[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 239 (Friday, December 12, 1997)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 65478-65572]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-31457]



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Part II





Department of Transportation





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Federal Railroad Administration



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49 CFR Part 243



FOX High Speed Rail Safety Standards; Proposed Rule





  Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / 
Proposed Rules  

[[Page 65478]]



DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Part 243

[FRA Docket No. HST-1]
RIN 2130-AB14


FOX High Speed Rail Safety Standards

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking for rule of particular 
applicability (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: FRA is proposing a rule of particular applicability that 
establishes safety standards for the Florida Overland eXpress (FOX) 
high speed rail system. The proposed standards are not intended for 
general application in the railroad industry, but would apply only to 
the FOX system that is planned for development in the State of Florida. 
The FOX system will operate from Miami to Tampa, via Orlando on 
dedicated track, with no grade crossings, at a maximum speed of 200 
mph. The FOX equipment and track are patterned after the French TGV 
high speed rail system, and will be used exclusively for passenger 
service.
    The proposed rule of particular applicability takes a systems 
approach, and so includes standards that address all aspects of the FOX 
high speed system, including system description, system safety, signal, 
track, rolling stock, operating practices, system qualification tests, 
personnel qualifications, and power distribution. In addition, the 
proposed rule adopts and incorporates by reference many existing 
standards that apply to all railroads, which are appropriate for 
application to FOX, such as alcohol and drug standards, hours of 
service requirements, and locomotive engineer qualifications.

DATES: (1) Written comments: Written comments must be received on or 
before February 10, 1998. Comments received after that date will be 
considered only to the extent possible without incurring substantial 
expense or delay.
    (2) Public hearing: A public hearing will be held if one is 
requested by January 2, 1998. Anyone requesting a hearing must notify 
FRA's Docket Clerk, Renee Bridgers, in writing and provide her with the 
requesting party's name, telephone number, and address. If a hearing is 
requested, FRA will notify the public of the date, time, and location 
of the hearing, and provide instructions for those who wish to make an 
oral statement at the hearing.

ADDRESSES: Written comments must identify the docket number and be 
submitted in triplicate to the Docket Clerk, Office of Chief Counsel, 
Federal Railroad Administration, Stop 10, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., 
Washington, D.C. 20590. Persons desiring to be notified that their 
comments have been received by FRA should submit a stamped, self-
addressed postcard with their comments. The Docket Clerk will indicate 
on the postcard the date on which the comments were received and will 
return the card to the addressee. Written comments will be available 
for examination, both before and after the closing date for written 
comments, during regular business hours on the seventh floor of 1120 
Vermont Avenue, NW, in Washington, D.C.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, CONTACT: Bill Goodman or Mark Jones, Signal 
Division, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, FRA, 400 Seventh 
St., S.W., Stop 25, Washington, D.C. 20590, (telephone: 202-632-3353); 
Bill O'Sullivan or Dave Jamieson, Track Division, at the same address, 
(telephone: 202-632-3341); Ed Pritchard, Motive Power and Equipment 
Division, at the same address, (telephone: 202-632-3348); Doug Taylor 
or Laura Mizner, Operating Practices Division, at the same address, 
(telephone: 202-632-3346); Bob Dorer, Volpe National Transportation 
Systems Center, Kendall Square, Cambridge, MA 02142, (telephone: 617-
494-3481); or Christine Beyer, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, 
FRA, 400 Seventh St., S.W., Stop 10, Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone: 
202-632-3177).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background and Regulatory Structure

    The State of Florida plans to develop a high speed rail system that 
will run from Miami to Tampa, via Orlando. The system's trains will 
travel on dedicated rail, with no public grade crossings, in exclusive 
passenger service, at speeds not to exceed 200 mph. These operational 
characteristics and the equipment that the State plans to use mark a 
dramatic step forward for the development of regional high speed 
passenger rail service in the United States. FRA announces in this 
notice proposed safety standards for the system that will be developed 
in Florida.
    Through a public bid process, Florida has selected the Florida 
Overland eXpress (FOX) to build and operate the high speed rail system. 
FOX is a consortium of engineering and rail design and construction 
entities. The system FOX proposes to build in Florida utilizes the high 
speed technology and equipment currently in use in France, Holland, 
Spain, and Belgium, which was developed in France and is known as the 
French TGV (train a grande vitesse, or very high speed train). The 
French TGV has been in service in Europe since 1981 and has safely 
carried 450 million passengers. This is a traditional rail system, in 
the sense that steel wheels operate over steel rails, powered by 
electrical power that is carried and transferred to the equipment 
through an overhead catenary system. However, the TGV equipment is 
generally lighter than conventional rail vehicles, and utilizes 
advanced computer and aerodynamic technology that facilitates travel at 
very high speeds with minimal track and equipment degradation. (The 
trainsets travel at maximum speeds of 186 mph in France.) In addition, 
the TGV high speed trainsets are articulated into one long unit that 
resists buckling or rolling in the event of an accident, which greatly 
reduces the likelihood of serious injury for passengers. The 
lightweight design of the equipment permits high speed travel, but also 
lends itself to grave damage if involved in a train-to-train collision, 
particularly where heavy freight vehicles are present. To counter this 
aspect of the design, the TGV is operated with a focus on collision-
avoidance, in addition to collision-mitigation, a systems approach to 
safety that has proven to be quite successful. (It is also important to 
note here that the Florida system will not include any freight 
traffic.) Newer generations of the TGV system include in-cab signal 
systems and passenger stations that are customized to service high 
speed trainsets only. The French TGV system has an exceedingly safe 
record, which is discussed in greater detail below.
    The federal railroad statutes apply to all railroads, as defined in 
49 U.S.C. 20102, including the FOX system proposed to be built in 
Florida. The only railroads excluded from FRA's jurisdiction are urban 
rapid transit railroads that are not connected to the general railroad 
system. The contemplated FOX system will clearly be intercity passenger 
rail, not urban rapid transit. Accordingly, the Florida system will be 
subject to FRA jurisdiction whether or not it is connected to the 
general railroad system. Moreover, FRA would consider a stand-alone 
intercity railroad line to be part of the general system, even though 
not physically connected to other railroads (as FRA has previously 
stated with respect to the Alaska Railroad; see 49 CFR part 209, 
Appendix A).

[[Page 65479]]

    FRA has a regulatory program in place, pursuant to its statutory 
authority, to address equipment, track, operating practices, and human 
factors in the existing, conventional railroad environment. However, 
significant operational and equipment differences exist between the 
system proposed for Florida and existing passenger operations in the 
United States. In many of the railroad safety disciplines, FRA's 
existing standards of general applicability do not address the safety 
concerns and operational peculiarities of the proposed FOX system. 
Therefore, in order to assure the public that this new system will 
operate safely, minimum federal standards must be in place when FOX 
commences operations.
    FOX and FDOT discussed their plans for the system in a series of 
meetings with FRA held throughout 1996. The purpose of the discussions 
was to explain to FRA the system that they plan to build in Florida, 
and for FOX and FDOT to understand more fully the applicable regulatory 
framework that would govern their operations. On February 18, 1997, FOX 
filed a petition for rulemaking (Petition) with FRA, which proposes 
standards that would apply to their system safety program, track, 
rolling stock, signal, operating practices, personnel qualifications, 
and power distribution. Since February, FOX has supplemented the 
Petition with additional information that is pertinent to the existing 
French operation or the one planned for Florida. (A copy of the 
Petition and supplemental submissions are available for public review 
in the docket of this matter, which is docket number HST-1, previously 
identified as docket number RM Pet. 97-1.) The FOX Petition attempts to 
incorporate the French practice in each safety discipline listed in the 
Petition, but also contains proposed standards that differ from 
practices in France. FRA understands these differences to reflect 
operational and environmental deviations between the system proposed 
for Florida and the TGV lines in operation in France.
    FRA analyzed the Petition and supporting documentation, gathered 
background data that describe the French system, and now publishes this 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), based on consideration of the 
available information and the expertise of the Agency's safety 
specialists. This NPRM constitutes FRA's initial response to the 
Petition and includes standards that are similar, but not identical, to 
those in the FOX Petition.
    It is important to note at this juncture that any new standards 
which FRA adopts to address safety on the FOX high speed rail system 
would apply only to that system, and therefore will be issued in the 
form of a rule of particular applicability, rather than one of general 
applicability. Such a rule of particular applicability would not 
displace existing safety standards that apply to all other entities in 
the railroad industry, and would be enforced only against the FOX 
system. Also, it should be noted that FRA plans at this time to publish 
any final standards that pertain to the FOX system in the Code of 
Federal Regulations (CFR). For that reason, these proposed standards 
have been assigned Part number 243, and are organized into Subparts for 
each safety discipline.

Safety Characteristics of the French TGV System

    As part of the process for determining appropriate rules for those 
aspects of the FOX system that will duplicate the French TGV system, it 
is logical to consider the safety record of the French high speed rail 
system.
    In preparation for filing the Petition, FOX and the Florida 
Department of Transportation (FDOT) commissioned DLSF Systems, Inc. to 
complete a risk assessment to evaluate the relative safety of the FOX 
system vis-a-vis the French TGV system, and that predicted for the 
Amtrak 150-mph trainsets in the northeast corridor (NEC). (A copy of 
the Florida Overland eXpress Risk Assessment is available for public 
review in the docket of this matter, docket number HST-1.) The analysis 
set forth in the risk assessment provides a fairly extensive discussion 
of the safety of TGV high speed rail in France, and the numbers 
indicate an admirable safety record.
    The risk assessment divides the analysis of the TGV system into two 
categories: those that are exclusive high speed lines, which include 
in-cab signaling, and passenger stations designed to service only high 
speed trains; and those that consist of a mixed high speed/conventional 
system in which high speed trains service conventional passenger 
stations, and use conventional trackside signaling. For the most part, 
the risk assessment deals with incidents that occurred between January 
1, 1990 and June 30, 1996. The numbers are limited to post-1989 data 
because the Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais (SNCF), the 
quasi-governmental agency in France that oversees and operates TGV, 
does not have computerized records concerning events prior to 1990.
    It is important to note that the accident figures discussed below 
occurred in a system that maintains high traffic density and passenger 
service: train-miles for this period totaled 204 million for all TGV 
service and 111 million for the exclusive high speed lines; passenger-
miles on the high speed lines totaled 43,316,000; and the number of 
passengers served on TGV trains totaled 249,696. The TGV system 
operates at a maximum speed of 186 mph and runs approximately 184 
trains per day.
    On the exclusive high speed lines, only thirteen incidents have 
been recorded from January 1, 1990 through June 30, 1996. There have 
been no fatalities and no collisions between trains during this period. 
Of the thirteen recorded incidents, only three resulted in passenger 
injury. The first incident that caused injury did not involve 
casualties on board a TGV trainset. This incident, which caused 27 of 
the 30 total injuries, occurred when passengers waiting on a loading 
platform were sprayed with ballast that was kicked up by a derailed 
truck. The truck in this incident derailed due to a wheel slide failure 
that resulted in a flat wheel. The second incident that resulted in 
casualty involved two passengers who were slightly injured when a 
trainset derailed. The derailment occurred while traveling at 150 mph, 
due to track subsidence that was caused by heavy rains and a previously 
unknown World War I trench. The third event, in which one passenger was 
injured, was caused by human error. Fasteners were incorrectly 
tightened after a maintenance procedure, which caused a fairing to fall 
and break a window in a passenger coach.
    The remaining ten incidents on the exclusive high speed lines did 
not involve passenger injuries. Five of the incidents recorded involved 
trainsets that struck an animal in the right-of-way. Two of the 
incidents consisted of fire on moving equipment: In one event the fire 
was located in the baggage compartment, cause unknown; and in the other 
it was located in the rear locomotive, due to rolling stock failure. 
Two of the thirteen incidents involved the operation of the passenger 
compartment doors. In one of these events, a trainset door opened and 
was pulled away by the force of the wind while the conductor was 
checking an air leak, and in the second event a passenger compartment 
door opened while the train was moving, due to rolling stock failure. 
Finally, in the last incident a trainset hit concrete covers of 
electrical cable conduits, which was attributed to vandalism.
    In the second category, which includes all mixed high speed/

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conventional lines, eight incidents have been recorded from January 1, 
1990 to June 30, 1996. In this group of accidents, two fatalities 
occurred. The first involved a passenger who boarded the trainset, and 
then subsequently disembarked after departure was underway, and fell 
under the train. The second fatality occurred when a conductor 
attempted to board after train departure and fell between the train and 
platform. In another incident reported in this group, ten injuries 
occurred when a high speed trainset passed an absolute stop signal 
during a switching movement and hit a local train. The injuries 
occurred on the local, conventional train. In the final incident which 
involved injuries, a passenger standing on a platform was injured when 
a shock absorber between two passenger cars broke and kicked up 
ballast.
    The remaining four incidents on the mixed lines occurred due to 
human error. In two instances, the locomotive engineer forgot to apply 
an immobilization brake after a switching movement, and in each case 
the trainset slowly hit another rail car. In one case, an engineer was 
distracted by another individual in the cab and released the brakes. 
The trainset slowly hit a bumper. In the last incident, a trainset 
rolled from a rolling stock repair facility unattended and hit a 
loading ramp.
    Prior to 1990, one significant accident involving TGV equipment is 
noted, in which two fatalities and forty-four injuries occurred. A 
highway vehicle at a public grade crossing entered the railroad right-
of-way and was struck by a TGV trainset. The TGV engineer and a 
passenger were killed and forty-four people were injured. (It is 
important to note here that the FOX high speed rail system will not 
contain any public grade crossings.) A second event is noted in the 
risk assessment concerning a terrorist attack in 1983 in which 
fatalities occurred, but no description of the incident is provided.
    In summary, four fatalities have occurred on the TGV system from 
1981 through June 1996, and none of these occurred on the exclusive 
high speed lines. FRA and, undoubtedly, the SNCF believe that any loss 
of life is one too many. However, given the traffic density, speed of 
travel, and passenger load that the TGV system supports, these figures 
are exceptional. The risk assessment calculates a TGV passenger risk of 
less than 0.99 per billion passenger-miles traveled.
    It is difficult to make many meaningful comparisons between the 
French TGV system and existing passenger service in the United States 
because the operating environment, technology, data collection, and 
equipment differ in a variety of ways. However, the risk assessment 
computes fatality rates based on available information for the TGV 
system in France and the NEC, and those rates provide some context to 
the accident data. According to the risk assessment, the normalized 
passenger risk calculated in per billion passenger-miles for the TGV 
system in France is 5.9% of that for the 1994 NEC.
    FRA understands that differences of opinion may exist concerning 
methodology or conclusions reached in the FOX/FDOT risk assessment. 
Moreover, as explained below, FRA's safety determinations about the FOX 
system are based on its own careful analysis of the proposed system and 
the existing French system. However, the Agency believes the document 
presents useful data concerning the general safety of the French TGV 
system.
    FRA, in conjunction with the Volpe National Transportation Systems 
Center (Volpe), has studied the French TGV system extensively. FRA and 
Volpe technical staff visited France and Belgium in order to examine 
the TGV system in operation, to review the signal system testing as it 
is conducted, and to pose questions to representatives of the SNCF 
concerning details of the system.
    FRA and Volpe staff visited a manufacturing plant in eastern France 
where the equipment is constructed, and met with the plant's staff to 
discuss equipment design, crashworthiness, operating characteristics, 
and construction. FRA and Volpe staff visited a central train 
dispatching center, and studied the practices and required procedures 
that train dispatchers follow to prevent train collisions. FRA and 
Volpe staff spent several days at the signal system test track in 
Belgium to review the test procedures and test results with SNCF 
personnel. In addition, FRA has maintained communications with 
personnel at the test site to follow the progress of the signal testing 
as it proceeds.
    FRA and Volpe staff visited a TGV repair facility in order to 
analyze the existing facility design, and employee practices at repair 
facilities generally. At the repair site, Agency staff received 
training from SNCF personnel on the operation of the major components 
of the TGV rolling stock, and the inspection and maintenance 
frequencies that have been established over time by the SNCF.
    Agency and Volpe staff met with representatives of the French 
government and the SNCF in a series of meetings, and discussed a 
variety of questions concerning governmental oversight of the TGV 
operation, annual safety reviews, the process by which the SNCF revises 
the TGV system safety plan, personnel qualifications, operating rules, 
track maintenance and repair, and the development of new equipment.
    Personnel from Volpe have studied and prepared reports on the 
French TGV, which not only provide a broad overview of the system, but 
also examine individual components and operating practices of the 
system. This, in combination with Volpe's broad expertise in the area 
of high speed rail systems generally, aided the FRA team to make 
effective and rapid comparisons and assessments of the relative safety 
of all aspects of the French TGV as the comprehensive review proceeded. 
Based on its own review of all of the information received, FRA 
possesses a high level of confidence in the safety of many of the major 
elements of the French system that will be duplicated in Florida.

Safety Characteristics of the FOX System

    The FOX system planned for development in Florida contains safety 
features that do not exist on the TGV system in France, and so 
presumably, FOX has the potential to surpass the level of safety that 
exists on the TGV high speed lines. The primary improvements include 
lower traffic density, no opportunity for mixed traffic, an expanded 
intrusion protection system, fewer underpasses and overpasses, an 
advanced technology signal system, and the addition of protective 
station platform doors. In addition, the FOX system includes several 
attributes that do not exist on passenger lines in the U.S., which are 
discussed below, that should also enhance the overall safety of the 
program.
    The traffic density will be lower in Florida than that of the TGV 
system in France. FOX anticipates operating a maximum of eighteen 
trains per day in the first two years of operation, at a rate of 
approximately one train every thirty minutes. FOX plans to increase the 
number to twenty-six per day afterward. In France, approximately 184 
TGV trains run per day. Traffic density has generally been associated 
with train accidents and incidents, and can impact the likelihood and 
severity of train accidents. The expanded train departure intervals on 
FOX are expected to reduce the risk of one train overtaking another or 
train-to-train collisions.
    FOX will operate over a dedicated right-of-way that will not 
include freight

[[Page 65481]]

traffic or other types of passenger equipment. The high speed track in 
France is connected directly to conventional lines and so the risk of 
freight penetrating the high speed tracks exists. In Florida, the track 
will not be connected to rail lines that carry freight traffic. The 
only freight equipment that will be permitted on the FOX system is that 
involved in FOX maintenance or rescue operations. This is a significant 
factor that will eliminate or reduce a variety of risks. First, the 
likelihood of a freight-to-passenger trainset collision, and the high 
casualty rates that would accompany such a collision, will be nearly 
eliminated. Second, the absence of freight traffic will minimize track 
degradation that occurs with the transport of heavy loads, which in 
turn will reduce the risk of track defects that cause train 
derailments. Finally, train dispatchers will not manage districts that 
carry mixed passenger and freight loads, and so the stress and 
confusion that may result from freight and passenger route scheduling 
will be eliminated.
    There will no public at-grade crossings on the FOX system, and so 
the risk of a highway-rail grade crossing accident will be eliminated. 
There are no public at-grade crossings on the TGV high speed lines in 
France, but highway-rail grade crossings are prevalent on the U.S. rail 
system, and account for many human injuries and fatalities. This aspect 
of the FOX system greatly reduces the risk of casualties to railroad 
employees, passengers, and road travelers along the FOX right-of-way.
    FOX will install fencing that runs the length of the right-of-way 
to restrict unauthorized entry, which should minimize the risk of 
accidents involving trespassers and animals. In addition, the FOX 
system will include detection systems for intrusion, high wind, flood 
conditions, and rolling stock that contains dragging equipment. These 
detection systems will be connected to the signal system, and will 
notify the main dispatching center when hazardous events occur. Some of 
these features do not exist on the French TGV, and most do not 
currently exist on American railroads. It is expected that they will 
enhance safety for the FOX system.
    The French TGV operates over a system that includes 490 overpasses 
and 676 underpasses. Current plans for FOX indicate that there will be 
approximately 100 overpasses and 60 underpasses. In addition, there 
will be no moveable bridges on the Florida system, structures that, 
like overpasses and underpasses, tend to increase the need for 
maintenance and the risk of incident.
    FOX will utilize a new signal and train control system that is not 
currently in revenue service anywhere in the world. Trainsets in 
Belgium are testing the system, which is a form of Positive Train 
Control (PTC), and it is anticipated that before FOX commences revenue 
operations, the system will be certified and in use in Europe. Although 
FRA and others familiar with the system generally believe that this new 
variety of signaling will increase railroad safety, there may be some 
risk associated with the introduction of this new component to an 
operative railroad system. The risk assessment prepared for FOX and 
FDOT does not address this factor. However, FRA believes that this item 
deserves significant attention, given the ramifications of a signal 
system failure on high speed passenger lines. This issue deserves 
particular concern in Florida because of the significant risk that 
exists there of extreme weather conditions, i.e., lightning strikes, 
hurricanes, and flooding which could require relatively frequent 
exercise of the safety-critical features of this signal system. As the 
risk assessment notes, these are conditions that do not exist in 
France. FRA must be very cautious in establishing standards for a 
system that has not been used in revenue service, and that will be 
expected to function without fail in a location where catastrophic 
weather conditions are not rare. Therefore, FRA proposes as a 
requirement in this NPRM, a process in which an independent entity with 
proven technical expertise will conduct a review of the safety of the 
safety-critical hardware and software microprocessor-based elements of 
the signal system, which will be submitted to FRA. The proposed 
standards include a brief acceptance procedure that would follow this 
submission and precede implementation of the signal system as finally 
configured. FRA anticipates that this sort of process will accompany 
certification of the system in Europe, which will likely predate FOX 
operations. Given the risks presented by a signaling failure on a 
passenger line traveling at speeds of 200 mph, the Agency believes it 
is necessary to implement standards that formalize such a peer review 
process for FOX in this country. This is very similar to procedures 
that FRA has required other entities to follow concerning signal 
systems. However, FRA invites comment on this and all other proposals 
set forth in the NPRM from interested and expert parties, particularly 
as to the criteria that should be addressed in the peer review, or 
other avenues of achieving the same end.
    Although FRA does not currently enforce safety standards concerning 
passenger stations, it is important to note that the FOX system will 
include protective doors on the station platforms to prevent the risk 
of injury from loose equipment or flying debris. As the TGV safety 
record discussed above points out, passengers waiting to board face the 
risk of injury unless shielded by the sort of protection that will be 
included in the FOX system.
    There are certain advantages to building this new railroad system, 
particularly relating to roadbed and infrastructure, that accrue simply 
because construction will be designed to suit all components of the 
system. For instance, the right-of-way may be selected to suit the 
needs of the track and signaling system. Track curves will be minimized 
during track layout and designed to accommodate speeds in excess of the 
maximum revenue service speed of 200 mph. However, it is important to 
acknowledge, as the risk assessment does, that unique system aspects 
such as sink holes are an ever-present, potential problem in Florida, 
and decrease the safety of the FOX system unless mitigated. FOX plans 
to use geotechnical analysis to look for indicators of sinkhole 
activity prior to installing the track infrastructure. FRA's proposal 
includes a proviso that any abnormalities which arise in the 
construction phase of development must be recorded, and that all 
actions taken in response to the abnormality must be documented. Also, 
this hazard must be accounted for in the FOX system safety plan, which 
will be developed prior to commencing construction. FRA seeks comment 
from interested parties and experts on this subject to determine other 
methods for managing this risk effectively.
    There are two other potential areas of risk that warrant particular 
attention. Neither is fully addressed in the FOX/FDOT risk assessment. 
The first involves the increase in TGV speed from a maximum of 186 mph, 
which is currently used in French operations, to 200 mph, which is 
proposed for Florida operations. The risk assessment states that French 
TGV plans to increase the operating speed to 200 mph, and a safety 
record will have developed in France prior to FOX operations in 
Florida. Unfortunately, FRA finds itself in the position of writing 
safety standards for the system at this juncture, when the appropriate 
safety record concerning these enhanced speeds is unformed. As is also 
noted in the risk assessment, higher train speed tends to

[[Page 65482]]

increase the severity of accidents. The FOX system safety plan must 
address this issue, but we also seek comment from interested parties 
and experts as to the enhanced risk involved, if any, and other viable 
methods of addressing it.
    Second, FRA believes that there is a risk, however intangible, that 
arises from moving this European system to a new culture where the 
pertinent institutional knowledge is not abundant and the role of the 
government in supporting operations is quite different. For instance, 
rolling stock maintenance personnel on FOX will be expected to inspect 
and maintain equipment using unfamiliar tools, in dramatically 
different repair facilities, on equipment that utilizes computers to 
achieve what is traditionally done in the U.S. by visual and manual 
means. No amount of training can achieve the level of professional 
insight that fifteen years of experience on the equipment would 
produce. The risk assessment alludes to this factor in passing, and 
seems to indicate that so long as the TGV equipment, inspection 
frequencies, and procedures are implemented on FOX, nothing is lost and 
no risk ensues.
    FRA agrees that it is very difficult to quantify the value of 
institutional knowledge in a system as large as the French TGV or FOX. 
However, this is not a factor that the Agency can or desires to 
overlook. In discussions with FRA, FOX and FDOT have indicated that 
they plan to bring TGV professionals into the training, maintenance, 
and operation of the system. However, it is impossible to know at this 
point whether or to what extent that participation will occur, as 
revenue operations are not planned to commence until 2004. A variety of 
events may occur between now and then to make those plans difficult or 
impossible to achieve.
    Also factored into this issue of risk, is the knowledge that the 
TGV has a different cost accounting structure, in which the daily 
safety of the operation is not compromised by short-term operating 
costs and long-term capitol costs. The SNCF may be able to make 
purchases and decisions that a private entity would be unable to 
accomplish. FRA is certain that all reputable transportation companies 
have as their first priority the safety of passengers and employees. 
However, the need to be profitable in a privately financial context 
undeniably plays a role in decision making that on occasion impacts 
safety. FRA believes that there may be a connection between the TGV's 
superb safety record and the degree to which the system is financially 
supported that will not exist on the FOX system. There is no way of 
knowing with certainty whether TGV safety is due in some measure to its 
financial structure. Similarly, there is no way of ascertaining at this 
point whether the loss of comprehensive institutional knowledge that is 
bound to occur in Florida will impact the safety of the operation. 
However, FRA believes that the potential for these safety risks is 
sufficient to make preventative measures sensible.
    In this proposal, FRA seeks to address these concerns with 
standards that provide a very high level of safety in areas where FRA 
believes French TGV safety cannot or will not be met in Florida. FRA 
anticipates that the petitioner may object to the imposition of certain 
of the proposed standards that require more than is currently the 
practice in France. However, given the risk factors outlined above, the 
grave potential for human loss in the event of an accident, and the 
flexibility that is incorporated into the proposal, FRA believes at 
this time that any perceived burdens are justified.

System Safety

    System safety is the cornerstone of the French TGV, and as proposed 
in these standards, the heart of the FOX high speed rail system. The 
systems approach to safety is used pervasively in a variety of 
industries to reduce the likelihood and occurrence of accidents and 
injuries. FRA has discussed the need for this approach to safety in two 
recent rulemakings, Passenger Train Emergency Standards, 62 FR 8330 
(February 24, 1996), and Passenger Equipment Safety Standards, 62 FR 
49728 (September 23, 1997). This concept requires an organization to 
identify, evaluate, and reduce or eliminate safety hazards that exist 
in any portion of the organization's ``system,'' or may be caused by 
interrelationships between various components of that system, and 
create a system safety plan to reflect those evaluations. Where 
possible, the development of a system safety plan precedes the design, 
construction, and operation of the system, so that potential risks are 
eliminated at the earliest possible opportunity. Once in place, system 
safety plans are viewed as living documents, which should be updated as 
circumstances change, new information becomes available, or goals 
shift. Therefore, incremental changes may be made on a daily basis, if 
appropriate, to reflect the safety needs of the organization. 
Typically, system safety plans should be formally updated on an annual 
basis, in order to maintain their utility in advancing safety with the 
best information available.
    The French TGV utilizes a system safety approach whose primary goal 
or philosophy is to avoid collisions. This varies from an accident-
mitigation philosophy, which seeks to maximize protection for employees 
and others at risk in the event of an accident. The FOX system, as 
planned, will operate under the theory of collision-avoidance. Examples 
of this philosophy at work in the design of the system are: the grade 
separated right-of-way that excludes public at-grade crossings; double 
track that will facilitate train movements side-by-side rather than 
end-to-end; and the PTC-style signal system that will prevent trains 
from being routed on collision courses, whether meeting or overtaking.
    Subpart B of the NPRM requires FOX to prepare a system safety plan. 
For the most part, these proposed standards parallel the FOX Petition, 
and address every phase and component of the FOX system. However, FRA's 
proposal also includes the proviso that FOX submit the system safety 
plan to FRA for approval one year after the effective date of the final 
rule in this matter, and that the plan be updated at least annually. 
Based on the philosophy of systems planning, FRA believes that 
initiating this process prior to design and construction is critical to 
the development of a complete system safety plan and a safe high speed 
rail system. FRA understands, however, that this rulemaking proceeding 
predates much of the work involved in the Florida project, and so 
filing a complete system safety plan within one year of the final rule 
may be difficult. FRA seeks comment on this proposal, including 
suggestions for other methods of addressing this issue. For instance, 
perhaps the standard should impose a tiered completion date for 
portions of the system safety plan. On the other hand, a tiered system 
may undermine the purpose and philosophy of the system safety approach. 
FRA would find it helpful to know exactly when FDOT and FOX plan to 
initiate the final design, based on the specific right-of-way chosen, 
and the construction of the system. This information would likely 
inform the Agency's decision on the appropriate timing for submission 
of the system safety plan. It is important to note, however, that while 
FRA has not predetermined the specific outcome of this issue, the 
Agency believes in general terms that a fairly comprehensive system 
safety plan should precede the design and construction phases of the 
FOX system.

[[Page 65483]]

FRA's Proposal

    FRA has made every attempt in this NPRM to facilitate the transfer 
of the excellence of the French equipment and operation, by proposing 
standards that would permit the TGV equipment and procedures to operate 
in the U.S. in the same fashion as is done in France. However, in 
several areas, FRA has gone beyond or varied from the French standards 
and practices where the Agency believed it necessary to do so in order 
to ensure the highest level of safety. FRA's proposal includes 
requirements, organized in chapters by subject matter, to address 
general legal principles, system safety, signaling, track, rolling 
stock, operating practices, system qualification testing, personnel 
qualifications, and power distribution. In addition, the proposal 
adopts and incorporates by reference several existing regulations that 
apply generally to all railroads operating in the U.S. These are listed 
specifically in Subpart A of the NPRM, and constitute areas in which 
FOX needs no special treatment. In other words, for these safety 
disciplines, FOX is so similar to the general railroad industry that no 
new standards are necessary. For instance, FRA's alcohol and drug 
regulations impose no burdens that are inherently impossible for FOX to 
meet or that are inconsistent with the FOX operation, and so these 
standards and any future amendments to them would apply to FOX.
    FRA's proposal is similar in many ways to the Petition FOX filed. 
The FOX consortium includes entities that have been involved with the 
design, construction, and operation of the TGV equipment, and so FRA 
has made every effort to study their submission and replicate it in 
proposed standards where appropriate. Their assistance in this 
rulemaking proceeding is, and will continue to be, quite informative 
and helpful. However, it is important to note that railroads in the 
U.S. operate under a different legal framework than exists in France, 
and the differences are relevant in understanding why FRA changed some 
standards in the NPRM that were not in the Petition.
    The French government has issued laws which broadly call for a safe 
railroad system, but which delegate that responsibility, in large 
measure, to the SNCF. Therefore, the SNCF, or TGV operator, establishes 
its own safety parameters and implements them. Each year, the SNCF 
files a report with the government that outlines the safety record of 
the previous year, emerging trends, and proposed changes to the 
operation. However, there are no government-issued regulations that 
mandate TGV activities or authorize enforcement of rules. There is no 
relationship equivalent to this in the U.S. regulatory or 
transportation system. There are political, legal, cultural, and 
financial differences at work here, and the result is that the FOX 
Petition omitted some internal SNCF guidelines that FRA believes would 
or should be regulations in the U.S. system. For instance, some of the 
FOX supplemental materials include a list of rolling stock components 
that are inspected at specified intervals in France. These intervals 
and items developed internally at SNCF over years of operational 
experience. Although FOX has expressed the intention to follow the SNCF 
internal guidelines in Florida, FRA believes that these guidelines 
should be part of the minimum Federal standards for the FOX system. 
Similarly, FRA has included a proviso in the Operating Practices 
Subpart that requires FRA approval of the FOX safety-critical operating 
rules prior to commencing operations. This was not part of the 
Petition, but FRA proposes it in the interest of ensuring that the 
internal, and at this time, undisclosed, SNCF-TGV operating rules will 
be followed on FOX. FRA values the internal guidelines that have 
developed in France over many areas, believes that they may be 
equivalent to U.S. Federal safety standards, and desires to incorporate 
them into the minimum Federal standards.
    In addition to the reasons discussed above, the NPRM takes a 
different approach on some issues from that found in the Petition, 
based on the regulatory program that exists in this country, which has 
governed railroad operations for decades. FRA has a mandate to devise 
standards that protect the public, have a rational basis, and do not 
impose needless cost. FRA's existing regulatory program achieves these 
goals, and therefore, it would be unwise to vary from it greatly unless 
the subject matter requires a substantially different treatment given 
the nature of the FOX system. If FRA were to stray significantly from 
the existing U.S. safety standards in this proceeding, despite the fact 
that it will only apply to FOX, serious questions might be raised 
concerning the appropriateness of this proposal.
    It is important to note that this proposal and many individual 
standards in it would be inappropriate for any other U.S. passenger or 
freight operation. The safety features of the FOX system, taken as a 
whole, do not exist in combination on any other railroad in this 
country. This uniqueness is the basis on which the proposal is made, 
and the treatment of any specific issue here should not be viewed as a 
regulatory trend for passenger operations generally. In this proposal, 
FRA has relied to a great extent on the operating environment in which 
FOX will exist, and unless that environment is duplicated in identical 
fashion elsewhere, these standards would not be suitable.
    FRA believes that this proposal includes a reasonable and effective 
blend of proven practices and procedures from both the French TGV 
system and American railroading. However, with publication of this 
NPRM, FRA invites comment from all interested parties on each standard 
proposed. FRA requests comments on whether less or more permissive 
standards should be adopted, with supporting rationale; whether 
inspection frequencies should be increased or decreased, or are 
sufficient as written, with supporting rationale; whether FRA should 
widen or narrow the scope of subject matters covered by standards for 
the FOX system, and the reasons for such a change; whether FRA has 
assessed accurately the safety of French TGV and the risks that may 
arise on the FOX system in Florida; and any other areas that commenters 
deem necessary in order to produce final safety standards that are 
effective.
* * * * *

Section-by-Section Analysis

Subpart A--General Requirements

Section 243.1  Purpose and Scope
    Paragraph (a) states that the purpose of this proposal is to 
prevent accidents, injuries, and property damage that could result from 
operation of FOX, or ``Railroad,'' as the system is called throughout 
the rule text. Also, this section explains that the scope of the Part 
is to provide minimum Federal safety standards for the Railroad. The 
Railroad may adopt more stringent requirements so long as they are not 
inconsistent with this rule.
Section 243.3  Applicability
    Paragraph (a) of this section explains that this Part would apply 
only to the FOX system in Florida, and not to any other railroad 
operating in the U.S. Also, this paragraph restricts the FOX operation 
to the specific boundaries that are described in the system 
description, Sec. 243.13 of the rule, unless FOX obtains prior approval 
from FRA. Therefore, if FOX desires to build a new line in the future, 
the Railroad would have to receive FRA approval prior to commencing 
operations on that line.

[[Page 65484]]

(The term ``approval'' is used loosely here. Conceivably, FOX could 
file a Petition for Rulemaking amending the system description to 
include the new line, and FRA's issuance of the new section would 
achieve the desired result.) FRA believes that such approval would be 
necessary to ensure that the new line meets all of the appropriate 
standards that exist in this Part. For instance, there could be no 
grade crossings or mixed traffic on the line. The TGV equipment is 
structurally different than passenger equipment currently in use in 
this country, and would not respond to a collision with a freight train 
in the same manner. The standards in this proposal permit 200 mph 
travel with this equipment because of the other operating conditions 
that exist on FOX, and FRA must ensure that those conditions also exist 
on any new lines that develop. Paragraph (a) reflects the fact that the 
standards in this proposed rule of particular applicability are 
appropriate for the FOX system only when all of the system elements are 
present; the systems approach demands this result. If an integral 
portion of the system disappears, all of the standards would have to be 
reevaluated.
    Paragraph (b) of this section states that Part 243, rather than the 
general safety standards currently found in Title 49 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations (CFR), would govern the FOX system. However, in 
recognition of the fact that the FOX system is similar or identical to 
conventional railroad operations in certain areas, this paragraph also 
states that some of the general standards, which are adopted and 
incorporated in paragraph (c), shall apply to FOX. Paragraphs (b) and 
(c) work in conjunction with one another, so that the two taken as a 
whole constitute all of the railroad safety regulations that would 
apply to FOX at this time. Therefore, any regulations found in Title 49 
of the CFR that have not been adopted and incorporated in paragraph (c) 
do not apply to FOX.
    Paragraph (c) of this section lists the general railroad safety 
standards found in Title 49 of the CFR that apply to the FOX system. 
The subject areas are: Part 209, Safety Enforcement Procedures; Part 
210, Railroad Noise Emission Compliance Regulations; Part 211, Rules of 
Practice; Part 212, State Safety Participation Regulations; Part 214, 
Railroad Workplace Safety; Part 216, Special Notice and Emergency Order 
Procedures; Part 218, Railroad Operating Practices; Part 219, Control 
of Alcohol and Drug Use; Part 220, Radio Standards and Procedures; Part 
225, Railroad Accidents/Incidents: Reports, Classification, and 
Investigations; Part 228, Hours of Service of Railroad Employees; 
Sec. 135 of Part 229, Event Recorders; Part 235, except Sec. 235.7, 
Instructions Governing Applications for Approval of a Discontinuance or 
Material Modification of a Signal System or Relief from the 
Requirements of Part 236; Part 240, except Secs. 240.227 and 240.229, 
Qualification and Certification of Locomotive Engineers; Part 215, 
Railroad Freight Car Standards, Part 229, Railroad Locomotive Safety 
Standards, Part 232, Locomotive Inspection, Part 231, Railroad Safety 
Appliance Standards, and Part 232, Railroad Power Brakes and Drawbars 
shall all apply to the FOX conventional equipment; and FRA's proposed 
Passenger Train Emergency Standards, which will be codified when 
finalized in 49 CFR Part 239. Because these standards are suitable to 
apply to the FOX system as they are currently written, FRA is adopting 
and incorporating them to avoid massive reprinting. As has been stated 
earlier in this proposal, each of these standards address safety issues 
in a manner that is consistent with the FOX operation.
    While the relevance to FOX of most of the incorporated rules is 
clear, the relevance of some CFR parts and the reasons that some 
sections are specifically not adopted requires some discussion. First, 
49 CFR 235.7 of the signal modification standards permits a railroad to 
forego filing an application for approval concerning certain signal 
modifications. FRA believes that the more prudent approach would be to 
require FOX to apply for any modifications of its signal system for 
several reasons. The system FOX plans to utilize does not possess a 
long revenue service safety history for which future events are 
predictable. As planned, the system will carry thousands of passengers 
each year, and the cost in human lives for a signal failure could be 
catastrophic. FRA believes that these factors point to the need for 
Federal oversight concerning any modification of the FOX signal system. 
Accordingly, 49 CFR 235.7 will not apply to FOX. Instead, any 
modification of the Railroad's signal system must be accounted for in 
the system safety plan and be done cautiously in order to enhance the 
integrity of the system safety approach.
    Second, the Petition did not include Part 240 in the list of 
regulations to be incorporated by reference in this rule. As FRA 
understands it, FOX plans to identify the personnel who will operate 
the power cars on the system as ``enginemen'' and so they object to 
Part 240 and its pervasive use of the term ``locomotive engineer.'' FRA 
chose this term in Part 240 for a variety of reasons, none of which 
relate to the gender, union status, or other extraneous background 
details of the in-cab personnel who direct locomotive movements. The 
term is a functional distinction that applies to the performance of a 
locomotive engineer, power car driver, or engineman. Therefore, FRA 
finds no merit in reissuing Part 240 in this proceeding in order to 
change the title of a cadre of employees. FRA has no interest in 
mandating the use of any occupational title on any railroad. However, 
the Agency does have an interest in and obligation to use language that 
is gender-neutral and consistent with existing terminology, to the 
fullest extent possible.
    It is also important to note that FRA's proposal does not 
incorporate 49 CFR 240.227 and 49 CFR 240.229 for application to FOX. 
These sections relate to joint operations with Canadian railroads, and 
with other railroads in the U.S. Neither of these scenarios can occur 
on the FOX system for reasons of geography and more importantly, 
safety, and therefore, it is important to exclude these sections 
explicitly from application to FOX.
    Third, FRA's proposal includes the adoption of several existing 
standards that govern the maintenance, inspection, and operation of 
conventional freight equipment (Parts 215, 229, 230, 231, and 232). FRA 
believes that these requirements must be included here in order to 
protect employees and the public in instances where conventional 
equipment must be used on the FOX operation. As FRA understands it, FOX 
will likely have in its fleet conventional railroad equipment to 
facilitate maintenance and rescue operations in yards and along the 
right-of-way. FRA believes that where these limited operations arise, 
the existing safety standards should apply. There is nothing in the 
Petition or background information concerning FOX that would make 
application of these standards inappropriate or deleterious to safety. 
Moreover, the employees involved with the movement of conventional 
equipment must possess all of the protections that accompany 
conventional operations on other properties.
    Fourth, FRA has adopted safety standards relating to emergency 
preparedness for application on the FOX network. FRA does not 
understand FOX to object to imposition of these standards, but because 
they were in proposed, rather than final, form at the time of Petition 
filing, FOX did not list them among the standards incorporated.

[[Page 65485]]

In this proposal, FRA adopts the emergency preparedness standards as 
proposed at this time, and ultimately as they appear in final form. FRA 
anticipates that these standards will be finalized in the very near 
future and codified at 49 CFR part 239.
    Finally, FOX expressed the desire to adopt and incorporate by 
reference the existing general safety standards without also adopting 
future amendments to these standards. FRA does not agree with this 
approach to the general safety standards. By their very nature, these 
standards address subject matters that present no need for special 
treatment on FOX. Following this logic to its natural conclusion, FRA 
presumes that amendments to these same subject matters will not present 
the need for special proceedings or considerations for FOX. If proposed 
amendments give rise to safety concerns on the FOX system, FOX will 
have every opportunity, as a vital and responsible member of the U.S. 
railroad system, to provide comments in the normal course of regulatory 
process in those areas.
    Paragraph (d) states that FOX is a railroad, pursuant to the 
definition set forth by statute, which includes, in pertinent part 
``high speed ground transportation systems that connect metropolitan 
areas, without regard to whether those systems use new technologies not 
associated with traditional railroads * * *'' Therefore, all of the 
railroad safety statutes (including those pertaining to hours of 
service) apply to FOX, except portions of the former Safety Appliance 
Acts, from which FRA proposes that FOX be exempted due to the advanced 
technology in use that makes those requirements unnecessary. (The issue 
of new technology and safety appliances is discussed in detail in the 
analysis of Sec. 243.15 below.)
    Paragraph (e) states that the measurement values provided in the 
rule are in metric form, which is due to the fact that the TGV 
equipment was designed abroad according to metric standards. The NPRM 
includes the U.S. equivalent to provide an adequate frame of reference 
for interested parties. FRA has some concern that the American 
workforce, which maintains and inspects conventional railroad equipment 
using tools and measurements in U.S. standard values, may experience a 
period of adjustment in converting to the metric system. The FOX 
personnel qualification program, set forth in Subpart H, must address 
this potential safety factor.
Section 243.5  Definitions
    As a general rule of regulatory construction, definitions provide 
clarity and understanding to the reader. Definitions should not include 
legal requirements, and should not somehow hide the true meaning of a 
standard. FRA's proposal makes changes to many definitions that were 
provided in the Petition where those definitions were unclear, 
contained legal requirements, or limited the scope of a standard's 
application. In addition, FRA has added to the list of definitions 
included in the Petition where necessary, and deleted those that 
involved terms not used in the proposed standards.
    Most of the definitions included in this section have been 
published in other rulemaking proceedings, or have straightforward 
meaning, and so additional discussion on them is unnecessary. However, 
a few terms should be explained.
    FRA would like to emphasize that the term ``employee'' used 
throughout the proposed rule includes Railroad employees, as well as 
the employees of contractors engaged by the Railroad. Therefore, 
contractors must comply with the requirements of the rule, and FOX may 
not avoid the Railroad's compliance with the standards through the use 
of contracting entities.
    The terms ``in passenger service'' and ``in revenue service'' have 
identical meaning, and include all trains, trainsets, and passenger 
equipment that are carrying or are available to carry passengers. The 
determination as to whether a fare has been paid is not relevant to 
establishing the status of the equipment. The term ``in service'' 
includes equipment that is in revenue or passenger service, as well as 
other passenger equipment, unless the equipment falls into one of three 
categories: it is being handled as defective under Sec. 243.15 of the 
proposal; or it is in a repair shop or repair track; or it is on a 
storage track without passengers. Generally, the Railroad will be 
subject to civil penalty for any equipment that is ``in service'' in 
noncomplying condition.
    The term ``power car'' refers to a type of locomotive used on the 
TGV system that is typically positioned at the beginning and end of a 
passenger trainset. Power cars contain a cab in which the locomotive 
engineer controls the train's movement. As proposed for FOX, every 
passenger trainset will contain a power car at each end with eight 
trailer cars between them. FOX proposed a definition that would have 
set power cars apart from locomotives, but FRA finds no reason to 
define the term in that way. Also, it is important to note that the 
power cars and trailer cars are articulated and connected in such a way 
as to resist buckling in the event of a derailment. The term ``semi-
permanent connectors'' describes the connections that exist among and 
between the trailer and power cars of a TGV trainset. These connections 
are significantly different from couplers that exist on conventional 
equipment. These connections are designed so that they may be 
disconnected only by use of special tools, and only in repair 
facilities. Because of this design, employees will not be involved in 
coupling or uncoupling at locations where they would face the risk of 
injury that arises from working between rail equipment. Conventional 
couplers will only be present on the leading or trailing ends of each 
trainset, and will be used primarily for attachment during rescue 
operations. Section 243.431 of the proposal sets forth the requirements 
that govern the use of conventional couplers and semi-permanent 
connectors.
    FRA has revised the speed definitions that the Petition contained. 
Many of the definitions appeared to be circular in their use of 
terminology and so would not provide sufficient clarity and notice to 
the public. As FRA understands it, some of the speed definitions would 
be pertinent to a matrix that will be developed for use in the system 
safety plan, concerning train speed and braking capacity. Until such 
chart exists, the definitions serve no purpose and may ultimately be 
erroneous or inconsistent with the signal system. Therefore, FRA 
proposes a simplified approach. ``Maximum authorized speed'' is defined 
as the maximum speed at which trains may operate safely, taking into 
account all right-of-way, rolling stock, weather, and other operating 
conditions. ``Maximum revenue service speed'' is 200 mph, which cannot 
be exceeded under any circumstance. ``Maximum safe operating speed'' is 
the maximum speed at which braking can occur without damage to the 
discs or wheels. ``Slow speed'' is any speed less than 20 mph, and 
``restricted speed'' is a speed that is less than 20 mph that will 
facilitate stopping within half the range of vision of the locomotive 
engineer.
    FRA requests comments on these changes to the FOX proposed 
definitions, as well as all definitions proposed in this NPRM. FRA also 
requests comment on whether additional definitions should be provided 
in the rule text that FRA may have overlooked in preparing this 
proposal.

[[Page 65486]]

Section 243.7  Responsibility for Compliance
    This section sets forth the compliance and liability requirements 
that will govern FOX operations. Paragraph (a) proposes that the 
Railroad will be strictly liable for all violations of the standards 
set forth in this rule, except where equipment is not ``in use'' or 
with respect to violations of the track standards. To establish a 
violation of the equipment standards, FRA must demonstrate that the 
equipment was in use, but need not demonstrate any level of knowledge 
on the part of the Railroad or other violator. To establish a violation 
of the track standards, FRA must show a failure to exercise reasonable 
care.
    Paragraph (b) states that passenger equipment will be considered 
``in use'' before a train has departed, but after the equipment has 
received or should have received the appropriate inspection. This 
proposal mirrors the approach taken in FRA's proposed rule on Passenger 
Equipment Safety Standards. 62 FR 49728, 49756. The result of this 
language is that FRA need not wait for a train to depart a terminal 
before issuing a citation for a defective condition. FRA believes that 
this authority is consistent with the purpose of our safety program--to 
reduce railroad accidents and injuries, and is prudent in its 
application to FOX.
    Paragraph (c) states that this rule is applicable to the Railroad 
and to any person performing functions required by the rule. Although 
the proposal expresses the duties imposed by the rule in terms of the 
Railroad, FRA wishes to make clear that any person who performs on 
behalf of the Railroad an action that is covered by the proposed rule 
is required to perform that action in the same manner as required of 
the Railroad.
    Paragraph (d) relates to track and states that the Railroad 
operator is responsible for compliance with all track safety provisions 
set forth in Subpart D of the proposal. FRA proposes this language to 
avoid any questions of track ownership, which are particularly 
important here because FRA does not know at this juncture which entity 
will purchase and own the right-of-way to be used for the FOX system. 
This language is different from the approach taken in 49 CFR part 213, 
FRA's existing track standards, which permit an owner to assign 
responsibility for operation of the track system to another entity. FRA 
obviates the need for the assignment process set forth in 49 CFR 213.5 
by proposing that the Railroad operator, rather than the right-of-way 
owner, shall be responsible for track safety requirements.
    When the Railroad operator has knowledge, or a reasonable person 
exercising reasonable care would have knowledge, that the track does 
not comply with the regulations, the Railroad operator has four 
options: it may bring the track into compliance; it may halt operations 
over the track; it may continue operations over the noncomplying track 
at 10 mph, for 30 days, under the authority of qualified personnel; or 
it may operate under the operational limits established for track 
classes 1-5, as set forth in 49 CFR part 213.
    The Petition did not provide this level of flexibility for 
operations when track noncompliance occurs, and on occasion was silent 
or unclear concerning ameliorative action. For instance, the Petition 
called for ``immediate remedial action'' for some defects, but failed 
to specify the required actions. Also, the Petition established time 
periods for certain defects, in which conditions could go uncorrected. 
FRA believes that the options established in this section greatly 
enhance safety, provide clarity, and increase flexibility for the 
Railroad. There must be some provision in the standards for moving 
equipment that carries passengers to their final destination when a 
noncomplying event occurs on the Railroad track. FRA prefers to include 
these options rather than dictate one response, in order to allow the 
Railroad to choose the best alternative, given the existing operating 
conditions. This proposed section grants the Railroad broader and more 
comprehensive alternatives than were included in the Petition. FOX has 
stated that the French TGV track rarely reaches the condition that 
would warrant any of the measures discussed here. FRA is hopeful that 
will also be the case in Florida, but the Agency must provide a 
rational and safe response in the event of noncomplying track 
conditions.
Section 243.9  Enforcement
    This section describes the civil penalties that FRA may impose on 
any person, including the Railroad or an independent contractor 
providing goods or services to the Railroad, that violates any 
requirement of this rule. These penalty provisions parallel the civil 
penalty provisions in numerous other railroad safety regulations, and 
are authorized by 49 U.S.C. 21301, 21302, 21303, and 21304. Any person 
who violates a requirement of this rule may be subject to a penalty of 
$500 to $10,000 per violation. Individuals may be subject to penalties 
for willful violations only. Where a pattern of repeated violations, or 
a grossly negligent violation creates an imminent hazard of death or 
injury, or causes death or injury, penalties of up to $20,000 may be 
assessed. In addition, each day a violation continues constitutes a 
separate offense. Finally, a person may be subject to criminal 
penalties under 49 U.S.C. 21311 for knowingly and willfully falsifying 
reports required by these regulations. FRA believes that inclusion of 
the penalty provisions is important in ensuring that compliance is 
achieved.
    The final rule will include a schedule of civil penalties as 
Appendix A. Penalty schedules are considered statements of agency 
policy, and so notice and comment are not required prior to their 
issuance. See 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(A). Nevertheless, FRA invites comment 
on proposed penalty amounts.
Section 243.11  Preemptive Effect
    This section informs the public as to FRA's views regarding what 
will be the preemptive effect of the final rule in this proceeding. The 
presence or absence of this does not, in itself, affect the preemptive 
effect of a final rule, but it does inform the public concerning the 
statutory provision which governs the preemptive effect of a rule. 
Section 20106 of title 49 of the United States Code provides that all 
regulations prescribed by the Secretary relating to railroad safety 
preempt any State law, regulation, or order covering the same subject 
matter, except a provision necessary to eliminate or reduce an 
essentially local safety hazard that is not incompatible with a Federal 
law, regulation, or order and that does not unreasonably burden 
interstate commerce. With the exception of a provision directed at an 
essentially local safety hazard, 49 U.S.C. 20106 will preempt any State 
regulatory agency rule covering the same subject matter as the 
regulations proposed today when issued as final rules.
Section 243.13  System Description
    This section describes the FOX system components. In addition, and 
more importantly, this provision requires FOX to include all of the 
elements and practices listed in this section when revenue operations 
begin. FRA has determined that the items discussed in this section are 
so integral to the overall safety of the FOX program, that all 
standards contained in this NPRM would have to be reevaluated if FOX 
failed to include, construct, or meet any of these system elements.
    FRA's existing regulatory program does not include this sort of 
requirement in any other safety

[[Page 65487]]

discipline or context. However, due to the nature of the system safety, 
accident-avoidance philosophy that FOX has adopted in the design of the 
system, which FRA reflects in the proposed standards, FRA believes that 
it is necessary to include these requirements. It is important to note 
here that many of the standards proposed for FOX, if adopted 
separately, might lead to unsafe conditions in other operating 
environments. In fact, many of these standards would be wholly 
inappropriate on other railroads in this country where the full panoply 
of accident-avoidant measures are not also present. Therefore, FRA must 
ensure that the key system elements of this operating environment, on 
which all of the standards are ultimately based, remain in the system 
as finally configured. FRA's enforcement authority extends to this 
section as it does to all others in the rule, and the Railroad's 
failure to meet any condition specified in this section will be subject 
to civil penalty or other appropriate remedy. The FOX Petition 
contained a system description section, and it included most of the 
components enumerated here in FRA's proposal. However, FRA has deleted 
some unnecessary detail, and added a few proposals that were not 
contemplated by the Petition.
    Paragraph (a) sets forth the general parameters of the FOX system. 
Paragraph (a)(1) establishes the geographic limits of the system, which 
are Miami to Tampa via Orlando. Operations beyond these limits are 
prohibited without prior FRA approval. FRA believes that it is 
extremely important to restrict the high speed operations to the right-
of-way that is known at this time. For instance, if the Railroad 
chooses to expand its operation to cover track that includes freight 
traffic or grade crossings, many of the safety standards in this 
proposal would not adequately protect passengers. If FOX decides to 
increase the boundaries of the system, that should be accomplished 
through a thoughtful, methodical process that includes FRA oversight 
and public comment. FOX may accomplish this by filing a petition for 
rulemaking to develop new standards, or a petition to amend this 
section of the rule, if adopted in this form in the final standard in 
this proceeding.
    Paragraph (a)(2) states that trains may not under any circumstance 
exceed a speed of 200 mph, and that the Railroad must operate at all 
times in accordance with the requirements of the rule. This language is 
meant to cover those situations in which conditions warrant certain 
speeds that may not be at or near 200 mph. For instance, if severe 
weather causes flooding or high wind, the FOX operating rules would 
require significant speed restrictions. This language makes clear that 
FOX must adhere to the speed restrictions, regardless of the maximum 
system capability of 200 mph.
    Paragraph (a)(3) prohibits the transport of any hazardous material 
on the FOX high speed rail system. Although the Petition did not 
contain this restriction, FRA believes that safety demands it. An 
accident involving passengers at high speed would be catastrophic 
alone; adding hazardous materials to the mix would greatly reduce 
safety for the passengers, the surrounding environment, and local 
residents.
    Paragraph (a)(4) prohibits smoking on trains while they are used in 
passenger service. FRA believes that fire safety is a key component for 
any passenger operation, and by prohibiting smoking, the potential for 
fire in passenger compartments is greatly reduced. In other sections of 
this proposal, FRA requires passenger equipment to include flame-
retardant materials and fire detection systems, and FRA believes that 
all requirements are necessary to protect the public from fire hazards 
on passenger trains. Flame-retardent materials and detection systems 
greatly minimize the risk of injury due to fire and smoke inhalation. A 
ban on smoking further increases the level of passenger safety by 
eliminating a prime causal factor from the equipment altogether. The 
U.S. airline industry has adopted this approach with little or no 
passenger complaint, and FRA believes that nonsmoking high speed rail 
service will experience a similar outcome. Nonsmokers and employees 
would be protected from the hazards and discomfort of second-hand 
smoke, and smokers would have a relatively short trip--approximately 
150 minutes from Miami to Tampa, without the opportunity to smoke. This 
item was not included in the Petition, but FRA believes that its safety 
interest in protecting employees and the traveling public makes this 
proposal a valid and important one.
    Paragraph (b) describes the proposed requirements for the FOX 
right-of-way. This section requires FOX to operate over dedicated 
track, and prohibits any joint operations with freight or other 
passenger service. The Railroad would be permitted to operate 
conventional vehicles of its own to facilitate maintenance and rescue 
operations, but no other mixed freight or passenger service could 
occur. Paragraph (b)(2) prohibits public at-grade crossings throughout 
the right-of-way, and states that animal and equipment crossings not 
controlled by the Railroad must be accomplished by an underpass or 
overpass. As previously discussed, this characteristic of the FOX 
system greatly enhances railroad safety, and must be a part of the 
system as finally configured, if all other safety standards are to 
remain in place. The right-of-way may include private grade crossings 
that are for the exclusive use of the Railroad. FRA believes that this 
is necessary for the Railroad to complete repairs, inspections, 
construction, rescue movements, or other normal internal operations.
    Paragraphs (b)(3), (4), and (5) require a permanent fence along the 
entire right-of-way; require intrusion, flood, high wind, hot box, and 
dragging equipment detectors along the right-of-way where deemed 
necessary by the system safety plan and Chapter 3 of this proposal; and 
limit access for Railroad employees to certain intervals along the 
right-of-way. FRA expects that these aspects of the FOX plan will 
enhance safety by reducing or eliminating the incidence of animals, 
trespassers, highway vehicles, and undesirable or unexpected events 
that could interrupt or impact safe train operation. However, FRA 
requests additional information from FOX as to the type of fencing that 
will be utilized along the right-of-way. Certain fences are designed to 
eliminate entirely the risk of unathorized entry and would enhance 
railroad safety greatly. However, these fences may be unnecessary along 
portions of the right-of-way where the system safety plan determines 
that the risk of entry from individuals, vehicles, or animals is 
negligible. Fences used along highways are generally designed to 
prevent cars from leaving the highway right-of way, rather than to 
restrict intrusion from individuals or animals. Therefore, typical 
highway fencing may not be effective in populated areas along the FOX 
right-of-way. In short, there are a variety of factors that must be 
considered in determining the appropriate design and strength for 
fencing along the FOX right-of-way. As FRA understands the situation, 
FOX has not yet finalized the location of the right-of-way, and so it 
may be premature to dictate strict guidelines concerning fencing. 
However, FRA will consider the risk factors presented and whether 
establishing specific fencing requirements would be appropriate in this 
proceeding. FRA requests a description from FOX as to what is planned 
in the way of fencing, and

[[Page 65488]]

invites comment from interested parties on appropriate fencing 
standards.
    Paragraph (b)(6) provides that the Railroad will build walkways 
along the right-of-way, which will be used primarily for inspection 
activities or rescue operations. In order to ensure the safety of 
workers and rescue personnel, the walkways must be built at a safe 
distance from the track, which the proposed standard sets at a minimum 
of 7.87 feet from the outside rail. This means that the Railroad's 
walkways must be built at least 7.87 feet from the field side of the 
rail, or in other words, the rail that is farthest from the Railroad's 
double track. Due to the track centerlines that have been proposed in 
paragraph (d) of this section and the requirement that any walkway be 
at least 7.87 feet from the outside rail, the Railroad cannot build 
walkways between the double track. Such a scenario could lead to 
hazardous conditions for employees or rescue personnel forced to work 
between the Railroad's two tracks, in close proximity to moving, high 
speed equipment.
    Paragraph (b)(7) requires the Railroad to design the right-of-way 
so that it will accommodate high speed travel, meaning curves should be 
avoided or large, so that the risk of derailment and excessive braking 
is reduced. Paragraphs (b)(8) and (9) require the Railroad to record 
all difficulties or abnormalities discovered during the construction 
phase of this project, and make available to FRA the track layout 
drawings that must include specified information. FRA believes that 
this section is critical to the safety of the FOX infrastructure and 
high speed operations. As discussed earlier, sink holes and other 
potentially dangerous sub-grade formations and conditions are prevalent 
in Florida, and create serious risks for FOX unless mitigated. One of 
the most serious high speed accidents in France occurred because an 
unknown, underground World War I trench collapsed under the weight of a 
TGV trainset. FRA proposes in this section to eliminate the risk that 
such an accident could occur in Florida. This section was also included 
in the FOX Petition.
    Paragraph (b)(10) proposes that all highway bridges that cross the 
right-of-way be constructed so that drivers of motor vehicles will have 
a clear view of the right-of-way, and so that the potential for 
vehicles falling into the right-of-way are minimized to the fullest 
extent possible. It is also important to note that this proposal is 
bolstered by the fall intrusion detection systems that are required by 
Subpart C. The detection systems will alert the Railroad to any 
vehicles that enter the right-of-way, but this section requires an 
additional level of safety by mandating highway overpass design that 
will minimize the risk of a vehicle entering the right-of-way in the 
first place. Similarly, paragraph (b)(11) requires the Railroad to 
protect railroad bridges, if they are necessary, from impact. Railroad 
operations are vulnerable to accident when railroad bridges are struck 
by road or water transport. The track or signal systems on the bridge 
may be disturbed to such an extent that a derailment or signal 
malfunction occurs. This proposal seeks to avoid that by requiring FOX 
to erect a barrier or other device that will protect the bridge 
structure from a sudden strike or movement. If tunnels become necessary 
on the FOX right-of-way, paragraph (b)(12) requires the Railroad to 
design and construct them to minimize the safety hazards connected with 
excessive air pressure in the tunnel created by the operation of 
trains.
    Paragraph(b)(13) restricts track crossings in areas where operating 
speeds reach 100 mph to locations where designated track crossing 
devices are installed. The track crossing devices must be installed 
where frequent crossing by employees is anticipated, such as turnouts 
and substations. Paragraph (b)(14) requires the Railroad to install 
emergency traffic stop or slow devices at certain intervals along the 
right-of-way, and at special locations such as turnouts, substations, 
block section limits, or autotransformers. These devices will be 
connected to the signaling system and create a communication link with 
the Railroad's central traffic control. All of the proposals in 
paragraph (b) were included in the Petition. However, FRA omitted one 
of the Petition's paragraphs which related to roadway worker 
protection. FRA has adopted and incorporated the existing roadway 
worker protection standards, 49 CFR part 214, and so additional 
language concerning this topic is unnecessary and potentially 
conflicting. The FOX Petition also adopted 49 CFR part 214 for 
incorporation on the FOX system.
    In considering the appropriate standards for FOX to adhere to vis-
a-vis the system description and the Railroad's right-of-way, it is 
important to determine whether the FOX high speed trainsets will travel 
on lines that are parallel to freight or conventional passenger 
operations, and if so, how close those lines will be to the FOX track. 
The presence of heavy, conventional rail equipment on parallel track, 
in close proximity to the FOX trainsets, would introduce risk factors 
that greatly detract from the system's overall safety, and might 
require a reevaluation of some of the standards in this proposal. A 
derailment on the conventional line could result in an accident between 
FOX trainsets and conventional equipment, which could bring about the 
sort of grave damage that the system, as planned, is designed to 
prevent. Therefore, FRA requests additional information from FOX 
concerning the clearance distances that are required to maintain the 
accident-avoidant systems approach that FOX has adopted, if the 
Railroad ultimately utilizes a right-of-way that runs parallel to 
conventional operations. FRA does not intend in this inquiry to 
preclude altogether a FOX right-of-way that runs parrallel to 
traditional rail operations. However, such a scenario may undermine the 
safety of the system, as it has been described to FRA and as is 
reflected in this proposal, and so, additional safety measures might be 
warranted. Similarly, the proximity of a highway right-of-way and 
traffic to the FOX lines is a matter that deserves attention. There is 
a ``startle'' factor associated with the sudden appearance of high 
speed trains next to highway traffic that should be minimized, to the 
extent possible, in the design and location of the FOX right-of-way. 
The Agency invites comment on all of the issues raised by this topic 
from interested parties. Also, FRA asks FOX to provide additional 
information that describes the proximity of conventional rail lines and 
highway traffic to the FOX track, and any additional measures needed to 
ensure the safety of the FOX right-of-way. Based on this information, 
FRA will consider whether further appropriate measures are necessary in 
order to ensure the integrity of the dedicated track system that FOX 
has planned for Florida.
    Paragraph (c) contains proposed requirements for all of the 
Railroad's system components: system safety program; inspection, 
testing and maintenance procedures and criteria; operating practices; 
emergency preparedness plan; personnel qualification requirements; and 
system qualification tests. These items are proposed in the system 
description section of the proposal in order to underscore their 
importance in the overall FOX system. Although the primary requirements 
of these substantive areas are set forth in later Subparts of the 
proposal, their presence in the FOX system is mandated by the 
requirements of paragraph (c) of this section.
    Paragraph (d) of this section sets forth the required primary 
elements of the Railroad's track and infrastructure. This

