[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 25 (Friday, February 6, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 6237-6239]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-2994]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Event Reporting Guidelines; Availability of Report

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Notice of availability.

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SUMMARY: The NRC is announcing the availability of a report, NUREG-
1022, Revision 1, ``Event Reporting Guidelines, 10 CFR 50.72 and 
50.73.''

ADDRESSES: NUREG-series documents are available for inspection at the 
Commission's Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW., Washington, DC. 
NUREG-series documents may be purchased from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, P.O. Box 37082, Washington, 
DC 20402-9328.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dennis Allison, Office for Analysis 
and Evaluation of Operational Data, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, Telephone (301) 415-6835, e-mail [email protected]

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The purpose of this report is to help ensure 
that events are reported as required by improving the guidelines for 
implementing 10 CFR 50.72, ``Immediate notification requirements for 
operating nuclear power reactors,'' and 10 CFR 50.73, ``Licensee event 
report system,'' including consolidation of the guidelines into a 
single reference document. NUREG-1022, Revision 1 supersedes NUREG-1022 
and its Supplements 1 and 2.

Previous Draft and Comment

    The availability of the second draft report for public comment was 
announced on February 7, 1994 (59 FR 5614). The comment period expired 
April 5, 1994. Eighteen comment letters were received, representing 
comments from fourteen nuclear power plant licensees (utilities), three 
organizations of utilities, and one individual. A list is provided 
below. All the comment letters provided specific recommendations for 
changes to the report. Seven letters indicated general support, at 
least to the extent of indicating that a document which satisfies the 
mutual goals of the NRC and its licensees was within reach. Two letters 
appeared to indicate general disapproval. The resolution of comments is 
summarized below. This summary addresses the principal comments (i.e., 
those that are not minor, editorial, or supportive in nature).
    Comment: Two comment letters appeared to express general 
disapproval. One commentor indicated that, although there were some 
significant improvements over the existing reporting guidance, 
significant issues remained in the report that would very likely result 
in an increase in reporting burden with little or no gain in safety. 
Four specific examples were cited: (1) The voluntary reporting guidance 
in the Foreword, Sections 2.5 and 3.3.2, (2) an example of relief valve 
testing in Section 2.7, (3) the need to report as ``outside the design 
basis'' when a system is found to lack suitable redundancy as discussed 
in Section 3.2.4, and (4) an example of inadvertent opening of a high 
pressure to low pressure isolation valve in Section 3.2.4. Another 
commentor indicated that the guidance would expand the reporting 
requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 without appropriate rulemaking or backfit 
analysis. The comment emphasized two particular items: (1) The need to 
report non-redundant emergency assessment equipment out of service 
after 8 hours as discussed in Section 3.2.7 and (2) the guidance and 
rationale related to voluntary reporting in Section 5.1.5.
    Response: The NRC staff has considered the guidance and the 
comments and modified the guidance where appropriate. After these 
modifications the NRC staff concludes that the guidance properly 
interprets the requirements of the current rules and is, therefore, 
appropriate.
    With regard to burden, the staff has reviewed the guidance which is 
new or different in a meaningful way from previously published generic 
guidance (i.e., NUREG-1022 and its Supplements 1 and 2 and generic 
correspondence such as generic letters and information notices). Such 
new or different guidance is marked by redlining in Revision 1. In most 
cases the new or different guidance is expected to result in the same 
number of reported events, or fewer reported events. Where there is an 
expected increase in the number of reported events, the number is 
small. On balance, the net effect is expected to be a modest reduction 
in the number of reported events.
    Responses to the specific issues cited above are included in the 
discussions below.
    Comment: Several comment letters objected to guidance in the 
Foreword and Sections 2.5 and 3.3.2 which requested voluntary reporting 
in certain circumstances for events that result in actuation of the 
systems listed in Table 2. The comments indicated that discussion of 
voluntary reporting in NUREG-1022 was not appropriate and would lead to 
enforcement problems.
    Response: The Foreword has been deleted. Sections 2.5 and 3.3.2 
have been revised and no longer call for voluntary reporting. They 
indicate that the reporting criterion is based on the premise that 
engineered safety features (ESFs) are provided to mitigate the 
consequences of a significant event, and the NRC staff considers the 
systems listed in Table 2 to be a reasonable interpretation of what 
constitutes systems provided to mitigate the consequences of a 
significant event.
    Comment: Several comment letters objected to the discussion of 
relief valve testing in Section 2.7. The comments included the 
following: (1) The entire discussion should be deleted, (2) the 
discussion characterized relief valves with set points outside of 
technical specification (T.S.) limits as being inoperable although they 
were still capable of performing their safety functions, and (3) the 
example should simply be characterized as a condition or operation 
prohibited by the plant's T.S.
    Response: The discussion of relief valve testing has been deleted 
from Section 2.7. The specific example of multiple relief valves with 
set points outside of T.S. limits has been moved to Section 3.2.2 and 
characterized as a condition or operation prohibited by the plant's 
T.S.
    Comment: Some comment letters recommended that the definition of 
``discovery date'' in Section 2.11, which starts the 30-day 
reportability clock for licensee event reports (LERs), be revised to 
allow for appropriate management and/or engineering review. One 
suggested definition, for example, was ``The discovery date is when 
someone in the plant recognizes that a reportable event has occurred or 
it is determined that an existing condition is reportable.''
    Response: The NRC staff continues to conclude that the current 
guidance, which has been in use since 1984, is appropriate. Allowing 
additional time

