    P&W commented that the final order should require the High Speed 
Passenger Project (Project) to assume the costs of retrofitting 
locomotives since ACSES is a fundamental component of the Project. P&W 
indicated that as a small private sector freight operator, it is not 
subsidized (unlike Amtrak and commuter rail operations), and would not 
stay competitive with trucking operations on the I-95 corridor if it 
passed ACSES implementation costs onto its customers. Although P&W 
objected to paying for ACSES implementation to realize the proposed 150 
mph speeds on the NEC-North End, P&W pledged to work with Amtrak to 
develop an implementation schedule once a retrofit design is available 
for review.
    Senators Edward M. Kennedy and Jack Reed, and Representative 
Patrick J. Kennedy wrote in support of P&W's views. In his comments, 
Senator Kennedy reiterated his support for the Project, and agreed with 
P&W's recommendation that the Project assume P&W's implementation 
costs.
    MBTA also objected to the proposed order, commenting that it would 
impose unfunded mandates on state authorities. MBTA also recommended 
that the proposed order be amended to require funding by the Project, 
and, in addition, to hold MBTA harmless from right of way construction 
costs.
    ConnDOT commented that FRA and Amtrak should provide full funding 
for ACSES implementation, since this investment in equipment and 
infrastructure is necessitated by Amtrak's new HST service. ConnDOT 
indicated that it does not have access to funding required to comply 
with the order on its Shore Line East operation. Moreover, the tenuous 
viability of Shore Line East commuter service and the concurrent 
funding needed for double-sided high speed platforms could force this 
line of commuter rail service to close. ConnDOT requested that FRA 
pledge to provide full funding for any mandated conversion to ACSES.
    SEPTA commented that NEC commuter railroads have undergone a number 
of mandatory retrofits in recent years (e.g., speed control, event 
recorders, ditch lights, and emergency door access), and expect 
additional required retrofits even though separate funding has never 
been provided for this work. Since SEPTA capital is limited, requiring 
commuter railroads to fund systems such as ACSES would force tradeoffs 
with other safety improvements. SEPTA proposed that the proposed 
modifications and civil speed enforcement system be funded by Amtrak, 
as the beneficiary of these proposed requirements.
    Conrail commented that the proposed order's purpose is to enable 
higher speed passenger operations through improved train control 
systems. Conrail, however, has already invested in the Locomotive Speed 
Limiter (LSL) system, to provide train control compatible with the NEC 
cab signal system. While Conrail has a vested interest in improving 
safety and reducing risk, the additional risks caused by higher speed 
passenger operations are being introduced by other parties and should 
not be borne by Conrail. Like other commentators, Conrail urged FRA to 
structure the final order to provide relief from the cost burden, 
arguing that ACSES will provide no quantifiable benefits beyond 
Conrail's current LSL system.
    Metro-North requested that its territory be excluded from the final 
order, stating that it will not operate at high speeds since the 
catenary and signal systems on the territory between New Rochelle and 
New Haven are designed for a maximum of 100 mph.
    The NTSB, on the other hand, strongly supported the proposed order, 
since Positive Train Separation (PTS) is one of the Board's ``Most 
Wanted'' safety measures. The Board recommended that FRA require 
implementation of PTS for ``all trains where commuter and intercity 
passenger railroads operate,'' including the South End.
    Allocation of financial responsibility. FRA appreciates that 
resolving the issue of which organizations bear the ultimate financial 
responsibility for this safety system is not a simple or 
straightforward matter. The Project with which this safety enhancement 
is associated has been aggressively advocated by the Coalition of 
Northeastern Governors for many years and supported by most members of 
the northeast congressional delegations. While the Project has national 
significance, a large share of the benefits will accrue to the region, 
including potential avoidance of major costs associated with 
improvement of aviation and highway facilities. As a result of careful 
planning and aggressive advocacy, the region will enjoy many related 
improvements to its transportation infrastructure, including the 
opening of rail access for double

[[Page 39348]]

stack intermodal service to the site of the former U.S. Navy facilities 
at Quonset Point and Davisville, Rhode Island, at a cost to the Federal 
taxpayer estimated at $55 million.
    Amtrak has recognized its stake in this Project by budgeting 100% 
of wayside costs of ACSES, even though much of the territory involved 
is actually owned by other public authorities. In addition, Amtrak will 
bear the cost for equipping its own trains, high-speed and 
conventional.
    Since issuance of the notice of proposed order, Amtrak has 
communicated with ConnDOT, MBTA, and P&W regarding the logistics of 
this Project. Although FRA has not been privy to the details of these 
conversations, copies of letters provided for the docket of this 
rulemaking affirm that Amtrak has secured an option with its vendor for 
a sufficient number of on-board equipment sets to the benefit of these 
other railroads. Amtrak has offered to complete installation at a cost 
of $40,000, split between approximately $27,000 for the equipment and 
$13,000 for installation. Amtrak has also offered to assist these 
railroads by supporting their ``efforts to find a source of funding.''
    FRA is concerned that parties to the rulemaking may have hesitated 
to make reasonable financial arrangements for this work with the 
anticipation that FRA would spare them the necessity by allocating that 
responsibility in this final order. From the point of view of staging 
the work, FRA has confidence that Amtrak will ensure interim financing 
to complete equipping of ConnDOT, MBTA, and P&W locomotives. Conrail 
and its successors (NS and CSX) are major Class I railroads fully 
capable of handling their own financing. The remaining issue is who 
will bear the ultimate financial burden, and the considerations 
pertaining to this question are far more complex than could be 
developed within the scope of this proceeding.
    It seems reasonable to expect that Conrail or its successors will 
shoulder the cost of this safety improvement and equip as many 
locomotives as may be appropriate for optimum power utilization over 
its system. FRA has provided funding under a cooperative agreement with 
Conrail, NS and CSX for development of an on-board platform capable of 
providing interoperability among various train control systems, 
including ACS, ATC, and ACSES. This innovation may help hold down the 
cost of ACSES compliance.
    FRA has carefully considered P&W's comments regarding its role in 
this safety improvement. FRA appreciates P&W's willingness to cooperate 
and its concerns regarding the timing of the necessary retrofits 
(further addressed below), and accepts P&W's representation that at 
least 22 locomotives will need to be equipped with ACSES and that 
nighttime operation is not a viable option. However, FRA had not 
identified from P&W's submission a basis for becoming more directly 
involved in deciding the matter of financial responsibility.
    P&W operates on the NEC largely as a result of an expedited 
supplemental transaction effected under section 1155 of the Northeast 
Rail Service Act of 1981 (NERSA) (45 U.S.C. 745). Pursuant to that 
statute, and under an order of the Special Court established by the 
Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Conrail was compelled to 
surrender certain properties and service rights to a successor railroad 
that would commit to providing at least 4 years of service on the 
properties transferred. P&W aggressively pursued that opportunity, with 
the full knowledge that public planning from the 1960's forward had 
focused on dramatic passenger service improvements on the NEC between 
New York and Boston. As recently as the past year, P&W has sought to 
extend its service rights farther west into Connecticut based upon 
P&W's claim that the proposed acquisition of Conrail by NS and CSX 
constitutes a termination of Conrail's residual franchise and 
activation of rights P&W enjoys under the Special Court's order. As 
noted above, as an adjunct to the current improvement project, P&W will 
be the beneficiary of construction of a third track on the NEC between 
Davisville and ``Boston Switch'' that will provide the new doublestack 
access that otherwise would not exist.
    MBTA and ConnDOT are also realizing considerable benefits from the 
improvement project. MBTA is already implementing plans to utilize 
electric locomotives which will provide improved accelerations, reduced 
trip times and reduced emission of polluting gases and particulates. 
ConnDOT and MBTA benefit substantially from Amtrak's substantial 
investments in the track structure associated with high-speed 
operations.
    All of the operators over the affected territory will enjoy 
benefits from ACSES, such as the following:
    (1) Reduction of risk related to collisions at junctions. This 
feature may help avoid a collision with a high-speed or conventional 
passenger train that could result in massive liability.
    (2) Reduction of the risk of derailment on curves and secondary 
collisions following such derailments. Although principally a benefit 
to high-speed trains, this feature may benefit other passenger 
operators that wish to take advantage of higher levels of unbalance to 
achieve improved trip times (which, without ACSES, might be imprudent). 
Even freight operators may benefit under conditions where cab signals 
must be cut out due to en route malfunction.
    (3) Reduction of risk related to incidents involving roadway 
workers and their equipment. This benefit should accrue to all 
operators very nearly in direct proportion to the number of trains they 
operate.
    (4) Improved scheduling and execution of roadway inspections and 
maintenance associated with the ability to load temporary movement 
restrictions into the on-board units of trains en route through data 
radio facilities along the route. This benefit, which may be realized 
over a period of several years, should help hold down costs and 
increase efficiency for all operators. If the data radio network is 
fully exploited, dispatching may also be enhanced through access to 
real-time train location information.
    FRA is aware of contrary arguments for allocation of financial 
responsibility based upon the institution of high-speed service and the 
timing of requirements for compliance. These arguments may be worthy of 
consideration within the full context of the commercial relationships 
involved, including existing arrangements for allocating costs of 
operation over the affected NEC segments, contractual arrangements for 
operation of commuter service, and any relationships established for 
executing the obligations imposed by this order. Forums such as the 
Surface Transportation Board, arbitration panels referenced in existing 
agreements, and courts of appropriate jurisdiction may have a role in 
determining the ultimate allocation of financial responsibility for 
implementation of ACSES, should the parties fail to come to mutually 
acceptable accommodations.
    In summary, the arguments related to financial responsibility are 
complex; and various forums are available to resolve them. It is 
neither necessary nor appropriate for those determinations to be made 
in this order, and FRA does not intend by this order to govern the 
ultimate allocation of financial responsibility for equipping non-
Amtrak locomotives and cab cars. However, FRA does require that trains 
be equipped within a fixed time frame as a condition of operating over 
the subject territory. This approach is consistent with prior orders of 
the Interstate