[[Page 65489]]

paragraph works in conjunction with Subpart D of the proposal, which 
contains the specific performance standards and inspection procedures 
that the Railroad must adhere to concerning track and infrastructure. 
This paragraph requires the Railroad to install and operate over 
standard gage track (56.5 in.). Paragraph (d)(3) requires the Railroad 
to install and operate over double track throughout its entire right-
of-way. FOX plans to use each track for a single direction, except 
during certain maintenance operations, which will dramatically reduce 
the risk of head-on collisions between trains. As planned, trains will 
depart in 30-minute intervals, and so the risk of one train overtaking 
another is also minimized. Crossover connections are to be installed at 
each station, to facilitate change of direction for trains or the 
removal of disabled trains. In addition, crossovers will be located 
throughout the right-of-way in order to provide flexibility and 
emergency rescue.
    Paragraphs (d)(4) and (5) require the Railroad to install 
continuous, shop-welded rail, and concrete ties. These items enhance 
the stability of the track and add to the system's safety. Paragraph 
(d)(6) requires the Railroad to use ballast that will support the track 
structure, but that will not degrade in combination with concrete ties. 
Some forms of ballast in use in the railroad industry are known to 
deteriorate when used with concrete ties. FOX may not use any of these 
forms of ballast. Paragraphs (d)(7)-(10) set forth standards for the 
substructure layer. Paragraph (d)(11) states that FOX must utilize 
moveable frog turnouts that are identical to those used along the TGV 
lines in France. FRA proposes this to ensure that alternate devices, 
which may decrease safety, are not substituted in Florida. Paragraph 
(d)(12) proposes that the Railroad may reduce the thickness of ballast 
in yards and maintenance facility operations, where speeds are 
generally low. The proposed requirements of paragraph (d) were included 
in the FOX Petition.
    Paragraph (e) sets forth requirements for the integral portions of 
the Railroad's signal system. This paragraph works in conjunction with 
Chapter 3 of the rule, which sets standards for the specific 
performance of the signal system components and procedures. Paragraph 
(e)(1) explains that the Railroad's signal system shall include 
automatic train control (ATC), interlocking equipment, wayside 
detectors, and central traffic control. Paragraphs (e)(2)-(6) describe 
the basic function and design that must exist with respect to the ATC 
system. The system must interface with the interlocking system and 
train braking systems. The on-board equipment must include multiple 
processors, software for braking distance-to-go determinations, and 
decoders that receive messages from track beacons and short cable loops 
that provide notification of upcoming curves, gradients, speed 
restrictions, and track occupancy. The on-board equipment will also 
calculate braking curves, continuously monitor speed, and initiate 
braking in the event the locomotive engineer exceeds maximum authorized 
speed. The on-board computers are constructed on a two-out-of-three 
voting architecture, which fails safe in the event of an equipment 
failure. Paragraph (e)(7) requires the Railroad's braking profiles to 
comply with speed restrictions and maximum authorized speed. Paragraph 
(e)(9) sets basic requirements for the track circuits: those on main 
line must provide jointless audio frequency, which reduces the chance 
of intermittent of broken connections; those in crossovers may be 
combined with sequential release logic in the interlocking controllers 
to ensure protection against poor wheel-rail contact on the seldom-used 
rail; those in yards and maintenance facilities may be jointed high-
voltage impulse.
    Paragraph (e)(10) describes the function and design of the 
Railroad's interlocking system. The interlocking must: Interface with 
the wayside signal equipment, track circuits, switch machines, and 
wayside signals; monitor all track circuits; interface with the ATC; 
exchange supervisory control and status information with central 
traffic control; provide back-up control at each interlocking; and 
control switch machines and monitoring devices used to verify switch 
positions. Paragraphs (e)(11) and (12) require that the interlocking's 
vital logic processor shall utilize two processors that operate 
simultaneously in a redundant fashion, and that all wayside detectors 
interface with the train control system. Finally, paragraph (e)(13) 
requires that the Railroad's central traffic control shall monitor and 
regulate all train routes and movements. As FRA understands the 
current, proposed configuration for the FOX central traffic control 
system, there is no built-in redundancy for the CTC processors. The 
wayside processors are built with a two-out-of-three architecture, but 
it is presumed that the signal system will shut down and trains will 
come to a safe stop if the CTC processors fail. FRA requests 
clarification from FOX as to whether this is an accurate assessment of 
the system's operation. If this is not the case, FRA may consider 
further appropriate standards to ensure the safety of the system in the 
event that the central traffic control system fails.
    Paragraph (f) describes the key communication systems and 
components for the Railroad. The Railroad must install a dedicated, 
fiber-optic system along the right-of-way to transmit data, and 
telephone and radio communications. In addition, the system must have 
back-up systems in place in the event of failures. For train 
operations, the system must include a dedicated telephone system with 
fixed telephones and field sockets along the track, yards, and 
platforms; a portable radio system; and a train radio to facilitate 
communication among trainsets and central traffic control.
    Paragraph (g) addresses the primary elements of the Railroad's 
power distribution system. This paragraph works in conjunction with 
Chapter 9 of the rule, which sets forth minimum standards for the 
operation of the power distribution system. The system will include a 
25 kV overhead catenary electrification system, which the Railroad must 
protect from the potentially unsafe consequences of lightning strikes. 
FRA anticipates that the Railroad's system safety plan will address 
this potentially serious risk to the overall safety of the system, and 
that the Railroad will devise protective measures in the design, 
construction, and equipment used for the catenary system and power 
distribution center. All power stations along the right-of-way will 
include remote control operating features that facilitate operation 
from a central control center. In addition, supervisory control 
equipment at remote locations and power substations must have battery-
powered back-up capability in the event of a power system failure.
    Paragraph (h) describes the primary elements of the Railroad's 
rolling stock. This section works in conjunction with Subpart E of the 
proposal, which sets forth equipment design, operation, and maintenance 
standards. Much of this paragraph is self-explanatory, but it is 
important to note that the FOX trainsets will mimic the basic elements 
of French TGV design, and so will consist of articulated, fixed-consist 
trains. This formation resists buckling and twisting, and tends to stay 
in an upright position in the event of a derailment, which greatly 
enhances passenger safety. The FOX trainsets will be capable of 
traveling in either direction because a power car will be positioned at 
either end of each trainset. The passenger cars and power cars will be 
connected with

[[Page 65490]]

semi-permanent connections that can be disconnected only with special 
tools and procedures. These semi-permanent connectors between each 
trailer car, and between the power cars and trailer cars, are not 
couplers. Therefore, the FOX trainsets will not and cannot be coupled 
or uncoupled in yards or along the right-of-way, a process which 
presents many safety risks for employees who work with conventional 
equipment. As an additional safety feature, couplers will be present 
and are required at the leading and trailing end of each trainset, in 
case a rescue operation requires attaching disabled high speed 
trainsets to operative equipment.
    Paragraph (h)(3) requires each truck of the trainset to be 
continuously monitored by the on-board computer system, which will 
alert the locomotive engineer to any malfunction, including hunting 
oscillations, brake defects and wheelslide. This feature will greatly 
enhance the engineer's ability to prevent an accident or incident by 
bringing the train into proper operating condition, if possible, or 
slowing the train, as soon as possible. This may also restrict 
potential brake system degradation, because the corrective action can 
occur before the equipment deteriorates altogether. However, FRA is 
uncertain about the redundant capabilities of the on-board computer 
monitoring system. The system description section of the Petition 
states that the main cab microprocessor is ``backed up by a separate 
standby unit.'' It is unclear from the language provided as to whether 
this unit is designed to work redundantly and will fail safe in 
operation. Therefore, FRA requests additional information from FOX that 
describes in detail how the power car microprocessor, which 
continuously monitors the equipment, is supported by the other 
``standby unit.'' For instance, FRA would like to know whether all 
circuits are redundant, if two-out-of-three voting architecture is 
employed, and all other pertinent information concerning the computer's 
resistance to failure in operation. Section 243.425 of Subpart E, 
Rolling Stock describes the requirements of the automated monitoring 
system further. However, because FRA is unsure as to whether this 
monitoring is redundant and will fail safe, FRA proposes in 
Sec. 243.425 that the Railroad address a complete failure of the 
automated monitoring system in the system safety plan, and through 
appropriate operating rules. Based on the information that FRA receives 
from FOX concerning this issue, FRA may determine that an alternative 
method of addressing this risk would be preferable, or that the risk is 
adequately covered by the design of the equipment.
    Paragraph (h)(4) requires each trainset to possess operative 
wheelslide control, independent trucks, and fault-tolerant braking. 
These devices enhance the overall system safety by permitting trainsets 
to stop within shorter distances, to slow or stop with certainty, and 
to continue operating safely with defective conditions. The wheelslide 
control system is designed to adjust the braking force on each wheel to 
prevent sliding during braking, and prevents flat wheel conditions to 
arise, which can occur when wheels lock during braking.
    This proposal deals with fire safety in a variety of ways. 
Paragraph (h)(5) requires all FOX trainsets to possess operative smoke 
and fire detection systems, which will increase the likelihood that 
passengers will know of the existence of fire and smoke in sufficient 
time to exit the equipment. As stated earlier, FRA also proposes to 
prohibit smoking on FOX trainsets, which further enhances passenger 
safety. In addition, FRA proposes to adopt FRA's emergency preparedness 
regulations, which address fire safety and fire protection for railroad 
passengers. Finally, the system safety plan that FOX develops must 
address the likelihood of fire, the risks presented, and effective 
methods of eliminating or reducing those risks.
    Paragraph (h)(6) permits FOX to operate vehicles other than the 
high speed equipment on the right-of-way. However, these vehicles are 
limited to maintenance and rescue equipment, such as a grinding train, 
a tamping machine, a track stabilizing machine, track inspection 
vehicles (Mauzin car and Melusine car), an ultrasonic test car to 
measure the integrity of the rails, a ballast-plowing railway car, and 
electric and diesel locomotives for shunting and rescue purposes. All 
other rail vehicles are prohibited by the rule. If FOX believes that 
other vehicles are necessary for the safe operation of the system, 
those should be listed, with rationale, in any comments that FOX may 
have to this proposal. FRA seeks to minimize the number and type of 
vehicles that operate over the right-of-way, for a variety of reasons 
that have been discussed previously. Unless required to advance safety 
or move passengers to their final destination, FRA believes that the 
operating environment would not support additional or mixed equipment 
on the FOX lines.
    Paragraph (h)(7) requires the Railroad to equip fully each repair 
facility and employee with the appropriate tools needed to maintain the 
equipment. Paragraph (h)(8) requires the power cars to incorporate 
crash energy management that will protect the locomotive engineer to 
the maximum extent possible. The TGV equipment that FOX will use 
embodies this requirement. Additional, more specific structural 
standards are set forth in Subpart E of the proposal.
    Paragraph (h)(10) requires the locomotive engineer cab to 
facilitate ease of movement, vision and access to all sensors, 
controls, and indicators, and to control climate and noise. FRA 
believes that these issues have an impact on employee performance and 
railroad safety, and so proposes that the cab be designed to maximize 
employee performance. The TGV equipment that FOX plans to use 
incorporates this principle.
    Paragraph (h)(11) describes the critical components of the 
passenger equipment brake system. Each trainset must be equipped with 
an electro-pneumatic brake system that maintains the independence of 
each truck's response to a brake demand. The locomotive engineer's 
automatic brake valve in the leading cab controls the brake pipe 
pressure. Each of the following devices must be capable of initiating 
an emergency brake application: the ATC, the deadman control, two 
emergency brake valves located in the cab, and emergency brake valves 
located in two trailer cars of each trainset. Each powered truck shall 
be independently controlled by the brake pipe, and will have electric 
braking that is battery-operated in the case of a main power failure. 
The brake system will be arranged so that the electric brake has 
priority over others. During emergency braking, relays will check the 
level of electric braking, and will apply the friction brake if a 
failure is detected. The locomotive engineer will have control of the 
powered truck electric brake through the traction-braking master 
controller to slow the trainset or maintain low speed. The braking 
functions on each powered truck will be controlled by separate 
microprocessors. Also, microprocessors will continuously monitor all of 
the power brake systems. The microprocessors will store all brake 
failures and notify the locomotive engineer of failures in any of the 
following areas: reception of cab and train control signals, truck 
hunting, electric brake, friction brake, fire detection system, head 
end power system, alerter, horn, and wheel slide. The braking system 
must be designed and operated in a failsafe manner, and include fault 
tolerant redundancy and notification of failures as they occur.

[[Page 65491]]

    Also, paragraph (h)(11) requires the Railroad to prepare, in 
conjunction with its system safety plan, a matrix of authorized train 
speed and braking reductions that correspond to potential brake 
failures that may occur en route. This matrix is required by Subparts B 
and E, and this section, and is an extremely important safety feature 
of the FOX system. This document, and the planning it reflects, will 
guide the movement of equipment in passenger service when brake 
failures occur en route, after the daily inspection. Without this plan 
in place, the Railroad may be forced to return to the more draconian 
and less effective option of moving the defective equipment to the next 
repair facility. (See full discussion below in Sec. 243.15 concerning 
the movement of defective equipment for additional information on this 
topic.) The French TGV operates under a braking matrix plan that is 
devised specially for each route taken throughout their system. FOX 
plans to replicate this process in Florida. FRA requires development of 
and adherence to the matrix in this NPRM, but believes that it would be 
unwise to dictate the specific speed reductions and corresponding brake 
failures in this proposal. The right-of-way has not yet been chosen and 
many subtle operating conditions are unknown at this time. FRA believes 
that the most appropriate course is to require FOX to prepare and test 
the braking matrix as part of the overall system safety planning and 
development called for by the proposal. However, FRA seeks comment from 
FOX and other interested parties on whether these safety standards 
should require the Railroad to automate the enforcement of the braking 
matrix. Given the technological capacity of the equipment and the 
importance of the correct train speed in the event of brake failure, 
FRA is considering imposing such a requirement.
    Finally, paragraph (h)(12) states that the Railroad must install 
and maintain hot box detectors throughout the right-of-way, which sense 
journal bearing temperature and alert central traffic control of any 
potentially defective equipment.
    All of these provisions relating to the braking system were 
included in the FOX Petition, and reflect the state of modern braking 
systems for passenger equipment.
Section 243.15  Movement of Defective Equipment
    This section requires the Railroad to meet certain conditions prior 
to moving defective equipment or continuing with it in revenue service. 
Paragraph (a) provides that any equipment containing a condition that 
does not comply with Sec. 243.433(f)(1) of the proposal may be moved 
only after the Railroad has completed a series of actions to ensure the 
safety of the movement. In order for the movement to proceed, a 
qualified person must determine that the equipment can be moved safely; 
the qualified person must inform the locomotive engineer and crew of 
the non-complying condition, the maximum authorized speed and other 
appropriate restrictions; and the qualified person must affix a tag to 
the control cab of the trainset that contains specified information 
concerning the defect. Section 243.433(f)(1) is a daily inspection 
requirement contained in the rolling stock chapter of this proposal, 
which includes a list of several items that must be operating as 
intended when the inspection is done in order for the equipment to 
depart. Therefore, paragraph (a) covers any defect that occurs after 
the daily inspection has been completed, and the trainset was 
determined to be in compliance and released for revenue service.
    Paragraph (b) provides that a trainset which develops a non-
complying condition en route, or in other words, after the daily 
inspection required by Sec. 243.433(f)(1), may continue in revenue 
service until the next inspection required by the rule, only if the 
Railroad has accomplished the tasks required by paragraph (a). 
Paragraph (b) also states that, if brake defects arise en route, the 
requirements of Sec. 243.409 of the proposal apply. The pertinent 
portions of Sec. 243.409 state that the Railroad must develop and 
adhere to speed restrictions that correspond to varying levels of brake 
defects or failure, and that the locomotive engineer must notify the 
central traffic control of any brake failure that occurs within one 
trip.
    Paragraph (c) permits the movement of defective equipment in a 
yard, so long as there are no passengers in the equipment, the movement 
does not exceed a speed of 10 mph, and the movement is made solely for 
the purpose of moving to a repair facility.
    The movement of defective equipment is a topic that deserves 
considerable discussion as it relates to power brakes and other safety 
appliances, given the safety risks involved and the statutory 
background implicated. FRA's proposed Passenger Equipment Safety 
Standards, published on September 23, 1997 (62 FR 49728) provide a 
thorough explanation of the factors and conclusions involved, which is 
summarized here.
    FRA's existing regulations do not contain requirements pertaining 
to the movement of equipment with defective power brakes. The movement 
of equipment with these defects is currently controlled by a statutory 
provision (originally enacted in 1910 as part of the laws formerly 
known as the Safety Appliance Acts), which states:

    (a) GENERAL--A vehicle that is equipped in compliance with this 
chapter whose equipment becomes defective or insecure nevertheless 
may be moved when necessary to make repairs, without a penalty being 
imposed under section 21302 of this title, from the place at which 
the defect or insecurity was first discovered to the nearest 
available place at which the repairs can be made--
    (1) on the railroad line on which the defect or insecurity was 
discovered;
or
    (2) at the option of a connecting railroad carrier, on the 
railroad line of the connecting carrier, if not further than the 
place of repair described in clause (1) of this subsection.

49 U.S.C. 20303(a) (emphasis added).

    Although there is no limit contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303 as to the 
number of cars with defective equipment that may be hauled in a train, 
FRA has a longstanding interpretation which requires that, at a 
minimum, 85 percent of the cars in a train have operative brakes. FRA 
bases this interpretation on another statutory requirement that permits 
a railroad to use a train only if ``at least 50 percent of the vehicles 
in the train are equipped with power or train brakes and the engineer 
is using the power or train brakes on those vehicles and on all other 
vehicles equipped with them that are associated with those vehicles in 
a train.'' 49 U.S.C. 20302(a)(5)(B). As originally enacted in 1903, 
section 20302 also granted the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) the 
authority to increase this percentage, and in 1910 the ICC issued an 
order increasing the minimum percentage to 85 percent. See 49 CFR 
232.1, which codified the ICC order.
    As virtually all freight cars are presently equipped with power 
brakes and are operated on an associated trainline, the statutory 
requirement is in essence a requirement that 100 percent of the cars in 
a train have operative power brakes, unless being hauled for repairs 
pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 20303. Consequently, FRA currently requires that 
equipment with defective or inoperative air brakes constitute no more 
than 15 percent of the train and that, if it is necessary to move the 
equipment from where the railroad first discovered it to be defective, 
the defective equipment be moved no further than the nearest place on 
the

[[Page 65492]]

railroad's line where the necessary repairs can be made.
    The requirements regarding the movement of equipment with defective 
or insecure brakes noted above can create safety hazards and 
operational difficulties in passenger operations. As the provisions 
regarding the movement of defective brake equipment were written almost 
a century ago, they do not address contemporary realities of these 
operations. Strict application of the requirements has the potential of 
causing major disruptions of service, which could create serious safety 
and security problems. For example, requiring repairs to be made at the 
nearest location where the necessary repairs can be made could result 
in discharging passengers between stations where adequate facilities 
for their safety are not available, or onto overcrowded station 
platforms. In addition, strict application of the statutory 
requirements could result in trains with defective brake equipment 
moving against the current of traffic during high traffic hours. 
Irregular movements of this type increase the risk of collisions. 
Furthermore, like many passenger operations, FOX may operate trains 
that include eight or fewer cars. Consequently, the necessity to cut 
out the brakes on one or more cars can easily result in noncompliance 
with the 85-percent requirement for hauling the car for repairs, thus 
prohibiting train movement and resulting in the same sort of safety 
problems noted above.
    FRA has attempted to recognize the nature of passenger operations, 
and the importance of passenger safety, and to avoid disrupting service 
when applying the requirements regarding the movement of equipment with 
defective brakes. FRA believes that speed restrictions can readily be 
used to compensate for the loss of brakes on a minority of cars. FRA 
believes that affirmatively recognizing appropriate movement 
restrictions would actually enhance safety, because compliance with the 
existing restrictions is potentially unsafe.
    FRA recognizes that some of the proposed standards in Sec. 243.15 
are not in accord with the requirement contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303(a) 
that cars with defective or insecure brakes be moved to the ``nearest'' 
location where the necessary repairs can be made. However, FRA does 
have authority under 49 U.S.C. 20306, entitled ``Exemption for 
technological improvements,'' to establish the restrictions proposed in 
Sec. 243.15. Section 20306 provides:

    [T]he Secretary of Transportation may exempt from the 
requirements of this chapter railroad equipment or equipment that 
will be operated on rails, when those requirements preclude the 
development or implementation of more efficient railroad 
transportation equipment or other transportation innovations under 
existing law.

This provision was originally enacted as a part of the Rock Island 
Railroad Transition and Employee Assistance Act to authorize the use of 
certain trailers as freight cars. See Public Law 96-254 (May 30, 1980). 
FRA believes that the use of the provision as contemplated in this 
proposal is consistent with the authority granted the Secretary of 
Transportation in 49 U.S.C. 20306. As noted previously, the statutory 
requirements regarding the movement of equipment with defective brakes 
were written nearly a century ago, were focused largely on the 
operation of freight equipment, and did not contemplate passenger train 
operations currently prevalent throughout the nation and that will 
exist on FOX. Since the original enactment in 1910 of the provisions 
now codified at 49 U.S.C. 20303(a), there have been substantial changes 
in the nature of the operations of passenger trains, and the technology 
used in those operations.
    Contemporary passenger equipment incorporates many types of 
advanced braking systems; in some cases these include electrical 
activation of brakes on each car (with pneumatic application through 
the train line available as a backup). Dynamic brakes are also 
typically employed to limit thermal stresses on friction surfaces and 
to limit the wear and tear on the brake equipment. Furthermore, the 
brake valves and brake components used today are far more reliable than 
was the case several decades ago. In addition to these technological 
advances, the brake equipment used in passenger train operations 
incorporates advanced technologies not found with any regularity in 
freight operations. These include:
     The use of brake cylinder pressure indicators which 
provide a reliable indication of the application and release of the 
brakes;
     The use of disc brakes which provide shorter stopping 
distances and decrease the risk of thermal damage to wheels;
     The ability to effectuate a graduated release of the 
brakes due to a design feature of the brake equipment which permits 
more flexibility and more forgiving train control;
     The ability to cut out brakes on a per-axle or per-truck 
basis rather than a per car basis, thus permitting greater use of those 
brakes that are operable;
     The use of a pressure-maintaining feature on each car 
which continuously maintains the air pressure in the brake system, 
thereby compensating for any leakage in the trainline and preventing a 
total loss of air in the brake system;
     The use of a separate trainline from the locomotive main 
reservoir to continuously charge supply reservoirs independent of the 
brake pipe train line; and
     Brake ratios that are 2\1/2\ times greater than the brake 
ratios of loaded freight cars.
    Although some of the technologies noted above have existed for 
several decades, most of the technologies did not become prevalent 
until 1980. Furthermore, most of the noted technological advances have 
been integrated into one efficient and reliable braking system only 
within the last decade. Consequently, the technology incorporated into 
the brake equipment used in contemporary passenger train operations, 
including FOX equipment, increases the reliability of the braking 
system and permits the safe operation of the equipment for extended 
distances, even where a portion of the braking system may be 
inoperative or defective.
    In the face of these technological advances, FRA believes it is 
appropriate to utilize the authority granted by 49 U.S.C. 20306 and 
exempt certain passenger train operations from the specific restriction 
contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303(a) requiring the movement of equipment 
with defective or insecure brakes to the nearest location where 
necessary repairs can be made. FRA proposes restrictions on the 
movement of this type of equipment that are more conducive to safe 
operations. Under this proposal, the Railroad could move such cars only 
at reduced speeds and only until the next required inspection of the 
equipment.
    In utilizing the authority granted pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 20306, the 
Secretary is required to make ``findings based on evidence developed at 
a hearing,'' unless there is ``an agreement between national railroad 
labor representatives and the developer of the new equipment or 
technology.'' FRA is confident that, after notice and opportunity for 
oral and written public comment, the record will support a finding that 
the proposed provisions are ``in the public interest and consistent 
with railroad safety,'' the test required in order to waive safety 
requirements issued under other, general provisions of the code. See 49 
U.S.C. 20103(d). It should be noted that the exemption granted to the 
movement of equipment

[[Page 65493]]

on FOX with defective brakes would not include an exemption from 49 
U.S.C. 20303(c), which contains the liability provisions attendant with 
the movement of equipment with defective or insecure safety appliances, 
including power brakes. Consequently, the liability provisions 
contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303(c) will be applicable to the Railroad when 
hauling equipment with defective or insecure power brakes pursuant to 
the requirements proposed by FRA in this notice.
    FRA also proposes to exempt FOX passenger train operations from its 
longstanding interpretation, based on 49 U.S.C. 20302(a)(5)(B) and 49 
CFR 232.1 noted above, prohibiting the movement of a train if more than 
15 percent of the cars in the train have defective, insecure, or 
inoperative brakes. As discussed above, such a limitation is overly 
burdensome and has the potential of creating safety hazards, due to the 
short length of the trains commonly operated in FOX passenger service.
    Based on the preceding discussion, FRA proposes in this NPRM to 
permit FOX trainsets to move under speed restrictions if brake defects 
occur en route. This proposal incorporates procedures used in France on 
the TGV that will guide the establishment of those speed restrictions. 
As is discussed above, the Railroad shall devise a matrix, in which 
speed levels are established to correspond to certain brake defects 
that will facilitate the safe movement of the equipment. The 
development of this matrix must be accomplished in conjunction with the 
development of the Railroad's system safety plan, which requires FRA 
approval. FRA believes that this approach will ensure a high level of 
safety by taking into account advanced technology, the proven TGV 
procedure, and the system safety concept of planning to minimize or 
eliminate hazards.

Subpart B--System Safety Program and Plan

Section 243.101  General System Safety Requirements
    This Subpart proposes system safety program requirements that FOX 
must develop and follow. System safety is the concept that forms the 
foundation for the proposed rule, as it does for TGV operation in 
France. As discussed earlier in this document, system safety means the 
application of design, operating, technical, and management techniques 
and principles throughout the life cycle of a system to reduce hazards 
and unsafe conditions to the lowest level possible, through the most 
effective use of available resources. In this process, FRA proposes 
that the Railroad implement a system safety program to identify and 
manage safety risks, and generate data for use in making safety 
decisions.
    The proposed requirements for the Fox system safety program are 
very similar to the requirements proposed for high speed (Tier II) 
passenger equipment, which were published on September 23, 1997 in the 
Federal Register (62 FR 40728). However, the Tier II system safety 
standards were developed to cover only the trainset, and not the 
remaining railroad system elements. The system safety program proposed 
for FOX covers the design, development, testing and operation of the 
entire railroad system, which includes track, signal, rolling stock, 
operating practices, power distribution, personnel qualification 
requirements, and system qualification tests.
    Paragraph (a) of Sec. 243.101 requires the Railroad to adopt a 
system safety program using MIL-STD-882(C) as a guide. MIL-STD-882(C) 
is a standard issued by the Department of Defense that describes system 
safety planning and system safety programs used by the U.S. military 
for procuring and operating weapon systems. This standard is often used 
as a form or reference for system safety planning. FRA does not intend 
in this proposal to dictate how the Railroad should apply this 
guidance, but FRA believes that the Railroad should tailor application 
of the guidance to FOX's unique safety needs and operating scenarios. 
FRA envisions that the system safety plan will be a living document 
that evolves as new information and knowledge become available. 
Therefore, this section requires FOX to update the system accordingly 
in the course of operations, and to change practices that prove to be 
unsafe.
    Due to the critical role that the system safety plan plays in this 
rule, FRA proposes that FOX submit the initial plan for FRA approval, 
and brief FRA annually on any changes made to it. The Petition 
contained language that provided for FRA ``audits'' of the system 
safety plan, rather than a clear approval process. However, given the 
fact that so many safety features in the FOX system are controlled by 
development of the system safety plan, FRA believes that anything short 
of approval would be an abdication of the Agency's responsibility to 
promulgate clear, enforceable, and effective safety standards. For 
instance, one of the safety features relied upon in the FOX risk 
assessment and Petition involve a series of wayside detection systems, 
which will greatly enhance the safety of the system and have led to 
standards in this proposal that permit 200 mph speeds and lighter 
equipment. However, these detection systems, as proposed, will not be 
placed at regular intervals throughout the right-of-way; rather, they 
will be placed, for the most part, where the system safety plan 
indicates safety risks exist. If FRA has no approval authority over the 
placement of the detection systems and the thought process that 
determined the placement, the detection system could conceivably be 
used ineffectively, and ultimately have no impact on improving safety. 
A similar analysis can be made concerning the braking system matrix 
that will define operating procedures for passenger equipment with 
defective brakes. Clearly, the Railroad braking system is key to the 
safety of the high speed trainsets, and a matrix that establishes 
rational speed restrictions is mandatory, for safety and statutory 
reasons. FRA believes that the Agency must have an approval mechanism 
in place to ensure that such a matrix is in place. FRA understands that 
FOX has the desire and capacity to operate the system safely, and FRA 
does not intend to interfere unnecessarily in the system safety process 
that will be undertaken in Florida. However, FRA believes that the 
basis of this rulemaking would be undermined if Federal oversight of 
the FOX system safety plan does not take place.
    This paragraph also requires FOX to submit the initial system 
safety plan to FRA for approval no later than one year after the rule 
takes effect. The Petition contained a less certain time frame, related 
to the design and construction phases of the project. However, FRA 
believes that the system safety plan must be used as a guide in the 
earliest conceptual stages of the project. Thus, it should be available 
earlier in the program than initially proposed by FOX. As discussed 
previously in this document, FRA seeks comment from FOX and other 
interested parties concerning alternatives to this proposal. Commenters 
are asked to consider the relative merits of a tiered system safety 
plan submission schedule, that would permit FOX to produce the system 
safety plan in stages, rather than as one complete package. However, 
commenters should also address the risk that such a tiered schedule 
would lead to a system safety plan that is incomplete or inaccurate 
because it does not address all potential hazards at the earliest 
possible opportunity.
    FRA also requires FOX to brief the FRA annually on the status of 
the

[[Page 65494]]

system safety program and on any proposed changes to the system safety 
plan. FRA believes this process will permit FRA to assess how 
effectively the system safety plan works, and how FOX identifies and 
resolves safety risks.
    Paragraph (b) of Sec. 243.101 makes clear that the system safety 
plan must address the design, construction, maintenance, operation, and 
overhaul of the system as a unit. The plan must address how individual 
components of the system operate, as well as how those components 
operate once integrated into the system. For instance, a particular 
appurtenance may perform well in tests or other operations, but that 
same component may not perform suitably when integrated into the FOX 
system. The plan must evaluate components in this light in order to 
ensure the ultimate safety of the system. Also, this paragraph requires 
FOX to consider safety at least as important as cost and performance in 
assessing design, construction, operation, maintenance, and overhaul of 
the Railroad system.
    Paragraph (c) describes the various elements that must be included 
in the plan. FRA proposes, at a minimum, that the system safety plan 
specifically address fire protection; software safety; inspection, 
testing, and maintenance; training and qualifications; emergency 
preparedness; pre-revenue service qualification testing; hazard 
identification and reduction; operating procedures for defective 
equipment in passenger service; identification of safety-critical 
subsystems; and relationships between safety-critical subsystems. FRA 
places emphasis on these elements of the Fox system because they tend 
to be overlooked when a less formal, non-systems approach to safety 
analysis is taken. Each of these elements of the system safety program 
is discussed in greater detail below.
    Paragraph (d) sets forth the approach and process FOX must take in 
order to develop the system safety program. FRA intends the program to 
be a formal step-by-step process that includes: identification of all 
safety requirements that govern the operation of the system; evaluation 
of the total system to identify known or potential safety hazards that 
may arise over the life cycle of the Railroad; identification of all 
safety issues during the design phase of the process; elimination or 
reduction of the risk posed by the hazards identified; resolution of 
safety issues presented; development of a process to track progress; 
and development of a program of testing and analysis to demonstrate 
that safety requirements are met.
    Paragraph (e) requires the Railroad to document how the system 
design meets safety requirements, and to monitor how safety issues are 
raised and resolved. This is very important in system safety 
philosophy; if risks are not identified, eliminated or mitigated, the 
system is inherently unsafe.
    Paragraph (f) requires the system safety plan to describe how 
operational limitations would be imposed if the FOX system design 
cannot meet certain safety requirements. FRA anticipates that this 
section would include an initial determination from FOX that 
operational limits can effectively address the hazard, and if not, a 
design change will be put in place to accommodate the risk. Operational 
limits are considered the least desirable option in system safety 
planning, and thus, the last means utilized to reduce a safety risk.
    Paragraph (g) requires the Railroad to facilitate FRA inspection of 
the system safety plan and documentation required by paragraph (e). FRA 
must have access to this information in order to determine the 
Railroad's compliance with the requirements of this Chapter.
 Section 243.103  Fire Protection Program
    As part of the system safety program, paragraph (a) requires the 
Railroad to address fire safety considerations in the design stage of 
the project, and to reduce the risk of harm caused by fire on the 
equipment to a level established in MIL-STD-882(C) as acceptable. 
Paragraph (b) requires the Railroad to make a written analysis of the 
fire protection problem, and lists a series of factors that the 
Railroad must complete and consider concerning fire protection. These 
paragraphs require the Railroad to ensure that good fire protection 
practice is used during the design and operation of the equipment. 
FRA's primary concern is to protect passengers from the risk of fire 
and smoke inhalation, and to ensure that they can evacuate quickly and 
safely if a fire erupts.
    Elements of this analysis correspond to required action under 
Sec. 243.413 of the rolling stock provisions in the rule: Overheat 
detectors; a fire or smoke detection system; a fixed, automatic, fire-
suppression system where the Railroad's written analysis determines 
they are required; and compliance with the Railroad's written 
procedures for the inspection, testing, and maintenance of fire safety 
systems and equipment that the procedures designate as mandatory. [See 
Sec. 243.413(c)-(f)].
    Paragraph (c) requires the Railroad to exercise reasonable care to 
assure that the design criteria are followed and that the tests 
required by this program are performed. To fulfill this obligation in 
part, the Railroad must include fire safety requirements in all 
contracts for new equipment purchases.
Section 243.105  Software Safety Program
    This section proposes requirements for the software portion of the 
system safety program. Paragraph (a) requires the Railroad to develop 
and implement a software safety program to guide the design, 
development, testing, integration and verification of FOX system 
software. Software plays a key role in the overall performance of the 
FOX system, and safety demands that the Railroad place a strong 
emphasis on the system's software safety.
    Paragraph (b) sets out the proposed required elements of the 
software safety program. The program must treat software that controls 
or monitors safety functions as safety-critical, unless a completely 
redundant, failsafe, non-software means to provide the same function is 
provided as part of the design. Paragraph (b) also specifies the steps 
required to develop a comprehensive software safety program, which must 
culminate in a demonstration of overall software safety as part of the 
pre-revenue service system qualification tests of the FOX system.
    Paragraph (b) also requires the Railroad to include a hazard 
analysis in its software design and implementation that will, to the 
fullest extent possible, prevent unauthorized penetration on all 
computerized systems in use. As the railroad industry embraces new 
technology and increases reliance on electronic information systems, 
there must also be development and adherence to effective methods of 
preventing intrusion from unauthorized railroad personnel and other 
individuals or entities. The FOX system relies on many computerized 
systems and sub-systems, the largest being the Railroad's signal 
system. Clearly, any opportunity for infiltration of the signal system 
by outsiders would expose the passengers, employees, and those along 
the right-of-way to grave risk. Therefore, FOX must develop and 
implement in its system safety program a method to prevent cyber 
threats and alleviate these risks.
    Paragraph (c) requires the Railroad to adhere to the requirements 
of the software safety program. To fulfill this obligation the Railroad 
must include software safety requirements in procurement contracts that 
involve design or purchase of software components.

[[Page 65495]]

    Paragraph (d) requires the Railroad to follow the process and 
procedures of the software safety program.
Section 243.107  Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Program
    This section contains the requirements for the Railroad's program 
for inspecting, testing, and maintaining the FOX system. FRA's goal is 
a set of standards that will ensure that the Fox system remains safe as 
it wears and ages, and will protect workers who perform the inspection, 
testing, and maintenance tasks. These proposed requirements are based 
on FRA's knowledge of inspection, testing and maintenance programs 
generally, and the French TGV practices.
    Paragraph (a) requires the Railroad to provide to FRA particulars 
concerning the inspection, testing, and maintenance program for the 
system, including: Safety inspection procedures, intervals and 
criteria; testing procedures and intervals; scheduled preventive 
maintenance intervals; maintenance procedures; and employee training.
    In this proposal, FRA does not dictate specific program contents, 
and so the Railroad retains much flexibility to tailor the program to 
its needs and experience. However, FRA believes this provision is an 
important element of the overall Railroad system, and should be 
designed to maximize safe operations and protect safety-related 
components of the system from deterioration over time.
    Paragraph (b) defines broadly the conditions that can endanger the 
safety of the crew, passengers, or equipment, which the inspection, 
testing, and maintenance program should prevent, or detect and correct. 
Paragraph (c) establishes a link between scheduled maintenance 
intervals and the system safety program. Scheduled maintenance 
intervals should be set so that worn parts are replaced before they 
fail. Initial intervals should be based on manufacturer's 
recommendations or operating experience. As more operating experience 
is gained, FRA believes that accumulated reliability data should be 
used as the basis for changing preventive maintenance intervals on 
safety-critical components. This standard should encourage the Railroad 
to keep reliability records on safety-critical components, which will 
provide confidence that any safety or economic trade-offs have a firm 
basis.
    Paragraph (d) requires the Railroad to adopt standard operating 
procedures, in writing, that explain how all safety-critical 
inspection, testing, and maintenance tasks will be performed. This 
provision is intended to provide protection to the workers who perform 
maintenance and inspection duties, many of which are inherently 
dangerous. FRA does not intend to prescribe how these tasks should be 
performed. Rather, this proposal requires the Railroad to devise a 
program that will ensure employee safety in each individual setting 
that may arise in the maintenance of all of the Railroad's equipment. 
FRA believes that standard operating procedures are often a key 
component in a successful program to train employees to perform their 
employment duties safely.
Section 243.109  Training, Qualification, and Designation Program
    This section requires the Railroad to develop and implement a 
training, qualification, and designation program for workers who 
perform inspection, testing, and maintenance tasks. FRA believes that 
employee training, qualification, and designation are central to 
maintain safe railroad equipment and a safe workforce. Paragraph (a) 
requires the Railroad to establish and comply with a training, 
qualification, and designation program for employees and contractors 
who perform safety-related inspection, testing, or maintenance tasks in 
this rule.
    Paragraph (b) lists the steps that must be followed in developing 
the Railroad's training, qualification, and designation program. This 
paragraph lists the general requirements that the Railroad's training, 
qualification, and designation program must do to ensure that employees 
know how to keep the system operating safely. The SNCF has a training 
program in place for operation of TGV equipment in France that is 
similar to these proposed requirements. The list of actions that FRA 
proposes also compel the Railroad to evaluate its operation and focus 
its training resources where the need is greatest.
    The proposed rule grants the Railroad flexibility to focus and 
provide training that is needed in order to complete a specific job 
category. For instance, the proposal does not require ``checkers'' to 
receive the same intensive training needed for ``maintainers.'' FRA 
anticipates that this proposal will not require extensive changes to 
the manner in which TGV employees in France are trained. However, the 
proposal will prevent the Railroad from using minimally trained and 
unqualified people to perform crucial safety tasks.
    FRA believes that many benefits will be gained from the Railroad's 
investment in a comprehensive training program. The quality of 
inspections will improve, which will result in fewer instances of 
defective equipment in revenue service and increased operational 
safety. Equipment conditions that require maintenance attention are 
more likely to be discovered while the equipment is in a maintenance or 
yard site, where repairs can be completed safely and efficiently. 
Trouble-shooting will take less time, and maintenance will be completed 
correctly the first time, resulting in increased safety and decreased 
costs.
Section 243.111  Emergency Preparedness Program
    This section requires the Railroad to develop and adopt an 
emergency preparedness program that meets the requirements set forth in 
FRA's proposed Passenger Train Emergency Standards, 62 FR 8330, 
(February 24, 1996) which will be codified at 49 CFR part 239 after 
consideration of all comments received and adopted as final. FRA 
believes that the FOX system should meet the same emergency 
preparedness requirements imposed on every other passenger railroad 
operating in the U.S.
Section 243.113  Pre-revenue Service System Qualification Plan
    This section sets forth general requirements for pre-revenue 
service testing of the FOX system, and works in conjunction with the 
specific provisions set forth in Chapter 7 of this rule. Pre-revenue 
qualification tests are extremely important because they represent the 
culmination of all safety analysis and component tests conducted as 
part of the system safety program, and will serve as a basis for all 
passenger operations. The pre-revenue service system qualification 
tests are intended to demonstrate the effectiveness of the system 
safety program and to prove that the FOX system can operate safely in 
its intended environment. FRA believes that these procedures and the 
documentation required by the pre-revenue system qualification test 
plan are necessary to ensure that all safety risks have been reduced to 
a level that will facilitate safe operation in revenue service.
Section 243.115  Hazard Identification and Reduction
    This section requires the Railroad to identify all hazards that may 
arise in the course of operations and analyze methods available to 
reduce or eliminate the hazards. The Railroad may consider remedies 
that are based in design, construction, equipment, or operations. 
However, operation-based solutions are not favored, and should be used 
only when no other alternative

[[Page 65496]]

exists. Design and construction are the preferred methods to eliminate 
risk in system safety philosophy, because they completely remove the 
opportunity for simple human mistakes or errors in judgment that can 
occur in the normal course of operations. This section is important 
because operational hazards cannot be minimized or prevented until they 
are first recognized as risks. This thought process is basic to system 
safety, and so this proposal is an integral component to the Railroad's 
system safety plan.
Section 243.117  Operating Procedures in the Event of Component Failure
    This section requires the Railroad to consider and develop 
operating rules that will protect passengers, employees, and the public 
when portions of the system become defective. This section works in 
conjunction with Subpart F of the rule, which requires the Railroad to 
develop a comprehensive set of operating rules that must be approved by 
FRA. It is extremely important to the overall safety of the system that 
the Railroad deliberate over appropriate procedures that will 
compensate for the loss of safety that malfunctioning equipment causes. 
Aside from developing general operating rules, pursuant to the 
requirements of Subpart F, this section obligates the Railroad to 
engage in a slightly different thought process--to focus on defective 
equipment and to mitigate the dangers that arise when equipment 
malfunctions. FRA believes that this section is necessary to ensure 
passenger and system safety, particularly as it relates to power brake 
defects. Also, this section requires the Railroad to analyze and 
describe the fault tolerant limits of each system that possesses fault 
tolerant components, and develop a process by which the Railroad and 
the engineer operating a trainset will be made aware that the system is 
approaching its fault tolerant limits. This proposal requires the 
Railroad to acknowledge the pre-determined limits of the system 
equipment, and to prepare appropriately for instances when those limits 
are exceeded, which is consistent with and critical to comprehensive 
system safety planning.
Section 243.119  Safety-Critical Subsystems
    This proposed section requires the Railroad to identify the safety-
critical subsystems that exist in the FOX system, and to prepare an 
explanation of the relationship they have with one another throughout 
the life cycle of the system. FRA anticipates that this requirement 
reflects the thought that would occur in the normal course of system 
safety analysis, and believes it is important enough, in terms of the 
ultimate safety of the system, to incorporate in this Subpart.
Section 243.121  Approval Procedure
    This section sets forth the system safety plan approval procedures 
that the Railroad and FRA must follow. Paragraph (b) requires the 
Railroad to file a petition for approval with FRA, and the petition 
must include the Railroad's system safety plan, pertinent supporting 
documentation, and the primary person to contact if questions arise. 
This section also requires the Railroad to prepare a petition for 
approval for safety-critical changes to the Railroad's existing safety 
plan. FRA believes that such changes have the potential to alter the 
overall safety of the FOX network, and therefore, Federal oversight 
should be present. Also, pursuant to principles of administrative law, 
FRA would notify the public of such changes. Paragraph (c) requires the 
Railroad to submit the petition for approval with FRA's Associate 
Administrator for Safety, and paragraph (d) describes the actions FRA 
must take upon receipt of the petition.
    FRA must review the petition, detemine if it complies with all 
procedural requirements, and evaluate the substantive validity of the 
petition or proposed changes to the petition. Under this proposal, FRA 
may approve, approve with special conditions, or disapprove the 
petition within ninety days. If FRA is unable to arrive at a 
determination within ninety days, the petition remains pending until 
FRA acts. Once a petition has been approved, FRA may reopen 
consideration of the petition for good cause, which might include the 
discovery of new information or new safety evaluations. FRA must 
provide the Railroad with written notice of the disposition of the 
petition. If FRA determines that changes to safety-critical standards, 
criteria, or inspection frequencies are appropriate in the interest of 
safety, FRA will publish a notice in the Federal Register announcing 
those changes. Sixty days after the notice is published, the changes 
become effective.
    The FOX system safety program is the most important portion of the 
Florida high speed rail project. Every safety discipline will be 
governed by the design, construction, and equipment determinations made 
in the process of developing the Railroad's system safety program. FRA 
has no desire to meddle unnecessarily in the internal, nonsafety 
matters of the Railroad's operation. However, due to the role that the 
system safety plan plays in the FOX system, and the potential for human 
casualty that exists on the system, FRA believes that the agency must 
have approval authority over the final system safety plan that is 
adopted by the Railroad, in order to ensure the safety of the public. 
As stated earlier, FRA invites comment on alternatives to the timing 
proposed for submission of the Railroad's system safety plan. In 
addition, FRA invites commentary on the approval process that is 
proposed in this NPRM, and any alternatives that may be more effective.

Subpart C--Signal System

    Subpart C sets forth the safety standards for the Railroad's signal 
system. This Subpart is similar to FRA's existing signal safety 
standards, 49 CFR part 236, that apply generally to railroad operations 
in this country. However, changes have been made to account for the 
differences in the signal system that will be utilized in Florida and 
the high speed train operations associated with the FOX system.
Section 243.201  Plans, Where Kept
    This section requires the Railroad to keep plans that are necessary 
for the proper maintenance and testing of the signal and train control 
system at each interlocking and intermediate track circuit case. Plans 
must be legible and accurate, in order to protect against errors in 
circuitry connections. This is consistent with the Petition and current 
U.S. practices.
Section 243.202  Grounds
    This proposed section requires the Railroad to keep each circuit 
that affects the safety of train operations, free from any ground or 
combination of grounds that will permit a flow of current equal to or 
in excess of 75 percent of the release value of any relay or other 
electromagnetic device in the circuit. However, the following circuits 
are not included in this requirement: circuits that include any track 
rail; the common return wires of single-wire, single-break, signal 
control circuits using a grounded common; and alternating current power 
distribution circuits that are grounded in the interest of safety. This 
is consistent with the Petition and current U.S. practice.
Section 243.203  Locking of Signal Apparatus Housings
    This section requires the Railroad to protect signal apparatus 
housings from unauthorized entry. The proposal requires the Railroad to 
lock, seal, or secure all external housings of signal and track-side 
automatic train control system apparatus. The purpose of this

[[Page 65497]]

section is to prevent vital components of the signal system from being 
vandalized or tampered with, which could cause the system to 
malfunction. The proposed rule is consistent with the Petition and 
current U.S. practice.
Section 243.204  Design of Control Circuits on Failsafe Principle
    This section requires that the failure of a safety-critical control 
circuit will not cause a condition more permissive than intended. 
Safety-critical circuits shall be designed on a failsafe principle. 
This section includes all vital circuits and track circuits through 
which signal control circuits are selected, including any failure of 
the data link radio transmission system. Circuits should be designed so 
that failure of any part or component of the circuit will cause the 
most restrictive aspects to be displayed. The proposed rule is intended 
to address the design of the FOX signal system, including electronic 
and processor-based equipment.
Section 243.205  Power-operated Switch Use
    This section requires all switch movements to be completed by 
power-operated electric switch machines. Hand-operated switches are 
prohibited in territory controlled by ATC. Each power-operated switch 
will be controlled from the Railroad's central traffic control center. 
This is consistent with the FOX petition and current U.S. practice.
Section 243.206  Yard Operations
    This section requires the Railroad to control yard operations 
through the traffic control center for the yard, and to complete all 
movements in the yard at restricted speed. This section also states 
that relevant portions of 49 CFR 236.1 through 236.109 apply to signals 
that are used in FOX yard operations. There are some requirements 
presently in other sections of this proposed rule that would apply to 
yard operations. However, since signals and switches used in yard 
limits will be similar or identical to conventional signal systems 
currently in use in the U.S., FRA believes that the applicable portions 
of 49 CFR 236.1 through 236.109 would be more appropriate. These 
address such items as design of control circuits, operating 
characteristics, location of roadway signals, and shunting sensitivity.
Section 243.207  Timetable Instructions
    The section requires the Railroad to designate all interlockings, 
automatic train control territory, and yard limits in timetable 
instructions. The designation may be published in timetable 
instructions in any manner that the Railroad chooses. This is 
consistent with the Petition and U.S. practice.

Wayside and Cab Signals

Section 243.208  Location of Wayside Signals
    This section requires FOX to position and align each wayside signal 
so that its aspects can be visually associated with the track it 
governs. The proposal grants the Railroad discretion to determine where 
the wayside signals will be positioned. FRA's safety experts will 
determine whether the location and alignment of each signal complies 
with the intent of this section and that the signal aspect is 
associated with the track governed. This section is consistent with the 
Petition and current U.S. practice.
Section 243.209  Aspects and Indications
    Paragraph (a) of this section requires that aspects of wayside 
signals must be shown by the color of lights, position of lights, 
flashing of lights, or any combination thereof. They may be qualified 
by marker plate, number plate, letter plate, marker light, or any 
combination thereof. Paragraph (b) states that the fundamental 
indications of wayside signal aspects must conform to the following: a 
red light or a series of horizontal lights will indicate stop; a yellow 
light or a lunar light will indicate that speed is to be restricted and 
stop may be required; and a green light or a series of vertical lights 
will indicate proceed at maximum authorized speed. Paragraph (c) 
requires that the names, indications, and aspects of wayside and cab 
signals must be defined in the Railroad's operating rules or special 
instructions, and all modifications must be filed with the FRA within 
thirty days after the modifications take effect. Paragraph (d) states 
that absence of a qualifying appurtenance or the failure of a lamp in a 
light signal may not cause the display of a less restrictive aspect 
than intended.
    Paragraph (e) of this section relates to cab display and requires 
all cab displays to include the maximum authorized speed, shown by a 
bar graph or a needle in the periphery of the dial used for the 
indication of train speed; the target speed, shown by numbers; and the 
target distance corresponding to the indicated target speed, shown by a 
continuously refreshed bar graph and numbers in case of overflow of the 
bar graph. Paragraph (f) states that all bar graphs and numbers must be 
illuminated so that they can be read easily in all lighting conditions 
in which the equipment will be used. This proposed section is 
consistent with the Petition and current U.S. practice.
Section 243.210  Markers
    This section requires the Railroad to equip all high speed lines 
with block section markers and route origin markers, and requires all 
block section limits to be indicated by marker plates installed along 
the right-of-way. These markers must be located at adjoining block 
sections and must be illuminated during night operations and when 
visibility along the line is limited. Paragraph (c) requires that route 
origin markers must be positioned at the beginning of each route and 
must be equipped with a proceed light. Paragraph (d) requires the 
Railroad to provide special shunting markers at locations that are not 
equipped with route origin markers and where turn-back operations may 
be required. This marker must be equipped with a shunting light.
    This section, as proposed by FRA, is very similar to portions of 
the Petition, except that FRA requires the block section limits to be 
illuminated and FOX proposed that the block section limits would be 
indicated by retroreflective marker plates. FRA believes that, given 
the speed trains will travel and the frequent storms that occur in 
Florida, lighted markers enhance the safety of the system, and impose 
little financial burden. This addition should ensure that locomotive 
engineers recognize block sections, which is particularly important for 
occasions when an engineer must rely on the block sections during any 
interruption of the ATC system.
Section 243.211  Spacing of Beacons
    This proposed section requires the Railroad to design the ATC 
system and beacon spacing so that the locomotive engineer can comply 
with any imposed speed restriction by initiating a service brake 
application, and if the locomotive engineer fails to react, an 
automatic brake application will occur. In ATC territory, the braking 
distances must be designed in order to compensate for delay time, which 
will ensure the trainset complies with the target speed and distance 
through the brake application initiated by the system. An aspect that 
mandates a stop at the next signal requires sufficient spacing so that 
a stop can be achieved before reaching the next signal, without an 
emergency brake application. These proposed sections apply to all 
systems, including

[[Page 65498]]

the Railroad's high wind, flood, intrusion, and dragging equipment 
protective devices. The section is consistent with the FOX petition and 
U.S. practice.

Track Circuits

Section 243.212  Track Circuit Requirements
    This proposed section sets forth a variety of track circuit 
requirements. Generally, track relay controlling home signals or 
beacons must be in the de-energized position, or a device that 
functions as a track relay controlling home signals or beacons must be 
in its most restrictive state. In addition, the track circuit must be 
de-energized when a rail is broken or a rail or switch-frog is removed 
or when a trainset occupies any part of the track circuit. It will not 
be a violation if a track circuit is energized because a break occurs 
between the end of rail and track circuit connector; within the limits 
of rail-joint bond, appliance or other protective device, which 
provides a bypath for the electric current; or, as a result of leakage 
current or foreign current in the rear of a point where a break occurs.
    This proposed section is consistent with the Petition and U.S. 
practice.
Section 243.213  Track Circuit Shunting Sensitivity
    This proposed section requires the Railroad to maintain each track 
circuit controlling a home signal so that the track relay is in a de-
energized position, or a device that functions as a track relay will be 
in its most restrictive state if, when the track circuit is dry, a 
shunt is connected across the track rails of the circuit, including 
fouling sections of turnouts. The electric resistance of the shunt must 
be: 0.15 Ohm on open track and 0.25 Ohm in interlocking areas. These 
values are given for use with a ballast of 8 Ohm per kilometer (0.62 
mi) resistance and is consistent with the FOX petition.
    The proposed signal system will utilize jointless audio frequency 
track circuits on the main line. Typical track circuits on the FOX main 
line will be center fed, using one transmitter at the center and a 
receiver at each end of the circuit. In crossover areas, circuits will 
be combined with sequential release logic in the interlocking 
controllers to ensure protection against poor wheel-rail contact on 
seldom-used rail. Jointed high-voltage impulse track circuits must be 
used in the yards and maintenance facilities.
Section 243.214  Insulated Rail Joints
    This section requires the Railroad to maintain insulated rail 
joints so that the failure of any track circuit, caused by track 
circuit current that flows between insulated rails, will be prevented. 
This is consistent with the Petition and U.S. practice.
Section 243.215  Fouling Wires
    This section requires that fouling wires consist of at least two 
discrete conductors, and that each be of sufficient conductivity and 
maintained in such condition that the track relay will be in de-
energized position, or the device that functions as a track relay will 
be in its most restrictive state, when the circuit is shunted. This is 
consistent with the Petition and U.S. practice.
Section 243.216  Turnout, Fouling Section
    This section requires rail joints within the fouling section to be 
bonded, and the fouling section to extend at least to a point where 
sufficient track centers and allowance for maximum car overhang will 
prevent interference with trainset movement on the adjacent track. It 
is important that all rail joints are bonded to ensure continuity of 
track circuits. The proposed rule is consistent with the FOX petition 
and U.S. practice.

Wires and Cables

Section 243.217  Protection of Insulated Wire; Splice in Underground 
Wire; Aerial Cable
    This section requires insulated wire to be protected from 
mechanical injury, any splice in underground wire to have insulation 
resistance at least equal to the wire spliced, and all aerial cable to 
be supported by messenger. This is consistent with the Petition and 
U.S. practice. Insulated wire must be positioned in such a manner that 
it cannot be damaged by the operation of apparatus, vehicles, tools, 
workers, or by closing doors. Temporary installation of cable or wires 
on top of the ground is prohibited by this section.
Section 243.218  Tagging of Wires and Interference of Wires or Tags 
With Signal Apparatus
    This section requires the Railroad to tag or otherwise mark each 
wire so that it can be identified at each terminal. Tags and other 
identifiers must be made of insulating material, arranged so that they 
do not interfere with the moving parts of equipment, and correspond 
with the circuit plans. The proposed rule is consistent with the FOX 
petition and U.S. practice.

Standards

Section 243.219  Control Circuits; Requirements
    This section of the proposal requires the Railroad to install each 
signal or beacon that governs train movements into a block section so 
that it will convey its most restrictive state as long as any of the 
following conditions exist within the block: a trainset occupies the 
block, points of a switch are not closed in proper position; a track 
relay is in de-energized position or a device which functions as a 
track relay is in its most restrictive state; or, when a signal control 
circuit is de-energized. This section reflects the unique 
characteristics of the FOX beacon and loop transmission signal system 
(TBL) and is consistent with the Petition.
Section 243.220  Control Circuits for Signals, Selection Through Point 
Detector Operated by Switch Movement
    This section requires that control circuit(s) for each signal 
aspect or beacon, which conveys an indication more favorable than 
``proceed at restricted speed'' for signal governing movements over 
switches, be selected through a point detector operated directly by 
switch points for each switch, movable-point frog, and derail in the 
routes governed by such signal or beacon. Circuits must be arranged so 
that the signal or beacon can convey an indication more favorable than 
``proceed at restricted speed'' only when each switch, movable-point 
frog, and derail in the route is in proper position. This section 
reflects the FOX TBL system and is consistent with the Petition.
Section 243.221  Time Locking; Where Required
    This section of the proposal requires the Railroad to provide time 
locking in conjunction with signal aspects or beacons that convey 
indications more favorable than ``proceed at restricted speed.'' FRA 
will expect that any signal that displays an aspect more favorable than 
``proceed at restricted speed'' will have time locking. This 
requirement would apply regardless of any speed restrictions that may 
be placed on a stretch of track at any given time. The time locking 
must be effective for the maximum authorized speed that is permitted on 
each route. Also, this section requires the Railroad to provide locking 
for all interlocking signals where route or direction of traffic can be 
changed. FRA's proposal differs from the Petition by using the term 
``interlocking signals'' rather than'controlled signals' because the

[[Page 65499]]

FOX system will consist of interlockings.
Section 243.222  Indication Locking
    This proposed section requires the Railroad to provide indication 
locking for switches, movable-point frogs, and derails. Indication 
locking should prevent the clearing of signals governing movements over 
switches, movable-point frogs, and derails until each operative unit 
has completed its required movement. This is consistent with the 
Petition and U.S. practice.
Section 243.223  Electric Locking Circuits
    This proposed section requires the Railroad to provide vital design 
methods to prevent the system from displaying aspects that will result 
in conflicting or unsafe movements. The operation of controlling 
devices, logic, or apparatus are required to succeed each other in 
proper sequence before a proceed aspect can be displayed. Vital design 
methods in interlocking circuitry shall prevent ``proceed'' aspects 
from being displayed for conflicting movements.
Section 243.224  Loss of Shunt Protection; Where Required
    This section requires that loss of shunt protection not permit the 
release of the route locking circuit of each power-operated switch. The 
loss of shunt protection must be based on a sequential release logic. 
Sequential release logic requires that when any track circuit becomes 
occupied in logical sequence from a previous track circuit, in 
combination with an established train route, its status will not be 
allowed to return to unoccupied, even though the detected shunt may be 
lost, until a specified safe time interval after the next track circuit 
in the route becomes occupied. This section is consistent with the 
Petition and U.S. practice.
Section 243.225  Signal Control Circuits, Selection Through Track 
Relays or Devices Functioning as Track Relays
    This section requires control circuits for signal aspects or 
beacons, which convey indications more favorable than ``proceed at 
restricted speed,'' to be selected through track relays, or through 
devices that function as track relays, for all track circuits in the 
route governed. This section would not apply to control circuits of 
signals displaying aspects with indications of ``proceed at restricted 
speed.'' This is consistent with the Petition and U.S. practice.
Section 243.226  Switch, Movable-Point Frog or Split-point Derail
    This section requires the Railroad to equip switches, movable-point 
frogs, or split-point derails with clamp locks on each switch or 
movable point frog and to maintain it so that it cannot be locked when 
the point is open 6 mm (.25 in) or more. Each high speed turnout on the 
main line must be equipped with a pair of switch machines (one for the 
points and one for the movable frog), clamp locks, and position 
detectors.
Section 243.227  Point Detector
    This proposed section requires the Railroad to maintain point 
detectors so that when switch mechanisms are locked in normal or 
reverse position, contacts cannot be opened by manually applying force 
at the closed switch point. Point detector circuit controllers must be 
maintained so that the contacts will not assume the position 
corresponding to switch point closure if the switch point is prevented 
by an obstruction, from closing to within 6 mm (0.25 in). This is 
consistent with the Petition.
Section 243.228  Signals Controlled by Track Circuits
    This section requires control circuits for aspects with indications 
more favorable than ``proceed at restricted speed'' to be controlled by 
track circuits extending through an entire block section. A block 
section would extend from signal to signal, or from signal to its 
defined limits at end of the system. This section is consistent with 
the Petition and U.S. practice.
Section 243.229  Circuits at Interlocking
    This proposed section prevents circuits at interlockings from 
displaying aspects that would permit conflicting movements. FRA's 
proposal uses the term ``interlocking'' rather than the FOX term, 
``control point,'' because the proposed system will actually consist of 
interlockings.
Section 243.230  Signals at Adjacent Interlockings
    This proposed section requires signals at adjacent interlockings to 
be arranged so that movements at greater than restricted speed cannot 
be displayed simultaneously for conflicting movements. The intent of 
this section is to ensure that the maximum authorized speed between 
adjacent interlockings where signals can simultaneously display aspects 
indicating ``proceed at restricted speed'' may not exceed 20 mph, 
regardless of more favorable aspects displayed. This is consistent with 
U.S. practice.
Section 243.231  Track Signaled for Movements in Both Directions, 
Change of Direction of Traffic
    This section requires that where track is signaled for train 
movement in both directions, occupancy of the track between opposing 
signals at adjacent interlockings must prevent changing the direction 
of traffic from that which was obtained at the time the track became 
occupied. After a train, locomotive, or power car has passed a signal 
displaying an aspect permitting it to proceed into and through an 
interlocking, the opposing signals at the adjacent interlocking will 
not be permitted to display any aspect with an indication other than 
``stop,'' so long as the section of track between interlockings is 
occupied. The only exception to this applies in instances when a train 
is left on the main track while its locomotive, power car and/or cars 
move into an adjacent siding or yard for switching purposes and must, 
in returning to its train, reverse its direction for a short distance. 
It would be permissible in such instances to permit such movements to 
be made with a signal aspect indicating ``proceed not to exceed 
restricted speed'' into the occupied block.
Section 243.232  Route Locking
    The section requires the Railroad to provide route locking at all 
interlockings where power-operated switches are located. When a train, 
locomotive, or power car passes a signal displaying any type of proceed 
aspect, including ``proceed at restricted speed,'' over power operated 
switches, track circuits and route locking would be required.
Section 243.233  Wayside Detectors
    This section addresses all of the wayside detection systems that 
will be located in the FOX right-of-way and connected to the Railroad's 
central traffic control system. The Railroad must establish guidelines 
for the events that trigger the detection systems in such a way that 
all potentially hazardous occurrences are conveyed to the signal system 
or central traffic control.
    Paragraph (c) of this section requires the Railroad to install fall 
intrusion detectors at all highway, animal, and non-Railroad equipment 
overpasses and underpasses. Fall intrusion detectors must be activated 
when the network of protective wiring located at each overpass and 
underpass experiences a partial or complete break, and this

