Dated: March 2, 1998.

M. Rebecca Winkler,

Committee Management Officer.

[FR Doc. 98–5747 Filed 3–4–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7555–01–M

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION

Special Emphasis Panel in Geosciences; Meeting

In accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92–463, as amended), the National Science Foundation announces the following meeting:

Name: Special Emphasis Panel in Geosciences (1756).

Date and Time: March 25–27, 1998; 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. each day.

Place: University Corporation for Atmospheric Research (USCAR)/UNIDATA, 3300 Mitchell Lane, Suite 170, Boulder, CO 80301.

Contact Person: Dr. Clifford Jacobs, Section Head for the USCAR and Lower Atmosphere Facilities Oversight Section, Division of Atmospheric Sciences, Room 775, National Science Foundation, 4201 Wilson Blvd., Arlington, VA 22230. Telephone (703) 306–1521.

Purpose of Meeting: To provide and make recommendations concerning the renewal proposal of the five year award to operate the UNIDATA Program Center under management of the University Corporation for Atmospheric Research (UCAR).

Agenda: To review and evaluate the renewal proposal for the five year award to operate the UNIDATA Program Center under management of the University Corporation for Atmospheric Research (UCAR).

Reason for Closing: The proposal being reviewed includes information of a proprietary or confidential nature, including technical information; financial data; such as salaries, and personal information concerning individuals associated with the proposal. These matters are exempt under 5 USC 552b(c)(4) and (6) of the Government in the Sunshine Act.

Dated: March 2, 1998.

M. Rebecca Winkler,

Committee Management Officer.

[FR Doc. 98–5750 Filed 3–4–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7555–01–M

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION

Special Emphasis Panel in Human Resource Development; Meeting

In accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92–463, as amended), the National Science Foundation announces the following meeting.

Name and Committee Code: Special Emphasis Panel in Human Resource Development (#1199).

Date and Time: March 23–24, 1998: 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.

Place: National Science Foundation, 4201 Wilson Boulevard, Rooms 310 and 320, Arlington, VA 22230.

Type of Meeting: Closed.

Contact Person: Margrete Klein, Program Director, Human Resource Development Division, Room 815, National Science Foundation, 4201 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, VA 22230 Telephone: (703) 306–1637.

Purpose of Meeting: To provide advice and recommendations concerning proposals submitted to NSF for financial support.

Agenda: To review and evaluate formal proposals submitted to the Women and Girls program.

Reason for Closing: The proposals being reviewed include information of a proprietary or confidential nature, including technical information; financial data, such as salaries; and personal information concerning individuals associated with the proposals. These matters are exempt under 5 U.S.C. 552b(c), (4) and (6) of the Government in the Sunshine Act.

Dated: March 2, 1998.

M. Rebecca Winkler,

Committee Management Officer.

[FR Doc. 98–5749 Filed 3–4–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7555–01–M

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION

Special Emphasis Panel in Mathematical Sciences; Meeting

In accordance with the federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92–463, as amended), the National Science Foundation announces the following meeting.

Name and Committee Code: Special Emphasis in Mathematical Sciences (1204).

Date and Time: March 23–25, 1998, 8:30 A.M. until 5:00 P.M.

Place: Room 365, National Science Foundation, 4201 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, VA 22230.

Type of Meeting: Closed.

Contact Person: Dr. Ann Boyle, Program Director, National Science Foundation, 4201 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, VA 22230. Telephone: (703) 306–1875.

Purpose of Meeting: To provide advice and recommendations concerning proposals submitted to NSF for financial support.

Agenda: To review and evaluate proposals concerning the Grants for Vertical Integration of Research and Education in the Mathematical Sciences Program, as part of the selection process for awards.

Reason for Closing: The proposals being reviewed include information of a proprietary or confidential nature, including technical information; financial data, such as salaries and personal information concerning individuals associated with the proposals. These matters are exempt under 5 U.S.C. 552b(c) (4) and (6) of the Government in the Sunshine Act.

Dated: March 2, 1998.

M. Rebecca Winkler,

Committee Management Officer.

[FR Doc. 98–5746 Filed 3–4–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7555–01–M

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50–250 and 50–251]

Florida Power and Light Company; (Turkey Point Units 3 and 4); Exemption

I

Florida Power and Light Company (the licensee) is the holder of Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR–31 and DPR–41, which authorize operation of Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 (the facility) at a steady-state reactor power level not in excess of 2300 megawatts thermal per unit. The facility is a pressurized-water reactor located at the licensee's site in Dade County, Florida. The licenses provide, among other things, that the facility is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or NRC) now or hereafter in effect.