[[Page 39349]]

Commerce Commission and FRA actions pertaining to train control, 
including prior train control orders for the NEC, which have generally 
required that all trains operating in a designated territory be 
equipped, without regard to ownership.

(4) ACSES and the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee

    In 1996, FRA established the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee 
(RSAC or the Committee) to implement a more consensual approach to 
rulemaking. RSAC is comprised of 48 representatives from 27 member 
organizations, including railroads, labor groups, equipment 
manufacturers, state government groups, public associations, and two 
associate non-voting representatives from Canada and Mexico. To address 
specific tasks, RSAC formed working groups, comprised of knowledgeable 
persons from the organizations represented on RSAC. Among the current 
working groups is a group on positive train control (PTC), which was 
tasked on September 30, 1997, and met for the first time in November. 
This group is considering three tasks related to development of 
performance standards for new train control systems, evaluation of 
costs and benefits of PTC, and consideration of issues related to 
implement.
    Both APTA and Conrail commented that the proposed order contained 
no input from the PTC working group. Since the final order would define 
and implement PTC on the NEC-North End, both recommended that FRA not 
issue the final order until the PTC working group has completed its 
task. Conrail also commented that the proposed order would impose 
similar costs for functions that duplicate PTC.
    Although FRA and Amtrak have briefed the RSAC PTC Working Group on 
ACSES and the proposed order in this proceeding, FRA has not tasked the 
PTC Working Group with development of this order, which pertains to a 
specific territory already equipped with ACS and ATC (in contrast to 
most of remainder of the general rail system). ACSES is intended to 
supplement the existing train control system on the NEC, completing 
positive train control functions in a manner that is cost effective and 
capable of execution within the time period necessary to support 
enhanced service associated with electrification and the delivery of 
new HSTs.
    Though not required to do so, FRA utilized the Northeast Corridor 
Safety Committee to develop issues related to ACSES at a meeting in 
September of 1994, and Amtrak has proceeded since that time to bring 
ACSES to a high state of maturity. The ACSES system is specifically 
designed to support dense passenger operations at up to 150 mph. Its 
architecture provides a particularly suitable approach for NEC and 
related operations (as illustrated by New Jersey Transit's use of a 
similar approach to rapidly implement a positive stop system on its own 
lines).
    ACSES uses components and strategies already extensively employed 
in European train control and other applications. ACSES will be applied 
to equipment that--with the exception of a small number of freight 
locomotives on the NEC at any given time--is largely dedicated to NEC 
operations.
    By contrast, the RSAC PTC Working Group is considering the 
potential for train control systems that would be applied principally 
in non-electrified territory, over most of which freight operations 
predominate and shared power arrangements permit locomotives to range 
extensively. For most of the National rail system, there is presently 
no ACS/ATC infrastructure on the wayside, and many locomotives are not 
equipped with responsive apparatus. PTC systems for most of the general 
rail system will likely utilize a much different architecture that the 
combination of ACS, ATC and ACSES provided in this and related orders. 
In concert with a train control project sponsored by the State of 
Illinois and the FRA, the Association of American Railroads' 
Transportation Technology Center Inc. is just now commencing work on 
criteria for interoperability of such systems that is expected to 
extend past the actual cut-in date for ACSES. The extent to which PTC 
systems designed for general applications may be capable of supporting 
train speeds above 110 or 125 miles per hour is not currently known, 
and widespread deployment of these systems will not be possible until 
test and demonstration projects now underway reach fruition.
    In short, awaiting the results of the RSAC PTC Working Group would 
defer important safety enhancements for territory where the chosen 
strategy is ready to implement and particularly appropriate. The PTC 
Working Group was formed to accelerate movement toward implementation 
of PTC safety functions, not to impede it. FRA looks forward to 
institution of high-speed service on the NEC-North End late next year, 
and implementation of ACSES is necessary to ensure the safety of that 
service within the context of dense passenger and freight operations.

(5) Nighttime operations

    P&W commented that it would not be feasible to limit its train 
operations to night time, the window within which the order proposed to 
permit non-equipped trains to run on the NEC, since nighttime switching 
service would result in a dramatic increase in costs, cause operational 
disruptions for P&W customers, disrupt neighborhoods, and raise serious 
safety issues. Conrail commented that while the order was unclear as to 
whether Conrail would be permitted to operate non-equipped trains using 
time separation from high speed passenger schedules, mandatory time 
separation is not an acceptable business solution since Conrail already 
operates during lightly scheduled passenger periods for efficiency. 
Although the proposed order properly anticipates potential increases in 
operation by Conrail or its successors, Conrail commented that 
operations would be adversely impacted if time separations are mandated 
for trains not equipped with ACSES.
    As discussed above, after considering the comments, FRA is not 
allowing a window within which non-equipped trains could operate during 
early morning hours when high-speed trains are not on the territory. 
Any exceptions will be handled through waivers or spot amendments to 
the order.

Technical Issues

(1) Flanking Protection

    BLE-ATTD asked for an interpretation of the term ``flanking 
protection,'' and a description of how such protection would work. BLE-
ATTD also requested clarification as to how flanking protection would 
work on the NEC-South End, on whether electric lock derails would be 
used instead of flanking protection in two-track areas, and on who 
would enter information into the mobile communication package.
    Flanking protection is inherent in interlockings where there are 
parallel tracks. On a four track railroad, for example, with high speed 
middle tracks, lower speed outer tracks, and crossovers across all four 
tracks, a train could not overrun a signal on an adjacent track and 
encroach onto the path of a high speed train if the signal was lined up 
for the high speed track straight down one of the middle tracks. 
Flanking protection is not a new concept designed to work with ACSES 
since it is already in place at interlockings where there is a parallel 
route to the track being protected in the event of a signal overrun.