[[Page 65500]]

information must be transmitted to central traffic control 
continuously. The Railroad's system safety plan must list the location 
of all fall intrusion detectors, and dictate the actions that will be 
taken when intrusions occur.
    Paragraph (d) requires the Railroad to install an intrusion 
detection system in the protective fencing along the Railroad right-of-
way that must restrict, to the fullest extent possible, unauthorized 
entry by trespassers, personnel, equipment, and animals. This system 
shall be installed at each location that is identified in the system 
safety plan as an area where intrusion is likely to occur. This system 
must be connected to the Railroad's signal system and to the central 
traffic control system, and must alert the Railroad to any intrusion. 
Also, the Railroad must explain in detail where intrusion is likely to 
occur and why, and set forth specific actions that will be taken when 
intrusion occurs.
    Paragraph (e) requires the Railroad to install dragging equipment 
detectors at all locations where underframe repair or maintenance work 
is performed, and at other locations determined necessary by the system 
safety plan. This system must transmit data continuously to the central 
traffic control so that Railroad personnel can make appropriate 
adjustments in operations. The Railroad must explain, in detail, in the 
system safety plan where dragging equipment is likely to occur and why, 
and prescribe specific actions that will be taken when dragging 
equipment is located. The Petition proposed to locate these detectors 
only where underframe repair and maintenance work is completed, but FRA 
believes that dragging equipment may actually occur more often at other 
locations throughout the system. FRA believes that when a rail unit 
leaves a repair facility it is less likely to be in defective condition 
than when it travels other portions of the system. Also, equipment that 
is entering or leaving repair facilities will not be carrying 
passengers, and so the risk of injury at these locations is minimal. 
Therefore, FRA proposes in this section that the Railroad, in the 
process of the system safety analysis, determine where the risk of 
dragged equipment exists, and place detectors at those locations.
    Paragraph (f) requires the Railroad to install flood detectors 
where determined necessary by the system safety plan. This 
determination must include consideration of drainage, culverts, 
bridges, overpasses, underpasses, and flood plain status along the 
right-of-way. The flood detection system must alert the signal system 
and central traffic control of any location where an accumulation of 
water exists in the right-of-way that may present a risk to a right-of-
way structure or in-service railroad equipment. The Railroad's system 
safety plan must include specific actions that will be taken when high 
water is detected.
    Paragraph (g) requires the Railroad to install wind detectors along 
the right-of-way, where it is determined to be necessary pursuant to 
area wind and weather patterns, topography, and proximity to large 
bodies of water. Wind speed data must be conveyed to the central 
traffic control continuously so that Railroad personnel may make 
operational changes when necessary. The Railroad's system safety plan 
must explain where and why wind detectors are located along the right-
of-way, list the speeds and conditions at which operational safety is 
compromised; and set forth the specific actions that will be taken when 
those wind speeds occur.
    Paragraph (h) requires the Railroad to install and maintain hot box 
detectors along the length of the right-of-way to detect the journal 
bearing temperature of all moving rail equipment. The wayside detectors 
must be arranged so that the journal bearing temperature on both sides 
of each train, and on each track, is monitored. The detectors must be 
located at least once every twenty-five miles, and must be linked to 
the signal system to alert the locomotive engineer or the central 
traffic control system, or both, depending on the level of the 
overheating, so that Railroad personnel can take appropriate action. 
This system shall include a hierarchy of alarms, which will alert the 
Railroad to the level of overheating that is occurring and bring about 
corresponding actions. For instance, when journal bearing temperature 
could cause safety-critical components to fail in operation, the 
detection system will cause the defective train to stop at a designated 
block marker, and cause all passing trains to slow to a speed of 50 mph 
or less. When the detectors reveal defective equipment that is less 
serious, but may result in unsafe operations, the system will require 
the equipment to move to the next siding, where it will be inspected 
before movement. Finally, the system will include inspection threshold 
alarms that will alert the Railroad to journal bearing temperature in a 
trainset that is significantly higher than the average temperature 
taken on the other journal bearings. This alarm will be transmitted to 
the central maintenance facility so that the appropriate inspection and 
repair can be completed.
    The Petition contained several sections on wayside detection 
systems. FRA has consolidated the concept by placing them together in 
subpart C, and we require the Railroad to develop the detectors in 
conjunction with the system safety analysis required by subpart B of 
this NRPM. The Petition did not contain sufficient clarity concerning 
the detection systems, which conditions would trigger a Railroad 
response, and what the Railroad response would be, and so FRA invites 
comment from FOX and other interested parties on the language we 
propose in this section. It is difficult to predetermine what events 
may occur in Florida and how the Railroad should respond to varying 
levels of high wind or water, for instance. FRA believes that the 
system safety approach is the most effective way of dealing with all of 
the factors and conditions that may arise in Florida, and so we have 
added that connection to the proposed rule text. However, FRA is also 
concerned that this section may not yet be clear enough, in terms of 
providing notice to the Railroad and interested parties on the 
appropriate activity that must accompany potentially unsafe events, and 
what degree of safety is compromised before the activity is required. 
Therefore, FRA requests comments from the public on suggested language 
or concepts that may more fully address the risk factors presented.
Section 243.234  Protection of Maintenance-of-Way Personnel
    This section requires that the signaling system include circuitry 
to lock-out particular block sections and restrict the speed of passing 
trains on these block sections or adjacent trackage for the protection 
of maintenance of way personnel, and that corresponding procedures be 
covered in the Operating Rules. This is consistent with the Petition 
and current U.S. requirements. FOX proposes that after receiving 
authorization from the CTC center, roadway workers would be able to 
ensure their safety by use of a local switch that will protect them 
from unsafe or inconsistent train movements.
Section 243.235  ATC Device Installation
    This section requires that each power vehicle capable of being the 
lead vehicle be equipped with an automatic train control or ATC device 
that will operate when the trainset travels at a speed of more than 32 
km/h (20 mph). This is consistent with the Petition and U.S. practice. 
It is important to note that FOX is designing the system to operate so 
that, if the ATC system does not operate correctly when the speed is 
greater than 32 km/h (20 mph), external backup

[[Page 65501]]

speed control equipment will limit the speed to 32 km/h (20 mph).
Section 243.236  Forestalling Device and Speed Control
    Paragraph (a) of this section establishes the requirements of the 
ATC system arrangement. Paragraph (b) establishes required features of 
the ATC system, such as braking supervision and maximum speed 
supervision. This section is consistent with the Petition and U.S. 
practice, although the system is more advanced than systems in use in 
this country at the present time. FOX is designing the ATC system to 
incorporate the following: (1) Multiple processor architecture and on-
board equipment; (2) Trackside encoders sending messages through the 
track beacons and short cable loops, providing notifications of 
upcoming curves and gradients in the next portion of the line, 
distances to point, and speed restrictions; (3) On-board equipment that 
calculates the braking curve requirements with respect to the data 
received.
Section 243.237  Cab Signal Indication in Accordance With Maximum Speed 
Limit
    This section requires that while providing maximum speed 
supervision, the Railroad's ATC system will provide a cab signal 
indication of the maximum authorized speed. This will provide the 
locomotive engineer with valuable speed authorization information. The 
proposal is consistent with the petition and U.S. standards.
Section 243.238  Automatic Brake Application; Initiation When the 
Maximum Speed Limit Is Exceeded
    This section requires that the Railroad's ATC system operate to 
initiate an automatic brake application when the speed of the train 
exceeds the maximum speed intervention curve. The Automatic brake 
application can be interrupted by the locomotive engineer only when the 
speed of the train is lower than the maximum authorized speed. This is 
consistent with the Petition and U.S. practice. The FOX design includes 
supervision for a local maximum authorized speed which will consist of: 
(1) Providing a cab indication of the maximum allowed speed; (2) 
issuing an audible and/or visual warning if the trainset speed exceeds 
the maximum allowed speed by a predefined margin and; (3) automatically 
applying the brake if the trainset speed exceeds the maximum authorized 
speed by a predefined margin.
Section 243.239  Advance Cab Signal Indication.
    This section requires that the ATC system provide a cab signal 
indication of the target speed and distance before commencing the 
braking supervision, thus allowing the locomotive engineer to respond 
by a manual brake application. The section is consistent with the 
petition and U.S. standards. The opportunity for information enabling a 
manual brake application by the locomotive engineer is obviously more 
desirable than resorting to ATC system braking intervention.
Section 243.240  Automatic Brake Application Initiated by the ATC
    This section requires that the ATC system initiate an automatic 
brake application to ensure compliance with target speed and target 
distance, in the absence of an appropriate response to a cab display 
indication on the part of the locomotive engineer. This is consistent 
with the Petition and U.S. practice. The FOX system will be designed so 
that prior to intervention, the ATC system will provide an audible and/
or visual warning so that intervention will be avoided if the engineer 
reacts within a pre-defined delay.
Section 243.241  Cab Signal Indication After Authorization to Enter a 
Block Section Where Conditions Defined in Sec. 243.219 Exist
    Paragraph (a) of this section requires that if a trainset is 
authorized to enter a block section in which any condition listed in 
Sec. 423.219 of this Part exists, the ATC system must display an 
indication to ``Proceed at Restricted Speed.'' Paragraph (b) requires 
if the restricted speed is exceeded, the ATC must initiate an automatic 
brake application. This is consistent with the Petition and U.S. 
practice. This section will ensure that if another trainset is 
occupying the block, a switch point is not closed in the proper 
position or something such as a broken rail is causing a track relay to 
be deenergized, the trainset authorized to enter such block will be 
protected from a collision or derailment.
Section 243.242  Audible Indicator
    This section requires that the audible cab indicator have two 
distinctive sounds and be clearly audible throughout the cab under all 
operating conditions. When the cab display changes, the audible 
indicator will sound briefly (for approximately 0.5 seconds) to draw 
the locomotive engineer's attention to the change. This sound will be 
used to draw the engineer's attention when there is some change in the 
speed authorization, whether permissive or restrictive. There will be 
no acknowledgment necessary for this sound. A different audible warning 
will sound before an automatic brake application is initiated. The 
warning will be given in sufficient time to allow the locomotive 
engineer and the train brake equipment to respond to the change. This 
indicator will sound continuously until the warning condition 
disappears. The section is consistent with the Petition and U.S. 
practice. Methods to silence or muffle the audible indicator, such as 
tampering with the audible device, would be prohibited.
Section 243.243  Delay Time
    This section requires that the delay time of the ATC train-borne 
equipment ensure that the trainset complies with the target speed and 
distance through the brake application initiated by the system. This 
section is consistent with the Petition. The principle of the ATC 
system does not factor in a preset delay time of 8 seconds, as is 
required by 49 C.F.R. 236.563. Instead, the system permanently checks 
the level of braking available on the train and takes into account 
these data to compute the warning and braking curves.
Section 243.244  Automatic Brake Application; Full Service
    This section requires that an automatic brake application initiated 
by the ATC system will cause a full service application of the brakes. 
This is consistent with the Petition and U.S. practice. FRA will 
consider a full service brake application to be an application of the 
brakes, other than emergency, which develops the maximum brake cylinder 
pressure, as determined by the design of the brake equipment for the 
speed at which the train is operating.
Section 243.245  Interference With Application of Brakes by Means of 
Brake Valve
    This section will ensure that the ATC apparatus is arranged so the 
automatic application of the brakes cannot be interfered with by means 
of the brake valve and the efficiency of the braking system will not be 
impaired, thus assuring safe train movements. This is consistent with 
the Petition and with U.S. practice.
Section 243.246  Control From Lead Vehicle
    This section requires that each trainset be controlled and operated 
from the lead vehicle. Each lead vehicle will be equipped with an ATC 
device. This device will have a fail safe and fault

[[Page 65502]]

tolerant architecture, such as a two out of three voting architecture. 
This is consistent with the Petition and constitutes a desirable method 
of ensuring safety of train operation and system reliability.
    As defined in this proposal, ``fault tolerant architecture'' means 
the built-in capability of a system to provide continued (full or 
limited) operation in the presence of a limited number of faults or 
failures of the system, such as a defect in a hardware device, 
component or an incorrect step, process or data definition in a 
computer program.
    ``Two out of three voting architecture'' means three independent 
processors operating on dissimilar software operating in such a manner 
so as to compare the software output from each processor to ensure 
safety critical results match. If one processor produces an answer 
inconsistent with the other two processors the conflicting processor is 
taken off-line and the two remaining processors continue to compare 
with each other and drive safety critical commands, only as long as 
they both agree. If the remaining two processors fail to agree, the 
system will cease to issue safety critical commands and will be shut 
down and assume a safe state.
Section 243.247  Proper Operative Relation Between Parts Along Roadway 
and Parts on Power Car
    This section requires that ATC track-side and power car components 
be designed and operate in compatibility under all conditions of speed, 
weather, wear, oscillation, and shock. This section is consistent with 
the Petition and U.S. practice, and will ensure ATC system reliability 
under various outside influences.
Section 243.248  Visibility of Cab Signals
    This section requires that cab signals be plainly visible to the 
locomotive or power car crew from their stations in the cab. The 
proposal is consistent with the Petition and U.S. practice. Cab signals 
will be required to be installed so that the crew member or members can 
plainly see aspects displayed from their normal position in the cab. 
The cab signal will be required to be properly illuminated, without 
cracked or broken roundels and its view not obstructed by other 
equipment installed in the cab.
Section 243.249  Power Supply
    This section requires that the ATC system operate from a separate 
or isolated power supply. The proposal is consistent with the Petition 
and U.S. practice. Power supplies for ATC systems should be separate 
and distinct to eliminate interference from other electrical control 
circuits, thus ensuring reliable power to the ATC system.
Section 243.250  Seal, Where Required
    This section requires that a seal be maintained on any device other 
than the brake-pipe cut-out cock (double-heading cock), where the 
operation of the pneumatic portion of the automatic train-control 
apparatus can be cut out. This is consistent with the Petition and U.S. 
practice. The seal is required to be applied in such a manner that the 
device cannot be operated to cut out the apparatus without breaking the 
seal. This provides a means to prevent tampering with the ATC system.
Section 243.251  Rate of Pressure Reduction; Equalizing Reservoir or 
Brake Pipe
    This section will ensure that equalizing-reservoir pressure or 
brake-pipe pressure reduction during an automatic brake application 
will be at least equal to a manual service brake application. This is 
consistent with the Petition and U.S. practice, and will prevent an 
automatic brake application from being less effective than an 
application by the locomotive engineer.
Section 243.252  Restrictions Imposed When Device Fails and/or is Cut 
Out En Route
    Paragraph (a) of this section provides instructions for train 
operation in the event of ATC system failure or when the ATC system is 
cut-out en route. It is important to note that, for purposes of Subpart 
C, the ATC system will be considered to be in failure when two or more 
of the on-board processors are not operating as intended. If one on-
board processor malfunctions, the remaining two are designed to capably 
operate the train safety, and so this event will not be considered to 
be an ATC failure. It is also important to note that, for purposes of 
this Subpart, ATC failures are not limited to malfunctioning on-board 
processors. A variety of conditions may occur to result in ATC failure, 
and all of them are contemplated by the language in this Subpart.
    Paragraph (b) requires that where an ATC system fails or is cut out 
en route, the Railroad must test the ATC, record the results in 
accordance with Sec. 243.276 (departure test) and Sec. 243.278 (results 
of tests), and determine that the ATC is fully operative before the 
trainset leaves its next initial terminal. This section is consistent 
with the Petition and U.S. practice.
Section 243.253  The Trackage
    This section requires that the trackage over which the Railroad 
operates trains in revenue service be completely equipped with wayside 
equipment designed to interface with and provide safety control 
commands to the lead vehicle of trainsets which operate over that 
trackage. Signaling beacons and antennas will be installed and 
maintained in accordance with manufacturer's specifications. This is 
consistent with the Petition and U.S. practice. The ATC system wayside 
equipment proposed by FOX will consist of active beacons and cable 
loops which will be used to transmit intermittent and semi-continuous 
data from the track to the train. The appropriate quantity of beacons 
and loops will be calculated in order to meet performance targets and 
will be adapted to the local conditions. Wayside encoders will be used 
to store permanent data for the topology of the line, and the data sent 
to the train through beacons and loops will interface with the 
interlocking system.
Section 243.254  Cut Out of the ATC System
    This section requires that any cut out of the ATC system or 
activation of the acknowledging device be registered in the on-board 
event recorder. This is consistent with the Petition and an improvement 
over current U.S. practice, which currently involves keeping a record 
of system cut-out. This section will ensure accurate data depicting any 
ATC system intervention.

Reporting Requirements

Section 243.255  Accidents Resulting from Signal Failure
    This section requires that the occurrence of an accident/incident 
arising from the failure of an appliance, device, method or system to 
function or indicate as required by this NPRM that results in a more 
favorable aspect than intended or other conditions hazardous to the 
movement of a train, shall be reported within 24 hours to the FRA by 
toll free telephone number, 800-424-0201. This is consistent with the 
Petition and U.S. practice.
Section 243.256  Signal Failure Reports
    This section establishes a time period of five days in which the 
Railroad must report each failure of an appliance, device, method, or 
system to function or indicate as required by these standards that 
results in a more favorable aspect than intended or other condition 
hazardous to the movement of a train. Form FRA F6180-14, ``Signal 
Failure

[[Page 65503]]

Report,'' must be used for this purpose and completed in accordance 
with instructions printed on the form. This section is consistent with 
the Petition and will constitute a recordkeeping requirement. Current 
U.S. requirements dictate a time period of fifteen days. However, since 
this is a controlled environment and proper ATC system operation will 
be vital to the safety of the passenger trains operating at high 
speeds, there is a need for faster notification by the Railroad and an 
FRA investigation concerning any unsafe signal failure.
Section 243.257  Annual Signal Systems Report
    This section requires that the railroad file an annual signal 
systems report, which will detail current signal system information, on 
a form provided by FRA in accordance with instructions and definitions 
on the reverse side of the form. This section was not in the Petition, 
but is consistent with current U.S. practice.

Inspection, Testing and Maintenance

Section 243.258  General
    This section requires that the Railroad's inspection, testing and 
maintenance program be designed to ensure that the safety of the 
Railroad's signaling system does not deteriorate over time, in 
accordance with Sec. 243.107 of this proposal.
Section 243.259  Interference with Normal Functioning of Device
    This section requires that inspection, testing and maintenance will 
not interfere with or alter the normal functioning of any signal 
device, except after measures are in place to provide for the safety of 
train operations that depend on normal functioning of such device. This 
is consistent with the petition and U.S. practice. Interference would 
be any condition that circumvents, hinders, impedes, or diminishes 
whatsoever the intended protection of a device, and may be done by 
testing, installing, repairing, replacing, operating, or manipulating a 
component indicating or affecting the indication of safe passage for 
trains. There will be no difference between accidental or intentional 
interference with respect to the enforcement of this rule.
Section 243.260  Operating Characteristics of Electromagnetic, 
Electronic, or Electrical Apparatus
    This section requires that signal apparatus which affects the 
safety of train operations, be maintained in accordance with the design 
limits of the device. This is consistent with the Petition and U.S. 
practice. The railroad must have specifications setting forth the pick-
up values, release values, working values, and condemning limits of 
these values for all applicable signal apparatus in use on its 
property. Manufacturer specifications or Railroad standards compatible 
with manufacturer specifications will be used to determine such values.
Section 243.261  Adjustment, Repair, or Replacement of Component
    This section requires that when any component of a signal system 
that is essential to the safety of train operation fails to perform its 
intended signaling function or does not correspond with known operating 
conditions, the cause shall be determined and the faulty component 
adjusted, repaired or replaced as soon as possible. This is consistent 
with the Petition and U.S. practice. The Railroad would be required to 
determine the cause of each ``stop'' or ``stop and proceed'' aspect 
resulting from an unknown condition. If that condition is the result of 
the failure of a signaling component and is a hazard to safe 
operations, corrective action is required before the next train 
movement.
Section 243.262  Purpose of Inspection and Tests; Removal From Service 
of a Relay or Device Failing to Meet Test Requirements
    This section requires all inspections and tests to be made in 
accordance with the specifications of the Railroad and approved by FRA 
as part of the system safety plan. Tests should be made to determine if 
the equipment is maintained in the appropriate condition so that it 
will consistently perform its intended function. Any electronic device, 
relay, or other electromagnetic device that fails to meet the 
requirements of the specified tests will be removed from service, and 
not returned to service until its operating characteristics are 
consistent with the design limits. This is consistent with the Petition 
and U.S. practice. This section would apply to all devices that effect 
the safety of train operations. It is understood and accepted 
throughout the railroad industry that all signal devices must be 
designed so that the limits of their operating characteristics provide 
adequate safety margins.
Section 243.263  Point Detector Test
    This section requires the Railroad to test point detectors operated 
by power-operated switch movement at least once every three months. 
This test ensures that a safe tolerance of switch point closure is 
maintained. This section is consistent with the Petition and U.S. 
practice.
Section 243.264  Relays; Microprocessor Testing
    Paragraph (a) of this section requires that each safety-critical, 
train-borne ATC relay be tested at least once each year to ensure the 
correct parameters of the relays. Paragraph (b) requires that each 
safety-critical, wayside relay be tested at least once every four years 
to ensure the correct parameters of the relays. Paragraph (c) requires 
the Railroad to test each safety-critical, train-borne electronic 
subsystem which is not verified internally on a continuous basis at 
least once each year. Paragraph (d) provides that each safety-critical, 
train-borne electronic subsystem, in which proper operation is verified 
internally in a closed loop fashion, will not require periodic tests. 
Subsystems that contain continuous verification will not need to be 
tested because of their fail safe design. Paragraph (e) requires the 
Railroad to test each safety-critical wayside electronic subsystem, 
which is not verified internally on a continuous basis, at least once 
every two years. Paragraph (f) provides that each safety-critical 
wayside electronic subsystem, in which proper operation is verified 
internally in a closed loop fashion, will not require periodic tests.
    The paragraphs in this section are consistent with the Petition and 
U.S. practice. Although the relay testing requirements of this rule are 
based on 49 CFR part 236, new language has been added to this proposal 
in order to address microprocessors.
Section 243.265  Ground Tests
    Paragraph (a) requires the Railroad to test for grounds on each 
safety-critical energy bus furnishing power to circuits at least once 
every three months. Paragraphs (b) and (c) provide exceptions to this 
requirement. Periodic ground tests would not be required if ground 
detection devices are properly functioning, or if the design of 
circuits is such that a grounded energy bus could not impact the safety 
of train operation. An inspection of the ground detection device to 
ensure proper operation of the device will be required at least once 
every three months. This section is consistent with the Petition, 
except for the inspection of ground detection devices, and with U.S. 
practice, except that ground tests are not required when automatic 
detection devices are used. If ground detection devices are used, such 
devices should

[[Page 65504]]

be verified for proper operation on a periodic basis.
Section 243.266  Insulation Resistance Tests; Wires in Trunking and 
Cables
    Paragraph (a) of this section requires that an insulation 
resistance test of signal system wires and cables be made at least once 
every 10 years to ensure that circuit conductors are in proper working 
order for the safe operation of the signal system. Paragraph (b) 
provides that a circuit may not be permitted to function on a conductor 
that has an insulation resistance to ground or between conductors of 
less than 200,000 ohms. When a test reveals this condition, the 
conductor must be removed from service immediately to avoid the risk of 
an unsafe failure in the Railroad's signal system. This section is 
consistent with the FOX petition and U.S. practice.
Section 243.267  Time Releases, Timing Relays and Timing Devices
    This section requires the Railroad to test time releases, timing 
relays, and timing devices at least once each year. The timing must be 
maintained at no less than 90 percent of the predetermined time 
interval, to ensure adequate predetermined parameters, such as train 
braking distance calculations. The predetermined time will be shown on 
the plans or marked on the time release, timing relay, or timing 
device. Where time releases are an integral part of a safety-critical, 
processor-based controller, and are specified in the applications 
program, such intervals must be tested only at the time of installation 
and whenever a change is made in the applications program. This section 
is consistent with the Petition and with U.S. practice.
Section 243.268  Time Locking
    This section requires that where time locking is an integral part 
of a safety-critical, processor-based controller, and is specified in 
the applications program, the locking will be tested at the time of 
installation and whenever a change is made in the applications program. 
This is consistent with the Petition. The time locking test will 
determine that no route can be changed until a predetermined amount of 
time has expired, ensuring the safe movement of the train whose route 
has been established. There will be no periodic testing required under 
this rule, such as once every two years, which is required in 49 CFR 
part 236, because the vital logic processor of the interlocking 
controller will employ two processors that operate simultaneously in a 
redundant, checking-system architecture. All safety-critical operations 
will be continuously performed by both processors. The solid state 
controller will be based on closed loop principles, software diversity, 
and the use of vital hardware design techniques.
Section 243.269  Route Locking
    This section similarly requires the Railroad to test route locking 
at the time of installation, whenever a change is made in the 
applications program, and when route locking has been disarranged. This 
is consistent with the Petition, except that FRA has included the test 
requirement ``when route locking has been disarranged.'' In this 
context, the term ``disarranged'' could apply to several circumstances. 
Route locking will be considered to be disarranged when: a vital relay, 
if used, in the route locking circuit is replaced with another; when 
two or more conductors are severed; when a cable or conductor in a 
locking circuit is replaced with another; or when wires are removed at 
the same time from more than one terminal of a relay or terminal board. 
The route locking test will determine that a train's route cannot be 
changed once the train has passed a signal indicating proceed until the 
train has cleared the track section of the route governed. No periodic 
testing is required by this proposal for the reasons previously stated 
in Sec. 243.268.
Section 243.270  Indication Locking
    This section similarly requires that indication locking be tested 
at the time of installation, whenever a change is made in the 
applications program and when the indication locking has been 
disarranged. This is consistent with the Petition and U.S. practice, 
except that no periodic testing is required for the reasons stated 
previously. The indication locking test will ensure that no conflicting 
route can be established, and no power-operated switch can be moved 
with a route already established for a train.
Section 243.271  Traffic Locking
    This proposed section requires the Railroad to test traffic locking 
at the time of installation and whenever a change is made in the 
applications program. This is consistent with the Petition and U.S. 
practice, except that there will be no periodic testing required by 
this rule for the reasons stated previously. The traffic locking test 
will determine that the direction of train traffic cannot be changed, 
for instance, an opposing proceed signal displayed, where a route is 
already established for a train in one direction.
Section 243.272  Switch Obstruction Test
    This section requires the Railroad to conduct a switch obstruction 
test of each switch when the lock rod is installed, and at least once 
every 3 months. This section is consistent with the Petition. This 
deviates from the monthly switch obstruction test currently required of 
existing railroads because of the differences in the FOX operating 
environment. FRA believes that switches will experience little or no 
variation from their original adjustments.
Section 243.273  Locomotive or Powercar Power Supply Voltage 
Requirement
    This section requires that the output voltage of the power supply 
for FOX locomotive ATC will be maintained within 10 percent of rated 
voltage. This will ensure adequate and steady energy to operate the ATC 
system. This section is consistent with the Petition and U.S. practice.
Section 243.274  Power-Car or Locomotive Insulation Resistance; 
Requirement
    This section requires that when the periodic test prescribed in 
Sec. 243.266 is performed, insulation resistance between wiring and 
ground of the automatic train control system may not be less than one 
megohm. This deviates from the Petition by stating a value for minimum 
insulation resistance. This requirement is based on current practice 
for existing operations in this country. The standard referred to in 
the FOX Petition for insulation resistance (EN-50155) does not state a 
minimum value, and hence, provides no notice as to what the standard is 
and would be unenforceable.
Section 243.275  Antennas and Beacons
    This section requires the Railroad to inspect and maintain 
signaling beacons and antennas in accordance with manufacturer's 
specifications. Also, antennas and beacons that have been repaired or 
rewound must adhere to the same operating characteristics which they 
possessed originally or as specified for new equipment. This proposal 
would ensure that the beacons or antennas are in condition sufficient 
to transmit reliable data to the on-board ATC equipment. This section 
is consistent with the Petition and U.S. standards.
Section 243.276  Departure Test
    Paragraph (a) of this section requires the Railroad to test the 
train-borne ATC

[[Page 65505]]

equipment by operation over track elements, by operation over a test 
circuit, or by an on-board test device in order to ensure a reliable 
means of testing the apparatus. Paragraph (b) requires the Railroad to 
determine the extent of the departure test in accordance with the 
system safety analysis described in Subpart B, and include, at a 
minimum, ground-to-train transmission, the cab display indications, and 
the interface with the train brakes.
    Paragraph (c) requires the Railroad to perform a departure test, 
and put on-board ATC equipment in service before the trainset operates 
over equipped territory. If the ATC is cut out, the Railroad must 
perform another departure test before the ATC equipment can be 
considered operative. Paragraph (d) provides only one departure test is 
required in each 24-hour period, except as provided in Sec. 243.252(b) 
concerning failures or cut-outs en route. This is consistent with 
current U.S. practice and has provided a high level of safety.
    Paragraph (e) requires the Railroad to record each test run and its 
outcome in the train-borne event recorder, downloaded and retained for 
at least one year. This will provide a database in the event that a 
determination of proper testing is needed.
    This section is consistent with the Petition and U.S. practice, 
except for the train-borne event recorder requirement, which is a 
desirable feature of this ATC system that will enhance safety. ``On-
board equipment'' will consist of the on-board unit, vehicle antenna, 
cab display, and systems that will interface with the train, including 
a speed measurement system, an event recorder, and an on-board 
microprocessor system network. The on-board unit consists of processing 
logic and receiving/transmitting equipment. The vehicle antenna will be 
mounted under the power-car frame and will receive line description 
data. The cab display will include the actual speed of train, target 
speed, target distance, and maximum authorized speed information.
Section 243.277  Periodic Test
    This section requires the Railroad to perform a periodic test of 
the train-borne ATC equipment at least once every two months and on 
multiple-unit cars as specified by the Railroad, subject to approval by 
FRA. The Petition recommended a periodic test at least once each year. 
Current U.S. practice requires a periodic test at least once every 92 
days. However, existing standards require a ``daily or after trip 
test,'' unless a periodic test is done at intervals of not more than 
two months. It is FRA's belief that, unless the Railroad intends to 
perform daily or after-trip tests, the ATC equipment should be tested 
on the same periodic basis as required by current U.S. industry 
standards. FRA sees nothing in the FOX system to make this requirement 
unnecessary, and believes that the test enhances safety with minimal 
cost.
Section 243.278  Results of Tests
    This section requires the Railroad to record the results of tests 
made in compliance with Secs. 243.252(b), 243.262 through 243.272 
inclusive, 243.276, and 243.277. This section sets forth the required 
information for recording tests either via pre-printed or computerized 
forms, or by electronic means. This section is consistent with the 
Petition and U.S. practice.
Section 243.279  Independent Verification and Validation
    This section describes the process by which an independent entity 
with known technical expertise will conduct an audit of all safety-
critical, processor-based equipment in the Railroad's signal system. 
The audit must be done on the system as it is finally configured, and 
before revenue operations commence. Paragraph (b) lists the items that 
the audit must review, and paragraph (c) requires preparation of a 
report by the independent audit firm. Paragraph (d) describes the 
procedure by which the report and the Railroad's signal system will be 
accepted.
    FRA believes that this process is necessary in order to ensure the 
integrity of the FOX signal system. As discussed earlier, the system is 
not currently in revenue service anywhere in the world, and although 
safety experts agree that it will likely improve railroad safety, there 
is no safety record available on which FRA can assess the system's 
reliability and endurance during operations. Of particular concern is 
the likelihood of severe weather in Florida, which could disrupt or 
obliterate the operation of the signal system. FRA believes that an 
independent audit of the system's software and processors will reveal 
any system weakness and assist the Railroad in mitigating hazards. FRA 
does not have the expertise at this time to conduct such an audit, and 
so seeks appropriate input from recognized, independent experts in the 
field before the system is approved for revenue service. FRA has 
required other companies to undergo similar independent validation and 
verification inspections, and believes that such an inspection is 
equally wise in the case of FOX. FRA understands that the FOX signal 
system is being tested presently in Belgium, and will likely be used in 
revenue service in Europe prior to the commencement of FOX operations. 
FRA anticipates that the European testing will reveal and correct 
potential problems, which will benefit FOX and help to focus the review 
done on the system in the U.S. However, FRA expects that the right-of-
way chosen for Florida and the extreme weather conditions that exist, 
present new factors that will not be considered during the testing in 
Europe. For all of these reasons, FRA believes that an independent 
audit would greatly enhance the safety of the system, and will 
ultimately work to the Railroad's advantage. This proposal was not 
included in the Petition. FRA seeks comment from the public concerning 
the value of the audit and any other information that the Agency should 
evaluate concerning the FOX signal system.
    FRA suggests as a guide a verification and validation study 
commissioned by the Volpe Transportation Systems Center, and completed 
by Battelle in 1995, entitled Safety of High Speed Ground 
Transportation Systems, Analytical Methodology for Safety Validation of 
Computer Controlled Subsystems, Volume 1: State-of-the-Art and 
Assessment of Safety Verification/Validation Methodologies (Battelle 
Volume 1 Report), and Volume 2: Development of a Safety Validation 
Methodology (Battelle Volume 2 Report).

Subpart D--Track Safety Standards

    Subpart D of the NPRM sets forth minimum track safety standards for 
the FOX system. These proposed standards are based on the Petition, the 
Agency's proposed high speed track standards for general application in 
the U.S. railroad industry (62 FR 36138, July 3, 1997) known as ``Track 
Subpart G,'' and other pertinent standards used internationally. A 
brief discussion of each of these is warranted, in order to understand 
the standards proposed in this NPRM for application on FOX.
    FRA's Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) convened a working 
group to revise, where appropriate, the existing track standards that 
govern track safety in the general railroad system (49 CFR part 213). 
The working group included representatives from rail labor, railroads, 
trade associations, state government groups, track equipment 
manufacturers, and FRA. The working group established a special task 
group, which consisted of individuals with

[[Page 65506]]

high speed track expertise, to focus specifically on new high speed 
track standards.
    The high speed task group recognized that high speed track safety 
standards should be based on sound engineering research, and foreign 
and domestic practice, and, be understandable, cost beneficial, and 
enforceable. With these principles in mind, the task group concluded 
early on that it could not consider high speed track or high speed 
vehicles in isolation but must consider them as an integral system. 
This approach led to the development of vehicle/track interaction 
performance limits--the cornerstone of the group's recommended 
standards.
    The task group asked FRA's Office of Research and Development to 
organize an effort to provide recommendations on vehicle/track 
interaction and track geometry. An informal group of experts, including 
members of the FOX consortium, contributed to this effort. Engineering 
studies conducted by the experts included evaluation of the use of 
measuring track geometry with offsets from several chord lengths, 
computer simulations of vehicle response to track surface and alignment 
variations, application of the proposed specifications to previously 
measured track geometry, and comparison of specifications to foreign 
practice.
    The work began with general acceptance of established parameters 
for vehicle/track interaction (VTI). Then, through analysis of 
modelling, test data, and foreign practice, the group of experts 
selected a small number of descriptors adequate to assure freedom from 
derailment and other hazardous vehicle/track interactions. For the most 
part, these proposals were considered appropriate for both dedicated 
track and mixed-traffic environments. The recommendations of the 
experts on the topics of VTI and track geometry were considered by the 
high speed task group and incorporated into its recommendation to the 
RSAC track working group for Track subpart G. The RSAC track working 
group also accepted the recommendations of the high speed task group, 
and they became part of Track subpart G, as it was published by FRA for 
comment on July 3, 1997.
    After the track working group forwarded its recommendations to 
RSAC, members of the high speed task group and its supporting panel of 
experts met with a separate group who were working on FRA's proposed 
passenger equipment standards for high speed rail (Tier II). The 
purpose of this meeting was to ensure that the proposed track standards 
and the proposed equipment standards would not conflict. The 
conclusions reached during this meeting are pertinent to this NPRM and 
are discussed in detail below.
    Members of the FOX consortium and FRA staff participated in the 
development of Track subpart G, and did so with the knowledge that 
those standards would apply generally to high speed operations across 
the country. However, it was understood that portions of the FOX 
Petition and FRA's proposed track standards for FOX might vary from 
Track subpart G, in this rule of particular applicability, in order to 
accommodate and assess accurately the specific safety needs in Florida. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that FOX incorporated many of the Track 
subpart G proposals in the Petition, that FRA proposes many of those 
recommendations here, and that both FRA and FOX believe portions of 
Track subpart G may not adequately address safety standards for the 
system planned for Florida.
    In its Petition, FOX altered some of the proposals that are 
contained in Track subpart G, based on the operating characteristics 
that will exist in Florida, such as the absence of freight equipment, 
and the French TGV practice. The Petition, however, is not identical to 
the French TGV practice either. As FRA understands it, FOX believes 
that the lower train density, detection systems, and other operating 
conditions that will exist in Florida that are not also present in 
France, merit some reconsideration of the French general practice on 
high speed lines.
    FRA believes that the majority of Track subpart G is applicable to 
all high speed environments, including the environment proposed in the 
Petition. FRA is in agreement with FOX that certain specific standards, 
particularly those pertaining to inspection methods and frequencies, 
are largely dependent on the loads associated with the types and amount 
of traffic on the high speed line. The dynamic loads associated with 
different types of traffic affect the rate of track degradation, which 
is an important factor to consider when selecting an inspection 
strategy. Any comprehensive inspection strategy must include automated 
and visual inspections, which together ensure that the track maintains 
a high quality, so that it will not induce adverse vehicle response and 
will withstand the dynamic loads imparted to the track.
    In this NPRM, FRA alters some of the inspection frequencies that 
were set forth in Track subpart G, due to the fact that the FOX system 
will not include freight traffic, and because of the other operating 
features that are unique to FOX. Also, FRA reviewed practices utilized 
on the French TGV and on Japan's high speed rail system, and weighed 
the appropriateness of those standards to the Florida system. Finally, 
as discussed previously in this document, FRA recognizes that there are 
unknown factors, which may present risks or benefits to passengers and 
employees, that arise because the French system works in a very 
different financial and legal framework; the US workforce does not 
possess great institutional knowledge of the system; the Florida 
topography and weather differ greatly from France; and the FOX system 
will include features that do not exist now, and have no reliable 
safety record on which to predict safety. FRA proposes a track safety 
program that reflects all of the available relevant information, and 
consideration of the unknown elements outlined above.
    Subpart D of this proposal represents FRA's best judgment on 
appropriate track safety standards that will effectively protect 
passengers and employees in Florida. FRA anticipates that FOX will 
object to some of the inspection intervals set forth in this NPRM. FRA 
believes that the minimal costs associated with the increased 
inspection frequencies are outweighed by the safety benefit that will 
accrue to the system, and take into account some of the unknown risks 
that result from moving this system from France to North America that 
were discussed previously in this document.
Section 243.301  Restoration or Renewal of Track Under Traffic 
Conditions
    This section, except for minor editing, mirrors the Petition. There 
are two elements of concern addressed in this section: the track 
structure stability must not significantly degrade, and roadway worker 
safety may not be compromised. Only track maintenance involving 
replacement of worn, broken, or missing components or fastenings, which 
does not affect safe train movement is permitted. Paragraph (b) 
prohibits specific activities during train operations, which would 
compromise track stability and railroad safety.
Section 243.303  Measuring Track not Under Load
    This section is identical to the Petition and is consistent with 
the present track safety standards, which require that any rail 
movement occurring while the track is loaded must be added to the 
measurement of the unloaded track.

[[Page 65507]]

Section 243.305  Drainage
    This section is identical to the Petition and current U.S. 
practice. The Railroad must design and maintain the right-of-way so 
that water drains without obstruction, and to such an extent that safe 
train operations are not jeopardized.
Section 243.307  Vegetation
    This section corresponds to the Petition and current U.S. practice. 
The Railroad must restrict the growth of vegetation along the right-of-
way so that it will not interfere with safe train operations.
Section 243.309  Track Geometry; General and Section 243.311 Track Gage
    FRA's proposal for Secs. 243.309 and 243.311 concerning track 
geometry and track gage differs from the Petition. FRA's proposal 
essentially incorporates and expands upon the geometry table found in 
the Petition, which follows the French TGV's geometry inspection 
techniques. However, FRA includes a second intervention table to 
address multiple defects, the requirement to make an additional chordal 
measurement, additional requirements for the geometry measurement 
system, and other changes that FRA believes are necessary for safety.
    FOX asserts that the values used in the Petition are identical to 
those used by the French TGV, which permit wider and narrower gage than 
would be acceptable for railroad operations in this country. Gage 
limits are extremely important to railroad safety because high wheel 
forces and wheel climb can occur in tight gage conditions, and high 
wheel forces and sudden wide gage can occur in wide gage conditions. 
These conditions can cause train derailments and incidents.
    FOX proposes to use the European combination of rail and wheelset 
profiles, including the wheelset flange back-to-back dimensions, which 
are slightly different than standard US designs. The significance of 
these dimensional variations is that the distance between the flange 
points on a nominal FOX-style wheelset will be very close to the 
distance between flange points on a standard US wheelset. There is an 
increase in the tread cone angle of the FOX wheel profile from a 1-in-
40 slope to a 1-in-6.67 slope for the last 20 mm of the tread, which 
would tend to increase any gage widening forces if the wheel 
experiences very wide gage. The flange back-to-back dimension is larger 
than permitted under current US practice and should be considered when 
designing guard rails and flange ways.
    FRA is concerned that the Petition would allow tight gage up to 170 
km/h (105 mph). The use of 1420 mm gage with wheelsets in nominal 
condition would cause more than \1/2\'' wheel climb on both wheels. 
Based on these dimensional analyses, FRA recommends that the minimum 
gage be modified to 12 mm less than nominal for speeds below 105 mph.
    FRA has concluded that several modifications to the Petition are 
necessary to address additional key safety concerns in this regard. The 
Petition does not include a provision for multiple or repeating 
defects, but FRA believes that such provisions are essential to a 
comprehensive set of minimum track safety standards. The basis of this 
concept is that safe railroad operations are jeopardized by a series of 
track defects that in isolation may not be troublesome, but in 
combination may result in train incidents or accidents. The panel of 
experts who advised the high speed track task group considered the case 
of multiple alignment defects and their ability to excite harmonic 
motion in the carbody. Multiple deviations were considered to occur 
when three or more non-overlapping deviations from uniformity in track 
alignment occurred within a distance equal to five times the specified 
chord length.
    FOX states that the Mauzin car, (or track geometry measurement 
system, as it is called in the proposed rule text), which is a geometry 
car used in French TGV track inspection, will be used to measure track 
geometry in Florida. This car does not detect multiple defects. 
Therefore, FRA proposes provisions in this document to compensate for 
this deficiency, based on French practice and Track Subpart G, so that 
a level of safety equivalent to the proposals of Track Subpart G is 
maintained. In Sec. 243.309, FRA modifies the geometry table FOX 
proposed in the Petition.
    FRA's modifications are consistent with FRA's understanding of 
French TGV practice, which includes several levels of track geometry 
defects that require varying levels of remedial action over different 
periods of time, as determined by the magnitude of the measurements 
from the Mauzin car. FRA's proposal makes these French maintenance 
practices the minimum safety requirements for track geometry 
measurement. FRA believes that it is important to include these 
practices in the two-table approach proposed by FRA, because the two 
intervention tables, in combination will prevent multiple defects from 
occurring. Multiple defects are addressed in a different manner in 
Track Subpart G, where specific thresholds are established when more 
than one defect occurs in rapid succession.
    The use of these multiple intervention levels identify 
deteriorating track conditions before they become critical track 
defects. This practice makes the occurrence of critical multiple 
defects less likely to occur than would otherwise be expected with a 
single, safety-level strategy. To capture the desired level of safety, 
the high speed task group recommended adopting a multiple defect table. 
Another approach would be a bi-level intervention table, in which the 
first level would require remedial action within a reasonable period of 
time to correct defects, and the second level would require immediate 
action to correct critical defects. FRA's proposal incorporates these 
concepts.
    Aside from the differences outlined above between the Petition and 
FRA's proposal, FRA adds a chordal measurement that would not be 
required under the Petition. The FOX petition proposes two chordal 
measurements to identify critical alignment defects. Careful dynamic 
analyses indicate that track anomalies with wavelengths at 
approximately 20 meters can cause unacceptable vehicle responses and 
may not be detected by the thresholds proposed in the Petition for the 
10-meter and 31-meter chordal measurements. FOX engineers have informed 
FRA that French TGV maintenance practice and use of the Mauzin car, 
particularly the use of 20-meter chordal measurements by the equipment, 
precludes the existence of these critical track defects. However, such 
maintenance practice is not covered by the Petition, and so does not 
provide the level of assurance desired in this important area. FRA 
proposes here that the measurements obtained through use of the Mauzin 
car be processed in a manner similar to the process used to create the 
31 meter chord offsets to create a 20-meter chordal measurement. FRA 
proposes appropriate thresholds for this chord in the tables provided 
in Sec. 243.309.
    For the reasons explained above concerning multiple defects, warp, 
and related geometry considerations, FRA has concluded that the 
approach to track geometry that is proposed in the Petition would be 
acceptable only if the measurements are performed with a measurement 
vehicle that is similar to the Mauzin car, or the track geometry 
measurement system. Therefore, as set forth in Sec. 243.331, the 
standards proposed in this document apply if FOX uses a Mauzin-type 
vehicle. If FOX does not use a Mauzin car or the track geometry 
measurement system, the

[[Page 65508]]

requirements of Track Subpart G would apply.
Section 243.313  Curves, elevation and speed limitations
    This section of the NPRM is unchanged from Track Subpart G and the 
Petition. The section provides for a procedure in which the Railroad 
may seek approval to operate equipment at higher curving speeds, based 
on engineering data. FRA utilizes these procedures when processing 
waivers for higher cant deficiencies. In order to operate with higher 
cant deficiencies, the Railroad must submit specified engineering data 
and analysis to FRA that determines safe operations at the new level of 
cant deficiency. This information would also be part of the Railroad's 
determinations concerning safe curving speeds.
Section 243.315  Track Strength
    This section is identical to Track Subpart G and the Petition. FRA 
concurs that the track must be of very high quality to withstand the 
vertical and lateral loads associated with high speed trains. During 
the high speed task group discussions, the subject of track modulus was 
discussed at great length. Track modulus is a physical measurement of 
the strength of the track. However, it is difficult to measure track 
modulus with present technology. Track Subpart G and FRA's proposal do 
not include a specific numeric value for the vertical and lateral 
strength of the track. Rather, FRA relies on the track's safety 
performance, as determined by the monitoring of vehicle/track 
interaction and track geometry measurements required in Secs. 243.309, 
243.311, and 243.333.
Section 243.317  Crossties
    The Petition would require concrete ties for all tracks that carry 
passenger service trains and FRA includes this proposal in this NPRM. 
FRA has made a small change from the Petition concerning all other 
track, by increasing the number of non-concrete ties from 14 ties in 
each 39 foot segment of track, to 18 ties in each segment. The 
remainder of this section mirrors the tie requirements contained in 
Track Subpart G for higher track classes, and the existing track safety 
standards for the lower classes. This section also lists 
characteristics of defective concrete or non-concrete ties, which must 
be replaced by the Railroad. In all cases, the ties must be capable of 
holding gage, maintaining surface, and maintaining alignment within the 
geometry limits specified in Sec. 243.309.
Section 243.319  Continuous Welded Rail (CWR)
    This section is consistent with Track Subpart G and the Petition 
and lists requirements for effectively installing, adjusting, and 
maintaining CWR. The Railroad must submit a plan to address CWR 
installation, adjustment, maintenance and inspection, and a training 
program for the application of those procedures. The procedures must 
follow the detailed guidelines set forth in this section of the NPRM, 
which represent current industry practice to protect against track 
buckling.
Section 243.321  Rail End Mismatch
    This section of FRA's proposal is identical to Petition. The values 
listed in this section for rail end mismatch represent pervasive 
industry practice in the U.S. and abroad. Controlling mismatched rail 
is essential for the safety of a high speed operation. If a wheel 
flange would encounter a mismatch of the rail on the gage corner, an 
accident or incident would be likely. The limits included for this 
condition follow FRA's present track safety standards for Class 6 
track.
Section 243.323  Rail Joints and Torch Cut Rails
    FRA's proposal concerning rail joints and torch cut rails differs 
from the Petition. FOX stated in its petition that the requirements 
pertaining to rail joints found in Track Subpart G were not included in 
the Petition because they would not be utilized at all on the Railroad 
in Florida. As FRA understands it, the French TGV practice does not 
permit rail joints and so FOX would also not permit them on the system 
in Florida. However, FRA believes that it is essential to include 
minimum Federal standards for the condition of joint bars, because 
joint bar failures or disturbances can quickly lead to train accidents 
or incidents. If the operating and maintenance practices employed by 
FOX do not permit unsafe joint bar conditions to develop, the Railroad 
will have no difficulty in maintaining compliance with this proposal.
    In addition, the Petition would permit torch cutting, even in 
routine welding tasks on the Railroad's track. Based on its own 
expertise and consistent with the high speed task group's 
recommendations in Track Subpart G, FRA permits torch cutting rails 
only in emergency situations. Current U.S. practice utilizes torch 
cutting only where needed for emergency repairs. It is generally 
believed in this country that technology has advanced to the point that 
cutting rail with the available variety of rail saws is more efficient 
than torch cutting.
    Torch cuts present safety hazards in the railroad environment. In 
1983, following its investigation of an Amtrak derailment in Texas 
where torch cut rails became an issue, the National Transportation 
Safety Board (NTSB) recommended that railroads remove all torch cut 
rail and that trains travel at 10 mph over any new torch cuts that were 
made in emergency situations, or as a preparatory step in field 
welding. It should be noted, however, that the rail involved in the 
Texas accident had a high alloy content, which tends to increase the 
rail's resistance to wear, but decreases the rail's resistance to 
fracture. Torch cutting is no longer used in the U.S. industry because 
analysis reveals that torch cut rails have a greater tendency to 
develop fractures, and FRA believes that FOX should not utilize torch 
cutting on its system. FRA's proposal lists emergency or temporary 
conditions in which torch cutting may be used, but otherwise prohibits 
the practice.
Section 243.325  Turnouts and Crossovers, Generally
    FRA's proposal is identical to the Petition and Track Subpart G. 
The members of the high speed task group discussed many types of 
turnout designs and fastenings, which may be in use today or developed 
in the future. The group believed, and FRA adopts in this proposal, 
that the best way to address turnouts would be to require each railroad 
to prepare a detailed, comprehensive Guidebook on the inspection and 
maintenance for all turnouts and crossovers. The book would contain, at 
a minimum, inspection frequency, inspection methodology, limiting 
measurement values for all components subject to wear or requiring 
adjustment, and maintenance techniques. The Guidebook must be submitted 
to the FRA and FRA will monitor the Railroad's compliance with the 
identified procedures. FRA believes that most major railroads currently 
provide their employees with instructions for the maintenance of 
turnouts, and this requirement in the NPRM creates minimal additional 
paperwork for the Railroad.
Section 243.329  Derails
    This section is identical to Track Subpart G and the Petition. It 
is absolutely critical to safe railroad operations to prevent equipment 
standing on side tracks from fouling the main track. Each derail must 
be

[[Page 65509]]

operable, clearly visible, and linked to the Railroad's signal system.
Section 243.331  Track Geometry Measurement Systems
    This section of FRA's proposal varies from the Petition. As 
discussed in the section-by-section analysis for Sec. 243.309, FRA 
developed geometry tables for this proposal that differ from the tables 
set forth in Subpart G and the FOX submission. This is due to the fact 
that the Mauzin car, used by the French and probably by FOX, measures 
track characteristics in different ways than track geometry measurement 
systems in this country. Therefore, the table set forth in 
Sec. 243.309, which lists parameters for alignment, surface, gage, gage 
variation, cant, and warp, is acceptable, so long as the Railroad 
measures these parameters with a Mauzin, or Track Geometry Measurement 
System, car. Use of FRA's T-10 geometry car, which measures geometry in 
a different manner than the Mauzin car used on the French TGV, would 
not correspond accurately to the geometry table set forth in 
Sec. 243.309. Therefore, FRA's specific requirements for the Railroad's 
Track Geometry Measurement System included in this section describe a 
Mauzin car. FRA believes that the table in Sec. 243.309 and use of the 
Mauzin car will provide a level of safety equivalent to that of Subpart 
G. If FOX ultimately elects to substitute another geometry vehicle with 
different properties than those identified in the Mauzin car, the 
Railroad must comport with the equivalent requirements set forth in 
Track Subpart G.
    Track Subpart G contains a requirement for a geometry inspection 
once per month, with at least 15 days between inspections. The Petition 
proposed geometry vehicle inspections at least twice within 200 
calendar days, with at least 30 days between inspections, or nearly 
once every three months. In this NPRM, FRA proposes to make this 
requirement twice within 180 days, with at least 30 days between 
inspections, so that the requirement is clearly done once every three 
months. In its determination of the recommended frequency of geometry 
car inspections, the RSAC high speed task group considered the 
possibility of mixed passenger-freight service, which would likely 
accelerate the rate of track degradation. FRA concludes that, in view 
of the light loads and dedicated traffic on the proposed FOX line, an 
inspection with a geometry car once every three months sufficiently 
provides for the necessary monitoring of geometry parameters. If the 
Railroad discovers exceptions to the geometry limits, the Railroad must 
field verify the exceptions and institute remedial action within two 
days.
    This section also requires the Railroad to maintain continuous 
plots of all measured track geometry parameters and exception reports 
that contain a systematic listing of all track geometry conditions that 
constitute an exception to the speed limits over the track segments 
surveyed, for at least one year.
Section 243.333 Track/Vehicle Performance Measurement Systems.
    This section proposes requirements for the periodic measurement of 
carbody and truck accelerations using a Track Acceleration Measurement 
System (TAMS), which differs from the FOX Petition. The Petition and 
Track Subpart G differ in a variety of ways concerning track/vehicle 
measurement systems. FOX did not incorporate many of the Track Subpart 
G proposals with respect to condemning safety limits and corresponding 
remedial actions. FOX did not include a requirement for the measurement 
of wheel/rail forces, beyond the qualification phase of the project. 
Track Subpart G, on the other hand, proposes an annual requirement for 
the measurement of wheel/rail forces to verify that the track/vehicle 
system remains within safe performance limits throughout the life of 
the system. Also, Track Subpart G requires immediate action when 
minimum performance limits are exceeded, regardless of speed, while FOX 
proposed to set different safety limits for various speed ranges. In 
the Petition, FOX states that ``Each exception must lead to an 
immediate slow order on the corresponding portion of track'' but later 
states that ``within two days after the inspection, field verify and 
institute remedial action for all recorded exceptions.'' Track Subpart 
G also includes filtering characteristics that are not apparent in the 
Petition's discussion of the TAMS car and proposed safety thresholds. 
Finally, the Petition uses ``zero-to-peak'' thresholds and the Track 
Subpart G uses ``peak-to-peak.'' Under most circumstances, an 
interpretation of an accelerometer trace using a ``zero-to-peak'' 
measurement results in approximately one-half of the magnitude of a 
``peak-to-peak'' threshold. In the development of the proposed high 
speed standards contained in Track Subpart G, the high speed experts 
recommended using the peak-to-peak criterion.
    FRA believes that an immediate speed reduction must be imposed when 
vehicle/track performance limits are exceeded. The intent of track and 
carbody acceleration limits is to limit vehicle response, regardless of 
track condition and vehicle speed. FRA proposes to adopt the approach 
contained in Track Subpart G for vehicle/track interaction safety 
limits. The measurement of wheel/rail forces and accelerations is 
required. Many experts advise that derailments may be imminent if these 
limits are exceeded. An immediate speed reduction must be imposed until 
the Railroad determines the cause of the adverse vehicle/track 
interaction and corrects the condition.
    The Petition suggests, and FRA proposes, using the term ``TAMS'' to 
describe a vehicle with capabilities such as the ``Melusine'' car in 
France to measure accelerations. Although this term is not used in 
Track Subpart G, the frequency of inspection recommended in Track 
Subpart G is approximately the same as the Petition. For speeds over 
125 mph, Track Subpart G requires the measurement of accelerations at a 
frequency of at least twice within sixty days, with not less than 
fifteen days between inspections. FOX proposed an inspection frequency 
of at least twice within 45 calendar days, with not less than seven 
days between inspections. FRA has adopted the frequency set forth in 
the Petition.
    To summarize, FRA's proposal differs from the Petition in several 
significant ways. The Petition would require the measurement of wheel/
rail forces once during system qualification, and would not require 
periodic re-measurement of wheel/rail forces. FRA believes renewed, 
periodic measurements are necessary to ensure safety. The Petition does 
incorporate a requirement for the periodic measurement of 
accelerations, but uses threshold descriptors, thresholds, and remedial 
actions that differ from FRA's view and proposal. These measurement 
systems and remedial measures are important to demonstrate continued 
vehicle/track safety performance--the cornerstone of high speed track 
standards.
Section 243.335 Wheel/rail Force Measurement System.
    In this section, FRA proposes that FOX conduct bi-annual wheel/rail 
force measurements and that FOX equipment not exceed limits established 
in the vehicle/track interaction chart in this section. The Petition 
did not contain a similar section or requirement.
    The FOX petition and Track Subpart G would require a qualification 
procedure for vehicles on the high speed track, using instrumented 
wheelsets. The high speed task group concluded that the interaction of 
the high speed vehicle on the track must not exceed wheel/rail force, 
truck side

[[Page 65510]]

accelerometer, and carbody accelerometer performance thresholds during 
the qualification phase and during the life of the railroad. The 
Petition includes a requirement for the use of instrumented wheelsets 
to measure wheel/rail forces during the system qualification phase, but 
does not include a requirement for a periodic re-measurement of wheel/
rail forces during the life of the system because ``forces are 
proportional to accelerations,'' which are monitored every two weeks. 
FRA believes that wheel/rail force measurements, and carbody and 
truckside accelerometer measurements relate to different safety 
concerns and so, the measurements are not appropriate substitutes for 
one another.
    Vehicle/track interaction has critical consequences in railroad 
safety, and so establishing safe parameters and developing a 
measurement system to adhere to those parameters is highly important 
for any track safety program. The high speed task group considered 
several hazardous and unacceptable vehicle/track interaction events 
that are well-known in railroad engineering, and for the most part, 
occur on existing high speed operations. These unsafe events include 
wheel climb, rail rollover, vehicle overturning, gage widening, and 
track panel shift. Truck hunting is a dynamic phenomenon that results 
from unstable motion of railroad wheelsets, and may result in wheel 
climb or other unsafe events.
    FRA's proposed vehicle/track interaction chart includes provisions 
for truck hunting and carbody accelerometers. Truck hunting is 
typically measured by truck-mounted lateral accelerometers. Carbody 
accelerations measurements address different concerns. Large carbody 
accelerations can be hazardous to standing or walking passengers; large 
vertical accelerations may cause passengers to fall. The primary and 
secondary suspension characteristics of a particular car and truck 
spacing influence the natural frequency of vertical motion and, 
therefore, the wavelength of profile variations become of interest. 
Carbody vertical acceleration is also an indicator of variation in 
vertical force applied to the rails.
    FRA believes that an annual or biannual inspection using 
instrumented wheelsets must be considered as part of a high speed 
inspection strategy that includes visual inspections, pilot (sweeper) 
train, geometry car inspections, periodic carbody and truck-mounted 
accelerometer measurements, and other inspections deemed necessary. All 
of these requirements are largely dependent on track and vehicle 
degradation. Paragraph (a) of this section requires FOX to complete a 
wheel/rail force measurement system inspection biannually, with at 
least 240 days between each inspection, to ascertain whether the 
vehicles respond to the existing track within the limit defined. FRA 
agrees with FOX that its axle loads, minimization of unsprung mass, 
high quality track, and low cant deficiency would probably not lead to 
the sort of track or vehicle degradation that would become hazardous 
within one year after the Railroad's trainsets meet the pre-revenue 
qualification phase of the system. However, the track or vehicle 
degradation rate is an unknown and FRA, therefore, believes that an 
inspection frequency of once every two years, as required by paragraph 
(b) in this section, is a prudent requirement.
    This section requires the Railroad to maintain for one year after a 
qualifying track acceleration measurement is done, a copy of the plot 
and exception printout for the track segment involved, the date the 
inspection was made, the track segment involved, and the remedial 
action taken, for all listed exceptions. The Railroad must maintain a 
list of locations where the limits are exceeded.
Section 243.337 Daily Inspection Trainset
    In this section, FRA proposes a daily inspection trainset that must 
be operated each morning over the Railroad's entire system, prior to 
revenue service. FRA also proposes that the inspection train be 
equipped with on-board truck side and carbody accelerometers to measure 
track conditions, and that the Railroad develop procedures to notify 
track personnel when track conditions warrant attention. In its 
petition, FOX described the French TGV practice of operating a daily 
sweep train to visually inspect the track and ensure that the right-of-
way is free from obstacles, and included such a requirement for 
Florida. FRA agrees that this is a valuable safety measure. However, 
FRA added the requirements for minimal instrumentation on the daily 
inspection train in order to more closely reflect the expertise of the 
high speed task group and the Tier II passenger equipment group.
    Track Subpart G requires accelerometers in at ``least two cars in 
every train.'' At the latter stages of the development of Track Subpart 
G, the high speed task group met with a group of experts working on the 
Tier II equipment standards. This group consisted of members from 
labor, the rail industry, and private associations. Many members from 
both groups concluded that requirements for carbody accelerometers on 
every train would generate voluminous data that would not be necessary 
for safety. Members of both groups noted that a requirement for lateral 
truck-mounted accelerometers already existed in the Tier II passenger 
equipment standards.
    Instead, many members of both groups felt that accelerometer 
measurements could better be addressed with a requirement for lateral 
and vertical carbody accelerometers and lateral truckside 
accelerometers on at least one train each day. Truck and carbody 
accelerometers on one train per day would detect settlement or other 
geometry conditions, such as culvert settlement or an anomaly 
inadvertently introduced by a maintenance crew, before they became 
serious. Several of the members believed that safety would be enhanced 
if track personnel were dispatched to investigate the track whenever 
the accelerometers indicated possible track concerns. These members 
felt that these conditions could be identified and corrected before the 
next regularly scheduled periodic ride quality inspection with an 
instrumented car, and concluded that the threshold to trigger 
notification and the procedures for the notification of the track 
personnel should be left up to the high speed railroad.
    The requirement here for the daily monitoring of accelerations was 
included in order to provide an instrumented ``rough track report.'' It 
is normal practice in this country for train engineers or crews who 
sense an irregularity in the track, to communicate their concerns to 
track personnel who then perform a follow-up inspection. The 
accelerometers on the daily inspection train would remove the 
subjectivity from this process, and would more accurately identify 
areas that should be investigated by track personnel. However, because 
of time limitations, the high speed task group was ultimately unable to 
change the requirement from accelerometers on every train to 
accelerometers on one train per day.
    FOX believes that a requirement for daily carbody accelerometer 
measurements is unnecessary because the TGV equipment comes equipped 
with truck-side accelerometers on each power and trailer truck, and the 
truck-side accelerometers would identify the defect as being track 
related. However, carbody accelerometers perform an entirely different 
function than truck-side accelerometers. FOX recognizes this 
distinction by recommending an

[[Page 65511]]

inspection with carbody and truckside inspections once every two weeks.
    FRA believes that a requirement for accelerometers on the daily 
inspection train would enhance safety at minimal cost and so, includes 
the requirement in the NPRM. However, FRA invites comment on this 
section, as on all others in the NPRM.
Section 243.339 Inspection of Rail in Service
    This section proposes that the Railroad develop and implement 
written inspection procedures for internal defects, joint bars, and 
defective rails. The section includes a chart of specific defects with 
corresponding remedial measures, and requires the Railroad to adhere to 
appropriate remedial actions.
    In this NPRM, FRA replaced the section in the FOX petition entitled 
``Defective Rails'' with this section, with substantial change. The 
Petition stated that the frequency of inspection for rail defects 
should be once per year in view of French TGV practice and the fact 
that the track will be newly constructed in Florida. Track Subpart G 
proposes an inspection frequency of twice per year for high speed rail 
in the general system, which is higher than the annual inspection 
required in the current track standards for lower speed operations.
    In view of the load characteristics proposed for the FOX project, 
the occurrence of rail flaws are not expected to be high. In addition, 
since rail flaw growth is largely dependent on accumulated tonnage, the 
growth of flaws is expected to be minimal. However, there are concerns 
relating to new rail due to possible weld defects that may occur in the 
factory or field, and the potential for damage to the rail during 
installation. In addition to the requirements for the initial 
inspection of new rail at the mill and an inspection of welds required 
by proposed Sec. 243.341 discussed below, FRA's proposal includes a 
requirement in Sec. 243.339 for the Railroad to conduct a continuous 
inspection of all rail within ninety days after the initiation of 
revenue service. This inspection will verify that the mill inspection 
and plant weld inspections accurately located any rail flaws present in 
the new rail and will confirm that the rail was not damaged during 
installation. FRA concurs with the language of the Petition, in which 
it is determined that a rail inspection frequency of once each year is 
appropriate, considering the absence of freight traffic and the 
presence of relatively light axle loads on the proposed FOX lines.
    FOX proposed a remedial action table for rail flaws based on French 
TGV practice and somewhat vague standards that ``take into account the 
quality of the track to be restored once the defect is fixed.'' The 
defect table in the Petition largely does not categorize all defects in 
terms of the size of the defect, and so does not include corresponding 
remedial actions that are based on the size or severity of the defect. 
For example, the FOX proposal does not specify different remedial 
actions for transverse defects of varying sizes.
    FRA believes it would be unwise to deviate from the rail flaw 
procedures that developed in this country to control rail-caused 
accidents. They are included in Track Subpart G and are identical for 
high and low speed track. These requirements are the result of railroad 
experience in this country, rail flaw research, and recommendations 
from the NTSB.
    FRA does not anticipate that adoption of this rail flaw table and 
with accompanying remedial actions will negatively impact FOX 
maintenance policies. Given the axle loads associated with the FOX 
system, the rail flaws of the size specified in the table may never 
occur in Florida, and so FOX would have no difficulty in complying with 
this section. However, if these serious rail flaws do arise, this 
section will secure the safety of passengers and employees.
Section 243.341 Initial Inspection of New Rail and Welds
    This section sets forth minimum standards for the Railroad's in-
service rail and weld inspections, mill inspections, welding plant 
inspections, and field weld inspections. FRA has made a minor change in 
this section from what was set forth in the Petition, by correcting an 
error in the rule text that would have permitted an in-service 
inspection, conducted ninety days after the rail is installed, for a 
mill or welding plant inspection. FRA believes that FOX intends to 
conduct a mill and welding plant inspection prior to installation, 
which is common practice on US railroads. Rail defects discovered in 
the course of these inspections must be handled in accordance with the 
actions set forth in Sec. 243.339 of the proposal.
Section 243.343 Visual Inspections
    This section requires the Railroad to conduct a visual track 
inspection once each seven days by riding in a vehicle at a speed that 
facilitates visual inspection of the track structure. This section is 
not consistent with the Petition, which proposed a visual inspection 
once each six weeks.
    FOX proposed a six-week visual inspection based on French TGV 
practice. However, the practice in this country historically has been 
to conduct a visual inspection at least twice each week on all 
passenger lines. For example, Amtrak performs walking visual 
inspections on the Northeast Corridor at a frequency of at least two 
times per week. Amtrak also conducts automated inspections in a manner 
similar to the French TGV practice, which includes geometry car and 
acceleration measurements.
    In the lower speed classes of track in the US, present track safety 
standards require two visual inspections per week on passenger tracks, 
but do not mandate the use of automated inspections to supplement the 
visual inspections. Freight railroads also typically inspect main 
tracks at least twice each week. Many railroad maintenance officials 
believe that this inspection frequency facilitates early identification 
of conditions that require maintenance. However, it is also important 
to note that, while many major railroads use geometry cars, the use of 
the automated inspection techniques proposed by FOX are generally not 
used on freight railroads.
    Track Subpart G requires two inspections per week for track speeds 
between 110 mph and 160 mph, and three times per week for speeds 
between 160 mph and 200 mph. These frequency levels developed through 
consideration of all available automated and visual inspection methods. 
Some members of the high speed task group emphasized that state-of-the-
art automated inspections techniques enhance, but cannot replace visual 
inspections. Walking or hi-rail inspections identify certain 
conditions, such as loose or missing fastenings and blocked culverts, 
that are not discovered by geometry, acceleration, rail flaw, or other 
automated equipment. Visual and automated inspections compliment one 
another, and should both be part of a high speed track safety system.
    In support of its position of performing visual inspections at a 
frequency of once every six weeks, FOX discusses its concern for the 
hazards inspectors might face along the high speed line. In addition, 
FOX argues that more frequent visual inspections are unnecessary in 
view of its total inspection program, which is based on French TGV 
practices. FOX also asserts the daily ``sweeper'' train conducts a 
visual inspection of the track and ensures that the right-of-way is 
clear.
    FRA acknowledges the hazards associated with inspecting high speed 
track and urges FOX to take every

[[Page 65512]]

precaution to ensure the safety of its inspectors. (This NPRM adopts 
and incorporates safety standards for roadway workers in 49 CFR part 
214, which should address these safety concerns if followed properly.) 
Also, FOX may wish to conduct inspection activities during low traffic 
periods, and perhaps at night as is done in France. Amtrak routinely 
accomplished track work during evening hours, and has policies in place 
to protect inspection crews.
    FRA has considered the factors discussed above and believes that a 
prudent, initial standard would include one weekly visual inspection of 
the track and turnouts. This is consistent with the visual inspections 
conducted in Japan on high speed, dedicated lines. However, FRA invites 
comment on this inspection frequency from safety experts and members of 
the public. FRA considered, but did not succeed in devising, an 
objective performance standard for adjusting inspection frequency. 
Commenters are invited to suggest such a performance standard.
Section 243.345 Special Inspections
    This section requires the Railroad to make special track 
inspections where emergency or extreme events occur that could cause 
damage to the track structure. This section is consistent with 
Petition.
Section 243.347 Inspection Records
    This section sets forth minimum requirements for treatment of the 
Railroad's track inspection records. The section is consistent with the 
Petition and Track Subpart G. However, this proposal contains a 
noteworthy change from the present track safety standards for records 
inspections. Paragraph (d) of this section requires the Railroad to 
record any location where a proper rail inspection cannot be performed 
because of rail surface conditions. The new language in this section 
requires a recordkeeping of those instances.
    Paragraph (f) of this section also proposes a provision for 
maintaining and retrieving electronic records of track inspections. The 
provision permits Railroad to design its own electronic system, so long 
as the system meets specified criteria to safeguard the integrity and 
authenticity of each record. The provision also requires that railroads 
make available paper copies of electronic records when needed by FRA or 
by railroad track inspectors.

