[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 4 (Wednesday, January 7, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 893-896]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-371]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (Vermont Yankee Nuclear 
Power Station); Issuance of Final Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 
2.206

[Docket No. 50-271]
    Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation (NRR), has taken action with regard to a Petition dated 
December 6, 1996, submitted by Mr. Jonathan M. Block, on behalf of the 
Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. (CAN). The Petition requested 
evaluation of certain Memoranda included with the Petition related to 
the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (Vermont Yankee) operated by 
the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (Licensee) to see if 
enforcement action is warranted.
    The first document enclosed with the Petition is a CAN Memorandum 
dated December 5, 1996, that reviews information presented by the 
Licensee at an enforcement conference held on July 23, 1996, involving 
the minimum-flow valves in the Vermont Yankee residual heat removal 
(RHR) system. The second document included with the Petition is a CAN 
Memorandum dated December 6, 1996, that contains a

[[Page 894]]

review of certain licensee event reports (LERs) submitted by the 
Licensee in the latter part of 1996. On the basis of these documents, 
CAN requests that the NRC determine whether enforcement action is 
warranted pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206.
    On October 8, 1997, a Partial Director's Decision was issued that 
responded to the first Memorandum concerning the RHR system and all but 
three of the LERs listed in the second Memorandum. This Final 
Director's Decisionaddresses the NRC staff's conclusions regarding the 
three remaining LERs that were still being evaluated at the time the 
Partial Director's Decision was issued.
    On November 7, 1997, CAN submitted a letter to the Director of NRR 
commenting on the Partial Director's Decision. CAN raised a concern 
that the Partial Director's Decision did not adequately address 
concerns raised in its Petition of December 6, 1996. In a response from 
the NRC staff dated November 28, 1997, CAN was informed that its letter 
provided no new or additional information that would warrant a review 
of the Partial Director's Decision. In its letter of November 7, 1997, 
CAN also raised a concern asserting ``systematic mismanagement'' at the 
Vermont Yankee facility and requested certain NRC actions. The 
Petitioner was informed that this concern would be treated as a 
supplement to the original Petition and is also addressed in this Final 
Director's Decision.
    The Director of NRR has granted the Petition in that the NRC staff 
has evaluated all of the issues and LERs raised in the two Memoranda to 
see if enforcement action is warranted on the basis of the information 
contained therein. The evaluation concludes that no further enforcement 
action is warranted. The Director has denied the Petitioner's requests 
set out in the November 7, 1997 letter that the NRC conduct additional 
reviews of safety systems at the Vermont Yankee facility. The reasons 
for the NRC staff's conclusions are provided in the ``Director's 
Decision Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206'' (DD-97-26), the complete text of 
which follows this notice and is available for public inspection at the 
Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, 
NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room located at 
Brooks Memorial Library, 224 Main Street, Brattleboro, VT.
    A copy of the Decision will be filed with the Secretary of the 
Commission for the Commission's review in accordance with 10 CFR 
2.206(c) of the Commission's regulations. As provided for by this 
regulation, the Decision will constitute the final action of the 
Commission 25 days after the date of issuance, unless the Commission, 
on its own motion, institutes a review of the decision in that time.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 29th day of December 1997.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Collins,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

Final Director's Decision Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206

[DD-97-26]