[[Page 39350]]

(2) Interoperability With Existing Systems

    Several commentators were concerned about the impact of the new 
ACSES system on current signal systems. Conrail questioned whether its 
existing 4-aspect system would be compatible with the new 9-aspect 
system, and whether ACSES would interfere with an ongoing Conrail/CSX/
NS project to develop an on-board platform to support multiple system 
configurations. LIRR also questioned how ACSES would interfere with 
existing ATC systems, and how the proposed order would impact those 
railroads sharing track with Amtrak at speeds over 100 mph. APTA wanted 
to review Amtrak's equipment specifications because of concerns about 
the reliability and maintainability of untested equipment. APTA also 
questioned ACSES' impact on existing ATC systems and commuter rail 
outside the NEC. ConnDOT questioned the benefits of the proposed 
system, and SEPTA expressed concern about how ACSES would affect 
operations outside of the areas where wayside equipment is installed.
    In Amtrak's proposed system, the brake and propulsion interface 
between the ACSES and the locomotive would be similar to that utilized 
in conventional cab signal/ATC systems. The interface would be separate 
and distinct from the interface used by the cab signal/ATC system. The 
failure of either the cab signal/ATC system or the ACSES would not 
prevent the remaining functioning system from performing its intended 
operation and displaying the proper on-board aspect. Both the signal 
speed and the civil speed would be displayed with the lower of the two 
speeds to be enforced.
    FRA questioned the need or prudence of displaying both speeds and 
requested comment on the appropriate means of displaying system 
information to the locomotive engineer. Amtrak submitted the only 
response on this issue. In a January 16, 1998 letter, Amtrak clarified 
that the 9-Aspect Cab Signal/ATC system and the ACSES system are 
independent systems that share a common display. The 9-ACS/ATC system 
will continuously display the ``signal'' speed, dependent upon routes 
opening up in front of the approaching train, and supported by eight 
simple codes supplied continuously to the train through the rails. The 
ACSES system, on the other hand, will enforce the track (civil) maximum 
authorized speeds, supported by more complex codes received at 
intermittent intervals from transponders located along the track 
structure. The ``signal'' speed is actually part of the cab signal 
aspect (e.g., ``CLEAR 150,'' ``CLEAR 125,'' ``CAB SPEED 80''), with 
discrete aspects displayed in accordance with Part 236. The ``track'' 
speed will be carefully coordinated with the cab signal aspect, and 
highlighted to clearly indicate which speed (always the lower) governs. 
The lower speed will always be enforced. Thus, merging the two digital 
``speed'' displays into one ``window'' would seriously complicate and 
undermine the stand-alone capability of each system if the other should 
fail, and would compromise the viability of the redundancy or ``back-
up'' capability envisioned for the total system.

(3) 60 mph Turnouts

    Amtrak had proposed, as an interim measure, to install #26.5 
straight-frog turnouts at those crossovers where there is insufficient 
space to install the #32.7 turnouts needed for diverging moves at 80 
mph. Since these #26.5 straight-frog turnouts could be used only for 
diverging moves at 60 mph, ACSES passive transponder sets approaching 
such locations would enforce a 60 mph civil speed restriction for all 
routes through the interlocking where the # 26.5 turnout is located. 
The 60 mph speed restriction would also be backed up by a site specific 
instruction and an appropriate reflectorized sign on the distant 
signal.
    NTSB, however, remained concerned about how this system would work 
when a train's on-board ACSES system was cut out, since the train would 
then be unable to read the speed restrictions transmitted by the 
temporary transponders. In a June 4, 1998 conversation with FRA 
(memorialized in the docket), Amtrak stated that implementation of this 
proposed interim system was unlikely. While long-range planning may 
eventually require the installation of some 60 mph turnouts on the NEC, 
none are currently planned for the territory between New Haven and 
Boston. If such installations become necessary in the future, Amtrak 
intends to restrict passenger train speeds at these locations to 45 
mph, or request a site specific waiver for each location.

Section-by-Section Analysis

    The section-by-section analysis below discusses the modifications 
made from the proposed order in response to comments or technical 
considerations. Each section of the final order is printed in small 
type and followed by its analysis. The final order is reprinted in its 
entirety at the end of this preamble discussion.

Effective Date

    As discussed above, this order becomes effective on the date 
proposed, October 1, 1999. FRA will defer the implementation date if 
necessary and keep open the docket of this proceeding to receive any 
petitions for adjustment of the compliance date.

Scope and Applicability

    This order supplements existing regulations at 49 CFR Part 236 
and existing orders for automatic train control on track controlled 
by the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) on the 
Northeast Corridor (NEC) between Washington, D. C., and Boston, 
Massachusetts. This order applies in territory where Amtrak has 
installed wayside elements of the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement 
System (ACSES), permitting high-speed operations under the 
conditions set forth below.
    All railroads operating on high-speed tracks in such equipped 
territory between Boston, Massachusetts and New Haven, Connecticut 
(NEC-North End), or on tracks providing access to such high-speed 
tracks, shall be subject to this order, including the following 
entities operating or contracting for the operation of rail 
service--

Amtrak;
Connecticut Department of Transportation;
Consolidated Rail Corporation and its successors;
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority; and
Providence and Worcester Railroad Company.

    The requirement that all trains be equipped with operative on-
board ACSES applies as specified in paragraph (2) from milepost 73.2 
at New Haven, Connecticut, to South Station, Boston, Massachusetts, 
but applies only to high-speed trains operating on NEC high-speed 
tracks between Washington, D.C., and New York, New York (NEC-South 
End), as set forth in paragraph 9(b).

    Explanation and Analysis. Amtrak has undertaken the planning and 
installation of the ACSES as part of its capital program for intercity 
service on the NEC, consistent with legislation providing for improved 
rail service in the region. This order requires all carriers operating 
in ACSES territory to equip their controlling locomotives with 
operative on-board equipment, consisting of a transponder scanner, an 
on-board computer, a display unit for the locomotive engineer, and 
appropriate interface with the cab signal/train control apparatus. The 
final order clarifies that trains other than HSTs must be equipped on 
the NEC-North End but not on the NEC-South End.
    Over time, the ACSES system may be completed and used by all 
operators throughout the NEC for routes where speeds exceed 110 mph on 
any segment, enhancing safety throughout the NEC.

[[Page 39351]]

For example, New Jersey Transit Rail Operations (NJT) intends to equip 
its controlling locomotives with an Advanced Speed Enforcement System 
(ASES), deriving safety advantages both on the NEC and on certain of 
its lines where the ASES system can be used as an intermittent train 
stop system. As Amtrak, NEC-North End operators and NJT demonstrate the 
benefits and reliability of the system, progress toward universal 
upgrading of the NEC signal and train control system will be fostered. 
At a later date, FRA may propose to amend this order to require more 
extensive use of this new safety technology, as determined by increases 
in traffic and types of equipment used on the NEC.

    Definitions. Unless otherwise provided terms used in this order 
have the same definitions contained in Part 236. For purposes of 
this order--
    ACSES means a transponder based system that operates independent 
of the cab signal system, and provides enforcement of permanent 
speed restrictions, temporary speed restrictions, and stop signals 
at interlockings.
    High-speed train means a train operating in excess of 125 miles 
per hour (mph) on the NEC-South End, and 110 mph on the NEC-North 
End.
    High-speed track means (1) a track on the main line of the NEC-
South End, where the authorized train speed for any class of train 
exceeds 125 mph, or (2) a track on the main line of the NEC-North 
End where the maximum authorized train speed for any class of train 
is in excess of 110 mph.
    Immediately adjacent track means a track within 30 feet of a 
high-speed track when measured from track center to track center.
    Signal and train control system means the automatic cab signal/
automatic train control system (cab signal/ATC) in effect on the NEC 
at the date of issuance of this order, as supplemented by ACSES, 
together with such modifications as Amtrak shall make consistent 
with this order.

    Explanation and analysis. In its comments, BLE-ATTD suggested that 
FRA define the terms ``civil speed enforcement system'' (ACSES), ``off-
peak operating times,'' and ``repair facilities.'' As explained above, 
the term ``off-peak operating times'' is no longer relevant since FRA 
does not adopt its proposed window for nighttime operations. Similarly, 
FRA believes it unnecessary to define ``repair facilities'' considering 
the limited scope of this order. FRA has added a definition for 
``ACSES'' that is derived from Amtrak's performance specifications.
    The proposed order had suggested requiring ACSES on tracks 
immediately adjacent to (within 30 feet of) high-speed tracks. In this 
order, FRA extends the requirements for ACSES to trains operating on 
immediately adjacent tracks where the maximum authorized speed exceeds 
20 mph, since such tracks are located within the effective operating 
envelope of high-speed tracks where derailments could endanger high-
speed operations.
    Operations are already highly dense on the NEC-North End, with 
projected increases in both freight and passenger traffic. Track 
curvature on the NEC-North End also exceeds the average curvature on 
the NEC-South End, resulting in greater potential concern for 
compliance with civil speed restrictions. Accordingly, FRA 
distinguishes between the two operations for purposes of determining 
applicability of the new performance requirements.