II

In exemptions dated March 27, 1984, and August 12, 1987, the staff approved the use of 1-hour rated fire barriers in lieu of 3-hour barriers in certain outdoor areas at Turkey Point Units 3 and 4. In addition, the staff found that, for certain outdoor areas not protected by automatic fire detection and suppression systems, separation of cables and equipment and associated nonsafety circuits of redundant trains by a horizontal distance of 20 feet free of intervening combustibles provided an acceptable level of fire safety.

Based on the results of the industry's Thermo-Lag fire endurance testing program, the licensee concluded that the outdoor Thermo-Lag fire barrier designs cannot achieve a 1-hour fire resistive rating but can achieve a 30-minute fire resistive rating when exposed to a test fire that follows the ASTM E–119 standard time-temperature curve. Because of these test results, the licensee in a letter dated June 15, 1994, requested an exemption to use 30-minute fire barriers for outdoor applications in lieu of the 1-hour fire barriers previously approved; however, the exemption request was withdrawn by letter dated June 28, 1996.

In a letter dated December 12, 1996, the licensee submitted an exemption request (evaluated herein) for outdoor

areas, excluding the turbine building area. The licensee requested that the NRC approve the use of 25-minute raceway fire barriers for these outdoor applications in lieu of the 1-hour fire barriers which were previously approved (refer to SEs dated March 27, 1984, and August 12, 1987). This request was based on the following: (1) The fire loading and potential fire severities are low; (2) there are minimal ignition sources; (3) transient ignition sources and combustibles are controlled in these zones; and (4) manual fire fighting equipment is readily accessible to the zones.

10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.a requires:

> Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a fire barrier having a 3-hour rating. Structural steel forming a part of or supporting such fire barriers shall be protected to provide fire resistance equivalent to that required of the barrier.

The underlying purpose of this rule is to provide reasonable assurance that one safe shutdown train and associated circuits used to achieve and maintain safe shutdown are free of fire damage.

In its December 12, 1996, exemption request, as supplemented by letters dated July 31 and October 31, 1997, the licensee requested an exemption for outdoor fire zones, excluding the turbine area, permitting the use of the following in lieu of Section III.G.2.a requirements:

(1) Separation of cables and equipment and associated nonsafety circuits of redundant trains west of the Open Turbine Building Structure column line A by a 1-hour rated fire barrier until a horizontal distance of 20 feet is attained. Water suppression systems are provided for the major combustible sources, however no suppression or detection is provided for the raceways. This request is applicable to fire zones 81; and 86 West of the A-line.

(2) Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a 25-minute rated fire barrier until a horizontal distance of 20 feet is attained. No suppression or detection is provided. This request is applicable to fire zones 47 and 54; 86 North of column line 22 and East of the A-line; 79, 84, 88 and 89 East of the Jc-line; and 106R, 113, 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, 120, 131 and 143.

(3) Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a 25-minute rated fire barrier until a horizontal distance of 10 feet is attained in Roof Top locations. No suppression or detection is provided. This request is applicable to fire zones 106R, 114, 115, 118 and 143.

(4) Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a radiant energy shield having an equivalent 30-minute fire rating until a horizontal distance of 20 feet is attained. A radiant energy shield is a line of sight barrier between redundant equipment and/or components. The radiant energy shield may be combustible. No suppression or detection is provided. This request is applicable to fire zones 47 and 54; 86 North of column line 22 and East of the A-line; 79, 84, 88 and 89 East of the Jc-line; and 106R, 113, 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, 120, 131 and 143.

(5) The existing separation of approximately 12 feet on center for the Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pumps combined with fire detection and a dual-header partial-coverage suppression system for the pumps. This request is applicable to fire zones 47 and 54.

(6) The existing separation of approximately 14 feet on center for the Intake Cooling Water (ICW) Pumps and associated conduits, with fire detection for the pumps. No suppression is provided. This request is applicable to fire zones 119 and 120.

(7) The use of a partial height (10 feet high) fire barrier between the Unit 3 Emergency Diesel Generator(EDG) ''A'' and ''B'' radiator rooms. No suppression or detection is provided. This request is applicable to fire zone 131.

III

In summary, according to the licensee's submittal, the exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common defense and security.

