[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 70 (Monday, April 13, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 18104-18108]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-9642]


      

[[Page 18103]]

_______________________________________________________________________

Part IX





Department of Transportation





_______________________________________________________________________



Federal Aviation Administration



_______________________________________________________________________



Explosives Detection Systems; Notices

  Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 70 / Monday, April 13, 1998 / 
Notices  

[[Page 18104]]



Department of Transportation

Federal Aviation Administration
[Docket No. 28671]
RIN 2120-AF95


Explosives Detection Systems

agency: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

action: Final criteria for certification of explosives detection 
systems.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

summary: The FAA is issuing the final Criteria for Certification of 
Explosives Detection Systems (EDS's) (hereafter referred to as 
``Criteria''). The Criteria introduces minimum performance standards 
for EDS equipment designed to identify detonators. The prior EDS 
Criteria issued September 10, 1993, established minimum performance 
standards only for EDS equipment designed to identify main/bulk 
explosive charges. The current Criteria allows the FAA to certify EDS 
equipment that meets or exceeds either the minimum performance 
standards for explosive material categorized as main/bulk explosive 
charges, or the minimum performance standards for explosive material 
categorized as detonators. This action is responsive to 49 U.S.C. 44913 
(formerly section 108 of the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, 
Public Law 101-604), which requires the Administrator to certify, prior 
to mandating its deployment, that EDS equipment ``can detect under 
realistic air carrier operating conditions the amounts, configurations, 
and types of explosive material which would be likely to be used to 
cause catastrophic damage to commercial aircraft.''

effective date: May 13, 1998.

for further information contact: Mr. Armen A. Sahagian, Senior Engineer 
(ACP-400), Office of Civil Aviation Security Policy and Planning, 
Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., 
Washington, D.C., 20591, telephone (202) 267-7076.
supplementary information:

Availability of Document

    Any person may obtain a copy of this document by submitting a 
request to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, 
ARM-1, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by 
calling (202) 267-9680. Communications must identify the docket number 
of this notice.

Release of National Security and Sensitive Information

    The Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security has 
determined that certain portions of the Criteria are of national 
security concern and require safeguarding from unauthorized disclosure 
pursuant to Executive Order 12356 (National Security Information). 
Further, pursuant to 14 CFR part 191 (Protection of Sensitive Security 
Information), certain unclassified information has been determined to 
be sensitive security information. Upon request, the complete Criteria 
will be provided to prospective manufacturers of explosives detection 
equipment, and other interested parties with a bona fide need to have 
the complete Criteria, provided such persons have appropriate 
authorization for access to U.S. Government national security 
information and/or sensitive security information.

Availability of Criteria

    Persons requesting access to, or a copy of, the complete text 
(including all classified and sensitive security information) of the 
Criteria may write to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of 
Civil Aviation Security Operations, Attention: FAA Security Control 
Point (ACO-400), Docket No. 28671, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., 
Washington, D.C. 20591.
    Individuals requesting the classified portion of the Criteria must 
include information regarding authorizations and security clearances 
for access to U.S. Government national security information, and 
sufficient explanatory information supporting the request to 
demonstrate a bona fide need to know the information contained in the 
Criteria.

Background

    The Criteria are responsive to the statutory mandate for testing 
and certifying EDS. The FAA has had a long-standing research and 
development (R&D) effort to counter the threat of explosive materials 
to civil aviation. Along with other technologies, the FAA invested in 
detonator detection R&D beginning in 1985. However, based upon early 
research, the FAA focused its R&D resources primarily on the detection 
of main/bulk explosive charges, because it appeared to be the most 
technologically feasible approach. The effort resulted in the September 
10, 1993, Criteria (58 FR 47804), which established minimum performance 
standards for main/bulk explosive charges detection equipment; however, 
recent technological advances suggest that equipment capable of 
detecting the different types of detonators used to initiate or 
detonate an explosive may also be effective means of screening checked 
baggage. On August 30, 1996, the FAA published a Proposed Amendment to 
Criteria for Certification of Explosive Detection Systems (61 FR 46011) 
with a request for public comments by October 29, 1996, which was later 
extended to January 6, 1997 (61 FR 57511; Nov. 6, 1996). After 
considering the comments received, the FAA now considers it appropriate 
to adopt amendments to the minimum performance standards for the 
detection of detonators.