[[Page 6238]]

for management and/or engineering review in the definition of discovery 
date could lead to open ended due dates for reporting.
    Comment: Several comment letters objected to the guidance in 
Section 3.2.4 which indicates that lack of suitable redundancy means 
the nuclear power plant is in a condition outside of its design basis. 
The comments indicate that this guidance will call for one-hour 
telephone notification (as a condition outside design basis) for events 
that are currently reported via LER only (as a condition prohibited by 
T.S.).
    Response: The NRC staff continues to conclude that a plant 
operating for an extended period of time without suitable redundancy in 
its emergency core cooling system (ECCS), for example, is operating 
outside the design basis of the plant, as defined in 10 CFR 50.2 and 
described in the Final Safety Analysis Report.
    Comment: Two comment letters suggested that the plant being in a 
condition outside of its design basis should be applied at the plant 
level. It was suggested that this would mean determining whether the 
plant remained within the design bases of its principal barriers. The 
specific safety function (design bases) of each principal barrier would 
be limiting the release of radioactive material. Typical controlling 
parameters (design bases) would be quantities such as offsite dose, 
fuel clad temperature, fuel clad oxidation, hydrogen generation, core 
geometry, primary containment integrity and reactor coolant pressure 
boundary integrity.
    Response: The NRC staff has deferred issuance of any new or 
different guidance, beyond the definition of ``design bases'' provided 
in Sec. 50.2, pending consideration of rulemaking to clarify the extent 
of reporting required.
    Comment: Some comment letters suggested adding guidance on the use 
of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) determinations to define or to 
bound the intent of the terms ``seriously degraded'' and 
``significantly compromised.''
    Response: Providing guidance on PRA as a tool to quantify plant 
risk for the purpose of making reportability decisions is beyond the 
scope of this report. Modification of event reporting requirements to 
make them more risk-informed has been identified as a future rulemaking 
initiative.
    Comment: Some comment letters objected to the example of reporting 
the loss of part of a normal barrier between the reactor coolant system 
and the environment, for example, when one of the Event V isolation 
valves is inadvertently opened. The comments indicated that the 
discussion was too broad and should be deleted. They also indicated 
that loss of a single isolation valve and not the isolation function 
would not result in the plant being ``seriously degraded.''
    Response: The example has been deleted.
    Comment: Two comment letters objected to the statement in Section 
3.2.7 that the unavailability of one non-redundant emergency assessment 
system would become reportable after 8 hours as a ``major loss of 
emergency assessment capability.'' The comments indicated that the 8-
hour standard would be inconsistent with the allowed remedial action 
times in the plant's T.S.
    Response: The 8-hour standard has been deleted.
    Comment: One comment letter objected to the need to report starting 
of a charging pump in response to ``rapidly decreasing pressurizer 
level'' associated with a reactor coolant system leak, as discussed in 
Section 3.3.2. The comment stated that this appears to be a case of 
component level reporting that adds confusion to the guidance.
    Response: The example has been retained. It shows that actuation of 
a component of an ESF should be reported if the ESF is needed to 
mitigate the consequences of the event, consistent with the statements 
of considerations for 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73.
    Comment: One comment letter objected to the statement in Section 
5.1.5 that encourages the use of voluntary LERs, rather than 
information letters for example, for the purpose of voluntary 
reporting.
    Response: The NRC staff continues to conclude that the current 
guidance, which has been in use since 1984, is appropriate. Voluntary 
reporting, and thus the format chosen, is non-mandatory. Use of the LER 
format will facilitate distribution of the information as well as entry 
into computerized data bases.

