

helicopters that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must use the authority provided in paragraph (b) to request approval from the FAA. This approval may address either no action, if the current configuration eliminates the unsafe condition, or different actions necessary to address the unsafe condition described in this AD. Such a request should include an assessment of the effect of the changed configuration on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD. In no case does the presence of any modification, alteration, or repair remove any helicopter from the applicability of this AD.

**Compliance:** Required within 25 hours time-in-service (TIS) after the effective date of this AD, unless accomplished previously.

To prevent failure of a vibration absorber weight support assembly, which could lead to adverse vibrations, contact between the fuselage and a main rotor blade or loss of a main rotor blade; and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter, accomplish the following:

(a) Convert the vibration absorbers, P/N 332A11-0460-01 into P/N 332A11-0460-02 by replacing the weight support assemblies, P/N 332A11-0470-00, with weight support assemblies, P/N 332A11-0474-00, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Eurocopter France Service Bulletin No. 62.00.43, dated February 13, 1997.

(b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Rotorcraft Standards Staff, Rotorcraft Directorate, FAA. Operators shall submit their requests through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Rotorcraft Standards Staff.

**Note 2:** Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Rotorcraft Standards Staff.

(c) Special flight permits will not be issued.

(d) The modification shall be done in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Eurocopter France Service Bulletin No. 62.00.43, dated February 13, 1997. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from American Eurocopter Corporation, 2701 Forum Drive, Grand Prairie, Texas 75053-4005, telephone (972) 641-3460, fax (972) 641-3527. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663, Fort Worth, Texas; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

(e) This amendment becomes effective on March 12, 1998.

**Note 3:** The subject of this AD is addressed in Direction De L'Aviation Civile (France) AD 97-026-005(B) R2, dated March 12, 1997.

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on February 13, 1998.

**Eric Bries,**

*Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate,  
Aircraft Certification Service.*

[FR Doc. 98-4409 Filed 2-24-98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-U

## DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

### Federal Aviation Administration

#### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 98-ANE-04-AD; Amendment 39-10351; AD 98-04-39]

RIN 2120-AA64

#### Airworthiness Directives; Pratt & Whitney JT8D Series Turbofan Engines

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

**ACTION:** Final rule; request for comments.

**SUMMARY:** This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to Pratt & Whitney (PW) JT8D series turbofan engines. This action requires a one-time borescope inspection of the combustion chamber outer case (CCOC) for cracks on engines identified by serial number that were ultrasonically inspected in accordance with AD 96-23-14 with defective probes. In addition, this AD requires an ultrasonic probe functional check at PW prior to using the probe to perform an ultrasonic inspection if the probe was overhauled, repaired, or otherwise altered since original manufacture and not subsequently functionally checked by PW. This amendment is prompted by reports of defective probes discovered in the field. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent uncontained engine failure, inflight engine shutdown, engine cowl release, and airframe damage.

**DATES:** Effective February 25, 1998.

The incorporation by reference of Pratt & Whitney Alert Service Bulletin No. A6202, Revision 1, dated January 4, 1996, as listed in the regulations, was approved previously by the Director of the Federal Register as of January 2, 1997 (61 FR 63707, December 2, 1996). Comments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or before April 27, 1998.

**ADDRESSES:** Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), New England Region, Office of the Regional Counsel, Attention: Rules Docket No. 98-ANE-04-AD, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803-5299. Comments

may also be sent via the Internet using the following address: "9-ad-engineprop@faa.dot.gov". Comments sent via the Internet must contain the docket number in the subject line.

The service information referenced in this AD may be obtained from Pratt & Whitney, 400 Main St., East Hartford, CT 06108; telephone (860) 565-6600, fax (860) 565-4503. This information may be examined at the FAA, New England Region, Office of the Regional Counsel, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Christopher Spinney, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803-5299; telephone (781) 238-7175, fax (781) 238-7199.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:** On November 7, 1996, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued airworthiness directive (AD) 96-23-14, Amendment 39-9820 (61 FR 63707, December 2, 1996), which supersedes ADs 87-11-07 R1 and 95-08-15, to require repetitive eddy current, fluorescent penetrant, fluorescent magnetic particle, or visual inspections for cracks in the rear flange, and ultrasonic, fluorescent penetrant, or fluorescent magnetic particle inspections for cracks in the PS4 boss, and drain bosses of the combustion chamber outer case (CCOC); and an additional inspection of the CCOC rear flange for intergranular cracking. In addition, AD 96-23-14 reduces the rear flange inspection interval for CCOCs when only the aft face of the rear flange has been inspected, and introduces an improved ultrasonic probe assembly. Also, AD 96-23-14 introduces a rotating eddy current probe for shop inspections in which the case is removed from the engine. Finally, AD 96-23-14 eliminates fluorescent penetrant inspection (FPI), fluorescent magnetic particle inspection (FMPI), and visual inspections from hot section disassembly level inspection procedures. That action was prompted by reports of crack origins in the forward face of the rear flange that could not be detected by the inspection methods for installed CCOCs that were mandated in the superseded ADs 87-11-07 R1 and 95-08-15. That condition, if not corrected, could result in uncontained engine failure, inflight engine shutdown, engine cowl release, and airframe damage.

