[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 120 (Tuesday, June 23, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 34198-34200]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-16645]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 030-31174, License No. 07-28386-01, EA NO. 98-061]


Koch Engineering Company, Inc., Newark, Delaware; Order Imposing 
a Civil Monetary Penalty

I

    Koch Engineering Company, Inc. (Licensee) is the holder of 
Byproduct Materials License No. 07-28386-01 (License) issued by the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) on July 24, 1989, and 
most recently renewed by the NRC on August 28, 1995. The License 
authorizes the Licensee to possess and use certain byproduct materials 
in accordance with the conditions specified therein at its facilities 
in Newark, Delaware, Canton, Michigan, and temporary job sites anywhere 
in the United States where the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
maintains jurisdiction.

II

    A special inspection of the Licensee's activities was conducted on 
September 15, 1997, to review the circumstances associated with an 
event involving the shipment of a package of radioactive material (3 
cesium-137 sources) via Federal Express from the Licensee's facility in 
Newark, Delaware to Wilmington, North Carolina. The package was empty 
upon arrival in North Carolina, and the sources were later found at a 
Federal Express facility in Memphis, Tennessee. The NRC inspection was 
continued in the Region I office on January 20, 1998, to review 
evaluations of doses received by Federal Express workers as a result of 
the event. The results of this inspection indicated that the Licensee 
had not conducted its activities in full compliance with NRC 
requirements. A written Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of 
Civil Penalty (Notice) was served upon the Licensee by letter dated 
March 13, 1998. The Notice states the nature of the violations, the 
provisions of the NRC requirements that the Licensee violated, and the 
amount of the civil penalty proposed for the violation.
    The Licensee responded to the Notice in letters, dated April 8 and 
9, 1998. In its responses, the Licensee admits the violations, but 
disputes the Severity Level of the violation that resulted in the 
issuance of the civil penalty and requests that the proposed penalty of 
$4,400 be reconsidered.

III

    After consideration of the Licensee's response and the statements 
of fact, explanation, and argument contained therein, the NRC staff has 
determined, as set forth in the Appendix to this Order, that the 
Licensee has not provided an adequate basis for reducing the Severity 
Level of the violation or for withdrawal of the civil penalty 
associated with this violation. Therefore, a civil penalty in the 
amount of $4,400 should be imposed.

[[Page 34199]]

IV

    In view of the foregoing and pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205, 
It is hereby ordered that:

    The Licensee pay a civil penalty in the amount of $4,400 within 
30 days of the date of this Order, by check, draft, money order, or 
electronic transfer, payable to the Treasurer of the United States 
and mailed to Mr. James Lieberman, Director, Office of Enforcement, 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738.

V

    The Licensee may request a hearing within 30 days of the date of 
this Order. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to 
extending the time to request a hearing. A request for extension of 
time must be made in writing to the Director, Office of Enforcement, 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and include a 
statement of good cause for the extension. A request for a hearing 
should be clearly marked as a ``Request for an Enforcement Hearing'' 
and shall be addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, with a copy to the 
Commission's Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555. Copies also 
shall be sent to the Deputy Assistant General Counsel for Enforcement 
at the same address and to the Regional Administrator, NRC Region I, 
475 Allendale Road, King of Prussia, PA 19406.
    If a hearing is requested, the Commission will issue an Order 
designating the time and place of the hearing. If the Licensee fails to 
request a hearing within 30 days of the date of this Order (or if 
written approval of an extension of time in which to request a hearing 
has not been granted), the provisions of this Order shall be effective 
without further proceedings. If payment has not been made by that time, 
the matter may be referred to the Attorney General for collection.
    In the event the Licensee requests a hearing as provided above, the 
issues to be considered at such hearing shall be:
    Whether on the basis of the violation admitted by the Licensee, 
this Order should be sustained.

    Dated at Rockville, MD, this 12th day of June 1998.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Ashok C. Thadani,
Acting Deputy Executive Director for Regulatory Effectiveness.

Appendix--Evaluations and Conclusion

    On March 13, 1998, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of 
Civil Penalty (Notice) was issued to Koch Engineering Company, Inc. 
(Licensee) for violations identified during NRC review of the 
circumstances associated with an event involving the shipment of a 
package containing 3 cesium-137 sources from the Licensee's facility in 
Newark, Delaware to Wilmington, North Carolina. The package was empty 
upon arrival in North Carolina, and the sources were later found at a 
Federal Express facility in Memphis, Tennessee. The Licensee responded 
to the Notice in letters, dated April 8 and 9, 1998. In its responses, 
the Licensee admits the violations, but disputes the Severity Level of 
the violation for which a civil penalty was assessed and requests the 
NRC reconsider the proposed civil penalty of $4,400. The NRC's 
evaluation and conclusion regarding the Licensee's requests are as 
follows:

Restatement of the Violation

    10 CFR 71.5(a) requires that a licensee who transports licensed 
material outside of the site of usage, as specified in the NRC license, 
or where transport is on public highways, or who delivers licensed 
material to a carrier for transport, comply with the applicable 
requirements of the regulations appropriate to the mode of transport of 
the Department of Transportation (DOT) in 49 CFR Parts 170 through 189.
    49 CFR 173.475 requires, in part, that before each shipment of any 
radioactive materials package, the offeror must ensure, by examination 
or appropriate tests, that each closure device of the packaging, 
including any required gasket, is properly installed, secured, and free 
of defects.
    Contrary to the above, prior to September 15, 1997, the licensee 
had failed to ensure, by examination or test, that each closure device 
was properly installed, secured, and free of defects before each 
shipment of packages containing radioactive material. Specifically, the 
licensee did not ensure that the Master Lock No. 175 padlock attached 
to the packages were examined or tested in that the individual 
responsible for installing the padlock did not pull on the lock after 
it was closed to ensure that it was secure.
    This is a Severity Level II violation (Supplement VI). Civil 
Penalty--$4,400

