[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 27 (Tuesday, February 10, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 6783-6784]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-3272]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-317 and 50-318]


Baltimore Gas & Electric Company (Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power 
Plant, Units 1 and 2); Exemption

I

    The Baltimore Gas & Electric Company (BGE or the licensee) is the 
holder of Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-53 and DPR-69, which 
authorize operation of the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 
and 2 (the facilities), respectively. The license provides, among other 
things, that the facilities are subject to all rules, regulations, and 
orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the 
Commission) now or hereafter in effect.
    The facilities are pressurized-water reactors located at the 
licensee's site in Calvert County, Maryland.
    The licensee is implementing an upgrade to the existing Calvert 
Cliffs Unit 1 emergency diesel generator (EDG) 1B during the upcoming 
Unit 1 refueling outage (RFO-14). RFO-14 is scheduled to commence on 
April 3, 1998, and is expected to be completed in early June 1998. To 
support the upgrade, the licensee has identified one temporary 
exemption required at this time. The exemption is specified below.

II

    The Code of Federal Regulations at 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, 
General Criterion 2 (GDC-2) requires that structures, systems, and 
components important to safety be designed to withstand the effects of 
natural phenomena, such as tornadoes, without the loss of capability to 
perform their safety functions.
    The licensee has requested the temporary exemption from GDC-2 
because of the planned upgrade of the Unit 1 EDG 1B. The effort will 
require temporary removal of two steel doors, which will expose the 
out-of-service Unit 1 EDG 1B and the operating Unit 2 EDGs 2A and 2B, 
as well as the support systems for the out-of-service Unit 1 EDG 1B and 
the operating Unit 2 EDGs 2A and 2B. Unit 2 EDGs 2A and 2B must be 
operable to support the operation of Unit 2. These EDGs require 
protection from the effects of missiles, generated by natural 
phenomena.
    The licensee indicates that the steel missile doors will be removed 
four times during RFO-14; only one door will be removed at a time. The 
licensee estimates that each of the missile door removals will take 
less than 24 hours, which will result in a total removal time of about 
100 hours during the scheduled 60-day outage.
    The licensee is providing compensatory action to ensure the safe 
operation of Unit 2, for the short periods that the steel missile doors 
will be removed. To cover all severe weather conditions, as defined in 
the plant site Emergency Response Plan Implementing Procedures 3.0, 
Attachment 17, a concerted effort will be made to reinstall the missile 
doors if a tornado or a hurricane watch is issued or if sustained winds 
are predicted to be greater than 50 miles an hour at the site. When the 
missile shield is removed, it is left connected to the crane used to 
remove it. A crane operator remains at the crane controls during the 
time the missile shield is removed. In addition to

[[Page 6784]]

the crane operator, three people are used to handle the movement of the 
shield and fasten it in place. These people are drawn from the crew 
working on the diesel upgrade since the shield is removed only when 
they are working in the area. The time required to reinstall the 
missile shield is approximately 1 hour and 15 minutes. This time 
includes 30 minutes to 45 minutes to move and position the shield, and 
30 minutes to completely torque a minimum of 13 bolts to hold it in 
place. The installation time is considered sufficient since plant 
procedures require that the missile shield be reinstalled on an adverse 
weather watch, rather than waiting until a warning is issued. The only 
factor that would impede the reinstallation of the missile doors would 
be the safety of the individuals performing the reinstallation. The 
licensee has also stated that the missile doors between the EDG 1B room 
and the EDG 2A room is a fire barrier but not a flood barrier. The fire 
barrier will be breached when the door is removed to pass EDG parts 
through. Plant procedures require a fire watch if any fire barrier is 
to remain open. The procedures will be followed from the time the door 
is removed until it is replaced.
    Considering the existing design features and the compensatory 
measures proposed by the licensee, the likelihood of damage to the 
exposed EDGs and the support systems from postulated missiles generated 
by natural phenomena is minimal for the short periods that the 
protective doors will be removed. Also, on the basis of the 
compensatory measure provided, reasonable assurance exists that the 
ability to reinstall the missile doors will be maintained during any 
severe weather that could result in airborne missiles. Therefore, there 
is reasonable assurance that the proposed GDC-2 exemption will present 
no undue risk to public health and safety.

III

    The Commission has determined, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a), that 
special circumstances, as set forth in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(v), exist. 
The exemption would provide only temporary relief from the applicable 
regulation (GDC-2). The exemption is requested for a specific period, 
after which the facility would again be in conformance with all the 
requirements of GDC-2. The licensee has made good faith efforts in 
considering alternatives to the exemption request and has concluded 
that without the subject exemption, the EDG upgrade can only be 
conducted when both units are shut down.
    On the basis of this information and review of the licensee's 
submittal, as summarized in the Safety Evaluation, the NRC staff 
concludes that the likelihood of unacceptable damage to the exposed 
portions of the operable EDGs and support systems as a result of 
weather-induced missiles during short-duration exposures in the 
exemption period is low.
    On the basis of the low probability of the occurrence of 
unacceptable events, coupled with the compensatory measure to which the 
licensee has committed, the NRC staff finds the proposed exemption from 
GDC-2 to be acceptable.

IV

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.12, the subject exemption is authorized by law, will not present an 
undue risk to public health and safety, and is consistent with the 
common defense and security. The Commission further determines that 
special circumstances, as provided in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(v), are 
present that justify the exemption; namely, that the exemption would 
provide only temporary relief from the applicable regulations and that 
the licensee has made good faith efforts to comply with the 
regulations.
    Therefore, the Commission hereby approves the following exemption: 
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, may operate without 
conforming to the requirements of GDC-2 as they apply to the exposed 
portions of the Unit 2 EDGs 2A and 2B and the support systems for the 
EDGs, providing that the compensatory measure, as described herein, is 
in place for the period of the exemption.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that 
granting the above exemption will have no significant impact on the 
quality of the human environment (62 FR 114).
    The subject Unit No. 1 EDG 1B upgrade GDC-2 exemption is effective 
from the date of issuance through July 31, 1998.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day of February 1998.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Collins,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 98-3272 Filed 2-9-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P