Detection of Main/Bulk Explosive Charges

    During the past two decades, the FAA has been working on the 
development of explosive detection equipment, with the initial 
explosive detection research and development (R&D) efforts beginning in 
1977. As part of these R&D efforts, in 1983 the FAA established a 
formal, internal statement of detection and false alarm performance 
goals for explosive detection equipment designed to identify main/bulk 
explosive charges in checked baggage, air cargo, carry-on baggage and 
on passengers. Based upon additional information and further 
evaluation, these FAA explosives detection goals were revised and 
upgraded in 1986 to reflect the changing terrorist threat to civil 
aviation. Portions of these performance requirements were further 
revised in August 1989 in anticipation of using explosives detection 
equipment for screening international checked baggage. In October 1991, 
the FAA completed an internal review of all previous studies, reviews, 
analyses and other materials associated with explosive detection. The 
review was the most extensive examination yet conducted of previous 
classified and unclassified technical reviews and available information 
on the amounts, types, and configurations of explosives used in 
attempted or successful acts of sabotage against civil aviation. This 
review culminated with the issuance of the Criteria (58 FR 47804; Sept. 
10, 1993) which established minimum performance standards only for 
main/bulk explosive charges detection equipment.

Detection of Detonators

    In October 1995, the FAA completed its compilation and analyses of 
detonator technical designs obtained during visits to 38 detonator 
manufacturers located in the United States and 20 other countries. 
These analyses were the most extensive

[[Page 18105]]

examinations on the types, materials, and configurations of detonators. 
As a result, the FAA developed a comprehensive database on detonators 
manufactured worldwide, as well as global detonator production and 
consumption profiles. The types of detonators specified in the Criteria 
were based, in part, upon reports which identified the types of 
detonators used in terrorists acts, as well as those likely to be used 
in future attempts to destroy or sabotage civil aviation, other modes 
of transportation, and physical structures. This analysis was conducted 
by the FAA with advice and consultation from U.S. and international 
explosive materials experts, and agencies of the United States and 
other governments.

Development of the Amended Criteria

    The primary change to the September 10, 1993, EDS Criteria is the 
introduction of minimum performance standards for the detection of 
detonators. These standards are included in the portion of the document 
not published in the Federal Register because they involve national 
security and sensitive information. The principal purpose of the 
Criteria is to state that it is possible to obtain certification of an 
EDS to automatically detect explosive materials in two distinct ways, 
either by identifying bulk/main explosive charges, or by identifying 
detonators.
    The changes to the September 10, 1993, EDS Criteria, which are 
published here, include a definition for the term ``explosive 
material.'' The definition distinguishes between two principal 
components of explosive material: bulk/main explosive charges and 
detonators.

Management Plan for Certification Testing

    To facilitate testing of EDS candidate equipment under either of 
the two methods of explosives material detection, the Criteria 
references separate management test plans. The FAA previously developed 
a management test plan for EDS certification of bulk/main explosive 
charges detection equipment. A notice of availability of the draft 
management test plan was published in the Federal Register on June 22, 
1993, for public comment (58 FR 33967). That management test plan, 
entitled FAA Management Plan for EDS Certification Testing, was based 
upon the National Academy of Science's General Testing Protocol for 
Bulk Explosive Detection Systems. A separate management test plan for 
EDS certification of detonator detection equipment is currently being 
developed. The FAA expects to issue a notice of availability of a draft 
management test plan for EDS certification of detonator detection 
equipment in the near future.