List of Comment Letters

1. John L. Crooks, letter dated 2/23/94
2. A.C. Passwater, Union Electric Company, letter dated 3/22/94
3. Burton A. Grabo, Arizona Public Service Company, letter dated 3/31/
94
4. Thomas E. Tipton, Nuclear Energy Institute, letter dated 4/5/94
5. Daniel F. Stenger, William A. Horin, Mark J. Hedian, Winston & 
Strawn, letter dated 4/5/94
6. George A. Hunger, Jr., PECO Energy, letter dated 4/5/94
7. L.A. England, BWR Owner's Group, letter dated 4/5/94
8. Jerrold G. Dewease, Entergy Operations, Inc., letter dated 4/6/94
9. E.A. DeBarba, Northeast Utilities System, letter dated 4/5/94
10. Richard F. Phares, Illinois Power Company, letter dated 4/5/94
11. Bob Link, Wisconsin Electric Power Company, letter dated 4/4/94
12. C.A. Schrock, Wisconsin Public Service Corporation, letter dated 4/
5/94
13. John S. Marshall, TUELECTRIC, letter dated 4/8/94
14. Richard M. Rosenblum, Southern California Edison Company, letter 
dated 3/30/94
15. D.W. Edwards, Yankee Atomic Electric Company, letter dated 4/4/94
16. Dave Morey, Southern Nuclear Operating Company, letter dated 4/5/94
17. J.T. Beckham, Georgia Power, letter dated 4/5/94
18. M.L. Bowling, Virginia Power, letter dated 4/27/94

Impact

    NUREG-1022, Revision 1 clarifies and consolidates the guidance on 
implementing the event notification and reporting requirements in 10 
CFR 50.72 and 50.73. Little of the guidance is new or different from 
the generic reporting guidance previously published in final form in 
NUREG-1022 (1983), its Supplement 1 (1984) and subsequent generic 
communications. Where it is different, the changes are minor. In some 
areas the new guidance will result in fewer reports and in some areas 
it will result in more reports. On balance, the clarified guidance will 
result in a small decrease in reporting burden.
    The NRC has determined that this report is not a major rule and 
verified this determination with the Office of Management and Budget.

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

    This report amends the guidance for information collections 
contained in 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) part 50 and NRC Form 
366, Licensee Events Reports. The changes are considered to be 
insignificant when compared with the overall requirements of the CFR 
part and the form (NRC Form 366 reduction of 350 hours annually vs. the 
current 75K, and 10 CFR 50.72 reduction of 150 hours annually vs. the 
current 2.4K). NRC does not consider the burden change to be 
significant enough to trigger the requirements of the Paperwork 
Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing requirements 
were approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), approval 
number 3150-0011 and 3150-0104.

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Public Protection Notification

    If an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB 
control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not 
required to respond to, the information collection.

Planned Rulemaking

    The NRC staff recognizes that there is also a need to revise 10 CFR 
50.72 and 50.73 to correct weaknesses in the current rules, including 
elimination of unnecessary reporting, and better align the rules with 
the NRC's current needs, including support for the move toward risk-
informed regulation. Accordingly, the staff plans to request permission 
to initiate rulemaking to address these areas. In the future, as rule 
changes are developed, appropriate changes to the guidance in NUREG-
1022, Revision 1 will be developed as well.

    Dated at Rockville, MD, this 3d day of February, 1998.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Charles E. Rossi,
Director, Safety Programs Division, Office for Analysis and Evaluation 
of Operational Data.
[FR Doc. 98-2994 Filed 2-5-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P