[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 108 (Friday, June 5, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 30808-30809]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-14975]



[[Page 30808]]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration


Notice of Safety Advisory

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of safety advisory.

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SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 98-2 addressing safety 
practices to reduce the risk of casualties caused by failure to 
activate the available two-way end-of-train telemetry device (two-way 
EOT) to initiate an emergency brake application beginning at the rear 
of the train when circumstances require an emergency application of the 
train airbrakes.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dennis Yachechak, Operating Practices 
Specialist, Office of Safety Enforcement, FRA, 400 Seventh Street, SW., 
RRS-11, Mail Stop 25, Washington, DC. 20590 (telephone 202-632-3370), 
or Thomas Herrmann, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 400 
Seventh Street, SW., RCC-12, Mail Stop 10, Washington, DC. 20590 
(telephone 202-632-3178).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Several recent freight train incidents 
potentially involving the improper use of a train's airbrakes have 
caused FRA to focus on railroad airbrake and train handling procedures 
related to the initiation of an emergency airbrake application, 
particularly as they pertain to the activation of the two-way EOT from 
the locomotive. FRA and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
are currently investigating four incidents in which a train was placed 
into emergency braking by use of the normal emergency brake valve 
handles on the locomotive, and although the train in each instance was 
equipped with an armed and operable two-way EOT, the device was not 
activated by the locomotive engineer. These incidents include:
     A March 30, 1997, incident occurring near Ridgecrest, 
North Carolina, involving Norfolk Southern train No. P32, resulting in 
42 cars derailed and two crewmembers injured;
     An October 25, 1997, incident occurring in Houston, Texas, 
involving Union Pacific train Nos. IHOLB-25 and MTUHO-21, resulting in 
five locomotives derailed and totally destroyed and two crewmembers 
injured;
     A November 3, 1997, incident occurring near Alvord, Texas, 
involving Burlington Northern Santa Fe train Nos. HALTBAR 1-03 and 
ESLPCAM 3-11, resulting in three locomotives and seven cars derailed 
and two crewmembers injured;
     A March 23, 1998, incident occurring near Herington, 
Kansas, involving Union Pacific train Nos. MKSTUX-23 and IESLB-21, 
resulting in one locomotive and six cars derailed and one crewmember 
injured.
    The facts and findings developed in the investigations currently 
being conducted by FRA and the NTSB will be published when the 
individual investigations are complete.
    FRA's preliminary findings indicate that in all of the incidents 
noted above, there was evidence of an obstruction somewhere in the 
train line, caused by either a closed or partially closed angle cock or 
a kinked air hose. This obstruction prevented an emergency brake 
application from being propagated throughout the entire train, front to 
rear, after such an application was initiated from the locomotive using 
either the engineer's automatic brake valve handle or the conductor's 
emergency brake valve. Furthermore, the locomotive engineers in each of 
the incidents stated that they did not think to use the two-way EOT, 
when asked why they failed to activate the device.

Two-Way End-of-Train Device Regulation

    On January 2, 1997, FRA published a final rule amending the 
regulations governing train and locomotive power braking systems 
contained at 49 CFR part 232 by adding provisions pertaining to the use 
and design of two-way EOTs. See 62 FR 278. Two-way EOTs provide 
locomotive engineers with the capability of initiating an emergency 
brake application that commences at the rear of the train. The purpose 
of the new provisions was to improve the safety of railroad operations 
by requiring the use of two-way EOTs on a variety of trains pursuant to 
1992 legislation, and by establishing minimum performance and 
operational standards related to the use and design of the devices. 
Furthermore, the regulatory provisions related to two-way EOTs are 
intended to ensure that trains operating at a speed over 30 mph or in 
heavy grade territory are equipped with the technology to effectuate an 
emergency application of the train's airbrakes starting from both the 
front and rear of the train. The specific exceptions contained in the 
regulation are aimed at trains that: (i) Do not operate within the 
express parameters; or (ii) are equipped or operated in a fashion that 
provides the ability to effectuate an emergency brake application that 
commences at or near the rear of the train without the use of a two-way 
EOT. See 49 CFR 232.25(e)(1)-(e)(9).
    Based on FRA's review of the above incidents, and its awareness of 
other incidents involving non-use of two-way EOTs under similar 
circumstances, it appears that further guidance regarding the use of 
the devices may be of assistance to our nation's railroads. This 
advisory may be especially beneficial to individuals responsible for 
train operations that do not have a thorough understanding of two-way 
EOTs and their function. Accordingly, FRA believes that the following 
recommended procedure for activating the two-way EOT should be taken to 
reduce the likelihood of future incidents caused by an inability to 
stop a moving train that encounters a train line obstruction.

Recommended Action

    FRA recommends that each railroad adopt and implement a procedure 
that requires the locomotive engineer or other train crewmember to 
activate the two-way EOT, on trains equipped with the device, using the 
manual toggle switch, whenever it becomes necessary to place the train 
airbrakes in emergency using either the automatic brake valve handle or 
the conductor's emergency brake valve. FRA also recommends that the 
two-way EOT be activated whenever an undesired emergency application of 
the train airbrakes occurs. FRA believes that the likelihood of future 
incidents, such as the ones described above, would be greatly reduced 
if, besides following existing procedures regarding emergency train 
braking, railroads require additional action to be taken by a member of 
the train crew. FRA believes that this additional procedure would not 
only ensure that an emergency brake application is commenced from both 
the front and rear of the train, but that it will help familiarize the 
engineer with the activation of the device and will educate the 
engineer to react in the safest possible manner whenever circumstances 
require an emergency brake application. FRA further recommends that 
railroads have an operating supervisor personally conduct a face-to-
face meeting with each locomotive engineer and conductor to explain the 
contents of this advisory, preferably during a mock demonstration in 
order to reinforce employee familiarization with the operation of the 
two-way EOT, and to ensure that each individual has a thorough 
understanding of how and under what circumstances to activate the two-
way EOT. In issuing this safety advisory, FRA acknowledges the 
following

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railroads that have already taken the lead on this issue by having in 
effect a similar or comparable requirement: Burlington Northern Santa 
Fe, Conrail, CSX, Norfolk Southern, and Union Pacific.
    FRA may modify Safety Advisory 98-2, issue additional safety 
advisories, or take other appropriate necessary action to ensure the 
highest level of safety on the Nation's railroads.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on June 1, 1998.
George Gavalla,
Acting Associate Administrator for Safety.
[FR Doc. 98-14975 Filed 6-4-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P