In addition, the licensee asserts that special circumstances as set forth in 10 CFR 50.12, paragraphs (a)(2)(ii) and (a)(2)(iii) are present, i.e., (1) Application of the regulation in the particular circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule since the alternative actions proposed by the licensee will assure that a fire in the power plant will not disable the capability to safely shut down the plant, and (2) compliance with the regulation would result in costs significantly in excess of those contemplated when the regulation was adopted, since it was not foreseen that the fire barriers would have to be upgraded.

IV

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's supporting information for its exemption request and conducted a site visit.

During its site visit the staff performed the following actions during walkdowns of the outdoor areas:

- Reviewed the general area and assessed fire protection features (manual and automatic).
- Reviewed the location of the fire brigade equipment.
- Reviewed fire brigade accessibility to the area.
- Observed fire hazards and fire loadings associated with the area.
- Observed the material conditions of the plant and of the fire protection equipment.
- Observed the adequacy of administrative controls (noted any transient combustibles).
- Reviewed the adequacy of the fire rating of the raceway fire barriers in the area.

Based on the plant open/outdoor configuration of the fire zones noted below, the impact a fire may have on the plant and its ability to shut down in the event of a fire tends to be localized to the zone of concern. During its site evaluation the staff observed that the hot fire gases and smoke would be directly vented to the atmosphere. Therefore, components required to achieve and maintain safe shutdown would not be subjected to convective heat. In outdoor areas a ceiling jet and hot gas layer would not develop, unlike enclosed compartments.

Fire Zone 47—Unit 4 Component Cooling Water Pump Room and Fire Zone 54—Unit 3 Component Cooling Water Pump Room

Fire zone 47, the Unit 4 component cooling water pump room, is located outdoors near the southeast corner of auxiliary building elevation 18′ − 0″. This fire zone is separated from other auxiliary building fire areas by 3-hour fire rated walls. This zone does not have a ceiling and is open to the atmosphere. Fire zone 54, the Unit 3 component cooling water pump room, is located outdoors near the northeast corner of auxiliary building elevation 18′ − 0″. This fire zone is open to the atmosphere and is separated from other auxiliary building fire areas by 3-hour fire barriers.

The major safe-shutdown-related equipment in these zones are the CCW pumps (three pumps) and heat exchangers. The pumps are arranged in an ''L'' configuration and are spaced approximately 12 feet on center. The

power cables for each pump are routed in embedded conduit with the exception of a short length from the embedded conduit to the motor terminal box which is flexible steel conduit. The local control stations for these pumps are more than 20 feet apart. The conduits and their post-fire safe shutdown functions (identified in the Appendix) are protected by an electrical raceway fire barrier system which has a minimum fire resistive rating of 25 minutes.[1]

These CCW pumps and cabling lack the required 20 feet of spacial separation as specified in Appendix R III.G.a.2.b. The NRC approved this configuration in an exemption dated March 27, 1984, on the basis that the licensee had installed redundant open-head deluge fire control-suppression systems activated by ultraviolet (UV) fire detectors; however, this area was resubmitted for review since cabling with less than 20 feet of separation is protected by a 25-minute rated fire barrier. The in-situ fire load in this area is low, consisting of two horizontal cable trays installed approximately 10 feet above the floor and 1 gallon of lubricating oil in each pump. Manual hose stations and portable fire extinguishers are accessible. If a fire occurred in either of these fire zones, it is anticipated that the UV fire detectors would react and activate the deluge fire suppression system. Since the suppression system would provide fast total coverage of the CCW pumps, there is reasonable assurance that a fire affecting one pump would be confined to that pump. The 12 feet of separation between the pumps provides adequate passive protection to assure that one train of CCW pumps would remain free of fire damage. In addition, since these fire zones are outdoor areas with no significant equipment or component obstructions, there is reasonable assurance that the required post-fire safe shutdown functions protected by the 25-minute electrical raceway fire barrier system would remain free of fire damage until the deluge system activated and controlled the fire. The staff has determined that licensee's proposal provides adequate protection, will not pose an undue risk to public health and safety, and that the underlying purpose of the rule is satisfied. Therefore, the staff finds the licensee's proposed exemption for these areas to be acceptable.

