[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 94 (Friday, May 15, 1998)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 26955-26963]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-12978]



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  Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 94 / Friday, May 15, 1998 / Rules and 
Regulations  

[[Page 26955]]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Parts 60, 72, 73, 74, and 75

RIN 3150-AF32


Physical Protection for Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level 
Radioactive Waste

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its regulations 
to clarify physical protection requirements for spent nuclear fuel and 
high-level radioactive waste stored at independent spent fuel storage 
installations (ISFSIs), monitored-retrievable storage (MRS) 
installations, and geologic repository operations areas (GROAs). These 
amendments codify standards for protecting spent fuel at the various 
storage sites licensed under the Commission's regulations.

EFFECTIVE DATE: November 12, 1998.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Priscilla A. Dwyer, Office of Nuclear 
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-8110, e-mail 
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

    On August 15, 1995 (60 FR 42079), the Commission published for 
public comment a proposed rule that would clarify its regulations on 
the physical protection of spent nuclear fuel and high-level 
radioactive waste. The proposed regulation would have applied to spent 
fuel and high-level radioactive waste stored at ISFSIs, power reactors 
that have permanently ceased reactor operations, MRS installations, and 
the GROA. The proposed rule stated that the requirements for physically 
protecting this type of material lacked clarity in defining which 
regulations were to be applied at these sites. This resulted in a non-
cohesive regulatory base. The proposed rule would provide a set of 
performance-based requirements, consistent with current programs that 
are currently licensed and implemented at sites under a unified policy 
for physical protection.
    The proposed rule also indicated that the Commission was studying 
the need for specific protection against the malevolent use of a 
vehicle at sites affected by the rule (this is discussed further under 
the ``Protection Goal'' heading). The rule also proposed a conforming 
amendment to 10 CFR Part 60--to require material control and accounting 
(MC&A) measures at the GROA that would be identical to that required of 
ISFSIs under Part 72 . The proposed rule added a provision under 10 CFR 
Part 75 to clarify that if GROAs are subject to International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, then NRC's nuclear material accounting 
and control regulations for implementing the ``Agreement between the 
United States and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the 
United States'' apply. Finally, the Commission requested specific 
comment on five questions regarding impacts of the proposed regulation 
on licensees.

II. Summary and Analysis of Public Comments

    The proposed rule was subject to a 90-day public comment period 
which ended on November 13, 1995. Twenty letters of comment were 
received. Sources for these comments included a nuclear industry group 
[the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)]; one national laboratory; fifteen 
utilities involved in nuclear activities; two Federal agencies [the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Energy 
(DOE)]; and one citizen's group. Twelve letters of comment explicitly 
endorsed, either in total or in part, the views expressed by the NEI. 
Four letters of comment, in part, supported the general objectives of 
the proposed rulemaking. Correspondence received from EPA indicated no 
comment. The comments have been grouped under the following general 
topics:

1. Protection Goal.
2. Basis for Requirements.
3. Required Level of Physical Protection.
4. Backfit and Regulatory Analysis.
5. Rule Language Specifics.
6. GROAs.
7. Staff-Generated Amendments.
8. Summary of Responses to Commission's Specific Questions.

1. Protection Goal

    Comment. Commenters noted that, although it was appropriate that a 
protection goal for spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste be 
defined, the protection goal needed to be less stringent than the 
codified design basis threat for radiological sabotage. It was further 
stated that a 10 CFR Part 100 release, the unofficial criterion for 
determining radiological sabotage of power reactors, would be extremely 
difficult to realize with respect to spent fuel and high-level 
radioactive waste. The citizen's group commented that any protection 
goal developed for spent fuel should also counter the malevolent use of 
an airborne vehicle.
    Response. The NRC agrees that the establishment of a protection 
goal should be the first step in the development of any physical 
protection standards. One issue that may have caused confusion in the 
proposed rule is that the assumptions for determining ``radiological 
sabotage'' differ between Part 72, ``Licensing Requirements for the 
Independent Storage of Spent Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste,'' 
and Part 73, ``Physical Protection of Plants and Material.'' The 
differing assumptions are appropriate because ``radiological 
sabotage,'' as used under Part 73, applies to a power reactor and 
implies the unofficial criterion of a Part 100 release for power 
reactors. ``Radiological sabotage'' as used under Part 72 applies to 
the storage of spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste and is based 
on the consequences of a design basis accident as defined under Part 
72. Although the same term is used under both 10 CFR Parts; it is based 
on different assumptions and results in different levels of required 
protection. The Commission agrees that this is confusing and that 
``radiological sabotage,'' as used for operating reactors, is not an 
appropriate protection level for spent fuel and high-level radioactive 
waste. The Commission concludes that the protection goal is best 
characterized by the phrase: ``protection against the loss of control 
of the facility that could be sufficient to cause radiation exposure 
exceeding the dose as described in 10

[[Page 26956]]

CFR 72.106.'' The final rule has been modified accordingly.
    With regard to protection against the malevolent use of a land-
based vehicle, NRC has determined, based on the opinions of expert 
study and a peer review of findings, that there is no compelling 
justification for requiring a vehicle barrier as perimeter protection 
for spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste stored under a Part 60 
or Part 72 license. Inclusion of an airborne vehicle was assessed for 
possible inclusion into the protection goal for this rule. However, 
protection against this type of threat has not yet been determined 
appropriate at sites with greater potential consequences than spent 
fuel storage installations. Therefore, this type of requirement is not 
included within the protection goal for this final rule.

2. Basis for Requirements

    Comment. Commenters frequently questioned the need for tying Part 
72 requirements to Part 73. The commenters assumed that by involving 
Part 73 in the rulemaking, it was implied that the level of physical 
protection normally attributed to power reactors was being required. 
Phraseology used in the proposed requirements, such as using the term 
``protected area,'' (PA) tended to further foster this impression.
    Response. The Commission disagrees that placing requirements under 
Part 73 implies any association with the physical protection 
requirements for power reactors. It is noted that Part 73 provides, in 
one consolidated Part, all of the requirements for those facilities 
needing physical protection. This is one reason why an explicit 
requirement for the protection of spent fuel and high-level radioactive 
waste is being added to Part 73. Part 73 includes more stringent 
requirements for power reactor and Category I fuel cycle facilities and 
much less stringent requirements for the protection of Category III 
facilities. With regard to use of the term ``protected area,'' the 
Commission has determined that the term is correctly used in review of 
its definition under 10 CFR 73.2. Nonetheless, the Commission has 
reviewed the physical protection terminology found in the final rule to 
ensure that it does not imply a different level of physical protection 
than intended.

3. Level of Physical Protection Needed

    Comment. Some commenters expressed the opinion that the level of 
physical protection described by the proposed amendments was 
unnecessary and overly burdensome. The industry group noted that what 
was truly needed was a level of physical protection comparable to 
``enhanced industrial security.'' Cited examples of this type of 
protection were: use of suitable fencing, locked access points, 
sufficient illumination, and periodic security patrols. Other 
commenters questioned the need for some of the redundancy that was 
included in the proposed rule. One citizen's group believed that 
physical protection measures should be more stringent than those 
described in the proposed rule.
    Response. The Commission believes that the appropriate level of 
physical protection for spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste 
lies somewhere between industrial-grade security and the level that is 
required at operating power reactors. The Commission also notes that 
the nature of spent fuel and of its storage mechanisms offers unique 
advantages in protecting the material. This factor, along with revised 
consequence considerations, leads the Commission to conclude that 
physical protection at sites where spent fuel and high-level 
radioactive waste are stored under a 10 CFR Part 60 or 72 license can 
be more flexibly applied than previously proposed. Accordingly, the 
final rule has been revised to minimize redundancy and add flexibility. 
Specific changes are outlined in Section III, ``Summary of Specific 
Changes Made to the Proposed Rule as a Result of Public Comment.''

4. Backfit and Regulatory Analysis

    Comment. NEI and a few licensees commented that the proposed 
regulation imposes a generic backfit as defined under 10 CFR 50.109 and 
72.62. The NRC asserted in the proposed rule that the amendments merely 
codified and standardized physical protection measures that, through 
license amendment, were already in place at existing sites. Hence, it 
was concluded that no backfit was involved. Commenters further stated 
that, in terms of backfit requirements, the cost to implement the 
proposed rule was not justified based on the potential increase in 
protection that the rule would afford public health and safety.
    Other commenters specifically responded to the Regulatory Analysis 
that accompanied the rule. These commenters expressed concern that 
certain provisions of the regulatory analysis could turn into de facto 
requirements.
    Additionally, it was recommended that affected sites should be 
``grandfathered'' under any final rulemaking. Accordingly, these sites 
would not be required to meet the provisions of the new physical 
protection rule because an adequate level of physical protection was 
already in place at the site, based on an NRC-approved physical 
protection plan.
    Response. Under the proposed rule, the Commission stated that the 
backfit rule in 10 CFR 50.109 did not apply because the amendments did 
not impose any additional requirements on Part 50 licensees. 
Furthermore, the Commission notes that all references to Part 50 
licensees are deleted in the final rule.
    The Commission further stated that the backfitting requirements in 
10 CFR 72.62 did not apply because the proposed amendments neither 
imposed nor modified procedures or organizations of ISFSIs licensed 
under Part 72. The Commission considers these statements true based on 
their assessment of the proposed regulation and its intended 
implementation. However, on further review, the backfit rule in 10 CFR 
72.62 may be applicable to one facility which has only one isolation 
zone exterior to the perimeter barrier. The NRC staff has identified 
alternative measures currently in place that provide an equivalent 
level of physical protection. The staff does not intend to require this 
facility to establish an interior isolation zone. Thus, no backfit 
occurs due to the new rule. Because 10 CFR 72.62 does not cover 
reporting and recordkeeping requirements, the inclusion of 10 CFR 73.51 
in 73.71 event reporting is not a backfit.
    With respect to grandfathering existing sites, the Commission 
believes that implementation of this final rule at these sites presents 
no undue burden to affected licensees and provides a minimum level of 
physical protection to adequately protect the public health and safety. 
Accordingly, there is no need for a grandfathering provision and no 
change has been made in the final rule in response to this comment. The 
Commission notes that the Regulatory Analysis for the final rule has 
been revised to reflect changes made in response to public comment and 
to eliminate ambiguities.

5. Rule Language Specifics

    Comment. A variety of comments were received regarding specific 
rule terminology. The suggestion was made that the term ``protected 
area'' be revised to ``ISFSI controlled access area.''
    Response. As indicated previously in this notice, the use of the 
term ``protected area,'' is consistent with its definition in 10 CFR 
73.2. Furthermore, because it is the Commission's position

[[Page 26957]]

that a site where spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste is stored 
be surrounded by a fence, it is not considered adequate to call the 
enclosure a controlled access area (CAA). Under 10 CFR 73.2, the 
definition of a CAA requires only a demarcation of the area, not a 
fence.
    Comment. Another commenter supported the Commission position that 
operating power reactor licensees that store spent fuel under a general 
license should have the option of using the physical protection 
measures of either 10 CFR 72.212(b)(5) or the proposed 10 CFR 73.51. 
The commenter also questioned whether the requirements of 10 CFR 
72.182, 72.184, and 72.186 apply to a general license, in addition to 
Subpart K. A related question requested clarification on how general 
license holders were to notify NRC regarding which option they would 
exercise.
    Response. The Commission notes that a licensee having a Part 50 
license does not fall within the scope of the final rule. The 
Commission believes it is premature to bring these licensees under the 
provisions of the final rule because continued protection for spent 
fuel in storage pools at Part 50 sites is currently under study by the 
NRC.
    Comment. One commenter requested clarification on the specific 
exclusion of an exemption for ISFSIs from the malevolent use of a 
vehicle threat within the design basis threat. The commenter indicated 
that it was not readily apparent and also a cumbersome process to 
determine the current exempt status of an ISFSI under present 
regulations.
    Response. The Commission agrees and has revised the text of the 
rule to exclude reference to the design basis threat described under 10 
CFR 73.1.
    Comment. One commenter questioned whether the proposed rule would 
apply to a permanently shutdown power plant where spent fuel is stored 
and the plant is operating with a Part 50 possession-only license.
    Response. A facility with a Part 50 license is not subject to the 
provisions of the final rule. This revision to the final rule has been 
made because the Commission believes it is premature to include these 
licensees within the scope of the rule because continued protection for 
spent fuel in storage pools at Part 50 sites is currently under study 
by the NRC.
    Comment. A commenter requested clarification on the need for back-
up power for physical protection-related equipment.
    Response. The Commission believes that affected licensees should 
not be vulnerable to loss of offsite power. Thus, it is necessary for 
licensees to assure either continuous operation of required physical 
protection equipment during power failure or to demonstrate the ability 
to provide immediate compensation for such failures.
    Comment. Required illumination levels, assessment techniques, 
required frequency of physical protection patrols, and searches before 
entry to the PA were all subjects of comment. A commenter suggested 
that illumination be provided only during periods of assessment and 
that the entire PA need not be illuminated to a level of 0.2 
footcandle.
    Response. The Commission agrees that illumination to a 0.2 
footcandle level represents a large operating cost and may be difficult 
to achieve, given cask structure. This provision has been amended to 
more clearly indicate that, while illumination should be maintained 
during all periods of darkness, only an adequate level of illumination 
is required within the PA for the detection assessment means used. In 
addition, required performance capabilities regarding detection are 
clarified in the final rule by specifying the use of active intrusion 
detection equipment, as opposed to passive systems.
    Comment. Some commenters noted that the frequency of patrols should 
coincide with watchmens' duty shift lengths, as opposed to once every 
eight hours as recommended in the proposed rule.
    Response. The Commission does not agree that the frequency of 
patrols should coincide with duty shift lengths. However, the 
Commission agrees that some flexibility can be provided. Accordingly, 
this provision of the final rule is revised to require daily random 
patrols, only.
    Comment. Licensees cited the burden of maintaining expensive and 
delicate explosives detection equipment to meet the proposed 
requirement for explosives searches conducted before entry to the PA.
    Response. The Commission agrees. To clarify this issue, the 
Commission has revised the proposed rule to require only a visual 
search for explosives. Because pedestrian and vehicular traffic is not 
expected to be high volume at facilities affected by the rule, this 
type of search is not considered an undue burden to affected licensees. 
Furthermore, the amount of explosives that may cause a radiological 
release is not easily concealed.
    Comment. Other commenters noted redundant records retention 
requirements in 10 CFR 72.180 and 10 CFR 73.51(c).
    Response. This concern has been corrected in the final rule.
    Comment. One commenter noted an apparent contradiction in the 
proposed regulation regarding use of deadly force in the protection of 
an ISFSI. The commenter had been advised by NRC staff that use of 
deadly force was not expected of members of the security organization 
at ISFSIs. The commenter reasoned that this was not consistent with the 
requirement to protect against radiological sabotage under the proposed 
rule.
    Response. The issue involving the use of the term radiological 
sabotage has been resolved as discussed previously. Further, the 
Commission never intended that onsite physical protection personnel at 
an ISFSI would provide a response to a safeguards event other than 
calling for assistance from local law enforcement or other designated 
response force unless their timely response could not be ensured. The 
Commission also notes that 10 CFR 73.51 only calls for unarmed 
watchmen, not armed guards.
    Comment. Commenters believe that the requirements for redundant 
alarm monitoring stations and specified staffing levels for the primary 
alarm station are overly burdensome and unnecessary.
    Response. The Commission agrees that the requirement for redundant 
alarm stations is excessive. Regarding alarm monitoring, this provision 
is revised in the final rule to require, in the redundant location, 
only a summary indication that an alarm has been generated. This 
location need not necessarily be located onsite and could, for example, 
be a simple readout in a continually-staffed local law enforcement 
agency office. This is contingent on the assurance that communications 
with the local law enforcement agency or the designated response force 
can be maintained. Regarding required staffing levels of the primary 
alarm station, the Commission has deleted the specific requirement that 
the physical protection organization be comprised of at least two 
watchmen from the final rule. This deletion is contingent on the 
Commission's expectation that a human presence be maintained in the 
primary alarm station at all times. To achieve this, the Commission 
clarifies its position that the primary alarm station must be located 
within the PA, be bullet-resisting, and be configured such that 
activities within the station are not visible from outside the PA. The 
intent of these measures is to ensure that a single act cannot destroy 
the capability of an onsite watchman to call for

[[Page 26958]]

assistance. The final rule has been modified accordingly.
    Comment. Finally, concerning the actual terminology and format of 
the proposed rule, commenters expressed support for its performance-
based nature but rejected the set of provisions under 10 CFR 73.51(d) 
as being overly prescriptive.
    Response. The Commission responds that the proposed regulation 
found in 10 CFR 73.51(d) is needed to provide additional clarity in 
meeting the performance capabilities in 10 CFR 73.51(b) and notes that 
many of the physical protection measures described under 10 CFR 
73.51(d) are relaxed in the final rule and are less prescriptive in a 
number of cases.

6. GROA

    Comment. Two comments were received from DOE on the amendments to 
Part 60 dealing with the geologic repository. The first commenter 
requested that it be emphasized in the ``Statement of Considerations'' 
for the final rule that the requirement for physical protection of 
GROAs be applicable only during their operational phases and not after 
closure.
    Response. The Commission agrees with this observation and has 
clarified the exemption in the final rule to specifically exempt GROAs 
from the requirements of 10 CFR 73.51 after permanent closures.
    Comment. The second commenter requested clarification on apparent 
conflicts in Part 60, ``Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Waste in 
Geologic Repositories,'' regarding the level of detail required of 
physical protection plans during the different phases of the 
certification process.
    Response. The Commission notes that NUREG 1619, ``Standard Review 
Plan for Physical Protection Plans for the Independent Storage of Spent 
Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste,'' to be issued concurrently with 
the effective date of the final rule, will contain guidance in this 
area.

7. NRC Staff-Generated Amendments

    Subsequent to publication of the proposed rule, a technical issue 
arose involving the cooling time of spent fuel as it relates to the 
degree of physical protection needed. Because a response to this issue 
continues to evolve within the NRC, the Commission believes it would be 
inappropriate to apply the provisions of the final rule at this time to 
a licensee holding a 10 CFR Part 50 license. Hence, licensees holding a 
10 CFR Part 50 license are not within the scope of the final rule. 
Further, review indicated that there was some confusion pertaining to 
MC&A requirements for ISFSIs. Specifically, the NRC staff asked if 
ISFSIs were exempt from the requirements of 10 CFR 74.51 and, if not, 
why not. Specific MC&A requirements for ISFSIs are found under Part 72. 
After consideration of the issue, for clarification, the NRC staff has 
included an amendment to 10 CFR Part 74 that specifically exempts 
ISFSIs from 10 CFR 74.51 in the final rule.

8. Summary of Responses to Commission's Specific Questions

    Question 1. Would the proposed amendments impose any significant 
additional costs for safeguards of currently stored spent nuclear fuel 
beyond what is now incurred for that purpose?
    Summary of Responses. Five responses from nuclear utilities 
specifically addressed this issue. All indicated that the amendments, 
as proposed, would significantly increase costs. Manpower-intensive 
measures, such as the requirement to maintain a minimum of two watchmen 
per shift, were most often cited as creating an undue burden. One 
licensee estimated costs of $1 to $2 million to implement, and a 
continuing cost increase of 30-50 percent, annually, to physical 
protection operations.
    NRC Response. Licensees holding a 10 CFR Part 50 license are no 
longer within the scope of this rule. The final rule has been revised 
to minimize redundancy and add flexibility to its implementation. There 
should be no significant increase in cost to current licensees.
    Question 2. Is there reason to expect the costs to future licensees 
to differ substantially from those of current licensees?
    Summary of Responses. Four responses from nuclear utilities 
specifically addressed this issue. Three utilities cited both higher 
current and annual operating costs. One utility noted that, to the 
extent that current licensees have been required to commit to the 
practices recommended in the proposed rule in initial licensing, there 
is no anticipated difference in cost.
    NRC Response. Licensees holding a 10 CFR Part 50 license are no 
longer within the scope of this rule. The final rule has been amended 
to be more consistent with physical protection implemented at sites 
with currently approved physical protection plans. Hence, there should 
be no significant increase in costs to future licensees.
    Question 3. Are the cost estimates in Table III of the Draft 
Regulatory Analysis representative of current industry experience? Are 
there significant costs that have not been included in the table?
    Summary of Responses. Three responses from nuclear utilities 
specifically addressed this issue. One respondent indicated that the 
cost estimates in Table III of the ``Draft Regulatory Analysis'' are 
sufficiently broad to address industry experience. However, the 
inclusion of a continual surveillance system is not covered and the 
respondent suggested that it should be a separate line item. Another 
respondent indicated that the cost estimates appear to be comprehensive 
except they do not include construction and maintenance of physical 
protection office space, a records retention area, and alarm 
station(s).
    NRC Response. The ``Regulatory Analysis'' has been revised to 
reflect public comment to include any omissions or changes made to the 
final rule.
    Question 4. Are the costs justified by the benefits that would be 
afforded by the proposed amendments? Are there alternatives that would 
afford essentially the same benefits but be more cost effective?
    Summary of Responses. Three responses from nuclear utilities 
specifically addressed this issue. All three indicated that the costs 
were not justified by the benefits derived from the proposed rule. One 
respondent stated that the individual measures of 10 CFR 73.51(d) have 
merit, but, when taken in aggregate, they are not necessary to protect 
public health and safety. This respondent further stated that 
redundancy in the proposed rule was not needed and the rulemaking 
should give affected licensees latitude in selecting and justifying the 
means of physical protection. Alternatives that were suggested involved 
the deletion of specific provisions of the proposed rule and also the 
restructuring of the rule so as to not group all ISFSIs under one set 
of physical protection criteria.
    NRC Response. The Commission has revised the requirements of the 
proposed rule to eliminate unnecessary redundancies, add flexibility in 
implementation, and reduce manpower-intensive measures while 
maintaining an adequate level of physical protection.
    Question 5. Are the proposed amendments to 10 CFR 73.51 appropriate 
for an MRS or geologic repository operated by DOE?
    Summary of Response. NEI was the only respondent to this issue. NEI 
noted that NRC should be mindful of the evolving nature of MRS 
installations and the geologic repository in the development of 
physical protection regulations for these sites.

[[Page 26959]]

    NRC Response. NRC staff continues to work closely with DOE staff in 
the development of the certification process for MRS installations and 
the GROA.

III. Summary of Specific Changes Made to the Proposed Rule as a Result 
of Public Comment

    Major changes made to the proposed rule include:
    (1) The incorporation of a protection goal, and
    (2) Regarding required levels of physical protection, redundancies 
have been reduced, flexibility added, and manpower-for example--
     Regarding alarm monitoring, the redundant alarm station 
need only provide a summary indication at a continually staffed 
location;
     Redundant records retention has been eliminated;
     The required staffing level for the security organization 
has been eliminated and required siting and configuration of the 
primary alarm station clarified;
     Hand-held equipment searches for explosives are replaced 
with visual searches; and
     Illumination levels need only permit adequate assessment 
of the PA according to the assessment means used. Detection equipment 
must be active in nature.
    As discussed previously, the final rule does not apply to a 
licensee holding a 10 CFR Part 50 license.
    A section-by-section comparison of the proposed and final rules 
follows.

Part 60--Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in Geologic 
Repositories

    1. Section 60.21, Content of application. This section is unchanged 
from the proposed rule.
    2. Section 60.31, Construction authorization. This section is 
unchanged from the proposed rule.
    3. Section 60.41, Standards for issuance of a license. This section 
is unchanged from the proposed rule.
    4. Section 60.78, Material control and accounting records and 
reports. This section is unchanged from the proposed rule.

Part 72--Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent 
Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste

    5. Section 72.24, Contents of application: Technical information. 
This section is unchanged from the proposed rule. The term 
``radiological sabotage'' is based on Part 72 assumptions and not a 
Part 100 radiological release.
    6. Section 72.180, Physical security plan. This section is 
unchanged from the proposed rule except for changing the title to 
Physical Protection Plan to be consistent with 10 CFR Part 73.
    7. Section 72.212, Conditions of general license issued under 
Sec. 72.210. Revisions to this section have been deleted in their 
entirety.

Part 73--Physical Protection of Plants and Materials

    8. Section 73.1, Purpose and Scope. Paragraph (b)(6) is unchanged 
from the proposed rule.
    9. Section 73.50, Requirements for physical protection of licensed 
activities. This section remains unchanged from the proposed rule.
    10. Section 73.51, Requirements for the physical protection of 
stored spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. Paragraph 
(a), Applicability, has been revised to more precisely define the type 
of material affected by the rule and to eliminate 10 CFR Part 50 
licensees from the provisions of the rule.
    Paragraph (b)(3), General Performance Objectives, has been revised 
to read: ``The physical protection system must be designed to protect 
against loss of control of the facility that could be sufficient to 
cause radiation exposure exceeding the dose as described in 10 CFR 
72.106.'' This revised statement describes a more appropriate 
protection goal that is consistent with Part 72. It also allows for a 
physical protection system less stringent than required to protect 
against radiological sabotage at operating power reactors.
    The introductory text of paragraph (d) has been revised to more 
clearly indicate the Commission's intent that alternative measures may 
also be available for meeting the provisions of (d). For example, 
several questions arose during final rule development as to whether the 
use of a hardened and protected alarm station sited at an adjacent 
operating power reactor would meet the intent of paragraph (d)(3) to 
have a hardened alarm station within the PA of the ISFSI. Staff 
considers this to be an acceptable alternative measure for meeting this 
provision of the final rule.
    In paragraph (d)(1), the last sentence has been deleted because it 
is no longer necessary due to the revision cited in the previous 
paragraph above.
    Paragraph (d)(2) has been revised to read: ``Illumination must be 
sufficient to permit adequate assessment of unauthorized penetrations 
of or activities within the protected area.'' This revision has been 
made to permit flexibility in illumination levels.
    Paragraph (d)(3) has been revised to read: ``The perimeter of the 
protected area must be subject to continual surveillance and be 
protected by an active intrusion alarm system that is capable of 
detecting penetration through the isolation zone and that is monitored 
in a continually staffed primary alarm station located within the 
protected area, and in one additional continually staffed location to 
ensure that a single act cannot destroy the capability of the onsite 
watchman to call for assistance. The primary alarm station must be 
located within the protected area; have bullet-resisting walls, doors, 
ceiling, and floor; and the interior of the station must not be visible 
from outside the protected area. A timely means for assessment must 
also be provided. Regarding alarm monitoring, the redundant location 
need only provide a summary indication that an alarm has been 
generated.'' This clarifies the Commission's position that the 
necessary level of protection should ensure that a single act cannot 
destroy the capability of the onsite watchman to call for assistance.
    Paragraph (d)(4) has been revised to reduce the frequency of patrol 
from ``not less than once every 8 hours'' to ``daily random patrols'' 
with additional discussion provided in guidance issued to support the 
rule.
    Paragraph (d)(5) has been revised to read: ``A security 
organization with written procedures must be established. The security 
organization must include sufficient personnel per shift to provide for 
monitoring of detection systems and the conduct of surveillance, 
assessment, access control, and communications to assure adequate 
response. Members of the security organization must be trained, 
equipped, qualified and requalified to perform assigned job duties in 
accordance with Appendix B to Part 73, I.A, (1) (a) and (b); B(1)(a); 
and the applicable portions of II.'' This change eliminates a required 
staffing level and describes qualification and training levels for 
watchmen, only, as the primary members of the security organization.
    Paragraph (d)(6) has been changed to require ``timely'' response 
from the designated response forces. If timely response cannot be 
provided, additional protective measures may be required, to include 
use of armed guards.
    Paragraph (d)(7) has been deleted.
    Paragraph (d)(8) has been redesignated as paragraph (d)(7) and 
revised to read as follows: ``A personnel identification system and a 
controlled lock system must be established and maintained to limit 
access to authorized individuals.'' This eliminates the unnecessary 
coupling of the identification system with the system

[[Page 26960]]

used for key and lock control as requested by commenters.
    Paragraph (d)(9) has been deleted. If a person is authorized access 
to the PA, properly identified, and subject to search, there is no need 
for the individual to be escorted.
    Paragraph (d)(10) has been redesignated as paragraph (d)(8). 
Regarding communications, the term ``security organization'' has been 
revised to ``onsite security force members'' to more precisely define 
communication channels.
    Paragraph (d)(11) has been redesignated as paragraph (d)(9) and 
revised to read as follows: ``All individuals, vehicles and hand-
carried packages entering the protected area must be checked for proper 
authorization and visually searched for explosives before entry.'' This 
is permissible because the amount of explosives needed to cause a 
radiological release is not easily concealable.
    Paragraph (d)(12) has been redesignated as paragraph (d)(10). The 
text of this paragraph is unchanged from the proposed rule.
    Paragraph (d)(13) has been redesignated as paragraph (d)(11) and 
revised to read as follows: ``All detection systems, surveillance/ 
assessment systems, and supporting subsystems including illumination 
systems must be tamper-indicating with line supervision and be 
maintained in operable condition. Timely compensatory measures must be 
taken after discovery of inoperability to assure that the effectiveness 
of the physical protection system is not reduced.''
    Paragraph (d)(14) has been redesignated as paragraph (d)(12) and 
remains unchanged from the proposed rule.
    Paragraph (d)(15) has been redesignated as paragraph (d)(13). This 
provision has been added to assure that duplication of records under 
Sec. 72.180 is not required. Paragraph (d)(13)(ii) has been revised to 
read as follows: ``Screening records of members of the security 
organization.'' Finally, the log of patrols must contain all patrols, 
not just routine patrols.
    Paragraph (e) has been revised for clarity.
    11. Section 73.71, Reporting of safeguards events, remains 
unchanged from the proposed rule.

Part 74--Material Control and Accounting of Special Nuclear Material

    12. In Section 74.51, Nuclear material control and accounting for 
special nuclear material, paragraph (a) has been revised to read as 
follows: ``General performance objectives. Each licensee who is 
authorized to possess five or more formula kilograms of strategic 
special nuclear material (SSNM) and to use such material at any site, 
other than a nuclear reactor licensed pursuant to Part 50 of this 
chapter, an irradiated fuel reprocessing plant, an operation involved 
with waste disposal, or an independent spent fuel storage facility 
licensed pursuant to Part 72 of this chapter, shall establish, 
implement, and maintain a Commission approved material control and 
accounting (MC&A) system that will achieve the following objectives: * 
* * '' This paragraph specifically exempts Part 72 ISFSIs from the 
requirements of 10 CFR 74.51.

Part 75--Safeguards on Nuclear Material--Implementation of US/IAEA 
Agreement

    13. Section 75.4, Definitions, remains unchanged from the proposed 
rule.
Criminal Penalties
    NRC notes that these final amendments are issued under Sections 
161b and i of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Therefore, 
violation of these regulations may subject a person to criminal 
sanctions under section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act.
Environmental Impact: Categorical Exclusion
    The Commission has determined that this final rule is the type of 
action described as a categorical exclusion in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(3)(i) 
and (iii). Therefore, neither an environmental impact statement nor an 
environmental assessment has been prepared for this final rule.
Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
    This final rule amends information collection requirements that are 
subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et 
seq.). These requirements were approved by the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB), approval numbers 3150-0002, 3150-0055, 3150-0123, and 
3150-0132.
Public Protection Notification
    If an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB 
control number, the NRC may not conduct and a person is not required to 
respond to, the information collection.
Regulatory Analysis
    The Commission has prepared a ``Final Regulatory Analysis'' for 
this final rule. The final analysis examines the benefits and 
alternatives considered by the Commission. The ``Final Regulatory 
Analysis'' is available for inspection in the NRC Public Document room, 
2120 L Street NW (Lower Level), Washington DC. Single copies of the 
analysis may be obtained from Priscilla A. Dwyer, Division of Fuel 
Cycle Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and 
Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001. The ``Final Regulatory Analysis'' is available for viewing and 
downloading from the NRC's rulemaking bulletin board.
Regulatory Flexibility Certification
    As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the 
Commission certifies that this rule does not have a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The final 
rule affects operators of ISFSIs and DOE as the operator of the MRS and 
GROA. The affected licensees do not fall within the scope of the 
definition of ``small entities'' set forth in Section 601(3) of the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act, or the NRC's size standards (10 CFR 2.810).
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
    In accordance with the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement 
Fairness Act of 1996, NRC has determined that this action is not a 
``major rule'' and has verified this determination with the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs of OMB.
Backfit Analysis
    The Commission has determined that the backfit rule in 10 CFR 
50.109 does not apply because this final rule does not impose new 
requirements on existing 10 CFR part 50 licensees. The backfit rule in 
10 CFR 72.62 may be applicable to one facility which has only one 
isolation zone exterior to the perimeter barrier. However, the NRC 
staff has identified alternative measures currently in place that 
provide an equivalent level of physical protection. The staff does not 
intend to require this facility to establish an interior isolation 
zone. Thus, no backfit occurs due to the new rule. Because 10 CFR 72.62 
does not cover reporting and recordkeeping requirements, the inclusion 
of 10 CFR 73.51 in 10 CFR 73.71 event reporting is not a backfit. 
Finally, the transfer of spent fuel from a reactor, licensed under 10 
CFR part 50 and subject to 10 CFR 73.55 physical protection 
requirements, to an ISFSI licensed under 10 CFR part 72, and its 
associated physical protection provisions (e.g., 10 CFR 73.51) is not a 
backfit. A new license under 10 CFR art 72 is a matter of compliance 
with regulations. In all

[[Page 26961]]

cases, transition from 10 CFR 73.55 to 73.51 is a relaxation of 
requirements and not a backfit.

List of Subjects

10 CFR Part 60

    Criminal penalties, High-level waste, Nuclear power plants and 
reactors, Nuclear materials, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, 
Waste treatment and disposal.

10 CFR Part 72

    Manpower training programs, Nuclear materials, Occupational safety 
and health, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security 
measures, Spent fuel.

10 CFR Part 73

    Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials transportation, Export, 
Import, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting 
and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.

10 CFR Part 74

    Accounting, Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials transportation, 
Material control and accounting, Nuclear materials, Packaging and 
containers, Radiation protection, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements, Scientific equipment, Special nuclear material.

10 CFR Part 75

    Criminal penalties, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear materials, 
Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements, Security measures.
    For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization 
Act of 1974, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553 the NRC is adopting 
the following amendments to 10 CFR parts 60, 72, 73, 74, and 75.

PART 60--DISPOSAL OF HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTES IN GEOLOGIC 
REPOSITORIES

    1. The authority citation for part 60 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: Secs. 51, 53, 62, 63, 65, 81, 161, 182, 183, 68 Stat. 
929, 930, 932, 933, 935, 948, 953, 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2071, 
2073, 2092, 2093, 2095, 2111, 2201, 2232, 2233); secs. 202, 206, 88 
Stat. 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5842, 5846); secs. 10 and 14, Pub. L. 
95-601, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C. 2021a and 5851); sec. 102, Pub. L. 
91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332); secs. 114, 121, Pub. L. 97-
425, 96 Stat. 2213g, 2228, as amended (42 U.S.C. 10134, 10141) and 
Pub. L. 102-486, sec 2902, 106 Stat. 3123 (42 U.S.C. 5851).

    2. In Sec. 60.21, paragraphs (b)(3), (b)(4), and (c)(10) are 
revised to read as follows:


Sec. 60.21  Content of application.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (3) A detailed plan to provide physical protection of high-level 
radioactive waste in accordance with Sec. 73.51 of this chapter. This 
plan must include the design for physical protection, the licensee's 
safeguards contingency plan, and security organization personnel 
training and qualification plan. The plan must list tests, inspections, 
audits, and other means to be used to demonstrate compliance with such 
requirements.
    (4) A description of the program to meet the requirements of 
Sec. 60.78.
* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (10) A description of the program to be used to maintain the 
records described in Secs. 60.71 and 60.72.
* * * * *
    3. In Sec. 60.31, paragraph (b) is revised to read as follows:


Sec. 60.31  Construction authorization.

* * * * *
    (b) Common defense and security. That there is reasonable assurance 
that the activities proposed in the application will not be inimical to 
the common defense and security.
* * * * *
    4. In Sec. 60.41, paragraph (c) is revised to read as follows:


Sec. 60.41  Standards for issuance of license.

* * * * *
    (c) The issuance of the license will not be inimical to the common 
defense and security and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to 
the health and safety of the public.
* * * * *
    5. A new Sec. 60.78 is added to read as follows:


Sec. 60.78  Material control and accounting records and reports.

    DOE shall implement a program of material control and accounting 
(and accidental criticality reporting) that is the same as that 
specified in Secs. 72.72, 72.74, 72.76, and 72.78 of this chapter.

PART 72--LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE INDEPENDENT STORAGE OF 
SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE

    6. The authority citation for part 72 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: Secs. 51, 53, 57, 62, 63, 65, 69, 81, 161, 182, 183, 
184, 186, 187, 189, 68 Stat. 929, 930, 932, 933, 934, 935, 948, 953, 
954, 955, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C. 
2071, 2073, 2077, 2092, 2093, 2095, 2099, 2111, 2201, 2232, 2233, 
2234, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2282); sec. 274, Pub. L. 86-373, 73 Stat. 
688, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2021); sec. 201, as amended, 202, 206, 88 
Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846); 
Pub. L. 95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 2951 as amended by Pub. L. 102-
486, sec. 7902, 106 Stat. 3123 (42 U.S.C. 5851); sec. 102, Pub. L. 
91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332); secs. 131, 132, 133, 135, 
137, 141, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2229, 2230, 2232, 2241, sec. 148, 
Pub. L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-235 (42 U.S.C. 10151, 10152, 10153, 
10155, 10157, 10161, 10168).

    Section 72.44(g) also issued under secs. 142(b) and 148(c), (d), 
Pub. L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-232, 1330-236 (42 U.S.C. 10162(b), 
10168 (c), (d)). Section 72.46 also issued under sec. 189, 68 Stat. 955 
(42 U.S.C. 2239); sec. 134, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2230 (42 U.S.C. 
10154). Section 72.96(d) also issued under sec. 145(g), Pub. L. 100-
203, 101 Stat. 1330-235 (42 U.S.C. 10165(g)). Subpart J also issued 
under secs. 2(2), 2(15), 2(19), 117(a), 141(h), Pub. L. 97-425, 96 
Stat. 2202, 2203, 2204, 2222, 2224 (42 U.S.C. 10101, 10137(a), 
10161(h)). Subparts K and L are also issued under sec. 133, 98 Stat. 
2230 (42 U.S.C. 10153) and sec. 218(a), 96 Stat. 2252 (42 U.S.C. 
10198).
    7. In Sec. 72.24, paragraph (o) is revised to read as follows:


Sec. 72.24  Contents of application; Technical information.

* * * * *
    (o) A description of the detailed security measures for physical 
protection, including design features and the plans required by subpart 
H. For an application from DOE for an ISFSI or MRS, DOE will provide a 
description of the physical protection plan for protection against 
radiological sabotage as required by subpart H.
* * * * *
    8. Section 72.180 is revised to read as follows:


Sec. 72.180  Physical protection plan.

    The licensee shall establish, maintain, and follow a detailed plan 
for physical protection as described in Sec. 73.51 of this chapter. The 
licensee shall retain a copy of the current plan as a record until the 
Commission terminates the license for which the procedures were 
developed and, if any portion of the plan is superseded, retain the 
superseded material for 3 years after each change or until termination 
of the license. The plan must describe how the applicant will meet the 
requirements of Sec. 73.51 of this chapter and provide physical 
protection during on-site transportation

[[Page 26962]]

to and from the proposed ISFSI or MRS and include within the plan the 
design for physical protection, the licensee's safeguards contingency 
plan, and the security organization personnel training and 
qualification plan. The plan must list tests, inspections, audits, and 
other means to be used to demonstrate compliance with such 
requirements.

PART 73--PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS

    9. The authority citation for part 73 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: Secs. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 948, as amended, sec. 
147, 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201, as 
amended, 204, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1245, sec. 1701, 106 Stat. 
2951, 2952, 2953 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5844, 2297f).

    Section 73.1 also issued under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 
Stat. 2232, 2241 (42 U.S.C, 10155, 10161). Section 73.37(f) also issued 
under sec. 301, Pub. L. 96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note). 
Section 73.57 is issued under sec. 606, Pub. L. 99-399, 100 Stat. 876 
(42 U.S.C. 2169).
    10. In Sec. 73.1, paragraph (b)(6) is revised to read as follows:


Sec. 73.1  Purpose and scope.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (6) This part prescribes requirements for the physical protection 
of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste stored in either 
an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) or a monitored 
retrievable storage (MRS) installation licensed under part 72 of this 
chapter, or stored at the geologic repository operations area licensed 
under part 60 of this chapter.
* * * * *
    11. The introductory text of Sec. 73.50 is revised to read as 
follows:


Sec. 73.50  Requirements for physical protection for licensed 
activities.

    Each licensee who is not subject to Sec. 73.51, but who possesses, 
uses, or stores formula quantities of strategic special nuclear 
material that are not readily separable from other radioactive material 
and which have total external radiation dose rates in excess of 100 
rems per hour at a distance of 3 feet from any accessible surfaces 
without intervening shielding other than at a nuclear reactor facility 
licensed pursuant to part 50 of this chapter, shall comply with the 
following:
* * * * *
    12. A new Sec. 73.51 is added to read as follows:


Sec. 73.51  Requirements for the physical protection of stored spent 
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste.

    (a) Applicability. Notwithstanding the provisions of Secs. 73.20, 
73.50, or 73.67, the physical protection requirements of this section 
apply to each licensee that stores spent nuclear fuel and high-level 
radioactive waste pursuant to paragraphs (a)(1)(i), (ii), and (2) of 
this section. This includes--
    (1) Spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste stored 
under a specific license issued pursuant to part 72 of this chapter:
    (i) At an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) or
    (ii) At a monitored retrievable storage (MRS) installation; or
    (2) Spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste at a 
geologic repository operations area (GROA) licensed pursuant to part 60 
of this chapter;
    (b) General performance objectives. (1) Each licensee subject to 
this section shall establish and maintain a physical protection system 
with the objective of providing high assurance that activities 
involving spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste do not 
constitute an unreasonable risk to public health and safety.
    (2) To meet the general objective of paragraph (b)(1) of this 
section, each licensee subject to this section shall meet the following 
performance capabilities.
    (i) Store spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste only 
within a protected area;
    (ii) Grant access to the protected area only to individuals who are 
authorized to enter the protected area;
    (iii) Detect and assess unauthorized penetration of, or activities 
within, the protected area;
    (iv) Provide timely communication to a designated response force 
whenever necessary; and
    (v) Manage the physical protection organization in a manner that 
maintains its effectiveness.
    (3) The physical protection system must be designed to protect 
against loss of control of the facility that could be sufficient to 
cause a radiation exposure exceeding the dose as described in 
Sec. 72.106 of this chapter.
    (c) Plan retention. Each licensee subject to this section shall 
retain a copy of the effective physical protection plan as a record for 
3 years or until termination of the license for which procedures were 
developed.
    (d) Physical protection systems, components, and procedures. A 
licensee shall comply with the following provisions as methods 
acceptable to NRC for meeting the performance capabilities of 
Sec. 73.51(b)(2). The Commission may, on a specific basis and upon 
request or on its own initiative, authorize other alternative measures 
for the protection of spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste 
subject to the requirements of this section, if after evaluation of the 
specific alternative measures, it finds reasonable assurance of 
compliance with the performance capabilities of paragraph (b)(2) of 
this section.
    (1) Spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste must be 
stored only within a protected area so that access to this material 
requires passage through or penetration of two physical barriers, one 
barrier at the perimeter of the protected area and one barrier offering 
substantial penetration resistance. The physical barrier at the 
perimeter of the protected area must be as defined in Sec. 73.2. 
Isolation zones, typically 20 feet wide each, on both sides of this 
barrier, must be provided to facilitate assessment. The barrier 
offering substantial resistance to penetration may be provided by an 
approved storage cask or building walls such as those of a reactor or 
fuel storage building.
    (2) Illumination must be sufficient to permit adequate assessment 
of unauthorized penetrations of or activities within the protected 
area.
    (3) The perimeter of the protected area must be subject to 
continual surveillance and be protected by an active intrusion alarm 
system which is capable of detecting penetrations through the isolation 
zone and that is monitored in a continually staffed primary alarm 
station and in one additional continually staffed location. The primary 
alarm station must be located within the protected area; have bullet-
resisting walls, doors, ceiling, and floor; and the interior of the 
station must not be visible from outside the protected area. A timely 
means for assessment of alarms must also be provided. Regarding alarm 
monitoring, the redundant location need only provide a summary 
indication that an alarm has been generated.
    (4) The protected area must be monitored by daily random patrols.
    (5) A security organization with written procedures must be 
established. The security organization must include sufficient 
personnel per shift to provide for monitoring of detection systems and 
the conduct of surveillance, assessment, access control, and 
communications to assure adequate response. Members of the security 
organization must be trained, equipped, qualified, and requalified to 
perform assigned job duties in accordance with appendix B to

