[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 244 (Friday, December 19, 1997)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 66502-66506]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-33142]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. 93-ANE-08; Amendment 39-10260; AD 97-26-17]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Teledyne Continental Motors IO-360,
TSIO-360, LTSIO-360, IO-520, LIO-520, TSIO-520, LTSIO-520 Series, and
Rolls-Royce plc IO-360 and TSIO-360 Series Reciprocating Engines
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive
(AD), applicable to certain Teledyne Continental Motors (TCM) IO-520
and TSIO-520 series reciprocating engines, that currently requires
ultrasonic inspection for subsurface fatigue cracks in crankshafts
installed in TCM IO-520 and TSIO-520 series engines and replacement of
the crankshaft if a crack is found. This amendment adds a requirement
to remove crankshafts manufactured using the airmelt process and
replace them with crankshafts manufactured using the vacuum arc remelt
(VAR) process, incorporates new ultrasonic inspection criteria in the
AD, adds engine series TCM IO-360, TSIO-360, LTSIO-360, IO-520, LIO-
520, TSIO-520, LTSIO-520 and Rolls-Royce, plc IO-360 and TSIO-360 to
the applicability, and revises the economic impact analysis. This
amendment is prompted by reports of crankshaft failures due to
subsurface fatigue cracking on engines that had been inspected in
accordance with the current AD. The actions specified by this AD are
intended to prevent crankshaft failure and subsequent engine failure.
DATES: Effective January 23, 1998.
The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in
the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as
of January 23, 1998.
ADDRESSES: The service information referenced in this AD may be
obtained from Teledyne Continental Motors, P.O. Box 90, Mobile, AL
36601; telephone (334) 438-3411. This information may be examined at
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), New England Region, Office
of the Assistant Chief Counsel, 12 New England Executive Park,
Burlington, MA 01803-5299; or at the Office of the Federal Register,
800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jerry Robinette, Aerospace Engineer,
Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Small Airplane Directorate,
Campus Building, 1701 Columbia Ave., Suite 2-160, College Park, GA
30337-2748; telephone (404) 305-7371, fax (404) 305-7348.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal
Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to add an airworthiness directive
(AD), applicable to certain Teledyne Continental Motors (TCM) IO-360,
TSIO-360, LTSIO-360, IO-520 and TSIO-520 series reciprocating engines
was published as a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (SNPRM)
in the Federal Register on August 24, 1995 (60 FR 43995). That proposal
would have superseded AD 87-23-08, Amendment 39-5735 (52 FR 41937,
October 30, 1987), which currently requires ultrasonic inspection of
TCM IO-520 and TSIO-520 series engines for sub-surface fatigue cracks
in the crankshaft and replacement of the crankshaft, if a crack is
found. The proposed AD would have retained the ultrasonic inspection,
but would have required the removal of crankshafts manufactured using
the airmelt process and required replacement with crankshafts that were
manufactured using the vacuum arc remelt (VAR) process. The proposed AD
would have also expanded the affected population of engines to add the
TCM IO-360, TSIO-360 and LTSIO-360 series engines to the IO-520 and
TSIO-520 series engines affected by AD 87-23-08. That proposal was
prompted by reports of crankshaft failures due to subsurface fatigue
cracking on engines that had been inspected in accordance with AD 87-
23-08. That condition, if
[[Page 66503]]
not corrected, could result in crankshaft failure and subsequent engine
failure.
Since the issuance of that SNPRM, TCM has revised and improved the
ultrasonic test procedure and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
determined that the proposed AD should reference this new procedure. In
addition, the FAA has also determined that TCM LIO-520 and LTSIO-520
and Rolls-Royce, plc IO-360 and TSIO-360 series engines are affected
and should be included in this proposal as they are identical in design
and manufacturing process. The number of Rolls-Royce, plc engines that
were added was small, estimated to be 500 worldwide. The added TCM
engines were affected only by the repetitive ultrasonic inspection
requirements, as they already have VAR crankshafts.
Since those changes expanded the scope of the originally proposed
rule, the FAA determined that it was necessary to reopen the comment
period to provide additional opportunity for public comment. On March
12, 1997, the FAA issued a second SNPRM ( 62 FR 15133, March 31, 1997).
Interested persons have been afforded an opportunity to participate
in the making of this amendment. Due consideration has been given to
all comments received from these three notices: 41 to the original
NPRM, 26 to the SNPRM, and 4 to the second SNPRM.
One group of commenters state that the AD should be withdrawn,
since the listed price of the replacement part is not believed to be
accurate nor will it be available for a sustained period of time. The
FAA concurs in part. Since the original issuance of the NPRM, the cost
of the exchange crankshaft has increased from $2,222 to $2,599 and the
cost analysis has been corrected to reflect this new price. This price
assumes the customer exchanges an airmelt crankshaft for a VAR
crankshaft. However, some commenters have stated that the price of the
crankshaft is $7,000 or higher, but this is based on the outright
purchase price without an exchange crankshaft (actual TCM List Outright
prices currently range from $7,407 to $8,979). The cost analysis is
based on the exchange price because the applicability of this action is
limited to registered owners of the specified TCM engine models, and it
is assumed these owners have crankshafts installed in their engines.
One group of commenters state that the AD should be withdrawn,
since the data used for the NPRM is invalid and the handling of the
data is not statistically correct. The FAA does not concur. The data
used to justify the AD is valid; as stated previously, it is derived
from crankshaft failures where the failure mode was determined by
engineering evaluation of numerous failure events, which included
reviews of engine operating histories, analytical engine teardowns, and
laboratory analyses of the failed crankshafts. The FAA participated in
many of these investigative activities.
One commenter (ARSA) presented data from repair stations which they
insist is the only valid data. Their data is derived from ultrasonic
inspection of airmelt and VAR crankshafts and shows 29 airmelt removals
out of 3,821 crankshafts inspected and 3 VAR removals out of 488
crankshafts inspected. They then conclude that statistically there is
no difference in the two types of crankshafts. Their statistical
comparison of the number they found to the number they inspected is
invalid. The comparison must be made to the total population.
A better comparison is to combine their inspection data with the
FAA/TCM failure data. This is still not completely accurate but it
includes all the data currently available. When this is done, there are
77 airmelt ``events'' out of an initial population of 23,000 and 7 VAR
``events'' out of an initial population of 35,800; this comparison
showed an airmelt to VAR ``event'' rate of 17 to 1. An ``event'' is
either crankshaft removal per ARSA data or crankshaft failure per FAA/
TCM data. When the one set of ARSA data is combined with the latest
FAA/TCM data (the latest data includes failures for 1993 through 1996),
there are 89 airmelt ``events''. There were no VAR subsurface fatigue
failures for 1993 through 1996. The population of the engines has
changed since this process was initiated and continues to change,
literally each day, which makes failure rate comparisons extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to accurately calculate; the airmelt
population is now estimated at 10,100. The FAA has determined that the
failure rate is high enough to warrant an AD.
One group of commenters state that the AD should be withdrawn,
since they operate 10-12 of these engines with no failures to date. The
commenters' justification is that in complying with the AD there is no
increase in aviation safety but expenses and operating costs will
increase. The FAA does not concur. These five comments were all
identical but with different signatures. No technical justification was
given for not publishing the AD. The FAA is aware of the costs this AD
will impose on operators, but has determined that an unsafe condition
exists which must be addressed by performing the actions required by
this AD. These actions are necessary to return the affected engines to
the level of safety established at the time the engine design was type
certified by the FAA.
One group of commenters state that the AD should be withdrawn,
since unreported propeller strikes have contaminated the data and
cannot be eliminated; therefore, the data is invalid. The FAA does not
concur. The history of the engines for each data point was evaluated to
eliminate any data from propeller strikes and improper operation;
however, there is the remote possibility that some of the failures were
due to a propeller strike or improper operation. There is no way to be
100% sure that all failures due to propeller strikes and improper
operation were eliminated from the data. The data, however, is reliable
enough that the FAA feels that the AD is warranted.
One group of commenters state that the AD should be withdrawn,
since the FAA did not use the service difficulty reports (SDR) database
to validate the findings of the AD; therefore, the data is not valid.
The FAA does not concur. As stated in the SNPRM, the SDR database does
not identify cracks as being subsurface fatigue cracks or originating
from some other source, nor does it easily identify airmelt versus VAR.
This information may not have been available at the time the ``M'' or
``D'' report was submitted. The FAA requires the submission of ``M'' or
``D'' reports in certain cases and certainly encourages submittal of
all pertinent findings. The SDR database may be used to determine if a
particular part/engine is experiencing a problem; however, it may not
be possible to determine the exact nature of the problem. Using data
sources other than the SDR database does not invalidate the FAA's
determination that an AD is warranted.
One commenter states that the AD should be made applicable to
engines installed on single-engine aircraft only, since with twin-
engine aircraft the second engine is available. The FAA does not
concur. Although the second engine is available, the accident/incident
data shows that a high percentage of engine out incidents involving
twin-engine aircraft result in off airport landings/crashes. For this
reason, engines installed on twins should remain in the AD.
One commenter states that TCM should identify VAR crankshafts on
the propeller flange instead of on the cheek, as this would allow the
identification of VAR crankshafts without separating the case halves.
The FAA does not concur.
[[Page 66504]]
If the crankshaft has had an ultrasonic inspection in accordance with
TCM Service Bulletin M87-5, Revision 1, or AD 87-23-08, the heat code,
the letter ``V'' (only if it is a VAR crankshaft) and the letter ``U''
will be vibroetched on the propeller flange. If the ``V'' is missing
then it is an airmelt crankshaft. In addition, this AD requires
compliance at overhaul or whenever the crankshaft is removed from the
engine so that the internal marking will be visible. Of course, any new
crankshaft purchased from TCM will be VAR, and even if TCM started to
mark them now there is still over a decade of production which have no
marking on the exterior.
One commenter states that the IO-360 series engines should be
removed from the AD's applicability, as verbal contact with their
members (800 total, 225 using the IO-360 engine) indicate no problems.
The commenter believes that the failures are associated with ground
strikes and improper operation of engines with under 1,200 hours total
time. The FAA does not concur. The issue of propeller strikes and
improper operation has been previously addressed. The FAA data shows
that 5 of the 8 IO/TSIO-360 airmelt crankshaft failures occurred on IO-
360 engines (the data from ARSA does not differentiate between 360 and
520 series engines). Of the five IO-360 failures, two had more than
1,200 hours total time.
One group of commenters state that the AD should be withdrawn,
since the time in service of the engines are not accurately represented
in FAA data because TCM rebuilt engines are included in data. Engines
with serial numbers (S/Ns) lower than 300000 are reserved by TCM for
rebuilt engines. The FAA does not concur. The FAA agrees that many of
the engines listed are rebuilt by TCM, where the time in service of the
crankshaft cannot be accurately determined, but the crankshaft would be
considered high time. However, there are other engines listed which are
``first run'' with low time in service failures. The data supports the
FAA's position that the failures are random and time in service is not
the determining factor.
One group of commenters state that the AD should be withdrawn,
since there will be a loss of revenue to the repair stations,
overhaulers, etc. Some commenters state that TCM is replacing the
crankshafts in rebuilt engines at no charge to the customer, thereby
reducing the potential for overhauls. The commenters state that they
have lost numerous overhauls because their customers have elected to
buy a TCM rebuilt engine instead of paying for an overhaul. The
commenters consider this an unfair business practice and feel that the
FAA is furthering this scheme by issuing an AD.
The FAA disagrees. The commenters ignore the FAA's determination
that an unsafe condition is likely to exist or develop on engines of
this type design. The FAA recognizes that competition affects the
profitability of entities engaged in the aviation industry, but denies
any scheme to aid one competitor over another. That the original
manufacturer of these engines has elected to compete in the overhaul
market does not affect the FAA's determination that an unsafe condition
exists or the need for this AD to address that safety issue.
One commenter states that the cost is shown as an annual amount but
should have been shown as a total amount. The commenter believes this
economic analysis is unprecedented and irregular and undermines the
confidence of the aviation general public in the rulemaking process.