Subpart E--Rolling Stock

    Subpart E sets forth minimum safety standards for the design, 
performance, and maintenance of the FOX rolling stock. For the most 
part, the Railroad's compliance with the design and performance 
requirements of this Subpart will be demonstrated by the pre-revenue 
qualification tests required in Subparts B and G of this proposal. 
However, FRA will closely monitor the operation of the FOX equipment 
throughout the life of the system in order to ensure compliance with 
the equipment inspection, test, and maintenance requirements.
    The rolling stock safety standards set forth in the NPRM are very 
similar to the Petition, and are based on 15 years of safe operating 
experience in France. As discussed previously in this document, the 
French design, operation, and maintenance practices have resulted in an 
exceedingly safe passenger system. FRA proposes standards in this 
Subpart that will facilitate development of an equally safe system in 
Florida. It is extremely important to note, as we do throughout this 
NPRM, that these standards would not be appropriate for any other 
operation in this country. The standards set forth in this Subpart 
relate to a specific system with unique safety characteristics. This 
proposal reflects the combination of many operating features, and if 
any one feature disappears, all of the standards would have to be 
reevaluated.
Section 243.401 Clearance Requirements
    This subsection requires the rolling stock to be designed to meet 
all applicable clearance requirements of the Railroad, including the 
static clearance diagram, the dynamic clearance diagram and the 
obstacle clearance diagram. Rolling stock clearance of all natural or 
infrastructure obstacles is a basic safety requirement. Adequate 
clearance of all obstacles will be demonstrated during the pre-revenue 
service system qualification tests. At a minimum, the Railroad must 
make the following diagrams available to FRA upon request: rolling 
stock static clearance diagram, rolling stock dynamic clearance 
diagram, and obstacle clearance diagram.
Section 243.403 Structural Strength of Trainset
    This section sets forth the structural design or performance 
requirements for the FOX passenger equipment. This section is patterned 
after FRA's proposed Tier II Passenger Equipment Safety Standards, 
which were published on September 23, 1997 (62 FR 49728). The Tier II 
passenger proposals are based equipment that would travel at high speed 
(125 to 150 mph) in existing North American rail corridors, which may 
include grade crossings used by heavy highway vehicles, and mixed rail 
traffic that includes heavy freight or commuter trains.
    FRA recognizes that existing North American corridors which contain 
grade crossings or mixed freight-commuter rail operations may be less 
conducive to safe operation of passenger trains at speeds greater than 
150 mph. Due to the high degree of kinetic energy that must be 
dissipated in the event of a collision or derailment, structural 
mitigation of the effects of the accident are very difficult to achieve 
in high speed passenger equipment. Therefore, combining very high speed 
operations with slow, heavy rail traffic, or heavy highway vehicles at 
grade crossings, produces a relatively high risk of collision and 
passenger injury. As discussed previously, to counter these risks, the 
French TGV system operates on an accident-avoidance, rather than 
accident-mitigation philosophy. FOX plans to utilize this philosophy in 
Florida, and the standards that FRA proposes concerning rolling stock 
reflect this approach to safety.
    FRA proposes structural standards for the FOX passenger trainsets 
that are based on International Union of Railways (UIC) standards for 
the design of passenger equipment in Europe, and on SNCF specifications 
that adapt UIC standards to the TGV trainset configuration. The 
European structural standards result in a lighter trainset, which 
facilitates travel at high speeds with minimal track forces and lower 
track degradation.
    Paragraph (a) proposes two very important general structural 
requirements. First, the passenger cars in each trainset must be semi-
permanently coupled with articulated trucks between the trailer cars. 
These trainsets may be uncoupled only in repair facilities, in 
accordance with the operating procedures set forth in Sec. 243.433. 
When a derailment occurs at high speed, trains containing individually 
coupled passenger cars tend to buckle, accordion style, which exposes 
individual cars to side impacts or rollover. The articulated connection 
between trailer cars has been shown to be extremely effective in 
keeping the trainset in-line and upright during derailments, even at 
high speed. The articulated connection also provides significant anti-
climbing resistance between each passenger car.
    The second proposed general requirement is essentially an operating 
requirement with strong structural implications. FRA requires the 
Railroad to operate every trainset with a power

[[Page 65513]]

car at each end of the train. FOX proposed to operate in this manner, 
and FRA believes that these high speed trainsets should not be operated 
in a push-pull mode. The presence of a power car in the lead maximizes 
the protection provided for the cab crew and passengers, in the event 
of a head-on or rear end collision.
    Paragraph (b) proposes the structural requirements for power cars. 
Paragraph (b)(1) lists the basic carbody structural strengths of the 
power car, which represent European design practice and the UIC 
standards. Equipment built to these standards provides structural 
protection for the operator and passengers during low speed train-to-
train collisions that might occur in station or yard operations. Also, 
equipment built to these standards provides structural protection for 
the operator and passengers during collisions at moderate speeds with 
highway vehicles. The proposal establishes the magnitude of the force 
that the power car structure must resist, and how that force must be 
applied during the testing and analysis that will be done to ensure 
that the design complies with each safety standard.
    Paragraph (b)(2) proposes that each power car be equipped with an 
anti-penetration wall ahead of the operator's cab. This anti-
penetration wall serves the function of a collision post in North 
American design practice, or of a forward end structure, as proposed in 
the Tier II passenger equipment NPRM. This anti-penetration wall in the 
power car cab plays a vital role in protecting personnel and the 
equipment in a collision with another object. This structure must 
resist override, prevent the entry of fluids into occupied spaces of 
the cab, and allow the crash energy management system to function. FRA 
proposes the following specific design parameters for the anti-
penetration wall: resist a longitudinal compressive load of 3000 kN 
(675,000 lb) at the top of the underframe, without exceeding the 
ultimate strength of the joint; and resist a longitudinal compressive 
load of 1500 kN (337,000 lb) applied at a height of 760 mm (30 in) 
above the top of the underframe, and reacted at the rear of the cab 
structure, without exceeding the ultimate strength of the structure. 
FRA also requires that the Railroad verify compliance with these 
requirements by either linear static analysis or equivalent means.
    Paragraph (b)(3) sets forth the crash energy management 
requirements for the power car. Crash energy management is an equipment 
design technique used to provide controlled deformation and collapse of 
designated sections of the unoccupied volumes of a passenger train, to 
absorb energy that occurs in a collision. This permits collision energy 
to dissipate before any structural damage occurs to the occupied 
volumes of the train, and reduces the decelerations experienced by 
passengers and crew members in a collision. Reduced decelerations 
mitigate the force of any secondary collision between passengers and 
objects in the train's interior, such as seats. The French equipment 
incorporates a crash energy management design that has been 
demonstrated to be safe and commercially feasible. This is the sort of 
design that will likely develop on the Amtrak lines in the Northeast 
Corridor.
    FRA proposes that in unoccupied areas, each power car shall be 
designed to absorb a minimum 4.2 megajoules through controlled 
structural deformation. This requirement can be met using existing 
technology and provides an adequate level of safety.
    Paragraph (b)(4) proposes a basic longitudinal compressive strength 
for the power car cab. Specifically, FRA proposes that in occupied 
areas, each power car must be designed to resist, without permanent 
deformation of the sidesill, contrail, and side post structural 
members, a longitudinal compressive load of 3560 kN (800,000 lb) when 
applied uniformly at the front of the cab between the underframe and 
waist level, and reacted at the cross section of the carbody at the 
back of the cab. This proposed requirement provides a degree of crash 
refuge or structural shelter to the operator equivalent to that typical 
of North American design practice.
    Paragraph (b)(5) requires each power car to be designed to 
withstand a uniformly distributed vertical load of 1.3 times its static 
laden weight, when supported at the truck centers, without permanent 
deformation. This requirement essentially sets the vertical stiffness 
of the car body as it is supported between the two trucks.
    Paragraph (b)(6) proposes the rollover strength for the FOX power 
cars. Specifically, power cars must be designed to rest on their sides, 
uniformly supported at the top (cantrail) and the bottom (sidesill) 
chords of the side frame with the allowable stress in the main 
structural members for occupied volumes for this condition limited to 
one-half yield stress. In addition, power cars must be designed to rest 
on their roofs, with damage limited to roof sheathing and framing. 
Deformation of the roof sheathing and framing, to the extent necessary 
to permit the vehicle to be supported directly on the top chords of the 
side frames and end frames, are permitted. The permissible stress in 
the main structural members for occupied volumes for this condition are 
one-half yield. These rollover strength requirements are equivalent to 
the requirements proposed in the Tier II NPRM for passenger cars. 
Presently, there are no North American standards for rollover strength 
of locomotives.
    Paragraph (c) proposes the structural requirements for trailer 
cars. Paragraph (c)(1) lists the basic carbody structural strengths of 
the trailer car. These parameters represent European design practice as 
reflected in UIC standards. Equipment built to these standards provides 
structural protection for the passengers during low speed, train-to-
train collisions typical of station or yard operations. Equipment built 
to these standards also provide structural protection for the 
passengers during collisions at moderate speeds with most highway 
vehicles. The proposed requirements specify the magnitude of the force 
that the trailer car structure must resist and how that force is to be 
applied during the test and analysis done to prove that the design 
complies with each requirement.
    Paragraph (c)(2) requires each trailer car to be designed to 
withstand a uniformly distributed vertical load of 1.3 times its static 
laden weight, when supported at the truck centers, without permanent 
deformation. This requirement essentially sets the vertical stiffness 
of the car body as it is supported between the two trucks.
    Paragraph (c)(3) proposes that the occupied volumes of trailer cars 
be designed to resist, without permanent deformation of the sidesill, 
cantrail, and side post structural members, a longitudinal compressive 
load of 3560 kN (800,000 lb.) when applied as distributed over the 
carbody cross section at the seated passenger compartment. This 
requirement is equivalent to North American practice for passenger 
coach design.
    Paragraph (c)(4) proposes that trailer cars possess the same 
rollover strength as power cars. This rollover strength requirement is 
equivalent to the requirements set forth in the Tier II standards of 
FRA's Passenger Equipment Safety Standards NPRM for passenger coaches.
Section 243.405 Trailer Car Interior
    This section contains proposed requirements for interior fittings 
and surfaces in passenger trailer cars. Research indicates that 
passengers striking interior objects in trains, principally during 
collisions and

[[Page 65514]]

derailments, account for 57% of the serious injuries and 7% of the 
fatalities on passenger trains.1 Once survivable space is 
ensured by basic vehicle structural strength and crash energy 
management, the design of the interior becomes an important factor in 
preventing or mitigating serious injury. To reduce the injury and 
fatality numbers, FRA proposes that passenger seats and other interior 
fittings be securely attached to the car body; interior fittings be 
recessed or flush-mounted; overhead storage racks provide restraint for 
stowed articles; and sharp edges be padded or otherwise avoided.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ ``Rail Safety/Equipment Crashworthiness.'' M. J. Reiley, R. 
H. Jines, & A. E. Tanner. (FRA/ORD-77/73, Vol. I, July 1978).''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FRA and NTSB investigations of passenger train accidents have 
revealed that luggage, seats, and other interior objects that break or 
loosen during an accident often cause passenger and crew injuries. 
During a collision, the greatest decelerations, and thus the likeliest 
forces to cause potential failure of interior fitting attachment 
points, occur in the longitudinal direction, i.e., in the direction 
parallel to the normal direction of train travel. Current North 
American design practice consists of seats and other interior fittings 
that withstand the forces due to accelerations of 6g in the 
longitudinal direction, 3g in the vertical direction, and 3g in the 
lateral direction. Due to injuries caused by broken seats and other 
loose fixtures, FRA believes that the current design practice is 
inadequate. Accordingly, FRA's NPRM for Passenger Equipment Safety 
Standards proposed that each seat in a passenger car remain firmly 
attached to the car body when subjected to individually applied 
accelerations of 4g in the vertical direction and 4g in the lateral 
direction acting on the deadweight of the seat or seats, if a tandem 
unit. In addition, the attachment must resist a longitudinal inertial 
force of 8g acting on the mass of the seat, plus the impact force of 
the mass of a 95th-percentile male occupant(s) being decelerated from a 
relative speed of 25 mph and striking the seat from behind. By 
resisting the force of an occupant striking the seat from behind, a 
potential domino effect of seats breaking away from their attachments 
is avoided.
    In addition, the NPRM for Passenger Equipment Safety Standards 
proposes that overhead storage racks provide longitudinal and lateral 
restraint for stowed articles to minimize the potential for these 
objects to come loose and injure train occupants. Further, to prevent 
overhead storage racks from breaking away from their attachment points 
to the carbody, the racks must have an ultimate strength capable of 
resisting individually applied accelerations of 8g longitudinally, 4g 
vertically, and 4g laterally acting on the mass of the luggage stowed.
    Paragraph (a)(1) proposes that Fox trainset seat backs be designed 
to withstand, with deflection and permanent deformation allowed, but 
without total failure, the load due to a 95th-percentile male seat 
occupant accelerated with the following pulse: 0 to 6g in 0.05 s; 6g 
for 0.125 s; and 6 to 0g in 0.05 s.
    Paragraph (a)(2) proposes that the ultimate strength of a seat 
attachment to the trailer carbody be sufficient to withstand the 
following individually-applied accelerations acting on the mass of the 
seat, plus the mass of a seat occupant who is a 95th-percentile male: 6 
g, longitudinal; 2 g, lateral; and 2 g, vertical.
    Paragraph (b)(1) proposes that other interior fittings be attached 
to the trailer carbody with sufficient strength to withstand the 
following individually-applied accelerations acting on the mass of the 
fitting: 3 g, longitudinal; 2 g, lateral; and 2 g, vertical.
    Paragraph (b)(2) requires, to the extent possible, that interior 
fittings be recessed or flush-mounted, and corners and sharp edges 
avoided altogether or padded to mitigate the consequences of impact 
with such surfaces.
    Paragraph (c) proposes that luggage stowage compartments include a 
means to restrain luggage, and have sufficient strength to resist loads 
due to the following individually-applied accelerations acting on the 
mass of the luggage that the compartment is designed to accommodate: 3 
g, longitudinal; 2 g, lateral; and 2 g, vertical.
    These seat attachment, interior fitting attachment, and luggage 
compartment strengths that FRA proposes for the FOX system are lower 
than those set forth in FRA's Passenger Equipment Safety Standards for 
Tier II equipment. Also, FRA is not proposing for FOX enclosed overhead 
luggage racks, as are proposed for the generic Tier II equipment. FRA 
believes that the standards we propose here for FOX provide an 
equivalent level of safety for passengers and employees on the FOX 
equipment for several reasons.
    First, the Railroad's operation is based on principles of accident-
avoidance. As discussed previously, this safety philosophy will be 
implemented on FOX through a variety of operating features, including 
the dedicated right-of-way, the absence of grade crossings, low train 
density, and an advanced signaling system. In combination, these 
characteristics of the system provide a very high level of safety 
performance and a very low risk of an accident.
    Second, FOX could not find any record of passenger injury caused by 
loose seats, loose interior fixtures or fallen luggage on TGV 
trainsets, including the high speed derailments. Given the high number 
of passenger-miles covered by the TGV in France since 1981, this fact 
tends to indicate that such injuries are unlikely.
    Third, the trainset provides several alternate stowage areas so 
that all luggage need not be stored on the overhead racks. The TGV 
trainsets will have two locations, at the first and last passenger 
units, where heavy or large pieces of baggage may be checked into a 
dedicated compartment for stowage. Also, two of the passenger units 
will include stowage racks for large carry-on luggage. Finally, stowage 
will also be available throughout the trainset between back-to-back 
seats. The overhead racks would typically be used for smaller and 
lighter luggage, which is less likely to cause injury in an accident.
    Fourth, the TGV trainsets inherently provide excellent ride quality 
at high speed due to the articulated design, the quality and geometry 
of the track, the suspension characteristics, and the large curve 
radii. The articulated design eliminates in-train forces due to slack; 
the quality and geometry of the track provide smooth high speed 
operation; and the large curve radii facilitates high speed travel 
through curves at low cant deficiency. These combined factors result in 
very low longitudinal, lateral, and vertical forces on trainsets 
throughout the speed range.
    Finally, the estimated increase in weight, per trailer car, of 
nearly 456 kg (1,000 lb.) that would be required to meet the more 
stringent, generic standards would be detrimental to the operational 
design limits for this high speed transportation system.
Section 243.407 Glazing
    Paragraph (a) proposes the glazing impact and ballistic 
requirements for the trainset, which are based on French TGV standards. 
The end facing (engineer's front windshield) must resist an energy of 
30 kJ at 20 deg. C (72 deg. F) and 25 kJ at 0 deg. C (32 deg. F). As a 
comparison, the proposed Tier II equipment standards would require the 
end facing glazing to resist 12.2 kJ of energy for operation at 240 kph 
(150 mph) and 21.7 kJ for 322 kph (200 mph) operation. These glazing 
standards are more

[[Page 65515]]

stringent than those proposed for Tier II equipment, and have proven 
effective in service in France.
    Paragraph (b) requires interior glazing to meet the minimum 
requirements of AS1 type laminated glass, as defined in American 
National Standard ``Safety Code for Glazing Materials for Glazing Motor 
Vehicles Operating on Land Highways,'' ASA Standard Z26.1-1966. This 
requirement alleviates the need for interior glazing to meet the 
stringent impact resistance requirements placed on exterior glazing, 
but ensures that the glazing will shatter in a safe manner in the event 
of an accident, much like automotive glazing.
    Paragraph (c) proposes that the glazing frame will hold glazing in 
place against all forces that are generated in the tests required by 
this proposal.
Section 243.409 Brake System
    Paragraph (a) requires the FOX brake system to be capable of 
stopping trainsets with a service application of the brakes from its 
maximum authorized operating speed, within the signal spacing that 
exists on the track. This proposed requirement is the fundamental 
performance standard for any train brake system. This section merely 
codifies a requirement which is current industry practice, and is the 
basis for safe train operations in the U.S. Paragraph (a) also defines 
the test conditions for braking under low adhesion levels as defined in 
UIC leaflet 541.05. This standard requires a specific quantity of 
detergent to be sprayed on the rails during the braking test. In 
addition, paragraph (a) requires the flow rate, defined by UIC 541.05, 
to be doubled at speeds in excess of 180 km/h (112 mph). This meets the 
French TGV requirement to minimize the attainable adhesion level during 
a high speed test, in order to ensure a high margin of safety for high 
speed braking.
    Paragraph (b) proposes that the braking on each truck shall be 
independently controlled by the brake pipe. Unlike conventional North 
American brake systems which have a brake manifold on each car, the FOX 
trainset braking system has a separate manifold for each truck. The 
brakes are applied through a brake pipe pressure reduction, controlled 
by the engineer's brake valve. A uniform distribution of the pressure 
reduction throughout the train is enhanced by an electro-pneumatic 
control. An electric trainline signal is used to activate an electro-
pneumatic valve on the brake manifold for each truck, which provides a 
quick and uniform control of the brake pipe pressure. This arrangement 
also minimizes the operational effects of a failure of a brake 
manifold, in that only one truck in the consist is inoperative if a 
brake manifold has failed or has cut out.
    Paragraph (c) proposes to require that the electric brake be 
completely independent on each powered truck and shall operate with the 
loss of the overhead power supply. The kinetic energy of a train, and 
hence the energy that must be dissipated in stopping a train, is 
proportional to its mass and the square of its speed. Therefore, there 
is a radical increase in energy to be dissipated for a very high speed 
train, compared to that required for a typical North American train. As 
an example, the energy that must be dissipated to stop the Railroad's 
trainset (1-8-1; or one power car, eight trailer cars, and one power 
car) from 322 km/h (200 mph), is about 1.7 x 10\6\ kJ (1.3 billion ft-
lb). To put this in perspective, this is approximately 3 times the 
energy required to stop a 1-8-1 Amfleet consist from 161 km/h (100 
mph). Unlike conventional North American equipment, very high speed 
trainsets rely to a great extent on the electric brake. Therefore, 
paragraph (c) requires the electric brake to be independent on each 
powered truck and be able to operate if power from the catenary is 
lost. To achieve this, separate batteries and battery chargers are used 
for field excitation of the traction motors on each truck. There are 
two power cars on each FOX trainset, each with two powered trucks; each 
trainset will have four completely independent electric brakes, which 
provides for a high level of redundancy and safety.
    In addition, paragraph (d) proposes that any failure of the 
electric brake on any powered truck must be displayed to the train 
operator. This important safety feature will alert the operator so that 
s/he can take compensating action to prevent accident or incident.
    Paragraph (e) requires the brake system to be designed to prevent 
thermal damage to wheels or discs. The purpose of this requirement is 
to ensure that the brake system is designed and operated to prevent 
dangerous cracks in wheels. Passenger equipment wheels are normally 
heat treated so that the wheel rim is in compression. This condition 
forces small cracks that form in the rim to be closed. Heavy tread 
braking can heat wheels to the point that a stress reversal occurs and 
the wheel rim is in tension to a certain depth. Rim tension is a 
dangerous condition because it promotes surface crack growth. In 1994, 
FRA published an NPRM on power brakes, which proposed a wheel surface 
temperature limit to prevent this condition. (See 59 FR 47729). Several 
brake manufacturers and railroads objected to this approach, claiming 
that the temperature limit was too conservative and did not facilitate 
the development of new materials that can withstand higher 
temperatures. Based on these comments and concerns, FRA is proposing a 
more flexible performance requirement here, rather than a wheel tread 
surface temperature limit. This is an extremely important safety 
requirement because a cracked wheel that fails at high speed can have 
catastrophic consequences. In addition, the proposed requirement will 
lead to longer wheel life, and so should provide maintenance savings to 
the Railroad.
    Paragraph (f) proposes to require the Railroad to demonstrate, 
through analysis and test, the maximum safe operating speed of the 
trainset where no thermal damage occurs to wheels or discs, for various 
combinations of electric and friction brake failure. The railroad must 
also demonstrate that no thermal damage results to the wheels or discs 
under conditions resulting in maximum friction braking effort being 
exerted. Unlike conventional North American passenger trains which may 
vary in weight, length and braking capability, FOX will use fixed 
consists. This significantly simplifies the task of determining the 
braking characteristics for various modes of degraded braking. 
Demonstrating that the requirements of paragraph (e) have been met will 
be an important objective of the pre-revenue service system 
qualification tests.
    Paragraph (f) also requires the Railroad to develop a matrix that 
lists a variety and combination of brake failures and corresponding 
safe speeds that must be followed in the event of brake failures. This 
matrix must be completed in conjunction with the Railroad's system 
safety plan analysis, and must be displayed prominently in each power 
car. This process is employed by the French TGV to assess accurately 
appropriate braking distances and train speed for each route on the TGV 
line. This paragraph requires FOX to complete this analysis for the 
entire right-of-way in Florida, and to adhere to the train speeds that 
are determined to be safe for all potential brake failures.
    Paragraph (g) requires that when a failure of the electric or 
friction portion of the brake occurs en route, the trainset must 
proceed at the speed determined appropriate by the matrix prepared in 
accordance with paragraph (f), and confirmed by the pre-revenue service 
system qualification tests required by Sec. 243.21 and Subpart G of 
this proposed rule. Also, the engineer must notify central traffic 
control of any combination of brake failure that

[[Page 65516]]

requires a speed restriction. On the FOX system, these speed 
limitations will be automatically enforced by the signal system.
    In paragraph (h), FRA proposes that the trainset be equipped with 
an emergency application feature that produces an irretrievable stop, 
using a brake rate consistent with prevailing adhesion, passenger 
safety, and brake system thermal capacity. In addition, an emergency 
application shall be available at any time, and a means to apply the 
emergency brake must be provided at two locations in each trainset that 
are accessible to the train crew. This paragraph merely codifies 
current industry practice and ensures that passenger equipment will 
continue to be designed with an emergency brake application feature. In 
FRA's 1994 NPRM on power brakes, FRA proposed a requirement that all 
trains be equipped with an emergency application feature capable of 
increasing the train's deceleration rate a minimum of 15 percent. See 
59 FR 47729. Comments received indicated that passenger brake equipment 
should provide a deceleration rate with a full service application that 
is close to the emergency brake rate, and that the proposed requirement 
would require lowering full service brake rates, which would compromise 
safety and reduce train speeds. Based on these comments, FRA proposes 
the current requirement, which is in accordance with suggestions made 
by several U.S. passenger railroads.
    Paragraph (i) proposes that FOX trainsets be designed so that an 
inspector would not be on, under, or between components of the 
equipment in order to observe brake actuation or release. The proposal 
grants the Railroad flexibility to use a reliable indicator in place of 
direct observation of the brake application or piston travel. The 
current design of many passenger car brake systems make direct and safe 
observation extremely difficult. FRA wishes to avoid this and the 
employee injuries that may result. Brake system piston travel or piston 
cylinder pressure indicators have been used with satisfactory results 
for many years. Although indicators do not provide 100 percent 
certainty that train brakes are effective, FRA believes that they 
provide a high degree of assurance and are preferable to placing an 
inspector in a dangerous position.
    Paragraph (j) requires the trainset brake design to permit a 
disabled train's pneumatic brakes to be controlled by a rescue 
locomotive through brake pipe control alone. This feature will 
facilitate easy and safe removal of disabled trainsets to an 
appropriate repair shop.
    Paragraph (k) proposes that the Fox trainset be equipped with a 
hand or parking brake that can be set and released manually and can 
hold the equipment on the maximum grade anticipated by the operating 
railroad. A hand or parking brake is an important safety feature, which 
prevents parked equipment from rolling or runaway. In the 1994 NPRM on 
power brakes, FRA proposed requiring a hand brake on cars and 
locomotives. See 59 FR 47729. FRA received several comments suggesting 
that the term ``parking brake'' be added to the requirement, because 
that is the term used in many passenger operations. Based on those 
suggestions, FRA has added the term in this proposal. This requirement 
differs from typical North American practice, which calls for a hand 
brake on each car. FOX trainsets are a fixed consist that can not be 
uncoupled in the field, and so this proposal treats the trainset as a 
single vehicle.
    Paragraph (l) proposes an independent failure detection system to 
compare brake commands with brake system output to determine if a 
failure has occurred. The failure detection system shall report brake 
system failures to the automated train monitoring system. This 
requirement ties the brake system to the automatic monitoring system, 
as required by Sec. 243.425(a) discussed below. Also, this important 
safety feature will alert the operator to potential brake system 
problems so that timely compensating action.
    Paragraph (m) requires that each truck of the trainset be equipped 
with a wheelslide system designed to automatically adjust the braking 
force on each wheel to prevent axle-locking during braking. In the 
event of failure of a truck's wheelslide system, control will be 
automatically provided by the wheelslide system of an adjacent truck. 
This redundancy is necessary, because at very high speeds, the 
available adhesion between the wheel and the rail is lower than exists 
at slower, conventional speeds. This factor increases the possibility 
of wheelslide during braking at high speeds. The FOX trainset has a 
separate and independent microprocessor to control wheelslide on each 
truck. If a microprocessor fails, an adjacent microprocessor takes over 
wheelslide control for the truck with the inoperative microprocessor. 
The trainset is also equipped with a system that detects non-rotating 
axles and removes pressure from the brake cylinders until rotation 
resumes. Paragraph (m) also proposes that a visual and/or audible alarm 
be provided in the cab of the controlling power car if a blocked axle 
is detected.
Section 243.411 Truck and Suspension System
    This section contains the proposed requirements for trucks and 
suspension systems. Truck and suspension system performance are crucial 
to the safe operation of high speed passenger equipment. The suspension 
system requirements proposed in this section were also used for the 
successful demonstrations of the X-2000 and the ICE trainsets on the 
Northeast Corridor at speeds up to 135 mph. These proposed requirements 
are also likely to be part of the suspension system performance 
Amtrak's passenger future equipment.
    Paragraph (a)(1) requires the truck-to-car-body attachment on the 
FOX trainset to resist, without failure, a force of 250,000 pounds 
acting in any horizontal direction. The requirement for the attachment 
to resist a horizontal force is intended to allow the truck to act as 
an anti-climbing device during a collision. With the truck attached to 
the car body, the truck of an overriding rail vehicle is likely to be 
caught by the underframe of the overridden rail vehicle, thus arresting 
the override. The parameter selected represents the current North 
American design practice, which has proven effective in preventing 
horizontal shear of trucks from car bodies.
    Paragraph (a)(2) requires each component of the truck must to 
remain attached to the truck when a force equivalent to 2g acting on 
the mass of the component is exerted in any direction on that 
component. Paragraph (a)(1) is intended to keep the truck attached to 
the car body, and paragraph (a)(2) is intended to keep truck components 
attached to the truck.
    To ensure safe, stable performance and ride quality, paragraph (b) 
requires suspension systems to be designed to prevent wheel climb, 
wheel lift, rail rollover, rail shift, and to prevent vehicles from 
overturning. These requirements must be met in all operating 
environments, and under all track and loading conditions as determined 
by the operating railroad. In addition, these requirements must be met 
under all track speeds and conditions, consistent with the requirements 
of Subpart D, up to the maximum operating speed and maximum cant 
deficiency of the equipment. These broad suspension system performance 
requirements address the operation of equipment at both high speed over 
well maintained track and at low speed over lower

[[Page 65517]]

classes of track. Suspension system performance requirements are needed 
at both high and low speeds, in order to prevent derailments while 
negotiating curves. Compliance with paragraph (b) must be demonstrated 
during the Railroad's pre-revenue service system qualification testing 
of the equipment as described in Subpart G.
    Paragraph (c) requires the steady-state lateral acceleration of 
passenger cars to be less than 0.1g, as measured parallel to the car 
floor inside the passenger compartment, under all operating conditions. 
Passenger cars must not operate when the steady-state lateral 
acceleration is 0.1g or greater. FRA originally considered limiting the 
cant deficiency to effect this requirement, but members of the RSAC 
track working group concluded that this steady-state lateral 
acceleration requirement would ensure safe operation.
    Paragraph (d) requires each truck to be equipped with a permanently 
installed lateral accelerometer mounted on the truck frame. If hunting 
oscillations are detected, the train monitoring system shall provide an 
alarm to the locomotive engineer and the train shall be slowed by the 
locomotive engineer to a speed of 8 km/h (5 mph) less than the speed at 
which hunting oscillations stopped. Also, this requirement must be 
included in the Railroad's operating rules.
    Paragraph (e) provides ride vibration, or quality, limits for 
vertical accelerations, lateral accelerations, and the combination of 
lateral and vertical accelerations. These limits must be met while the 
equipment is traveling at the maximum operating speed over its intended 
route during the qualification phase of the system. The limiting 
parameters and the means to measure them are a result of the consensus 
recommendations from the RSAC high speed track task group and the 
passenger equipment working group. These standards have proven 
effective during the demonstrations of the X-2000 and ICE trainsets 
here in the U.S. Compliance with ride quality requirements contained in 
this paragraph must be demonstrated during the pre-revenue service 
qualification tests required by Sec. 243.113 and Subpart G of this 
proposal. One of the most important objectives of pre-revenue service 
system qualification testing is to demonstrate that suspension system 
performance requirements have been met.
    Paragraph (f) requires bearing overheat sensors to be provided on-
board the equipment, or at reasonable wayside intervals. FRA prefers 
sensors on-board the equipment, in order to eliminate the risk of a 
hotbox that develops between wayside locations. However, FRA recognizes 
that on-board sensors have a history of falsely detecting overheat 
conditions, which have caused operating difficulties for some passenger 
railroads.
Section 243.413 Fire Safety
    This section contains the fire safety requirements proposed for the 
FOX system. In 1984, FRA published guidelines recommending testing 
methods and performance criteria for the flammability, smoke emission, 
and fire endurance characteristics for categories and functions of 
materials to be used in the construction of new or rebuilt rail 
passenger equipment. 49 FR 33076 (Aug. 20, 1984); 49 FR 44582 (Nov. 7, 
1984). The guidelines mirrored fire safety guidelines developed by the 
Federal Transit Administration (formerly known as the Urban Mass 
Transit Administration).
    The intent of the guidelines is to prevent fire ignition and to 
maximize the time available for passenger evacuation where fire does 
occur. FRA subsequently reissued the guidelines in 1989 in order to 
update the recommended testing methods. 54 FR 1837 (Jan. 17, 1989). 
Testing methods cited in the current FRA guidelines include those of 
the American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM) and the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA). In particular, the ASTM and FAA testing 
methods provide a useful screening device to identify materials that 
are especially hazardous.
    FRA sought comments in the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(ANPRM) for Passenger Equipment Safety Standards on the need for more 
thorough fire safety guidelines. 61 FR 30672 (June 17, 1996). FRA noted 
that fire resistance, detection, and suppression technologies have all 
advanced since the guidelines were first published. In addition, FRA 
explained that a trend toward a systems approach to fire safety is 
evident in most countries with modern rail systems. In response, the 
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) commented that perhaps more 
thorough guidelines are needed, or at least should be evaluated.
    Paragraph (a) addresses fire safety by proposing to make FRA's fire 
safety guidelines mandatory in the construction of FOX trainsets. In 
addition, the proposed rule would also require that fire safety be 
furthered through a fire protection plan and program carried out by the 
railroad. Paragraph (b) proposes that the Railroad require 
certification from the equipment supplier that combustible materials 
used in the construction of trainset interiors have been tested by a 
recognized independent testing laboratory, and that the results comply 
with the requirements of paragraph (a) of this section.
    Paragraphs (c)-(e) link the fire safety analysis portion of the 
system safety program required by Subpart B to the trainset design 
requirements. These paragraphs require the Railroad to ensure that good 
fire protection practice is used during the design and operation of the 
equipment. These paragraphs require the Railroad to install various 
detection and suppression equipment where the Railroad's written 
analysis determines they are required.
    Paragraph (f) requires the Railroad to comply with all elements of 
its written procedures designated as mandatory under Subpart B for the 
inspection, testing, and maintenance of all fire safety systems and 
equipment.
Section 243.415 Doors
    This section contains the requirements for exterior side doors on 
FOX trailer cars. These doors are the primary means of egress from the 
train. During an NTSB investigation of the February 16, 1996, collision 
between the MARC and Amtrak trains in Silver Spring, Maryland, that 
agency identified unsafe conditions on MARC's rail cars that had been 
manufactured by Sumitomo. Concerned that the unsafe conditions 
identified on these rail cars may exist on other commuter lines subject 
to FRA oversight, on March 12, 1996, the NTSB recommended that FRA:

    Inspect all commuter rail equipment to determine whether it has: 
(1) Easily accessible interior emergency quick-release mechanisms 
adjacent to exterior passageway doors; (2) removable windows or kick 
panels in interior and exterior passageway doors; and (3) 
prominently displayed retro-reflective signage marking all interior 
and exterior emergency exits. If any commuter equipment lacks one or 
more or these features, take appropriate emergency measures to 
ensure corrective action until these measures are incorporated into 
minimum passenger car safety standards. (Class I, Urgent Action) (R-
96-7).

The requirements proposed in this section respond to this NTSB 
recommendation.

    Paragraph (a) proposes requirements for powered, exterior side 
doors. In paragraph (a)(1) FRA proposes that each trailer car have a 
minimum of four exterior side doors, or the functional equivalent of 
four side doors, that each permit at least one 95th-percentile male to 
pass through at a single time. FRA believes that such a requirement is

[[Page 65518]]

necessary, at least as an interim measure, so that each passenger car 
have a sufficient number of exits to allow passengers to quickly exit 
in an emergency. This requirement would be met by providing two sets of 
double-wide doors that permit two 95th-percentile males to pass through 
at the same time. However, FRA invites comment concerning the extent to 
which the design of the FOX trainsets cannot comply with this proposed 
section. FRA may modify this proposal based on information provided by 
FOX or other interested parties. As a long term approach, FRA is 
investigating an emergency evacuation performance requirement similar 
to that used in commercial aviation where a sufficient number of 
emergency exits must be provided to evacuate the maximum passenger load 
in a specified time for various types of emergency situations.
    Paragraph (a)(2) proposes that the status of each powered, exterior 
door shall be displayed to the crew in the operating power car and if 
door interlocks are used, the sensors used to detect train motion shall 
be nominally set to operate at 5 km/h (3 mph). Such a proposal would 
enable a crew member in the operating cab to determine whether train 
doors are closed before departure. This capability is well within 
current technology and complies with the emergency exit requirements 
proposed in the NPRM for Tier II Passenger Equipment Safety Standards.
    In paragraph (a)(3) FRA proposes that powered, exterior doors be 
powered by the compressed air system or by electricity. If powered by 
electricity, the doors shall be connected to an emergency back-up power 
system. The back-up power system should facilitate rapid evacuation 
through the doors in the event of primary power failure.
    Paragraph (a)(4) requires that each powered, exterior door be 
equipped with a manual override that is: Located adjacent to the door 
that it controls; capable of opening the door without power from inside 
and outside the car; and designed and maintained so that a person may 
access the override device from inside and outside the car, without the 
use of any tool or other implement. FRA believes this requirement is 
necessary to ensure that passengers are able to quickly evacuate the 
train.
    Paragraph (a)(5) requires that instructions for manual override be 
clearly posted in the car interior at door locations. As a result of 
the MARC/Amtrak accident in Silver Spring, Maryland, the NTSB stated 
that several train passengers were unaware of the locations of 
emergency exits, and none knew how to operate them. The NTSB found that 
the interior emergency window decals were not prominently displayed and 
that one car had no interior emergency window decals.
    Paragraph (a)(6) addresses this concern by requiring a means for 
emergency responders to access the manual override from outside the car 
be provided. In addition, instructions for access and use of the handle 
must be clearly posted outside the car at all door locations. As a 
result of the Silver Spring accident, the NTSB had found that the 
exterior emergency decals were often faded or obliterated, and the 
information on them, when legible, directed emergency responders to 
another sign at the end of the car for instructions on how to open 
emergency exits.
    Paragraph (a)(7) requires that manual door releases be activated 
easily. To ensure that most passengers are capable of opening the doors 
using the manual releases, FRA proposes that they be easily operable by 
a 5th-percentile female, without the use of any tool to accomplish the 
manual override, in the event of head-end power loss.
    To ensure that manual override devices are easily accessible by 
passengers, FRA is proposing requirements in paragraph (a)(8) to 
address covers and screens used to protect such devices from casual or 
inadvertent use. FRA desires to balance the concern that passengers may 
unnecessarily exit cars when no emergency is present with the need for 
passengers to easily access a door-release mechanism in a life-
threatening situation. Thus, the Railroad may protect a manual override 
device used to open a powered, exterior door with a cover or a screen 
capable of removal by a 5th-percentile female without requiring the use 
of a tool or other implement. If the method of removing the protective 
cover or screen entails breaking or shattering it, the cover or screen 
must be scored, perforated, or otherwise weakened so that a 5th-
percentile female can penetrate the cover or screen with a single blow 
of her fist without injury to her hand.
    In paragraph (b), FRA proposes that passenger compartment end doors 
be equipped with a kick-out panel, pop-out window or other equivalent 
means of egress in the event the door will not open. The NTSB noted 
that none of the car doors on the MARC train involved in the Silver 
Spring, Maryland, accident had removable windows or pop-out emergency 
escape panels (``kick panels'') for use in an emergency.
    FRA shares the NTSB's concern about passenger egress in an 
emergency; however, FRA believes that the NTSB's suggestion to install 
kick panels is best limited to interior doors to ensure passage through 
a train in an emergency--and not applied to exterior doors. To the best 
of FRA's knowledge, the concept of kick panels has not been utilized in 
North American rail equipment. Installing kick panels below the window 
levels in exterior doors was evaluated by FRA--with concurrence from 
the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards Working Groups--as 
unacceptable for safety reasons. Because passenger railroads have 
encountered recurring situations in which passengers have 
inappropriately exited moving trains, leading to death or serious 
injury, introducing kick panels in exterior doors would create an 
unacceptable risk of inadvertent use, particularly by children.
    Use of kick panels to open passageways through a train has merit. 
If panels can be made sufficiently large without decreasing the 
functionality of doors in normal operation, such a feature may 
facilitate evacuation through the length of the train if exterior side 
doors are jammed. Evacuation throughout the length of the train is 
often the safest route of egress in situations such as fires, 
derailments in multiple track territory, and incidents in third-rail 
powered commuter service. Accordingly, FRA proposed in the NPRM for 
Passenger Equipment Safety Standards that Tier II passenger car end 
doors be equipped with a kick-out panel, pop-out window or other 
similar means of egress in the event the doors will not open.
Section 243.417 Emergency Equipment
    Paragraph (a) proposes that the emergency system requirements given 
in this section apply to each FOX trailer car. Experience gained during 
rescues conducted after recent passenger train accidents indicates that 
emergency lighting systems either did not work or failed after a short 
time, greatly hindering rescue operations. Paragraph (b) requires FOX 
trailer cars to be equipped with emergency lighting providing a minimum 
average illumination level of 55 lux (5.1 ft-candles) at floor level 
for all potential evacuation routes, and a back-up power feature 
capable of operation for a minimum of two hours after loss of normal 
power.
    The two-hour time duration for availability of back-up power is 
based on experience gained during rescue operations for passenger train 
accidents in remote locations. In such accidents, fully-equipped 
emergency response forces can take an hour or more to arrive at the 
site, and additional time is

[[Page 65519]]

required to deploy and reach people trapped or injured in the train. In 
addition, the back-up power system must be able to operate in all 
orientations and after experiencing a shock due to a longitudinal 
acceleration of 3g and vertical and lateral accelerations of 2g. The 
shock requirement will ensure that the back-up power system has a 
reasonable chance of operating after the initial shock caused by a 
collision or derailment.
    Paragraph (c) requires an emergency communication system within the 
train with back-up power. This safety feature will allow the train crew 
to provide evacuation and other instructions to passengers. Such a 
system can help prevent panic that often occurs during emergency 
situations. FRA is proposing that transmission locations be located 
throughout the trainset and that the locations be marked with clear 
instructions for the use of the emergency communication system.
    Paragraph (d) proposes that locations of emergency equipment and 
exits be clearly marked with luminescent material that makes the 
identity and location of the emergency exit recognizable from a 
distance equal to the width of the car. This requirement is intended to 
allow passengers and crew to easily locate emergency equipment and 
exits, even under poor visibility conditions. The requirement will aid 
an orderly evacuation of the train in the event of an emergency.
    Paragraph (e) contains the proposed requirements for FOX emergency 
exits. Paragraph (e)(2) requires clear and understandable instructions 
for the use of emergency exits to be posted at each emergency exit and 
be visible from a distance of 30 inches. This provision should aid 
passengers unfamiliar with the operation of emergency exits to operate 
them and evacuate train quickly.
    Paragraph (e)(3) proposes that each trailer car have a minimum of 
four emergency window exits, arranged in a staggered configuration, or 
with one located at each end of each side of the trailer car. Each FOX 
trailer car will be equipped with 4 emergency windows, 2 at each end 
and one on each side, to comply with this requirement. An emergency 
window is also located in each FOX trailer car side entrance door to 
provide emergency access in the event of a blocked door. This 
configuration complies with the emergency exit requirements proposed in 
the NPRM for Passenger Equipment Safety Standards.
    Paragraph (e)(4) proposes that each trailer car window emergency 
exit shall have a minimum free opening of 1.6 m (63 in) wide by 0.6 m 
(24 in) high. This configuration complies with the emergency window 
exit requirements proposed in the NPRM for Passenger Equipment Safety 
Standards and is the minimum size that will allow a fully equipped 
emergency responder to enter the car through the window. The FOX 
trainsets will have emergency windows much larger than this minimum 
size.
    Paragraph (e)(5) requires that emergency window exits be capable of 
activating easily. The FOX system trainsets will employ breakable 
emergency windows, rather than the conventional North American 
removable type. This will facilitate use of a window-to-carbody seal 
that will withstand the large pressure variation between passing 
trainsets, and use of a flush-mounted window seal that will minimize 
air drag for high speed operations. A small pointed hammer will be 
located at each end of the passenger compartment, beside each window 
and door, to break the emergency window. FRA proposes that each 
emergency window exit shall be easily operable by a 5th-percentile 
female using this hammer. No other tool or implement may be required 
for this purpose.
    Paragraph (e)(6) proposes that each power car have an emergency 
roof hatch with a minimum opening of 0.45 m (18 in) by 0.6 m (24 in) 
and an emergency escape exit in the cab sidewall. Such features should 
aid in removing passengers and crew members from a vehicle that is 
either on its side or upright in water. This proposed requirement 
exceeds the requirements for Tier II equipment proposed in the NPRM on 
Passenger Equipment Safety Standards.
    In paragraph (f) FRA requires the Railroad to have in place a 
redundant means for the train crew to communicate with the pertinent 
railroad operations center to summon aid in the event of an emergency 
situation. These redundant methods may include operating portable 
radios or cellular telephones. This requirement will ensure that 
emergency response forces can be quickly summoned in the event of an 
emergency.
 Section 243.419 Operator's Controls and Power Car Layout
    FRA believes that power car cab interior features play an important 
role in safety, because they affect employee response and performance. 
Given the speed that FOX trainsets will travel, FRA believes it would 
be appropriate to establish minimum standards for the cab layout, in 
order to maximize employee cab performance. The proposed requirements 
set forth in this section attempt to capture sound ergonomic design 
practice for cab layout in order to minimize the risk of human error, 
attention loss, and operator fatigue. These standards are self-
explanatory, and consistent with the FOX high speed equipment.
 Section 243.421 Exterior Lights
    Paragraph (a) proposes that each power car be equipped with two or 
more headlights, each capable of producing 12,000 or more candela. 
Paragraph (b) proposes the following taillight requirements: each 
trailing power car shall be equipped with two or more red taillights; 
each taillight shall be located at least 1.2 m (3.9 ft) above rail; 
each taillight shall produce 15 or more candela; and taillights of the 
trailing power car must be on when the trainset is on a section of the 
system that is in revenue service.
    The intensity of the headlights and taillights proposed here for 
the FOX trainsets are lower than exist on standard North American 
equipment. Due to all of the unique operating characteristics that are 
part of the FOX system, (no grade crossings, a fenced right-of-way with 
intrusion detection systems, no mixed traffic, advanced signal system), 
the high speed equipment can be (and often is in France) operated at 
full speed without the locomotive engineer having sight of the right-
of-way. The intensity of the TGV lights have provided safe operation 
for fifteen years of revenue service in France, and FRA believes this 
will be sufficient for the system in Florida.
 Section 243.423 Electrical System Design
    This section contains the proposed requirements for the FOX 
electrical system design. These requirements reflect common electrical 
safety practice and are widely recognized as good electrical design 
practice. They include provisions for circuit protection against 
surges, overload and ground faults; electrical conductor sizes and 
properties to provide a margin of safety for the intended application; 
battery system design to prevent the risk of overcharging or 
accumulation of dangerous gases that can cause an explosion; and design 
of resistor grids that dissipate energy produced by dynamic braking 
with sufficient electrical isolation and ventilation to minimize the 
risk of fires. These proposed electrical system design requirements are 
consistent with the FRA's NPRM for Tier II Passenger Equipment Safety 
Standards.

[[Page 65520]]

 Section 243.425 Automated Monitoring
    This section contains proposed requirements for automated 
monitoring of the status or performance of the Railroad's safety-
related equipment systems and subsystems. Investigations of past 
passenger train accidents reveal that many accidents were caused, in 
some measure, by human error. FOX's high operating speeds will reduce 
the time train operators will have to react to nonconforming 
conditions, and evaluate potentially dangerous situations. Therefore, 
the potential for accidents increases. Automated monitoring systems can 
reduce the risk of accidents by alerting the operator to abnormal 
conditions and advising the operator of necessary or recommended 
corrective action as soon as the abnormalities appear. These systems 
can even be designed to make automatic corrective action in certain 
situations. FRA proposes that the FOX trainsets be equipped with an 
automated system to monitor various train systems and components. The 
requirements that FRA proposes are consistent with the requirements for 
FRA's NPRM for Tier II Passenger Equipment Safety Standards.
    Paragraph (a) requires the train to be equipped to monitor the 
performance of a minimum set of safety-related systems and components 
that includes the following: Reception of cab signals and train control 
signals; truck hunting; electric brake status; friction brake status; 
fire detection systems; head end power status; alerter; horn; and wheel 
slide. This monitoring system will also provide information to the 
Railroad for use in trouble-shooting, maintenance, and to accumulate 
reliability data that will form the basis for establishing required 
periodic maintenance intervals.
    Paragraph (b) requires that the locomotive engineer be alerted when 
any of the monitored parameters are out of predetermined limits. The 
Railroad's operating rules, developed pursuant to Sec. 243.117 and 
Subpart F of the rule, will govern the engineer's activities if the 
equipment malfunctions. If the engineer does not act in accordance with 
the Railroad operating rules for this situation, the Railroad's central 
traffic control must initiate corrective action.
    Paragraph (c) requires the Railroad to develop, in the course of 
its system safety plan analysis, appropriate operating rules that will 
address engineer and train performance if a trainset's automated 
monitoring system becomes defective en route, or is defective when the 
daily inspection required by Sec. 243.433 is completed. The automated 
monitoring system greatly enhances safe operations. Although trains may 
operate safety without this system, FRA believes that specific 
practices must be developed and followed by the Railroad to address 
such items as train speed, braking distances, and communications when 
the system becomes defective. As stated earlier in this document, FRA 
is unclear whether this monitoring system is designed to function in 
redundant fashion. If that is the case, it may be very unlikely that 
the monitoring system will ever fail. Nonetheless, FRA believes that 
the added precaution of standards to cover that event is necessary to 
ensure safety.
    Paragraph (d) proposes that each lead power car be equipped with an 
event recorder that monitors and records safety data as required by 
Sec. 243.425(a) of this proposal and 49 CFR 229.135, Event Recorders.
    Paragraph (e) requires that each of the systems monitored, and 
listed in paragraph (a), must be inspected during the daily inspection 
that is required by Sec. 243.433 of this Subpart. This works in 
conjunction with Sec. 243.433(f)(1), which requires the Railroad to 
inspect these monitored systems in the daily inspection of each 
trainset. If for some reason, conditions cannot be determined through 
the automated monitoring system, the Railroad must perform a visual 
inspection before the trainset can be placed in revenue service.
 Section 243.427 Trainset System Software and Hardware Integration
    This section contains the proposed requirements for the Railroad's 
rolling stock hardware and software. This section reflects the growing 
role of automated systems to control passenger train safety functions. 
Paragraph (a) proposes that the trainset system hardware and software 
integration conform with CF-001, On-Board Electronic Equipment and 
Computer Hardware. In addition, paragraph (b) proposes that the 
trainset system hardware and software integration conform with Pr CF-
67-004, Methodology for the Development of On-Board Micro-Computer 
Equipment.
    These requirements represent accepted practice, and will not limit 
the flexibility of the Railroad's equipment designers. However, these 
standards reflect good design, that has led to reliable, safe computer 
hardware and software control systems in the European railroad 
industry. Computer hardware and software systems designed to meet these 
standards may require an initial investment, but it has shown that such 
an investment is quickly recovered by the reduction in hardware and 
software integration problems, minimizing trouble-shooting, debugging 
of equipment.
Section 243.429  Control System Design Requirements
    This section requires that the rolling stock computer be designed 
and function pursuant to the software safety program developed as part 
of the Railroad's system safety plan in Subpart B of this proposal, 
discussed previously.
Section 243.431  Safety Appliance
    This section contains proposed requirements for safety appliances 
on FOX trainsets. The proposal is consistent in concept with existing 
requirements, but is tailored specifically for application to this new 
and somewhat unconventional equipment. These requirements are also 
consistent with those proposed for Tier II equipment in the FRA's 
Passenger Equipment Safety Standards.
    Paragraph (a) of this section contains the proposed requirements 
for couplers that are positioned at either end of the trainset, which 
will be used to connect to other locomotives for hauling or rescue 
purposes. Paragraph (a) requires automatic couplers at the leading and 
trailing ends of the trainset to couple on impact, and uncouple by use 
of uncoupling lever or other means that does not require a person to go 
on, under, or between equipment units. This requirement prevents 
employee exposure to the safety hazards that arise from working on or 
between rail equipment. The leading and trailing automatic couplers of 
the trainset must be compatible with the Railroad's rescue locomotive 
couplers, without the use of special adapters. This would facilitate 
rapid movement of disabled trains and protects employees from the 
hazards of going between the locomotive units. Paragraph (a) also 
proposes that all couplers be equipped with an anti-climbing mechanism 
capable of resisting an upward or downward vertical force of 250 kN 
(56,200 lb) without permanent deformation. This is common European 
design and is appropriate in an operating environment such as the FOX 
system, where the risk of a collision has been greatly reduced through 
strict collision-avoidance measures, and the articulated train 
formation that resists climbing in the event of an accident.
    Paragraph (b) of this section sets forth minimum requirements for 
safety appliance mechanical strength and fasteners. Handrails and sill 
steps must be made of steel pipe that is 1 inch in

[[Page 65521]]

diameter, and fasteners must have a mechanical strength of at least a 
M10-diameter SAE steel bolt. These standards are consistent with 
European and U.S. practice, and provide a high degree of safety for 
employees who must utilize the safety appliances in the course of their 
duties.
    Paragraph (c) sets forth the minimum standards for handrails and 
handholds. All handrails and handholds must be made of stainless steel, 
which provides optimum strength and durability for equipment exposed to 
all sorts of environmental elements. This paragraph also establishes 
minimum clearance requirements that will facilitate safe employee 
usage. Handrails and handholds are not required on units of a trainset 
that are semi-permanently connected, as the FOX trainsets are. The 
reason for this exclusion is that these units can be disconnected only 
in repair facilities with the use of special tools, and employees have 
no reason to position themselves between units and so, have no need for 
the handholds and handrails for that process. Similarly, handrails and 
handholds are not required on the leading and trailing units, which are 
equipped with automatic couplers that are coupled or uncoupled with the 
use of tools that do not require employees to work between the units. 
However, handrails and handholds are required at both sides of the 
doors used to board and depart the trainset. This will provide 
passengers and employees additional stability and safety as they enter 
or leave the equipment.
    Paragraph (d) of this section sets forth the minimum requirements 
for sill steps on the FOX passenger equipment. Sill steps must be 
present below each side door on all power and trailer cars, and must be 
made of expanded metal or equivalent anti-skid material, in order to 
protect employees and passengers from slipping from the step. Sill 
steps must conform to the clearance requirements set forth in order to 
accommodate safety the average foot, and must be securely fastened to 
prevent collapse when under load. Sill steps are not required on cars 
that are semi-permanently connected, or on the leading and trailing 
units, which are equipped with automatic couplers. FOX may utilize 
these devices, but is not required to do so, so long as the equipment 
remains semi-permanently connected, and possesses automatic couplers at 
each end of each trainset.
    Finally, paragraph (e) of this section describes the manner in 
which the FOX trailer and power cars are connected to one another. The 
system does not use traditional couplers that are common in U.S. 
railroading. Cars are connected through articulated semi-permanent 
connections that can be disengaged only in repair facilities, with the 
use of special tools. These connectors between trainset vehicles are an 
integral design characteristic of the French TGV equipment, and one 
which will be duplicated on the FOX system. Employees are not placed in 
danger from the hazards that arise from unexpected rail car movements, 
and these connectors tend to resist buckling and rolling in the event 
of a derailment. They greatly enhance employee and passenger safety, 
and this proposal requires their use.
Section 243.433 Trainset Inspection, Testing and Maintenance 
Requirements
    This section sets forth the minimum standards for the FOX 
inspection, testing, and maintenance program. FRA proposes general 
guidelines for the Railroad to follow in order to develop a 
comprehensive inspection, testing, and maintenance program that will 
assure the safety of the system's rolling stock. However, FRA proposes 
to exercise final approval of the inspection, testing, and maintenance 
program developed by the Railroad and to enforce the safety-critical 
inspection, testing, and maintenance procedures, criteria, and 
maintenance intervals that result from the approval process.
    FRA sets forth this proposed cycle of preventive maintenance for 
the FOX trainsets, which is based on the operational experience 
acquired in France throughout the last fifteen years. The French 
inspection and maintenance program utilizes accumulated mileage and 
degradation rates as indicators for inspection needs, and FRA adopts 
those criteria in this proposal.
    Paragraph (a) requires the Railroad to obtain FRA approval of the 
written inspection program for the rolling stock prior to 
implementation of that program and prior to commencing operations. At a 
minimum, this program must include the complete inspection, testing, 
and maintenance program for the TGV trainsets as it is performed in 
France, including all inspections set forth in Sec. 243.433(d) of this 
rule. This information shall include a detailed description of: safety 
inspection procedures, intervals and criteria; test procedures and 
intervals; scheduled preventive maintenance intervals; maintenance 
procedures; special test equipment or measuring devices required to 
perform safety inspections and tests; and training and qualification of 
employees and contractors to perform safety inspections, tests and 
maintenance.
    Paragraph (b) requires the Railroad to designate which inspection 
and maintenance criteria are safety-critical, and deems all emergency 
equipment safety-critical. ``Safety-critical'' requirements are those 
that, if not fulfilled, increase the risk of damage to equipment or 
personal injury to a passenger, crew member, or other person. The 
Railroad must identify the items in the inspection, testing, and 
maintenance program that are safety-critical, and must submit the 
program to FRA.
    Paragraph (c) requires the Railroad to obtain FRA approval for any 
changes to the safety-critical portion of the program required in this 
section. Paragraph (d) requires the Railroad to adopt and implement the 
inspection, testing, and maintenance program that FRA approved and 
paragraph (e) mandates that the Railroad's program must ensure that all 
systems and components are free from hazardous conditions.
    Paragraph (f) sets forth specific inspections and maintenance 
programs that FOX must complete throughout the life of the system. 
These are identical to the French practice, which have produced a high 
level of safety on the TGV system. Paragraph (f)(1) sets forth the 
daily inspection that each trainset must undergo before it can begin 
revenue operations. This paragraph lists a series of conditions that, 
if not corrected, would prevent the trainset from commencing passenger 
service. These conditions are: Malfunction of the driving assistance 
system (SIAC); malfunction of the fire detection system; indication of 
an unbalanced tripod; indication of a broken tripod; indication of 
blocked axle; a single phase pantograph or its circuit breaker out of 
order; power car failure or cut-out; isolated roof disconnecting switch 
H(HT); transformer cooling or ventilation out of order; two or more 
motor blocks isolated; mechanical brake on one or more trucks isolated; 
total failure of the anti-slide device on one truck; failure of 
locomotive engineer's vigilance system (VACMA); speedometer failure; 
failure of on-board signaling system; failure of the speed measuring 
system (the warning flag of the speedometer does not disappear when the 
driving cab is activated); locomotive engineer's console out of order; 
locomotive engineer's brake valve not operating; leak in the main 
reservoir line; leak in the main brake pipe; failure indication during 
the required brake test; any battery charger out of order; and total 
failure of the trainset interior lighting.
    The daily inspection is required prior to placing a trainset in 
service for the

[[Page 65522]]

first time during a calendar day. As FRA understands it, this 
inspection will utilize the automated, electronic test features that 
are part of the FOX equipment, rather than rely on visual or manual 
inspections. As rail technology improves, reliance on electronic 
sensors will naturally increase, and benefits flow from this 
progression. Electronic devices can often detect imperfections or 
potential problems that are invisible to the human eye. Also, some of 
the equipment that the automated testing devices inspect are difficult 
or impossible to view on the TGV trainsets. Therefore, this electronic 
capability reduces the risk of injury to employees who might otherwise 
crawl on, under, or between equipment subject to movement, and 
dramatically reduces the risk that defective equipment could be 
released for service.
    Paragraph (f)(1) also requires that if any of the conditions listed 
above cannot be detected through the equipment's on-board automated 
monitoring system, the Railroad must conduct a visual inspection to 
verify that the condition does not exist and the equipment is safe for 
use. As FRA understands the FOX equipment, the automated monitoring 
system should have the capability to detect all of the potentially 
unsafe conditions that are listed in the daily inspection requirement. 
However, this in unclear from the FOX submission. Also, if the on-board 
monitoring system malfunctions, all of the conditions listed in this 
paragraph could not be detected from the cab and a visual inspection 
would be the only method of ensuring that the conditions do not exist. 
As discussed previously, the Railroad must develop appropriate 
operating rules, pursuant to Sec. 243.117 and Sec. 243.425 of this 
proposal, to address the safety risks that may arise if an on-board 
monitoring system fails en route or during this daily inspection. FRA 
believes that, in the interest of safety, the Railroad must conduct a 
visual inspection to detect the items listed in this paragraph if the 
on-board monitoring system is not capable of detecting them.
    FRA is considering making all or some of these items part of a trip 
inspection, rather than a daily inspection, which would be completed 
before each trainset begins a new trip. FRA is concerned that some of 
the items listed in the daily inspection are so critical to the safety 
of the system, that a train should not be in service for any period of 
time when those items are not functioning properly. A recent passenger 
train collision in England, in which six fatalities occurred, may have 
been prevented if the railroad had conducted a trip inspection and then 
prevented the train's departure when the defective condition was 
discovered. Because the items inspected here in the daily inspection 
are inspected electronically, as FRA understands it, requiring the 
inspection to occur at the beginning of each trip would impose few, if 
any, financial or operational burdens on the Railroad. However, FRA 
seeks comment on the merit of this proposal and any changes to it. 
Also, FRA requests commenters to discuss which, if any, items should be 
required to be inspected on a trip basis.
    Paragraph (f)(2) describes the examination in service which is a 
walking visual inspection conducted by qualified personnel every 4000 
km (2,485 mi), at a location where there is a repair pit and access to 
the top of the trainset. The purpose of the examination in service is 
to detect anomalies that have occurred and correct them so that the 
trainset can be returned to service without any safety risk. This 
examination focuses on the systems keenly involved in trainset 
trackworthiness, including running gear, trucks, and components under 
the carbody. As FRA understands it, this may become a daily visual 
inspection if the ridership studies commissioned by FOX become a 
reality, and the system operates so that each trainset will complete 
four round-trip journeys each day.
    At a minimum, the items listed below must be inspected during an 
examination in service. All conditions found that do not comply with 
the safety inspection criteria required by Sec. 243.433(a)(1) of this 
rule must be corrected before the trainset is put into revenue service: 
Condition of the pantographs and roof insulators; condition of sanding 
nozzles; fixation and condition of dampers; condition of suspension 
springs; fixation and condition of grounding straps; condition of side 
skirts and underbody panels; condition of trucks; oil levels; traction 
motor-to-carbody securement; presence of brake pads; condition of brake 
shoes; condition of wheel tread; and condition of drive train.
    Paragraph (f)(3) proposes the running gear inspection which must be 
done by qualified personnel once every 18 days. The purpose of the 
running gear inspection is to guarantee running safety by monitoring 
wear conditions on wheels, bearings, brakes and suspension systems. The 
inspection is to be conducted once every 18 days on each trainset, 
independent of distance traveled.
    At a minimum, the items listed below must be inspected during a 
running gear inspection. All conditions found that do not comply with 
the safety inspection criteria required by Sec. 243.433(a)(1) of this 
proposal must be corrected before the trainset is put into revenue 
service: A visual inspection of trucks; an inspection of the operation 
of flange-lubricating devices; an inspection of the condition and 
attachment of dampers, roof mounted elements, and suspension 
components; an inspection of the brake rigging, journal bearings, and 
tripod transmission; a visual inspection of the condition and 
attachment of brake pads; an inspection of the oil levels on drive 
train; an inspection of the securement of drive train and wheel slide 
sensors; an inspection of the condition of the pantographs and roof 
insulators; and check for audible leaks on pneumatic system.
    Paragraph (f)(4) sets requirements proposed for the wheel 
inspection (also called Systematic Work). Each trainset wheel and wheel 
profile must be inspected by qualified personnel at an interval not to 
exceed 50,000 km of travel. Equipment not in compliance with the 
inspection criteria established in paragraph (a) must be corrected or 
replaced before trainset returns to revenue service. The purpose of the 
wheel inspection is to ensure safety and ride comfort at high speeds.
    Paragraph (f)(5) describes the Minor Inspection which must be done 
by qualified personnel at an interval not to exceed 150,000 km of 
travel or 7 months of time, whichever comes first. The Minor Inspection 
must be equivalent to the Minor (Limited) Inspection performed on TGV 
trainsets in France and performed in accordance with the tests 
procedures and inspection criteria established in paragraph (a). All 
conditions found that do not comply with the safety inspection criteria 
required by paragraph (a) must be corrected before the trainset is put 
into revenue service. The Minor Inspection must complete the following 
for electrical parts: Inspect current return devices, antennas, 
transponders; examine batteries; check operation of lighting; check 
operation of speedometer unit and of cab signal receptor; check sensors 
and sensor protectors; check roof switches and contacts; check circuit 
breakers; and check traction motors and main transformers. For 
mechanical parts, the Railroad must: Inspect axles, axle boxes and 
trucks; check tightening torque of shock absorber and support mounting 
bolts; check buffing gear; inspect pantographs; check attachment of 
anti-roll bars; examine condition of guard-irons; check setting of 
sanders; verify proper operation of flange-lubricating

[[Page 65523]]

devices; check level and condition of oil on motor and reducing gears; 
check attachment of geared motors; check for grease projections from 
the motive force transmission components, and carrying and fixed rings 
of the articulation joint; check attachment of motive force 
transmission components and tripod transmission; check condition of 
motorized axle torque reaction rods; check condition of brake-units and 
brake shoes; check condition of disk brake pads and of the brake 
rigging cylinder assembly; check condition of bellows; check for 
attachment defects and/or distortions on carbody components such as 
underside panels, skirts, windows, fairings, etc.; verify proper 
operation of doors including locking devices; check for defects on 
front windows; inspect extinguishers, tooling and safety equipment; and 
inspect tachometer and odometer sensors. For pneumatic parts, the 
Railroad must check main compressor; check the oil level and check for 
leaks on main compressor; check condition of pneumatic suspension 
components; and check brake equipment and brake indicator lamps.
    Paragraph (f)(6) describes the general inspection which must be 
conducted at an interval not to exceed 300,000 km of travel or 13 
months of time, whichever comes first. The Railroad must perform a 
General Inspection (equivalent to the General Inspection performed on 
TGV trainsets in France) in accordance with the tests procedures and 
inspection criteria established in paragraph (a). All conditions found 
that do not comply with the safety inspection criteria required by 
paragraph (a) must be corrected before the trainset is put into revenue 
service. The General Inspection must consist of the following steps for 
electrical parts: Inspect circuit breaker; examine insulators; inspect 
main transformers; inspect braids and connecting shunts, sensors and 
sensor protectors; examine electro-pneumatic and electromagnetic 
contacts; inspect freon enclosures; check for anomalies on resistors; 
check operation of various signaling lights; visual inspection of 
diodes and antennas; check condition of electronic plug-in units; check 
condition of switches, controls, joints; check condition of master 
controller; check operation of clock, indicator of imposed speed; check 
operation of ground-to-train radio link and speed supervision by 
transponder; check operation of passenger alarms; inspect antenna; 
verify that headlights (full and dimmed), tail lights, other 
indicators, lighting, desks operate properly; verify power supply to 
electrical outlets available to passengers and service personnel; check 
operation of lights and telltale indicators in electrical cabinets; 
inspect various motors (traction, main, auxiliary compressors, 
ventilation); check operation of refrigeration system and circuit 
breakers. For mechanical parts, the Railroad must: Check operation of 
pantographs; check for defects on trucks (cracks, distortions); check 
for defects and check play on fixed and carrying rings of articulation 
joint; check for defects on intercar passageways; check for defects on 
doors, locks and joints; check interbody and anti-tilt dampers; check 
tread brake units; check underbody rotation stops. For pneumatic parts, 
the Railroad must: Check pressure gauge; check operation of braking 
gear; check operation of the anti-wheelslide device; check operation of 
the emergency brake valve; clean driver's brake valve and check its 
operation; inspect various flexible and half-couplings; check operation 
of valves which control alarms, windshield washers, windshield wipers, 
and of differential valves; check brake indicator lights.
    Paragraph (f)(7) proposes the Major Inspection which must be 
conducted at an interval not to exceed 600,000 km of travel or 25 
months of time, whichever comes first. The Railroad must perform a 
Major Inspection (equivalent to the Major Inspection performed on TGV 
trainsets in France) in accordance with the tests procedures and 
inspection criteria established in paragraph (a) of this section. All 
conditions found that do not comply with the safety inspection criteria 
required by paragraph (a) shall be corrected before the trainset is put 
into revenue service. The Major Inspection must include the following 
steps for electrical parts: Inspect roof cable and lightning arresters; 
check operation of the roof switch; inspect battery switches; inspect 
battery charger and battery voltmeter; inspect inverters; examine 
coils; clean electronic gear; inspect couplers and connecting cables; 
check driver's console switch box; test driver's vigilance system; pre-
departure checks (pantograph uplift, air conditioning, etc.); check 
operation of cab signal; clean switchgear cabinets; lubricate traction 
motors; check ammeters, key switch panel; check 30 KVA inverter; check 
spare light bulb supply.
    For mechanical parts, the Railroad must: Check calibration of 
pantographs; check for defects on motorized axle reaction rods; check 
the constituents of fixed and carrying rings of articulation joint; 
check that headlight covers are tightly secured; check for defects on 
carbody exterior paint. For pneumatic parts, the Railroad must inspect 
air and oil filters; inspect main compressor couplings; check operation 
of the main air dryer; check operation of pressure gauges; inspect 
pneumatic suspension reservoirs; check operation of power car and 
trailer car brakes; check operation of pneumatic pressure regulators; 
inspect truck-to-carbody coupling and pneumatic suspension connections; 
and check operation of the spring-applied parking brake.
    Paragraph (g) proposes that the Railroad designate brake system 
repair point(s) in the inspection criteria established in paragraph (a) 
of this section. FRA proposes that no trainset depart a brake system 
repair point unless that trainset has a 100% operational brake system.
    Paragraph (h) proposes that the Railroad's program established 
pursuant to paragraph (a) must include the Railroad's scheduled 
maintenance intervals for equipment based on TGV operations in Europe, 
and on an analysis required the system safety program set forth in 
Subpart B of this rule. FRA proposes to allow the maintenance intervals 
for safety-critical components to be changed only when justified by 
accumulated acceptable operating data. Changes in maintenance cycles of 
safety-critical components must be based on verifiable data made 
available to all interested parties and shall be reviewed by FRA. This 
proposal is another attempt to balance the needs of the operating 
railroad to run efficiently and the concern of rail labor organizations 
that railroads have the ability to unilaterally make safety decisions.
    Paragraph (i) requires the Railroad to establish a training and 
qualification program as defined in Subpart H of this proposal to 
qualify individuals to perform inspections, testing, and maintenance on 
the rolling stock. Only qualified individuals may perform inspections, 
testing, and maintenance of the rolling stock. An employee or 
contractor employee shall have knowledge of standard procedures 
described in paragraph (h) of this section in order to qualify to 
perform a task. FRA does not prescribe a detailed training program or 
qualification and designation process.
    Paragraph (j) proposes that the Railroad's program required by this 
section include the Railroad's written standard procedures for 
performing all safety-critical equipment inspection, testing, 
maintenance, or repair tasks. This paragraph proposes various broad 
requirements relating to the content and enforceability of the standard 
operating procedures. FRA has drawn on the

[[Page 65524]]

experiences of other heavy industries and in the military, where 
inherently dangerous tasks are common, which have proven that standard 
operating procedures are an effective tool in reducing work-related 
injuries. Further, standard operating procedures can form the basis for 
periodic safety refresher training. FRA does not propose to prescribe 
the detailed procedures to be used. The proposed rule is designed to 
have the detailed procedures developed by those with most knowledge of 
how to safely perform the tasks--the operators and employees.
    These standard procedures must: Describe in detail each step 
required to safely perform the task; describe the knowledge necessary 
to safely perform the task; describe any precautions that must be taken 
to safely perform the task; describe the use of any safety equipment 
necessary to perform the task; be approved by the railroad's chief 
mechanical officer; be approved by the railroad's official responsible 
for safety; be enforced by supervisors with responsibility for 
accomplishing the tasks; and be reviewed annually by the railroad.
    Paragraph (k) requires the Railroad to establish an inspection, 
testing, and maintenance quality control program, which will be 
enforced by the Railroad, to reasonably ensure that inspections, tests, 
and maintenance are performed in accordance with Federal safety 
standards and the procedures established by the Railroad. In essence, 
this creates the need for the Railroad to perform spot checks of the 
work performed by its employees and contractors to ensure that the work 
is performed in accordance with established procedures and Federal 
requirements. FRA believes that this is a very important management 
function that, if neglected will surely lead to safety problems.
    Paragraph (l) of this section requires the Railroad to make and 
maintain a written or electronic record of each of the inspections 
required in this Subpart. The record must be maintained for at least 
one year. Inspection records are extremely helpful to railroads and FRA 
in determining the natural life of equipment and components, and 
appropriate safety limits that should be imposed because of those 
natural restrictions. These records will assist the Railroad and FRA to 
determine whether all inspection and replacement intervals are 
understood and followed by the system employees and supervisory staff. 
Also, these records are often helpful, in the event of an accident, to 
determine probable causation factors.