    Performance standards. Effective October 1, 1999, the following 
performance standards and special requirements shall apply:
    1. Except as provided in paragraph 9(b), the signal and train 
control system shall enforce both permanent and temporary civil 
speed restrictions (e.g., track curvature, bridges, and slow orders) 
on all high-speed tracks and immediately adjacent tracks where the 
maximum authorized speed exceeds 20 mph. Permanent restrictions 
shall be loaded into the onboard computer by direct data transfer 
from a verified database. Temporary restrictions shall be loaded 
into the onboard computer by direct data transfer from the computer-
aided dispatching system. (For not to exceed 12 months following 
cut-in of the system, use of temporary transponders programmed with 
appropriate speed restrictions will be deemed to satisfy this 
paragraph. Thereafter, use of temporary transponders alone shall be 
acceptable only in the case of an emergency restriction for which 
transfer of the restriction into the onboard computers of all 
affected trains is not practicable.)

    Explanation and analysis. As discussed above, the existing signal 
system does not enforce temporary speed restrictions, such as slow 
orders over defective track or protections for roadway workers. Amtrak 
had proposed to use temporarily placed transponders, and entry of 
restrictions into the on-board computer by milepost, to protect train 
movements and workers and equipment on or adjacent to live high-speed 
tracks. BLE-ATTD commented that this proposed use of temporary 
transponders would be insufficient to enforce temporary speed 
restrictions, and recommended as a failsafe that FRA also require the 
train dispatcher to enter these restrictions into the on-board computer 
by milepost.
    FRA agrees with BLE-ATTD that temporary transponders should not be 
routinely used to enforce temporary speed restrictions. Rather, the 
dispatcher will automatically load temporary restrictions into the on-
board computer, through the computer-aided dispatching system and a 
data radio network, to avoid the possibility of data entry errors by 
the train crew. Amtrak may use temporary transponders as an alternative 
routinely for the first 12 months after implementation of this order, 
and only on an emergency basis thereafter. Data entry by train crews is 
not an acceptable alternative.
    FRA also clarifies that permanent restrictions will also be loaded 
by direct data transfer from a verified database. FRA is not specifying 
a method for verifying the database, but expects that Amtrak will 
utilize appropriate reviews and field verifications to ensure a high 
level of accuracy.
    Nothing in this order excuses compliance with current Amtrak 
requirements for creating and issuing appropriate authorities or for 
providing protection for roadway workers. Amtrak has represented to FRA 
that these protections will remain, supplemented by the additional 
layer of safety provided by the ACSES. FRA will reopen consideration of 
this order should Amtrak undertake any substantial revision of current 
procedures that may have the effect of diminishing safety on the NEC.

    2. Except as provided in paragraph 9(b), all trains operating on 
high-speed track, immediately adjacent track where the maximum 
authorized speed exceeds 20 mph, or track providing access to high-
speed track shall be equipped to respond to the continuous cab 
signal/speed control system and ACSES.

    Explanation and analysis. The benefits of equipping conventional 
speed trains that operate on immediately adjacent tracks providing 
access to high-speed tracks may derive primarily from enforcement of 
positive stop features. If a train is prevented from inappropriately 
proceeding through a junction and onto a high-speed track, the safety 
of the subject train and the safety of the oncoming high-speed train 
are equally assured. FRA believes that most equipped trains will make 
use of high-speed tracks. (See the discussion in paragraph 9(b) below.)
    As discussed above, FRA does not adopt its proposed nighttime 
operations window and accordingly removes the proposed language from 
this section.

    3. No conflicting aspects or indications shall be displayed in 
the locomotive cab.

    Explanation and analysis. As explained above, FRA believes that 
Amtrak's dual display (details of which are contained in the program 
description placed in the docket of this proposed order) is appropriate 
for a hybrid system such as this. The order

[[Page 39352]]

requires consistent information to be displayed to the locomotive 
engineer. Amtrak plans to implement this principle, while providing 
information from both the cab signal/ATC system and ACSES, by 
displaying both of the resulting maximum speeds, with the lower speed 
to be identified and enforced.

    4. The system must enforce the most restrictive speed at any 
location associated with either the civil/temporary restriction or 
cab signal aspect.

    Explanation and analysis. As discussed above, the most restrictive 
of the limitations indicated by the cab signal/ATC or ACSES system will 
be enforced.

    5. At interlocking home signals and control points on high-speed 
tracks or protecting switches providing access to high-speed tracks, 
the signal and train control system shall enforce a positive stop 
short of the signal or fouling point when the signal displays an 
absolute stop. The system shall function such that the train will be 
brought to a complete stop and cannot be moved again until the first 
of the following events shall occur: (1) the signal displays a more 
permissive aspect; or (2) in the event of a system malfunction, or 
system penalty, the train comes to a complete stop, the engineer 
receives verbal authority to proceed from the dispatcher, and the 
engineer activates an override or reset device that is located where 
it cannot be activated from the engineer's accustomed position in 
the cab. The train may then only travel at restricted speed until a 
valid speed command is received by the on-board train equipment. For 
not to exceed 12 months following cut-in of ACSES, release of the 
positive stop feature, under conditions where the signal displays an 
aspect more favorable than stop, but not less favorable than 
restricting, may be accomplished by use of the reset device; 
thereafter, this function shall be accomplished automatically so 
that it is not necessary for the engineer to leave his or her 
accustomed position in the cab.

    Explanation and analysis. As originally conceived by Amtrak, ACSES 
would enforce a positive stop through an active transponder near the 
distant signal which would recognize that the home signal is capable of 
displaying an absolute stop, and enforce a positive stop even if the 
home signal actually displayed a restricting indication. FRA requested 
that Amtrak redesign this feature to better coordinate with the wayside 
signals. Amtrak agreed to accelerate the development of the ACSES data 
radio feature to reduce the need to operate the ``stop override'' 
button to only those instances where a system failure requires the 
train to be moved. The Mobile Communication Package (MCP), a data radio 
feature located at the interlocking, will broadcast a track specific, 
direction specific, and location specific message to the approaching 
train which automatically releases the stop-override feature without 
the engineer having to operate the ``stop override'' button when the 
home signal displays ``stop and proceed.'' This message will only be 
transmitted and only be effective when the train is between the distant 
signal and the home signal of the interlocking. If the signal displays 
``restricting,'' the MCP data radio will broadcast a similar message to 
the approaching train relieving the train from actually having to stop. 
Over the past year, Amtrak has consistently advised FRA that MCP data 
radios may not be installed at all interlockings for some time 
following cut-in of the system. Amtrak has not been able to specify 
when this element of the system would be completed. To resolve this 
concern, FRA has added language to the order requiring that this 
element of the system be completed not less than 12 months following 
cut-in.

    6. Failure modes of the system will allow for train movements at 
reduced speeds, as follows:
    a. Failure of Cab Signal/ATC System: In the event of failure of 
the cab signal/ATC system on board a train, the cab signal/ATC 
system will be cut out; however, ACSES shall remain operative and 
enforce the 79 mph speed limit. If intermediate wayside signals are 
provided, the train will continue to operate at speeds not exceeding 
79 mph subject to indications of the wayside signal system. In 
territory without fixed automatic block signals, the train will 
receive information approaching the home signal, through the MCP 
radio, with the information actually derived from the ``flashing 
lunar signal with the letter ``C'' displayed at the home signal.'' 
When failure occurs after a train has entered such a block, the 
train will proceed at restricted speed to the next interlocking and 
may not pass the home signal, regardless of the aspect displayed, 
until the flashing lunar ``Clear to Next Interlocking'' signal is 
displayed. The train may then pass the signal and proceed at a speed 
not to exceed 79 mph. This speed limit shall be enforced by ACSES.