Since the issuance of AD 96-23-14, the FAA has received reports of 13

defective ultrasonic inspection probes used to accomplish the ultrasonic inspections required by AD 96-23-14. Those 13 defective probes have been identified and removed from the field, but the engines inspected with the defective probes must be reinspected. Other ultrasonic inspection probes were either overhauled, repaired, or otherwise altered since original manufacture and were not subsequently functionally checked to insure that they met the necessary inspection sensitivity requirements. The calibration check contained in the ultrasonic inspection procedure does not serve as an adequate check to insure that the probe meets inspection sensitivity requirements. Currently, only PW has the capability to perform the necessary functional check to the proper standard.

The FAA has reviewed and approved the technical contents of PW Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) No. A6202, Revision 1, dated January 4, 1996, that describes procedures for a borescope inspection of the CCOC rear flange for cracks. This ASB identifies applicability to engines installed on McDonnell Douglas DC-9 and Boeing 737 series engines only; however, the inspection requirements of paragraph 2.A.(5) of PW ASB No. A6202, Revision 1, dated January 4, 1996, are applicable to engines installed on Boeing 727 series aircraft as well.

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop on other engines of the same type design, this AD is being issued to prevent an uncontained engine failure. This AD requires a borescope inspection of engines, identified by serial number (S/N) that were ultrasonically inspected in accordance with AD 96-23-14 with defective probes. In addition, this AD requires a functional check at PW of all ultrasonic inspection probes that were overhauled, repaired, or otherwise altered since original manufacture and not subsequently functionally checked. The borescope inspection is required to be accomplished in accordance with the ASB described previously.

Since a situation exists that requires the immediate adoption of this regulation, it is found that notice and opportunity for prior public comment hereon are impracticable, and that good cause exists for making this amendment effective in less than 30 days.

#### Comments Invited

Although this action is in the form of a final rule that involves requirements affecting flight safety and, thus, was not preceded by notice and an opportunity for public comment, comments are invited on this rule. Interested persons

are invited to comment on this rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire.

Communications should identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified under the caption **ADDRESSES**. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments will be considered, and this rule may be amended in light of the comments received. Factual information that supports the commenter's ideas and suggestions is extremely helpful in evaluating the effectiveness of the AD action and determining whether additional rulemaking action would be needed.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the rule that might suggest a need to modify the rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report that summarizes each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this AD will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this notice must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: "Comments to Docket Number 98-ANE-04-AD." The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

The regulations adopted herein will not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

The FAA has determined that this regulation is an emergency regulation that must be issued immediately to correct an unsafe condition in aircraft, and is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866. It has been determined further that this action involves an emergency regulation under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979). If it is determined that this emergency regulation otherwise would be significant under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures, a final regulatory evaluation will be prepared and placed in the Rules Docket. A copy of it, if filed, may be obtained from the

Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption **ADDRESSES**.

#### List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

#### Adoption of the Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

#### PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

**Authority:** 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

#### § 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new airworthiness directive:

**98-04-39 Pratt & Whitney:** Amendment 39-10351. Docket 98-ANE-04-AD.

*Applicability:* Pratt & Whitney (PW) JT8D-1, -1A, -1B, -7, -7A, -7B, -9, -9A, -11, -15, -15A, -17, -17A, -17R, and -17AR turbofan engines, with combustion chamber outer case (CCOC) part numbers (P/Ns) 490547, 542155, 616315, 728829, 728829-001, 730413, 730413-001, 730414, 730414-001, 767197, 767279, 767279-001 installed. These engines are installed on but not limited to Boeing 737 and 727 series, and McDonnell Douglas DC-9 series aircraft.

**NOTE 1:** This airworthiness directive (AD) applies to each engine identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For engines that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (c) of this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it.

*Compliance:* Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.