Discussion of Comments

    The FAA received only one comment, from the Air Line Pilots 
Association (ALPA), to the unclassified sections of the Notice of 
Proposed Amendment to Criteria for Certification of Explosives 
Detection Systems, and five responses from commenters addressing 
sections that contain national security and sensitive information.
    The Air Line Pilots Association opposes formal certification of 
detonator detection equipment as EDS on several grounds. First, ALPA 
states that it will be too difficult to detect detonators in cluttered 
bags, a problem ALPA believes will increase as terrorists become more 
sophisticated. The FAA agrees that the development of equipment to 
detect detonators in baggage, whether cluttered or not, is a difficult 
task. However, the FAA, in concert with foreign governments, has 
conducted extensive research that indicates detection of detonators is 
possible in cluttered baggage. The Criteria are designed to assure that 
only equipment that can reliably detect detonators, even in cluttered 
baggage, will be certified.
    Second, ALPA opposes certification of detonator detection equipment 
because it would not detect bulk explosive material, even though that 
undetected explosive material is not part of a device designed to 
explode, i.e., there is no detonator present to initiate an explosion. 
The Air Line Pilots Association believes that the inability to detect 
such bulk explosive material poses some risk of catastrophic damage 
because of the instability of some explosive material. The FAA 
acknowledges that detonator detection equipment is not designed to 
detect bulk explosive material; however, EDS designed to detect bulk 
explosive material will not identify detonators. Both detonators and 
bulk explosive material could be transported aboard aircraft in 
violation of the hazardous materials regulations, and both would pose 
some risk. However, neither by itself is ``likely to be used to cause 
catastrophic damage to an aircraft.'' The FAA vigorously enforces the 
hazardous materials regulations and would take aggressive action in any 
instance where either a detonator or bulk explosive material is 
transported in violation of those regulations.
    The Air Line Pilots Association also opposes certification of 
detonator detection equipment because it does not believe that a 
detonator is an ``explosive material'' as that term is used in the 
statutory provision on certification of EDS. The Air Line Pilots 
Association views certification of detonator detection equipment as 
weakening the existing Criteria. The FAA shares ALPA's commitment to 
ensuring that equipment is certified as an EDS only when it meets the 
rigorous standard of the statute, but does not agree with ALPA's 
analysis. A detonator is designed to explode, and contains explosives 
to achieve that purpose. More important, a detonator is a critical part 
of an explosive device. A narrow reading misses the real purpose of the 
statutory provision, which is to foster the development and 
certification of EDS equipment that reliably detect explosive devices 
that can cause catastrophic damage to aircraft. The FAA is committed to 
that goal, and will encourage all technologies that demonstrate the 
potential to reliably detect such explosive devices. The standards for 
certification of detonator detection equipment are very high and are 
not weaker than the standards for certification of bulk explosive 
detection equipment.
    The FAA also fully considered the five comments to sections of the 
Proposed Amendment to Criteria that contain national security and 
sensitive information. The FAA's analysis and response to those 
comments has been placed in the non-public docket. The comments 
resulted in the addition of another detonator to the list of detonators 
and in minor revisions to the language of both the unclassified and 
confidential portions of the proposed amendment. The comments 
determined to contain sensitive security information, and the FAA's 
response to them, are available, upon written request to the FAA, to 
prospective manufacturers of explosives detection equipment and other 
interested parties with a bona fide need, provided such persons have 
appropriate authorization for access to U.S. Government national 
security information.

Revisions to the Proposed Amendment

    Based upon comments it received, the FAA added one detonator to the 
list prescribed in the sensitive portion of the original proposal. 
Additionally, in the ``Component Testing'' section, FAA has deleted 
reference to detonator detection equipment in the discussion of 
explosives detection devices (EDS's).

Regulatory Evaluation

    The FAA has considered the impact of the Criteria as required under 
Executive Order 12866 and under the Department of Transportation's

[[Page 18106]]

regulatory policies and procedures. The FAA has determined that this 
action is not significant under either of these directives. In 
addition, the FAA has determined that no cost-benefit analysis is 
needed for the Criteria and related matters such as the Management Test 
Plans. Any final EDS deployment decision will be subject to further 
review, according to the requirements of Executive Order 12866. In this 
regard, the Department determined that the rule authorizing deployment 
of an EDS for screening international flights was a major rule as 
defined in the Executive Order. Based upon circumstances and 
information available at the final rule stage in 1989, the FAA 
determined that the EDS available at that time, the Thermal Neutron 
Analysis (TNA) device, would be cost-beneficial. The FAA has not 
required, nor will it require the deployment of TNA or any other EDS 
until such equipment meets the prescribed requirements of 49 U.S.C. 
44913. The FAA's deployment strategy requires deployment of effective 
EDS equipment in a cost-effective manner.
    Information relevant to deployment decisions was developed in the 
1989 final rule (54 FR 36946) in terms of the development, 
installation, and annual operating costs of a TNA device. However, as 
the EDS certification process proceeds and policies affecting EDS 
deployment are developed, all relevant issues influencing the ultimate 
decision on the timing and scope of deployment will be reviewed. The 
FAA will analyze the information submitted by manufacturers during the 
certification testing process to determine its effect on the scope and 
timing of deployment.