I. Introduction

    On December 6, 1996, Mr. Jonathan M. Block submitted a Petition on 
behalf of the Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. (CAN or Petitioner), and 
included two Memoranda from CAN. The first Memorandum, dated December 
5, 1996, reviews information presented by the Vermont Yankee Nuclear 
Power Corporation (Licensee) at a predecisional enforcement conference 
held on July 23, 1996, involving the minimum-flow valves in the 
residual heat removal (RHR) system at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 
Station (Vermont Yankee facility). The second Memorandum, dated 
December 6, 1996, contains a review of certain licensee event reports 
(LERs) submitted by the Licensee in the latter part of 1996. The 
Petitioner requests that the NRC evaluate these documents, pursuant to 
10 CFR 2.206, to determine if enforcement action is warranted on the 
basis of information contained therein.
    On February 12, 1997, the NRC informed the Petitioner in an 
acknowledgement letter that the Petition had been referred to the 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) for the preparation of a 
Director's Decision and that action would be taken within a reasonable 
time regarding the specific concerns raised in the Petition. On October 
8, 1997, the NRC issued a Partial Director's Decision that responded to 
the first Memorandum concerning the RHR system and all but three of the 
LERs listed in the second Memorandum. This Final Director's Decision 
addresses the NRC staff's conclusions regarding the three remaining 
LERs that were still being evaluated at the time the Partial Director's 
Decision was issued.
    On November 7, 1997, CAN submitted a letter to the Director of NRR 
commenting on the Partial Director's Decision. CAN raised a concern 
that the Partial Director's Decision did not adequately address 
concerns raised in its Petition of December 6, 1996. In a response from 
the NRC staff dated November 28, 1997, CAN was informed that its letter 
provided no new or additional information that would warrant a review 
of the Partial Director's Decision. In its November 7, 1997 letter, CAN 
also raised a concern about asserted ``systematic mismanagement'' at 
the Vermont Yankee facility and requested certain NRC actions. The 
Petitioner was informed that this specific concern would be treated as 
a supplement to the original Petition and is addressed in this Final 
Director's Decision.

II. Discussion

    The NRC staff's evaluation of the three remaining LERs and the 
Petitioner's supplemental request for action follows.

A. Licensee Event Reports

    A CAN Memorandum dated December 6, 1996, included with the Petition 
contains a review of several LERs submitted by the Licensee in the 
latter part of 1996. On the basis of its analysis of the LERs, CAN 
reaches certain conclusions regarding Licensee performance and actions 
that it believes should be taken. The Partial Director's Decision 
evaluated LERs 96-13, 96-14, 96-19, 96-20, 96-21, 96-22, and 96-25 and 
provided a response to CAN's overall conclusions regarding Licensee 
performance and requested actions. LERs 96-15, 96-18, and 96-23 were 
still open at the time the Partial Director's Decision was issued. The 
staff has completed its evaluation of these three LERs and its 
conclusions are presented below.

1. LER 96-15: ``Original B31.1 ANSI Code Section That Required 
Overpressurization Relief for Isolated Piping Sections Was Not 
Considered During [the] Original Design''

    Certain piping sections which would be isolated after a loss-of-
coolant accident (LOCA) were found to lack overpressure protection, 
contrary to code requirements. The water in this piping could expand 
because of the high temperatures accompanying a LOCA and exceed the 
design pressure rating of the piping. CAN asserts that the Licensee 
failed to take advantage of earlier opportunities to identify this 
design error when making modifications to the six systems discussed in 
the LER. CAN is correct in that the LER documented the first discovery 
of this problem, although modifications had been made to the affected 
systems earlier. This potential

[[Page 895]]

overpressurization problem has been identified at other plants, as 
evidenced by the issuance of NRC Information Notice 96-49 on August 20, 
1996, and NRC Generic Letter (GL) 96-06 on September 30, 1996. The 
Licensee was aware of events in this area and identified this issue at 
its site before the generic communications previously referred to were 
issued. The Licensee's corrective actions included a design change that 
provided the required overpressure protection for the affected lines. 
The change was completed in the 1996 refueling outage conducted during 
the period of September 6, 1996 to October 30, 1996.
    Because the Licensee identified the design deficiency described in 
this LER by other than routine quality assurance or surveillance 
activities and has implemented appropriate corrective actions to 
resolve the discrepancy, this ``old design issue'' was not cited in 
accordance with NRC Enforcement Policy, Section VII.B.3.1 
The LER was closed in Inspection Report 50-271/97-11.