The FAA does not concur. The FAA normally shows costs on an annual
basis when compliance with an AD will be extended over a long time
frame. The total costs are generally shown, but in this case, as stated
in the SNPRM, ``The FAA estimates that approximately 10% of the
affected engines will be overhauled each year''; thus it should be
clear that it will take approximately 10 years before all the affected
engines are in compliance. The total cost is easily derived by
multiplying the annual cost estimate by 10. This issue was avoided in
the second SNPRM by showing both annual and total costs.
Two commenters state that the cost estimate is too low, as a big
cost in procuring a new crankshaft is not stated; i.e., the shipping/
freight cost, which should be included in the cost estimate for this
AD. The FAA concurs. Since the FAA's cost estimate of a replacement
crankshaft is based on an ``exchange'' part, the FAA concurs that the
costs of shipping are appropriately included as direct cost of the
replacement part. Shipping costs will vary widely however, and the FAA
has no reasonable means to estimate those costs. Therefore, the FAA
will use the commenters' estimate of $100 for shipping costs and adjust
the cost analysis accordingly.
One commenter states that the AD should be withdrawn, since the
economic impact does not include the cost to remove the engine and
propeller from the airplane and to reinstall them. The FAA does not
concur. The AD is to be accomplished at overhaul or whenever the
crankcase is separated. Since the engine and propeller, in either case,
must be removed anyway, there will be no additional expense to remove/
reinstall the engine and propeller in order to comply with the AD.
One commenter states that the FAA should acquire more data about
the currently required ultrasonic inspection before issuing the AD. The
commenter questions whether any of the engines that failed that were
listed in the TCM data had undergone the required ultrasonic
inspection. The FAA does not concur. Of the failures listed in the FAA/
TCM data, 22 airmelt and 1 VAR had been inspected one or more times in
accordance with AD 87-23-08 and/or TCM SB M87-5, or M87-5, Revision 1.
All of the crankshafts in the data provided by ARSA (29 airmelt and 3
VAR) were removed from service because they failed the ultrasonic
inspection.
One group of commenters state that the AD should be withdrawn,
since the data on which the FAA's determination that an unsafe
condition exists was not available to the commenter for review. The FAA
does not concur. The commenters have filed a number of comments with
the AD docket file that indicate a careful review of available data
from a number of sources, including the docket file. The FAA denies
that the information available in the docket file is inadequate to
warrant AD action. While some information cannot be included in the
public docket file due to the proprietary nature of the information,
the FAA has placed in the docket a summary of the data on which it
bases its determination that an unsafe condition exists, that the
unsafe condition is likely to exist or develop on other products of the
same type design, and that this AD is necessary to address this safety
concern.
One commenter states that in Note 2 of the proposed AD, reference
was made to the term magnaflux; the commenter correctly points out that
magnaflux is a registered trademark and should not be used in this
context. The generic terminology magnetic particle inspection should be
used instead. The FAA concurs and has revised this final rule
accordingly.
Two commenters state that the AD should be withdrawn, since the FAA
has failed to address comments made to the previous NPRM and SNPRM. The
FAA does not concur. The purpose of the SNPRM is to continue the fact
gathering process. For clarity, certain comments were partially
addressed in the SNPRMs; however, all comments have been addressed in
the processing of this final rule.
[[Page 66505]]
One commenter states that the AD should be withdrawn, since the FAA
has not substantiated the inclusion of the Rolls-Royce, plc engines
which are not US type certificated. The FAA does not concur. The FAA
stated in the second SNPRM that the Rolls-Royce, plc engines are
identical in design and manufacturing process, which substantiates
their inclusion. It is true that there is no US type certificate for
these engines; however, these engines are accepted for use on US type
certificated airplanes, and several are installed on US registered
aircraft. Therefore, TCM service information and FAA ADs apply to these
engines.
One commenter states that the AD should be withdrawn, since a
number of alternatives to AD action already exist and they have been
shown to be as effective as an AD. The alternatives include the current
TCM service information, special TCM pricing, strong sales of TCM
rebuilt engines and attrition of older airmelt crankshafts. The FAA
does not concur. There was TCM service information prior to the initial
issuance of the original NPRM and that did not affect the failure rate.