Regulatory Flexibility Determination

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) was enacted by 
Congress to ensure that small entities are not unnecessarily burdened 
by government regulations. The RFA requires agencies to consider the 
impact of rules on small entities, that is, small businesses, non-
profit organizations, and local governments. If there is a significant 
impact on a substantial number of small entities, the agency must 
prepare a Regulatory Flexibility Analysis.
    The small entities that could be potentially affected by the 
implementation of this action are small business enterprises that are 
or might seek to become manufacturers of EDS equipment. The number of 
small business enterprises that are in, or that might seek to enter, 
this market cannot be determined.
    The Criteria imposes minimal costs on those small business 
enterprises. These costs are primarily for obtaining access to or 
copies of the classified and sensitive security information portions of 
the Criteria. Because the incremental cost imposed by this proposed 
action is expected to be small, the FAA finds that this proposed action 
would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of 
small entities.

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and Joint Aviation 
Regulations

    In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA's policy to comply with ICAO 
Standards and Recommended Practices and the Joint Aviation Regulations 
to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA is not aware of any 
differences that the Criteria would present.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 
3507(d)), there are no requirements for information collection 
associated with the Criteria.

The Amended Criteria (Excluding Sensitive Portions)

    The following sets forth the entire text of the Criteria except 
those portions of the document that contain either national security 
information that requires safeguarding pursuant to Executive Order 
12356, or sensitive security information that requires safeguarding 
pursuant to 14 CFR part 191. (Note: Paragraph markings (U) indicate 
that the content of the paragraph is unclassified consistent with 
standard procedures for paragraph markings in the original classified 
document.)

Criteria for Certification of Explosives Detection Systems

Introduction

    (U) Prior to any requirement for the deployment or purchase of 
explosives detection equipment under 14 CFR, 49 U.S.C. 44913 (formerly 
section 108 of the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, Public 
Law 101-604) requires the FAA to certify that, based upon the results 
of tests conducted pursuant to protocols developed in consultation with 
experts from outside the FAA, such equipment can detect under realistic 
air carrier operating conditions the amounts, configurations, and types 
of explosive materials likely to be used in attacks against commercial 
aircraft.
    (U) The criteria establish the minimum acceptable performance 
requirements for an Explosives Detection System (EDS) to meet the 
mandate of 49 U.S.C. 44913 for certification by the FAA, and supersede 
previous EDS performance requirements established by the FAA.

Explosive Materials Definition

    (U) For purposes of these Criteria for Certification of Explosives 
Detection Systems: ``Explosive materials'' consist of bulk/main 
explosive charges and detonators; a ``bulk/main explosive charge'' is 
an explosive which may be detonated or initiated by a detonator; and a 
``detonator'' is a device, containing an initiating or primary 
explosive, used for initiating detonation if the bulk/main explosive 
charge.

Explosives Detection System (EDS) Definition

    (U) An EDS is an automated device or combination of devices, which 
has the ability to detect, in passenger checked baggage, the amounts, 
types, and configurations of explosive materials as specified by the 
FAA. The term ``automated'' means that the ability of the system to 
detect explosive materials, prior to the initial automated system 
alarm, does not depend on human skill, vigilance, or judgment.
    (Sensitive Portion of Document Deleted): In the full text of the 
classified Criteria document, this portion addresses alarm resolution 
requirements subsequent to the initial automated alarm.)

General Operational Requirements

    (U) The EDS must detect and differentiate explosive materials from 
among all other materials found in checked baggage.
    (U) The detection must not be dependent on the shape, position, 
orientation, or configuration of the explosive materials.
    (U) The EDS must not pose a health hazard to system operators or 
the public (as detailed in 10 CFR part 20--Standards for Protection 
Against Radiation and 10 CFR part 51--Environmental Protection 
Regulations for Domestic Licensing and Related Regulatory Functions and 
21 CFR part 1020--Performance Standards for Ionizing Radiation Emitting 
Products).
    (U) The EDS must not cause damage or significant residual 
alteration of the luggage or its contents, other than highly sensitive 
materials such as photographic film.

Detection Requirements

    (U) The detection of explosive materials in checked baggage is 
affected by the type, quantity, and configuration of the bulk/main 
explosive charges or detonators, as well as the bag and its

[[Page 18107]]

contents. Depending on the type of detection equipment used, the EDS 
must reliably detect a mix of types and quantities of explosive 
materials selected by the FAA when any of these charges or detonators 
are present in checked baggage.
    (U) The term ``checked baggage'' applies to all passenger bags 
destined for the cargo hold, including originating and transfer 
baggage, regardless of whether or not the bags accompany a passenger on 
a particular flight.
    (Sensitive Portion of Document Deleted: In the full text of the 
classified Criteria, this portion contains two tables. The first table 
identifies the types and quantities of explosive materials (bulk/main 
explosive charges) that must be detected, the minimum detection rate 
for each category of bulk/main explosive charges; and the overall 
detection and maximum false alarm rates. The first table also specifies 
the requirement to detect the minimum quantity and larger quantities of 
each listed bulk/main explosive charge. The second table lists the 
makes, models, and U.N. classification numbers of detonators that must 
be detected, and the overall detection and maximum false alarm rates. 
The throughput requirement that appears in both the main/bulk explosive 
charges and detonator tables, is quoted under ``Overall Performance 
Requirements'' below, because it is the only item that is not sensitive 
security information.)