Subpart F--Operating Practices

    Operating rules and practices play a vital role in assuring 
railroad safety. This Subpart proposes requirements for the Railroad's 
operating rules and practices, which for the most part, mirror the 
Petition and general U.S. practice. However, FRA makes some important 
changes to our treatment of the FOX operating rules, based on the 
peculiarities of this operation.
Section 243.501 Purpose
    First, this proposal grants FRA authority to approve the FOX 
operating rules prior to revenue operations. FRA believes that approval 
authority is necessary to ensure that FOX follows, to the maximum 
extent possible, the safety-critical operating rules used in France on 
the TGV, which have helped to create the TGV's admirable safety record. 
FRA has not had the opportunity to review these rules, though they 
exist, and believes that Federal approval of the FOX operating rules 
should not occur until a comparison between the TGV rules and the FOX 
operating rules can take place. Therefore, this section proposes that 
FRA must approve FOX operating rules before revenue operations 
commence.
Section 243.503 Operating Rules; Filing and Recordkeeping
    Section 243.503 of the proposal sets forth the filing and 
recordkeeping requirements for the Railroad. Paragraph (a) requires FOX 
to file its operating rules with FRA six months prior to commencing 
internal operations, and one year prior to revenue operations. The 
reason for this distinction is that FRA would like to review the 
Railroad's operating rules when the equipment first travels across the 
system, when the potential for employee injury exists. This requirement 
would ensure that the Railroad has in place appropriate operating rules 
at that time to protect employees from moving equipment and operating 
systems, and the potential for injury that may arise as a result of 
initial disorganization, inconsistent movements, or faulty equipment. 
FRA requests comment from FOX and other interested parties as to 
whether the operating rules prepared for internal operations will vary 
greatly from the rules for revenue operations. If the rules are 
strikingly different, modifications may need to be made to this 
proposed requirement.
    Paragraph (a) also requires the Railroad to designate which of its 
operating rules are safety-critical, and states that FRA will adopt and 
incorporate the safety-critical rules as Appendix C to this Part. 
Paragraph (b) of the proposal requires the Railroad to file any 
amendment to its operating rules with FRA within 30 days of the day it 
takes effect. Section 243.509 of this Subpart, discussed below, permits 
the amendment to remain in effect until or unless FRA disapproves the 
amendment. Therefore, this Subpart grants FRA the authority to approve 
the Railroad's operating rules, as well as all changes that are made to 
the rules after initial approval.
    Paragraph (c) requires the Railroad to keep one copy of the 
operating rules at headquarters and make the records available to FRA 
for inspection or duplication. Paragraph (d) authorizes FRA to issue 
civil penalties or take other enforcement action against any person who 
violates a safety-critical operating rule, which has been adopted and 
incorporated by reference in Appendix C to this rule under paragraph 
(a) discussed above. This proposal marks an important change from the 
way in which FRA currently addresses operating rules for existing 
railroads. This authority will underscore the importance of Railroad, 
employee, and contractor adherence to safety-critical rules that have 
been developed thoughtfully and in connection with development of a 
system safety plan. FRA has no desire to meddle unnecessarily into non-
safety issues on railroad property, and the authority proposed in this 
paragraph will not facilitate such Federal action. FRA may only 
initiate enforcement actions under this section where clear safety 
hazards arise due to the violation of a safety-critical rule. This 
authority will enhance the system's performance for passengers, 
employees, and the Railroad.
Section 243.505 Program of Operational Tests and Inspections; 
Recordkeeping
    Section 243.505 requires the Railroad to conduct periodic tests and 
inspections to determine the extent of compliance with its code of 
operating rules, timetables, and timetable special instructions in 
accordance with the program filed with and approved by the FRA. This 
section is consistent with the Petition and current U.S. practice, and 
will ensure that FRA will be informed of the Railroad's internal 
validation that employees are complying with the operating rules.
    The testing and inspections refer to operational field tests and 
inspections, not qualifying tests or examinations of employees in 
operating rule classes. Also, the terms ``inspection'' and ``test'' are 
not functional equivalents. The term ``inspection'' is broader in scope 
and

[[Page 65525]]

may include varying numbers and types of specific ``tests.'' Each 
terminal, division, or other organizational category would be inspected 
periodically for compliance with operating rules. The number and 
variety of specific ``tests'' comprising each periodic inspection may 
vary according to the size and nature of the component, local operating 
conditions, and safety problems uncovered in past inspections or that 
have developed since the previous inspections. The documents listed in 
paragraphs (a-d) must be kept at system headquarters, for specified 
time periods, and must be available to FRA for inspection and copying 
during normal business hours.
    Paragraph (d) requires the Railroad, before March 1, to maintain an 
annual summary covering the previous year's activities. This must 
include the number, type and result of each operational test and 
inspection that was conducted in accordance with paragraphs (a) and (b) 
of this section.
    Paragraph (e) facilitates retaining the required information in an 
electronic format. This format may be utilized only where certain 
procedures are in place. There must be restricted access to the 
electronic database, and identification of those personnel granted 
access to the information. Also, a terminal with a central processing 
unit attached to either a fax or printer, that can retrieve and produce 
information in a usable format for immediate review by FRA 
representatives must be present. The Railroad must designate a person 
who is authorized to authenticate retrieved information from the 
electronic system as true and accurate copies of such electronic 
records.
Section 243.507 Program of Instruction on Operating Rules; 
Recordkeeping; Electronic Recordkeeping
    Section 243.507 contains the requirements for the Railroad to 
develop and implement a program of instruction on its code of operating 
rules. The Railroad must ensure that its employees understand and 
comply with its code of operating rules. Many railroad accidents are 
attributable to a lack of compliance with railroad operating rules or a 
misinterpretation of their intended application. If the Railroad's 
employees have a better understanding of the operating rules, the 
chances for non-compliance or misinterpretation should be reduced.
    Paragraph (a) requires that a written instructional program, kept 
at system headquarters and at the division headquarters, will be the 
basis of instruction on the Railroad's operating rules for those 
employees governed by such rules. FRA does not intend to prescribe 
every detail of what the program must contain. However, the program 
should be based on the specific safety needs and operating environment 
of the high speed rail system being developed.
    Paragraph (b) covers the gradual implementation schedule of its 
program of periodic instruction. Each amendment to the original program 
will be retained at the system headquarters and at the division 
headquarters. The program must be available to representatives of the 
FRA for inspection and copying during normal business hours. The 
program must include a description of the means and procedures for 
instruction of different classes of affected employees. The frequency 
of instruction and the rationale on which it is based, must also be 
explained. A schedule for completing initial instructions for employees 
who are already employed and for those hired at a later date also must 
be included in the program.
    Paragraph (c) states that the Railroad is authorized to retain, via 
electronic recordkeeping, its program for periodic instruction of its 
employees on operating rules provided that the conditions and 
requirements set forth in Sec. 243.505 of this proposal are met.
Section 243.509 Operating Rules Approval
    Section 243.509 proposes the approval process for the Railroad's 
operating rules. Within ninety days of receipt, FRA must notify the 
Railroad, in writing, of the operating rules' approval or disapproval. 
If FRA disapproves the entire package or individual operating rules, 
FRA must explain in its written response the reasons for the 
disapproval, and the actions needed to obtain FRA approval. Paragraph 
(b) of this section requires the Railroad to submit any operating rule 
amendment to FRA for review, within thirty days after it was issued by 
the Railroad. The amendment will remain in effect, unless FRA notifies 
the Railroad, in writing, that the amendment has been disapproved. This 
section also states that the Railroad must submit supporting 
documentation to FRA that FRA believes is necessary to make an 
enlightened determination of the Railroad's proposed operating rules. 
FRA anticipates that the TGV operating rules, for instance, would be 
one document necessary to determine whether the FOX operating rules are 
comprehensive and likely to provide a high level of safety on the 
Railroad.

Subpart G--System Qualification Tests

    This Subpart sets forth pre-revenue qualification testing 
requirements that the Railroad must complete for a period of four 
months prior to commencing passenger service. This testing program 
developed pursuant to this Subpart is required by Subpart B of the 
proposal, and will be approved as part of the system safety plan 
approved by FRA. The testing program will provide the Railroad 
assurance that the system is safe, as designed and constructed, so that 
passengers are not put at risk when operations begin. For the most 
part, this Subpart is self-explanatory.
Section 243.601 Responsibility for Verification Demonstrations and 
Tests
    Section 243.601 requires the Railroad to comply with the pre-
revenue service testing plan, which must meet the specific requirements 
of this Subpart and the determinations made during the system safety 
plan analysis required by Subpart B of this proposal.
Section 243.603 Preparation of Test Plan
    Section 243.603 requires FOX to develop a test plan that covers 
every aspect of the system. The plan must include a clear set of 
objectives, and the Railroad's primary objective should be to 
demonstrate that the system, as constructed and operated, meets all 
design and performance standards required by this proposal. The test 
plan must set a schedule for the testing, describe all property and 
facilities that will be used, detail how the tests will be conducted, 
describe how the data obtained will be analyzed, create quality control 
procedures to ensure that the testing is done correctly, and 
demonstrate the inspection criteria developed for revenue service. 
Paragraph (d) requires that the test program include steps to verify 
the results of the installation and performance tests performed by 
contractors and manufacturers, conduct pre-operational testing of 
individual components and subsystems, and to conduct the full system 
tests.
Section 243.605 Pre-operational Qualification Tests
    Section 243.605 details the pre-operational qualification tests 
that the Railroad must complete on all safety-critical components of 
the system. The components must be shown to meet performance 
specifications and verify specified operational functions. This section 
is consistent with the Petition.

[[Page 65526]]

Section 243.607 Integrated Operational Testing of Systems.
    This section outlines the testing that FOX must complete with 
respect to the integrated systems. These tests include vehicle 
clearances to structures along the right-of-way; mechanical performance 
of the overhead catenary system; and the integrated performance of the 
track, signal, power supply, vehicle, software, and communications. 
Also, this section requires the Railroad to demonstrate safe system 
performance during normal and degraded operating conditions. These 
tests must verify power supply protection; catenary and pantograph 
interaction; incremental increases in train speed; braking rates; and 
wheel suspension characteristics.
    Paragraph (b)(10) of this section requires the Railroad to verify 
the track and civil structure under dynamic load. FOX must conduct 
qualification testing to ensure that the equipment will not exceed the 
wheel/rail force safety limits specified in the table in Subpart D and 
the limits for ride vibration specified in Subpart E at any speed less 
than 10 mph above the maximum authorized speed. During the 
qualification of the vehicle/track system, the ride vibration levels in 
Sec. 243.411 will be used rather than the accelerometer levels 
contained in Sec. 243.335. During a joint meeting of RSAC's High Speed 
Task Group and a group working on the Tier II Passenger Equipment 
standards, many members of both groups concluded that the lower ride 
vibration quality levels should apply when a railroad wishes to 
initially qualify a system, but that the accelerometer levels in the 
table as represented in Sec. 243.335 should apply during daily 
operation of the system. Equipment and track tolerances are expected to 
loosen slightly during operation, but the vehicle/track system must be 
monitored during the life of the system to ensure that the wheel/rail 
force measurement and accelerations specified in Sec. 243.335 are not 
exceeded. These concepts are discussed in greater detail in the 
analysis of Subpart D.
    The Railroad must establish a testing speed at least 10 mph above 
the maximum operating speed, as well as target test and operating 
conditions, and conduct a test program sufficient to evaluate the 
operating limits of the track and equipment. The test program must 
demonstrate safe vehicle dynamic response as speeds are incrementally 
increased from 100 mph to the target maximum speed. The test must be 
suspended where any of the vehicle/track performance limits in this 
section are exceeded.
    At the conclusion of the test, when the maximum safe operating 
speed is known, along with permissible levels of cant deficiency, a 
test run will be made over the entire route at the speeds the Railroad 
will request FRA to approve for such service, and a second run again at 
10 mph above this speed. A report of the test procedures and results 
must be submitted to FRA upon completion of the tests. The test report 
must also show the design flange angle of the equipment, because this 
flange angle is used to calculate the safety limit for the ratio of the 
lateral force to the vertical force exerted by the same wheel on the 
rail. FRA believes that this testing, in combination with all of the 
other tests, will reveal any weaknesses in the system or construction 
of the components, and will greatly enhance the overall safety of high 
speed passenger line.
Section 243.609 Pre-revenue Service Testing
    Section 243.609 requires the Railroad to conduct the pre-revenue 
service tests for four months prior to operations. The testing will 
expose problems before passengers are at risk, and will also give 
operational experience to the Railroad and its employees. This section 
is consistent with the Petition.
Section 243.611 Verification of Compliance
    Section 243.11 requires the Railroad to prepare a report that 
details the results of all pre-operational tests, and outlines the 
remedial measures necessary to correct any deficiencies discovered 
during the testing. This section also requires the Railroad to 
implement the improvement measures discussed in the report, and to 
submit the report to FRA sixty days prior to commencing railroad 
operations.
    This Subpart, as proposed, is very similar in concept to the 
Petition. FRA has made some subtle changes, primarily to streamline the 
requirements and avoid duplication with Subpart B of the proposal. The 
requirement proposed in paragraph (c) of Sec. 243.611, which mandates 
report filing with FRA sixty days prior to revenue operations, was not 
included in the Petition. FRA invites comment on the timing set forth 
in paragraph (c), and may consider alternatives to this proposal. FRA 
believes that Federal review of the verification report is necessary to 
ensure that all problems encountered during testing are corrected, and 
additional time may be warranted in order to conduct that review 
adequately and thoughtfully. FRA has no desire to prevent timely 
commencement of revenue operations, and would take that into 
consideration in determining a different time period.

Subpart H--Personnel Qualification Requirements

Section 243.701  General Requirements
    This Subpart sets forth specific requirements for the Railroad's 
personnel qualification program. This Subpart works in conjunction with 
Subpart B of the proposal, which requires that the Railroad's system 
safety plan consider the sort of training and qualifications that will 
be necessary to maintain the appropriate level of safety in the 
Railroad's revenue operations. This program takes on particular 
importance with respect to FOX because the American workforce generally 
does not have thorough knowledge of the FOX equipment and practices. 
Also, if FOX follows through with plans to bring representatives from 
the French TGV to Florida to train American workers, there will be 
language differences that must be overcome during the training process. 
In addition, the American workforce may not be accustomed to heavy 
reliance on metric measurements, which are prevalent in Europe and used 
throughout the FOX system. All of these factors make the Railroad's 
employee training and testing program critical to the safety of the 
high speed system. Also, it is important to repeat that all contractor 
employees must be trained and qualified by the Railroad for the tasks 
that they are required to complete.
    This section sets forth specific parameters for the Railroad's 
employee qualification program. The Railroad must develop and implement 
a program that prepares employees to complete their safety-related 
tasks effectively, and requires supervisory personnel to understand 
fully the Railroad system and exercise prudent judgment to ensure that 
the system runs safely. The program must provide ``hands-on'' testing 
and refresher training of all employees. The Railroad must designate, 
in writing, that each employee possesses the knowledge to assume his or 
her assigned duties, and maintain these records for the duration of 
each employee's employment. Paragraph (c) states that the Railroad's 
personnel qualification program must explain the process by which the 
Railroad will confirm that employees are fully capable of handling 
assigned tasks, and must explain how the Railroad will measure employee 
skills. Paragraph (e) requires the Railroad's training program for 
locomotive engineers to follow existing regulations,

[[Page 65527]]

49 CFR part 240, as discussed previously. Paragraph (f) prohibits the 
Railroad from using unqualified or untrained personnel from completing 
tasks on the Railroad's system.
Section 243.703-Section 243.709  Personnel Qualifications for Track 
Maintenance and Inspection Personnel
    Section 243.703 of Subpart H describes the qualifications that 
Railroad track personnel must possess in order to maintain and inspect 
track. Work on or about track structure supporting qualified high speed 
passenger trains demands the highest awareness about the need to 
perform work properly. Section 243.703 sets forth requirements for the 
Railroad to designate qualified individuals responsible for the 
maintenance and inspection of track in compliance with the safety 
requirements for Subpart D. The Railroad must maintain records of each 
designation in effect, the basis for the designation (including 
training and test results), and the records of the track inspections 
made by the qualified individuals.
    Three categories of qualifications are set forth: Sec. 423.705 
establishes the qualifications for the individuals who supervise 
restorations and renewals; Sec. 423.707 establishes the qualifications 
for those individuals who inspect track for defects; and Sec. 243.709 
sets forth qualifications for persons who inspect and restore 
continuous welded rail.
    A person may be qualified to perform restorations and renewals 
under Sec. 243.705 in three ways. First, the person may combine five or 
more years of supervisory experience in track maintenance for track 
Class 4 or higher and the successful completion of a course offered by 
the employer or by a college level engineering program, supplemented by 
special on-the-job training. Second, a person may be qualified by a 
combination of at least one year of supervisory experience in track 
maintenance of Class 4 or higher, 80 hours of specialized training or 
in a college level program, supplemented with on-the-job training. 
Third, an employee with at least two years of experience in maintenance 
of high speed track can achieve qualification status by completing 120 
hours of specialized training in maintenance of high speed track, 
provided by the employer or by a college level engineering program, 
supplemented by special on-the-job training. The third option is 
intended to provide a means for the railroad to promote and qualify an 
outstanding employee who has the prerequisite experience in maintenance 
of high speed track.
    Pursuant to Sec. 243.707, a person may be qualified to perform 
track inspections by attaining five or more years of experience in 
inspection in track Class 4 or higher and by completing a course taught 
by the employer or by a college level engineering program, supplemented 
by special on-the-job training. Or, the person may be qualified by 
attaining a combination of at least one year of experience in track 
inspection in Class 4 and higher and by successfully completing 80 
hours of specialized training in the inspection of high speed track 
provided by the employer or by a college level engineering program, 
supplemented with on-the-job training. Finally, a person may be 
qualified by attaining two years of experience in track maintenance in 
Class 4 and above and by successfully completing 120 hours of 
specialized training in the inspection of high speed track provided by 
the employer or by a college level engineering program, supplemented by 
special on-the-job training provided by the employer with emphasis on 
the inspection of high speed track. The third option is intended to 
provide a way for employees with two years of experience in the 
maintenance of high speed track to gain the necessary training to be 
qualified to inspect track.
    For both categories of qualifications, the person must have 
experience in Class 4 track or above. To properly maintain and inspect 
Class 4 track or higher requires a level of knowledge of track geometry 
and track conditions that are not as readily obtained at lower classes. 
Persons who are qualified for high speed track must know how to work, 
maintain, and measure high quality track. Experience in Class 4 track 
is established as a lower limit to provide a pool of candidates, who 
may be drawn from freight railroads, who would provide the necessary 
experience on well-maintained track. Each person must demonstrate 
annually to the Railroad that he or she understands the requirements of 
Subpart D, can detect deviations, and can prescribe appropriate 
remedial action to correct or safely compensate for those deviations. A 
recorded examination on Subpart D is required.
    Section 243.709 proposes specific requirements for qualifications 
of persons charged with maintaining and inspecting continuous welded 
rail (CWR). Training of employees in CWR procedures is essential for 
high speed operations. Each person inspecting and maintaining CWR must 
understand how CWR behaves and how to prevent track buckles and other 
adverse track reactions to thermal and dynamic loading. As part of the 
qualification, each employee who restores and inspects CWR must have an 
examination on the procedures for the handling of CWR required by 
Sec. 243.329.
Section 243.711--Sec. 243.717  Personnel Qualifications for Signal 
Maintenance and Inspection Personnel
    These sections describe the minimum qualifications for the 
Railroad's signal personnel. The Railroad must designate that signal 
employees have been qualified to perform their assigned tasks, and the 
designated employees must meet the specified standards in these 
sections.
    FRA is reluctant to dictate specific education or experience levels 
that would be required for various employment categories. FRA believes 
it more appropriate to set broad minimum standards that provide FOX 
flexibility to choose the best work force available. However, each 
employee designated as qualified must demonstrate annually, and 
preferably in writing, that she or he understands the signal safety 
standards set forth in Subpart C, that he or she can detect deviations 
from the standards, and that he or she can prescribe appropriate 
remedial measures. Signal supervisors must successfully complete the 
program that the employees complete, and must possess the ability to 
exercise judgment and make rational decisions concerning the Railroad's 
signal system.
Section 243.719-Sec. 243.723  Personnel Qualifications for Rolling 
Stock Maintenance and Inspection Personnel
    These sections establish minimum standards for the Railroad's 
rolling stock personnel. Again, FRA is reluctant to dictate specific 
education or experience levels, and so sets broad categories that 
provide FOX flexibility and ensure that qualified individuals are 
secured to work on the system's rolling stock. The Railroad must give 
rolling stock personnel written procedures to follow, hands-on training 
on the equipment, and periodic refresher training.
    FRA invites comment from interested parties on these proposed 
qualification standards. The proposal varies slightly from discipline 
to discipline, and reflects, to some extent, the existing qualification 
programs in this country. Because we are dealing with a new system, 
however, where specialized training will be very important, FRA seeks 
suggestions from the safety community on alternate methods to guarantee 
an informed and prepared workforce.

[[Page 65528]]

Subpart I--Power Distribution

    This Subpart of the proposal sets minimum requirements for the 
Railroad's power distribution system. As is explained in the system 
description of this proposal, the Railroad will operate on electric 
power generated and transferred to the equipment from an overhead 
catenary system. The catenary will maintain high voltage power 
throughout the length of the right-of-way, which can create an 
extremely hazardous work environment if not handled properly. The 
proposed standards in this Subpart follow generally accepted principles 
found in the National Electric Safety Code and the U.S. Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) existing employee protection 
requirements, and also are generally consistent with the Petition. FRA 
wishes to make very clear that nothing in this proposal displaces 
OSHA's authority over employees working on, around, or with the 
Railroad's electrical generation, distribution, or transmission systems 
or subsystems. Furthermore, it is important to note that this proposal 
does not displace OSHA's authority over any working condition that the 
Railroad's employees face that have not been specifically addressed in 
the final standards that follow this proposal.
Section 243.801  Warning Signs
    This section of the proposal requires the Railroad to post warning 
signs throughout the right-of-way, at underpasses and overpasses, and 
at each catenary mast to provide notice to employees, trespassers, and 
other individuals that high voltage lines are present. FRA believes 
that plentiful warnings will go a long way to prevent injuries to 
unauthorized individuals, and will also serve as a necessary reminder 
to employees working along the right-of-way.
Section 243.803 Clearance  Requirements
    This section requires all electrical clearances to meet the 
European standard, UIC 606-2 OR, which references formulas and values 
that are consistent with the system configuration that will develop in 
Florida, and that has safely guided the operation of the TGV in France. 
This standard includes references to other European standards, such as 
UIC 505-6, which must also be followed by FOX. The consideration of 
appropriate clearances in not a trivial matter, and many factors 
influence the development of safe, adequate clearances. Because the 
catenary system is dynamic, the task becomes that much more 
complicated. Therefore, FRA proposes that FOX adhere to the pertinent 
European standards, which we know safely accommodate the equipment that 
will be utilized in Florida and the employees who work along the right-
of-way.
Section 243.805  Catenary Connections
    This section requires the Railroad to ground the catenary masts to 
the ground or rail. Grounding of the catenary masts to the rail should 
be coordinated with the signaling system installation to insure that 
they function properly together, and FOX should design and construct 
this portion of the system in conjunction with the system safety plan. 
This is consistent with the Petition, which states that FOX will ground 
each catenary pole to the earthling wire, which will run the length of 
the right-of-way, and will be grounded to earth approximately every 10 
km or 6.2 miles. This is consistent with common safe practice. This 
section also states that the electrical impedance of the connection 
must meet the step and touch requirements set forth in international 
standards to prevent electrical shock. At a system level, the lower the 
impedance of the grounding system, the quicker the fault energy is 
diverted to ground, and the sooner the protection equipment, or circuit 
breakers, will isolate the faulty section of catenary/power 
distribution system. At an individual level, current takes the path of 
least resistance, and therefore, if someone was in contact with an 
object that had current running through it, we would want the grounding 
system to divert as much energy away from objects that potentially 
could come in contact with members of the public and railroad 
employees.
Section 243.807  Access to Stations
    Section 243.807 of Subpart I requires the Railroad to prevent 
unauthorized personnel from entering power supply stations, 
substations, and autotransformer stations. This provision aims at 
protecting employees and members of the public from exposing themselves 
to high voltage hazards, and also ensuring that the power system will 
not be harmed or disrupted by intruders. FOX states in the Petition 
that they intend to follow the National Electrical Safety Code with 
respect to station access and FRA believes that would provide an 
adequate measure of safety.
Section 243.809  Actuators
    This section of the proposal requires the Railroad to protect the 
operator from electrical shock, direct or induced, that may occur in 
the actuators of high voltage switches. The operation of the high 
voltage switch may induce current or voltage surges that may cause 
voltage surges between the switch control and ground. The person 
operating the switch much be protected against these surges.
Section 243.811  Power Feeding
    Section 243.811 requires the Railroad to protect the power 
distribution system from short circuits and over voltage that may occur 
as a result of lightning or utility surges. FRA is reluctant to dictate 
the specific method that FOX uses to accomplish this task, but believes 
that the system must be protected from interruptions or breakdowns that 
can occur on any electrical system, and may surely occur in Florida 
where electrical storms are commonplace.
Section 243.813  Emergency Devices
    Section 243.813 provides for communication and power disconnection 
abilities in the event of an emergency along the right-of-way. This 
section requires the Railroad to place emergency devices that are 
capable of disconnecting and isolating power, or grounding the catenary 
to the rail, or both, at every underpass, overpass, emergency entrance, 
supply station, substation, and autotransformer station along the 
right-of-way. Also, the Railroad must install telephones at each of 
these locations, and they must be connected to the Railroad's central 
power dispatching center.
Section 243.815  Overpass Protection
    Section 243.815 requires the Railroad to install fencing or other 
suitable device at each overpass that is adjacent to, above, or beneath 
the catenary. This section should protect the public, employees, and 
the electrical system by preventing accidental, hazardous contact with 
the catenary.
Section 243.817  Safety Work Rules
    Section 243.817 states FRA's expectation that FOX will provide for 
the safety of all employees by following all work practices covered by 
pertinent regulations issued by OSHA concerning the generation, 
distribution, and transmission of electrical power. The Petition states 
that FOX intends to follow the National Electrical Safety Code (NECS) 
in this regard. FRA believes that FOX should and will be able to comply 
with both sets of standards. FOX must comply with pertinent OSHA 
regulations, as they constitute the enforceable standard for working 
conditions that other federal agencies have not regulated. FRA has not 
exercised jurisdiction over the

[[Page 65529]]

working conditions that arise in the course of maintaining or 
inspecting power distribution systems, and therefore the pertinent OSHA 
standards apply to these employee working conditions. The NESC is a 
professional reference standard, commonly followed by all entities that 
operate, maintain, and inspect power distribution systems. As FRA 
understands it, the OSHA regulations and the NESC are not identical in 
scope and content, but complement one another. FRA invites comment as 
to whether compliance with each standard would be difficult to 
accomplish on the FOX system, and the reasoning for it. FRA anticipates 
that the Railroad's system safety plan analysis will devote attention 
to the development of appropriate employee work rules and protections 
vis-a-vis power distribution that are consistent with the OSHA and NESC 
safety standards.
Section 243.819 Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Power 
Distribution System
    Section 243.819 requires the Railroad to develop an inspection, 
testing, and maintenance program for the power distribution system. 
This section works in conjunction with Subparts B and H of the 
proposal, which also require the Railroad to establish and adhere to a 
comprehensive program that facilitates proper operation of the 
equipment and system, and which guarantees that employees receive 
adequate training to perform their duties safety. This section also 
includes specific inspection items and intervals, which comport with 
general industry practice and the Petition.
Appendix A--Schedule of Civil Penalties
    This appendix is being reserved until promulgation of the final 
rule of particular applicability. At that time, FRA will include a 
schedule of civil penalties to be used in connection with enforcement 
of the standards in the rule of particular applicability. Because such 
schedules are statements of policy, notice and comment are not required 
prior to their issuance. See 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(A). Nevertheless, 
commenters are invited to submit suggestions to FRA describing the 
types of actions or omissions under each regulatory section that would 
subject a person to the assessment of a civil penalty. Commenters are 
also invited to recommend what penalties may be appropriate, based upon 
the relative seriousness of each type of violation.

Regulatory Impact

Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

    FRA prepared a cost/benefit analysis of the NPRM for the FOX high 
speed rail system, and determined that the NPRM imposes no new costs on 
FOX. The analysis hinges on the establishment of what constitutes a 
baseline level of regulatory cost. The assumptions were:
     FOX will operate as it proposed in the Petition.
     There is no cost or benefit if FOX intended or intends to 
follow the proposal under its current practices. Where it was not clear 
what FOX intends to do as a business practice, the FRA assumed that FOX 
would follow procedures established by TGV operations in France.
     There is no cost or benefit where FOX would have to follow 
the requirements of the proposal under current or proposed regulations 
applying to all railroad operations. (For example, FOX will be required 
to file accident reports.)
     There is no cost or benefit where FOX has proposed, and 
FRA has accepted, provisions which are less strict than current or 
proposed regulations, but for which FOX has proposed limitations on its 
operations or other practices which directly affect the safety issue in 
question. (For example, because FOX will limit the weight of its trains 
and exclude freight operations, the dynamic load on the track will be 
less than on other track Class 4 and higher, so FRA will permit FOX to 
make one visual inspection a week, where other high-speed lines would 
be subject to visual inspection two or three times a week.)
     There is no cost or benefit where FOX would have to follow 
restrictions FRA now places on other railroads under waivers to 
accomplish the same end. (For example, FRA is requiring that railroads 
participating in the ITCS demonstration program validate their 
software.)
     The proposed rules FRA considered as part of the base case 
include track standards for high-speed operations, emergency 
preparedness and passenger equipment safety standards for Tier II 
equipment.
    The proposed rule will not impose any costs on FOX beyond those 
above, so the FRA does not anticipate that the proposed rule will 
create any benefits. If the first assumption, that FOX will operate as 
it represented in the Petition, is not true, then the public safety 
would be ensured by this proposal, and it would create benefits.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 601, et seq.) 
requires an assessment of the impacts of proposed rules on small 
entities. FRA has determined that this proceeding will not have a 
significant impact on a substantial number of small entities. The NPRM 
and any final standards that evolve in this proceeding relate only to 
the FOX high speed rail system, and FOX is not a small entity.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C 
3501-3520, and its implementing regulations, 5 CFR part 1320, when 
information collection requirements pertain to nine or fewer entities, 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) approval of the collection 
requirements is not required. This regulation pertains to one railroad, 
and therefore, OMB approval of the paperwork collection requirements in 
this proposed rule is not required.

Environmental impact

    FRA has evaluated these proposed standards in accordance with its 
procedures for ensuring full consideration of the environmental impact 
of FRA actions, as required by the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 4321, et seq.), and related laws and regulations. FRA 
has determined that this NPRM does not in and of itself have a direct 
impact on the environment. These proposed standards establish an 
improved framework for safety oversight of the system proposed by FOX, 
but FOX could build or operate a similar high speed rail network in the 
State of Florida under existing Federal railroad safety regulations of 
general applicability. It is expected that there will be other Federal 
approvals. The FRA has entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with 
the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and the Florida Department of 
Transportation (FDOT) through which the parties have established a 
process for considering the environmental impact of the implementation 
of the FOX high speed rail system in Florida to the extent that Federal 
approvals are required. The FHWA and FRA have agreed to serve as joint 
lead agencies for the purpose of complying with the statutory 
requirements of NEPA and related statutes, and such compliance will be 
completed prior to the proposed rule having practical effect. FDOT has 
agreed to coordinate the development of environmental studies at the 
state level. Appropriate notices, including a notice of the intent to 
prepare an

[[Page 65530]]

environmental analysis, will be provided to the public by the FRA and 
FHWA in accordance with FRA and FHWA procedures implementing NEPA.

Federalism Implications

    This proposed rule has been analyzed in accordance with the 
principles and criteria contained in Executive Order 12612, and it has 
been determined that the proposed rule does not have sufficient 
federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism 
Assessment. It should be noted that the U.S. Supreme Court in CSX v. 
Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993), upheld Federal preemption of any state 
or local attempts to regulate train speed. Nothing in this notice 
proposes to change that relationship.

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 243

    French TGV, High Speed Rail, Railroad safety, System safety

The Proposed Rule

    In consideration of the foregoing, FRA proposes to amend Title 49 
of the Code of Federal Regulations by adding Part 243, as follows:

PART 243--FLORIDA OVERLAND EXPRESS HIGH SPEED RAIL SAFETY STANDARDS

Subpart A--General Requirements

Sec.
243.1  Purpose and scope.
243.3  Applicability.
243.5  Definitions.
243.7  Responsibility for compliance.
243.9  Enforcement.
243.11  Preemptive effect.
243.13  System description.
243.15  Movement of defective equipment.

Subpart B--System Safety Program and Plan

243.101  General system safety requirements.
243.103  Fire protection program.
243.105  Software safety program.
243.107  Inspection, testing, and maintenance program.
243.109  Training, qualification, and designation program.
243.111  Emergency preparedness program.
243.113  Pre-revenue service system qualification testing plan.
243.115  Hazard identification and reduction.
243.117  Operating procedures in the event of component failures.
243.119  Safety-critical subsystems.
243.121  Approval procedure.

Subpart C--Signal System

243.201  Plans, where kept.
243.202  Grounds.
243.203  Locking of signal apparatus housings.
243.204  Design of control circuits on the failsafe principle.
243.205  Power-operated switch use.
243.206  Yard operations.
243.207  Timetable instructions.

Wayside and cab signals

243.208  Location of wayside signals.
243.209  Aspects and indications.
243.210  Markers.
243.211  Spacing of beacons.

Track circuits

243.212  Track circuit requirements.
243.213  Track circuit shunting sensitivity.
243.214  Insulated rail joints.
243.215  Fouling wires.
243.216  Turnout, fouling section.

Wires and cables

243.217  Protection of insulated wire; splice in underground wire; 
aerial cable.
243.218  Tagging of wires and interference of wires or tags with 
signal apparatus.

Standards

243.219  Control circuits; requirements.
243.220  Control circuits for signals, selection through point 
detector operated by switch movement.
243.221  Time locking; where required.
243.222  Indication locking.
243.223  Electric locking circuits.
243.224  Loss of shunt protection; where required.
243.225  Signal control circuits, selection through track relays or 
devices functioning as track relays.
243.226  Switch, movable-point frog or split-point derail.
243.227  Point detector.
243.228  Signals controlled by track circuits.
243.229  Circuits at interlocking.
243.230  Signals at adjacent interlockings.
243.231  Track signaled for movements in both directions, change of 
direction of traffic.
243.232  Route locking.
243.233  Wayside detectors.
243.234  Protection of maintenance-of-way personnel.
243.235  ATC device installation.
243.236  Forestalling device and speed control.
243.237  Cab signal indication in accordance with maximum speed 
limit.
243.238  Automatic brake application; initiation when the maximum 
speed limit is exceeded.
243.239  Advance cab signal indication.
243.240  Automatic brake application initiated by the ATC.
243.241  Cab signal indication after authorization to enter a block 
section where conditions defined in Sec. 243.219 exist.
243.242  Audible indicator.
243.243  Delay time.
243.244  Automatic brake application; full service.
243.245  Interference with application of brakes by means of brake 
valve.
243.246  Control from lead vehicle.
243.247  Proper operative relation between parts along roadway and 
parts on power car.
243.248  Visibility of cab signals.
243.249  Power supply.
243.250  Seal, where required.
243.251  Rate of pressure reduction; equalizing reservoir or brake 
pipe.
243.252  Restrictions imposed when device fails and/or is cut out en 
route.
243.253   Trackage.
243.254  Cut out of the ATC system.

Reporting Requirements.

243.255  Accidents resulting from signal failure.
243.256  Signal failure reports.
243.257  Annual signal systems report.

Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance

243.258  General.
243.259  Interference with normal functioning of device.
243.260  Operating characteristics of electromagnetic, electronic, 
or electrical apparatus.
243.261  Adjustment, repair, or replacement of component.
243.262  Purpose of inspection and tests; removal from service of a 
relay or device failing to meet test requirements.
243.263  Point detector test.
243.264  Relays; microprocessor testing.
243.265  Ground tests.
243.266  Insulation resistance tests; wires in trunking and cables.
243.267  Time releases, timing relays and timing devices.
243.268  Time locking.
243.269  Route locking.
243.270  Indication locking.
243.271  Traffic locking.
243.272  Switch obstruction test.
243.273  Locomotive or power car power supply voltage requirement.
243.274  Power car or locomotive insulation resistance; requirement.
243.275  Antennas and beacons.
243.276  Departure test.
243.277  Periodic test.
243.278  Results of tests.
243.279  Independent verification and validation.

Subpart D--Track Safety Standards

243.301  Restoration or renewal of track under traffic conditions.
243.303  Measuring track not under load.
243.305  Drainage.
243.307  Vegetation.

Geometry

243.309  Track geometry; general.
243.311  Track gage.
243.313  Curves, elevation and speed limitations.

Track Structure

243.315  Track strength.
243.317  Crossties.
243.319  Continuous welded rail.
243.321  Rail end mismatch.
243.323  Rail joints and torch cut rails.
243.325  Turnouts and crossovers, generally.
243.327  Frog guard rails and guard faces; gage.
243.329  Derails

Inspection

243.331  Track geometry measurement systems.
243.333  Track/vehicle performance measurement system.

[[Page 65531]]

243.335  Wheel/rail force measurement system.
243.337  Daily inspection trainset.
243.339  Inspection of rail in service.
243.341  Initial inspection of new rail and welds.
243.343  Visual inspections.
243.345  Special inspections.
243.347  Inspection records.

Subpart E--Rolling Stock

243.401  Clearance requirements.
243.403  Structural strength of trainset.
243.405  Trailer car interior.
243.407  Glazing.
243.409  Brake system.
243.411  Truck and suspension system.
243.413  Fire safety.
243.415  Doors.
243.417  Emergency equipment.
243.419  Operator's controls and power car layout.
243.421  Exterior lights.
243.423  Electrical system design.
243.425  Automated monitoring.
243.427  Trainset system software and hardware integration.
243.429  Control system design requirements.
243.431  Safety appliance.

Inspection

243.433  Trainset inspection, testing & maintenance.

Subpart F--Operating Rules

243.501  Purpose.
243.503  Operating rule; filing and recordkeeping.
243.505  Program of operational tests and inspections; 
recordkeeping.
243.507  Program of instruction on operating rules; recordkeeping; 
electronic recordkeeping.
243.509  Operating rules approval.

Subpart G--System Qualification Tests

243.601  Responsibility for verification demonstrations and tests.
243.603  Preparation of test plan.
243.605  Pre-operational qualification tests.
243.607  Integrated operational testing of systems.
243.609  Pre-revenue service testing.
243.611  Verification of compliance.

Subpart H--Personnel Qualification Requirements

243.701  General requirements.

Track Personnel

243.703  Personnel qualifications for track maintenance and 
inspection personnel.
243.705  Personnel qualified to supervise track restoration and 
renewal.
243.707  Personnel qualified to inspect track.
243.709  Personnel qualified to inspect and restore continuous 
welded rail.

Signal Personnel

243.711  Personnel qualifications for signal maintenance and 
inspection personnel.
243.713  Personnel qualified as signal inspector.
243.715  Personnel qualified as signal maintainer.
243.717  Personnel qualified to supervise signal inspectors and 
maintainers.

Rolling Stock Personnel

243.719  Personnel qualifications for rolling stock personnel.
243.721  Personnel qualified to inspect and maintain rolling stock.
243.723  Personnel qualified to supervise the inspection and 
maintenance of rolling stock.

Subpart I--Power Distribution

243.801  Warning signs.
243.803  Clearance requirements.
243.805  Catenary connections.
243.807  Access to stations.
243.809  Actuators.
243.811  Power feeding.
243.813  Emergency devices.
243.815  Overpass protection.
243.817  Safety work rules.
243.819  Inspection, testing, and maintenance of power distribution 
system.
Appendix A--Schedule of Civil Penalties [Reserved]
Appendix B--Test Performance Criteria for the Flammability and Smoke 
Emission Characteristics of Materials Used in Constructing or 
Refurbishing Locomotive Cab and Passenger Car Interiors
Appendix C--Railroad Safety-Critical Operating Rules [Reserved]

    Authority: Subtitle V of Title 49 of the United States Code; 49 
CFR 1.49(m).

Subpart A--General Requirements


Sec. 243.1  Purpose and scope.

    This Part prescribes minimum Federal safety standards for the high 
speed transportation system described in detail in Sec. 243.13 of this 
rule, known as the Florida Overland Express and hereinafter referred to 
as the ``Railroad.'' The purpose of this rule is to prevent accidents, 
casualties, and property damage which could result from operation of 
this system.


Sec. 243.3  Applicability.

    (a) This Part applies only to the Railroad operating between Miami, 
Orlando and Tampa in the State of Florida, as described Sec. 243.13. 
The Railroad shall operate only within the system defined in 
Sec. 243.13. Any operations outside the system as defined in 
Sec. 243.13 are prohibited without prior approval by the FRA.
    (b) Except as stated in paragraph (c) below, this rule, rather than 
the generally applicable Federal railroad safety regulations, shall 
apply to the Railroad.
    (c) Effective on the date the Railroad begins revenue operations, 
the following generally applicable Federal railroad safety regulations, 
all of which are found in Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 
and in the case of paragraph (c)(14), which will be codified in the 
near future, and any amendments thereto, are hereby made applicable to 
the Railroad, regardless of any statements of limited application that 
they may contain:
    (1) Part 209, Railroad Safety Enforcement Procedures;
    (2) Part 210, Railroad Noise Emission Compliance Regulations;
    (3) Part 211, Rules of Practice;
    (4) Part 212, State Safety Participation Regulations;
    (5) Part 214, Railroad Workplace Safety;
    (6) Part 216, Special Notice and Emergency Order Procedures;
    (7) Part 218, Railroad Operating Practices;
    (8) Part 219, Control of Alcohol and Drug Use;
    (9) Part 220, Radio Standards and Procedures;
    (10) Part 225, Railroad Accidents/Incidents: Reports, 
Classification, and Investigations;
    (11) Part 228, Hours of Service of Railroad Employees;
    (12) Part 229, Section 135, Event Recorders;
    (13) Part 235, Instructions Governing Applications for Approval of 
a Discontinuance or Material Modification of a Signal System or Relief 
from the Requirements of Part 236, except Sec. 235.7; Any reference in 
Part 235 to Part 236 shall be read to be a reference to Subpart C, 
Signal Standards, of this rule;
    (14) The emergency preparedness requirements set forth in FRA's 
proposed Passenger Train Emergency Standards, 62 FR 8330 (February 24, 
1996), which shall be codified as modified after consideration of all 
comments received at 49 CFR part 239;
    (15) Part 240, Qualification and Certification of Locomotive 
Engineers, except sections 240.227 and 240.229; and
    (16) Part 215, Railroad Freight Car Safety Standards; Part 229, 
Railroad Locomotive Safety Standards; Part 230, Locomotive Inspection; 
Part 231, Railroad Safety Appliance Standards; and Part 232 Railroad 
Power Brakes and Drawbars shall apply to the Railroad's conventional 
locomotive and freight fleet as it is used in work trains, rescue 
operations, yard movements, and other non-passenger functions.
    (d) The Federal railroad safety statutes apply to all railroads, as 
defined in 49 U.S.C. 20102. The Railroad covered by this Part is a 
railroad under that definition. Therefore, the Federal railroad safety 
statutes, Subtitle V of Title 49 of the United States Code, apply 
directly to the Railroad. However, pursuant to authority granted under 
49

[[Page 65532]]

U.S.C. 20306 (formerly the Rock Island Railroad Transition and Employee 
Assistance Act), FRA has exempted the Railroad from certain 
requirements of 49 U.S.C. 20301, et seq. (formerly the Safety Appliance 
Acts).
    (e) The Systeme International, or metric measurement system, is the 
measuring system used throughout this rule. For clarification, United 
States' standard values typically follow the metric values in 
parentheses, and a soft conversion has been used.


Sec. 243.5  Definitions.

    As used in this Part:
    Adjusting/destressing, track means the procedure by which a rail's 
temperature is readjusted to the desired value. It typically consists 
of cutting the rail and removing rail anchoring devices, which provides 
for the necessary expansion and contraction, and then re-assembling the 
track.
    Administrator means the Administrator of FRA, the Deputy 
Administrator of FRA, or the delegate of either.
    Alerter means a device or system installed in the locomotive 
engineer cab to promote continuous, active locomotive engineer 
attentiveness by monitoring select locomotive engineer control 
activities, providing alarms, and stopping the train, if necessary. If 
fluctuation of a monitored locomotive engineer control is not detected 
within a predetermined time, a sequence of audible and visual alarms is 
activated to progressively prompt a response by the locomotive 
engineer. Failure by the locomotive engineer to institute a change of 
state in a monitored control, or acknowledge the alerter alarm activity 
through a manual reset provision, results in a penalty brake 
application, bringing the power car, locomotive, consist or trainset to 
a stop.
    Anti-climbing mechanism means parts of the ends of adjoining 
trainset units that are designed to engage, when the units are 
subjected to large buff loads, to prevent override of one unit by 
another.
    Associate Administrator means the Associate Administrator for 
Safety, FRA, or a Deputy Associate Administrator for Safety, FRA.
    Automatic train control (ATC) means equipment installed on the 
power car or locomotive working in conjunction with a track-side 
system, so arranged that its operation will automatically result in the 
application of the brakes to stop a train or control its speed at 
designated speed or location restrictions, should the locomotive 
engineer not respond.
    Block means a length of track of defined limits, the use of which 
trains, trainsets, or any other on-track, self-propelled equipment are 
governed by block signals, or cab signals, or both.
    Block signal means a manual signal at the entrance of a block to 
govern trains, trainsets, or any other on-track, self-propelled 
equipment entering and operating in that block.
    Block, absolute means a block in which no train is permitted to 
enter while it is occupied by another train, trainset, or any other on-
track, self-propelled equipment.
    Brake, air means a combination of devices operated by compressed 
air, arranged in a system and controlled manually, electrically, or 
pneumatically, by means of which the motion of a power car, trailer 
car, or trainset is retarded or arrested.
    Brake, disc means a retardation system used on some rail vehicles, 
primarily passenger equipment, that utilizes flat metal discs as the 
braking surface, instead of the wheel tread.
    Brake, dynamic or electric means a train or trainset braking system 
in which the kinetic energy of a moving train or trainset is used to 
generate electric current at the power car or locomotive traction 
motors, which is then dissipated through banks of resistor grids.
    Brake, emergency application means a brake application that results 
in the maximum designed retarding force for the train brake system.
    Brake, full service application means an application of the brakes 
resulting from a continuous or a split reduction in brake pipe pressure 
at a service rate until maximum brake cylinder pressure is developed. 
As applied to an automatic or electro-pneumatic brake with speed 
governor control, an application other than emergency which develops 
the maximum brake cylinder pressure, as determined by the design of the 
brake equipment for the speed at which the train is operating.
    Brake, tread means a braking system that uses a brake shoe that 
acts on the tread of the wheel to retard the vehicle.
    Brake control system means the components, including software, that 
either automatically or under the control of the engineer cause changes 
in the retarding force applied to the trainset by the brake system.
    Brake pipe means the system of piping, including branch pipes, 
angle cocks, cutout cocks, dirt collectors, hose, and hose couplings, 
that connects power cars and all trailer cars and permits the passage 
of air to control the power car and trailer car brakes.
    Brake system failure means the brake system not applying or 
releasing in response to commands, or other significant departure from 
intended operation.
    Braking supervision means a function of the ATC system whereby the 
speed and position of the trainset are monitored in relation to its 
effective braking performance to ensure compliance with the target 
speed and target distance.
    Broken base means any break in the base of the rail.
    Broken rail means a complete break of the rail.
    Buckling incident/buckling rail mean the formation of a lateral 
mis-alignment sufficient in magnitude to constitute a deviation of 125 
mm (4.9 in.) measured within a 20 m (65.6 ft.) chord. These normally 
occur when rail temperatures are relatively high and are caused by high 
longitudinal compressive forces.
    Cab means the compartment of the power car or locomotive designed 
to be occupied by the crew, and from which the propelling power and 
power brakes of the trainset are manually controlled.
    Cab signal means a signal located in the locomotive engineer's 
compartment or cab, indicating a condition affecting the movement of a 
trainset, power car or locomotive and used in conjunction with 
interlocking signals, and in conjunction with or in lieu of block 
signals.
    Calendar day means any period beginning at 12:01 a.m. and ending at 
midnight on a given date.
    Cant means the vertical distance of the outer rail above the inner 
rail in a curve.
    Cant deficiency means the additional height, which if added to the 
outer rail in a curve, at the designated vehicle speed, would provide a 
single resultant force, due to the combined effects of weight and 
centrifugal force on the vehicle, having a direction perpendicular to 
the plane of the track.
    Cant, rail means a rail's inward inclination.
    Cantrail means the longitudinal structural member at the 
intersection of the side wall and the roof of a rail vehicle.
    Central traffic control means the system of railroad operation in 
which the movement of trains over routes and through blocks on a 
designated section of track or tracks is directed by signals controlled 
from a designated point.
    Compound fissure means a progressive fracture originating in a 
horizontal split rail head which turns up or down in the head of the 
rail as a smooth, bright, or dark surface progressing until 
substantially at a right angle to the length of the rail. Compound 
fissures require examination of both faces of the fracture to locate 
the

[[Page 65533]]

horizontal split head from which they originate.
    Continuous welded rail (CWR) means rail that has been welded 
together into lengths exceeding 120 m (394 ft).
    Crack, rolling stock means a fracture without complete separation 
into parts, except that castings with shrinkage cracks or hot tears 
that do not significantly diminish the strength of the member are not 
considered to be cracked.
    Crash energy management means an approach to the design of 
passenger rail equipment which controls the dissipation of energy 
during a collision to protect the occupied volumes from crushing, and 
to limit the decelerations on passengers and crew in those volumes. 
This may be accomplished by designing energy-absorbing structures of 
low strength in the unoccupied volumes of a rail vehicle or passenger 
train to collapse in a controlled fashion, while providing higher 
structural strength in the occupied volumes. Energy deflection can also 
be part of a crash energy management approach. Crash energy management 
can be used to help provide anticlimbing resistance and to reduce the 
risk of train buckling during a collision.
    Crew means the complement of crew members assigned to operate a 
train.
    Crew member means a Railroad employee called to perform service 
covered by 49 U.S.C. 21103 and subject to the Railroad's operating 
rules and program of operational tests and inspections required in this 
rule.
    Critical buckling stress, means the minimum stress necessary to 
initiate buckling of a structural member.
    Critical software means software whose failure could have an impact 
on safety, or could cause large social or financial loss.
    Damaged rail means any rail broken or injured by accidents, wrecks, 
broken wheels, flat wheels, unbalanced wheels, slipping or similar 
causes.
    Desired rail installation temperature range means the rail 
temperature range in a specific geographical area, at which forces in 
CWR installed in that temperature range should not cause a track buckle 
in extreme heat, or a pull-apart during extreme cold weather.
    Detail fracture means a progressive fracture originating at or near 
the surface of the rail head. These fractures do not include transverse 
fissures, compound fissures, or other defects which have origins 
internal to the rail. Detail fractures may arise from shelling, head 
checks, or flaking of the rail.
    Disturbed track means track having reduced resistance to lateral or 
longitudinal movement, or both, as a result of the disturbance of the 
roadbed or ballast by track maintenance or any other event.
    Emergency application means a brake application which results from 
an emergency reduction.
    Emergency reduction means a depletion of brake pipe pressure at a 
rate sufficiently rapid to move the operating valve to emergency 
position.
    Employee or Railroad employee means any employee of, contractor of, 
or employee of a contractor of, the Railroad.
    End structure means the main support projecting upward from the 
floor or underframe of a power car, locomotive, trailer car or other 
rail vehicle. The end structure is securely attached to the underframe 
at each end of a rail vehicle.
    Engine burn fracture means a progressive fracture originating in 
spots where driving wheels have slipped on top of the rail head. In 
developing downward, such fractures frequently resemble the compound or 
transverse fissures, with which they should not be confused or 
classified.
    Event recorder means a device, designed to resist tampering, that 
monitors and records data on train speed, direction of motion, time, 
distance, throttle position, brake applications and operations 
(including train brake, independent brake, and, if so equipped, 
electric brake applications and operations) and, where the locomotive, 
including a power car, is so equipped, cab signal aspect(s), over the 
most recent 48 hours of operation of the electrical system of the 
locomotive on which it is installed.
    Failsafe means a characteristic of a system or its elements that, 
upon any failure or malfunction affecting safety, will cause the system 
to revert to a state that is known to be safe.
    Fault tolerant architecture means the built-in capability of a 
system to provide continued full or continued limited operation in the 
presence of a limited number of faults or failures of the system, such 
as a defect in a hardware device or component, or an incorrect step, 
process or data definition in a computer program.
    Flattened head or flattened rail means a short length of rail, not 
a joint, which has flattened out across the width of the rail head to a 
depth of 10 mm (0.4 in) or more below the rest of the rail. Flattened 
rail occurrences have no repetitive regularity and thus do not include 
corrugations, and have no apparent localized cause such as a weld or 
engine burn. Their individual length is relatively short, as compared 
to a condition such as head flow on the low rail of curves.
    Full service application means a brake application which results 
from one or more brake pipe reductions sufficient in amount to cause a 
full service reduction.
    Full service reduction means a service reduction sufficient in 
amount to cause equalization of pressure in brake cylinder with 
pressure in the reservoir from which compressed air is supplied to 
brake cylinder.
    Glazing, end-facing means a glazing panel located where a line 
perpendicular to the exterior surface of the panel makes a vertical or 
horizontal angle of 50 degrees or less with the longitudinal center 
line of the rail vehicle in which the panel is installed. A glazing 
panel that curves so as to meet the definition for both side-facing and 
end-facing glazing is end-facing glazing.
    Glazing, exterior means a glazing panel that is an integral part of 
the exterior skin of a rail vehicle with a surface exposed to the 
outside environment.
    Glazing frame means the arrangement used to install the glazing 
into the structure of a rail vehicle.
    Glazing, interior means a glazing panel with no surface exposed to 
the outside environment and which is protected from projectiles by the 
structure of a rail vehicle.
    Glazing, side-facing means a glazing panel located where a line 
perpendicular to the exterior surface of the panel makes an angle of 
more than 50 degrees with the longitudinal center line of the rail 
vehicle in which the panel is installed.
    Grade Crossing means a location where a public highway, road, or 
street or private roadway, including associated sidewalks and pathways, 
crosses one or more railroad tracks at grade.
    Handrails means safety appliances installed on either side of a 
rail vehicle's exterior doors to assist passengers and crew to safely 
board and depart the vehicle.
    Head end power means electrical power provided on board the 
locomotive of a passenger train to serve the train.
    High voltage means an electrical potential of more than 150 volts.
    Home signal means a roadway signal at the entrance to a route or 
block to govern trains entering and using that route or block.
    Horizontal split head means a horizontal progressive defect 
originating inside of the rail head, usually 6 mm (0.25 in) or more 
below the running surface and progressing horizontally in all 
directions, and generally accompanied by a flat spot on the running 
surface. The defect appears as

[[Page 65534]]

a crack lengthwise of the rail when it reaches the side of the rail 
head.
    Hunting oscillations means a sustained cyclic oscillation of the 
truck which is evidenced by lateral accelerations in excess of 0.4g 
root mean square, mean-removed, for 2 seconds.
    In passenger service/in revenue service means a train or passenger 
equipment that is carrying, or available to carry, passengers. 
Passengers need not have paid a fare in order for the equipment to 
constitute in passenger or revenue service.
    In service means equipment subject to this that is in passenger or 
revenue service, unless the equipment:
    (1) Is being handled in accordance with Sec. 243.15, as applicable;
    (2) Is in a repair shop or on a repair track; or
    (3) Is on a storage track and is not carrying passengers.
    Indication locking means electric locking which directly prevents 
the operation of a switch or other operative unit, in case another unit 
which should operate first fails to make the required movement.
    Interior fittings means any component in the passenger compartment 
which is mounted to the ceiling, sidewalls or end walls and which 
projects into the passenger compartment more than 25 mm (1 in.) from 
the surface or surfaces to which it is mounted. Interior fittings do 
not include seats, windows, side wall, end wall, floor, door pockets 
and ceiling lining materials.
    Interlocking means an arrangement of signals and signal appliances 
so interconnected that their movements must succeed each other in 
proper sequence and which may be operated manually or automatically.
    Interlocking block limits means the tracks between the opposing 
home signals of an interlocking.
    Knowingly means having actual knowledge of the facts that give rise 
to a violation, or knowledge that a reasonable person acting in the 
circumstances and exercising reasonable care would have.
    Linear static analysis means an analysis of the stresses in a 
structure under load, for which the loads are constant and the loads do 
not cause permanent deformation to the structure.
    Locomotive means a piece of on-track equipment other than hi-rail, 
specialized maintenance or other similar equipment that may consist of 
one or more units operated from a single control stand--
    (1) With one or more propelling motors designed for moving other 
equipment;
    (2) With one or more propelling motors designed to transport 
freight, passenger traffic or both; or
    (3) Without propelling motors but with one or more controls. This 
term does not include locomotives propelled by steam power.
    Locomotive, controlling means the locomotive from which the 
locomotive engineer exercises control over the train.
    Longitudinal means in a direction parallel to the normal direction 
of travel of a rail vehicle.
    Luminescent material means a material that absorbs light energy 
when ambient levels of light are high and emits this stored energy when 
ambient levels of light are low, making the material appear to glow in 
the dark.
    L/V ratio means the ratio of the lateral force that any wheel 
exerts on an individual rail to the vertical force exerted by the same 
wheel on the rail.
    MIL-STD-882C means a military standard issued by the United States 
Department of Defense to provide uniform requirements for developing 
and implementing a system safety program to identify and then eliminate 
the hazards of a system or reduce the associated risk to an acceptable 
level.
    Main track means a principal track, other than an auxiliary track, 
designated by timetable or special instructions, and upon which trains 
are authorized to operate by one or more of the following explicit 
methods of control: timetable/train order, signal indication, yard 
limits, or some form of direct train control.
    Marker, block section means a marker located at the boundary 
between adjoining block sections.
    Marker, route origin means a marker that is equipped with a proceed 
light signal, located at the beginning of a route.
    Marker, shunting means a special marker, which is equipped with a 
shunting light, that is used for turn back operations where no route 
origin marker exists.
    Marker, signaling means a marker used in open track, located at the 
boundaries between each block, to indicate spacing information.
    Mechanical stabilization means a procedure used to restore track 
resistance to disturbed track following certain maintenance operations. 
This procedure may incorporate dynamic track stabilizers or ballast 
consolidators, which are units of work equipment that are used as a 
substitute for the stabilization action provided by the passage of 
tonnage trains.
    Occupied volume means the spaces of a vehicle where passengers or 
crew are normally located during service operation, such as the 
operating cab and passenger seating and sleeping areas. Vestibules are 
typically not considered occupied, except when in use as a control cab.
    Override means to climb over the normal coupling or side buffers 
and linking mechanism and impact the end of the adjoining vehicle or 
unit above the underframe.
    Permanent deformation means a permanent change in the shape of a 
structural member.
    Person means all categories of entities covered under 1 U.S.C. 1, 
including but not limited to the following: a railroad; a manager, 
supervisor, official, or other employee or agent of a railroad; any 
owner, manufacturer, lessor, or lessee of railroad equipment, track, or 
facilities; any independent contractor providing goods or services to a 
railroad; and any employee of such owner, manufacturer, lessor, lessee, 
or independent contractor.
    Piped rail means a vertical split in a rail, usually in the web, 
due to failure of the shrinkage cavity in the ingot to unite in 
rolling.
    Power car means a type of locomotive at the leading or trailing 
end, or both, of a trainset which has a locomotive engineer cab and 
propelling motors that move the trainset; when at the leading end of 
the trainset, the unit from which the locomotive engineer controls the 
trainset.
    Qualified person means a person determined by the Railroad to have 
the knowledge and skills necessary to perform one or more functions 
required by this rule. The Railroad determines the qualifications and 
competencies for employees designated to perform various functions in 
the manner set forth in this rule.
    Rail anchors means those devices which are attached to the rail and 
bear against the side of the crosstie to control longitudinal rail 
movement. Certain types of rail fasteners also act as rail anchors and 
control longitudinal rail movement by exerting a downward clamping 
force on the upper surface of the rail base.
    Rail temperature means the temperature of the rail, measured with a 
rail thermometer.
    Railroad equipment means all trains, trainsets, rail cars, 
locomotives, and maintenance vehicles owned or used by the Railroad.
    Railroad operation means any movement of a train, trainset, 
locomotive, on-track equipment, or track motor car, singly or in 
combination with other equipment, on the track owned or operated by the 
Railroad.