To prevent uncontained engine failure, inflight engine shutdown, engine cowl release, and airframe damage, accomplish the following:

(a) For engines identified by serial number (S/N) in Table 1 of this AD, perform a one-time borescope inspection of the CCOC rear flange in accordance with paragraph 2.A.(5) of PW Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) No. A6202, Revision 1, dated January 4, 1996, as follows:

TABLE 1

648796	653799	655969	665370	674333	695297	702602
648859	653876	655987	665372	674370	696555	702648
649077	653904	656036	665382	674513	696573	702699
649135	654043	656084	665393	674564	696645	702712
649157	654115	656121	665520	674580	696668	702772
649212	654428	656948	665529	674611	696757	707158
649262	654557	656964	665744	687407	700037	707200
649331	654804	657064	665992	687457	700053	707405
649354	654860	657119	666004	687634	700103	707922
649406	654877	657386	666019	687851	700140	708332
649451	654915	657418	666076	687891	700145	708921
649675	654949	657584	666331	687893	700156	709002
653316	654986	657613	666682	688029	700223	709168
653329	655108	657677	666715	688051	700243	709209
653363	655310	657739	666948	688054	700248	
653495	655437	665410	667042	688103	700261	
653514	655821	665412	667045	688161	700334	
653545	655842	665461	667059	688470	700383	
653574	655857	665468	667068	688491	700398	
653609	655870	665489	667110	688499	700404	
653622	655898	665497	674193	689934	700665	
653789	655900	665364	674251	695290	700133	

(1) For engines installed on McDonnell Douglas DC-9 series aircraft, inspect within 1,000 cycles in service (CIS) since the last ultrasonic inspection of the CCOC rear flange performed in accordance with AD 96-23-14, or within 100 CIS after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later.

(2) For engines installed on Boeing 737 series aircraft, inspect within 1,500 CIS since the last ultrasonic inspection of the CCOC rear flange performed in accordance with AD 96-23-14, or within 100 CIS after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later.

(3) For engines installed on Boeing 727 series aircraft, inspect within 2,500 CIS since the last ultrasonic inspection of the CCOC rear flange performed in accordance with AD 96-23-14, or within 100 CIS after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later.

(b) If the ultrasonic probe assembly, PWA 47942, used to inspect the CCOC rear flange in accordance with AD 96-23-14 was overhauled, repaired, or otherwise altered since original manufacture and not subsequently functionally checked at PW, within 30 days after the effective date of this AD return ultrasonic probes to PW to perform a functional check of the ultrasonic probe assembly.

**Note 2:** Operators should note that future inspections performed using the probe must be performed with a probe that has passed a functional check at PW since overhaul, repair, or alteration.

(1) If the ultrasonic probe assembly does not pass the functional check, PW must inform the operator, within 24 hours after the probe fails the functional check.

(2) If the ultrasonic probe assembly does not pass the functional check at PW, all engines that were ultrasonically inspected with that probe in accordance with AD 96-23-14 must be borescope inspected in accordance with paragraph 2.A.(5) of PW ASB No. A6202, Revision 1, dated January 4, 1996. Perform the inspections as follows:

(i) For engines installed on McDonnell Douglas DC-9 series aircraft, inspect within 1,000 cycles in service (CIS) since the last ultrasonic inspection of the CCOC rear flange performed in accordance with AD 96-23-14, or within 100 CIS after determining the probe is defective, whichever occurs later.

(ii) For engines installed on Boeing 737 series aircraft, inspect within 1,500 CIS since the last ultrasonic inspection of the CCOC rear flange performed in accordance with AD 96-23-14, or within 100 CIS after determining the probe is defective, whichever occurs later.

(iii) For engines installed on Boeing 727 series aircraft, inspect within 2,500 CIS since the last ultrasonic inspection of the CCOC rear flange performed in accordance with AD 96-23-14, or within 100 CIS after determining the probe is defective, whichever occurs later.

(c) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Engine Certification Office. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Engine Certification Office.

**Note 3:** Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this airworthiness directive, if any, may be obtained from the Engine Certification Office.

(d) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the aircraft to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

(e) The actions required by this AD shall be done in accordance with the following PW ASB:

Document No.	Pages	Revision	Date
A6202 .....	1-10	1 .....	Jan. 4, 1996.
	11	Original .....	Feb. 20, 1995.
NDIP-835 .....	1-17	A .....	Oct. 7, 1995.
Total pages: 28.			

This incorporation by reference of Pratt & Whitney Alert Service Bulletin No. A6202, Revision 1, dated January 4, 1996, was approved previously by the Director of the Federal Register as of January 2, 1997 (61 FR 63707, December 2, 1996). Copies may be

obtained from Pratt & Whitney, 400 Main St., East Hartford, CT 06108; telephone (860) 565-6600, fax (860) 565-4503. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, New England Region, Office of the Regional Counsel, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA; or

at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

(f) This amendment becomes effective on February 25, 1998.

Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on February 11, 1998.