Overall Performance Requirements

    (U) All the criteria pertaining to detection rate, false alarm 
rate, and throughput are based exclusively on the fully automated 
component(s) or element(s) of the system.
    (Sensitive Portion of Document Deleted: In the full text of the 
classified Criteria document, this portion includes information 
regarding requirements for no human intervention, detection rate, and 
false alarm rate.)
    (U) The cumulative minimum automated system throughput processing 
rate during the certification tests must be at least 450 bags/hour (not 
including alarm resolution).

Other Operational Issues

    (U) In addition to the mandatory criteria discussed above, there 
are a number of other operational considerations that will influence 
any future FAA decision to require the purchase, deployment, and use of 
EDS for screening checked baggage. While these considerations are not 
mandatory for certification of EDS equipment, they should be factored 
into development and design decisions made by potential manufacturers 
and vendors of EDS equipment.
    (U) The FAA has not yet established precise EDS parameters which 
would serve to define what is practical or cost-effective (e.g., 
precise physical characteristics such as unit weight and size, or 
precise unit cost). Given the variety of airport and air carrier 
operating environments, the FAA does not wish to foreclose the 
development of technologies which may work under some, but not all, 
operating conditions.
    (U) The FAA can, however, provide potential manufacturers and 
vendors, as well as air carriers and airports with the following 
guidance. In general, EDS equipment that is less costly, smaller and 
lighter is more practical for use in a variety of airports than a 
system that is more expensive, larger, and heavier, especially if such 
equipment would require separate structures or substantial 
modifications of existing terminal structures for installation or 
operation. Also, systems which are easily operated and maintained, and 
are proven to be reliable, will be more acceptable than systems that 
require extensive specialized training for operation, calibration, and 
maintenance.
    (U) In addition, systems with throughput rates that substantially 
exceed the minimum rate established in the certification criteria are 
operationally more efficient in many applications, and are less likely 
to cause delays and congestion when large numbers of passenger bags 
must be screened in short periods of time. Further, systems that can be 
more easily integrated into existing passenger and baggage processing 
systems would presumably be more acceptable to potential users.
    (U) Trade-offs are often made among these and other operational 
considerations during the course of system design. For example, 
reliability, maintainability, and availability can usually be improved, 
but often at the expense of an increase in purchase price. While such 
trade-offs may not affect certification, they will be considered during 
decision making to require deployment of certified EDS.

System Certification

    (U) The FAA will certify EDS equipment based upon the mandatory 
detection criteria and develop a list of certified equipment that would 
be eligible for use by air carriers. Additional action must be taken by 
the FAA to require the deployment of certified EDS to screen checked 
baggage.
    (Sensitive Portion of Document Deleted: In the full text of the 
classified Criteria document, this portion contains information on the 
Act's requirement to detect likely-to-be-used explosive materials.)
    (U) The FAA will not require air carriers to use certified EDS 
equipment until such time as the FAA determines that such equipment is 
available in sufficient quantities to satisfy air carrier and airport 
operational concerns, and is practical for use under realistic air 
carrier operating conditions (e.g., cost, size, weight, reliability, 
maintainability, and availability), and cost-effective.
    (U) The FAA will only certify complete systems. It will not certify 
or allow for use, individual component devices. Prior to final 
certification, the FAA will require manufacturers and vendors to 
provide full system documentation. This documentation will include, but 
is not limited to: recommended system installation and calibration 
procedures; minimum essential test equipment and devices; routine field 
testing procedures and test objects to be used; routine and emergency 
operation procedures; field preventative maintenance and repair 
procedures; and training programs.