[[Page 26963]]

part 73, sections I.A, (1) (a) and (b), B(1)(a), and the applicable 
portions of II.
    (6) Documented liaison with a designated response force or local 
law enforcement agency (LLEA) must be established to permit timely 
response to unauthorized penetration or activities.
    (7) A personnel identification system and a controlled lock system 
must be established and maintained to limit access to authorized 
individuals.
    (8) Redundant communications capability must be provided between 
onsite security force members and designated response force or LLEA.
    (9) All individuals, vehicles, and hand-carried packages entering 
the protected area must be checked for proper authorization and 
visually searched for explosives before entry.
    (10) Written response procedures must be established and maintained 
for addressing unauthorized penetration of, or activities within, the 
protected area including Category 5, ``Procedures,'' of appendix C to 
part 73. The licensee shall retain a copy of response procedures as a 
record for 3 years or until termination of the license for which the 
procedures were developed. Copies of superseded material must be 
retained for 3 years after each change or until termination of the 
license.
    (11) All detection systems, surveillance/assessment systems, and 
supporting subsystems, including illumination systems, must be tamper-
indicating with line supervision and be maintained in operable 
condition. Timely compensatory measures must be taken after discovery 
of inoperability, to assure that the effectiveness of the security 
system is not reduced.
    (12) The physical protection program must be reviewed once every 24 
months by individuals independent of both physical protection program 
management and personnel who have direct responsibility for 
implementation of the physical protection program. The physical 
protection program review must include an evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the physical protection system and a verification of 
the liaison established with the designated response force or LLEA.
    (13) The following documentation must be retained as a record for 3 
years after the record is made or until termination of the license. 
Duplicate records to those required under Sec. 72.180 of part 72 and 
Sec. 73.71 of this part need not be retained under the requirements of 
this section:
    (i) A log of individuals granted access to the protected area;
    (ii) Screening records of members of the security organization;
    (iii) A log of all patrols;
    (iv) A record of each alarm received, identifying the type of 
alarm, location, date and time when received, and disposition of the 
alarm; and
    (v) The physical protection program review reports.
    (e) A licensee that operates a GROA is exempt from the requirements 
of this section for that GROA after permanent closure of the GROA.
    13. In Sec. 73.71, paragraphs (b)(1) and (c) are revised to read as 
follows:


Sec. 73.71  Reporting of safeguards events.

* * * * *
    (b)(1) Each licensee subject to the provisions of Secs. 73.20, 
73.37, 73.50, 73.51, 73.55, 73.60, or 73.67 shall notify the NRC 
Operations Center within 1 hour of discovery of the safeguards events 
described in paragraph I(a)(1) of appendix G to this part. Licensees 
subject to the provisions of Secs. 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.51, 73.55, 
73.60, or each licensee possessing strategic special nuclear material 
and subject to Sec. 73.67(d) shall notify the NRC Operations Center 
within 1 hour after discovery of the safeguards events described in 
paragraphs I(a)(2), (a)(3), (b), and (c) of appendix G to this part. 
Licensees subject to the provisions of Secs. 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 
73.51, 73.55, or 73.60 shall notify the NRC Operations Center within 1 
hour after discovery of the safeguards events described in paragraph 
I(d) of appendix G to this part.
* * * * *
    (c) Each licensee subject to the provisions of Secs. 73.20, 73.37, 
73.50, 73.51, 73.55, 73.60, or each licensee possessing SSNM and 
subject to the provisions of Sec. 73.67(d) shall maintain a current log 
and record the safeguards events described in paragraphs II (a) and (b) 
of appendix G to this part within 24 hours of discovery by a licensee 
employee or member of the licensee's contract security organization. 
The licensee shall retain the log of events recorded under this section 
as a record for 3 years after the last entry is made in each log or 
until termination of the license.
* * * * *

PART 74--MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR 
MATERIAL

    14. The authority citation for part 74 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: Secs. 53, 57, 161, 182, 183, 68 Stat. 930, 932, 948, 
953, 954, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C. 
2073, 2077, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2282, 2297f); secs. 201, as amended 
202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 
5842, 5846).

    15. In Sec. 74.51, the introductory text of paragraph (a) is 
revised to read as follows:


Sec. 74.51  Nuclear material control and accounting for special nuclear 
material.

    (a) General performance objectives. Each licensee who is authorized 
to possess five or more formula kilograms of strategic special nuclear 
material (SSNM) and to use such material at any site, other than a 
nuclear reactor licensed pursuant to part 50 of this chapter, an 
irradiated fuel reprocessing plant, an operation involved with waste 
disposal, or an independent spent fuel storage facility licensed 
pursuant to part 72 of this chapter shall establish, implement, and 
maintain a Commission-approved material control and accounting (MC&A) 
system that will achieve the following objectives:
* * * * *

PART 75--SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL--IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA 
AGREEMENT

    16. The authority citation for part 75 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: Secs. 53, 63, 103, 104, 122, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 932, 
936, 937, 939, 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2093, 2133, 2134, 
2152, 2201); sec. 201, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841).

    Section 75.4 also issued under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 
Stat. 2232, 2241 (42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161).
    17. In Sec. 75.4, paragraph (k)(5) is revised to read as follows:


Sec. 75.4  Definitions.

* * * * *
    (k) * * *
    (5) Any location where the possession of more than 1 effective 
kilogram of nuclear material is licensed pursuant to parts 40, 60, or 
70 of this chapter, or pursuant to an agreement state license.
* * * * *
    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day of May, 1998.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
John C. Hoyle,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 98-12978 Filed 5-14-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P