Fire Zone 106R—Control Room Air Conditioner Condensing Units on the Control Building

Fire Zone 106R is the control building roof. The major safe shutdown equipment on the roof are the cable spreading room and computer room chillers and the control room air conditioning evaporative units. The control building roof is of concrete construction and is covered with a composite, built-up roof. The staff requested the licensee to evaluate the combustibility of this roof design and consider the potential effect of a fire on the combustible (Thermo-Lag) raceway fire barriers and the components they protect. The licensee determined that this roof consists of (1) A Koroseal vapor barrier; (2) Flintkote roof insulation; (3) Lexsuco adhesive; (4) eight layers of Ruberiod asphalt felt; and (5) clean, dry, opaque ¼'' to ⅝'' gravel. The licensee determined that this roof is the original roof; its fire classification is indeterminate. Because of the uncertainty as to the combustibility and fire classification of the control building roof, the licensee's proposed exemption which would permit it to separate cables and equipment and associated nonsafety circuits of redundant trains by a 25-minute rated fire barrier until a horizontal distance of 10 feet is attained is not acceptable.

Roof and Fire Zone 118—Control and Auxiliary Building Roof

Fire zone 118 is the control and auxiliary building roof. The auxiliary building roof construction is concrete without an asphalt roof membrane. There are minimal in-situ combustibles in this fire zone and intervening combustibles between redundant safe shutdown functions is not a concern. In addition, this roof is inside the radiation control area of the facility. The only transient combustible materials admitted are those used in maintenance or work activity within this area and controlled by the licensee's administrative controls. Therefore, transient combustibles are not a concern.

Located in fire zone 118 are redundant safe shutdown trains of DC equipment/inverter room heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) (Component Nos. E16D, E16E, E16F), electrical equipment room HVAC (Component Nos. E232/V76, E16E/E16F), cable spreading room HVAC (S74A/S75A, S74B/S75B), and the auxiliary building exhaust fan (V8A, V8B). In addition, the cabling and raceway associated with this equipment are routed in this fire zone. The conduits and the associated post-fire safe shutdown functions (identified in the appendix) are separated from the redundant train in this fire zone by a 25-minute rated fire barrier until a horizontal distance of 10 feet is attained. All other post-fire safe shutdown equipment (e.g., components, power and control circuits, and power distribution circuits) located in this fire zone are separated from their redundant equipment by a horizontal distance of greater than 10 feet. In addition, the space between the equipment is free of fixed combustibles. Since this fire zone is outdoors and the in-situ fire load is minimal, there is reasonable assurance that any fire would be small and that the required post-fire safe shutdown equipment protected by the 25-minute electrical raceway fire barrier system would remain free of fire damage until the fire burned itself out or was detected by plant personnel and adequately controlled and suppressed by the plant fire brigade. The staff has determined that licensee's proposal provides adequate protection, will not pose an undue risk to public health and safety, and that the underlying purpose of the rule is satisfied. Therefore, the staff finds the licensee's proposed exemption for this area to be acceptable.

Fire Zone 113—Unit 4 Feedwater Platform and Fire Zone 116—Unit 3 Feedwater Platform

Fire zones 113 and 116 are the feedwater platforms for Units 3 and 4, respectively. These platforms are located in the outdoor area on elevation 38′–0″. The major safe shutdown equipment located in each of these fire zones is two trains of auxiliary feedwater control valves and the auxiliary building supply fans. The train A valves (three valves) are located above the platform, on elevation 42′–0″ and the train B valves (three valves) are on elevation 30′–7″. They are separated by a ¼-inch thick steel checker-plate platform. In addition, these areas contain the associated feedwater and auxiliary feedwater systems that penetrate the reactor containment building. The area is bounded on two sides, north and west, by concrete walls. The east side is bounded by the respective Unit 3 or 4 reactor containment building. The south side is open to the atmosphere and the ceiling is concrete. The redundant post-fire safe shutdown trains located in these areas are not protected by an automatic suppression system. However, these fire

[1] As specified by the licensee's exemption request, the fire resistive rating of 25-minute electrical raceway fire barrier system applications (e.g., fire barrier application for various conduit diameters, lateral bends, radial bends, junction boxes, conduit bank enclosures) will be bounded by tests and will be representative of the tested configurations. The fire endurance and hose stream testing will also be done in accordance with Generic Letter 86–10, Supplement 1, and will have met the acceptance criteria.

zones are protected by UV fire detection capabilities, manual hose stations, and portable fire extinguishers.

