[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 136 (Thursday, July 16, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 38433-38435]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-18960]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287]


Duke Energy Corporation; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of 
Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses, Proposed No Significant 
Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
considering issuance of amendments to Facility Operating License Nos. 
DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55, issued to Duke Energy Corporation (the 
licensee), for operation of the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 
3, respectively, located in Seneca, South Carolina.
    If approved, the proposed amendments would allow temporary 
noncompliance with the Penetration Room Ventilation System air flow 
surveillance requirements of Technical Specification (TS) 4.5.4.1.b.1 
until modifications can be completed to support testing in accordance 
with ANSI Standard N510-1975, as required by the TSs. These 
modifications are scheduled to be completed on all three units by 
August 30, 1998.
    Oconee TS 4.5.4.1.b.1 requires that every 18 months the Penetration 
Room Ventilation System fans be demonstrated to operate at design flow 
(+/-10 percent) when tested in accordance with ANSI Standard N510-1975. 
ANSI Standard N510-1975 requires that a pitot tube velocity-traverse 
method be used in accordance with Section 9 of the American Conference 
of Government Industrial Hygienists Industrial Ventilation 
requirements. The flow measurement method that has been used since 
original construction uses installed orifice plates to measure the air 
flow.
    However, during a Safety System Engineering Inspection at Oconee 
for the Control Room Ventilation System (CRVS) and Penetration Room 
Ventilation System (PRVS), the NRC identified a violation that 
indicated that the PRVS fans were not tested in accordance with the TSs 
and ANSI Standard N510-1975. This violation was included in Inspection 
Report Nos. 50-269/98-03, 50-270/98-03, and 50-287/09-03 dated May 4, 
1998. By letter dated June 4, 1998, the licensee denied the violation 
based on a belief that the use of the orifice plates met the 
requirements of the TSs and the ANSI standard. As part of the review of 
this issue, the licensee conducted flow measurement tests using a pitot 
tube array and attempted (unsuccessfully) to locate calibration data 
for the orifices. The licensee was unable to develop an alternate 
method to measure flow that was reliable.
    By letter dated July 6, 1998, the NRC informed the licensee that 
its denial of the violation was rejected. Consequently, the licensee 
entered TS 3.0, which required that all three units be in the hot 
shutdown condition within 12 hours, and requested that a Notice of 
Enforcement Discretion (NOED) be granted. The NOED was issued on July 
8, 1998, and will be effective until the proposed amendments that were 
submitted on July 8, 1998, are processed. Since the proposed amendments 
are designed to complete the review process and implement the TS 
changes, pursuant to the NRC's policy regarding exercising discretion 
for an operating facility set out in Section VII.c of the ``General 
Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions'' 
(Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600, and be effective for the period until 
the issuance of the related TS amendments, these circumstances require 
that the amendments be processed under exigent circumstances.
    Before issuance of the proposed license amendments, the Commission 
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6) for amendments to be granted under 
exigent circumstances, the NRC staff must determine that the amendment 
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the 
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of 
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendments would not (1) 
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; 
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As 
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of 
the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented 
below:

    [This proposed change has been evaluated against the standards 
in 10 CFR 50.92 and has been determined to involve no significant 
hazards, in that operation of the facility in accordance with the 
proposed amendments would not:]
    1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated:
    This proposed change does not increase the probability of an 
accident evaluated in the SAR [Safety Analysis Report] because:
    This evaluation addresses the potential impact of revising 
Technical Specification 4.5.4.1.b.1 to include a note to allow a 
temporary noncompliance with this surveillance requirement until 
August 30, 1998, to complete the necessary modifications to enable 
flow testing in accordance with ANSI N510-1975.
    As described in the technical justification (Attachment 3 [of 
the July 8, 1998, submittal]), the use of orifice plates in the 
Oconee Units 1, 2, and 3 Penetration Room Ventilation Systems 
(PRVSs) to measure the flow from the PRVS fans, in lieu of ANSI 
N510-1975 requirements, does not increase the probability of an 
accident evaluated in the SAR because this condition is not an 
accident initiator. There is no physical change to any plant 
structures, systems, or components (SSCs) or operating procedures. 
Neither electrical power systems, nor important to safety mechanical 
SSCs will be adversely affected. The PRVS has been evaluated as 
operable for normal and accident conditions. There are no shutdown 
margin, reactivity management, or fuel integrity concerns. There is 
no increase in accident initiation likelihood, therefore analyzed 
accident scenarios are not impacted.
    This proposed change does not increase the probability of a 
malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the SAR 
because:
    As described in the technical justification, the use of orifice 
plates which are currently used in Oconee Units 1, 2, and 3 to 
measure the flow from the PRVS fans, in lieu of ANSI N510-1975 
requirements, does not increase the probability of a malfunction of 
equipment important to safety. This activity does not physically 
change or modify any plant system, structure, or component. The PRVS 
is QA [quality assurance] condition 1 (QA-1) and is required to 
filter reactor building leakage which enters the East and West 
Penetration Rooms. This activity does not change any test 
procedures. Nothing is being done to inhibit the integrity or 
function of the PRVS. No valve manipulations, electrical alignments, 
or system configurations are required.
    This change does not increase the consequences of an accident 
evaluated in the SAR because:
    This activity will not adversely affect the ability to mitigate 
any SAR described accidents. The PRVS flow is within the system 
design limits as measured by the orifice plates. In addition, Duke 
[Duke Energy Corporation] has performed bounding analyses which 
demonstrate that the carbon filter efficiency is still within the 
Technical Specification limits at higher flow rates. Therefore, 
Oconee Units 1, 2, and 3 will meet system design requirements for 
the PRVS. There is no adverse impact on containment integrity, 
radiological release pathways, fuel