Certification Testing

    (U) Testing of bulk/main explosive charges detection equipment 
presented to the FAA for EDS certification, will be performed in 
accordance with the FAA's Management Plan for EDS Certification 
Testing, based upon A General Testing Protocol for Bulk Explosives 
Detection Systems, (National Advisory Board, final report 1993).
    (U) Testing of detonator detection equipment presented to the FAA 
for EDS certification, will be performed in accordance with the FAA's 
Management Plan for EDS Certification Testing of Detonator Detection 
Equipment, based upon FAA's General Testing Protocol for Detonator 
Detection Systems.
    (U) The FAA Technical Center in Atlantic City, New Jersey will 
perform certification tests for producers of candidate explosives 
detection systems. The EDS Certification Test Director in the Office of 
Aviation Security Research and Development is the point of contact.
    (U) As required by both the FAA Management Plan for EDS 
Certification Testing, and the FAA Management Plan for EDS 
Certification Testing of Detonator Detection Equipment, manufacturers 
seeking FAA certification for their candidate EDS must submit complete 
descriptive data and their test results to the FAA prior to receiving 
permission to ship their equipment to the FAA Technical Center. The FAA 
reserves the right to visit manufacturers' facilities for technical 
quality assurance purposes, require and/or monitor in-

[[Page 18108]]

house tests, and review associated data prior to granting permission to 
ship equipment for certification testing.
    (U) There may be extenuating circumstances that make it impractical 
for the equipment to be accommodated at the FAA Technical Center. 
Therefore, the FAA will consider requests for an exception that would 
permit equipment to be tested at a facility other than the FAA 
Technical Center. The written request must explain in detail why an 
exception is in the best interest of the U.S. Government and indicate 
the methods and procedures that will be used to conduct equivalent 
tests to those conducted at the FAA's facility.
    (U) The FAA may recognize, on a reciprocal basis, EDS testing and 
certification conducted by a foreign government's aviation security 
organization. Such recognition by the FAA will be considered only if 
certain conditions are met. These conditions include, but are not 
limited to, the negotiation of an appropriate security technical 
exchange agreement which assures compliance with the FAA Criteria for 
Certification of Explosives Detection Systems using strict quality 
control procedures that are consistent with FAA testing procedures. The 
agreement must also provide for full reciprocity for certifications 
issued by both the foreign government aviation security organization 
and the FAA.
    (U) All direct costs associated with testing and certification 
(e.g., insurance, shipping, installation, set-up, technical operation, 
maintenance, calibration, disassembly, and FAA laboratory testing 
costs) must be borne by the manufacturers or vendors. Both the FAA 
Management Plan for EDS Certification Testing, and the FAA Management 
Plan for EDS Certification Testing of Detonator Detection Equipment 
contain specific information on the incremental costs associated with 
tests performed at the FAA Technical Center facilities, or other 
locations.
    (Sensitive Portion of Document Deleted: In the full text of the 
classified Criteria, this portion contains information pertaining to 
test objects used in EDS certification testing.)

Component Testing

    (U) As part of the FAA Security R&D program, the FAA Technical 
Center evaluates explosives detection devices (EDD's) that do not meet 
all of the EDS performance standards. An EDD is an automated, 
uncertified EDS that is capable of meeting the partial detection 
requirements for bulk/main explosive charges, in the criteria. For 
instance, some of the devices that the FAA has evaluated have 
relatively low throughput rates and higher false alarm rates than the 
maximum acceptable rate. It will be possible under certain 
circumstances, for example, for a manufacturer of an automated EDD to 
have the FAA test and evaluate the device, even though it is not 
expected to fully meet the EDS certification criteria (e.g., false 
alarm rate or throughput).
    (U) Although only complete systems can be certified, the FAA may 
attest to the performance of, but not certify or approve for use, EDD's 
or individual components. Attesting to the performance of EDD's is 
intended to assist manufacturers and vendors who are seeking partners 
with whom they can create a functioning EDS composed of multiple 
devices.
    (U) Testing of EDD's will only be conducted: (1) on a first-come, 
first-served basis; (2) if adequate resources and facilities are 
available at the FAA Technical Center to permit such testing (The FAA 
will also consider requests to test the equipment at a facility other 
than the FAA Technical Center; these requests will be given the lowest 
priority and the testing will be performed only if it does not delay 
other testing being performed by the FAA Technical Center.); (3) at a 
lower precedence than EDS certification testing; and (4) if the FAA 
determines from the manufacturer's test data that there is a 
substantial likelihood that the device will meet the partial detection 
criteria.

    (Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 5103, 40113, 40119, 44701-44702, 
44705, 44901-44905, 44907, 44913-44914, 44932, 44935-44936, 46105)

    Issued in Washington, DC, on April 7, 1998.
Jane F. Garvey,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 98-9642 Filed 4-10-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-M