[[Page 65535]]

    Railroad, the means the company, also known as the Florida Overland 
eXpress (FOX), which owns and operates the high speed rail 
transportation system connecting Orlando, Miami, and Tampa and which is 
responsible for compliance with all aspects of this rule.
    Redundancy means the existence in a system of more than one means 
of accomplishing a given function, with those means so arranged that if 
one means of accomplishing a function fails then another performs the 
function.
    Redundancy, active means that all redundant items are operating 
simultaneously rather than being activated when needed.
    Redundant system means a piece of equipment or a system that 
duplicates the essential function of another piece of equipment or 
system to the extent that either may perform the required function 
regardless of the state of operation or failure of the other.
    Refresher training means periodic retraining required and imposed 
by the Railroad for employees or contractors to remain certified to 
perform specific equipment inspection, testing, or maintenance 
functions.
    Repair point means a location designated by the Railroad where 
repairs of the type necessary occur on a regular basis, and that 
contains all facilities, tools, and qualified employees required to 
make necessary repairs.
    Rollover strength means strength needed to protect the structural 
integrity of a rail vehicle in the event the vehicle leaves the track 
and impacts the ground on its side or roof.
    Roof rail means the longitudinal structural member at the 
intersection of the side wall and the roof sheathing.
    Route locking means electric locking, effective when a train passes 
a signal displaying an aspect for it to proceed, which prevents the 
movement of any switch, movable-point frog, or derail in advance of the 
train within the route entered. It may be so arranged that as a train 
clears a track section of the route, the locking affecting that section 
is released.
    Safety appliance means an appliance, required under 49 U.S.C. 
chapter 203, excluding power brakes. The term includes automatic 
couplers, handbrakes, sill steps, handholds, handrails, or ladder 
treads which are made of steel or a material of equal or greater 
mechanical strength used by the traveling public and Railroad employees 
that provides a means for safe coupling, uncoupling, or ascending or 
descending Railroad equipment.
    Safety-critical means a component, system or task that, if not 
available, not performed, or not performed correctly, increases the 
risk of damage to equipment or injury to a passenger, crew member, or 
other person.
    Safety measurement criterion means a measurement limit or 
observation threshold used to trigger the duty to take corrective 
action to prevent a serious safety problem from developing. 
Measurements may be taken manually or by reliable sensors.
    Semi-permanently coupled means coupled by means of a drawbar or 
other coupling mechanism that requires tools to perform the uncoupling 
operation. Coupling and uncoupling of each unit in a train can be 
performed safely only while at a maintenance or shop location where 
personnel can safely get under a unit or between units.
    Service application means a brake application which results from 
one or more service reductions.
    Service reduction means a decrease in brake-pipe pressure, usually 
of from 5 to 25 pounds, at a rate sufficiently rapid to move the 
operating valve to service position, but at a rate not rapid enough to 
operate the valve to emergency position. Quick service is that feature 
of the operating valve which provides for local reduction of brake-pipe 
pressure.
    Shear strength means the ability of a structural member to resist 
forces or components of forces acting perpendicular to compression or 
tension forces, or both, in the member.
    Shock absorbent material means material designed to prevent or 
mitigate injuries due to impact by yielding and absorbing much of the 
energy of impact.
    Side posts means main vertical structural elements in the sides of 
a rail vehicle.
    Side sills means that portion of the underframe or side at the 
bottom of the rail vehicle side wall.
    Soft conversion means a dimension taken, typically from a product 
or component of a product, already designed and manufactured to English 
system dimensions, and expressing that dimension to nearly equivalent 
English or metric dimensions.
    Spall, glazing means small pieces of glazing that fly off the back 
surface of glazing when an object strikes the front surface.
    Speed, maximum authorized means the speed at which trains are 
permitted to travel safely, as determined by all operating conditions 
and signal aspects.
    Speed, maximum revenue service means a speed of 200 mph.
    Speed, maximum safe operating means the highest speed at which 
train braking may occur without thermal damage to the discs or wheels.
    Speed, restricted means a speed that will permit stopping within 
one-half the range of vision, but not exceeding 20 mph.
    Speed, slow means a speed not exceeding 20 mph.
    Split web means a lengthwise crack along the side of the web of a 
rail and extending into or through it.
    Superelevation means the actual elevation of the outside rail above 
the inside rail.
    System headquarters means the location designated by the Railroad 
as the primary office for the Railroad system.
    System safety plan means a document produced by the Railroad that 
states in detail the techniques, procedures, and tests to follow to 
reduce hazards and unsafe conditions to the lowest level possible 
through the most effective use of available resources. The system 
safety plan is used as part of the design process to ensure that the 
equipment and system meets all Federal safety standards and the 
Railroad's safety design requirements.
    System safety program means the activities described in the system 
safety plan to be performed to ensure that the Railroad's equipment and 
operations meet all Federal safety standards and the Railroad's safety 
design requirements.
    Target distance means the distance from the front of the train to 
the target.
    Target speed means the maximum speed limit which takes effect at 
the target.
    Terminal means the starting point or ending point of a single 
scheduled trip for a train. Normally, this location is where the 
trainset would reverse its direction.
    TGV means a high speed rail system currently in use in France, on 
which some of the equipment and operations to be utilized by the 
Railroad subject to the requirements of this rule are based.
    Thrust tube means the structural members in the trailer car end 
underframe that transmit longitudinal loads from the cross member 
located at the end of the trailer to the Car body side sills.
    Tight/kinky rail means continuous welded rail that exhibits minute 
alignment irregularities, which indicate that the rail is undergoing a 
level of compression at which it may deform unacceptably.
    Time locking means electric locking, which after a signal has been 
caused to display an aspect to proceed, prevents, until after the 
expiration of a predetermined time interval after such signal has been 
caused to display its most restrictive aspect, the operation of

[[Page 65536]]

any switch, movable-point frog, or derail in the route governed by that 
signal, and which prevents an aspect to proceed from being displayed 
for any conflicting route.
    Track acceleration measurement system means an on-track vehicle 
used to measure lateral truck accelerations, lateral carbody 
accelerations, and vertical carbody accelerations. A Melusine car, used 
on the French TGV, is a type of track acceleration measurement system.
    Track geometry measurement system means an on-track vehicle used to 
measure track surface, warp, alignment, and gage. The vehicle typically 
has eight axles spaced symmetrically from the centerline of the vehicle 
and conducts measurements by means of mechanical contact. A Mauzin car, 
used on the French TGV, is a type of track geometry measurement system.
    Track lateral resistance means the resistance provided by the rail/
crosstie structure against lateral displacement.
    Track longitudinal resistance means the resistance provided by the 
rail anchors/rail fasteners and the ballast section to the rail/
crosstie structure against longitudinal displacement.
    Traffic locking means electric locking which prevents changing the 
direction of traffic on a section of track while that section is 
occupied or while a signal displays an aspect for a movement to proceed 
into that section.
    Trailer car means a unit of a trainset designed to provide 
transportation for passengers, baggage, or mail.
    Train means a combination of a single power car or locomotive with 
any other power car, locomotive, trailer car, or maintenance car. This 
term includes a trainset.
    Train-induced forces means the vertical, longitudinal, and lateral 
dynamic forces which are generated during train movement and which can 
contribute to the buckling potential of track.
    Trainset means a passenger train including the locomotive(s) and 
power car(s) and passenger cars that are semi-permanently coupled to 
operate as a single unit. The individual components are uncoupled only 
for emergencies or maintenance conducted in repair facilities.
    Transmission beacon to locomotive (TBL) means the system which 
provides interface between the interlocking signal system and the 
automatic train control system used by the Railroad, resulting in the 
proper speed and location of all train movements.
    Transverse fissure means a progressive crosswise fracture starting 
from a crystalline center or nucleus inside the head from which it 
spreads outward as a smooth, bright, or dark, round or oval surface 
substantially at a right angle to the length of the rail. The 
distinguishing features of a transverse fissure from other types of 
fractures or defects are the crystalline center or nucleus and the 
nearly smooth surface of the development which surrounds it.
    Trip means the length of any single-direction, scheduled journey 
taken by a trainset. Once a trainset completes a turnaround at a 
station or predetermined location along the right-of-way, a new trip 
begins.
    Two-out-of-three voting architecture means three independent 
processors operating on dissimilar software in such a manner so as to 
compare the software output from each processor to ensure that safety-
critical results are identical. If one processor produces an answer 
inconsistent with the other two processors, the conflicting processor 
is taken off-line and the two remaining processors continue to compare 
with each other, and drive safety-critical commands, only so long as 
they both agree. If the remaining two processors fail to agree, the 
system ceases to issue safety-critical commands, shuts down, and 
assumes a safe state.
    Uncoupling mechanism means the arrangement for operating the 
coupler by any means.
    Underframe means the lower horizontal structure of a car body.
    Unit means car, trailer car, power car or locomotive of any type. 
For articulated equipment a unit means a piece of equipment located 
between two trucks.
    Unoccupied volume means the sections of the passenger vehicle or 
power vehicle which do not contain seating and are not normally 
occupied by passengers or crew.
    Validation means the process of evaluating a system or component 
during or at the end of the development process to determine whether it 
satisfies specified requirements.
    Vehicle, rail means a car, trailer car, locomotive, power car, or 
similar vehicle.
    Verification means the process of evaluating a system or component 
to determine whether the products of a given development phase satisfy 
the conditions imposed at the start of that phase.
    Vertical split head means a vertical split through or near the 
middle of the head of a rail, and extending into or through it. A crack 
or rust streak may show under the head close to the web or pieces may 
be split off the side of the head.
    Vestibule means an area of a trailer or passenger car that normally 
does not contain seating, that leads from the seating area to the side 
exit doors.
    Vital design method means a method of designing any device, circuit 
or software module used to implement a function essential to the safe 
operation of trains, such that the probability of its failing to return 
to the prescribed safe state is so low as to be considered practically 
nonexistent.
    Vital logic processor means a processor designed and operated 
according to vital design method.
    Warp means a measure of the change in track cant over a short 
distance.
    Window, emergency means that segment of a side facing glazing 
location which has been designed to permit rapid and easy removal 
during a crisis situation.
    Windshield means the combination of individual units of glazing 
material of the power car or locomotive that are positioned in an end 
facing glazing location.
    Yard means a system of tracks within defined limits provided for 
the making up of trains, storing of cars and other purposes.
    Yield strength means the stress under which a material will exhibit 
permanent deformation.


Sec. 243.7  Responsibility for compliance.

    (a) The Railroad shall not--
    (1) Use, haul, permit to be used or hauled on its line(s) any train 
or passenger equipment, that
    (i) has one or more defects not in compliance with this Part; or
    (ii) has not been inspected and tested as required by a provision 
of this Part; or
    (2) Operate over any track, except as provided in paragraph (d) of 
this section, that has one or more conditions not in compliance with a 
provision of this Part, if the Railroad has actual knowledge of the 
facts giving rise to the violation, or a reasonable person acting in 
the circumstances and exercising reasonable care would have that 
knowledge; or
    (3) Violate any other provision of this Part.
    (b) For purposes of this rule, passenger equipment shall be 
considered in use prior to the train's departure as soon as it has 
received, or should have received, the inspection required under this 
Part for movement and is ready for service.
    (c) Although many of the requirements of this Part are stated in 
terms of the duties of the Railroad, when any person (including, but 
not limited to, a contractor performing

[[Page 65537]]

safety-related tasks under contract to the Railroad subject to this 
part) performs any function required by this Part, that person (whether 
or not the Railroad) is required to perform that function in accordance 
with this Part.
    (d) For purposes of this Part, the Railroad operator shall be 
responsible for compliance with all track safety provisions set forth 
in Subpart D. When the Railroad operator has actual knowledge of the 
facts giving rise to a violation, or a reasonable person acting in the 
circumstances and exercising reasonable care would have knowledge that 
the track does not comply with the requirements of this Part, it 
shall--
    (1) Bring the track into compliance;
    (2) Halt operations over that track;
    (3) Continue operations over the segment of noncomplying track at a 
speed of 10 mph for a period not to exceed 30 days, under the authority 
of a person qualified under section 243.705 of this Part to supervise 
restorations and renewal of track under traffic conditions; or
    (4) Operate in accordance with the appropriate operational limits 
established for track classes 1 through 5 as set forth in 49 CFR part 
213.


Sec. 243.9  Enforcement.

    (a) Civil penalties. Any person who violates any requirement of 
this Part or causes the violation of any such requirement is subject to 
a civil penalty of at least $500 and not more than $10,000 per 
violation, except that, where a grossly negligent violation or a 
pattern of repeated violations has created an imminent hazard of death 
or injury or has caused death or injury, a penalty of up to $20,000 per 
violation may be assessed. Penalties may be assessed against 
individuals only for willful violations. Each day a violation continues 
shall constitute a separate offense. See 49 CFR part 209, Appendix A 
for a detailed statement of agency civil penalty policy.
    (b) Criminal penalties. Any person who knowingly and willfully 
falsifies a record or report required to be made under this Part, or 
knowingly and willfully fails to make, prepare, or preserve such a 
record or report may be liable for criminal penalties of a fine up to 
$5,000, imprisonment up to two years, or both, under the authority of 
49 U.S.C. 21311.
    (c) Other remedies. FRA has other enforcement remedies available to 
it, including the authority to seek injunctive relief and to issue 
compliance orders, special notices for repair, orders disqualifying 
individuals from safety-sensitive service, and emergency orders. FRA 
may use these other remedies, in addition to or instead of civil or 
criminal penalties, to ensure the system's compliance with the Federal 
railroad safety regulations and statutes, and to otherwise address 
safety concerns with respect to the system.


Sec. 243.11  Preemptive effect.

    Under 49 U.S.C. 20106, issuance of this Part preempts any State 
law, rule, regulation, order, or standard covering the same subject 
matter, except for a provision directed at an essentially local safety 
hazard if that provision is consistent with this part and does not 
impose an undue burden on interstate commerce.


Sec. 243.13  System description.

    (a) General. This section describes the components, operations, 
equipment, systems, and geographic limits of the Railroad's high speed 
rail system. Conditions that exceed or differ from the description set 
forth in this section are prohibited. In addition, the Railroad shall 
adhere to the following general requirements:
    (1) The Railroad shall operate between Miami, Orlando, and Tampa, 
Florida only. Operation beyond these locations is prohibited without 
prior approval by FRA.
    (2) The Railroad shall not under any circumstance exceed 200 mph, 
and at all times shall operate at speeds consistent with all 
requirements of this Part.
    (3) The Railroad shall not transport or permit to be transported 
any product that has been established to be a hazardous material 
pursuant to 49 CFR part 172, as amended.
    (4) The Railroad shall not permit smoking on any trainset while 
that trainset is in passenger service.
    (b) Right-of-Way. (1) The Railroad shall operate on a completely 
dedicated right-of-way. The Railroad shall not operate or conduct joint 
operations with rail freight or other rail passenger traffic. Other 
than its passenger trainsets and power cars, only the equipment listed 
in paragraph (h)(6) of this section may be operated on the Railroad's 
tracks.
    (2) There shall be no public at-grade crossings. Animal and non-
Railroad equipment crossings shall be accomplished by means of an 
underpass or overpass. Private at-grade crossings shall be for the 
exclusive use of the Railroad's internal operations.
    (3) The entire perimeter of the system's right-of-way shall be 
permanently fenced.
    (4) The Railroad shall install fall intrusion, intrusion, flood, 
wind, hot box and dragging equipment detectors in accordance with the 
requirements set forth in Subpart C.
    (5) Access to the right-of-way for roadway worker staff or 
emergency personnel shall be provided at intervals not to exceed 3.2 km 
(2 mi). This access shall be protected against entry by unauthorized 
persons.
    (6) Throughout the length of the right-of-way, the Railroad shall 
install walkways, located at a safe distance from the tracks, at a 
minimum distance of 2.4 m (7.87 ft) from the outside rail for a design 
speed of 350 km/h (217 mph). The walkways shall be used primarily for 
track and right-of-way inspection, and when required by emergency 
crews.
    (7) The right-of-way shall be designed for the high operating 
speeds planned which necessitate large curve radii in both the 
horizontal and vertical planes.
    (8) The Railroad shall record all difficulties and special 
situations regarding geology, hydrology, settlement, landslide, 
concrete and quality criteria that arise during construction of the 
right-of-way. After construction, the Railroad shall monitor the 
stability and quality standards of structures such as bridges, viaducts 
and earth structures.
    (9) The Railroad shall make available for review by the FRA the 
track layout drawings which show, at a minimum, the following 
information:
    (i) Length of straight sections, spirals and curves, curve radius, 
superelevation, superelevation variations, gradients, vertical curve 
radii;
    (ii) Turnouts and crossover location, technology and geometry;
    (iii) Maximum operating speed and allowable cant deficiencies;
    (iv) Signal boxes, block sectioning, wayside signal and 
communication devices;
    (v) Power feeding equipment and cut-out devices;
    (vi) Location of accesses to the right-of-way;
    (vii) Designated track crossing locations for Railroad personnel; 
and
    (viii) The Railroad shall also submit the specifications for the 
track layout, permissible track forces, components such as rail, 
ballast, ties, rail fasteners, switches.
    (10) Highway bridges. In order to guarantee a clear view for 
drivers of motor vehicles, highway bridges shall be constructed in a 
straight line and sharp bumps shall be avoided. Protection devices 
shall be installed to restrict to the maximum extent possible motor 
vehicles from falling onto the right-of-way.

[[Page 65538]]

    (11) Rail bridges. There shall be no movable bridges in the 
Railroad's system. Stationary rail bridges located over highways shall 
have their foundations protected against the impact of road vehicles.
    (12) Tunnels. There shall be no tunnels in the Railroad's system.
    (13) Track Crossing Device for Roadway Workers. Crossing of the 
tracks where operations occur above 160 km/h (100 mph) is not permitted 
except where designated track crossing devices are installed. Such 
track crossing devices shall be installed at all locations where the 
need for track crossing by workers is expected to occur on a regular 
basis, such as turnout areas and substations.
    (14) Emergency Traffic Stops. Emergency traffic stopping or slowing 
devices, or both, shall be installed at regular intervals on both sides 
of the tracks, at intervals not to exceed 3.2 km (2 mi), and at all 
special locations including block section limits, turnouts, substations 
or autotransformers. These devices shall act directly on the signaling 
system and establish voice connection to the central traffic control 
system.
    (c) Railroad system components. (1) System safety program. The 
Railroad shall develop, implement, and use a comprehensive system 
safety program, as described in detail in Subpart B of this Part, to 
ensure the identification, analysis, resolution, and documentation of 
all safety-critical processes and hazards.
    (2) Inspection, testing, and maintenance procedures and criteria. 
The Railroad shall develop, implement and use a system of inspection, 
testing, maintenance procedures and criteria, which meet the standards 
set forth in this Part, to ensure the integrity and safe operation of 
the Railroad's equipment, infrastructure, signal system, and power 
distribution.
    (3) Operating practices. The Railroad shall develop, implement, and 
use operating rules, which meet the standards set forth in Subpart F of 
this Part, which are based on the practices and procedures used on the 
French TGV system, to ensure the integrity and safe operation of the 
Railroad's system.
    (4) Emergency preparedness plan. The Railroad shall develop, 
implement, and use an emergency preparedness plan, which meets the 
standards to be set forth in 49 CFR part 239, to reduce the risk of 
injury to passengers and employees in the event of an emergency. This 
emergency plan shall incorporate proven safety procedures used on the 
French TGV system.
    (5) Personnel qualification requirements. The Railroad shall 
develop, implement, and use a training and testing program, which meets 
the standards set forth in Subpart H of this Part, to ensure that all 
personnel, including Railroad employees and employees of Railroad 
contractors, possess the skills and knowledge necessary to effectively 
perform their duties.
    (6) System qualification tests. The Railroad shall develop, 
implement, and use a series of operational and design tests, which meet 
the standards set forth in Subpart G of this Part, to demonstrate the 
safe operation of system components, and the system as a whole.
    (d) Track and infrastructure. (1) The Railroad shall construct its 
track and infrastructure to meet all material and operational design 
criteria, within normal acceptable construction tolerances, and to meet 
the requirements set forth in Subpart D of this Part.
    (2) The Railroad shall operate on nominal standard gage, 1.435 m 
(56.5 in.), track.
    (3) The Railroad shall install and operate on double track 
throughout its entire length, with a minimum nominal distance between 
track centerlines of 4.5 m (14.75 ft). Generally, each track will be 
used for a single direction of traffic, and trains will not overtake 
each other. The Railroad shall install crossover connections between 
the double track at each station, and at regular intervals along the 
line to permit flexibility in train operations, maintenance, and 
emergency rescue.
    (4) The Railroad's track shall consist of continuous welded rail 
that is shop-welded in continuous welded strings of approximately 396 m 
(1,300 ft.). Once installed, the rail will be field-welded to form one 
continuous track segment. The rail shall be nominal 130-pound rail, or 
equivalent.
    (5) The Railroad shall install concrete ties, nominally spaced at 
.6 m (23.6 in.) center-to-center.
    (6) The Railroad shall use ballast to support the track structure, 
as required by Subpart D of this Part. The Railroad shall use ballast 
that does not excessively degrade when used in combination with 
concrete ties. The ballast shall be of 20-60 mm (.8 to 2.4 in.) 
specification and layered to a nominal depth of .35 m (14 in.) under 
the ties.
    (7) The substructure layer shall consist of compacted sandy 
granular material, 20% maximum fines, layered to a depth selected on 
the basis of the prepared subgrade and ballast compatibility. The 
nominal depth of this layer will be .20 m (8 in.).
    (8) The formation layer shall consist of compacted granular sandy 
material, 15% maximum fines, layered to a depth selected on the basis 
of embankment and ballast compatibility. The nominal depth of this 
layer shall be .70 m (27.6 in.).
    (9) The embankment shall consist of compacted granular sandy 
material, 15% maximum fines, layered to a depth selected on the basis 
of embankment and ballast compatibility. The nominal depth of this 
layer will be .80 m (31.5 in.).
    (10) Excavated decomposed organic materials shall be replaced with 
compacted granular sandy materials, 20% maximum fines.
    (11) Mainline high speed movable frog turnouts shall be the same as 
those developed for and used on the TGV lines in France.
    (12) In yards and maintenance facilities, where operations will be 
at lower speeds, the Railroad shall install 50 kg/m (100 lb/yd) rail, a 
reduced ballast thickness of 25 cm (10 in.), and concrete or timber 
ties at turnouts with 50 kg/m (100 lb/yd) rail or equivalent.
    (e) Signal system. (1) The Railroad's signal system shall include 
an automatic train control system (ATC), interlocking equipment, 
wayside detectors, and centralized traffic control (CTC).
    (2) The Railroad's ATC shall be a transmission beacon-to-locomotive 
system, and shall interface with the interlocking system. The 
interlocking system shall generate movement authorizations, and the 
transmission beacon system will notify the power car and locomotive 
engineer of movement information.
    (3) The Railroad's ATC shall incorporate speed and distance-to-go 
principles; safety-based multiple processor architecture and on-board 
equipment; wayside encoders that send messages through the track 
beacons and short cable loops, and provide notifications of upcoming 
curves and gradients, distances to point, and speed restrictions; and 
on-board equipment that calculates the braking curve requirements with 
respect to the data received.
    (4) The Railroad's ATC shall provide continuous speed monitoring 
and interface with the train braking systems. The ATC shall initiate 
braking to control speed in the event the locomotive engineer exceeds 
the maximum authorized speed.
    (5) The on-board ATC computers shall be based on a two-out-of-three 
voting architecture. Operations shall be accomplished by the use of 
three processors that shall operate simultaneously.

[[Page 65539]]

    (6) The Railroad's ATC shall receive information from 
interlockings, that shall be transmitted to on-board equipment through 
track beacons and short cable loops. Track beacons shall transmit speed 
limit and line data for each block section. Cable loops shall be used 
for specific local information and, at the end of each block section, 
for permission to proceed.
    (7) Braking profiles shall be calculated in the on-board controller 
to comply with necessary speed limits and target points determined by 
the track profile and wayside equipment data.
    (8) Each block section will be denoted by a block section marker. 
On open line, block sections shall be equipped with one train detection 
system each. In areas managed by interlockings, the length of the 
section will vary according to the configuration of the line.
    (9) Track circuits shall be of two types:
    (i) Jointless audio frequency track circuits shall be used on the 
main line; in crossover areas, these circuits will be combined with 
sequential release logic in the interlocking controllers to ensure 
protection against poor wheel-rail contact on little-used rail; and
    (ii) Jointed high-voltage impulse track circuits shall be used in 
the yards and maintenance facilities.
    (10) The interlocking equipment shall:
    (i) interface with the wayside signal equipment, track circuits, 
switch machines, and wayside signals;
    (ii) Monitor all track circuits;
    (iii) Interface with the automatic train control system;
    (iv) Exchange supervisory control and status information with 
central control;
    (v) Provide local back-up control at each interlocking location; 
and
    (vi) Control switch machines and monitor devices used to verify 
switch position.
    (11) The vital logic processor module of the interlocking 
controller shall employ two processors that operate simultaneously in a 
redundant checking system architecture.
    (12) All wayside detectors shall interface with the train control 
system and be monitored from the central traffic control facility 
through the interlocking equipment.
    (13) The Railroad's central traffic control shall regulate, from a 
single point, all train routes and movements.
    (f) Communications. (1) The Railroad shall install a dedicated, 
fiber-optic communication system along the right-of-way to transmit 
data, telephone, and radio communications. To ensure transmission 
reliability, the system shall include back-up transmission routes.
    (2) For train operation and maintenance, the Railroad shall 
install:
    (i) A dedicated telephone system with fixed telephones and field 
sockets along the tracks, yards, and platforms;
    (ii) A portable radio system for maintenance and service use; and
    (iii) A train radio, which shall facilitate communication between 
each trainset and central control at any time.
    (g) Power distribution. (1) The Railroad shall install a 25 kV (60 
alternating current) overhead catenary electrification system.
    (2) The Railroad shall protect against local lightning conditions 
in the design and operation of the power distribution system.
    (3) All power substations located along the right-of-way shall be 
provided with remote control operating features that permit operation 
from a centrally-located control center.
    (4) Supervisory control equipment at remote locations and power 
substations shall have battery-powered back-up capability in the event 
of total utility service failure.
    (h) Rolling stock. (1) The Railroad's rolling stock shall be 
designed, operated, and maintained in accordance with the requirements 
set forth in Subpart E of this Part.
    (2) The Railroad's trainsets shall be bi-directional, articulated, 
fixed-consist trains with a power car at each end and eight passenger 
or trailer cars between the power cars. The power cars and trailer cars 
shall not be coupled together, but shall be semi-permanently connected 
into one unit that is capable of being disconnected only in a repair 
facility. The trailing and leading ends of each trainset shall be 
equipped with automatic couplers. The trailer cars shall be arranged so 
that adjacent car body ends are supported by a common truck. The end 
trailers shall be supported by a separate truck at the carbody end 
adjacent to the power car.
    (3) Each truck of a trainset shall be continuously monitored by on-
board computer while in operation to ensure proper function. The on-
board computer screen shall alert the locomotive engineer if 
malfunction occurs.
    (4) Each trainset shall be equipped with wheelslide control, 
independent trucks, and fault-tolerant braking.
    (5) All trainsets shall include operating smoke and fire detection 
systems.
    (6) The Railroad shall operate other rail vehicles for maintenance 
and rescue purposes, including a grinding train, a tamping lining 
machine, a track stabilizing machine, a track geometry measurement car 
or Mauzin car, a track acceleration measurement car or Melusine car, an 
ultrasonic test car to measure the integrity of the rails, a ballast-
plowing railway car, and electric and diesel locomotives for shunting 
and rescue purposes.
    (7) Each maintenance center and maintenance employee shall be fully 
equipped with tools, autonomous motorized railway motorized cars, and 
road vehicles needed for performance of duties required by this Part.
    (8) Each power car and trailer car shall incorporate crash energy 
management, and each power car shall contain a structural anti-
penetration wall ahead of the locomotive engineer cab, and energy 
absorbing structures at the front and rear of the car body.
    (9) The power cars shall be equipped with an alternating current 
propulsion system. Two self-commutated, synchronous traction motors on 
each truck of each power car shall provide maximum power at the wheel 
rims.
    (10) The locomotive engineer cab shall be arranged to enhance 
safety of operation, range of vision, visibility and readability of 
controls and indicators, accessibility of controls, climate control, 
noise control, engineer comfort and vigilance, and efficiency. The 
engineer's control stand shall be centrally located.
    (11) The Railroad's passenger equipment brake system shall meet the 
following standards:
    (i) Each trainset shall be equipped with a two-pipe, electro-
pneumatic brake system, which shall ensure that each truck respond 
independently to a brake demand from a reduction.
    (ii) The pressure in each brake pipe shall be controlled by the 
locomotive engineer's automatic brake valve in the leading cab. In the 
event of a failure of this device, a purely pneumatic control shall be 
available for use by the locomotive engineer.
    (iii) The maximum brake cylinder pressure shall vary depending on 
the speed range. At speeds above 200
km/h (125 mph), the maximum brake cylinder pressure will be reduced to 
avoid excessive demand of the adhesion.
    (iv) Independent of the automatic brake valve, the ATC, deadman 
control, two emergency brake valves located in each cab, and emergency 
brake valves located in two trailer cars, shall each be capable of 
producing a rapid and complete evacuation of the brake pipe and 
initiate an emergency application.
    (v) Each powered truck shall be independently controlled by the 
brake pipe, and shall have electric braking that is battery operated as 
a back-up in case of main power failure. The brake system shall perform 
so that the electric brake shall have priority action. The electric 
brake control shall be performed by the same electronic equipment that

[[Page 65540]]

controls the traction equipment on each truck. During emergency 
braking, electro-mechanical relays, independent of electronic control, 
shall check the level of electric braking and in case of failure, the 
friction brake shall be automatically applied at its maximum value. If 
the electronic equipment controlling the powered truck is out of 
service, friction braking shall be available in an emergency through a 
pneumatic application.
    (vi) The control of the powered truck electric brake shall be 
available to the locomotive engineer through the traction-braking 
master controller to slow the trainset or maintain speed down a 
gradient. This brake application shall be provided with an electric 
signal without any reduction in the brake pipe pressure.
    (vii) A separate microprocessor shall control the traction and the 
braking functions on each powered truck. Each microprocessor for the 
traction motor units shall be programmed so that the retarding force is 
distributed effectively between motors and air brake equipment. Each 
microprocessor shall also monitor the power dissipation in the 
rheostats.
    (viii) Each power car and trailer car shall be equipped with 
wheelslide protection.
    An anti-skid device for each truck shall be included in the 
traction system controls. The anti-skid function shall be controlled by 
a separate microprocessor for each power car truck. The anti-skid 
function for each truck shall be backed up a system that detects and 
notifies the engineer of nonrotating axles.
    (ix) Each trainset shall be equipped with an operative on-board 
detection system. During operation, all power equipment shall be 
continuously monitored by microprocessor. The detection system shall 
store all failures detected. Failures of the nature described in 
Sec. 243.425 of Subpart E of this Part shall appear on the display 
screen in the locomotive or power car cab.
    (x) The Railroad's system safety plan shall establish a maximum 
authorized speed and brake reduction matrix to address brake failures 
that occur in service or in passenger service. In the event of any 
brake failure on a trainset, the locomotive engineer shall reduce train 
speed to the maximum authorized speed for that failure, as established 
in the Railroad's safety system plan.
    (xi) The brake system on each trainset shall be designed and 
operated fail-safe. System redundancy and notification procedures shall 
ensure continuous monitoring and back-up in the event of failure.
    (12) Hot box detectors. The Railroad shall install and maintain hot 
box detectors along the length of the right-of-way that detect the 
journal bearing temperature of all moving rail equipment. The detectors 
shall be interconnected to the central traffic control and shall alert 
the Railroad and the locomotive engineer of defective equipment.


Sec. 243.15  Movement of defective equipment.

    (a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section 
and after departure in compliance with the daily inspection required by 
section 243.433(f)(1), a trainset with one or more conditions not in 
compliance with the list in section 243.433(f)(1) of this Part may be 
moved in revenue service only after the Railroad has complied with all 
of the following:
    (1) A qualified person determines that it is safe to move the 
trainset, consistent with the Railroad's operating rules developed and 
approved in accordance with the requirements of Subpart F of this Part;
    (2) The qualified person making the non-compliance determination 
notifies the locomotive engineer in charge of movement of the trainset 
and crew, in writing, that the trainset is non-complying, but safe to 
move, and of the maximum authorized speed, and any other restrictions 
that may apply; and
    (3) A tag bearing the words ``non-complying trainset'' and 
containing the following information, are securely attached to the 
control stand on each control cab of the trainset:
    (i) The trainset number;
    (ii) The name and signature of the qualified person making the non-
compliance determination;
    (iii) The location and date of the inspection that led to the non-
compliance determination;
    (iv) A description of each defect;
    (v) Movement restrictions, if any; and
    (vi) The authorized destination of the trainset.
    A copy of this tag may be used to provide the notification required 
by paragraph (a)(2) above.
    (b) A trainset that develops a non-complying condition en route may 
continue in revenue service, so long as the requirements of paragraph 
(a) are otherwise fully met, until the next daily inspection, 
examination in service, running gear inspection, wheel inspection, 
minor inspection, general inspection, or major inspection, whichever is 
required by this Part to occur first. Where en route defects or 
failures of the brake system occur, trainset movement shall be governed 
by section 243.409 of this Part.
    (c) A non-complying trainset, power car, or locomotive may be moved 
without passengers within a yard, at speeds not in excess of 16 km/h 
(10 mph), without meeting the requirements of paragraph (a) of this 
section where the movement is solely for the purpose of repair. The 
Railroad shall insure that the movement is made safely.

Subpart B--System Safety Program and Plan


Sec. 243.101  General system safety requirements.

    (a) One year after the date that this Part takes effect, the 
Railroad shall adopt a written system safety plan that describes the 
railroad's system safety program, using MIL-STD-882(C) as a guide. The 
Railroad shall submit the system safety plan to FRA for approval. The 
Railroad shall update the system safety plan as new information and 
knowledge concerning systems and equipment arise in the course of 
operations. The Railroad shall brief FRA's Associate Administrator for 
Safety annually on the status of the system safety program, including 
any changes proposed for the system safety plan.
    (b) The system safety plan shall describe the system safety program 
to be conducted as part of the Railroad's system design and 
construction process to ensure that the Railroad identifies, addresses, 
and documents all safety issues and Federal safety requirements. The 
system safety plan shall also describe the system safety program to be 
conducted as part of the operation, maintenance, and overhaul of all 
system components. The system safety plan shall take into account the 
operation of system components as they operate in isolation, as well as 
how they operate within the system. The system safety program shall 
ensure that safety issues are considered as important as cost and 
performance issues in the design, construction, operation, maintenance, 
and overhaul of the Railroad's system.
    (c) The system safety plan shall be the Railroad's principal safety 
document. It shall be used as guidance or, as applicable, as a 
requirement for the development and operation of the Railroad's system 
and subsystems. At a minimum, the system safety plan shall address:
    (1) Fire protection;
    (2) Software safety;
    (3) Inspection, testing, and maintenance;
    (4) Training and qualifications;
    (5) Emergency preparedness;
    (6) Pre-revenue service system qualification testing;

[[Page 65541]]

    (7) Hazard identification and reduction;
    (8) Operating procedures in the event of equipment that becomes 
defective while in passenger service;
    (9) Identification of safety-critical subsystems;
    (10) Relationships between safety-critical subsystems; and
    (11) Adequate staffing.
    (d) The system safety plan shall describe the approaches and 
processes to be used to:
    (1) Identify all safety requirements, including Federal 
requirements governing the design of passenger equipment and its 
supporting systems;
    (2) Evaluate the total system, including hardware, software, 
testing, and support activities, to identify known or potential safety 
hazards over the life cycle of the Railroad's system;
    (3) Identify safety issues during design reviews;
    (4) Eliminate or reduce the risk posed by the hazards identified;
    (5) Monitor the progress made toward resolving safety issues, 
reducing hazards, and meeting safety requirements; and
    (6) Develop a program of testing or analysis, or both, to 
demonstrate that safety requirements have been met.
    (e) As part of the system safety program, adequate documentation 
shall be maintained to audit how the design and operation of the 
Railroad's system meets safety requirements, and to monitor how safety 
issues are raised and resolved.
    (f) The system safety plan shall address how operational limits may 
be imposed on the use of the Railroad's system if the system design 
cannot meet certain safety requirements.
    (g) The Railroads shall make the system safety plan and 
documentation required by paragraph (e) of this section available for 
inspection and copying by FRA.


Sec. 243.103  Fire protection program.

    (a) As part of the system safety program, the Railroad shall 
include fire safety considerations and features in the design of the 
Railroad's system that reduce the risk of personal injury and equipment 
damage caused by fires on-board to a level established as acceptable in 
MIL-STD-882(C).
    (b) As part of the system safety program, the Railroad shall 
complete a detailed, written analysis of the fire protection problem. 
In conducting this analysis, the Railroad shall:
    (1) Ensure that good fire protection practice is used as part of 
the equipment design process;
    (2) Take effective steps to design equipment to be sufficiently 
fire resistant so that fire detection devices permit evacuation of the 
equipment before fire, smoke, or toxic fumes cause injury to a 
passenger or crew member;
    (3) Identify, analyze, and prioritize the fire hazards inherent in 
the design of equipment;
    (4) Document and explain how safety issues are resolved in relation 
to cost and performance in the design of equipment so that the risk of 
fire hazard is minimized;
    (5) Describe the analysis and tests necessary to demonstrate how 
the fire protection approach taken in the design of equipment will 
enable a train to meet the fire protection standards of this Subpart 
and of the Railroad's system safety plan;
    (6) Describe the analysis and tests necessary in order to select 
materials that will provide sufficient fire resistance to ensure 
adequate time for fire detection and safe evacuation;
    (7) Reasonably ensure that a ventilation system does not contribute 
to the lethality of a fire;
    (8) Identify in writing the trainset components that are a risk of 
initiating fire and which require overheat protection. As prescribed in 
Sec. 243.413(c), overheat detectors shall be installed in all 
components where the analysis determines that such equipment is 
necessary. If overheat protection is not provided for a component at 
risk of being a source of fire, the written rationale and justification 
for the decision shall be included as part of the system safety program 
documentation;
    (9) Identify in writing all unoccupied train compartments that 
contain equipment or material that pose a fire hazard, and analyze the 
benefit provided by including a fire or smoke detection system in each 
compartment identified. As prescribed in Sec. 243.413(d), fire or smoke 
detectors shall be installed in unoccupied compartments where the 
analysis determines that such equipment is necessary to ensure 
sufficient time for the safe evacuation of a train. The written 
analysis shall explain why a fire or smoke detector is not necessary, 
if the decision is made not to install one in any of the unoccupied 
compartments identified as a potential source of fire;
    (10) Perform an analysis of the occupied and unoccupied spaces 
which require portable fire extinguishers. The analysis shall include 
the proper type and size of fire extinguisher for each location;
    (11) Identify in writing all unoccupied train compartments that 
contain equipment or material that poses a fire hazard. On a case-by-
case basis, analyze the benefit provided by including a fixed, 
automatic fire-suppression system in each compartment identified. The 
type and size of the automatic fire-suppression system for each 
necessary application shall be determined. As prescribed in 
Sec. 243.413(e) a fixed, automatic fire suppression system shall be 
installed in unoccupied compartments where the analysis determines it 
is necessary and practical to ensure sufficient time for the safe 
evacuation of the train. The analysis shall provide the reasoning why a 
fixed, automatic fire-suppression system is not necessary or practical 
if the decision is made not to install one in any of the unoccupied 
compartments identified in the plan; and
    (12) Develop and adopt written procedures for the inspection, 
testing, and maintenance of all fire safety systems and equipment. As 
prescribed in Sec. 243.413(f), the Railroad shall comply with those 
procedures that it designates as mandatory.
    (c) The Railroad shall reasonably ensure that the design criteria 
is followed and that the tests required by the fire protection portion 
of the Railroad's system safety plan and program are performed.


Sec. 243.105  Software safety program.

    (a) The Railroad shall develop and maintain a software safety 
program to guide the design, development, testing, integration, and 
verification of computer programs used to control or monitor the 
Railroad's equipment, operations and systems.
    (b) The software safety program shall:
    (1) Treat system software that controls or monitors safety 
functions as safety-critical, unless a completely redundant, failsafe, 
non-software means to perform the same function is provided; and
    (2) Describe the following items, objectives, or tasks to ensure 
that safe, reliable, and impenetrable system software is used to 
monitor or perform safety functions:
    (i) The software design process to be used;
    (ii) The software design documentation to be produced;
    (iii) The software hazard analysis that will be performed, 
including a detailed explanation of the measures needed and taken by 
the Railroad to prevent the risk of penetration by unauthorized 
individuals or entities;
    (iv) The software safety reviews that will be performed;
    (v) The software hazard monitoring and tracking that will occur;
    (vi) The hardware and software integration safety tests that will 
be conducted; and

[[Page 65542]]

    (vii) The demonstration of overall software safety as part of the 
pre-revenue service tests of the Railroad's system.
    (c) The Railroad shall adhere to the design criteria, and perform 
the tests required by the software safety portion of the system safety 
program. To fulfill this obligation in part, the Railroad shall include 
software safety requirements in each of its contracts for the purchase 
of new equipment or new components of existing equipment that contain 
safety-critical software.
    (d) The Railroad shall use a formal safety methodology to develop 
electrical and electronic control systems that control safety 
functions. The safety methodology shall include a Failure Modes, 
Effects, Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and verification tests for all 
components of the control system and its interfaces, including computer 
software.
    (e) Safety-related control systems driven by computer software 
shall include hardware and software design features that result in a 
control system that fails safe.
    (f) The Railroad shall develop and comply with a comprehensive 
hardware and software integration program for safety-critical systems 
to ensure that the software functions as intended when installed in a 
hardware system identical to that to be used in service.
    (g) The Railroad shall follow the software safety procedures 
required by the software safety portion of the system safety program.


Sec. 243.107  Inspection, testing, and maintenance program.

    (a) General. The Railroad shall provide to FRA detailed 
information, consistent with the requirements of this rule and 
including those set forth in Sec. 243.433(a), Secs. 243.331 through 
243.347, and Secs. 243.258 through 243.279 of this Part, on the 
inspection, testing, and maintenance procedures necessary for the 
Railroad to safely operate its system. This information shall include a 
detailed description of:
    (1) Safety inspection procedures, intervals, and criteria;
    (2) Test procedures and intervals;
    (3) Scheduled preventive maintenance intervals;
    (4) Maintenance procedures; and
    (5) Special testing equipment or measuring devices required to 
perform safety inspections and tests.
     (b) General inspection, testing, and maintenance procedures. The 
inspection, testing, and maintenance program shall contain procedures 
that reasonably ensure that the Railroad's system is free from general 
conditions that endanger the safety of the crew, passengers, or 
equipment. This program shall include procedures to ensure that the 
system, all subsystems, and components are free from the following 
conditions that may endanger the safety of the crew, passengers, or 
equipment:
    (1) A continuous accumulation of oil or grease on the rolling 
stock;
    (2) Improper functioning of any component in the track, signal, 
rolling stock, or communication systems;
    (3) A crack, break, excessive wear, structural defect, or weakness 
of a component in the track, signal, or rolling stock systems;
    (4) A leak in any portion of the rolling stock;
    (5) Use of a component or system under a condition that exceeds the 
design capabilities of that component or system; and
    (6) Insecure attachment of a component of the track, signal or 
rolling stock systems.
    (c) Maintenance intervals. Initial scheduled maintenance intervals 
should be based on analysis completed as part of the system safety 
program. The intervals should be changed only when justified by 
accumulated, verifiable operating data, and approved in conjunction 
with the system safety plan approval.
    (d) Standard procedures for safely performing inspection, testing, 
and maintenance, or repairs. The Railroad shall establish written 
standard procedures for performing all safety-critical or potentially 
hazardous inspection, testing, maintenance, and repair tasks. These 
standard procedures shall be available to FRA upon request and shall:
    (1) Describe in detail each step required to safely perform the 
task;
    (2) Describe the knowledge necessary to safely perform the task;
    (3) Describe any precautions that shall be taken to safely perform 
the task;
    (4) Describe the use of any safety equipment necessary to perform 
the task;
    (5) Be approved by the Railroad's official responsible for safety;
    (6) Be enforced by the Railroad's supervisors responsible for 
accomplishing the tasks; and
    (7) Be reviewed annually by the Railroad.


Sec. 243.109  Training, qualification, and designation program.

    The Railroad shall adopt and comply with a training, qualification, 
and designation program for employees and contractors that perform 
emergency preparedness tasks or safety-related inspections, tests, or 
maintenance duties on the Railroad's system. This program shall meet 
the minimum requirements set forth in Subpart H of this Part, and it 
shall be submitted to FRA for approval as part of the Railroad's system 
safety plan.


Sec. 243.111  Emergency Preparedness Program.

    The Railroad shall develop, adopt, and implement an emergency 
preparedness plan that complies with the requirements of FRA's proposed 
Passenger Train Emergency Standards as ultimately codified in 49 CFR 
part 239, as amended.


Sec. 243.113  Pre-revenue service system qualification testing plan.

    The Railroad shall submit a pre-revenue service qualification 
testing plan, as part of the system safety plan, prior to testing the 
system. The pre-revenue service qualification testing plan shall cover 
all systems, including the signal, communication, infrastructure and 
track, rolling stock, software, and operating practices systems. The 
testing plan shall include all of the elements required by Subpart G of 
this Part and shall be approved in conjunction with the Railroad's 
system safety plan, prior to commencement of testing.


Sec. 243.115  Hazard identification and reduction.

    (a) The Railroad shall include in its system safety program, an 
identification of all hazards that may arise in the system, which shall 
be reduced to writing and available for review and copying by FRA.
    (b) The Railroad shall include in its system safety program, a 
written analysis of how the identified safety hazards may be reduced or 
eliminated through design, construction, equipment, or operations. 
Through system safety analysis, the Railroad shall choose the reduction 
or elimination method most appropriate for the safety of the system. A 
solution based in operations shall be discouraged. The Railroad's 
written analysis shall be available for review and copying by FRA.


Sec. 243.117  Operating procedures in the event of component failures.

    (a) The Railroad shall include in its system safety program 
consideration of appropriate operating procedures in the event that 
rolling stock or any other system component becomes defective while in 
passenger service. The Railroad's system safety program shall include, 
at a minimum, appropriate operating procedures for all major component 
failures under all potential

[[Page 65543]]

operating conditions; a description of the limits of the fault 
tolerance for each fault-tolerant system; and the development of a 
process by which the Railroad and any locomotive engineer operating a 
trainset will become aware that a system is approaching the limits of 
its fault tolerance before those limits are reached or surpassed.
    (b) As part of the system safety program, the Railroad shall 
complete a written explanation of the considerations completed under 
paragraph (a). The Railroad's written explanation shall be available 
for review and copying by FRA.


Sec. 243.119  Safety-critical subsystems.

    The Railroad shall include in its system safety program an 
identification of all safety-critical subsystems. The Railroad shall 
also prepare an explanation of the relationship between all safety-
critical subsystems. The Railroad's written identification and 
explanation shall be available for review and copying by FRA.


Sec. 243.121  Approval procedure.

    (a) General. The following procedures govern consideration and 
action upon requests for approval of the Railroad's system safety plan 
and safety-critical changes to the Railroad's existing system safety 
plan.
    (b) Petitions for approval. The Railroad's petition for approval of 
the system safety plan, or petition for approval of safety-critical 
changes to the system safety plan shall contain--
    (1) The name, title, address, and telephone number of the 
Railroad's primary person to be contacted with regard to review of the 
petition;
    (2) The system safety plan proposed, in detail, which addresses the 
Railroad's entire system as described in this Part; and
    (3) In the case of the Railroad's initial petition for approval, 
appropriate data or analysis, or both, establishing that the system 
safety plan will provide a high level of safety; and in the case of 
petitions for approval of safety-critical changes to the system safety 
plan, data or analysis, or both, which establishes that the requested 
change(s) provides an equivalent or greater level of safety than 
provided in the Railroad's previous system safety plan.
    (c) Service. The Railroad's petition for approval under paragraph 
(b) of this section shall be submitted in triplicate to the Associate 
Administrator for Safety, FRA, 400 7th Street, S.W., Stop 25, 
Washington, D.C. 20590.
    (d) Disposition of petition. (1) If FRA finds that the petition 
complies with the requirements of this section and that the proposed 
plan is acceptable or proposed changes are justified, the petition 
shall be granted, normally within 90 days of its receipt. If the 
petition is neither granted nor denied within 90 days, the petition 
remains pending for decision. FRA may attach special conditions to the 
approval of the petition. Following the approval of a petition, FRA may 
reopen consideration of the petition for cause stated.
    (2) If FRA finds that the petition does not comply with the 
requirements of this section and that the proposed plan is not 
acceptable or that the proposed changes are not justified, the petition 
shall be denied, normally within 90 days of its receipt.
    (3) When FRA grants or denies a petition, or reopens consideration 
of the petition, written notice shall be sent to the petitioner.
    (e) Publication of Changes. If FRA determines that changes to 
safety-critical standards, procedures, or inspection frequencies set 
forth in this rule are justified, the Administrator shall publish in 
the Federal Register a notice which explains those changes. The changes 
to the Railroad's system safety plan shall take effect 60 days after 
publication of such notice.

Subpart C--Signal System

General


Sec. 243.201  Plans, where kept.

    As required for maintenance, plans shall be kept at all 
interlockings and intermediate track circuit cases. Plans shall be 
legible and correct.


Sec. 243.202  Grounds.

    Each circuit, the functioning of which affects the safety of train 
operations, shall be kept free of any ground or combination of grounds 
which will permit a flow of current equal to or in excess of 75 percent 
of the release value of any relay or other electromagnetic device in 
the circuit, except circuits which include any track rail and except 
the common return wires of single-wire, single-break, signal control 
circuits using a grounded common, and alternating current power 
distribution circuits which are grounded in the interest of safety.


Sec. 243.203  Locking of signal apparatus housings.

    Signal apparatus housings shall be secured against unauthorized 
entry.


Sec. 243.204  Design of control circuits on the failsafe principle.

    The failure of a safety-critical control circuit shall not cause a 
condition more permissive than intended. Safety-critical circuits shall 
be designed on the failsafe principle.


Sec. 243.205  Power-operated switch use.

    All switch movements shall be operated by power-operated electric 
switch machines. Hand-operated switches are prohibited in territory 
controlled by ATC.


Sec. 243.206  Yard operations.

    Yard operations shall be controlled through the traffic control 
center for the yard, and movements in the yard shall be made at 
restricted speed. Relevant provisions of 49 CFR 236.1 through 236.109 
shall apply to signals that are used in yard operations.


Sec. 243.207  Timetable instructions.

    Interlockings, automatic train control territory, and yard limits 
shall be designated in timetable instructions.

Wayside and Cab Signals


Sec. 243.208  Location of wayside signals.

    Each wayside signal shall be positioned and aligned so that its 
aspects can be visually associated with the track it governs.


Sec. 243.209  Aspects and indications.

    (a) Aspects of wayside signals shall be shown by the color of 
lights, position of lights, flashing of lights, or any combination 
thereof. They may be qualified by marker plate, number plate, letter 
plate, marker light, or any combination thereof.
    (b) The fundamental indications of wayside signal aspects shall 
conform to the following:
    (1) A red light or a series of horizontal lights shall be used to 
indicate stop; and
    (2) A yellow light or a lunar light shall be used to indicate that 
speed is to be restricted and stop may be required.
    (3) A green light or a series of vertical lights shall be used to 
indicate proceed at authorized speed.
    (c) The names, indications, and aspects of wayside and cab signals 
shall be defined in the Railroad's Operating Rule Book or Special 
Instructions. Modifications shall be filed with the FRA within thirty 
days after such modifications become effective.
    (d) The absence of a qualifying appurtenance or the failure of a 
lamp in a light signal shall not cause the display of a less 
restrictive aspect than intended.
    (e) Cab display:
    (1) The aspects of the cab display shall include:
    (i) the maximum authorized speed, shown by a bar-graph or a needle 
in periphery of the dial used for the indication of train speed;

[[Page 65544]]

    (ii) the target speed, shown by numbers; and
    (iii) the target distance corresponding to the indicated target 
speed, shown by a continuously refreshed bar-graph and numbers in case 
of overflow of the bar-graph.
    (2) [Reserved]
    (f) All bar-graphs and numbers shall be illuminated well enough to 
read clearly in all lighting conditions in which the equipment will be 
used.


Sec. 243.210  Markers.

    (a) Block section markers and route origin markers shall be 
provided on high speed lines.
    (b) Block section limits shall be indicated by marker plates 
installed along the right-of-way. The markers shall be located at 
adjoining block sections. Marker plates shall be illuminated for train 
operations that occur between one hour before sunset and one hour after 
sunrise, and during all other hours when weather conditions restrict 
visibility.
    (c) Where route origin markers are used, the markers shall be 
located at the beginning of each route and each shall be equipped with 
a proceed light.
    (d) Special shunting markers shall be provided at locations not 
equipped with route origin markers where turn-back operations may be 
required. Each such marker shall be equipped with a shunting light.


Sec. 243.211  Spacing of beacons.

    The ATC system and beacon spacing shall be designed and operate 
such that:
    (a) The locomotive engineer can comply with any imposed speed 
restriction through the use of a service brake application;
    (b) if the locomotive engineer fails to react appropriately in 
response to speed restrictions or other safety-critical information 
conveyed, the safety of the trainset shall be ensured by an automatic 
brake application.

Track Circuits


Sec. 243.212  Track circuit requirements.

    (a) The track relay controlling home signals or beacons shall be in 
de-energized position, or a device that functions as a track relay 
controlling home signals or beacons shall be in its most restrictive 
state, and the track circuit shall be de-energized where any of the 
following conditions exist:
    (1) When a rail is broken or a rail or switch-frog is removed. It 
shall not be a violation of this requirement if a track circuit is 
energized:
    (i) When a break occurs between the end of rail and track circuit 
connector; within the limits of rail-joint bond, appliance or other 
protective device, which provides a bypath for the electric current, 
or;
    (ii) As a result of leakage current or foreign current in the rear 
of a point where a break occurs.
    (2) When any portion of a trainset occupies any part of a track 
circuit.
    (b) [Reserved]


Sec. 243.213  Track circuit shunting sensitivity.

    Each track circuit controlling a home signal shall be maintained so 
that the track relay is in a de-energized position, or a device that 
functions as a track relay shall be in its most restrictive state if, 
when the track circuit is dry, a shunt is connected across the track 
rails of the circuit, including fouling sections of turnouts. The 
electric resistance of the shunt shall be:
    (a) 0.15 Ohm on open track, for use with a ballast of 8 Ohm per 
kilometer (0.62 mi) resistance.
    (b) 0.25 Ohm in interlocking areas, for use with a ballast of 8 Ohm 
per kilometer (0.62 mi) resistance.


Sec. 243.214  Insulated rail joints.

    Insulated rail joints shall be maintained in a condition to prevent 
the failure of any track circuit due to track circuit current that 
flows between insulated rails.


Sec. 243.215  Fouling Wires.

    Fouling wires shall consist of at least two discrete conductors, 
and each shall be of sufficient conductivity and maintained in such 
condition that the track relay will be in de-energized position, or 
device that functions as a track relay will be in its most restrictive 
state, when the circuit is shunted.


Sec. 243.216  Turnout, fouling section.

    Rail joints within the fouling section shall be bonded, and fouling 
section shall extend at least to a point where sufficient track centers 
and allowance for maximum car overhang and width will prevent 
interference with trainset movement on an adjacent track.

Wires and Cables


Sec. 243.217  Protection of insulated wire; splice in underground wire; 
aerial cable.

    Insulated wire shall be protected from mechanical injury. The 
insulation shall not be punctured for test purposes. A splice in 
underground wire shall have insulation resistance at least equal to the 
wire spliced. Aerial cable shall be supported by messenger.


Sec. 243.218  Tagging of wires and interference of wires or tags with 
signal apparatus.

    Each wire shall be tagged or otherwise so marked that it can be 
identified at each terminal. Tags and other marks of identification 
shall be made of insulating material and so arranged that tags and 
wires do not interfere with moving parts of apparatus.

Standards


Sec. 243.219  Control circuits; requirements.

    The circuits shall be so installed that each signal or beacon which 
governs train movements into a block section will convey its most 
restrictive state as long as any of the following conditions exist 
within the block:
    (a) Occupancy by any portion of a trainset;
    (b) When points of a switch are not closed in proper position; or
    (c) When a track relay is in de-energized position or a device 
which functions as a track relay is in its most restrictive state; or 
when signal control circuit is de-energized.


Sec. 243.220  Control circuits for signals, selection through point 
detector operated by switch movement.

    The control circuit for each signal aspect or beacon, which conveys 
an indication more favorable than ``proceed at restricted speed'' for a 
signal governing movement(s) over switches, shall be selected through a 
point detector operated directly by switch points for each switch, 
movable-point frog, and derail in the routes governed by such signal or 
beacon. Circuits shall be arranged so that such a signal or beacon can 
convey an indication more favorable than ``proceed at restricted 
speed'' only when each switch, movable-point frog, and derail in the 
route is in proper position.


Sec. 243.221  Time locking; where required.

    Time locking shall be provided in conjunction with signal aspects 
or beacons which convey indications more favorable than ``proceed at 
restricted speed''. Time locking shall be provided for all interlocking 
signals where route or direction of traffic can be changed.


Sec. 243.222  Indication locking.

    Indication locking shall be provided for switches, movable-point 
frogs and derails.


Sec. 243.223  Electric locking circuits.

    Vital design methods in interlocking circuitry shall prevent 
``proceed'' aspects from being displayed for conflicting movements.

[[Page 65545]]

Sec. 243.224  Loss of shunt protection; where required.

    A loss of shunt protection shall not permit the release of the 
route locking circuit of each power-operated switch. The loss of shunt 
protection shall be based on a sequential release logic. Sequential 
release logic requires that when any track circuit becomes occupied in 
logical sequence from a previous track circuit, in combination with an 
established train route, its status will not be allowed to return to 
unoccupied, even though the detected shunt may be lost, until a 
specified safe time interval after the next track circuit in the route 
becomes occupied.


Sec. 243.225  Signal control circuits, selection through track relays 
or devices functioning as track relays.

    The control circuits for signal aspects or beacons which convey 
indications more favorable than ``proceed at restricted speed'' shall 
be selected through track relays, or through devices that function as 
track relays, for all track circuits in the route governed.


Sec. 243.226  Switch, movable-point frog or split-point derail.

    A switch, movable-point frog, or split-point derail shall be 
equipped with clamp locks and shall be maintained so that it cannot be 
locked when the point is open 6 mm (.25 in) or more.


Sec. 243.227  Point detector.

    Point detectors shall be maintained so that when switch mechanisms 
are locked in normal or reverse position, contacts cannot be opened by 
manually applying force at the closed switch point. Point detector 
circuit controllers shall be maintained so that the contacts will not 
assume the position corresponding to switch point closure if the switch 
point is prevented by an obstruction from closing to within 6 mm (0.25 
in).


Sec. 243.228  Signals controlled by track circuits.

    The control circuits for aspects with indications more favorable 
than ``proceed at restricted speed'' shall be controlled by track 
circuits extending through the entire block.


Sec. 243.229  Circuits at interlocking.

    Circuits at an interlocking shall be so interconnected that aspects 
to proceed cannot be displayed simultaneously for conflicting 
movements.


Sec. 243.230  Signals at adjacent interlockings.

    Signals at adjacent interlockings shall be so interconnected that 
aspects to proceed on tracks signaled for movements at greater than 
restricted speed cannot be displayed simultaneously for conflicting 
movements.


Sec. 243.231  Track signaled for movements in both directions, change 
of direction of traffic.

    On track signaled for movements in both directions, occupancy of 
the track between opposing signals at adjacent interlockings shall 
prevent changing the direction of traffic from that which was obtained 
at the time the track became occupied.


Sec. 243.232  Route locking.

    Route locking shall be provided at all interlockings where power-
operated switches are located.


Sec. 243.233  Wayside detectors.

    (a) All wayside detectors, including flood, wind, hot box, fall 
intrusion, intrusion, and dragging equipment detection systems, shall 
be linked to the central traffic control system or to the signaling 
system, or both.
    (b) The Railroad shall design and implement the wayside detection 
systems so that any detection of a potentially unsafe condition will be 
immediately conveyed to the central traffic control system or to the 
signaling system, or both.
    (c) Fall intrusion detectors. The Railroad shall install fall 
intrusion detectors at all highway, animal, and non-Railroad equipment 
overpasses and underpasses. Fall intrusion detectors shall be activated 
when the network of protective wiring located at each overpass and 
underpass experiences a partial or complete break. The fall intrusion 
detectors' data output shall be transmitted to the central traffic 
control facility such that sensor information is continuously available 
to Railroad operations personnel. The Railroad's system safety plan 
shall list all locations where fall intrusion detectors are installed, 
and shall set forth the actions to be taken when specific conditions 
are detected.
    (d) Intrusion detectors. The Railroad shall install a wayside 
intrusion detection system in the protective fencing along the Railroad 
right-of-way that shall restrict, to the maximum extent possible, all 
non-Railroad intrusion. The wayside intrusion detection system shall be 
installed at each location identified by the system safety plan as an 
area where intrusion is likely to occur. This system shall be connected 
to the Railroad's signal system and to the central traffic control 
system, and shall alert the Railroad when an intrusion occurs. The 
Railroad's system safety plan shall explain in detail where intrusion 
is likely to occur and why, and set forth specific actions to be taken 
by the Railroad when intrusion occurs.
    (e) Dragging equipment detectors. The Railroad shall install 
dragging equipment detectors at all locations where underframe repair 
or maintenance work is performed, including locations where maintenance 
facility track joins the main line, and at other locations determined 
necessary by the system safety plan. The dragging equipment detector 
data output shall be transmitted to the central traffic control 
facility such that sensor information is continuously available to 
railroad operations personnel. The Railroad's system safety plan shall 
explain in detail where dragging equipment is likely to occur and why, 
and shall set forth specific actions to be taken by the Railroad when 
such dragging equipment is detected.
    (f) Flood detectors. The Railroad shall install flood detectors 
along the right-of-way where determined necessary by the system safety 
plan, taking into account factors of drainage, culverts, bridges, 
overpasses, underpasses, and flood plain status. The flood detection 
system shall notify the signal system and central traffic control of 
any location where an accumulation of water exists in the right-of-way 
that may present a risk to a right-of-way structure, in service 
equipment, or passenger service equipment. The Railroad's system safety 
plan shall include specific actions to be taken when such water is 
detected.
    (g) Wind detectors. The Railroad shall install wind detectors along 
the right-of-way where determined necessary by the system safety plan, 
taking into account area wind and weather patterns, topography, and 
proximity to large bodies of water. This wind speed data output shall 
be transmitted to the central traffic control facility such that sensor 
information is continuously available to Railroad operations personnel. 
The Railroad's system safety plan shall explain in detail the locations 
chosen for wind detectors and why; list the speeds and conditions at 
which operational safety is compromised; and set forth specific actions 
to be taken when those wind speeds are detected.
    (h) Hot box detectors. The Railroad shall install and maintain hot 
box detectors along the length of the right-of-way that detect the 
journal bearing temperature of all moving rail equipment. Wayside 
detectors shall be arranged so as to check the journal bearing 
temperature on both sides of the trains, on each track. Detectors shall 
be located at intervals not to exceed 40 km

[[Page 65546]]

(25 mi). Hot box detectors shall be linked to the signal system to 
alert the locomotive engine or the central traffic control system, or 
both, depending on the level of the overheating, so that proper action 
will be taken by the Railroad. The hot box detector system shall 
include a tiered alarm system, as set forth below, to ensure that 
appropriate action accompanies journal box overheating.
    (1) Danger alarms shall alert the Railroad when any journal box or 
journal box component fails in operation, which shall cause the 
defective train to stop at a designated block marker, and shall cause 
all passing trains to slow to a speed not in excess of 80 km/hr or 50 
mph;
    (2) Simple alarms shall alert the Railroad when journal box 
overheating that is likely to compromise safety occurs, which shall 
cause the defective trainset to reach the next siding where it shall be 
parked and inspected prior to resuming operations; and
    (3) Inspection threshold alarms shall alert the Railroad when the 
temperature of the journal bearing is significantly higher than the 
average temperature taken on the other journal bearings. This alarm 
shall be transmitted to the central maintenance facility and the 
appropriate inspection and repair shall be completed.
    The Railroad shall develop the hot box detection system in 
conjunction with the system safety plan, and shall explain in detail 
the location of the detectors and the temperatures that trigger 
corresponding remedial measures.


