[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 65 (Monday, April 6, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 16829-16830]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-8918]



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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-254 and 50-265]


Commonwealth Edison Company and MidAmerican Energy Company; Quad 
Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2; Exemption

I

    Commonwealth Edison Company (ComEd) and MidAmerican Energy Company 
are the holders of Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30, 
which authorize operation of the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, 
Units 1 and 2 (the facility). ComEd (the licensee) is the holder of a 
75-percent ownership share in Quad Cities. ComEd, acting as agent and 
representative of the two owners listed on the licenses, is licensed to 
operate the facility. The license provides, among other things, that 
the facility is subject to all the rules, regulations, and orders of 
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission now or hereafter in effect.
    The facility is a boiling-water reactor located at the licensees' 
site in Rockford County, Illinois.

II

    Section 70.24 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 
``Criticality Accident Requirements,'' requires that each licensee 
authorized to possess special nuclear material maintain a criticality 
accident monitoring system in each area in which such material is 
handled, used, or stored. Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of 10 CFR 70.24 
specify detection and sensitivity requirements that these monitors must 
meet. Subsection (a)(1) also specifies that all areas subject to 
criticality accident monitoring must be covered by two detectors. 
Subsection (a)(3) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to maintain 
emergency procedures for each area in which this licensed special 
nuclear material is handled, used, or stored and requires that (1) the 
procedures ensure that all personnel withdraw to an area of safety upon 
the sounding of a criticality accident monitor alarm, (2) the 
procedures include drills to familiarize personnel with the evacuation 
plan, and (3) the procedures designate responsible individuals for 
determining the cause of the alarm and placement of radiation survey 
instruments in accessible locations for use in such an emergency. 
Subsection (b)(1) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to provide the 
means of identifying quickly any personnel who have received a dose of 
10 rads or more. Subsection (b)(2) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees 
to maintain personnel decontamination facilities, arrangements for a 
physician and other medical personnel qualified to handle radiation 
emergencies, and arrangements for the transportation of contaminated 
individuals to treatment facilities outside the site boundary. 
Paragraph (c) of 10 CFR 70.24 exempts Part 50 licensees from the 
requirements of paragraph (b) of 10 CFR 70.24 for special nuclear 
material used or to be used in the reactor. Subsection (d) of 10 CFR 
70.24 states that any licensee that believes that there is good cause 
why it should be granted an exemption from all or part of 10 CFR 70.24 
may apply to the Commission for such an exemption and shall specify the 
reasons for the relief requested.

III

    The special nuclear material that could be assembled into a 
critical mass at Quad Cities is in the form of nuclear fuel. The 
quantity of special nuclear material other than fuel that is stored on 
site in any given location is small enough to preclude achieving a 
critical mass. The Commission's technical staff has evaluated the 
possibility of an inadvertent criticality of the nuclear fuel at Quad 
Cities and has determined that it is extremely unlikely that such an 
accident will occur if the licensees meet the following seven criteria:
    1. Only three boiling-water reactor new fuel assemblies are allowed 
out of a shipping cask or a storage rack at one time;
    2. The k-effective dose does not exceed 0.95, at a 95-percent 
probability, 95-percent confidence level, in the event that the fresh 
fuel storage racks are filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-
235 enrichment and flooded with pure water;
    3. If optimum moderation occurs at low moderator density, the k-
effective dose does not exceed 0.98, at a 95-percent probability, 95-
percent confidence level, in the event that the fresh fuel storage 
racks are filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment 
and flooded with a moderator at the density corresponding to optimum 
moderation;
    4. The k-effective dose does not exceed 0.95, at a 95-percent 
probability, 95-percent confidence level, in the event that the spent 
fuel storage racks are filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-
235 enrichment and flooded with pure water;
    5. The quantity of special nuclear material, other than nuclear 
fuel, stored on-site in any given area is less than the quantity 
necessary for a critical mass;
    6. Radiation monitors, as required by General Design Criterion 
(GDC) 63, are provided in fuel storage and handling areas to detect 
excessive radiation levels and to initiate appropriate safety actions; 
and
    7. The maximum nominal U-235 enrichment is limited to 5.0 weight 
percent.
    By letter dated October 27, 1997, the licensee requested an 
exemption from 10 CFR 70.24. In this request, the licensee addressed 
the seven criteria previously stated. The licensee stated that Quad 
Cities does not analyze optimum moderation conditions as addressed in 
Criteria 3 above, but has used a standard industry practice by 
implementing administrative and physical controls in accordance with 
General Electric Service Information Letter 152, ``Criticality Margins 
for the Storage of New Fuel.'' To preclude the existence of an optimum 
moderation condition in the new fuel storage vault area, the following 
controls are used: the new fuel storage vault is verified dry; the 
drains are free and clear of obstruction before new fuel storage; low 
velocity fog nozzles (fire protection) in the vicinity of the dry 
storage vault have been removed; and the new fuel storage vault plugs 
are installed during prolonged work delays. The staff has found this 
practice acceptable.
    The Commission's technical staff has reviewed the licensee's 
submittal and has determined that Quad Cities meets the criteria for 
prevention of inadvertent criticality. Therefore, the staff has 
determined that it is extremely unlikely that an inadvertent 
criticality will occur in the handling of special nuclear materials or 
in their storage areas at Quad Cities.
    The purpose of the criticality monitors required by 10 CFR 70.24 is 
to ensure that if a criticality were to occur during the handling of 
special nuclear material, personnel would be alerted to that fact and 
would take appropriate action. The staff has determined that it is 
extremely unlikely that such an accident could occur. Although Quad 
Cities is not licensed to GDC 63, the licensee has radiation monitors 
consistent with the requirements of GDC 63 in fuel storage and handling 
areas. These monitors will alert personnel to excessive radiation 
levels and allow them to initiate appropriate safety actions. The low 
probability of an inadvertent criticality, together with the licensee's 
adherence to the requirements of GDC 63, constitutes good cause for 
granting an exemption to the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24.

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IV

    The Commission has determined that pursuant to 10 CFR 70.14, this 
exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or 
the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public 
interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants the licensee an 
exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24 for Quad Cities.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the 
granting of this exemption will not result in any significant adverse 
environmental impact (63 FR 10957).
    This exemption is effective upon issuance.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 31st day of March 1998.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Collins,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 98-8918 Filed 4-3-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P