Where there are intervening combustibles between redundant safe shutdown trains or the required post-fire safe shutdown circuits or equipment (e.g., components, power and control circuits, and power distribution circuits) are not separated from its redundant equipment by a minimum of 20 feet, the equipment is protected by an electrical raceway fire barrier system with a 25-minute fire resistive rating. The raceway protected by electrical raceway fire barrier systems are identified in the Appendix. These fire zones are outdoor areas and the in-situ fire load is low. Therefore, there is reasonable assurance that if a fire occurred the required post-fire safe shutdown equipment protected by the 25-minute electrical raceway fire barrier system would remain free of fire damage until the fire was automatically detected and then controlled and suppressed by the plant fire brigade. The staff has determined that licensee's proposal provides adequate protection, will not pose an undue risk to public health and safety, and that the underlying purpose of the rule is satisfied. Therefore, the staff finds the licensee's proposed exemption for this area to be acceptable.

Fire Zone 115—Unit 3 Main Steam Platform and Fire Zone 114—Unit 4 Main Steam Platform

These two outside areas are located at the 53′-6″ elevation. The major safe shutdown equipment in these fire zones consist of the main steam isolation valves, main steam isolation valve bypass valves, and the atmospheric dump valves. The redundant main steam isolation, bypass valves, and atmospheric dump valves are separated from each other by approximately 28 feet center to center. The redundant trains located in these areas are not protected by fixed fire suppression or automatic fire detection systems. Portable fire extinguishers and standpipes with the appropriate hose stations are available and accessible.

These areas are open to the atmosphere and do not have a ceiling. Redundant cables are separated horizontally by over 20 feet free off intervening combustibles and are routed in steel conduit. Where there are intervening combustibles or the required post-fire safe shutdown equipment (e.g., components, power and control circuits, and power distribution circuits) is not separated from its redundant equipment by a minimum of 20 feet, the equipment is protected by a electrical raceway fire barrier system with a 25-minute fire resistive rating. The raceway protected by electrical raceway fire barrier systems are identified in the Appendix. Since these fire zones are outdoor areas and the in-situ fire load is low, there is reasonable assurance that if a fire occurred, it would be small and the required post-fire safe shutdown equipment protected by the 25-minute fire barrier system would remain free of fire damage until the fire burned itself out or was detected by plant personnel and controlled and suppressed by the plant fire brigade. The staff has determined that licensee's proposal provides adequate protection, will not pose an undue risk to public health and safety, and that the underlying purpose of the rule is satisfied. Therefore, the staff finds the licensee's proposed exemption for this area to be acceptable.

Fire Zone 119—Unit 4 Intake Structure and Fire Zone 120—Unit 3 Intake Structure

The Unit 3 and 4 intake structures are contiguous and are designated fire zone 119 (Unit 4) and fire zone 120 (Unit 3) to differentiate between the units. These fire zones are outdoors and are not bounded by walls or a ceiling. The in-situ combustible in these fire zones is a small amount of lubricating oil contained in the motor housings. The fire protection features provided for these zones are manual fire hose stations and portable fire extinguishers. These fire zones are protected by automatic UV fire detectors.

Where there are intervening combustibles between redundant shutdown trains or the required post-fire safe shutdown equipment (e.g., components, power and control circuits, and power distribution circuits) is not separated from its redundant equipment by a minimum of 20 feet, the equipment is protected by an electrical raceway fire barrier system with a 25-minute fire resistive rating. The raceway protected by electrical raceway fire barrier systems are identified in the Appendix. Since these fire zones are outdoor areas and the in-situ fire load is low, there is reasonable assurance that if a fire occurred, the required post-fire safe shutdown equipment protected by the 25-minute fire barrier system would remain free of fire damage and that the fire would be automatically detected and adequately controlled and suppressed by the plant fire brigade. The staff has determined that licensee's proposal provides adequate protection, will not pose an undue risk to public health and safety, and that the underlying purpose of the rule is satisfied. Therefore, the staff finds the licensee's proposed exemption for this area to be acceptable.

Fire Zone 143—Unit 3 Emergency Diesel Generator Roof

The major safe shutdown equipment on the Unit 3 emergency diesel generator building roof consists of the emergency diesel generator exhaust silencers. The roof construction is concrete without an asphalt roof membrane. There are no in-situ combustibles located in this fire zone; therefore, intervening combustibles between redundant safe shutdown equipment is not a concern.