    \1\ General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC 
Enforcement Actions, NUREG-1600 (Enforcement Policy).
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2. LER 96-18: ``Inadequate Installation and Inspection of Fire 
Protection Wrap Results in Plant Operation Outside of Its Design Basis; 
A Single Fire Would Impact Multiple Trains of Safety-Related 
Equipment''

    CAN asserts that this deficiency had significant adverse safety 
implications. The reported deficiency consisted of a small gap in the 
fire barrier installed on a cable tray support. The cable tray 
contained wiring to support operation of the emergency core cooling 
system (ECCS). The NRC staff does not consider CAN's claim that a fire 
could have rendered both divisions of the ECCS inoperable credible. The 
Licensee's evaluation found that existing fire protection analyses were 
very conservative and that with the combustible loading and fire 
detection and suppression equipment in the area, no credible fire 
threat could challenge the functionality of the ``as found'' wrapped 
cable. The staff agrees with the Licensee's analysis as documented in 
the LER and has found that the Licensee acted appropriately to correct 
the fire barrier deficiency and to prevent similar problems in the 
future.
    The NRC staff found that the deficiency described in this LER was a 
violation of NRC requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section 
III.G. However, in accordance with the provisions of NRC Enforcement 
Policy, Section VII.B.4, no notice of violation was issued in this case 
because the deficiency: (1) Was identified by the Licensee as part of 
the corrective actions for a previous issue related to Appendix R, (2) 
had the same root cause as the previous issue, (3) did not 
substantially change the safety significance or the character of the 
regulatory concern arising out of the initial action, and (4) the 
deficiency was corrected within a reasonable time following 
identification. The LER was closed in Inspection Report 50-271/97-80.

3. LER 96-23: ``Inadequate Surveillance Procedure Results in Failure To 
Meet Technical Specification Requirements for Radiation Monitor 
Functional Testing''

    The reactor building and refueling floor radiation monitor test 
procedure did not verify the high alarm contact actuation as required 
by the Vermont Yankee Technical Specifications. The NRC staff agrees 
with CAN that this event presented no significant risk to public health 
and safety. Considering that the monitors were verified to be fully 
functional and were in the condition required by plant Technical 
Specifications, this specific event appears to have been limited to an 
inadequate testing methodology. The Licensee's corrective actions 
included revising the deficient surveillance test procedure to properly 
test the high alarm output contacts.
    Because the deficiency identified in this LER was of minor safety 
significance and was identified and corrected by the Licensee, it was 
treated as a non-cited violation in accordance with NRC Enforcement 
Policy, Section VII.B.1. The LER was closed in Inspection Report 50-
271/97-08.

B. Supplemental Request for Action

    On November 7, 1997, CAN submitted a letter which raised a concern 
about asserted ``systematic mismanagement'' at the Vermont Yankee 
facility and requested that three actions be taken. In its response to 
the Petitioner, the NRC staff indicated that this concern would be 
considered as a supplement to the Petition.
    The requested actions, along with the NRC staff's evaluation, are 
discussed below.
    1. ``An NRC team in conjunction with an outside contractor conduct 
a review of a second system, the ventilation system.''
    From May 5 through June 13, 1997, the NRC staff performed a 
detailed design inspection of the low-pressure coolant injection and 
RHR service water systems at the Vermont Yankee facility. The 
inspection team consisted of a team leader from the NRC and five 
contractor engineers from Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation. The 
systems were chosen on the basis of their importance in mitigating 
design-basis accidents at Vermont Yankee. The purpose of the inspection 
was to evaluate the capability of the selected systems to perform the 
safety functions required by the design bases and the consistency of 
the as-built configuration and system operations with the Final Safety 
Analysis Report (FSAR). Overall, the inspection team concluded that the 
two systems were capable of performing their intended safety functions. 
However, the team identified some issues that indicated potential 
programmatic concerns extending beyond the two systems that were 
inspected. Specifically, the team identified the following issues which 
indicated potential programmatic concerns: (1) Several examples which 
indicated the Licensee's correction of licensing documentation was not 
timely; (2) when rendering equipment inoperable for surveillance 
testing, the Licensee's practice concerning entry into the limiting 
condition of operation (LCO) was not consistent with the guidance 
provided in GL 91-18, ``Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming 
Conditions;'' (3) deviations from the licensing commitments made in 
response to GL 89-13, ``Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-
Related Equipment;'' (4) weaknesses in the development and control of 
calculations, and the review and approval process for calculations; and 
(5) weaknesses concerning the Licensee's translation of design criteria 
and design bases into detailed operating instructions. The results of 
this inspection were documented in Inspection Report 50-271/97-201.
    By letter dated October 27, 1997, the Licensee provided a schedule 
and detailed the plans to complete the corrective actions required to 
resolve the broader programmatic issues listed in the inspection 
report. In its letter, the Licensee listed several initiatives it has 
undertaken to improve its performance. These initiatives include: (1) A 
re-engineering of the corrective action program, (2) a large scale 
program to develop Design Basis Documents for the 23 most risk 
significant systems, (3) initiation of a Design Basis Validation 
Program, (4) conversion of the plant's Technical Specifications to the 
Standard Technical Specification format, (5) a large scale instrument 
setpoint calculation and verification program, (6) a large scale effort 
to re-engineer the