    Explanation and analysis. As proposed, the cab signal/ATC portion 
of the system will be cut out under operating rules meeting 49 CFR 
Sec. 236.567 requirements. When the cab signal/ATC portion of the 
system fails and/or is cut out, ACSES will still be in operation, with 
the central processing unit (CPU) receiving a message from the cab 
signal/ATC CPU through a vital link that the cab signal/ATC is cut in 
and not failed. If ACSES does not receive this message, a speed of 79 
mph will be locked in and the display will be dark, other than the 79 
mph displayed in the civil speed portion, which will be enforced. ACSES 
will continue to enforce temporary and permanent speed restrictions and 
positive stop at home signal locations.

     b. ACSES failure. If the on-board ACSES fails en route, it must 
be cut out in a similar manner to the cab signal/ATC system. The 
engineer will be required to notify the dispatcher that ACSES has 
been cut out. When given permission to proceed, the train must not 
exceed 125 mph (NEC-South End) or 110 mph (NEC-North End). All 
trains with cut out ACSES will operate at conventional train speeds.

    Explanation and analysis. Amtrak's comments to the proposed order 
recommended modifications in the proposed failure modes because the 
phrase ``* * * unless a flashing lunar signal with the letter ``N'' 
reflected Amtrak's previous plan, which would present the ``clear to 
next interlocking'' information to the train at the distant signal 
through an active transponder at the location. Under Amtrak's current 
plan, with the implementation of MCP radio at the interlocking, the 
train will receive the information as it approaches the home signal, 
with the information derived from the ``flashing lunar signal with the 
letter ``C'' displayed at the home signal.''
    FRA received no other comments on this proposed design standard, 
which requires trains to fall back to existing maximum speeds when the 
ACSES must be cut out on a train. However, this approach cannot provide 
positive stop capability or compensate for higher curving speeds that 
may be allowed using tilt HSTs. All trains with a cut out ACSES will 
operate at conventional train speeds whether they are tilt train 
equipment or conventional equipment. The vital link between CPUs 
mentioned in 6(a) above will inform the signal CPU that the civil speed 
CPU is cut out or has failed. The signal speed enforcement system will 
enforce a default speed limit when ACSES has failed and/or is cut out, 
with a maximum speed of 110 mph on the NEC-North End and 125 mph on the 
NEC-South End if ACSES is cut out. This places a premium on compliance 
with operating rules developed specifically for this purpose (copies of 
which are available in the docket).

    c. Cab signals/ATC & ACSES failure. If the cab signal/ATC system 
and ACSES both fail en route, the systems shall be cut out and the 
train shall proceed as provided in 49 CFR Sec. 236.567.

    Explanation and analysis. FRA received no comment on its proposal 
to follow the procedures and restrictions in Sec. 236.567 whenever the 
signal and train control system fails and/or is cut out en route. 
Accordingly, this section applies as follows whenever the signal and 
train control system fails and/or is cut out en route:
    Where an automatic train stop, train control, or cab signal device 
fails and/

[[Page 39353]]

or is cut out enroute, train may proceed at restricted speed or if an 
automatic block signal system is in operation according to signal 
indication but not to exceed medium speed, to the next available point 
of communication where report must be made to a designated officer. 
Where no automatic block signal system is in use train shall be 
permitted to proceed at restricted speed or where automatic block 
signal system is in operation according to signal indication but not to 
exceed medium speed to a point where absolute block can be established. 
Where an absolute block is established in advance of the train on which 
the device is inoperative train may proceed at not to exceed 79 miles 
per hour.
    These procedures, which are used with present train control systems 
on the NEC and throughout the nation, have proven to be a reliable and 
safe method of operating whenever the signal and train control system 
fails and/or is cut out.

    d. Wayside signal system failure. If the wayside signal system 
fails, train operation will be at restricted speed to a point where 
absolute block can be established in advance of the train. Where 
absolute block is established in advance of the train, the train may 
proceed at speeds not to exceed 79 mph.

    Explanation and analysis. FRA received no comment on its proposal 
to allow the carrier's operating rules to effect these requirements. If 
a wayside signal system failure occurs, ACSES will continue to 
function, by enforcing the 79 mph speed, civil and temporary speed 
restrictions, and positive stops, but an absolute block and proceed not 
to exceed 79 mph must still be established.

    e. Missing transponder. If a transponder is not detected where 
the equipment expected to find the next transponder, the train must 
not exceed 125 mph (NEC-South End) or 110 mph (NEC-North End) until 
the next valid transponder is encountered. The 125/110 mph speed 
restriction will be enforced by the system and ``--'' will be 
displayed to indicate that the civil speed is unknown. The audible 
alarm for civil speeds will sound and must be acknowledged. Speed 
restrictions previously entered into the system, whether temporary 
or permanent, will be displayed at the proper time and continue to 
be enforced. If the missing transponder is a positive stop 
enforcement transponder at the distant signal to an interlocking, 
then the system will treat the missing transponder as if it were 
present and a stop will be required. Since the previous transponder 
will have transmitted the distance to the stop location, the stop 
shall be enforced unless a cab signal is received that indicates the 
interlocking signal is displaying an aspect more favorable than 
``Stop,'' ``Stop & Proceed,'' and ``Restricting.'' The 125/110 mph 
speed restriction will also be enforced regardless of whether the 
cab signal aspect is being received.

    Explanation and analysis. As proposed, permanent transponders will 
be programmed with information that includes distance to the next 
transponder. Wheel rotations will be logged to determine train position 
between transponders. If a transponder is missing (or is not 
successfully read), speeds will be slowed to 125 or 110 mph, depending 
upon the territory involved, until the next valid transponder is 
detected.

    7. When it becomes necessary to cut out the cab signal/ATC 
system, ACSES, or both, these systems shall be considered 
inoperative until the engine has been repaired, tested and found to 
be functioning properly. Repairs shall be made before dispatching 
the unit on any subsequent trip.

    Explanation and analysis. FRA received no comment on this section, 
which is adopted as proposed.

    8. Other requirements applicable to the system are as follows:
    a. Aspects in the cab shall have only one indication and one 
name, and will be shown in such a way as to be understood by the 
engine crew. These aspects shall be shown by lights and/or 
illuminated letters or numbers.
    b. Entrances to the main line can be protected by electrically 
locked derails if the speed limit is 15 mph or less. A transponder 
set shall cut in ACSES prior to movement through the derail and onto 
the main line. If the speed limit is greater than 15 mph, a positive 
stop will be required. At entrances from a signaled track, ACSES 
shall be cut in prior to the distant signal and a positive stop 
enforced at the home signal.
    Explanation and analysis. FRA received no comment on these 
sections, which are adopted as proposed.

    c. An on-board event recorder shall record, in addition to the 
required functions of Sec. 229.5(g) [of FRA's Railroad Locomotive 
Safety Standards (49 CFR Part 229)], the time at which each 
transponder is encountered, the information associated with that 
transponder, and each use of the positive stop override. These 
functions may be incorporated within the on-board computer, or as a 
stand alone device, but shall continue to record speeds and related 
cab signal/ATC data, even if ACSES has failed and/or is cut out. The 
event recorder shall meet all requirements of Sec. 229.135.

    Explanation and analysis. The NTSB supported requiring the on-board 
event recorder to record the time each transponder is encountered, any 
associated information, and each use of the positive stop override. At 
a minimum, the event recorder specifications submitted by Amtrak 
require the recorder to log with time stamps the following data: speed, 
distance traveled, location by milepost in miles and tenths, track 
number, brake pipe pressure (for penalty applications), on/off status 
of ACSES, driver input to ACSES/system acknowledge on/off, transponder 
messages received, and data from ACSES sent to the driver's display 
unit and the diagnostic serial port of the driver's diagnostic panel.

    9. The following maximum speeds apply on the NEC in territory 
subject to this order:
    a. In ACSES territory where all trains operating on high-speed 
tracks, adjacent tracks where speeds exceed 20 mph, and tracks 
providing access to high-speed tracks are equipped with cab signal/
ATC and ACSES, qualified and ACSES-equipped trainsets otherwise so 
authorized may operate at maximum speeds not exceeding 150 mph. The 
maximum speed over any highway-rail crossing shall not exceed 80 
miles per hour where only conventional warning systems are in place. 
Train speeds shall not exceed 95 mph over any highway-rail crossing 
where arrangements approved by the Associate Administrator for 
Safety incorporating four-quadrant gates and presence detection are 
provided and tied into the signal system, such that a train will be 
brought to a stop should the crossing be determined to be occupied 
following descent of the gates. Amtrak shall submit for approval of 
the Associate Administrator for Safety plans for site-specific 
improvements with timetables for each of the 13 NEC crossings 
remaining on the NEC-North End by January 1, 1999.