Sec. 243.234  Protection of maintenance-of-way personnel.

    To protect maintenance-of-way personnel, the signaling system shall 
include circuitry to lock-out particular block sections and restrict 
the speed of passing trains on these block sections or adjacent 
trackage. The Railroad shall develop signal Operating Rules, as 
required in section 6 of this rule, in accordance with this 
requirement.


Sec. 243.235  ATC device installation.

    Each power vehicle capable of being the lead vehicle in a trainset 
shall be equipped with an automatic train control (ATC) device which 
shall be operative at all times the trainset operates at a speed of 
more than 32 km/h (20 mph).


Sec. 243.236  Forestalling device and speed control.

    (a) The ATC system shall be so arranged that if the authorization 
to proceed is not received from the wayside equipment and the train has 
reached the limit of its authorized progression, the trainset will be 
brought to a complete stop. The system shall not allow movement except 
upon the operation of an acknowledging device, and then only at slow 
speed until an authorization to proceed is received by the onboard 
train control device.
    (b) The ATC system shall include the following features:
    (1) Braking supervision, requiring the train to proceed at a speed 
ensuring compliance with the target speed at the target distance.
    (2) Maximum speed supervision, effecting an automatic brake 
application whenever the maximum speed limit is exceeded.


Sec. 243.237  Cab signal indication in accordance with maximum speed 
limit.

    While providing maximum speed supervision, the ATC system shall 
provide a cab signal indication of the maximum authorized speed.


Sec. 243.238  Automatic brake application; initiation when the maximum 
speed limit is exceeded.

    The ATC system shall operate to initiate an automatic brake 
application when the speed of the train exceeds the maximum speed 
intervention curve. The automatic brake application can be interrupted 
by the locomotive engineer only when the speed of the train is lower 
than the maximum authorized speed. Absent intervention by the engineer, 
an automatic brake application shall bring the train to a speed of less 
than maximum authorized speed. Mere acknowledgment by the engineer does 
not constitute intervention.


Sec. 243.239  Advance cab signal indication.

    The ATC system shall provide a cab signal indication of the target 
speed and distance before commencing the braking supervision, thus 
allowing the locomotive engineer to respond by a manual brake 
application.


Sec. 243.240  Automatic brake application initiated by the ATC.

    In the absence of an appropriate response to a cab display 
indication on the part of the locomotive engineer, the ATC system shall 
initiate an automatic brake application to ensure compliance with 
target speed and target distance. The automatic brake application can 
be interrupted by the engineer only when the speed of the train is 
lower than the maximum authorized speed. Absent intervention by the 
engineer, an automatic brake application shall bring the train to a 
speed of less than maximum authorized speed. Mere acknowledgment by the 
engineer does not constitute intervention.


Sec. 243.241  Cab signal indication after authorization to enter a 
block section where conditions defined in Sec. 243.219 exist.

    (a) If a trainset is authorized to enter a block section in which 
any condition listed in Sec. 243.219 of this Part exists, the ATC 
system shall display an indication to ``Proceed at Restricted Speed'.
    (b) If the restricted speed is exceeded, the ATC shall initiate an 
automatic brake application. Absent intervention by the engineer, an 
automatic brake application shall bring the train to a speed of less 
than maximum authorized speed. Mere acknowledgment by the engineer does 
not constitute intervention.


Sec. 243.242  Audible indicator.

    The audible cab indicator shall have two distinctive sounds as 
noted in (a) and (b) below, and be clearly audible throughout the cab 
under all operating conditions.
    (a) When the cab display changes, the audible indicator shall sound 
briefly (for approximately 0.5 seconds) to draw the engineer's 
attention to the change.
    (b) An audible warning shall sound before an automatic brake 
application is initiated. The warning shall be given in sufficient time 
to allow the engineer and the train brake equipment to respond to the 
change. The indicator shall sound continuously until the warning 
condition disappears.


Sec. 243.243  Delay time.

    The delay time of the ATC train-borne equipment shall be such as to 
ensure that the trainset shall comply with the target speed and 
distance through the brake application initiated by the system.


Sec. 243.244  Automatic brake application; full service.

    An automatic brake application initiated by the ATC system shall 
cause a full service application of the brakes.


Sec. 243.245  Interference with application of brakes by means of brake 
valve.

    The ATC apparatus shall be so arranged as not to interfere with the 
application of the brakes by means of the brake valve and not to impair 
the efficiency of the brake system.


Sec. 243.246  Control from lead vehicle.

    Each trainset shall be controlled and operated from the lead 
vehicle. Each lead vehicle shall be equipped with an ATC device. This 
device shall have a fail-safe and fault tolerant architecture, such as 
a two-out-of-three voting architecture.

[[Page 65547]]

Sec. 243.247  Proper operative relation between parts along roadway and 
parts on power car.

    ATC track-side and power car components shall be designed and shall 
operate in compatibility under all conditions of speed, weather, wear, 
oscillation, and shock.


Sec. 243.248  Visibility of cab signals.

    The cab signals shall be plainly visible to the locomotive crew or 
power car crew from their stations in the cab.


Sec. 243.249  Power supply.

    The ATC system shall operate from a separate or isolated power 
supply.


Sec. 243.250  Seal, where required.

    A seal shall be maintained on any device other than the brake-pipe 
cut-out cock (double-heading cock), by means of which the operation of 
the pneumatic portion of the automatic train-control apparatus can be 
cut out.


Sec. 243.251  Rate of pressure reduction; equalizing reservoir or brake 
pipe.

    The equalizing-reservoir pressure or brake-pipe pressure reduction 
during an automatic brake application shall be at a rate not less than 
that which results from a manual service application.


Sec. 243.252  Restrictions imposed when device fails and/or is cut out 
en route.

    (a) When the ATC system fails or is cut out en route, the train may 
proceed at restricted speed to the next available point of 
communication or siding, where a report must be made to a designated 
officer. An ATC system failure may result from a variety of conditions; 
for purposes of this Subpart, the failure of two or more of the on-
board processors will be considered an ATC failure. Where an absolute 
block is established in advance of the train on which the device is 
inoperative, the train may proceed at a speed not to exceed 127 km/h 
(79 mph).
    (b) Where an ATC system fails or is cut out en route, the Railroad 
shall test the ATC and record the results in accordance with 
Secs. 243.276 and 243.278, and determine that the ATC is fully 
operative before the trainset leaves its next initial terminal.


Sec. 243.253  The trackage.

    The trackage over which the Railroad operates trains in revenue 
service shall be completely equipped with wayside equipment designed to 
interface with and provide safety control commands to the lead vehicle 
of trainsets which operate over that trackage. Signaling beacons and 
antennas shall be installed and maintained in accordance with 
manufacturer's specifications.


Sec. 243.254  Cut out of the ATC system.

    Any cut out of the ATC system or activation of the acknowledging 
device shall be registered in the on-board event recorder.

Reporting Requirements


Sec. 243.255  Accidents resulting from signal failure.

    The occurrence of an accident/incident arising from the failure of 
an appliance, device, method or system to function or indicate as 
required by this rule that results in a more favorable aspect than 
intended or other conditions hazardous to the movement of a train, 
shall be reported within 24 hours to the FRA by toll free telephone 
number, 800-424-0201.


Sec. 243.256  Signal failure reports.

    Each failure of an appliance, device, method, or system to function 
or indicate as required by this rule that results in a more favorable 
aspect than intended or other condition hazardous to the movement of a 
train shall be reported to the FRA within five days from the date of 
occurrence. Form FRA F6180-14, ``Signal Failure Report,'' shall be used 
for this purpose and completed in accordance with instructions printed 
on the form.


Sec. 243.257  Annual signal systems report.

    The Railroad shall file an annual report with FRA which details the 
signal system configuration and operation, on a form provided by FRA in 
accordance with instructions and definitions on the reverse side of the 
form. The report shall be filed annually on or before April 1 of each 
year.

Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance


Sec. 243.258  General.

    The Inspection, Testing and Maintenance program shall be designed 
to ensure that the safety of the railroad's signaling system does not 
deteriorate over time, in accordance with Sec. 243.107 of this Part.


Sec. 243.259  Interference with normal functioning of device.

    Inspection, testing and maintenance shall not interfere with or 
alter the normal functioning of any signal device except after measures 
are in place to provide for the safety of train operations that depend 
on normal functioning of such device. Where interference or alteration 
has occurred, the device must be functioning normally before train 
operations dependent on such functioning resume.


Sec. 243.260  Operating characteristics of electromagnetic, electronic, 
or electrical apparatus.

    Signal apparatus, the functioning of which affects the safety of 
train operations, shall be maintained in accordance with the limits 
within which the device is designed to operate.


Sec. 243.261  Adjustment, repair, or replacement of component.

    When any component of a signal system, the proper functioning of 
which is essential to the safety of train operation, fails to perform 
its intended signaling function or is not in correspondence with known 
operating conditions, the cause shall be determined and the faulty 
component adjusted, repaired or replaced without undue delay.


Sec. 243.262  Purpose of inspection and tests; removal from service of 
a relay or device failing to meet test requirements.

    Inspections and tests shall be made in accordance with 
specifications of the Railroad, subject to approval by FRA in 
conjunction with the System Safety Plan set forth in Subpart B, to 
determine if the equipment is maintained in the proper condition to 
perform its intended function. Any electronic device, relay, or other 
electromagnetic device which fails to meet the requirements of 
specified tests shall be removed from service, and shall not be 
restored to service until its operating characteristics are in 
accordance with the limits within which such device or relay is 
designed to operate.


Sec. 243.263  Point detector test.

    Point detectors operated by power-operated switch movement shall be 
tested at least once every three months.


Sec. 243.264  Relays; microprocessor testing.

    (a) Each safety-critical, train-borne ATC relay shall be tested at 
least once each year.
    (b) Each safety-critical, wayside relay shall be tested at least 
once every four years.
    (c) Each safety-critical, train-borne electronic subsystem which is 
not verified internally on a continuous basis shall be tested at least 
once each year.
    (d) Each safety-critical, train-borne electronic subsystem in which 
proper operation is verified internally in a closed loop fashion shall 
not require periodic tests.
    (e) Each safety-critical wayside electronic subsystem which is not 
verified internally on a continuous basis shall be tested at least once 
every two years.
    (f) Each safety-critical wayside electronic subsystem, in which 
proper

[[Page 65548]]

operation is verified internally in a closed loop fashion, shall not 
require periodic tests.


Sec. 243.265  Ground tests.

    (a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) below, a test for 
grounds on each safety-critical energy bus furnishing power to circuits 
shall be made at least once every three months.
    (b) The provisions of this section 315 shall not apply to track 
circuit wires, common return wires of grounded common single-break 
circuits, or alternating current power distribution circuits grounded 
in the interest of safety.
    (c) Periodic ground tests are not required if ground detection 
devices are properly functioning, or if the design of circuits is such 
that a grounded energy bus could not impact the safety of train 
operation. An inspection of each ground detection device to ensure 
proper operation of such device shall be made at least once every three 
months.


Sec. 243.266  Insulation resistance tests; wires in trunking and 
cables.

    (a) Insulation resistance of wires and cables, except conductors 
connected directly to track rails, shall be tested when wires, cables, 
and insulation are dry. Insulation resistance tests shall be made 
between all conductors and ground, and between conductors in each 
multiple conductor cable, and between conductors in trunking, when 
wires or cables are installed and at least once every 10 years.
    (b) In no case shall a circuit be permitted to function on a 
conductor having an insulation resistance to ground or between 
conductors of less than 200,000 ohms.


Sec. 243.267  Time releases, timing relays, and timing devices.

    Time releases, timing relays, and timing devices shall be tested at 
least once each year. The timing shall be maintained at not less than 
90 percent of the predetermined time interval, which shall be shown on 
the plans or marked on the time release, timing relay, or timing 
device. Where time releases are an integral part of a safety-critical, 
processor-based controller and are specified in the applications 
program, such intervals shall be tested only at the time of 
installation and whenever a change is made in the applications program.


Sec. 243.268  Time locking.

    Where time locking is an integral part of a safety-critical, 
processor-based controller and is specified in the applications 
program, such locking shall be tested at the time of installation and 
whenever a change is made in the applications program.


Sec. 243.269  Route locking.

    Where route locking is an integral part of a safety-critical, 
processor based controller and is specified in the applications 
program, such locking shall be tested at the time of installation, 
whenever a change is made in the applications program, and when route 
locking has been disarranged.


Sec. 243.270  Indication locking.

    Where indication locking is an integral part of a safety-critical, 
processor based controller and is specified in the applications 
program, such locking shall be tested at the time of installation, 
whenever a change is made in the applications program, and when the 
indication locking has been disarranged.


Sec. 243.271  Traffic locking.

    Where traffic locking is an integral part of a safety-critical, 
processor based controller and is specified in the applications 
program, such locking shall be tested at the time of installation and 
whenever a change is made in the applications program.


Sec. 243.272  Switch obstruction test.

    A switch obstruction test of each switch shall be made when a lock 
rod is installed and at least once every 3 months.


Sec. 243.273  Locomotive or power car power supply voltage requirement.

    The output voltage of power supply for power car or locomotive ATC 
shall be maintained within 10 percent of rated voltage.


Sec. 243.274  Power car or locomotive insulation resistance; 
requirement.

    When the periodic test prescribed in Sec. 243.266 is performed, 
insulation resistance between wiring and ground of the automatic train 
control system shall be not less than one megohm.


Sec. 243.275  Antennas and beacons.

    (a) Signaling beacons and antennas shall be inspected and 
maintained in accordance with the manufacturer's specifications.
    (b) Antennas and beacons which have been repaired or rewound shall 
have the same operating characteristics which they possessed originally 
or as specified for new equipment.


Sec. 243.276  Departure test.

    (a) The train-borne ATC equipment shall be tested using one of the 
following methods:
    (1) Operation over track elements;
    (2) Operation over a test circuit; or
    (3) Onboard test device.
    (b) The extent of the departure test shall be defined by the 
Railroad in accordance with the system safety plan required by Subpart 
B of this Part, but shall include at least the following:
    (1) Ground-to-train transmission;
    (2) The cab display indications; and
    (3) The interface with the train brakes.
    (c) The Railroad shall perform a departure test, and onboard ATC 
equipment shall be put in service, before the trainset operates over 
equipped territory. If the ATC is cut out, the Railroad shall perform 
another departure test before the ATC equipment is considered 
operative.
    (d) If a locomotive or power car makes more than one trip in a 24-
hour period, only one departure test is required in such a 24-hour 
period, except as provided in section 3.119(b) concerning failures or 
cut-outs en route.
    (e) Each test run and its outcome shall be recorded in the train-
borne event recorder. These records shall be downloaded and retained 
for at least one year.


Sec. 243.277  Periodic test.

    A periodic test of the train borne ATC equipment shall be performed 
at least once every two months and on multiple-unit cars as specified 
by the Railroad, subject to approval by the FRA.


Sec. 243.278  Results of tests.

    (a) Results of tests made in compliance with Sec. 243.252(b), 
Secs. 243.262 through 243.272, Sec. 243.276, and Sec. 243.277, shall be 
recorded on pre-printed or computerized forms provided by the Railroad 
or by electronic means. Such forms shall show the name of the Railroad, 
place and date, equipment tested, results of tests, repairs, 
replacements, adjustments made, and condition in which the apparatus 
was left. Each record shall be signed by the employee making the test 
and shall be filed in the office of a supervisory official having 
jurisdiction. Results of tests shall be retained until the next record 
is filed, but in no case less than one year.
    (b) For purposes of compliance with the requirements of this 
section, the Railroad may maintain and transfer records through 
electronic transmission, storage, and retrieval provided that:
    (1) The electronic system be designed so that the integrity of each 
record is maintained through appropriate levels of security such as 
recognition of an electronic signature, or other means, which uniquely 
identify the initiating person as the author of that record. No two 
persons shall have the same electronic identity;

[[Page 65549]]

    (2) The electronic system shall ensure that each record cannot be 
modified in any way, or replaced, once the record is transmitted and 
stored;
    (3) Any amendment to a record shall be electronically stored apart 
from the record which it amends. Each amendment to a record shall be 
uniquely identified as to the person making the amendment;
    (4) The electronic system shall provide for the maintenance of 
inspection records as originally submitted without corruption or loss 
of data; and
    (5) Paper copies of electronic records and amendments to those 
records, that may be necessary to document compliance with this 
Subpart, shall be made available for inspection and copying by the FRA.


Sec. 243.279  Independent verification and validation.

    (a) General. The Railroad shall undergo a third-party safety audit 
of all safety-critical processor-based equipment and system elements as 
finally configured, prior to commencing operations. In order to 
complete this requirement, the Railroad shall contract with an 
independent reviewer, deemed ``Reviewer'' for purposes of this section, 
that is experienced in conducting verification and validation audits of 
safety-critical processor-based equipment and systems. The Reviewer 
shall use as a comparable standard for appropriate methodology and 
performance, all of the following standards:
    (1) Railway Applications: The specifications and demonstration of 
dependability, reliability, availability, maintainability and safety. 
prEN 50126, European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization 
(November 1995).
    (2) Railway Applications: Software for Railway Control and 
Protection Systems. prEN 50128, European Committee for Electrotechnical 
Standardization (August 1996).
    (3) Railway Applications: Safety Related Electronic Systems for 
Signaling, version 0.9. prEN 50129, European Committee for 
Electrotechnical Standardization (March 1996).
    (4) On-board Electronic Equipment and Computer Hardware. CF 67-001, 
Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fers Francais (June 1990).
    (5) Methodology for the Development of On-board Micro-computer 
Equipment. prCF 67-004, and NF F71-004, Societe Nationale des Chemins 
de Fers Francais (February 1989).
    (6) Railway Applications: Electronic Equipment used on Rolling 
Stock. EN 50155, European Committee for Electrotechnical 
Standardization (November 1995).
    (b) Items included in audit. (1) The Reviewer shall assess and 
comment on the adequacy of the processes which the Railroad applied to 
the design and development of the signal system. The Reviewer shall 
identify and document any safety vulnerabilities that are not 
adequately mitigated by the Railroad's processes.
    (2) The Reviewer shall evaluate the adequacy of the Railroad's 
system safety plan concerning the signal system.
    (3) The Reviewer shall analyze the Railroad's hazard analysis for 
comprehensiveness and adherence to the system safety plan.
    (4) The Reviewer shall analyze the Railroad's fault tree analysis 
for completeness, accuracy, and adherence to the system safety plan.
    (5) The Reviewer shall randomly select various safety-critical 
modules for audit to verify whether the Railroad's system safety plan 
were followed. The number of modules selected should be determined 
jointly by the Railroad and the Reviewer to ensure that a 
representative number sufficient to provide confidence that all 
unaudited modules were developed in adherence to the Railroad's system 
safety plan.
    (6) The Reviewer shall evaluate and comment on the Railroad's plan 
for installation and test procedures for revenue service.
    (c) Reviewer's report. (1) The Reviewer shall prepare a report of 
the audit and provide copies to the Railroad and FRA.
    (2) The Reviewer's report shall be submitted to the Railroad and 
FRA prior to the commencement of installation testing and contain, at a 
minimum, the following:
    (i) The Reviewer's evaluation of the adequacy of the Railroad's 
system safety program concerning the signal system, including any 
vulnerabilities that were not adequately mitigated;
    (ii) The method by which the Railroad would assure system safety in 
the event of hardware or software failures, including an explanation of 
how the Railroad will assure that all potentially hazardous operating 
circumstances are identified;
    (iii) The method by which the Railroad addresses the 
comprehensiveness of the system design for the requirements of the 
railroad operations it will govern, including an explanation of how the 
Railroad will assure that all potentially hazardous operating 
circumstances are identified, how the Railroad records deficiencies 
identified in the design process, and how the Railroad tracks the 
correction of these deficiencies;
    (iv) The identification of any documentation that was denied, 
incomplete, or inadequate;
    (v) The identification of each system procedure or process that was 
not properly followed;
    (vi) The identification of each deficiency or criticism not 
adequately mitigated in which the positions of the Reviewer and 
Railroad are clearly stated;
    (vii) The identification of the Railroad's software verification 
and validation procedures for its safety-critical applications, and 
adequacy of these procedures;
    (viii) The methods used by the Railroad to develop safety-critical 
software, such as the use of structured language, code checks, 
modularity, or other similar techniques; and
    (ix) A brief outline of what would be required to determine a mean 
time between unsafe failure value for the Railroad's hardware, a mean 
time between unsafe execution of the Railroad's software, and a mean 
time between hazardous events of the Railroad's system.
    (d) FRA acceptance.
    (1) FRA shall analyze the Reviewer's report upon receipt. Based on 
its analysis of the report, FRA shall notify the Railroad in writing 
that the signal system as finally configured is accepted or not 
accepted.
    (2) In the event that FRA does not accept the signal system as 
finally configured, FRA shall provide a written explanation of the 
reasons for the non-acceptance.
    (3) In the event that FRA does not accept the signal system as 
finally configured, the Railroad shall have an opportunity to respond 
to the Reviewer's report and to FRA's non-acceptance.
    (4) The Railroad shall conform the signal system to the Reviewer's 
recommendations and FRA acceptance prior to revenue operations.

Subpart D--Track Safety Standards


Sec. 243.301  Restoration or renewal of track under traffic conditions.

    (a) Restoration or renewal of track under traffic conditions is 
limited to the replacement of worn, broken, or missing components or 
fastenings that do not affect the safe passage of trains.
    (b) The following activities are expressly prohibited under traffic 
conditions:

[[Page 65550]]

    (1) Any work that interrupts rail continuity, e.g., as in joint bar 
replacement or rail replacement;
    (2) Any work that adversely affects the lateral or vertical 
stability of the track with the exception of spot tamping an isolated 
condition where not more than 5 m (16.4 lineal ft) of track are 
involved at any one time and the ambient air temperature is not above 
35 C (95 F); and
    (3) Removal and replacement of the rail fastenings on more than one 
tie at a time within 5 m (16.4 ft).


Sec. 243.303  Measuring track not under load.

    When unloaded track is measured to determine compliance with 
requirements of this Part, evidence of rail movement, if any, that 
occurs while the track is loaded shall be added to the measurements of 
the unloaded track.


Sec. 243.305  Drainage.

    Each drainage or other water carrying facility under or immediately 
adjacent to the roadbed shall be maintained and kept free of 
obstruction, to accommodate expected water flow for the area concerned.


Sec. 243.307  Vegetation.

    Vegetation on railroad property which is on or immediately adjacent 
to roadbed shall be controlled so that it does not:
    (a) Become a fire hazard to track-carrying structures;
    (b) Obstruct visibility of railroad signs and signals;
    (c) Interfere with railroad employees performing normal trackside 
duties;
    (d) Prevent proper functioning of signal and communication lines; 
or
    (e) Prevent railroad employees from visually inspecting moving 
equipment from their normal duty stations.

Geometry


Sec. 243.309  Track Geometry; General.

    If any value listed in the following Safety Level One Geometry 
Table are exceeded, the Railroad shall initiate remedial action within 
two calendar days. If the values listed in the following Safety Level 
Two table are exceeded, the Railroad shall initiate immediate remedial 
action. For either the Level One or Level Two tables, a reduction in 
operating speed so that the condition complies with the limits listed 
for a lower speed shall constitute bringing the track into compliance.

                                         Safety Level One Geometry Table                                        
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                       Max. speed    322      230      170      100       80       60       40  
                                       km/h (mph)   (200)    (143)    (105)     (62)     (50)     (37)     (25) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alignment (mm)......................           10        9       10       13       16       17       21       24
                                               20        9       10       13       16       17       21       24
                                               31       15       18       18       NA       NA       NA       NA
Surface (mm)........................     \5\ 12.2       11       13       16       18       19       21       52
                                               31       18       22       22       NA       NA       NA       NA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                         Safety Level One Geometry Table                                        
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  Max. speed km/h    322      230      170      100       80       60       40  
                                       (mph)        (200)    (143)    (105)     (62)     (50)     (37)     (25) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gage (mm) \1\..................  minimum                -7       -9      -12      -12      -12      -12      -12
                                 min. mean value        -4       -7       -7       -7       NA       NA       NA
                                  \2\                                                                           
                                 maximum \3\           +27      +27      +35      +35      +35      +35      +37
Gage Variation \4\.............  mm on 10 m base        15       15       15       15       NA       NA       NA
Cant (mm)......................  maximum Chord         180      180      180      180      180      180      180
                                  (m)                                                                           
Alignment (mm).................  10                     12       14       17       21       23       28       32
                                 20                     12       14       17       21       23       28       32
                                 31                     20       24       24       NA       NA       NA       NA
Surface (mm)...................  \5\ 12.2               15       18       22       24       26       28       70
                                 31                     24       30       30       NA       NA       NA       NA
Warp (mm)......................  \6\ 10                 15       15       18       18       18       24       24
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ With respect to the nominal track gage, 1435 mm (56.5 in).                                                  
\2\ Mean value on a 100 m (328 ft) length of track.                                                             
\3\ Local defect value > +20 mm (0.79 in) has to be corrected.                                                  
\4\ Gage variation is defined as the difference between the minimum and maximum gage measurements within 10     
  meters.                                                                                                       
\5\ The maximum values indicated on this line are not mid-chord offsets but are the difference between the      
  average level at eight locations spaced symmetrically from the center at 0.675 m, 2.075 m, 3.64 m, and 6.11 m 
  and a location at 0.675 m from the center. Surface12.2=\1/8\(Z-6.11+Z-3.64+Z-2.075+Z-                         
  0.675+Z0.675+Z2.075+Z3.64+Z6.11)-Z0.675                                                                       
\6\ Difference between the cross level value at any location and the mean value of the crosslevel over a        
  distance of +/-5.0 m (16.4 ft).                                                                               

Sec. 243.311  Track gage.

    (a) Gage is measured between the heads of the rails at right-angles 
to the rails in a plane 15 mm (0.6 in) below the top of the rail head.
    (b) The minimum gage, maximum gage, minimum mean value, and gage 
variation shall comply with the requirements defined in the Safety 
Level Two Geometry table given in Section 4.11.


Sec. 243.313  Curves, elevation and speed limitations.

    (a) The maximum operating speed for each curve shall be determined 
by the following formula: 

[[Page 65551]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP12DE97.000


where:

Vmax = Maximum allowable operating speed (km/h).
Ea = Actual elevation of the outside rail above the inside 
rail (mm) 1.
R = Curve radius (m) 2.
Eu = Maximum allowable unbalanced elevation (mm).
D = Distance between wheel contact circles (mm).
g = acceleration due to gravity (m/s2).

    In U.S. Engineering Units this formula becomes: 
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP12DE97.001
    
where:

Vmax = Maximum allowable operating speed (mph).
Ea = Actual elevation of the outside rail above the inside 
rail (in).\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ 1 Actual elevation for each 50 m (164 ft) track segment in 
the body of the curve is determined by averaging the elevation for 
10 points through the segment at 5 m (16.4 ft) spacing. If the curve 
length is less than 50 m (164 ft), the points through the full 
length of the body of the curve shall be averaged. If Eu exceeds 100 
mm (4 in), the Vmax formula applies to the spirals on both ends of 
the curve.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D = Degree of curvature (degrees).\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ Curve radius (Degree of curvature) is determined by 
averaging the degree of curvature over the same track segment as the 
elevation.

Eu = Unbalanced elevation.
    (b) Equipment meeting the standards of this section may be operated 
at curving speeds determined by the formula in paragraph (a) of this 
section, provided:
    (1) It is demonstrated that when positioned on a track with uniform 
superelevation, Ea, reflecting the intended target cant deficiency, Eu, 
no wheel of the equipment unloads to a value of 60 percent or less of 
its static value on perfectly level track and the roll angle between 
the floor of the vehicle and the horizontal does not exceed 5.7 
degrees;
    (2) It is demonstrated that when positioned on a track with a 
uniform 180 mm (7 in) superelevation, no wheel unloads to a value less 
than 60% of its static value on perfectly level track and the angle, 
measured about the roll axis, between the floor of the vehicle and the 
horizontal does not exceed 8.6 degrees;
    (3) The Railroad provides a complete description of the class of 
equipment involved, including schematic diagrams of the suspension 
system and the location of the center of gravity above top of rail;
    (4) The Railroad provides a complete description of the test 
procedure and instrumentation used to qualify the equipment and the 
maximum values for wheel unloading and roll angles which were observed 
during testing; the test procedure may be conducted in a test facility, 
where all wheels on one side (right or left) of the equipment are 
raised or lowered by the intended cant deficiency, the vertical wheel 
loads under each wheel are measured, and a level is used to record the 
angle through which the floor of the vehicle has been rotated;
    (5) The Railroad describes the procedures or standards in effect 
which detail the maintenance of the suspension system for the 
particular class of equipment; and
    (6) The Railroad identifies the line segment on which the higher 
curving speeds are proposed to be implemented.
    (c) Upon receipt of the information contained in paragraph (b), FRA 
shall approve use of the equipment and curving speeds established 
pursuant to paragraph (a). The Railroad shall notify the FRA Associate 
Administrator for Safety, in writing, no less than thirty calendar days 
prior to any proposed implementation of curving speeds higher than Vmax 
when the ``Eu'' term (above) will exceed 100 mm (4 in).

Track Structure


Sec. 243.315  Track strength.

    (a) Track shall have a sufficient vertical strength to withstand 
the maximum vehicle loads generated at maximum permissible train 
speeds, cant deficiencies and surface limitations. For purposes of this 
section, vertical track strength is defined as the track capacity to 
constrain vertical deformations so that the track shall return, 
following maximum load, to a configuration in compliance with the track 
performance and geometry requirements of this Part.
    (b) Track shall have sufficient lateral strength to withstand the 
maximum thermal and vehicle loads generated at maximum permissible 
train speeds, cant deficiencies and lateral alignment limitations. For 
purposes of this section lateral track strength is defined as the track 
capacity to constrain lateral deformations so that track shall return, 
following maximum load, to a configuration in compliance with the track 
performance and geometry requirements of this Part.


Sec. 243.317  Crossties.

    (a) Crossties shall be made of a material to which rail can be 
securely fastened. They shall be of concrete construction for all 
tracks over which trains run in revenue service.
    (b) Each 12 m (39 ft) segment of track shall have:
    (1) A sufficient number of crossties which, in combination, provide 
effective support that will:
    (i) Hold gage within the limits prescribed in Sec. 243.311;
    (ii) Maintain surface within the limits prescribed in Safety Level 
Two Geometry Table prescribed in Sec. 243.309; and
    (iii) Maintain alignment within the limits prescribed in Safety 
Level Two Geometry Table prescribed in Sec. 243.309.
    (2) The minimum number and type of crossties specified in paragraph 
(c) or (d) of this section effectively distributed to support the 
entire segment; and
    (3) Crossties of the type specified in paragraph (c) or (d) of this 
section that are located at a joint location as specified in paragraph 
(f) of this section.
    (c) For non-concrete tie construction, each 12 m (39 ft) segment of 
track shall have 18 crossties which are not:
    (1) Broken through;
    (2) Split or otherwise impaired to the extent the crossties would 
allow the ballast to work through, or would not hold spikes or rail 
fasteners;
    (3) So deteriorated that the tie plate or base of rail could move 
laterally 10 mm (0.4 in) relative to the crossties;
    (4) Cut by the tie plate through more than 40 percent of the 
thickness of the tie; or
    (5) Configured with less than 2 rail holding spikes or fasteners 
per tie plate.
    (6) So unable, due to insufficient fastener toe load, to maintain 
longitudinal restraint and maintain rail hold down and gage.
    (d) For concrete-tie construction, each 12 m (39 ft) segment of 
track shall have 16 crossties which are not:
    (1) So deteriorated that the pre-stress strands are ineffective or 
withdrawn into the tie at one end and the tie exhibits structural 
cracks in the rail seat or in the gage of track;
    (2) Configured with less than 2 fasteners on the same rail;
    (3) So deteriorated in the vicinity of the rail fastener that the 
fastener assembly may pull out or move laterally more than 10 mm (0.4 
in) relative to the crosstie;
    (4) So deteriorated that the fastener base plate or base of rail 
could move laterally more than 10 mm (0.4 in) relative to the 
crossties;
    (5) So deteriorated that rail seat abrasion is sufficiently deep to 
cause loss of rail fastener toeload;
    (6) Completely broken through; or
    (7) So unable, due to insufficient fastener toe load, to maintain 
longitudinal restraint and maintain rail hold down and gage.
    (e) The following speed limitation shall apply in case the number 
of

[[Page 65552]]

nondefective ties on each 12 m (39 ft) segment defined in paragraph (c) 
and (d) of this section is not achieved:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Number of 
                                                                 non    
                         Max. speed                           defective 
                                                                 ties   
------------------------------------------------------------------------
170 km/h (110 mph).........................................           14
145 km/h (90 mph)..........................................           12
95 km/h (60 mph)...........................................            8
25 km/h (15 mph)...........................................            5
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (f) Service track, including sidings, yards, sheds, and workshops, 
shall have at least one non-defective crosstie, the centerline of which 
is within 0.5 m (1.6 ft) of the rail joint location, or two crossties, 
the center lines of which are within 0.65 m (2.1 ft) either side of the 
rail joint location. All other tracks shall have two non-defective ties 
within 0.65 m (2.1 ft) each side of the rail joint.
    (g) For track constructed without crossties, such as slab track and 
track connected directly to bridge structural components, the track 
structure shall meet the requirements of paragraphs (b)(1)(i), (ii) and 
(iii).
    (h) On all tracks where the operating speeds exceed 170 km/hr (105 
mph), there shall be at least three non-defective ties each side of a 
defective tie.
    (i) Where wooden crossties are used there must be tie plates under 
the running rails on at least nine of ten consecutive ties.
    (j) No metal object which causes a concentrated load by solely 
supporting a rail shall be allowed between the base of the rail and the 
bearing surface of the tie plate.


Sec. 243.319  Continuous welded rail (CWR).

    The Railroad shall have in effect written procedures which address 
the installation, adjustment, maintenance and inspection of CWR, and a 
training program for the application of those procedures, in accordance 
with Sec. 243.107 of this Part. These procedures shall be submitted to 
the FRA Associate Administrator for Safety as part of the Railroad's 
system safety plan, and shall include:
    (a) Procedures for the installation and adjustment of CWR which 
include:
    (1) Designation of a desired rail installation temperature range 
for the geographic area in which the CWR is located; and
    (2) Destressing procedures/methods which address proper attainment 
of the desired rail installation temperature range when adjusting CWR.
    (b) Rail anchoring or fastening requirements that will provide 
sufficient restraint to limit longitudinal rail and crosstie movement 
to the extent practical, and that specifically address CWR rail 
anchoring or fastening patterns on bridges, bridge approaches, and at 
other locations where possible longitudinal rail and crosstie 
movement--associated with normally expected train-induced forces--is 
restricted.
    (c) Procedures which specifically address maintaining a desired 
rail installation temperature range when cutting CWR including rail 
repairs, in-track welding, and in conjunction with adjustments made in 
the area of tight track, a track buckle, or a pull-apart. Rail repair 
practices shall take into consideration the existing rail temperature 
so that:
    (1) When rail is replaced, the length installed shall be determined 
by taking into consideration the existing rail temperature and the 
desired rail installation temperature range; and
    (2) Under no circumstances should rail be added when the rail 
temperature is below that designated by paragraph (a)(1) of this 
section, without provisions for adjustment.
    (d) Procedures which address the monitoring of CWR in curved track 
for inward shifts of alignment toward the center of the curve as a 
result of disturbed track.
    (e) Procedures which control train speed on CWR track when:
    (1) Maintenance work, track rehabilitation, track construction, or 
any other event occurs which disturbs the roadbed or ballast section 
and reduces the lateral or longitudinal resistance of the track.
    (2) In formulating the procedures under this paragraph, the track 
owner shall:
    (i) Determine the speed required, and the duration and subsequent 
removal of any speed restriction based on the restoration of the 
ballast, along with sufficient ballast re-consolidation to stabilize 
the track to a level that can accommodate expected train-induced 
forces. Ballast re-consolidation can be achieved through either the 
passage of train tonnage or mechanical stabilization procedures, or 
both; and
    (ii) Take into consideration the type of crossties used.
    (f) Procedures which prescribe when physical track inspections are 
to be performed to detect conditions prone to buckling in CWR track. At 
a minimum, these procedures shall address inspecting track to identify:
    (1) Locations where tight or kinky rail conditions are likely to 
occur; and
    (2) Locations where track work of the nature described in paragraph 
(e)(1) of this section has recently been performed.
    (3) In formulating the procedures under this paragraph, the 
Railroad shall--
    (i) Specify the timing of the inspection; and
    (ii) Specify the appropriate remedial actions to be taken when 
conditions prone to buckling are found.
    (g) The Railroad shall have in effect a comprehensive training 
program for the application of these written CWR procedures, with 
provisions for periodic retraining for those individuals designated as 
qualified in accordance with Subpart H to supervise the installation, 
adjustment, and maintenance of CWR track and to perform inspections of 
CWR track.
    (h) The Railroad shall prescribe recordkeeping requirements in 
order to maintain a history of track constructed with CWR. At a 
minimum, these records shall include:
    (1) Rail laying temperature, location and date of CWR 
installations. This record shall be retained for the life of the rail; 
and
    (2) A record of any CWR installation or maintenance work that does 
not conform with the written procedures. Such record must include the 
location of the rail and be maintained until the CWR is brought into 
conformance with such procedures.


Sec. 243.321  Rail end mismatch.

    Any mismatch of rails at joints may not be more than that 
prescribed by the following table:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Any mismatch of rails at joints may not be more than the following--  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
   On the tread of the rail ends      On the gage side of the rail ends 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 mm (.13 in).                       3 mm (.13 in).                     
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 243.323  Rail joints and torch cut rails.

    (a) Each rail joint, insulated joint, and compromise joint shall be 
of a structurally sound design and appropriate dimensions for the rail 
on which it is applied.
    (b) If a joint bar is cracked, broken, or permits excessive 
vertical movement of either rail when all bolts are tight, it shall be 
replaced.
    (c) If a joint bar is cracked or broken between the middle two bolt 
holes it shall be replaced.
    (d) Each rail shall be bolted with at least two bolts at each 
joint.
    (e) Each joint bar shall be held in position by track bolts 
tightened to allow the joint bar to firmly support the abutting rail 
ends and to allow longitudinal movement of the rail in the joint to 
accommodate expansion and

[[Page 65553]]

contraction due to temperature variations.
    (f) No rail shall have a bolt hole which is torch cut or burned.
    (g) No joint bar shall be reconfigured by torch cutting.
    (h) No rail having a torch cut or flame cut end may be used, except 
as a temporary repair during emergency situations. When a rail end is 
torch cut in emergency situations, speed over that rail end must not 
exceed 25 km (40 mph) until removed.


Sec. 243.325  Turnouts and crossovers, generally.

    (a) In turnouts and track crossings, the fastenings shall be intact 
and maintained to keep the components securely in place. Also, each 
switch, frog, and guard rail shall be kept free of obstructions that 
may interfere with the passage of wheels.
    (b) The track through and on each side of track crossings and 
turnouts shall be equipped with rail anchoring to restrain rail 
movement affecting the position of switch points and frogs. Elastic 
fasteners designed to restrict longitudinal rail movement are 
considered rail anchoring.
    (c) Each flangeway at turnouts shall be at least 38 mm (1.5 in) 
wide.
    (d) For all turnouts and crossovers, the Railroad shall prepare an 
inspection and maintenance Guidebook for use by Railroad employees 
which shall be submitted to the FRA Associate Administrator for Safety. 
The Guidebook shall contain at a minimum:
    (1) Inspection frequency and methodology, including limiting 
measurement values for all components subject to wear or requiring 
adjustment; and
    (2) Maintenance procedures and techniques.


Sec. 243.327  Frog guard rails and guard faces; gage.

    The guard check and guard face gages in frogs shall be within the 
limits prescribed in the following table, applicable for a nominal 
track gage of 1435 mm (56.5 in).

------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Guard check gage                     Guard face gage          
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The distance between the gage line   The distance between guard         
 of a frog to the guard line \1\ of   lines,\1\ measured across the     
 its guard rail or guarding face,     track at right angles to the gage 
 measured across the track at right   line,\2\ may not be more than--   
 angles to the gage line,\2\ may         1435-80=1355 mm                
 not be less than--                                                     
    1435-45=1390 mm                                                     
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ A line along that side of the flangeway which is nearer to the      
  center of the track and at the same elevation as the gage line.       
\2\ A line 10 mm (0.4 in) below the top of the center line of the head  
  of the running rail, or corresponding location of the tread portion of
  the track structure.                                                  

Sec. 243.329  Derails.

    (a) All sidetracks connecting with main tracks shall be equipped 
with protection switches or functioning derails of the correct size and 
type, unless Railroad equipment on the track cannot move to foul the 
main track because of grade characteristics.
    (b) Each derail shall be clearly visible to Railroad personnel 
operating rail equipment on the affected track and to Railroad 
personnel working adjacent to the affected track. When in a locked 
position, a derail shall be free of any lost motion that would allow it 
to be operated without removal of the lock.
    (c) If a track protected by a derail is occupied by standing 
railroad rolling stock, the derail shall be in derailing position.
    (d) Each derail shall be interlocked with the signal system so as 
to produce a maximally restrictive signal aspect if the device is not 
deployed in a completely functional position.

Inspection


Sec. 243.331  Track Geometry Measurement Systems.

    (a) A Track Geometry Measurement System (TGMS) vehicle shall be 
operated at least twice within each 180 calendar days with not less 
than 30 days between inspections to demonstrate compliance with the 
geometry requirements in Sec. 243.309.
    (b) The TGMS Car shall have the following capabilities:
    (1) It shall be equipped with three bogies and have a rigid body 
which acts as the datum plane for all measurements.
    (2) The body shall rest on two end bogies which are spaced at 9.700 
m (31.82 ft) between center lines.
    (3) The four-axle middle bogie shall move laterally when the 
vehicle travels through a curve.
    (4) The TGMS car shall have eight axles spaced symmetrically from 
the centerline of the vehicle at 0.675 m, 2.075 m, 3.64 m, and 6.11. 
Each axle shall have a 9 tonne (20 kips) axle load.
    (5) Information shall be gathered at rail level by means of 
mechanical contact:
    (i) vertically, through the 16 high carbon steel wheels with a 
cylindrical profile; and
    (ii) laterally, through double sensors, each with a roller which 
follows the rail head's internal profile at an angle of 70 degrees 
placed between the outer bogies, 5 meters from the centerline of the 
vehicle.
    (6) Measurements shall be recorded by two means on the vehicle:
    (i) A continuous plot, on a constant distance basis, of the 
geometry parameters identified in the tables in Sec. 243.309; and
    (ii) Electronic records of elementary signals from transducers 
measuring displacements of different cables from the measuring points. 
In addition, the electronic record shall include all the computed track 
geometry parameters developed to determine compliance with the geometry 
tables in Sec. 243.309. Calculations of the extended base measurements 
are performed through real-time analog or digital processing of the 
alignment and level signals and are electronically recorded and 
displayed on charts.
    (7) The following parameters shall be measured vertically:
    (i) Surface: The surface or longitudinal level must be developed 
over two rail bases; the fundamental base of 12.2 m (40 ft) and the 
extended base of 31 m (102 ft) base. The fundamental surface 
measurement is the difference between the average level at eight 
locations spaced symmetrically from the center of the vehicle at 0.675 
m, 2.075 m, 3.64 m, and 6.11 m and the level at 0.675 m. 
Surface12.2 = \1/8\(Z-6.11 + Z-3.64 + 
Z-2.075 + Z-0.675 + Z0.675 + 
Z2.075 + Z3.64 + Z6.11) - 
Z0.675. The extended base measurement is calculated using 
the same transducers as used in the fundamental measurement. The 
displacement must be combined and appropriately filtered to produce a 
signal equivalent to the offset from the middle of a 31 meter chord.
    (ii) Warp: The cant variation shall be obtained by calculating the 
difference between the cant of an axle on the middle bogie and the 
average cant of the 4 axles of the end bogies.
    (8) The following parameters shall be measured laterally:
    (i) Alignment: The alignment for each rail must be developed based 
on three chords; the fundamental chord of 10 m

[[Page 65554]]

(32.8 ft), a middle distance chord of 20 m (65.6 ft) and an extended 
chord of 31 m (102 ft) base. The fundamental chord is measured through 
three double sensors: one at the center of the vehicle and the others 
symmetrically spaced 5 meters from the center. The long chords are 
developed through combinations and appropriate filtering of the 
fundamental measurements.
    (ii) Gage: The gage is measured by a pair of central double 
sensors.
    (9) The extended base graph shall be obtained by analog or digital 
computation of the level and alignment signals, and shall be printed 
out in real time on-board the vehicle.
    (10) Long wavelength values of level and alignment are calculated 
by low-pass filtering of the actual measurements with a transfer 
function specific to the signals for level (12.20 m (40 ft) base) and 
alignment (versine of 10 m (32.8 ft) chord) recorded by the TGMS 
vehicle.
    (11) The low-pass filtering shall be accomplished in the spatial 
frequency range, due to the monitoring of the cut-off frequency of the 
low-pass filters as a function of the running speed.
    (c) The TGMS shall, at a minimum, meet design requirements which 
specify that--
    (1) Track geometry measurements shall be taken no more than 1 m 
(3.3 ft) away from the contact point of wheels carrying a vertical load 
of no less than 4500 kg (10,000 lb) per wheel;
    (2) Track geometry measurements shall be taken and recorded on a 
distance-based sampling interval which shall not exceed 0.6 m (2 ft);
    (3) Calibration procedures and parameters assigned to the system 
assure that measured and recorded values accurately represent track 
conditions; and
    (4) Track geometry measurements recorded by the system shall not 
differ by more than 3 mm (0.13 in) on repeated runs at the same site at 
the same speed.
    (d) A qualifying TGMS shall measure and process the necessary track 
geometry parameters that enable the system to determine compliance 
with:
    (1) Track gage; mean gage within 100 m (328 ft.); and gage 
variation within 10 m (32.8 feet);
    (2) Alignment; 10 m (32.8 ft.), 20 m (65.6 ft.), and 31 m (102 ft.) 
Mid Chord Offsets;
    (3) Curvature, Cant and Vmax;
    (4) Surface; 12.2 m ( 40 ft.) averaged chord; 31 m (102 ft.) Mid 
Chord Offset; and
    (5) Warp.
    (e) A qualifying TGMS shall be capable of producing, within 24 
hours of the inspection, output reports that:
    (1) Provide a continuous plot, on a constant-distance axis, of all 
measured track geometry parameters required in paragraph (d) of this 
Section; and
    (2) Provide an exception report containing a systematic listing of 
all track geometry conditions which constitute an exception to the 
speed limits over the segment surveyed.
    (f) The output reports required under paragraph (e) of this Section 
shall contain sufficient location identification information so that 
maintenance workers may easily locate indicated exceptions.
    (g) Following a track inspection performed by a qualifying TGMS, 
the Railroad shall, within two days after the inspection, field verify 
and institute remedial action for all exceptions.
    (h) The Railroad shall maintain a record for a period of one year 
following an inspection performed by a qualifying TGMS that includes a 
copy of the plot, the track segment involved, a copy of the exception 
printout, the date of the inspection, and the location, date, and type 
of remedial action taken for all listed exceptions.
    (i) If the Railroad elects to substitute a geometry vehicle with 
different properties than those identified in paragraphs (b) and (c) of 
this section for the TGMS car, the Railroad shall use a geometry 
vehicle consistent with the requirements of Subpart G, Train Operations 
at Track Classes 6 and Higher of FRA's proposed Track Safety Standards, 
62 FR 36138 (July 3, 1997), and as ultimately codified in 49 CFR part 
213.


Sec. 243.333  Track/vehicle performance Measurement Systems.

    (a) A Track Acceleration Measurement System (TAMS) vehicle shall be 
operated at least twice within each 45 calendar days, with not less 
than 7 days between inspections, to determine whether a representative 
vehicle responds to the existing track conditions within the limits 
defined in the Vehicle/Track Interaction Performance Limits table for 
accelerations.
    (b) A TAMS vehicle must operate within 5% of the maximum authorized 
speed over any section of track in order to qualify as a valid survey.
    (c) A qualifying TAMS shall be capable of measuring and processing 
the necessary acceleration parameters, at an interval which shall not 
exceed 0.6 m (2 ft), which enables the system to determine compliance 
with:
    (1) Lateral truck acceleration;
    (2) Lateral carbody acceleration; and
    (3) Vertical carbody acceleration.
    (d) A qualifying TAMS shall be capable of producing, within 24 
hours of the inspection, output reports that:
    (1) Provide a continuous plot, on a constant-distance axis, of all 
measured acceleration parameters required in paragraph (c) of this 
section; and
    (2) Provide an exception report containing a systematic listing of 
all acceleration conditions which constitute an exception to the speed 
limits over the segment surveyed, as indicated in the table of Vehicle/
Track Interaction Performance Limits contained in Sec. 243.335.
    (e) If the carbody lateral, carbody vertical, or truck frame 
lateral accelerations exceed the safety limits as stated in the table, 
the Railroad must immediately initiate remedial action, which shall 
include reducing the maximum authorized speed for that section of track 
to a speed at least 8 km/h (5 mph) below the speed at which the 
acceleration limits were reached.
    (f) The Railroad shall maintain a record for a period of one year 
following an inspection performed by a qualifying TAMS that includes, a 
copy of the plot, a description of the track segment involved, the 
exception printout for the track segment involved, the date of the 
inspection, and the location, date, and remedial action taken for all 
listed exceptions to the class.


Sec. 243.335  Wheel/Rail Force Measurement System.

    (a) A Wheel/Rail Force Measurement System (WRFMS) shall be operated 
over the track bi-annually with not less than 240 days between 
inspections to determine whether a representative vehicle responds to 
the existing track conditions within the limits defined in the Vehicle/
Track Interaction Performance Limits table for wheel rail forces.
    (b) A WRFMS vehicle must operate at the revenue speed profile speed 
for a section of track to qualify as a valid survey.
    (c) A qualifying WRFMS shall be equipped with instrumented 
wheelsets to measure wheel/rail forces and shall be capable of 
measuring and processing the necessary wheel rail force parameters, at 
an interval which shall not exceed 0.6 m (2 ft), which enables the 
system to determine compliance with:
    (1) Minimum vertical wheel load;
    (2) Wheel L/V ratio, the ratio of the lateral wheel load to the 
vertical wheel load;
    (3) Net axle lateral load; and
    (4) Truck side L/V ratio.
    (d) A qualifying WRFMS shall be capable of producing, within 24 
hours of the inspection, output reports that:

[[Page 65555]]

    (1) Provide a continuous plot, on a constant-distance axis, of all 
measured wheel force and force ratio parameters required in paragraph 
(c) of this section;
    (2) Provide an exception report containing a systematic listing of 
all wheel force and force ratio conditions which constitute an 
exception to the speed limits over the segment surveyed, as indicated 
in the following table of Vehicle/Track Interaction Performance Limits.
    (e) If the wheel forces or force ratios exceed the safety limits as 
stated in the table, the Railroad must immediately initiate remedial 
action, which may include reducing the maximum authorized speed for 
that section of track, until these wheel forces and force ratios are 
within the safety limits.
    (f) The Railroad shall maintain a record for a period of two years 
following an inspection performed by a qualifying WRFMS that includes, 
a description of the track segment involved, the exception printout for 
the track segment involved, the date of the inspection, and the 
location, date, and remedial action taken for all listed exceptions to 
the class, and at a copy of the plot specified in paragraph (d) of this 
section for a distance along the track of at least 10 feet, centered on 
each exception.

                                         Vehicle/Track Interaction Limits                                       
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Parameter                     Safety limit            Filter/window             Requirements       
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wheel/Rail Forces:\1\                                                                                           
    Single Wheel Vertical Load       0.1.........  5 ft..................  No wheel of the equipment 
     Ratio.                                                                            shall be permitted to    
                                                                                       unload to less than 10%  
                                                                                       of the static vertical   
                                                                                       wheel load. The static   
                                                                                       vertical wheel load is   
                                                                                       defined as the load that 
                                                                                       the wheel would carry    
                                                                                       when stationary on level 
                                                                                       track. The vertical wheel
                                                                                       load limit shall be      
                                                                                       increased by the amount  
                                                                                       of measurement error.    
    Single Wheel L/V Ratio.........   (tan -.5)/   5 ft..................  The ratio of the lateral  
                                      (1 + .5 tan).                                    force that any wheel     
                                                                                       exerts on an individual  
                                                                                       rail to the vertical     
                                                                                       force exerted by the same
                                                                                       wheel on the rail shall  
                                                                                       be less than the safety  
                                                                                       limit calculated for the 
                                                                                       wheel's flange angle (). 
    Net Axle L/V Ratio.............  0.5.........  5 ft..................  The net lateral force     
                                                                                       exerted by any axle on   
                                                                                       the track shall not      
                                                                                       exceed 50% of the static 
                                                                                       vertical load that the   
                                                                                       axle exerts on the track.
    Truck Side L/V Ratio...........  0.6.........  5 ft..................  The ratio of the lateral  
                                                                                       forces that the wheels on
                                                                                       one side of any truck    
                                                                                       exert on an individual   
                                                                                       rail to the vertical     
                                                                                       forces exerted by the    
                                                                                       same wheels on that rail 
                                                                                       shall be less than 0.6.  
Accelerations: \2\                                                                                              
     Carbody Lateral...............  0.5 g peak-   10 Hz 1 sec window....  The peak-to-peak          
                                      to-peak.                                         accelerations, measured  
                                                                                       as the algebraic         
                                                                                       difference between the   
                                                                                       two extreme values of    
                                                                                       measured acceleration in 
                                                                                       a one second time period,
                                                                                       shall not exceed 0.5 g.  
    Carbody Vertical...............  0.6 g peak-   10 Hz 1 sec window....  The peak-to-peak          
                                      to-peak.                                         accelerations, measured  
                                                                                       as the algebraic         
                                                                                       difference between the   
                                                                                       two extreme values of    
                                                                                       measured acceleration in 
                                                                                       a one-second time period,
                                                                                       shall not exceed 0.6 g.  
    Truck Lateral \3\..............  0.4 g RMS     10 Hz 2 sec window....  Truck hunting \4\ shall   
                                      mean-removed.                                    not develop below the    
                                                                                       maximum authorized speed.
                                                                                                                
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The lateral and vertical wheel forces shall be measured with instrumented wheelsets with the measurements   
  processed through a low pass filter with a minimum cut-off frequency of 25 Hz. The sample rate for wheel force
  data shall be at least 250 samples/sec.                                                                       
\2\ Carbody lateral and vertical accelerations shall be measured near the car ends at the floor level.          
\3\ Truck accelerations in the lateral direction shall be measured at a position directly above the axle. The   
  measurements shall be processed through a filter having a pass band of 0.5 to 10 Hz.                          
\4\ Truck hunting is defined as a sustained cyclic oscillation of the truck which is evidenced by lateral       
  accelerations in excess of 0.4 g root mean square, mean-removed, for 2 seconds.                               

Sec. 243.337  Daily inspection trainset.

    (a) An inspection trainset shall be operated each morning over the 
Railroad's system prior to commencing revenue service. The inspection 
trainset shall operate at a speed no greater than 170 km/h (105 mph) to 
conduct a visual inspection of the track and ensure that the right of 
way is clear of obstacles within the clearance envelope and to identify 
conditions that could cause accidents.
    (b) The inspection trainset shall be equipped with on-board truck 
side and carbody accelerometers. The Railroad shall have in effect 
written procedures for the notification of track maintenance personnel 
when the acceleration measurements indicate a possible track-related 
condition.


Sec. 243.339  Inspection of rail in service.

    (a) Prior to revenue service and as part of the system safety plan, 
the Railroad shall submit to the FRA Associate Administrator for Safety 
written procedures for the inspection of rails.
    (b) A continuous search for internal defects shall be made of all 
rail within 90 days after initiation of revenue service and, 
thereafter, at least annually, with not less than 240 days between 
inspections.
    (c) Inspection equipment shall be capable of detecting defects 
between joint bars and within the area enclosed by joint bars.
    (d) Each defective rail shall be marked with a highly visible 
marking on both sides of the rail.
    (e) If the person assigned to operate the rail defect detection 
equipment being used determines that, due to rail surface conditions, a 
valid search for internal defects could not be made over a particular 
length of track, the test on that particular length of track cannot be 
considered as a search for internal defects under this section.
    (f) When an owner of track to which this part applies learns, 
through inspection or otherwise, that a rail in that track contains any 
of the defects listed in the following table, a person designated under 
Sec. 243.705 or Sec. 243.707

[[Page 65556]]

shall determine whether or not the track may continue in use. If he 
determines that the track may continue in use, operation over the 
defective rail is not permitted until--
    (1) The rail is replaced; or
    (2) The remedial action prescribed in the table is initiated--

                                                 Remedial Action                                                
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                    Length of defect (inch)    Percent of rail head                             
                                  --------------------------   cross-sectional area     If defective rail is not
                                                                weakened by defect         replaced, take the   
              Defect                              But not   --------------------------      remedial action     
                                    More than    more than                  But not        prescribed in note   
                                                              Less than    less than                            
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transverse fissure...............  ...........  ...........           70            5  B.                       
                                   ...........  ...........          100           70  A2.                      
                                   ...........  ...........  ...........          100  A.                       
Compound fissure.................  ...........  ...........           70            5  B.                       
                                   ...........  ...........          100           70  A2.                      
                                   ...........  ...........  ...........          100  A.                       
Detail fracture..................  ...........  ...........           25            5  C.                       
Engine burn fracture.............  ...........  ...........           80           25  D.                       
Defective weld...................  ...........  ...........          100           80  A2 or E and H.           
                                   ...........  ...........  ...........          100  A or E and H.            
Horizontal split head............            1            2  ...........  ...........  H and F.                 
Vertical split head..............  ...........            4  ...........  ...........  I and G.                 
Split web........................            2  ...........  ...........  ...........  B.                       
Piped rail.......................            4        (\1\)        (\1\)  ...........  A.                       
Head web separation..............        (\1\)  ...........  ...........  ...........                           
Bolt hole crack..................        \1/2\            1  ...........  ...........  H and F.                 
                                             1       1\1/2\  ...........  ...........  H and G.                 
                                        1\1/2\  ...........  ...........  ...........  B.                       
                                           (1)          (1)          (1)  ...........  A.                       
Broken base......................            1            6  ...........  ...........  D.                       
                                             6  ...........  ...........  ...........  A or E and I.            
Ordinary break...................  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........  A or E.                  
Damaged rail.....................  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........  D.                       
Flattened rail...................  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........  H.                       
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Break out in rail head.                                                                                     
\2\ Depth  \3/8\ and Length  8.                                                                                 

Notes

    A. Assign person designated under Sec. 243.705 or Sec. 243.707 
to visually supervise each operation over defective rail.
    A2. Assign person designated under Sec. 243.705 or Sec. 243.707 
to make visual inspection. That person may authorize operation to 
continue without visual supervision at a maximum of 10 mph for up to 
24 hours prior to another such visual inspection or replacement or 
repair of the rail.
    B. Limit operating speed over defective rail to that as 
authorized by a person designated under Sec. 243.705. The operating 
speed may not exceed 30 mph.
    C. Apply joint bars bolted only through the outermost holes to 
defect within 20 days after it is determined to continue the track 
in use. Limit operating speed over defective rail to 30 mph until 
angle bars are applied; thereafter, limit speed to 50 mph. When a 
search for internal rail defects is conducted under this section and 
defects are discovered which require remedial action C, the 
operating speed shall be limited to 50 mph, for a period not to 
exceed 4 days. If the defective rail has not been removed from the 
track or a permanent repair made within 4 days of the discovery, 
limit operating speed over the defective rail to 30 mph until joint 
bars are applied; thereafter, limit speed to 50 mph.
    D. Apply joint bars bolted only through the outermost holes to 
defect within 10 days after it is determined to continue the track 
in use. Limit operating speed over the defective rail to 30 mph or 
less as authorized by a person designated under Sec. 243.705 until 
angle bars are applied; thereafter, limit speed to 50 mph.
    E. Apply joint bars to defect and bolt in accordance with 
Sec. 243.323.
    F. Inspect rail 90 days after it is determined to continue the 
track in use.
    G. Inspect rail 30 days after it is determined to continue the 
track in use.
    H. Limit operating speed over defective rail to 50 mph.
    I. Limit operating speed over defective rail to 30 mph.


Sec. 243.341  Initial inspection of new rail and welds.

    (a) The Railroad shall provide for the initial inspection of newly 
manufactured rail, and for initial inspection of new welds made in 
either new or used rail. The Railroad may demonstrate compliance with 
this section by providing for:
    (1) Mill inspection. A continuous inspection at the rail 
manufacturer's mill shall constitute compliance with the requirement 
for initial inspection of new rail, provided that the inspection 
equipment meets the applicable requirements specified in Sec. 243.339 
of this Part. The Railroad shall obtain a copy of the manufacturer's 
report of inspection and retain it as a record until the rail receives 
its first scheduled inspection under Sec. 243.339 of this Part;
    (2) Welding plant inspection. A continuous inspection at a welding 
plant, if conducted in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 
(a)(1) of this section, and accompanied by a plant operator's report of 
inspection which is retained as a record by the Railroad, shall 
constitute compliance with the requirements for initial inspection of 
new rail and plant welds, or of new plant welds made in used rail; and
    (3) Inspection of field welds. Initial inspection of new field 
welds, either those joining the ends of CWR strings or those made for 
isolated repairs, shall be conducted not less than one day and not more 
than 30 days after the welds have been made. The initial inspection may 
be conducted by means of portable test equipment. The Railroad shall 
retain a record of such inspections until the welds receive their first 
scheduled inspection under Sec. 243.339 of this Part.

[[Page 65557]]

    (b) Each defective rail found during inspections conducted under 
paragraph (a)(3) of this section shall be marked with highly visible 
markings on both sides of the rail and the appropriate remedial action 
as set forth in Sec. 243.339 of this Part will apply.


Sec. 243.343  Visual inspections.

    (a) All track shall be visually inspected in accordance with the 
schedule prescribed in paragraph (c) of this section by person 
qualified under Sec. 243.705 or Sec. 243.707.
    (b) With the exception of paragraph (e) below, each inspection 
shall be made by riding over the track in a vehicle at a speed that 
allows the person making the inspection to visually inspect the track 
structure for compliance with this rule. However, mechanical, 
electrical, and other track inspection devices may be used to 
supplement visual inspection. If a vehicle is used for visual 
inspection, the speed of the vehicle may not be more than 8 km/h (5 
mph) when operating over track crossings or turnouts.
    (c) Each inspection shall be made at a minimum frequency of once 
every seven days with at least three days between inspections.
    (d) If a deviation from the requirements of this rule is found 
during the visual inspection, remedial action shall be initiated 
immediately.
    (e) Each turnout and crossover shall be inspected on foot at least 
once each week. The inspection shall be in accordance with the 
guidebook prepared as required under Sec. 243.325 of this Part.


Sec. 243.345  Special inspections.

    In the event of fire, flood, severe storm, temperature extremes or 
other occurrence which might have damaged track structure, a special 
inspection shall be made of the track and ROW involved as soon as 
possible after the occurrence.


Sec. 243.347  Inspection records.