[[Page 896]]

configuration management program, and (7) creation of a System 
Engineering Department.
    The NRC staff has concluded that the Licensee's proposed actions 
and schedule are acceptable and that the facility may be operated while 
the Licensee works to resolve these issues. The staff will continue to 
follow the Licensee's progress to improve the facility's design-basis 
documentation and implement the initiatives outlined in its October 27, 
1997 letter through the normal inspection process. A detailed design 
inspection by the NRC staff of an additional safety system is not 
warranted at this time.
    2. ``NRC with an outside contractor and VY [Vermont Yankee] conduct 
a review of all backup safety systems to assure adequacy of these 
systems in order to protect worker and public health and safety.''
    As stated in the reply to Item 1 above, the NRC staff has conducted 
a detailed design inspection of two selected systems at the Vermont 
Yankee facility. The inspection team found the two systems capable of 
performing their intended design functions. As discussed in Item 1 
above, the inspection report also documented several issues of 
programmatic concern. The NRC staff has determined that the Licensee's 
response to these programmatic concerns is acceptable and 
implementation of the Licensee's actions will be assessed during 
followup inspections. Overall, the staff finds that the detailed design 
inspection and the followup inspection activities provide adequate 
assurance of public health and safety and that a design review 
inspection of additional safety systems is not warranted at this time.
    3. ``Given the lack of thoroughness by the licensee and significant 
flaws in the FSAR and design basis evaluation, CAN questions Region I 
staff's competence to effectively oversee reactors under its authority. 
We therefore request that the archive of NRC's oversight failures at VY 
[Vermont Yankee] be added to the Inspector General's investigation of 
complicity and systematic failure to enforce NRC regulations by NRC 
staff in Region I and Project Directorates.''
    With regard to this request, CAN's letter has been forwarded to the 
Office of the Inspector General.

III. Conclusion

    The NRC staff has reviewed the information submitted by the 
Petitioner. The Petitioner's request is granted in part in that the NRC 
staff has evaluated all of the issues raised in the two Memoranda and 
the supplemental letter provided by the Petitioner to see if 
enforcement action is warranted on the basis of the information 
contained therein. In the Partial and the Final Director's Decision, 
the NRC staff has discussed each Memorandum and the supplemental letter 
and described any related enforcement action that was taken. The 
Petitioner's supplemental request that the NRC, in conjunction with an 
outside contractor, conduct additional review of safety systems at the 
Vermont Yankee facility is denied. With respect to the supplemental 
request for an investigation of NRC oversight of the Vermont Yankee 
facility, the Petitioner's supplemental letter was forwarded to the 
Office of the Inspector General.
    As provided in 10 CFR 2.206(c), a copy of this Decision will be 
filed with the Secretary of the Commission for the Commission's review. 
This Decision will constitute the final action of the Commission 25 
days after issuance, unless the Commission, on its own motion, 
institutes review of the Decision in that time.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 29th day of December 1997.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Collins,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 98-371 Filed 1-6-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P