The special TCM pricing has helped but is not enough to warrant no AD
action. Strong sales of TCM rebuilt engines and attrition of older
crankshafts certainly help the situation, but, again, are not
sufficient to warrant no AD action. The data reflects the need for the
AD and does not show that the alternatives presented are as effective
as an AD.
One commenter states that the AD should be withdrawn since the
SNPRM mandates a standard maintenance practice which is in conflict
with FAA internal guidance on the issuance of ADs. The FAA does not
concur. The problem here is not a maintenance procedure, but a
manufacturing process, and it affects all the affected engines
regardless of who is performing the maintenance, or the quality of
maintenance. The FAA has determined that an unsafe condition exists or
can develop on these crankshafts. It is therefore incumbent on the FAA
to issue an AD.
After careful review of the available data, including the comments
noted above, the FAA has determined that air safety and the public
interest require the adoption of the rule with the changes described
previously. The FAA has determined that these changes will not increase
the scope of the AD.
The FAA estimates that 10,100 engines are installed on aircraft of
U. S. registry and will need to have the crankshaft replaced, that it
will take approximately 1 work hour per engine to determine the type of
crankshaft installed and that the average labor rate is $60 per work
hour. Required parts will cost approximately $2,599 and shipping will
cost approximately $100. Based on these figures, the cost impact of
replacing crankshafts on U. S. operators is estimated to be $27,865,900
over a 10-year period or $2,786,590 annually.
The FAA further estimates that 59,300 engines with VAR crankshafts
installed would require ultrasonic inspections and the estimated cost
of performing an ultrasonic inspection is $200. The FAA estimates that
approximately 10%, or 5,930 engines, would need to be overhauled
annually, so the estimated total cost impact for ultrasonic inspections
is $1,186,000 annually.
Therefore, the FAA estimates the total cost impact of the AD to be
$27,865,900 over a 10-year period, plus an additional $1,186,000
annually for the repetitive ultrasonic inspections.
The regulations adopted herein will not have substantial direct
effects on the States, on the relationship between the national
government and the States, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in
accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this final
rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the
preparation of a Federalism Assessment.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this action (1) is
not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866;
(2) is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) will not have a
significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial
number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act. A final evaluation has been prepared for this action
and it is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained
from the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption
ADDRESSES.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air Transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of
the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
2. Section 39.13 is amended by removing Amendment 39-5735 (52 FR
41937, October 30, 1987) and by adding a new airworthiness directive,
Amendment 39-10260, to read as follows:
97-26-17 Teledyne Continental Motors and Rolls-Royce, plc:
Amendment 39-10260. Docket 93-ANE-08. Supersedes AD 87-23-08,
Amendment 39-5735.
Applicability: Teledyne Continental Motors (TCM) IO-360, LTSIO-
360, TSIO-360, IO-520, LIO-520, LTSIO-520 and TSIO-520 series
reciprocating engines built on or prior to December 31, 1980;
rebuilt TCM IO-360, LTSIO-360, TSIO-360, IO-520, LIO-520, LTSIO-520
and TSIO-520 series reciprocating engines with serial numbers lower
than those listed in TCM Critical Service Bulletin (SB) No. CSB96-8,
dated June 25, 1996; TCM factory overhauled IO-360, LTSIO-360, TSIO-
360, IO-520, LIO-520, LTSIO-520 and TSIO-520 series reciprocating
engines with serial number of 901203H and lower; and Rolls-Royce,
plc IO-360 and TSIO-360 series reciprocating engines with any serial
number. These engines are installed on but not limited to the
following aircraft: Raytheon (formerly Beech) models 95-C55, 95-
C55A, D55, D55A, E55, E55A, 58, 58A, 58P, 58PA, 58TC, 58TCA, S35,
V35, V35A, V35B, E33A, E33C, 35-C33A, 36, A36, F33A, F33C and A36TC;
Bellanca model 17-30A; Cessna models 172XP, A185, A188, T188C, 206,
T206, 207, T207, 210, T210, P210, 310R, T310P, T310Q, T310R, 320D,
320E, 320F, 336, 337, T337, P337, 340, 401, 402, 414 and T41B/C;
Colemill conversion of Commander 500A; Goodyear Airship Blimp 22;
Maule Model M-4-210, M-4-210C, M-4-210S, M-4-210T, and M-5-210C;
Mooney model M20-K; Navion model H; Pierre Robin HR 100; The New
Piper Aircraft, Inc. (formerly Piper Aircraft Company) models PA28-
201T, PA28R-201T, PA28RT-201T, PA34-200T and PA34-220T; Prinair
Dehavilland Heron; Reims models FR172, F337 and FT337; and Swift
Museum Foundation, Inc. models GC-1A and GC-1B equipped with the IO-
360 engine.