All post-fire safe shutdown equipment (e.g., components, power and control circuits, and power distribution circuits) located in this fire zone is separated from its redundant equipment by a horizontal distance of greater than 10 feet. The space between the equipment is free of fixed combustibles. Therefore, the licensee is relying on spacial separation in lieu of physical protection (e.g., raceway fire barriers) and has determined that the use of raceway fire barriers to assure that one train of required safe shutdown equipment remains free of fire damage is not required in this fire zone to provide reasonable assurance the equipment would be available. Since this fire zone is outdoors and there are no in-situ combustibles, there is reasonable assurance that any fire in this area would be small and that the required 10-foot separation of redundant safe shutdown trains would maintain one train free of fire damage until the fire burned itself out or was detected by plant personnel and controlled and suppressed by the plant fire brigade. The staff has determined that licensee's proposal provides adequate protection, will not pose an undue risk to public health and safety, and that the underlying purpose of the rule is satisfied. Therefore, the staff finds the licensee's proposed exemption for this area to be acceptable.

Generic Application of Alternative Physical and Spacial Separation Fire Protection Schemes

The licensee requested that the staff approve an exemption to use any of the following generic protection schemes in lieu of installing the 3-hour fire barriers required by Appendix R, Section III.G.2.a, in any outdoor fire zone (excluding the turbine building):

- Separation of cables and equipment and associated nonsafety circuits of redundant trains west of the open turbine building structure column line A by 1-hour rated fire barriers until a horizontal distance of 20 feet is attained.

- Separation of cables and equipment and associated nonsafety circuits of redundant trains by 25-minute rated fire barriers until a horizontal distance of 20 feet is attained.
- For roof top fire zones, separation of cables and equipment and associated nonsafety circuits of redundant trains by 25-minute rated fire barriers until a horizontal distance of 10 feet is attained.
- Separation of cables and equipment and associated nonsafety circuits of redundant trains by a radiant energy heat shield having an equivalent 30-minute fire rating until a horizontal distance of 20 feet is attained.

By letter dated October 31, 1997, the licensee submitted its technical bases for these protection schemes. In certain cases, the staff may find these schemes an acceptable alternative to the specific requirements of Section III.G of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50. However, in responding to the staff's request for additional information of June 16, 1997, and to the request made during the meeting between the NRC staff and the licensee on July 7, 1997, the licensee did not submit an analysis for each fire zone which identifies the post-fire safe shutdown equipment (e.g., components, power and control circuits, and power distribution circuits) in the zone, their relative safe shutdown importance, how the equipment is protected, including detailed evaluations of the fire hazards and the potential worst-case fires that may occur. Therefore, the staff cannot evaluate the generic acceptability of these schemes or whether the application of a specific protection scheme would provide reasonable assurance that one train of safe shutdown equipment (e.g., components, power and control circuits, and power distribution circuits) would be free of fire damage. Without a plant-specific fire-zone-by-fire-zone fire hazards analysis to support the use of these protection schemes on a case-by-case basis, the staff cannot assess the acceptability of these plant configurations and their ability to provide an adequate level of fire safety consistent with the underlying purpose of Section III.G of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50. However, additional information was recently submitted by the licensee and these remaining zones are being evaluated separately.

Conclusions

On the basis of its evaluation and review that included a site walkdown of the fire zones, the staff concludes the following:

For fire zone 47 (Unit 4 CCW) and fire zone 54 (Unit 3 CCW room), the use of a 25-minute fire rated electrical raceway fire barrier system in lieu of a 1-hour fire barrier system as required by Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR part 50 provides an adequate level of fire safety, poses no undue risk to public health and safety, meets the underlying purpose of the rule and is, therefore, acceptable.

For fire zone 113 (Unit 4 feedwater platform), fire zone 116 (Unit 3 feedwater platform), fire zone 119 (Unit 4 intake structure), and fire zone 120 (Unit 3 intake structure), the use of 25-minute fire barriers to separate cables and equipment andassociated nonsafety circuits of redundant trains until a horizontal distance of 20 feet free of intervening combustibles is attained provides an adequate level of fire safety, poses no undue risk to public health and safety, meets the underlying purpose of the rule and is, therefore, acceptable.

For fire zone 115 (Unit 3 main steam platform) and fire zone 114 (Unit 4 main steam platform), the use of 25-minute fire barriers to separate cables and equipment and associated nonsafety circuits of redundant trains until a horizontal distance of 20 feet free of intervening combustibles is attained provides an adequate level of fire safety, poses no undue risk to public health and safety, meets the underlying purpose of the rule and is, therefore, acceptable.

For fire zone 143 (Unit 3 emergency diesel generator roof) and fire zone 118 (control and auxiliary building roof), the use of 25-minute fire barriers to separate cables and equipment and associated nonsafety circuits of redundant trains until a horizontal distance of 10 feet free of intervening combustibles is attained provides an adequate level of fire safety, poses no undue risk to public health and safety, meets the underlying purpose of the rule and is, therefore, acceptable.