    Explanation and analysis. As discussed above, FRA extends the 
requirements for ACSES to trains operating on immediately adjacent 
tracks where the maximum authorized speed exceeds 20 mph. Speeds are 
permitted to 95 mph, rather than 80 mph as proposed, provided 4-
quadrant gates with presence detection are provided and tied into the 
train control system. FRA may consider amendment of this order to allow 
alternative secure arrangements at one or more private crossings 
following submission of a required crossover safety plan. This section 
is otherwise adopted as proposed.

    b. In ACSES territory on the NEC-South End, where access to any 
high-speed track is prevented by switches locked in the normal 
position and a parallel route to the high-speed track is provided at 
crossovers from adjacent tracks, and where no junctions providing 
direct access exist, qualified and ACSES-equipped trainsets 
otherwise so authorized may operate to a maximum speed not exceeding 
135 mph on such track; and provisions of this order requiring other 
tracks and trains to be equipped with the ACSES do not apply.

    Explanation and analysis. FRA received no comment on this section, 
which is adopted as proposed. Currently maximum speeds for trains on 
the general rail system are limited to 110 mph. Under a waiver, Amtrak 
operates

[[Page 39354]]

Metroliner service on the NEC-South End at speeds up to 125 mph. This 
order allows Amtrak to increase its speeds on the NEC-South End to 135 
mph by installing the ACSES transponders on the wayside and by 
equipping new high-speed trainsets with on-board scanners and 
computers. Other users of Amtrak's NEC-South End high-speed tracks are 
not required to be equipped for the present, but will benefit from the 
higher level of safety associated with Amtrak operations. On the NEC-
North End, maximum speeds currently top out at 110 mph, with no waiver 
for high-speed service. This order authorizes operation of qualified 
trainsets at up to 150 mph in territory where Amtrak has installed 
ACSES on the wayside, provided Amtrak and other users are equipped.
    The phrase ``otherwise authorized,'' as applied to trains, refers 
to equipment qualified for higher speeds under the track/vehicle 
interaction limits adopted in the recent revisions to the Track Safety 
Standards. Metroliner equipment is currently authorized to operate up 
to 125 mph. FRA anticipates that the new American Flyer trainsets will 
be qualified to operate up to 150 mph. Other equipment presently 
operating on the NEC may also qualify to operate at higher than 
conventional speeds under the revised Track Safety Standards.

    10. Schedule and acceptance requirements.
    a. This order is effective August 21, 1998.
    b. Not later than 45 days following publication of this order, 
Amtrak shall deliver to the Associate Administrator for Safety, FRA, 
a final program and timetable for completion of pre-qualification 
tests, submission of final production specifications, availability 
of on-board equipment from Amtrak's vendor, staging of installation 
of on-board equipment for which Amtrak takes responsibility, and 
testing of all wayside and on-board equipment prior to cut-in.
    c. Contingent upon FRA's acceptance of the final program and 
timetable, and FRA's acceptance of the results of pre-qualification 
and pre-service tests, compliance with requirements of this order 
for use of ACSES on the NEC-North End is required on and after 
October 1, 1999.
    d. Amtrak may commence operations under paragraph 9(b) of this 
order utilizing equipment qualified under 49 CFR Part 213, as 
revised, following FRA's approval of the elements of the final 
program, timetable and test results pertinent to the subject 
territory and operations.

    Explanation and analysis. Several commentators noted concerns 
regarding the ability of Amtrak, its vendor and other railroads to 
stage installation and testing of ACSES within the remaining time 
available. FRA shares this concern, but believes sufficient time 
remains prior to scheduled initiation of electrified operations and 
high-speed service to address these needs if Amtrak and its vendor move 
briskly, but deliberately, to complete final specifications and tests.
    FRA also has noted the need to ensure the quality of pre-service 
testing of this new system. Although the various elements of the ACSES 
system have been routinely used in train control applications 
internationally, integration of the system remains a challenge. 
Although Amtrak has extensive experience and an excellent record in 
implementing train control technology, oversight is appropriate to 
verify that safety remains the first priority in this undertaking.
    Accordingly, FRA has included a requirement for submission of a 
program and timetable for staging the implementation of this system in 
a manner that does not impair the ability of other railroads to provide 
quality passenger and freight service. FRA will expect that this 
timetable reflect consultation with other parties, as necessary and 
appropriate, and describe how adverse impacts on other parties will be 
prevented. FRA will cooperate with this process by providing one or 
more program monitors, who will oversee pre-qualification and pre-
service testing of all aspects of the system, advising the Associate 
Administrator for Safety regarding the readiness of the system as 
measured against the requirements of this order.
    FRA will continue to evaluate the ability of the parties subject to 
this order to meet the technical requirements specified without 
disruption of normal rail service and may amend the order as necessary 
to avoid any such disruptions.

Environmental Impact

    FRA has evaluated this final order of particular applicability 
under its procedures for ensuring full consideration of the potential 
environmental impacts of FRA actions, as required by the National 
Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 4321, et seq.) and related 
directives. This order meets the criteria for classification as a non-
major action for environmental purposes.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) was 
enacted by Congress to ensure that small entities are not unnecessarily 
and disproportionately burdened by Government regulations. Only one 
small entity is affected by this order, P&W. Their annual revenues are 
about $22,000,000, and this order will cost them about $1,100,000 in 
total discounted costs over twenty years. The twenty-year cost is thus 
about 5% of one year's revenue. This is a substantial impact on that 
one entity. This order is, however, only one part of a much larger 
infrastructure improvement, and much of the benefit of that improvement 
accrues to P&W, including the opening of rail access for double stack 
intermodal service to the site of the former U.S. Navy facilities at 
Quonset Point and Davisville, Rhode Island, at a cost to the Federal 
taxpayer estimated at $55 million. Also, as an adjunct to the current 
improvement project, P&W will be the beneficiary of construction of a 
third track on the NEC between Davisville and ``Boston Switch'' that 
will provide the new doublestack access that otherwise would not exist. 
P&W is the only freight railroad operating over those tracks. While the 
one-time cost of ACSES is a significant fraction of one year's revenue 
for P&W, the other projects will add far more than that to P&W's net 
worth, enabling them to compete effectively against other modes. They 
do not at present face rail competition.
    As noted above, P&W operates on the NEC largely as a result of an 
expedited supplemental transaction effected under section 1155 of the 
Northeast Rail Service Act of 1981 (NERSA) (45 U.S.C. 745). Pursuant to 
that statute, and under an order of the Special Court established by 
the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Conrail was compelled to 
surrender certain properties and service rights to a successor railroad 
that would commit to providing at least 4 years of service on the 
properties transferred. P&W aggressively pursued that opportunity, with 
the full knowledge that public planning from the 1960's forward had 
focused on dramatic passenger service improvements on the NEC between 
New York and Boston. As recently as the past year, P&W has sought to 
extend its service rights farther west into Connecticut based upon 
P&W's claim that the proposed acquisition of Conrail by NS and CSX 
constitutes a termination of Conrail's residual franchise and 
activation of rights P&W enjoys under the Special Court's order.
    FRA has sought to identify means to mitigate the impact of this 
order on P&W. The proposed order would have permitted operations of 
unequipped trains during nighttime hours when high-speed trains were 
not running. P&W commented that it would not be feasible to limit its 
train operations to night time, the window within which the order 
proposed to permit non-equipped trains to run on the NEC,

[[Page 39355]]

since nighttime switching service would result in a dramatic increase 
in costs, cause operational disruptions for P&W customers, disrupt 
neighborhoods, and raise serious safety issues. P&W has thus explained 
that the means suggested in the proposed order would not be helpful, 
but has not suggested any alternate means of mitigating the impacts 
that are compatible with early realization of reasonable returns from 
public investments in improved rail service in the region. As a result 
of those investments, P&W will be provided access to a third main track 
over a key route, and with improved clearances, at a cost to the 
Federal Government almost 50 times greater than the cost to P&W of 
installing ACSES on its equipment. Further, it is clear that P&W (like 
all operators on the subject territory) will realize substantial 
benefits from ACSES. Under these circumstances, FRA is unable to 
determine that P&W is unduly disadvantaged by the mandate of this 
order.
    Most importantly, FRA believes that there is no alternative that 
could meet the safety concerns which are FRA's primary mission without 
imposing similar costs on P&W. The Regulatory Flexibility Act makes 
clear that concerns about small entities are not to take precedence 
over the government's responsibility for public safety. Further, it is 
not the purpose of railroad safety regulations and orders to allocate 
societal costs among parties with shared interests in transportation 
improvements. Nevertheless, FRA states unequivocally that it does not 
by issuance of this order intend to deprive P&W of any claim it may 
have against Amtrak related to the assignment of responsibility for the 
cost of these safety improvements.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), Pub. L. No. 104-
13, Sec. 2,109 Stat. 163 (1995) (codified as revised at 44 U.S.C. 
Secs. 3501-3520), and its implementing regulations, 5 CFR Part 1320, 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) does not need to approve 
information collection requirements that affect nine or fewer 
respondents. FRA has determined that information collection 
requirements in this order will affect fewer than nine railroads, and 
that therefore OMB approval is not required.