Note 1: This airworthiness directive (AD) applies to each engine
identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of
whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area
subject to the requirements of this AD. For engines that have been
modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the
requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request
approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with
paragraph (d) of this AD. The request should include an assessment
of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the
unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe
[[Page 66506]]
condition has not been eliminated, the request should include
specific proposed actions to address it.
Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished
previously.
To prevent crankshaft failure and subsequent engine failure,
accomplish the following:
(a) At the next engine overhaul, or whenever the crankshaft is
next removed from the engine, after the effective date of this AD,
whichever occurs first, determine if the crankshaft was manufactured
using the airmelt or vacuum arc remelt (VAR) process in accordance
with the identification procedure described in TCM Critical SB No.
CSB96-8, dated June 25, 1996. If the crankshaft was manufactured
using the airmelt process or if the manufacturing process is
unknown, remove the crankshaft from service and replace with a
serviceable crankshaft manufactured using the VAR process.
(b) For all TCM IO-360, LTSIO-360, TSIO-360, IO-520, IO-520,
LTSIO-520 and TSIO-520 and Rolls-Royce, plc IO-360 and TSIO-360
engine models that have VAR crankshafts installed, regardless of
serial number; at the next and every subsequent crankshaft removal
from the engine case or installation of a replacement crankshaft,
prior to crankshaft installation in the engine, conduct an
ultrasonic inspection of the crankshaft in accordance with the
procedures specified in TCM Mandatory SB No. MSB96-10, dated August
15, 1996, and, if necessary, replace with a serviceable part.
Note 2: Accomplishment of the ultrasonic inspection required by
this AD does not fulfill any requirements for magnetic particle
inspection or any other inspections specified in TCM or Rolls-Royce,
plc overhaul manuals.
(c) The ultrasonic inspection of the crankshaft must be
performed by a non-destructive test (NDT) ultrasonic (UT) Level II
inspector who is qualified under the guidelines established by the
American Society of Nondestructive Testing or MIL-STD-410 or FAA-
approved equivalent, or must be trained by TCM personnel or their
designated representative on how to accomplish and conduct this
inspection procedure. The person approving the engine for return to
service is required to verify that the UT inspection was
accomplished in accordance with the requirements of this paragraph.
(d) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the
compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be
used if approved by the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification
Office. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate
FAA Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to
the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office.
Note 3: Information concerning the existence of approved
alternative methods of compliance with this airworthiness directive,
if any, may be obtained from the Atlanta Aircraft Certification
Office.
(e) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with
sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14
CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the aircraft to a location where
the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.
(f) The actions required by this AD shall be done in accordance
with the following TCM service documents:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Document No. Pages Date
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CSB96-8.............................. 1-6 June 25, 1996.
Total pages: 6.
MSB96-10............................. 1-3 August 15, 1996.
Total pages: 3.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of
the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR
part 51. Copies may be obtained from Teledyne Continental Motors,
P.O. Box 90, Mobile, AL 36601; telephone (334) 438-3411. Copies may
be inspected at the FAA, New England Region, Office of the Assistant
Chief Counsel, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA; or at
the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW.,
suite 700, Washington, DC.
(g) This amendment becomes effective on January 23, 1998.
Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on December 12, 1997.
Jay J. Pardee,
Manager, Engine and Propeller Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 97-33142 Filed 12-18-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P