For fire zone 106R, based on the uncertain combustibility and indeterminate fire classification of the built-up asphalt roof design, with respect to the use of 25-minute fire barriers to separate cables and equipment and associated nonsafety circuits of redundant trains until a horizontal distance of 10 feet free of intervening combustibles is attained, the staff cannot determine if an adequate level of fire safety would be provided and the exemption request is, therefore, unacceptable. The licensee's request for exemption for this fire zone is denied.

Without a specific analysis for each fire zone which identifies the post-fire safe shutdown equipment (e.g., components, power and control circuits, and power distribution circuits) in the zone, their relative safe shutdown importance, and how the equipment is protected (including detailed evaluations of the fire hazards and the potential worst-case fires that may occur), the staff cannot evaluate the acceptability of the generic protection schemes or whether the application of a specific protection scheme provides the reasonable assurance needed to satisfy the underlying purpose of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR part 50. Therefore, the staff finds the generic applicability of these protection schemes to outdoor areas unacceptable at this time. However, additional information was recently submitted by the licensee and these remaining zones are being evaluated separately.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that granting this Exemption for fire zones 47, 54, 113, 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, 120, and 143 will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment (63 FR 8695).

Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common defense and security. In addition, special circumstances are present in that application of the regulation in these particular circumstances is not necessary to achieve underlying purpose of the rule which is to provide reasonable assurance that one safe shutdown train and its associated circuits used to achieve and maintain safe shutdown are free of fire damage. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants Florida Power and Light Company an exemption from the requirements of Section III.G.2.a of Appendix R to 10 CFR part 50, as requested in the submittal, for fire zones 47, 54, 113, 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, 120, and 143. This exemption is effective upon issuance. The exemption for fire zone 106R is denied. The exemption requested for the remaining fire zones is being evaluated separately.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 24th day of February 1998.

Samuel J. Collins,

Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

POST-FIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS—RACEWAY/CABLES AND COMPONENTS REQUIRING FIRE BARRIER PROTECTION

[Turkey Point Units 3 and 4]

Fire zone	System	Component ID	Protected raceway ID	Cable function
O/D 47	CCW	4P211B	4N1361	CCW pump control.
O/D 54	CCW	3P211B	3N1372	CCW pump control.
O/D 113 ...	AFW	CV–4–2816	4K369	AFW flow control valve control.
			4K323	
		CV–4–2817	4K379	
			4K265	
			4K612	
		CV–4–2818	4K614	
			4K389	
		CV–4–2831	4K1065	
			4K1244	
			PB4519	
			TB4835	
			4K1240	
			TB4835	
			4K1243	
			4K1407	
			4K1408	
		CV–4–2832	4K1240	
			4K1243	
			TB4835	
			4K1068	
			4K1244	
			PB4519	
			TB4835	
			4K1407	
			4K1409	
		CV–4–2833	4K1240	
			4K1243	
			TB4835	
			4K1066	
			4K1244	
			PB4519	
O/D 113 ...	AFW	CV–4–2833	TB4835	AFW flow control valve control.
			4K1407	
			4K1410	
O/D 116 ...	AFW	CV–3–2816	3K368	AFW flow control valve control.
			3K369	
		CV–3–2817	3K574	
			3K576	
			3K577	
		CV–3–2818	3K568	
			3K570	
			3K585	
O/D 114 ...	MSS	POV–4–2604B	4K1403	Main Steam isolation valve control.
			4K1514	
			4K1518	
		POV–4–2605B	4K1402	
			4K1515	
			4K1518	
		POV–4–2606B	4K1401	
			4K1517	
			4K1518	
O/D 115 ...	MSS	POV–3–2604B	3K1624	Main Steam isolation valve control.
			3K1841	
			3K1843	
			3K1845	
			PB3946	
			PB3947	
		POV–3–2605B	3K1624	
			3K1841	
			3K1843	
			3K1845	
			PB3946	
			PB3947	
			3K1623	
			3K1844	
		POV–3–2606B	3K1622	
			3K1841	
			3K1842	

POST-FIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS—RACEWAY/CABLES AND COMPONENTS REQUIRING FIRE BARRIER PROTECTION—Continued

[Turkey Point Units 3 and 4]

Fire zone	System	Component ID	Protected raceway ID	Cable function
			PB3946	
O/D 118 ...	HVAC	E16F	4J1195	DC/Inverter HVAC E16F Power.
O/D 119 ...	ICW	4P9B	4R067 4R077	ICW Pump 4P–9B Power.
O/D 120 ...	ICW	3P9B	3R067 3R077	ICW Pump 3P–9B Power.