[[Page 38434]]

design, filtration systems, main steam relief valve setpoints, or 
radwaste systems.
    This change does not increase the consequences of a malfunction 
of equipment important to safety evaluated in the SAR because:
    No safety related or important to safety equipment necessary to 
place or maintain the plant in safe shutdown condition will be 
impacted by allowing a temporary noncompliance with this 
surveillance requirement until August 30, 1998, to complete flow 
testing in accordance with ANSI N510-1975. As described in the 
technical justification, the use of orifice plates which are 
currently used in Oconee Units 1, 2, and 3 to measure the flow from 
the PRVS fans, in lieu of ANSI N510-1975 requirements, does not 
increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to 
safety. The PRVS flow is within the system design limits as measured 
by the orifice plates. In addition, Duke has performed bounding 
analyses which demonstrate that the carbon filter efficiency is 
still within the Technical Specification limits at higher flow 
rates. Therefore, Oconee Units 1, 2, and 3 will meet system design 
requirements for the PRVS. There is no adverse impact on containment 
integrity, radiological release pathways, fuel design, filtration 
systems, main steam relief valve setpoints, or radwaste systems.
    (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of 
accident from any kind of accident previously evaluated:
    This change does not create the possibility for an accident of a 
different type than any evaluated in the SAR because:
    There is no increased risk of unit trip, or challenge to the 
Reactor Protection System (RPS) or other safety systems. There is no 
physical effect on the plant, i.e. none on Reactor Coolant System 
(RCS) temperature, boron concentration, control rod manipulations, 
core configuration changes, and no impact on nuclear 
instrumentation. There is no increased risk of a reactivity 
excursion. No new failure modes or credible accident scenarios are 
postulated from this activity.
    This change does not create the possibility for a malfunction of 
a different type than any evaluated in the SAR because:
    There is no physical change to the plant SSCs or operating 
procedures. This change does not involve any plant changes, 
electrical lineups, or valve manipulations. Analyses have been 
performed which demonstrate that the PRVS can perform its intended 
safety function relying on the orifice plates to measure flow. No 
new equipment or components were installed. No credible new failures 
are postulated.
    (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    This change does not involve a significant reduction in the 
margin of safety because:
    No function of any importance to safety SSC will be adversely 
affected or degraded as a result of continued operation. No safety 
parameters, setpoints, or design limits are changed. There is no 
adverse impact to the nuclear fuel, cladding, RCS, or required 
containment systems.
    Duke has concluded, based on the above, that there are no 
significant hazards considerations involved in this amendment 
request.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 14 days after the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination.
    Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendments until the 
expiration of the 14-day notice period. However, should circumstances 
change during the notice period, such that failure to act in a timely 
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, 
the Commission may issue the license amendments before the expiration 
of the 14-day notice period, provided that its final determination is 
that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration. The 
final determination will consider all public and State comments 
received. Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in 
the Federal Register a notice of issuance. The Commission expects that 
the need to take this action will occur very infrequently.
    Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and 
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of 
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of 
this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to 
Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of 
written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document 
Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.
    The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to 
intervene is discussed below.
    By August 17, 1998, the licensee may file a request for a hearing 
with respect to issuance of the amendments to the subject facility 
operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this 
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding 
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to 
intervene.
    Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene shall 
be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice for 
Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested persons 
should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is available at the 
Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, 
NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room located at 
the Oconee County Library, 501 West South Broad Street, Walhalla, South 
Carolina. If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene 
is filed by the above date, the Commission or an Atomic Safety and 
Licensing Board, designated by the Commission or by the Chairman of the 
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/
or petition; and the Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and 
Licensing Board will issue a notice of hearing or an appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the 
Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of 
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the 
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be 
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition 
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of 
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person 
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been 
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of 
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy 
the specificity requirements described above.
    Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to 
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions 
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must 
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be 
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a 
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise 
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the 
contention

[[Page 38435]]

and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the contention 
at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references to those 
specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on 
which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those facts or expert 
opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information to show that a 
genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law or 
fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of the 
amendments under consideration. The contention must be one which, if 
proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A petitioner who fails 
to file such a supplement which satisfies these requirements with 
respect to at least one contention will not be permitted to participate 
as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
    If the amendments are issued before the expiration of the 30-day 
hearing period, the Commission will make a final determination on the 
issue of no significant hazards consideration. If a hearing is 
requested, the final determination will serve to decide when the 
hearing is held.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves 
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the 
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the 
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance 
of the amendments.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a 
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place 
before the issuance of any amendment.
    A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must 
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and 
Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public 
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, 
by the above date. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the 
Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to Mr. J. Michael McGarry, III, Winston 
and Strawn, 1200 17th Street, NW., Washington, DC 20036, attorney for 
the licensee.
    Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended 
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not 
be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding 
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the 
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the 
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(l)-(v) and 2.714(d).
    For further details with respect to this action, see the 
application for amendment dated July 8, 1998, which is available for 
public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public 
document room, located at the Oconee County Library, 501 West South 
Broad Street, Walhalla, South Carolina.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 13th day of July 1998.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
David E. LaBarge,
Senior Project Manager Project Directorate II-2, Division of Reactor 
Projects--I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 98-18960 Filed 7-15-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P