Regulatory Impact

Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

    This rule has been evaluated in accordance with existing policies 
and procedures, and has been determined to be non-significant under 
both Executive Order 12866 and DOT policies and procedures (44 FR 
11034; February 26, 1979). FRA has prepared and placed in the docket a 
regulatory analysis addressing the economic impact of the rule. 
Document inspection and copying facilities are available at 1120 
Vermont Avenue, 7th Floor, Washington, DC, 20590. Photocopies may also 
be obtained by submitting a written request to the FRA Docket Clerk at 
Office of Chief Counsel, Federal Railroad Administration, 400 Seventh 
Street, SW, Washington, DC 20590.
    Even though full implementation of ACSES would cost about $200 
million, FRA is not ordering that here, nor does FRA plan to require it 
at present. For the portion of ACSES ordered here, FRA estimates that 
the direct safety benefits will exceed $44 million, discounted to 
present value over a 20-year period, through prevention of collisions, 
overspeed derailments, and incidents involving harm to roadway workers. 
Additional benefits are expected to include avoidance of other public 
investments in transportation infrastructure in the region. The 
allocated cost for installation and maintenance of ACSES on the 
segments affected by this order is expected to be $36 million for the 
same period, yielding a net benefit to society of at least $8.5 
million, exclusive of non-safety benefits. Of this amount, costs of 
installation on the right-of-way and on equipment will be about $33 
million, which is expected to be spread over three calendar years.
    FRA has based its analysis on many assumptions, which yield a great 
deal of uncertainty. The projected accident rates may be significantly 
lower without ACSES, in which case the analysis would overstate 
benefits. FRA believes it is equally likely that the analysis 
underestimates the accident rate without ACSES, in which case the 
analysis would understate benefits.
    There are several reasons for the uncertainty. The track safety 
standards have recently been modified, and will permit railroads to set 
maximum speeds on curves according to a performance standard which will 
likely permit higher maximum speeds on curves on the affected segments. 
This will leave less of a margin for error should the engineer permit 
the train to exceed the civil speed restriction for a curve on which 
the maximum speed has been increased. At the same time the corridor 
will be electrified. This will allow the use of electric locomotives 
which are capable of more rapid acceleration, and therefore are capable 
of violating civil speed restrictions more often, for longer durations 
and by greater speeds. FRA realizes that traffic on the affected 
segments will increase (as did A. D. Little, the firm that analyzed the 
risks of high speed service for Amtrak), but the consequences of this 
increase can only be estimated, and this estimate is itself based on 
uncertain volume estimates.
    The largest uncertainty, however, comes from the fact that the root 
cause of the kinds of accidents which ACSES may prevent is human 
failure. Human failure occurs somewhat randomly, and is very difficult 
to predict. FRA is aware that the more opportunities for human failure 
exist, the greater the likelihood of such failure, but there is no way 
to say with certainty that so many human failures will occur within 
such a period.
    If one accident like the 1996 Silver Spring, Maryland accident (11 
killed, 24 injured) is prevented, this rule will more than pay for 
itself. That accident was a relatively low speed collision between an 
Amtrak train and a commuter train, not on the affected segments. Higher 
speed accidents could easily have costs many times the total cost of 
the order (for example, the Chase, Maryland accident in 1987 which left 
16 killed, 228 injured). Even accidents where a collision is not the 
first event can be severe. In 1990, an Amtrak train derailed because of 
overspeed on a curve in Boston, and struck a train on an adjacent track 
(451 injured). In June 1998, a German high-speed train derailed and 
struck a bridge, killing approximately 95 people. Although that train 
was not derailed because of overspeed and did not have crash-energy 
management systems (as far as we now know), it was travelling at 125 
mph, a lower speed than trainsets will be capable of on this corridor, 
and may be illustrative of what a high-speed derailment could cause.
    FRA has already taken steps to see that high-speed trains on this 
corridor will have crash-energy management systems, but avoiding 
derailments and collisions with conventional passenger trains is 
extremely desirable. While it is impossible to know whether this will 
prevent something which may never happen, or multiple events, 
preventing just one major accident in twenty years will make the system 
pay for itself.
    Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the preamble, FRA issues the 
following Final Order:

Final Order of Particular Applicability

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20103, 20107, 20501-20505 (1994); and 49 
CFR 1.49(f), (g), and (m).


[[Page 39356]]



Scope and Applicability

    This order supplements existing regulations at 49 CFR Part 236 and 
existing orders for automatic train control on track controlled by the 
National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) on the Northeast 
Corridor (NEC). This order applies in territory where Amtrak has 
installed wayside elements of the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement 
System (ACSES), permitting high-speed operations under the conditions 
set forth below.
    All railroads operating on high-speed tracks in such equipped 
territory between Boston, Massachusetts and New Haven, Connecticut 
(NEC-North End), or on tracks providing access to such high-speed 
tracks, shall be subject to this order, including the following 
entities operating or contracting for the operation of rail service--

Amtrak;
Connecticut Department of Transportation;
Consolidated Rail Corporation and its successors;
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority; and
Providence and Worcester Railroad Company.

    The requirement that all trains be equipped with operative on-board 
ACSES applies as specified in paragraph (2) from milepost 73.2 at New 
Haven, Connecticut, to South Station, Boston, Massachusetts, but 
applies only to high-speed trains operating on high-speed tracks 
between Washington, DC, and New York, New York (NEC-South End), as set 
forth in paragraph 9(b).

Definitions

    Unless otherwise provided terms used in this order have the same 
definitions contained in Part 236. For purposes of this order--
    ACSES means a transponder based system that operates independent of 
the cab signal system, and provides enforcement of permanent speed 
restrictions, temporary speed restrictions, and stop signals at 
interlockings.
    High-speed train means a train operating in excess of 125 miles per 
hour (mph) on the NEC-South End, and 110 mph on the NEC-North End.
    ``High-speed track'' means (1) a track on the main line of the NEC-
South End, where the authorized train speed for any class of train 
exceeds 125 mph, or (2) a track on the main line of the NEC-North End 
where the maximum authorized train speed for any class of train is in 
excess of 110 mph.
    Immediately adjacent track means a track within 30 feet of a high-
speed track when measured from track center to track center.
    Signal and train control system refers to the automatic cab signal/
automatic train control system (cab signal/ATC) in effect on the NEC at 
the date of issuance of this order, as supplemented by ACSES, together 
with such modifications as Amtrak shall make consistent with this 
order.