**James C. Jones,**

*Assistant Manager, Engine and Propeller Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.*  
[FR Doc. 98-4408 Filed 2-24-98; 8:45 am]  
BILLING CODE 4910-13-U

## DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

### Federal Aviation Administration

#### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 98-NM-04-AD; Amendment 39-10362; AD 98-02-51]

RIN 2120-AA64

#### Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 737-300, -400, and -500 Series Airplanes

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

**ACTION:** Final rule; request for comments.

**SUMMARY:** This document publishes in the **Federal Register** an amendment adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD) 98-02-51 that was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of Boeing Model 737-300, -400, and -500 series airplanes by individual telegrams. This AD requires a one-time general visual inspection to detect any missing fasteners on the top and bottom of the leading edge skin where it attaches to the front spar of the horizontal stabilizer. This AD also requires a one-time detailed visual inspection to detect any loose or missing fasteners of the attachment of the elevator hinge plates to the horizontal stabilizer rear spar fittings. If a loose or missing fastener is detected, this AD requires installation of a new or serviceable fastener. This action is prompted by reports of loose or missing fasteners of the leading edge structure and elevator attachment fitting of the right-hand horizontal stabilizer. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent reduced structural integrity of the horizontal stabilizer due to loose or missing fasteners.

**DATES:** Effective March 2, 1998, to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by telegraphic AD T98-02-51, issued on January 8, 1998, which contained the requirements of this amendment.

Comments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or before April 27, 1998.

**ADDRESSES:** Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-114,

Attention: Rules Docket No. 98-NM-04-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Gregory L. Schneider, Aerospace Engineer, Airframe Branch, ANM-120S, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone (425) 227-2028 or (425) 227-2557; fax (425) 227-1181.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:** On January 8, 1998, the FAA issued telegraphic AD T98-02-51, which is applicable to Boeing Model 737-300, -400, and -500 series airplanes.

On December 9, 1997, a Boeing Model 737-300 series airplane operated by Silkair Airlines was involved in an accident after takeoff from Jakarta Soekarno Hatta Airport in Jakarta, Indonesia. The accident is under investigation by the Indonesian authorities with assistance from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) of the United States, the manufacturer, the operator, and other aviation organizations. Although there has been no determination of the cause of the accident, preliminary reports from the on-site accident investigation indicate that the horizontal stabilizer may have separated from the airplane prior to impact in the Musi River. On-site investigation has revealed that approximately 26 fasteners were missing from certain leading edge structure on the right-hand (RH) horizontal stabilizer (12 from the upper surface, and 14 from the lower surface). Additionally, early reports indicated that at least one fastener may have been missing from an elevator attachment fitting in an outboard section of the RH horizontal stabilizer.

Subsequently, there has been a report of evidence that the fastener was actually installed. However, the FAA has received a report that an operator found one loose fastener during inspection of an in-service airplane. (There have been no reports to date of any fasteners missing from the left-hand (LH) horizontal stabilizer.)

There is, as of yet, no evidence linking these missing or loose fasteners to the cause of the accident.

Loose or missing fasteners on the LH or RH horizontal stabilizer could reduce the structural integrity of the horizontal stabilizer.

Because the airplane had been placed in service a relatively short time ago (February 14, 1997), it is possible that the fasteners were missing because they had not been installed during manufacture. If such a quality control

failure occurred on this airplane, it may also have occurred on others produced at approximately the same time.

#### Explanation of Requirements of the Rule

Since the unsafe condition described is likely to exist or develop on other airplanes of the same type design, the FAA issued telegraphic AD T98-02-51 to require a one-time general visual inspection to detect any missing fasteners on the top and bottom of the leading edge skin where it attaches to the front spar of the horizontal stabilizer.

This AD also requires a one-time detailed visual inspection to detect any loose or missing fasteners of the attachment of the elevator hinge plates to the horizontal stabilizer rear spar fittings. If a loose or missing fastener is detected, this AD requires installation of a new or serviceable fastener.

In addition, this AD requires that operators submit a report of all inspection findings to the FAA. Since the cause of the missing fasteners of the LH and RH horizontal stabilizer is currently unknown, the intent of the required reports is to enable the FAA to determine how widespread such discrepancies may be in the affected fleet. Because the investigation is continuing, further action may be necessary. This is considered to be interim action until final action is identified, at which time the FAA may consider further rulemaking.

#### Publication and Effectivity of AD

Since it was found that immediate corrective action was required, notice and opportunity for prior public comment thereon were impracticable and contrary to the public interest, and good cause existed to make the AD effective immediately by individual telegrams issued on January 8, 1998, to all known U.S. owners and operators of certain Boeing Model 737-300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. These conditions still exist, and the AD is hereby published in the **Federal Register** as an amendment to section 39.13 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 39.13) to make it effective to all persons.

#### Comments Invited

Although this action is in the form of a final rule that involves requirements affecting flight safety and, thus, was not preceded by notice and an opportunity for public comment, comments are invited on this rule. Interested persons are invited to comment on this rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire.