[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 61 (Tuesday, March 31, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 15464-15465]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-8407]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328]


In the Matter of Tennessee Valley Authority; Sequoyah Nuclear 
Plant Units 1 and 2; Exemption

I

    The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA or the licensee) is the holder 
of Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-77 and DPR-79, which authorize 
operation of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN), Units 1 and 2, 
respectively. The licenses provide, among other things, that the 
licensee is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the 
Commission now or hereafter in effect.
    The facility consists of two pressurized-water reactors at the 
licensee's site located in Hamilton County, Tennessee.

II

    Section 70.24 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 
``Criticality Accident Requirements,'' requires that each licensee 
authorized to possess special nuclear material (SNM) shall maintain a 
criticality accident monitoring system in each area where such material 
is handled, used, or stored. Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of 10 CFR 
70.24 specify detection and sensitivity requirements that these 
monitors must meet. Subsection (a)(1) also specifies that all areas 
subject to criticality accident monitoring must be covered by two 
detectors. Subsection (a)(3) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to 
maintain emergency procedures for each area in which this licensed SNM 
is handled, used, or stored and provides that (1) the procedures ensure 
that all personnel withdraw to an area of safety upon the sounding of a 
criticality accident monitor alarm, (2) the procedures must include 
drills to familiarize personnel with the evacuation plan, and (3) the 
procedures designate responsible individuals for determining the cause 
of the alarm and placement of radiation survey instruments in 
accessible locations for use in such an emergency. Subsection (b)(1) of 
10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to have a means to identify quickly 
personnel who have received a dose of 10 rads or more. Subsection 
(b)(2) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to maintain personnel 
decontamination facilities, to maintain arrangements for a physician 
and other medical personnel qualified to handle radiation emergencies, 
and to maintain arrangements for the transportation of contaminated 
individuals to treatment facilities outside the site boundary. 
Paragraph (c) of 10 CFR 70.24 exempts Part 50 licensees from the 
requirements of paragraph (b) of 10 CFR 70.24 for SNM used or to be 
used in the reactor. Paragraph (d) of 10 CFR 70.24 states that any 
licensee who believes that there is good cause why he should be granted 
an exemption from all or part of 10 CFR 70.24 may apply to the 
Commission for such an exemption and shall specify the reasons for the 
relief requested.

[[Page 15465]]

III

    The SNM that could be assembled into a critical mass at SQN is in 
the form of nuclear fuel; the quantity of SNM other than fuel that is 
stored on site is small enough to preclude achieving a critical mass. 
The Commission's technical staff has evaluated the possibility of an 
inadvertent criticality of the nuclear fuel at SQN, and has determined 
that it is extremely unlikely for such an accident to occur if the 
licensee meets the following seven criteria:
    1. Only one fuel assembly is allowed out of a shipping cask or 
storage rack at one time.
    2. The k-effective does not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% 
confidence level in the event that the fresh fuel storage racks are 
filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and 
flooded with pure water.
    3. If optimum moderation occurs at low moderator density, then the 
k-effective does not exceed 0.98, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence 
level in the event that the fresh fuel storage racks are filled with 
fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and flooded with a 
moderator at the density corresponding to optimum moderation.
    4. The k-effective does not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% 
confidence level in the event that the spent fuel storage racks are 
filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and 
flooded with pure water.
    5. The quantity of forms of special nuclear material, other than 
nuclear fuel, that are stored on site in any given area is less than 
the quantity necessary for a critical mass.
    6. Radiation monitors, as required by General Design Criterion 63, 
are provided in fuel storage and handling areas to detect excessive 
radiation levels and to initiate appropriate safety actions.
    7. The maximum nominal U-235 enrichment is limited to 5.0 weight 
percent.
    By letter dated December 5, 1997, the licensee requested an 
exemption from 10 CFR 70.24. In this request the licensee addressed the 
seven criteria given above. The Commission's technical staff has 
reviewed the licensee's submittals and has determined that SQN meets 
the criteria for prevention of inadvertent criticality; therefore, the 
staff has determined that it is extremely unlikely for an inadvertent 
criticality to occur in SNM handling or storage areas at SQN.
    The purpose of the criticality monitors required by 10 CFR 70.24 is 
to ensure that if a criticality were to occur during the handling of 
SNM, personnel would be alerted to that fact and would take appropriate 
action. The staff has determined that it is extremely unlikely that 
such an accident could occur; furthermore, the licensee has radiation 
monitors, as required by General Design Criterion 63, in fuel storage 
and handling areas. These monitors will alert personnel to excessive 
radiation levels and allow them to initiate appropriate safety actions. 
The low probability of an inadvertent criticality, together with the 
licensee's adherence to General Design Criterion 63, constitutes good 
cause for granting an exemption to the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24.

IV

    The Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 70.14, this 
exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or 
the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public 
interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants the Tennessee Valley 
Authority an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the 
granting of this exemption will have no significant impact on the 
environment (63 FR 14481).
    This exemption is effective upon issuance.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 25th day of March 1998.
Samuel J. Collins,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 98-8407 Filed 3-30-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P