Performance Standards

    Effective October 1, 1999, the following performance standards and 
special requirements shall apply:
    1. Except as provided in paragraph 9(b), the signal and train 
control system shall enforce both permanent and temporary civil speed 
restrictions (e.g., track curvature, bridges, and slow orders) on all 
high-speed tracks and immediately adjacent tracks. Permanent 
restrictions shall be loaded into the onboard computer by direct data 
transfer from a verified database. Temporary restrictions shall be 
loaded into the onboard computer by direct data transfer from the 
computer-aided dispatching system. (For not to exceed 12 months 
following cut-in of the system, use of temporary transponders 
programmed with appropriate speed restrictions will be deemed to 
satisfy this paragraph. Thereafter, use of temporary transponders alone 
shall be acceptable only in the case of an emergency restriction for 
which transfer of the restriction into the onboard computers of all 
affected trains is not practicable.)
    2. Except as provided in paragraph 9(b), all trains operating on 
high-speed track, immediately adjacent track where the maximum 
authorized speed exceeds 20 mph, or track providing access to high-
speed track shall be equipped to respond to the continuous cab signal/
speed control system and ACSES.
    3. No conflicting aspects or indications shall be displayed in the 
locomotive cab.
    4. The system must enforce the most restrictive speed at any 
location associated with either the civil/temporary restriction or cab 
signal aspect.
    5. At interlocking home signals and control points on high-speed 
tracks or protecting switches providing access to high-speed tracks, 
the signal and train control system shall enforce a positive stop short 
of the signal or fouling point when the signal displays an absolute 
stop. The system shall function such that the train will be brought to 
a complete stop and cannot be moved again until the first of the 
following events shall occur: (1) the signal displays a more permissive 
aspect; or (2) in the event of a system malfunction, or system penalty, 
the train comes to a complete stop, the engineer receives verbal 
authority to proceed from the dispatcher, and the engineer activates an 
override or reset device that is located where it cannot be activated 
from the engineer's accustomed position in the cab. The train may then 
only travel at restricted speed until a valid speed command is received 
by the on-board train equipment. For not to exceed 12 months following 
cut-in of ACSES, release of the positive stop feature, under conditions 
where the signal displays an aspect more favorable than stop, but not 
less favorable than restricting, may be accomplished by use of the 
reset device; thereafter, this function shall be accomplished 
automatically so that it is not necessary for the engineer to leave his 
or her accustomed position in the cab.
    6. Failure modes of the system will allow for train movements at 
reduced speeds, as follows:
    a. Failure of Cab Signal/ATC System: In the event of failure of the 
cab signal/ATC system on board a train, the cab signal/ATC system will 
be cut out; however, ACSES shall remain operative and enforce the 79 
mph speed limit. If intermediate wayside signals are provided, the 
train will receive information approaching the home signal, through the 
MCP radio, with the information actually derived from the ``flashing 
lunar signal with the letter ``C'' displayed at the home signal.'' When 
failure occurs after a train has entered such a block, the train will 
proceed at restricted speed to the next interlocking and may not pass 
the home signal, regardless of the aspect displayed, until the flashing 
lunar ``Clear to Next Interlocking'' signal is displayed. The train may 
then pass the signal and proceed at a speed not to exceed 79 mph. The 
speed limit shall be enforced by ACSES.
    b. ACSES failure. If the on-board ACSES fails en route, it must be 
cut out in a similar manner to the cab signal/ATC system. The engineer 
will be required to notify the dispatcher that ACSES has been cut out. 
When given permission to proceed, the train must not exceed 125 mph 
(NEC-South End) or 110 mph (NEC-North End). All trains with cut out 
ACSES will operate at conventional train speeds.
    c. Cab signals/ATC & ACSES failure. If the cab signal/ATC system 
and ACSES both fail en route, the systems shall be cut out and the 
train shall proceed as provided in 49 CFR Sec. 236.567.
    d. Wayside signal system failure. If the wayside signal system 
fails, train

[[Page 39357]]

operation will be at restricted speed to a point where absolute block 
can be established in advance of the train. Where absolute block is 
established in advance of the train, the train may proceed at speeds 
not to exceed 79 mph.
    e. Missing transponder. If a transponder is not detected where the 
equipment expected to find the next transponder, the train must not 
exceed 125 mph (NEC-South End) or 110 mph (NEC-North End) until the 
next valid transponder is encountered. The 125/110 mph speed 
restriction will be enforced by the system and ``--'' will be displayed 
to indicate that the civil speed is unknown. The audible alarm for 
civil speeds will sound and must be acknowledged. Speed restrictions 
previously entered into the system, whether temporary or permanent, 
will be displayed at the proper time and continue to be enforced. If 
the missing transponder is a positive stop enforcement transponder at 
the distant signal to an interlocking, then the system will treat the 
missing transponder as if it were present and a stop will be required. 
Since the previous transponder will have transmitted the distance to 
the stop location, the stop shall be enforced unless a cab signal is 
received that indicates the interlocking signal is displaying an aspect 
more favorable than ``Stop,'' ``Stop & Proceed,'' and ``Restricting.'' 
The 125/110 mph speed restriction will also be enforced regardless of 
whether the cab signal aspect is being received.
    7. When it becomes necessary to cut out the cab signal/ATC system, 
ACSES, or both, these systems shall be considered inoperative until the 
engine has been repaired, tested and found to be functioning properly. 
Repairs shall be made before dispatching the unit on any subsequent 
trip.
    8. Other requirements applicable to the system are as follows:
    a. Aspects in the cab shall have only one indication and one name, 
and will be shown in such a way as to be understood by the engine crew. 
These aspects shall be shown by lights and/or illuminated letters or 
numbers.
    b. Entrances to the main line can be protected by electrically 
locked derails if the speed limit is 15 mph or less. A transponder set 
shall cut in ACSES prior to movement through the derail and onto the 
main line. If the speed limit is greater than 15 mph, a positive stop 
will be required. At entrances from a signaled track, ACSES shall be 
cut in prior to the distant signal and a positive stop enforced at the 
home signal.
    c. An on-board event recorder shall record, in addition to the 
required functions of Sec. 229.5(g) [of FRA's Railroad Locomotive 
Safety Standards (49 CFR Part 229)], the time at which each transponder 
is encountered, the information associated with that transponder, and 
each use of the positive stop override. These functions may be 
incorporated within the on-board computer, or as a stand alone device, 
but shall continue to record speeds and related cab signal/ATC data, 
even if ACSES has failed and/or is cut out. The event recorder shall 
meet all requirements of Sec. 229.135.
    9. The following maximum speeds apply on the NEC in territory 
subject to this order:
    a. In ACSES territory where all trains operating on high-speed 
tracks, adjacent track where the maximum authorized speed exceeds 20 
mph, and tracks providing access to high-speed tracks are equipped with 
cab signal/ATC and ACSES, qualified and ACSES-equipped trainsets 
otherwise so authorized may operate at maximum speeds not exceeding 150 
mph. The maximum speed over any highway-rail crossing shall not exceed 
80 mph where only conventional warning systems are in place. Train 
speeds shall not exceed 95 mph over any highway-rail crossing where 
arrangements approved by the Associate Administrator for Safety 
incorporating four-quadrant gates and presence detection are provided 
and tied into the signal system, such that a train will be brought to a 
stop should the crossing be determined to be occupied following descent 
of the gates. Amtrak shall submit for approval of the Associate 
Administrator for Safety plans for site-specific improvements with 
timetables for each of the 13 NEC crossings remaining on the NEC-North 
End by January 1, 1999.
    b. In ACSES territory on the NEC-South End, where access to any 
high-speed track is prevented by switches locked in the normal position 
and a parallel route to the high-speed track is provided at crossovers 
from adjacent tracks, and where no junctions providing direct access 
exist, qualified and ACSES-equipped trainsets otherwise so authorized 
may operate to a maximum speed not exceeding 135 mph on such track; and 
provisions of this order requiring other tracks and trains to be 
equipped with ACSES do not apply.
    10. Schedule and acceptance requirements.
    a. This order is effective August 21, 1998.
    b. Not later than 45 days following publication of this order, 
Amtrak shall deliver to the Associate Administrator for Safety, FRA, a 
final program and timetable for completion of pre-qualification tests, 
availability of on-board equipment from Amtrak's vendor, staging of 
installation of on-board equipment for which Amtrak takes 
responsibility, and testing of all wayside and on-board equipment prior 
to cut-in.
    c. Contingent upon FRA's acceptance of the final program and 
timetable, and FRA's acceptance of the results of pre-qualification and 
pre-service tests, compliance with requirements of this order for use 
of ACSES on the NEC-North End is required on and after October 1, 1999.
    d. Amtrak may commence operations under paragraph 9(b) of this 
order utilizing equipment qualified under 49 CFR Part 213, as revised, 
following FRA's approval of the elements of the final program, 
timetable and test results pertinent to the subject territory and 
operations.

    Issued in Washington, D.C. on July 10, 1998.
Jolene M. Molitoris,
Federal Railroad Administrator.
[FR Doc. 98-19431 Filed 7-21-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P