Summary of the Licensee's Response

    The Licensee admits the violation, but contends that the criteria 
used to classify the violation at Severity Level II are not applicable, 
because it believes that it is possible that the loss of control of 
radioactive material could have resulted from inappropriate handling by 
the carrier (Federal Express) and that the violation did not result in 
a clear potential for a member of the public to receive more than 100 
mrem to the whole body.
    The Licensee agrees that the violation may have been the probable 
cause for the ``loss of control of radioactive material via a breach in 
the package's integrity,'' but it believes that the inappropriate 
handling by the carrier's hazmat personnel may have also been a 
contributing factor. The Licensee contends that the package was offered 
to the carrier with the lock and two electrical tie wraps installed and 
that inappropriate handling by the carrier, such as a substantial drop 
from a height of greater than 4 feet, may have resulted in the initial 
lock failure and subsequent loss of the three sealed sources from the 
container. Additionally, the Licensee contends that the carrier's 
hazmat employee, who first noticed the opened empty container, did not 
follow proper procedures when he/she placed the lid back on the 
container and allowed the container to proceed, rather than immediately 
reporting the incident to his/her supervisor.
    Based on the regulatory criteria specified in 49 CFR, the Licensee 
contends that regulations required that its package should have only 
been in the care of individuals classified as ``hazmat employees'' 
during all stages of the shipping process. The Licensee also states 
that the regulations require that hazmat employees be trained 
concerning ``methods and procedures for avoiding accidents, such as the 
proper procedures for handling packages of hazardous material.'' 
Therefore, the Licensee contends that, while the carrier is not 
regulated by the NRC, the carrier's actions should be considered when 
determining accountability.
    The Licensee also contends that the violation did not result in a 
``clear potential for a member of the public to receive more than 100 
mrem to the whole body,'' noting that the regulations required that 
their radioactive material shipment only be handled by trained hazmat 
employees. The Licensee contends that the carrier's hazmat employees 
are not considered members of the public while performing hazmat duties 
because they receive

[[Page 34200]]

``occupational dose.'' Additionally, the Licensee notes that the 
incident occurred at the end of the film badge reporting period and 
there is no supportive evidence that all of the 90 mrem received by the 
worker was the direct result of the incident. Therefore, the Licensee 
maintains that there was no clear potential for a member of the public 
to receive more than 100 mrem to the whole body.
    Finally, the Licensee notes that while the NRC's March 13, 1998 
Notice stated that the Licensee's corrective actions were prompt and 
comprehensive, it was not clear whether credit for such actions was 
considered in assessing the amount of the civil penalty.

NRC's Evaluation of the Licensee's Response

    The NRC does not dispute the Licensee's contention that 
inappropriate handling by the carrier's hazmat personnel may have 
contributed to the loss of control of radioactive material. At a 
minimum, proper action when the lid was found unattached could have 
minimized the amount of time that the radioactive material was 
uncontrolled. However, the carrier's actions do not relieve the 
Licensee of its responsibility to ensure that each closure device on 
the radioactive materials package is properly installed and secure. 
Regardless of events that occurred after the package left the 
Licensee's control, the Licensee's failure to assure that the hasp on 
the lock was secure prior to shipment was the most probable cause of 
the loss of control of the radioactive material, and is considered a 
significant violation of NRC requirements.
    In addition, the NRC does not dispute the Licensee's position that 
hazmat employees are not considered members of the public. However, the 
NRC disagrees that there was no clear potential for a member of the 
public to receive more than 100 mrem to the whole body as a result of 
the Licensee's failure to ensure that the lock on the package 
containing the sealed sources was properly installed and secure. The 
sources could have been lost at any time during the shipping process, 
such as on the aircraft or in the vehicle that were used to transport 
the package, and so the clear possibility existed that members of the 
public could have come in contact with the sources. Considering the 
configuration of the sources (the sealed sources were contained in 
approximately 4 inch long bolts) and the quantity of radioactive 
material in the package (the 3 sources contained 1, 18, and 100 
millicuries of cesium-137 respectively), the NRC continues to conclude 
that there was a clear potential for a member of the public to 
unknowingly come in contact with the sources and receive an exposure 
greater than 100 mrem to the whole body.
    Example B.1 of Supplement V of the NRC's Enforcement Policy 
provides that a ``[f]ailure to meet transportation requirements that 
resulted in loss of control of radioactive material with a breach in 
package integrity such that there was a clear potential for the member 
of the public to receive more than .1 rem [100 mrem] to the whole 
body'' be considered as a Severity Level II violation. Therefore, the 
NRC maintains that the violation was appropriately classified at 
Severity Level II.
    With regard to the Licensee's argument concerning its corrective 
actions, as stated in our March 13, 1998 letter, credit was warranted 
for your corrective actions in accordance with the civil penalty 
assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Had the 
Licensee not taken prompt and comprehensive corrective actions, a civil 
penalty of $8,800 (twice the base amount) would have been proposed.

NRC Conclusion

    The NRC has concluded that the Licensee did not provide a basis for 
reducing the Severity Level of the violation nor for reducing or 
withdrawing the civil penalty. Accordingly, a civil penalty in the 
amount of $4,400 should be issued.

[FR Doc. 98-16645 Filed 6-22-98; 8:45 am]
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