[FR Doc. 98–5712 Filed 3–4–98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[IA 97–067]

In the Matter of Julian H. McGriff; Order Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed Activities; Effective Immediately

I

During the period of April 1996 through March 5, 1997, Julian H. McGriff was employed by Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC or licensee) at its Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant as an Emergency Preparedness Technician. SNC holds License Nos. NPF–2 and NPF–8 for Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50 on June 25, 1977, and March 31, 1981, respectively. The licenses authorize SNC to operate the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP or licensee) Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the conditions specified therein.

II

During an audit conducted by the licensee for the period November 25, 1996, through February 19, 1997, an inconsistency was identified relating to the documentation associated with the monthly check of a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) on the 83 foot elevation of the FNP Unit 2 Auxiliary Building. The monthly check was required by Procedure FNP–0–EIP 16, Emergency Equipment and Supplies, Revision 31. Subsequently, the licensee performed a more in-depth investigation and determined that a December 17, 1996 inspection, documented by Mr. Julian H. McGriff, had not been conducted. The licensee identified approximately 36 additional discrepancies in the documentation associated with Mr. McGriff's inspections of emergency equipment. Specifically, the licensee identified instances where inventory checklists were completed on dates different from the date the inspections were actually conducted, the deliberate misdating of checklists, and the completion of checklists for inspections never conducted. Mr. McGriff was terminated from employment with SNC on March 5, 1997.

On June 30, 1997, the NRC Office of Investigations (OI) completed an investigation of the alleged falsification of emergency preparedness checklists by Mr. McGriff. OI, in Report No. 2–97–005, concluded that during the period April 1996 through January 1997, Mr. McGriff failed to conduct at least three required inspections and deliberately falsified at least four checklists. The finding was based on the fact that inventory checklist documentation did not coincide with plant access records for Mr. McGriff, which indicated that entries were not made into the documented areas on the dates indicated on the checklists. Specifically, based on plant access data, the following checklist entries were falsified: (1) a December 17, 1996, entry for an inspection of the SCBA on the 83 foot elevation of the FNP Unit 2 Auxiliary Building that was documented but not performed; (2) a July 12, 1996, entry for an inspection of the SCBA in the Diesel Generator Building that was not performed; (3) an entry for an inspection of emergency supplies located in the Auxiliary Building that was intentionally documented as being performed on September 4, 1996, due to admonitions from Mr. McGriff's supervisor regarding the timeliness of inventory checks, when it was actually performed on September 30, 1996; and (4) a September 30, 1996, entry for an inspection of SCBAs in the Diesel Generator Building that was never performed. Numerous other instances where documentation did not coincide with plant access records for Mr. McGriff were also identified.

FNP Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1.e requires that written procedures be established and implemented for Emergency Plan implementation. Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure FNP–0–EIP–16.0, Emergency Equipment and Supplies, Revision 31 requires periodic inventory verification of emergency equipment and supplies. Records associated with FNP–0–EIP–016, a safety related procedure at Farley, are required to be maintained in accordance with Section 17.2 of the licensee's 10 CFR Appendix B required Quality Assurance Operations Manual, Revision 32. The checklists, that are to be completed pursuant to FNP–0–EIP–016, are required to be maintained for the lifetime of the plant in accordance with Section 8.7 of licensee procedure FNP–0–AP–4, Control of Plant Records, Revision 18. FNP–0–AP–4 implements item 1.h of Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.33, dated 1978, and is required to be established, implemented and maintained in accordance with TS 6.8.1.a. The failure to perform the emergency equipment inventories as prescribed by FNP procedures is a violation of TS 6.8.1.e. In addition, 10 CFR 50.9(a) states, in part, that information required by the Commission's regulations to be maintained by the licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects. The failure of SNC to maintain complete and accurate records of emergency equipment inspections due to Mr. McGriff's falsification of inventory checklists is a violation of 10 CFR 50.9(a). The inaccuracy of these records is material because the licensee and the NRC relied upon them to determine the availability and status of emergency equipment.

On August 22, 1997, the NRC sent a letter to Mr. McGriff advising him that his actions appeared to be in violation of 10 CFR 50.5, ''Deliberate Misconduct.'' 10 CFR 50.5, in part, prohibits an employee of a licensee from (1) engaging in deliberate misconduct that causes a licensee to be in violation of any rule or regulation or license