    (a) The Railroad shall keep a record of each inspection required to 
be performed on that track under this Subpart.
    (b) Except as provided in paragraph (f) of this section, each 
record of an inspection under Sec. 243.343 shall be prepared on the day 
the inspection is made and signed by the person making the inspection.
    (c) Records shall specify the track inspected, date of inspection, 
location and nature of any deviation from the requirements of this 
part, and the remedial action taken by the person making the 
inspection.
    (d) Rail inspection records shall specify the date of inspection, 
the location and nature of any internal defects found, the remedial 
action taken and the date thereof, and the location of any intervals of 
track not tested pursuant to Sec. 243.339 of this Part. The Railroad 
shall retain a rail inspection record for at least two years after the 
inspection and for one year after remedial action is taken.
    (e) The Railroad required to keep inspection records under this 
section shall make those records available for inspection and copying 
by the FRA.
    (f) For purposes of compliance with the requirements of this 
section, the Railroad may maintain and transfer records through 
electronic transmission, storage, and retrieval provided that:
    (1) The electronic system be designed so that the integrity of each 
record may be maintained through appropriate levels of security such as 
recognition of an electronic signature, or other means, which uniquely 
identify the initiating person as the author of that record. No two 
persons shall have the same electronic identity;
    (2) The electronic storage of each record shall be initiated by the 
person making the inspection within 24 hours following the completion 
of that inspection;
    (3) The electronic system shall ensure that each record cannot be 
modified in any way, or replaced, once the record is transmitted and 
stored;
    (4) Any amendment to a record shall be electronically stored apart 
from the record which it amends. Each amendment to a record shall be 
uniquely identified as to the person making the amendment;
    (5) The electronic system shall provide for the maintenance of 
inspection records as originally submitted without corruption or loss 
of data; and
    (6) Paper copies of electronic records and amendments to those 
records, that may be necessary to document compliance with this part, 
shall be made available for inspection and copying by the FRA and 
qualified State track inspectors. Such paper copies shall be made 
available to the track inspectors and at the locations specified in 
paragraph (c) of this section.
    (g) Track inspection records shall be kept available to persons who 
performed the inspection and to persons performing subsequent 
inspections.
    (h) Each Track/Vehicle Performance record required under 
Sec. 243.333 and Sec. 243.335 of this Part shall be made available for 
inspection and copying by the FRA at the locations specified in 
paragraph (c) of this section.

Subpart E--Rolling Stock


Sec. 243.401  Clearance requirements.

    The rolling stock shall be designed to meet all applicable 
clearance requirements of the Railroad. At a minimum, the Railroad 
shall make the following diagrams available to FRA upon request:
    (a) Rolling stock static clearance diagram;
    (b) Rolling stock dynamic clearance diagram; and
    (c) Obstacle clearance diagram.


Sec. 243.413  Structural strength of trainset.

    (a) General. (1) The trainset shall be permanently coupled with 
articulated trucks between the trailer cars. Trainsets shall be 
uncoupled only in repair facilities, in accordance with the operating 
procedures set forth in Sec. 243.433.
    (2) The trainset shall be operated with a power car at each end.
    (b) Power Car. (1) Each power car shall resist, without permanent 
deformation, the following loads:
    (i) A compressive load of 2000 kN (450,000 lb.) applied at the 
underframe level;
    (ii) A compressive load of 700 kN (157,500 lb.) uniformly 
distributed and applied on a 100 mm (4 in.) high band to the cab end of 
the carbody at any height between the underframe and the structure 
below the front window, reacted at the buffer location at the opposite 
end of the car;
    (iii) A compressive load of 300 kN (67,500 lb.), applied on the 
rear end of the power car shell, at the carbody waist level, reacted at 
the coupler position at the cab end;
    (iv) A uniformly distributed compressive load of 300 kN (67,500 
lb.), applied on the cab end of the power car shell, at cantrail level, 
reacted at the buffer location at the rear of the power car;
    (v) A compressive load of 300 kN (67,500 lb.), applied at the 
middle of the obstacle deflector over a width of 500 mm (20 in.) at a 
height of 500 mm (20 in.) above top of rail, reacted at buffer location 
at the rear of the power car;
    (vi) A compressive load of 250 kN (56,200 lb.) applied at the side 
edges of the obstacle deflector over a width of 500 mm (20 in.) at a 
height of 500 mm (20 in.) above top of rail, reacted at the buffer 
location at the rear of the power car;
    (vii) A tensile load of 1000 kN (225,000 lb.) applied on the front 
and rear coupling devices.
    (2) Each power car shall be equipped with an anti-penetration wall 
ahead of the cab which is capable of resisting:

[[Page 65558]]

    (i) A longitudinal compressive load of 3000 kN (675,000 lb) at the 
top of the underframe, without exceeding the ultimate strength of the 
joint; and
    (ii) A longitudinal compressive load of 1500 kN (337,000 lb) 
applied at a height of 760 mm (30 in) above the top of the underframe, 
and reacted at the rear of the cab structure, without exceeding the 
ultimate strength of the structure. Compliance shall be verified by 
either linear static analysis or equivalent means.
    (3) In unoccupied areas, each power car shall be designed to absorb 
a minimum 4.2 MJ through controlled structural deformation.
    (4) In occupied areas, each power car shall be designed to resist 
without permanent deformation of the sidesill, cantrail, and side post 
structural members, a longitudinal compressive load of 3560 kN (800,000 
lb) when applied uniformly at the front of the cab between the 
underframe and waist level, and reacted at the cross section of the 
carbody at the back of the cab.
    (5) Each power car shall be designed to withstand a uniformly 
distributed vertical load of 1.3 times its static laden weight, when 
supported at the truck centers, without permanent deformation. 
Compliance shall be verified by either linear static analysis or 
equivalent means.
    (6) Rollover strength of power cars shall be designed to permit 
those cars to:
    (i) Rest on their sides, uniformly supported at the top (cantrail) 
and the bottom (sidesill) chords of the side frame. The allowable 
stress in the main structural members for occupied volumes for this 
condition shall be one-half yield; and
    (ii) Rest on their roofs with damage limited to roof sheathing and 
framing. Deformation of the roof sheathing and framing to the extent 
necessary to permit the vehicle to be supported directly on the top 
chords of the side frames and end frames shall be allowed. The 
allowable stress in the main structural members for occupied volumes 
for this condition shall be one-half yield.
    Compliance with this requirement shall be verified by either linear 
static analysis or equivalent means.
    (c) Trailer Car. (1) Each trailer car of the trainset shall resist, 
without permanent deformation, the following loads:
    (i) A compressive load of 2000 kN (450,000 lb) applied at the level 
of the thrust tubes;
    (ii) A uniformly distributed compressive load of 300 kN (67,500 
lb), applied to the end of the trailer carshell, at cantrail level; and
    (iii) A tensile load of 1000 kN (225,000 lb) applied at the level 
of the thrust tube. and
    (2) Each trailer car shall be designed to withstand a uniformly 
distributed vertical load of 1.3 times its static laden weight, when 
supported at the truck centers, without permanent deformation.
    (3) The occupied volumes of trailer cars shall be designed to 
resist without permanent deformation of the sidesill, cantrail, and 
side post structural members, a longitudinal compressive load of 3560 
kN (800,000 lb.) when applied as distributed over the carbody cross 
section at the seated passenger compartment. Compliance with this 
requirement shall be verified by either linear static analysis or 
equivalent means.
    (4) Rollover Strength of trailer cars shall be designed to permit 
those cars to:
    (i) Rest on their sides, uniformly supported at the top (cantrail) 
and the bottom (sidesill) chords of the side frame. The allowable 
stress in the main structural members for occupied volumes for this 
condition shall be one-half yield; and
    (ii) Rest on their roofs with damage limited to roof sheathing and 
framing. Deformation of the roof sheathing and framing to the extent 
necessary to permit the vehicle to be supported directly on the top 
chords of the side frames and end frames shall be allowed. The 
allowable stress in the main structural members for occupied volumes 
for this condition shall be one-half yield.
    Compliance with this requirement shall be verified by either linear 
static analysis or equivalent means.


Sec. 243.405  Trailer car interior.

    (a) Seat and seat attachment strength. (1) Seat backs shall be 
designed to withstand, with deflection and permanent deformation 
allowed, but without total failure, the load due to a 95th-percentile 
male (85 kg or 187 lb.) seat occupant accelerated with the following 
pulse:
    (i) 0 to 6g in 0.05 s;
    (ii) 6g for 0.125 s; and
    (iii) 6 to 0g in 0.05 s.
    (2) The ultimate strength of a seat attachment to the trailer 
carbody shall be sufficient to withstand the following individually-
applied accelerations acting on the mass of the seat plus the mass of a 
seat occupant who is a 95th-percentile male (85kg or 187 lb.):
    (i) Longitudinal: 6 g;
    (ii) Lateral: 2 g; and
    (iii) Vertical: 2 g.
    (b) Interior Fittings. (1) Interior fittings shall be attached to 
the trailer carbody with sufficient strength to withstand the following 
individually-applied accelerations acting on the mass of the fitting:
    (i) Longitudinal: 3 g;
    (ii) Lateral: 2 g; and
    (iii) Vertical: 2 g.
    (2) To the extent possible, interior fittings shall be recessed or 
flush-mounted, and corners and sharp edges shall be either avoided or 
padded to mitigate the consequences of impact with such surfaces.
    (c) Luggage Stowage Compartments. Luggage stowage compartments 
shall include a means to restrain luggage, and have sufficient strength 
to resist loads due to the following individually-applied accelerations 
acting on the mass of the luggage that the compartment is designed to 
accommodate:
    (1) Longitudinal: 3 g;
    (2) Lateral: 2 g; and
    (3) Vertical: 2 g.
    (g = 1 gravity; s = seconds)


Sec. 243.407  Glazing.

    (a) Exterior Impact Performance. (1) End-facing exterior glazing 
shall resist the impact of a 10 kg (22 lb) solid aluminum sphere with 
an impact energy of 30 kJ at 22 deg.C (72 deg.F) and 25 kJ at 0 deg.C 
(32 deg.F).
    (2) Driver's cab side-facing exterior glazing shall resist the 
horizontal impact of a 600g (1.3 lb) steel sphere with an energy of 15 
kJ.
    (3) Trailer car side-facing exterior glazing shall resist, without 
spall or penetration, the impact of a 2.46g (38 grains) bullet at an 
impact speed of 442 m/s (1,450 ft/s).
    (4) Glazing and frame shall resist the forces due to air pressure 
differences under all operations caused by trains passing with the 
minimum separation for two adjacent tracks while traveling in opposite 
directions, each traveling at maximum operating speed.
    (b) Interior Performance. Interior equipment glazing shall meet the 
minimum requirements of AS1 type laminated glass as defined in American 
National Standard ``Safety Code for Glazing Materials for Glazing Motor 
Vehicles Operating on Land Highways,'' ASA Standard Z26.1-1990.
    (c) Frame. The glazing frame shall hold glazing in place against 
all forces generated in the tests specified in this section.


Sec. 243.409  Brake system.

    (a) The brake system shall be capable of stopping the trainset 
within the prevailing signal spacing from its

[[Page 65559]]

maximum authorized speed, under test conditions of adhesion as defined 
in UIC leaflet 541.05, with flow of detergent. The flow rate of 
detergent shall be doubled for speeds in excess of 180 km/h (112 mph).
    (b) The braking on each truck shall be independently controlled by 
the brake pipe.
    (c) The electric brake on each powered truck shall be completely 
independent and shall operate with the loss of the overhead power 
supply.
    (d) Any failure of the electric portion of the brake system on any 
power truck shall be displayed for the locomotive engineer in the 
control cab.
    (e) The brake system shall be designed to prevent thermal damage to 
wheels or discs. The Railroad shall demonstrate, through analysis and 
test that is confirmed by the system safety plan and pre-revenue 
service tests, that no thermal damage results to the wheels or discs 
under conditions resulting in maximum friction braking effort being 
exerted.
    (f) The Railroad shall demonstrate, through analysis and test that 
is confirmed by the system safety plan and pre-revenue service tests, 
the maximum authorized speed of the trainset at which no thermal damage 
to wheels or discs occurs, for various combinations of electric and 
friction brake failures. The Railroad shall develop a matrix that 
clearly lists potential brake failures or combinations of failures, to 
which each speed corresponds, that shall be displayed in each power 
car.
    (g) In the event of an en route failure of the electric or friction 
portion of the brake, or both, a train may proceed at a speed no 
greater than the maximum authorized speed as set forth in the matrix 
required by paragraph (f) of this section. The locomotive engineer 
shall notify central traffic control of any brake failure that requires 
a speed restriction in a trip.
    (h) The trainset shall be equipped with an emergency application 
feature that produces an irretrievable stop, using a brake rate 
consistent with prevailing adhesion, passenger safety, and brake system 
thermal capacity. An emergency application shall be available at any 
time. A means to apply the emergency brake shall be provided at two 
locations accessible to the train crew in each trailer car.
    (i) The brake system shall be designed so that an inspector may 
determine whether the brake system is functioning properly without 
being placed in a dangerous position on, under or between the 
equipment. This determination may be made through automated inspection 
equipment that utilizes sensors to verify that the brakes have been 
applied and released.
    (j) The brake system design shall allow a disabled train's 
pneumatic brakes to be controlled by a rescue locomotive through brake 
pipe control alone.
    (k) The train shall be equipped with a spring-applied, air-released 
parking brake that is capable of holding the train on any part of the 
Railroad system and, at a minimum, on a 0.5% grade.
    (l) An independent failure detection system shall compare brake 
commands with brake system output to determine if a failure has 
occurred. The failure detection system shall report immediately brake 
system failures to the automated train monitoring system.
    (m) Each truck of the trainset shall be equipped with a wheelslide 
system designed to automatically adjust the braking force on each wheel 
to prevent axle-locking during braking. In the event of failure of a 
truck's wheelslide system, control shall be automatically provided by 
the wheelslide system of an adjacent truck. A visual or audible alarm, 
or both, shall be provided in the cab of the controlling power car if a 
blocked axle is detected.


Sec. 243.411  Truck and suspension system.

    (a) Truck-to-car-body attachment. (1) For all power cars and 
trailer cars, the strength of the truck-to-car-body attachment shall be 
sufficient to resist without permanent deformation a longitudinal force 
equivalent to 2.5g acting on the mass of the truck.
    (2) Components of the truck, which include axles, wheels, bearings, 
truck mounted brake system, suspension system components, and any other 
components integral to the design of the truck, shall remain attached 
to the truck when a force equivalent to 2g acting on a mass of any 
component is exerted in any direction on that component.
    (b) Wheel climb. Suspension systems shall prevent wheel climb, 
wheel lift, rail roll-over, track shift, and vehicle over-turning and 
provide safe, stable performance and ride quality. Suspension systems 
shall meet these design requirements in all safety-critical operating 
environments, track conditions, and loading conditions. Compliance with 
these requirements shall be demonstrated as part of the System 
Qualification Tests set forth in Subpart G of this Rule.
    (c) Lateral accelerations. The trainsets shall not operate under 
conditions that correspond to a steady-state lateral acceleration to 
the outside of the curve of 0.1g or greater, as measured parallel to 
the car floor.
    (d) Hunting oscillations. Each truck shall be equipped with a 
permanently installed lateral accelerometer mounted on the truck frame. 
The accelerometer output signals shall be calibrated and filtered, and 
shall pass through signal conditioning circuitry designed to determine 
if hunting oscillations of the truck are occurring. If hunting 
oscillations are detected, the train monitoring system shall provide an 
alarm to the locomotive engineer and the train shall be slowed by the 
locomotive engineer to a speed 8 km/h (5 mph) less than speed at which 
hunting oscillations stopped. This requirement shall be included in the 
Railroad's Operating Rules.
    (e) Ride vibration. Compliance with ride quality requirements 
contained in this paragraph shall be demonstrated during equipment pre-
revenue service qualification tests in accordance with Sec. 243.113 and 
Subpart G of this Part. The Federal Railroad Administration shall 
verify ride quality performance of trainset equipment through the use 
of instrumentation. While traveling at the maximum revenue service 
speed over the intended route, the train suspension system shall:
    (1) Limit the vertical acceleration as measured by a vertical 
accelerometer mounted on the car floor to no greater than 0.55g single 
event, peak-to-peak.
    (2) Limit the lateral acceleration as measured by a lateral 
accelerometer mounted on the car floor to no greater than 0.3g single 
event, peak-to-peak.
    (3) Limit the combination of lateral acceleration (L) and vertical 
acceleration (V) occurring within any time period of 2 consecutive 
seconds as expressed by the square root of 
(V2+L2) to no greater than 0.604g, where L may 
not exceed 0.3g and V may not exceed 0.55g.
    (f) Bearing overheat sensors. Bearing overheat sensors shall be 
provided on board each trainset or at wayside intervals, as determined 
by the system safety plan.


Sec. 243.413  Fire safety.

    (a) All materials used in constructing the interior of both a 
trailer car and a power car shall meet the flammability and smoke 
emission characteristics testing standards contained in Appendix B to 
this rule, or alternative standards issued or recognized by an expert 
consensus organization after approval by FRA in conjunction with 
approval of the Railroad's system safety plan required by Subpart B of 
this Part. For purposes of this section, the interior of a trailer car 
and a power car includes walls, floors, ceilings, seats, doors, 
windows, electrical conduits, air ducts, and any other internal 
equipment.

[[Page 65560]]

    (b) The railroad shall require certification that combustible 
materials to be used in the construction of trainset interiors have 
been tested by a recognized independent testing laboratory, and that 
the results comply with the requirements of paragraph (a) of this 
section.
    (c) Overheat detectors shall be installed in all components of the 
trainset where the written analysis required by Subpart B determines 
that such equipment is necessary.
    (d) Fire or smoke detectors shall be installed in unoccupied 
compartments of a train if the analysis required by Subpart B 
determines that such equipment is necessary to ensure sufficient time 
for the safe evacuation of the train.
    (e) A fixed, automatic fire suppression system shall be installed 
in unoccupied compartments of a train if the analysis required by 
Subpart B determines that such a system is necessary and practical to 
ensure sufficient time for the safe evacuation of the train.
    (f) The railroad shall comply with those elements of its written 
procedures, under Subpart B, for the inspection, testing, and 
maintenance of all fire safety systems and equipment that it has 
designated as mandatory.
    (g) The Railroad shall prohibit smoking on all trainsets in 
passenger service.


Sec. 243.415  Doors.

    (a) Powered, exterior side doors. (1) Each trailer car shall have a 
minimum of four exterior side doors, or the functional equivalent of 
four side doors, that each permit at least one 95th-percentile male to 
pass through at a single time.
    (2) The status of each powered, exterior door shall be displayed to 
the crew in the operating power car. If door interlocks are used, the 
sensors used to detect train motion shall be nominally set to operate 
at 5 km/h (3 mph).
    (3) Powered, exterior doors shall be powered by the compressed air 
system or by electricity. If powered by electricity, the doors shall be 
connected to an emergency back-up power system.
    (4) Each powered, exterior door shall be equipped with a manual 
override that is:
    (i) Located adjacent to the door that it controls;
    (ii) Capable of opening the door without power from both inside and 
outside the car; and
    (iii) Designed and maintained so that a person may access the 
override device from both inside and outside the car without the use of 
any tool or other implement.
    (5) Instructions for manual override shall be clearly posted in the 
car interior at door locations.
    (6) A means for emergency responders to access the manual override 
from outside the car shall be provided. Instructions for access and use 
of the handle shall be clearly posted outside the car at all door 
locations.
    (7) Manual door releases shall be easily operable by a 5th-
percentile female without requiring the use of any tools to accomplish 
the manual override in the event of head-end power loss.
    (8) The Railroad may protect a manual override device used to open 
a powered, exterior door with a cover or a screen capable of removal by 
a 5th-percentile female without requiring the use of a tool or other 
implement. If the method of removing the protective cover or screen 
entails breaking or shattering it, the cover or screen shall be scored, 
perforated, or otherwise weakened so that a 5th-percentile female can 
penetrate the cover or screen with a single blow of her fist without 
injury to her hand.
    (b) Passenger compartment end doors shall be equipped with a kick-
out panel, pop-out window or other equivalent means of egress in the 
event the door will not open.


Sec. 243.417  Emergency equipment.

    (a) Emergency system requirements set forth in this Subpart shall 
apply to each trailer car.
    (b) Emergency lighting shall be provided and shall include the 
following:
    (1) An illumination level of a minimum of 55 lux (5.1 ft-candles) 
at floor level for all normal passenger and crew evacuation routes from 
the equipment;
    (2) A back-up power system capable of operating all emergency 
lighting for a period of at least two hours;
    (3) A back-up power system capable of operating in all equipment 
orientations; and
    (4) A back-up power system capable of operating after the initial 
shock of a collision or derailment due to individually applied shock 
loads at 3g/2g/2g, longitudinal/vertical/lateral respectively.
    (c) A means of emergency communication throughout the trainset 
shall be provided and shall include the following:
    (1) Transmission locations that are clearly marked with luminescent 
material at each end of each unit adjacent to the unit or car end 
doors;
    (2) Back-up power for a minimum time period of two hours; and
    (3) Clear and understandable operating instructions at or near each 
transmission location.
    (d) Locations of emergency equipment shall be clearly marked with 
luminescent material that makes the identity and location of the 
equipment recognizable from a distance equal to the width of the car.
    (e) Emergency exits. (1) Locations of all emergency exits shall be 
clearly marked with luminescent material that makes the identity and 
location of the emergency exit recognizable from a distance equal to 
the width of the car.
    (2) Clear and understandable instructions for use of the emergency 
exits shall be posted at each emergency exit and they must be visible 
from a distance of 30 inches.
    (3) Each trailer car shall have a minimum of four emergency window 
exits, arranged in a staggered configuration or with one located at 
each end of each side of the trailer car.
    (4) Each trailer car sealed window emergency exit shall have a 
minimum free opening of 1.6 m (63 in) wide by 0.6 m (24 in) high.
    (5) Each emergency window exit shall be easily operable by a 5th 
percentile female without requiring the use of a tool or implement 
other than a hammer designed to break the glazing that shall be located 
adjacent to each emergency window.
    (6) Each power car shall have an emergency roof hatch with a 
minimum opening of 0.45 m (18 in) by 0.6 m (24 in) and an emergency 
escape exit in the cab sidewall.
    (f) The Railroad shall have in place a redundant means for the 
train crew to communicate with the pertinent railroad operations center 
to summon aid in the event of an emergency situation. These may include 
operating portable radios or cellular telephones.


Sec. 243.419  Operator's controls and power car layout.

    (a) Operator controls in the power vehicle or control cab shall be 
arranged to be comfortably within view and easy reach when the 
locomotive engineer is seated in the normal train control position.
    (b) The control panels shall be laid out to minimize the risk of 
human error.
    (c) An alerter (Vigilance Device System) shall be provided. This 
system shall be operative at all speeds above 8 km/h (5 mph). If not 
acknowledged, the alerter shall cause a brake application to stop the 
train.
    (d) Cab information displays shall be designed with the following 
characteristics:
    (1) Simplicity and standardization shall be the driving criteria 
for design of

[[Page 65561]]

formats for the display of information in the cab;
    (2) Essential, safety-critical information shall be displayed as a 
default condition at the most visible place for the locomotive 
engineer.
    (3) Operator selection shall be required to display other than 
default information.
    (4) Cab or train control signals shall be displayed for the 
locomotive engineer.
    (5) Displays shall be readable from the locomotive engineer's 
normal position under all lighting conditions.
    (e) The power car shall be equipped with an obstacle deflector 
which extends across both rails of the track. The height of the 
obstacle deflector shall be more than 150 mm (5.9 in) and less than 300 
mm (11.8 in) off the rails.
    (f) The cab layout shall be arranged to meet the following 
requirements:
    (1) The crew has an effective field of view in the forward 
direction, and the right and left of the direction of travel; and
    (2) Field-of-view obstructions due to required structural members 
shall be minimized.
    (g) Each seat provided for a crew member shall:
    (1) Be secured to the carbody with an attachment having an ultimate 
strength capable of withstanding the loads due to individually applied 
accelerations of 3g/2g/2g acting longitudinally/ laterally/vertically 
respectively on the mass of the seat and the crew member occupying it; 
and
    (2) Be designed according to Layout of Drivers' Cabs in 
Locomotives, Railcars, Multiple Unit Trains and Driving Trailers, UIC 
651, International Union of Railways Standard (First Edition, 1986), 
which requires that:
    (i) All adjustments have the range necessary to accommodate a 5th-
percentile to a 95th-percentile male;
    (ii) The seat is equipped with a force-assisted 200 mm longitudinal 
adjustment, operated from the seated position; and
    (iii) The seat has a 20 degrees manually reclining seat back, 
adjustable from the seated position.
    (h) The ultimate strength of power car control cab interior fitting 
and equipment attachments shall be sufficient to resist without failure 
loads due to individually applied accelerations of 3g/2g/2g 
longitudinally/laterally/vertically respectively acting on the mass of 
the fitting or equipment.
    (i) Sharp edges and corners on interior surfaces of the cab likely 
to be impacted by the crew during a collision or derailment shall be 
eliminated, where possible, and if not, padded.
    (j) Each power car used in revenue service shall be equipped with 
operating heat and air conditioning systems.


Sec. 243.421  Exterior lights.

    (a) Headlights. Each power car shall be equipped with two or more 
headlights. Each headlight shall produce 12,000 or more candela.
    (b) Taillights. (1) Each trailing power car shall be equipped with 
two or more red taillights;
    (2) Each taillight shall be located at least 1.2 m (3.9 ft) above 
rail;
    (3) Each taillight shall produce 15 or more candela; and
    (4) Taillights of the trailing power car must be on when the 
trainset is on a section of the system that is in revenue service.


Sec. 243.423  Electrical system design.

    (a) Circuit protection. (1) The main propulsion power line shall be 
protected with a lightning arrestor, automatic circuit breaker, and 
overload relay. The lightning arrestor shall be run by the most direct 
path possible to ground with a connection to ground of not less than 
No. 6 AWG. These overload protection devices shall be housed in an 
enclosure designed specifically for that purpose with arc chute vented 
directly to outside air.
    (2) Head end power, including trainline power distribution, shall 
be provided with both overload and ground fault protection.
    (3) Circuits used for purposes other than propelling the equipment 
shall be connected to their power source through circuit breakers or 
equivalent current-limiting devices.
    (4) Each auxiliary circuit shall be provided with a circuit breaker 
located as near as practical to the point of connection to the source 
of power for that circuit. Such protection may be omitted from circuits 
controlling safety-critical devices.
    (b) Main battery system. (1) The main batteries shall be isolated 
from the cab and passenger seating areas by a non-combustible barrier.
    (2) Battery chargers shall be designed to protect against 
overcharging.
    (3) Battery circuits shall include an emergency battery cut-off 
switch to completely disconnect the energy stored in the batteries from 
the load.
    (4) If batteries are of the type to potentially vent explosive 
gases, the batteries shall be adequately ventilated to prevent 
accumulation of explosive concentrations of these gases.
    (c) Power dissipation resistors. (1) Power dissipation resistors 
shall be adequately ventilated to prevent overheating under worst-case 
operating conditions.
    (2) Power dissipation grids shall be designed and installed with 
sufficient isolation to prevent combustion between resistor elements 
and combustible material.
    (3) Power dissipation resistor circuits shall incorporate warning 
or protective devices for low ventilation air flow, over-temperature 
and short circuit failures.
    (4) Resistor elements shall be electrically insulated from resistor 
frames, and the frames shall be electrically insulated from the 
supports that hold them.


Sec. 243.425  Automated monitoring.

    (a) Each trainset shall be equipped to monitor the performance of 
the following systems or components:
    (1) Reception of cab and train control signals;
    (2) Truck hunting;
    (3) Electric brake status;
    (4) Friction brake status;
    (5) Fire detection systems;
    (6) Head end power status;
    (7) Alerter;
    (8) Horn; and
    (9) Wheelslide.
    (b) The monitoring system shall alert the locomotive engineer 
immediately when any of the monitored parameters are out of 
predetermined limits. The Railroad's operating rules, developed 
pursuant to Sec. 243.117 and Subpart F of this Part, shall control 
train movement when the monitored parameters are out of predetermined 
limits. If the locomotive engineer fails to act in accordance with 
these procedures, the Railroad's central traffic control shall initiate 
corrective action.
    (c) The Railroad shall develop, in the course of the system safety 
analysis and pursuant to Sec. 243.117 of this Part, appropriate 
operating rules to address locomotive engineer and equipment 
performance in the event that the automatic monitoring system becomes 
defective en route, or is defective when the daily inspection required 
by Sec. 243.433 is completed.
    (d) Each lead power car shall be equipped with an operative event 
recorder that monitors and records all safety data required by 
Sec. 243.425(a) of this Part and 49 CFR 229.135, Event Recorders.
    (e) All monitored systems set forth in paragraph (a) of this 
section shall be tested during each daily inspection required by 
Sec. 243.433(f).


Sec. 243.427  Trainset system software and hardware integration.

    (a) The trainset system hardware and software integration shall 
conform with On-Board Electronic Equipment and

[[Page 65562]]

Computer Hardware, CF 67-001, Bureau of Railroad Standards, (June 
1990).
    (b) The trainset system hardware and software integration shall 
conform with Methodology for the Development of On-Board Micro-Computer 
Equipment, Pr CF 67-004 and NF F71-004, Bureau of Railroad Standards, 
(February 1989).


Sec. 243.429  Control system design requirements.

    The Railroad's trainset computer hardware and software shall meet 
the requirements set forth in Sec. 243.105 of this Part.


Sec. 243.431  Safety appliance.

    (a) Couplers. (1) The leading and trailing ends of each semi-
permanently connected trainset shall be equipped with an automatic 
coupler that couples on impact and uncouples by either activation of a 
traditional uncoupling lever, or some other type of uncoupling 
mechanism that does not require a person to go between equipment units.
    (2) The leading and trailing end couplers and uncoupling devices 
may be stored within a removable shrouded housing.
    (3) Leading and trailing automatic couplers of trains shall be 
compatible with the Railroad's rescue locomotives without the use of 
special adapters.
    (4) All couplers shall be equipped with an anti-climbing mechanism 
capable of resisting an upward or downward vertical force of 250 kN 
(56,200 lb) without permanent deformation.
    (b) Safety appliance mechanical strength and fasteners. (1) All 
handrails and sill steps shall be made of approximately 25 mm (1 in.) 
diameter steel pipe.
    (2) All safety appliances shall be securely fastened to the carbody 
structure with mechanical fasteners that have mechanical strength 
greater than or equal to that of a M10 diameter SAE steel bolt 
mechanical fastener.
    (c) Handrails and handholds.  (1) Handrails and handholds shall be 
made of stainless steel.
    (2) Vertical handrails shall conform to the following:
    (i) The maximum distance above top of rail to the bottom of the 
handrail shall be 1250 mm (49.2 in) and the minimum distance shall be 
500 mm (19.7 in);
    (ii) Minimum hand clearance distance between the handrail and the 
vehicle body shall be 50 mm (1.97 in) for the entire length; and
    (iii) Vertical handrails shall be securely fastened to the vehicle 
body.
    (3) Handholds and handrails are not required on units of the 
trainset which are semi-permanently connected, which can be 
disconnected only in a repair facility.
    (4) Handholds and handrails are not required at the leading and 
trailing ends of the trainset equipped with automatic couplers, as 
these couplers are to be used only for rescue operations, and coupling 
can be achieved without requiring personnel to go between units.
    (5) Passenger handrails or handholds shall be provided at both side 
access doors used to board or depart the train.
    (6) Power vehicle side exits shall be equipped with handholds and 
handrails.
    (d) Sill steps. (1) Each power vehicle or control cab shall be 
equipped with sill steps below each side door;
    (2) Power vehicle or control cab sill steps shall be made of 
expanded metal or equivalent anti-skid material;
    (3) Sill steps shall be designed and installed so that:
    (4) The minimum tread length of the sill step shall be 250 mm (9.8 
in);
    (5) The minimum clear depth shall be 150 mm (5.9 in);
    (6) Sill steps shall not have a vertical rise between treads 
exceeding 450 mm (17.7 in). The lowest sill step tread shall be not 
more than 500 mm (19.7 in) above the top of the rail;
    (7) All sill steps shall be securely fastened;
    (8) Sill steps are not required on units of the trainset that are 
semi-permanently connected, which can be disconnected only in a repair 
facility;
    (9) Sill steps are not required at the leading and trailing ends of 
the trainset equipped with automatic couplers as these couplers are to 
be used only for rescue operations, and coupling can be achieved 
without requiring personnel to go between units.
    (10) Power vehicle side exits shall be equipped with sill steps.
    (e) Semi-permanent connectors between trainset vehicles. Each 
trailer car and power car in a trainset shall be connected to the 
adjacent trailer car or power car by use of a semi-permanent connector. 
Semi-permanent connectors may be disconnected only in repair 
facilities, with the use of special tools, and in such a manner that do 
not require employees to go on, under, or between equipment. Semi-
permanent connectors are not couplers.


Sec. 243.433  Trainset inspection, testing and maintenance 
requirements.

    (a) The Railroad shall develop a written inspection program for the 
rolling stock, in accordance with and approved under the requirements 
of Subpart B, prior to implementation of that program and prior to 
commencing operations. At a minimum, this program shall include the 
complete inspection, testing, and maintenance program for the TGV 
trainset as it is performed in France, including all inspections set 
forth in paragraph (f) below. This information shall include a detailed 
description of:
    (1) Safety inspection procedures, intervals and criteria;
    (2) Test procedures and intervals;
    (3) Scheduled preventive maintenance intervals;
    (4) Maintenance procedures;
    (5) Special test equipment or measuring devices required to perform 
safety inspections and tests;
    (6) Training and qualification of employees and contractors to 
perform safety inspections, tests and maintenance; and
    (7) Methods of ensuring accurate records of required inspections.
    (b) Identification of safety-critical items. In the program 
required by paragraph (a), the Railroad shall identify all inspection 
and testing procedures and criteria, and maintenance intervals that the 
Railroad deems to be safety-critical. Operation of emergency equipment, 
emergency back-up systems, and trainset exits shall be deemed safety-
critical.
    (c) Program changes. The Railroad must obtain FRA approval for any 
changes to the safety-critical portion of the trainset inspection, 
testing, and maintenance program required by paragraph (a).
    (d) Compliance. After the Railroad's inspection, testing, and 
maintenance program is approved by FRA pursuant to the requirements and 
procedures set forth in Subpart B, the Railroad shall adopt the program 
and shall perform:
    (1) All inspections and tests described in the program in 
accordance with the procedures and criteria that the Railroad 
identified as safety-critical; and
    (2) All maintenance tasks and procedures described in the program 
in accordance with the procedures and intervals that the railroad 
identified as safety-critical.
    (e) The inspection, testing, and maintenance program shall ensure 
that all systems and components of the equipment are free of conditions 
that endanger the safety of the crew, passengers, or equipment. These 
conditions include, but are not limited to:
    (1) A continuous accumulation of oil or grease;
    (2) Improper functioning of a component;
    (3) A crack, break, excessive wear, structural defect or weakness 
of a component;
    (4) A leak;

[[Page 65563]]

    (5) Use of a component or system under conditions that exceed those 
for which the component or system is designed to operate; and
    (6) Insecure attachment of a component.
    (f) Specific safety inspections. The program under paragraph (a) of 
this section shall specify that all passenger equipment shall receive 
thorough safety inspections by qualified personnel at regular 
intervals. At a minimum, each trainset shall have:
    (1) Daily inspection. Each trainset in use shall be inspected at 
least once each calendar day by qualified personnel. The inspection 
shall verify the correct operation of all on-board safety systems. If 
any of the conditions listed below are found during this inspection, 
the trainset shall not be put into revenue service until that condition 
is rectified. If the existence of any condition listed below cannot be 
determined by use of the on-board automated monitoring system, the 
Railroad shall perform a visual inspection to determine if the 
condition exists.
    (i) Malfunction of the driving assistance system (SIAC);
    (ii) Malfunction of the fire detection system;
    (iii) Indication of an unbalanced tripod;
    (iv) Indication of a broken tripod;
    (v) Indication of blocked axle;
    (vi) A single phase pantograph or its circuit breaker out of order;
    (vii) Power car failure or cut-out;
    (viii) Isolated roof disconnecting switch H(HT);
    (ix) Transformer cooling or ventilation out of order;
    (x) Two or more motor blocks isolated;
    (xi) Mechanical brake on one or more trucks isolated;
    (xii) Total failure of the anti-slide device on one truck;
    (xiii) Failure of locomotive engineer's vigilance system (VACMA);
    (xiv) Speedometer failure;
    (xv) Failure of on-board signaling system;
    (xvi) Failure of the speed measuring system (the warning flag of 
the speedometer does not disappear when the driving cab is activated);
    (xvii) Locomotive engineer's console out of order;
    (xviii) Locomotive engineer's brake valve not operating;
    (xix) Leak in the main reservoir line;
    (xx) Leak in the main brake pipe;
    (xxi) Failure indication during the required brake test;
    (xxii) Trailer car battery charger out of order; and
    (xxiii) Total failure of the trainset interior lighting.
    (2) Examination in service. A visual inspection conducted by 
qualified personnel every 4000 km (2,485 mi), at a location where there 
is a repair pit and access to the top of the trainset. At a minimum, 
the items listed below shall be inspected. All conditions found that do 
not comply with the safety inspection criteria required by paragraph 
(a) of this section shall be corrected before the trainset is put into 
revenue service.
    (i) Condition of the pantographs and roof insulators;
    (ii) Condition of sanding nozzles;
    (iii) Fixation and condition of dampers;
    (iv) Condition of suspension springs;
    (v) Fixation and condition of grounding straps;
    (vi) Condition of side skirts and underbody panels;
    (vii) Condition of trucks;
    (viii) Oil levels;
    (ix) Traction motor-to-carbody securement;
    (x) Presence of brake pads;
    (xi) Condition of brake shoes;
    (xii) Condition of wheel tread;
    (xiii) Condition of drive train.
    (3) Running gear inspection. The running gear shall be inspected by 
qualified personnel once every 18 days. At a minimum, the items listed 
below shall be inspected. All conditions found that do not comply with 
the safety inspection criteria required by paragraph (a) of this 
section shall be corrected before the trainset is put into revenue 
service.
    (i) A visual inspection of trucks;
    (ii) An inspection of the operation of flange-lubricating devices;
    (iii) An inspection of the condition and attachment of dampers, 
roof mounted elements, and suspension components;
    (iv) An inspection of the brake rigging, journal bearings, and 
tripod transmission
    (v) A visual inspection of the condition and attachment of brake 
pads;
    (vi) An inspection of the oil levels on drive train;
    (vii) An inspection of the securement of drive train and wheel 
slide sensors;
    (viii) An inspection of the condition of the pantographs and roof 
insulators; and
    (ix) Check for audible leaks on pneumatic system.
    (4) Wheel inspection. Each trainset wheel and reprofile shall be 
inspected by qualified personnel at an interval not to exceed 50,000 km 
of travel. Equipment not in compliance with the inspection criteria 
established in paragraph (a) of this section shall be replaced before 
the wheel or reprofile returns to revenue service.
    (5) Minor inspection. At an interval not to exceed 150,000 km of 
travel or 7 months of time, whichever comes first, the Railroad shall 
perform a Minor Inspection on all trainsets in accordance with the test 
procedures and inspection criteria established in paragraph (a) of this 
section. All conditions found that do not comply with the safety 
inspection criteria required by paragraph (a) shall be corrected before 
the trainset is put into revenue service. The Minor Inspection shall 
include:
    (i) Electrical Parts:
    (A) Inspect current return devices, antennas, and transponders;
    (B) Examine batteries;
    (C) Check operation of lighting;
    (D) Check operation of speedometer unit and of cab signal receptor;
    (E) Check sensors and sensor protectors;
    (F) Check roof switches and contacts;
    (G) Check circuit breakers; and
    (H) Check traction motors and main transformers.
    (ii) Mechanical Parts:
    (A) Inspect axles, axle boxes and trucks;
    (B) Check tightening torque of shock absorber and support mounting 
bolts;
    (C) Check buffing gear;
    (D) Inspect pantographs;
    (E) Check attachment of anti-roll bars;
    (F) Examine condition of guard-irons;
    (G) Check setting of sanders;
    (H) Verify proper operation of flange-lubricating devices;
    (I) Check level and condition of oil on motor and reducing gears;
    (J) Check attachment of geared motors;
    (K) Check for grease projections from the motive force transmission 
components, and carrying and fixed rings of the articulation joint;
    (L) Check attachment of motive force transmission components and 
tripod transmission;
    (M) Check condition of motorized axle torque reaction rods;
    (N) Check condition of brake-units and brake shoes;
    (O) Check condition of disk brake pads and of the brake rigging 
cylinder assembly;
    (P) Check condition of bellows;
    (Q) Check for attachment defects and distortions on car body 
components, including underside panels, skirts, windows, and fairings;
    (R) Verify proper operation of all doors, including locking 
devices;
    (S) Check for defects on front power car windows;
    (T) Inspect fire extinguishers, emergency safety equipment and 
tools, including the tink hammer; and
    (U) Inspect tachometer and odometer sensors.

[[Page 65564]]

    (iii) Pneumatic Parts:
    (A) Inspect main compressor for proper operation;
    (B) Check oil level and leaks in the compressor;
    (C) Inspect condition of pneumatic suspension components; and
    (D) Inspect brake equipment and brake indicator lamps.
    (6) General inspection. At an interval not to exceed 300,000 km of 
travel or 13 months of time, whichever comes first, the Railroad shall 
perform a General Inspection of all trainsets in accordance with the 
tests procedures and inspection criteria established in paragraph (a) 
of this section. All conditions found that do not comply with the 
safety inspection criteria required by paragraph (a) shall be corrected 
before the trainset is put into revenue service. The General Inspection 
shall include all items required in the Minor Inspection and:
    (i) Electrical Parts:
    (A) Inspect circuit breakers;
    (B) Examine insulators;
    (C) Inspect main transformers;
    (D) Inspect braids and connecting shunts, sensors and sensor 
protectors;
    (E) Examine electro-pneumatic and electromagnetic contacts;
    (F) Inspect freon enclosures;
    (G) Check for anomalies on resistors;
    (H) Check operation of signaling lights;
    (I) Visual inspection of diodes and antennas;
    (J) Check condition of electronic plug-in units;
    (K) Check condition of switches, controls, and joints;
    (L) Check condition of master controller;
    (M) Check operation of clock and indicator of imposed speed;
    (N) Check operation of ground-to-train radio link and speed 
supervision by transponder;
    (O) Check operation of passenger alarms;
    (P) Inspect antenna;
    (Q) Verify that headlights, tail lights, indicators, lighting, 
desks operate properly in full and dimmed status;
    (R) Verify power supply to electrical outlets that are accessible 
to passengers and service personnel;
    (S) Check operation of lights and indicators in electrical 
cabinets;
    (T) Inspect traction, main, auxiliary compressor, and ventilation 
motors; and
    (U) Check operation of refrigeration system and circuit breakers.
    (ii) Mechanical Parts:
    (A) Check operation of pantographs;
    (B) Check for defects, including cracks and distortions, on trucks;
    (C) Check for defects and check play on fixed and carrying rings of 
articulation joint;
    (D) Check for defects on intercar passageways;
    (E) Check for defects on doors, locks, and joints;
    (F) Check interbody and anti-tilt dampers;
    (G) Check tread brake units; and
    (H) Check underbody rotation stops.
    (iii) Pneumatic Parts:
    (A) Check pressure gauge;
    (B) Check operation of braking gear;
    (C) Check operation of the anti-wheelslide device;
    (D) Check operation of the emergency brake valve;
    (E) Clean driver's brake valve and check its operation;
    (F) Inspect flexible and half-couplings;
    (G) Check operation of valves which control alarms, windshield 
washers, windshield wipers, and of differential valves; and
    (H) Check brake indicator lights.
    (7) Major inspection. At an interval not to exceed 600,000 km of 
travel or 25 months of time, whichever comes first, the Railroad shall 
perform a Major Inspection on all trainsets in accordance with the 
tests procedures and inspection criteria established in paragraph (a) 
of this section. All conditions found that do not comply with the 
safety inspection criteria required by paragraph (a) shall be corrected 
before the trainset is put into revenue service. The Major Inspection 
shall include all items required in the General Inspection and:
    (i) Electrical Parts:
    (A) Inspect roof cable and lightning arresters;
    (B) Inspect operation of the roof switch;
    (C) Inspect battery switches;
    (D) Inspect battery charger and battery voltmeter;
    (E) Inspect inverters;
    (F) Examine coils;
    (G) Clean electronic gear;
    (H) Inspect couplers and connecting cables;
    (I) Inspect driver's console switch box;
    (J) Test driver's vigilance system;
    (K) Pre-departure sensors;
    (L) Inspect operation of cab signal;
    (M) Clean switchgear cabinets;
    (N) Lubricate traction motors;
    (O) Inspect ammeters and key switch panel;
    (P) Inspect 30 KVA inverter; and
    (R) Inspect spare light bulb supply.
    (ii) Mechanical Parts:
    (A) Inspect calibration of pantographs;
    (B) Inspect for defects on motorized axle reaction rods;
    (C) Inspect the constituents of fixed and carrying rings of 
articulation joint;
    (D) Inspect that headlight covers are tightly secured; and
    (E) Inspect for defects on car body exterior paint.
    (iii) Pneumatic Parts:
    (A) Inspect air and oil filters;
    (B) Inspect main compressor couplings;
    (C) Inspect operation of the main air dryer;
    (D) Inspect operation of pressure gauges;
    (E) Inspect pneumatic suspension reservoirs;
    (F) Inspect operation of power car and trailer car brakes;
    (G) Inspect operation of pneumatic pressure regulators;
    (H) Inspect truck-to-car body coupling and pneumatic suspension 
connections; and
    (I) Inspect operation of the spring-applied parking brake.
    (g) Brake system repair points. The Railroad shall designate brake 
system repair point(s) in the inspection criteria established in 
paragraph (a) of this section. No trainset shall depart a brake system 
repair point unless that trainset has a 100 percent operational brake 
system.
    (h) Maintenance intervals. The Railroad's program established 
pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section shall include the Railroad's 
scheduled maintenance intervals for equipment based on TGV operations 
in Europe, and on an analysis required the system safety program set 
forth in Subpart B of this Part. The maintenance interval of a safety-
critical components shall be changed only when justified by 
accumulated, verifiable operating data, and approved by FRA as part of 
a system safety plan amendment.
    (i) Training and qualification program. The Railroad shall 
establish a training and qualification program as defined in Subpart H 
of this Part to qualify individuals to perform inspections, testing, 
and maintenance on the equipment. Only qualified individuals shall 
perform inspections, testing, and maintenance of the equipment. An 
employee or contractor employee shall have knowledge of standard 
procedures described in paragraph (h) of this section in order to 
qualify to perform a task.
    (j) Standard procedures for safely performing inspection, testing, 
maintenance, or repairs. The Railroad's program required by paragraph 
(a) of this section shall include the Railroad's written standard 
procedures for performing all safety-critical equipment inspection, 
testing, maintenance, or repair tasks. These standard procedures shall:

[[Page 65565]]

    (1) Describe in detail each step required to safely perform the 
task;
    (2) Describe the knowledge necessary to safely perform the task;
    (3) Describe any precautions that must be taken to safely perform 
the task;
    (4) Describe the use of any safety equipment necessary to perform 
the task;
    (5) Be approved by the railroad's chief mechanical officer;
    (6) Be approved by the railroad's official responsible for safety;
    (7) Be enforced by supervisors with responsibility for 
accomplishing the tasks; and
    (8) Be reviewed annually by the Railroad.
    (k) Quality control program. The Railroad shall establish an 
inspection, testing, and maintenance quality control program enforced 
by the Railroad or its contractor(s) to reasonably ensure that 
inspections, tests, and maintenance are performed in accordance with 
Federal safety standards and the procedures established by the 
railroad.
    (l) Recordkeeping. The Railroad shall make and maintain a written 
or electronic record of each required inspection under this section. 
Each record shall be maintained for at least one year from the date of 
the inspection.

Subpart F--Operating Rules


Sec. 243.501  Purpose.

    Through the requirements of this Subpart, FRA learns the condition 
of the operating and emergency preparedness rules and practices in use 
by the Railroad. The Railroad's operating rules, and any amendments 
thereto, are subject to FRA approval in accordance with the procedures 
set forth in Sec. 243.509 of this Subpart. The rules and practices 
covered by this Subpart include the procedures for instruction and 
testing of all employees involved with the movement of rail vehicles, 
including locomotive engineers, on-board attendants, central control 
staff, and all maintenance staff, which are necessary to ensure that 
they possess the requisite skill and knowledge of the rules and 
operating practices to maintain the safety of the system.


Sec. 243.503  Operating rules; filing and recordkeeping.

    (a) The Railroad shall file with FRA one copy of its code of 
operating rules, timetables, timetable special instructions six months 
prior to commencing internal operations, and one year prior to 
commencing any revenue passenger transportation operations. The 
Railroad shall designate those rules, practices, and procedures that it 
deems safety-critical. Upon FRA approval of the operating rules 
pursuant to the procedures set forth in Sec. 243.509, FRA will adopt 
and incorporate the safety-critical operating rules as Appendix C to 
this Part. The Railroad's Emergency Preparedness Plan shall be filed in 
accordance with the requirements of FRA's Passenger Train Emergency 
Standards as ultimately codified in 49 CFR part 239, as amended.
    (b) The Railroad shall file each amendment to its code of operating 
rules, each new timetable, and each new timetable special instruction 
within 30 days after it is issued.
    (c) The Railroad shall keep one copy of its current code of 
operating rules, timetables, timetable special instruction, at its 
system headquarters, and shall make such records available to 
representatives of the FRA for inspection and copying during normal 
business hours. These records shall be retained at the Railroad's 
system headquarters for one year after the end of the calendar year to 
which they relate.
    (d) Any person who fails to comply with a safety-critical operating 
rule or practice, including timetables, timetable special instructions, 
or operational directives, issued pursuant to this Subpart and adopted 
and incorporated by reference in Appendix C to this rule, is subject to 
a civil penalty or other enforcement action for violation of those 
safety-critical rules and practices, in accordance with Sec. 243.9 of 
this Part.


Sec. 243.505  Program of operational tests and inspections; 
recordkeeping.

    (a) Requirement to conduct operational tests and inspections. The 
Railroad shall periodically conduct operational tests and inspections 
to determine the extent of compliance with its code of operating rules, 
timetables, timetable special instructions, and inspection, testing, 
and maintenance program in accordance with a written program retained 
at its system headquarters.
    (b) Written program of operational tests and inspections. Three 
months prior to commencing operations, and six months prior to 
commencing any revenue passenger service operations, the Railroad shall 
file and retain one copy of its current program for periodic 
performance of the operational tests and inspections required by 
paragraph (a) of this section, and shall file and retain one copy of 
each subsequent amendment to such program as amendments are made. These 
records shall be retained at the system headquarters of the Railroad 
for three calendar years after the end of the calendar year to which 
they relate. These records shall be made available to representatives 
of the FRA for inspection and copying during normal business hours. The 
program shall:
    (1) Provide for operational testing and inspection under the 
various operating conditions on the Railroad;
    (2) Describe each type of operational test and inspection adopted, 
including the means and procedures used to carry it out;
    (3) State the purpose of each type of operational test and 
inspection;
    (4) State, according to operating divisions where applicable, the 
frequency with which each type of operational test and inspection is 
conducted;
    (5) Begin within 30 days after the date of commencing operations; 
and
    (6) Include a schedule for making the program fully operative 
within 210 days after it begins.
    (c) Records of individual tests and inspections. The Railroad shall 
keep a record of the date, time, place, and result of each operational 
test and inspection that was performed in accordance with its program. 
Each record shall specify the officer administering the test and 
inspection and each employee tested. These records shall be retained at 
the system headquarters of the Railroad for one calendar year after the 
end of the calendar year to which they relate. These records shall be 
made available to representatives of the Federal Railroad 
Administration for inspection and copying during normal business hours.
    (d) Annual summary on operational tests and inspections. Before 
March 1 of each calendar year, the Railroad shall retain, at its system 
headquarters, one copy of a written summary of the following with 
respect to its previous year's activities: The number, type, and result 
of each operational test and inspection that was conducted as required 
by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section. These records shall be 
retained for three calendar years after the end of the calendar year to 
which they relate and shall be made available to representatives of FRA 
for inspection and copying during normal business hours.
    (e) Electronic recordkeeping. The Railroad is authorized to retain 
by electronic recordkeeping the information prescribed in paragraphs 
(b) through (d) of this section, provided that all of the following 
conditions are met:
    (1) The Railroad adequately limits and controls accessibility to 
such information retained in its electronic

[[Page 65566]]

database system and identifies those individuals who have such access;
    (2) The Railroad has a terminal at the system headquarters and at 
each division headquarters;
    (3) Each such terminal has a desk-top computer (i.e., monitor, 
central processing unit, and keyboard) and either a facsimile machine 
or a printer connected to the computer to retrieve and produce 
information in a usable format for immediate review by FRA 
representatives;
    (4) The Railroad has a designated representative who is authorized 
to authenticate retrieved information from the electronic system as 
true and accurate copies of the electronically kept records; and
    (5) The Railroad provides representatives of the Federal Railroad 
Administration with immediate access to these records for inspection 
and copying during normal business hours and provides printouts of such 
records upon request.


Sec. 243.507  Program of instruction on operating rules; recordkeeping; 
electronic recordkeeping.

    (a) To ensure that each Railroad employee whose activities are 
governed by the Railroad's operating rules understands those rules, the 
Railroad shall periodically instruct each such employee on the meaning 
and application of its operating rules in accordance with a written 
program retained at its system headquarters and at the division 
headquarters.
    (b) Three months before commencing operations, and six months 
before commencing any revenue passenger service operations, the 
Railroad shall file and retain one copy of its current program for the 
periodic instruction of its employees as required by paragraph (a) of 
this section and shall file and retain one copy of any amendment to 
that program as amendments are made. These records shall be retained at 
the Railroad's system headquarters for one calendar year after the end 
of the calendar year to which they relate. These records shall be made 
available to representatives of the FRA for inspection and copying 
during normal business hours. This program shall:
    (1) Describe the means and procedures used for instruction of the 
various classes of affected employees;
    (2) State the frequency of instruction and the basis for 
determining that frequency;
    (3) Include a schedule for completing the initial instruction of 
employees who are already employed when the program begins;
    (4) Begin on the date of commencing operations; and
    (5) Provide for initial instruction of each employee hired after 
the program begins.
    (c) The Railroad to which this Subpart applies is authorized to 
retain by electronic recordkeeping its program for periodic instruction 
of its employees on operating rules, provided that the requirements 
stated in Sec. 243.505(e)(1)-(5) of this Subpart are satisfied.


Sec. 243.509  Operating rules approval.

    (a) The Railroad shall submit its operating rules to FRA's 
Associate Administrator for Safety for review, within the time 
intervals required by this Subpart. FRA shall notify the Railroad, in 
writing, within 90 days of receipt of the Railroad's submission, that 
the rules are approved, disapproved, or disapproved in part. If 
disapproved or disapproved in part, FRA shall explain the reason on 
which the disapproval is based, and the measures needed to obtain 
approval.
    (b) The Railroad shall submit any amendment to its operating rules 
to FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety for review, within 30 days 
after it is issued. The Railroad's amendment shall go into effect until 
such time that FRA notifies the Railroad, in writing, that such 
amendment is disapproved or disapproved in part. If disapproved, FRA 
shall explain the reason on which the disapproval is based, and the 
measures needed to obtain approval.
    (c) In the course of the approval process set forth in this 
section, the Railroad shall provide to FRA supporting documentation 
that FRA deems necessary to assess accurately the level of safety 
provided for in the Railroad's operating rules.

Subpart G--System Qualification Tests


Sec. 243.601  Responsibility for verification demonstrations and tests.

    The Railroad shall comply with the pre-revenue qualification tests 
and verification requirements set forth in this Subpart and in Subpart 
B to demonstrate the overall safety of the system, prior to revenue 
operations.


Sec. 243.603  Preparation of test plan.

    (a) Prior to commencing revenue service operations and in 
accordance with Subpart B of this Part, the Railroad shall develop a 
system-wide test plan, that includes testing procedures, to demonstrate 
the operability of all system elements, including track and 
infrastructure, signal, communications, rolling stock, software, and 
operating practices, and the system as a whole. After receiving FRA 
approval of the pre-revenue service test plan as part of the system 
safety plan approval, and prior to commencing revenue service, the 
Railroad shall adopt and comply with the approved plan, including 
completion of all tests required by the plan.
    (b) The plan shall be made available to FRA for inspection and 
copying upon request.
    (c) The plan shall include all of the following elements:
    (1) A clear statement of the test objectives. One of the principal 
test objectives shall be to demonstrate that the Railroad's system 
meets the safety design and performance requirements specified in this 
Part when operated in the environment in which it will be used;
    (2) A schedule for conducting the tests;
    (3) A description of the Railroad property or facilities to be used 
to conduct the tests;
    (4) A detailed description of how the tests are to be conducted. 
This description shall include:
    (i) An identification of the systems and equipment to be tested;
    (ii) The method by which the systems and equipment shall be tested;
    (iii) The criteria to be used to evaluate the system's and 
equipment's performance; and
    (iv) The means by which the test results will be reported to FRA.
    (5) A description of any special instrumentation to be used during 
the tests;
    (6) A description of the information or data to be obtained;
    (7) A description of how the information or data obtained is to be 
analyzed or used;
    (8) A clear description of any criteria to be used as safety limits 
during the testing;
    (9) A description of the criteria to be used to measure or 
determine the success or failure of the tests. If system qualification 
is to be based on extrapolation of less than full-level testing 
results, the analysis done to justify the validity of the extrapolation 
shall be described.
    (10) A description of any special safety precautions to be observed 
during the testing;
    (11) A written set of standard operating procedures to be used to 
ensure that the testing is done safely;
    (12) Quality control procedures to ensure that the inspection, 
testing, and maintenance procedures are followed; and
    (13) A demonstration of the inspection criteria to be used for the 
revenue service operation of the Railroad's system.

[[Page 65567]]

    (d) The test plan shall include steps to:
    (1) Verify results of installation tests performed by contractors 
and manufacturers;
    (2) Conduct pre-operational testing of individual safety-related 
equipment, facilities, and subsystems; and
    (3) Conduct operational testing of the system safety.
    (e) The test plan shall include detailed, written procedures for 
the testing and start-up of all safety-critical equipment, facilities, 
and subsystems installed on the line, in passenger stations, in 
maintenance shops, and on the trainsets.


Sec. 243.605  Pre-operational qualification tests.

    (a) The Railroad shall conduct pre-operational qualification tests, 
prior to commencing revenue operations, to verify that all safety-
critical components meet all functional and all performance 
specifications.
    (b) The pre-operational qualification tests of equipment, 
facilities, and subsystems shall include, at a minimum:
    (1) Verification of the correct utility supply circuits, procedures 
for energization and de-energization, and formal permit-to-work 
procedures;
    (2) Verification of the installation of radio communication 
equipment that is compatible with existing systems and suitable for 
integration into the planned network; and
    (3) Verification of the operation of the dedicated telephone 
systems in facilities and along the right-of-way;
    (4) Verification of the operation of all safety-related equipment 
in the maintenance shop;
    (5) Verification of local control of substation equipment;
    (6) Energization of substations and verification of formal permit-
to-work procedures;
    (7) Continuity testing of the overhead catenary system and rail 
return circuits;
    (8) High-potential testing of traction power supply feeders and the 
overhead catenary system;
    (9) Energization of each section of the overhead catenary system 
and verification of formal permit-to-work procedures;
    (10) Verification of yard and shop overhead catenary system 
sectionalizing for power isolation during vehicle maintenance;
    (11) Verification of compliance with civil works and track 
standards;
    (12) Verification that all civil works, support structures, and 
installations are correctly positioned with respect to mechanical and 
electrical clearance envelopes, and with the Railroad's structure and 
clearance diagrams;
    (13) Verification that the dimensions of the vehicles are in 
compliance with the Railroad's structure and clearance diagrams;
    (14) Verification of correct operation of all wayside detectors;
    (15) Verification of safe operation of signal system and central 
traffic control functions;
    (16) Verification of local operation of track switching and signal 
system equipment;
    (17) Verification of all on-board trainset safety-critical 
components;
    (18) Verification of all emergency preparedness procedures; and
    (19) Verification that the system's software operates as intended, 
is reliable and crash-resistant, is impenetrable to unauthorized entry, 
and interacts redundantly as designed.


Sec. 243.607  Integrated operational testing of systems.

    (a) Prior to commencing revenue operations, the Railroad shall 
conduct high speed tests of the trainsets throughout the system to:
    (1) Apply dynamic loads to track and bridge structures;
    (2) Verify vehicle clearances to structures and platforms;
    (3) Verify mechanical positioning of the overhead catenary system; 
and
    (4) Verify performance of the vehicle, track, power supply, signal 
and communication systems.
    (b) The Railroad shall demonstrate safe operation of the system 
during normal and degraded-mode operating conditions. At a minimum, the 
following operation tests shall be performed:
    (1) Short-circuit tests to check power supply protection circuits 
and signal system immunization;
    (2) Slow-speed operation of a trainset;
    (3) Verification of correct overhead catenary and pantograph 
interaction;
    (4) Verification of vehicle clearance at structures and passenger 
platforms;
    (5) Incremental increase of train speed;
    (6) Performance tests on vehicles to verify braking rates;
    (7) Verification that vehicle noise and vibration are in compliance 
with codes and regulations;
    (8) Verification of correct vehicle suspension characteristics;
    (9) Verification of ride quality at operating speeds established in 
test plan;
    (10) Verification of track and civil structure performance under 
dynamic load, which shall meet the following requirements:
    (i) Each rolling stock type shall be qualified for its intended 
speed in order to demonstrate that the vehicle dynamic response to 
track alignment and geometry variations are within acceptable limits to 
assure safe operation;
    (ii) The qualification testing shall insure that the equipment will 
not exceed the wheel/rail force safety limits specified in the table in 
section 4.37 and the limits for ride vibration specified in section 
5.13(e) at any speed less than 16 km/h (10 mph) above the proposed 
maximum operating speed;
    (iii) The Railroad shall establish a target maximum testing speed 
that is at least 16 km/h (10 mph) above the proposed maximum revenue 
service speed, appropriate target test and operating conditions, and 
conduct a test program sufficient to evaluate the operating limits of 
the track and equipment in order to gather the test data required to 
support the analysis required above. The test program shall demonstrate 
vehicle dynamic response as speeds are incrementally increased from 160 
km/h (100 mph) to the target maximum test speeds. The test shall be 
suspended at that speed where any of the vehicle/track performance 
limits in this section are exceeded;
    (iv) At the conclusion of the testing phase, the Railroad shall 
complete test runs with the subject equipment over the entire route 
proposed for revenue service, when maximum safe operating speed has 
been determined taking into account permissible levels of cant 
deficiency. These concluding tests shall be conducted:
    (A) At the speeds the Railroad will request FRA to approve for 
service; and
    (B) At 16 km/h (10 mph) above such speed; and
    (v) The Railroad shall submit a report of the test procedures and 
results to FRA upon completion of the tests. The test report shall 
include the design flange angle of the equipment that applied to the 
criteria for the ratio of lateral forces that any wheel exerts on an 
individual rail to the vertical force exerted on the rail. This flange 
angle shall be used in the determination of the lateral to vertical 
wheel load safety limit for the track/vehicle performance measurements 
required by Subpart D.
    (11) Load tests with vehicles to verify relay settings and signal 
and communication system immunization;
    (12) Monitoring of utility supply circuits and telephone circuits 
to ensure the adequacy of power supplies, and to verify that transit-
related disturbances are within acceptable limits;

[[Page 65568]]

    (13) Verification of vehicle detection due to shunting of signal 
system circuits;
    (14) Verification of correct signal status indications;
    (15) Verification of safe operation of automatic train control 
(ATC) system;
    (16) Tests of vehicle radio reception during system-wide vehicle 
operation; and
    (17) Verification that the system's software operates as intended, 
is reliable and crash-resistant, is impenetrable to unauthorized entry, 
and interacts redundantly as designed.


Sec. 243.609  Pre-revenue service testing.

    For a period of four or more months prior to revenue operations, 
the Railroad shall conduct pre-revenue service tests that include 
simulation of full revenue service operation to verify overall system 
performance, and provide operating and maintenance experience. The 
frequency and duration of the tests shall be determined in conjunction 
with preparation of the Railroad's system safety plan and approved by 
FRA, as set forth in Subpart B of this Part.


Sec. 243.611  Verification of compliance.

    (a) The Railroad shall prepare a report detailing the results of 
all pre-operational and pre-revenue service qualification tests. The 
report shall identify any problems encountered during testing, and 
alternative actions necessary to correct defects in workmanship, 
materials, equipment, design, or operating parameters.
    (b) The Railroad shall implement all alternative actions necessary 
to correct defects, as identified by the report.
    (c) The Railroad shall submit the report to FRA 60 days prior to 
commencing revenue operations.

Subpart H--Personnel Qualification Requirements


Sec. 243.701  General requirements.

    (a) The Railroad shall develop and implement a personnel 
qualification training program to meet the requirements set forth in 
Sec. 243.109 of this Part, to provide all employees who perform safety-
related duties the knowledge and skills necessary to effectively 
complete safety-related duties.
    (b) As part of this program, the Railroad shall, at a minimum:
    (1) Identify the safety-related tasks that must be performed on the 
Railroad's system, including all emergency preparedness tasks required 
by this Part;
    (2) Develop written procedures for the performance of the tasks 
identified;
    (3) Identify the skills and knowledge necessary to perform each 
task;
    (4) Develop a training course that includes classroom and ``hands-
on'' instruction designed to impart the skills and knowledge identified 
as necessary to perform each task;
    (5) Require all employees to successfully complete the training 
course that covers the system, equipment, and tasks for which they are 
responsible;
    (6) Require all employees to pass a written examination covering 
the system, equipment, and tasks for which they are responsible;
    (7) Require all employees to demonstrate ``hands-on'' capability to 
perform their assigned tasks;
    (8) Require supervisors to complete the program that covers the 
employees that they supervise;
    (9) Require supervisors to exercise oversight to ensure that all 
the identified tasks are performed in accordance with the Railroad's 
written procedures;
    (10) Complete required training of the work force prior to the 
start of revenue service;
    (11) Designate in writing that each employee has the knowledge and 
skills necessary to perform the safety-related tasks for which she or 
he is responsible;
    (12) Require periodic refresher training at an interval not to 
exceed three years that includes classroom instruction, ``hands-on'' 
training, and testing;
    (13) Add new systems and equipment to the qualification and 
designation program prior to introduction into revenue service; and
    (14) Maintain records for the duration of the employee's employment 
which demonstrate that each employee performing safety-related tasks on 
the Railroad's system is currently qualified to do so. These records 
shall distinguish the qualifications of the employee as a qualified 
person.
    (c) The personnel qualification training program shall define the 
process by which the Railroad will ensure that all employees who 
perform safety-related duties are qualified to complete those duties. 
The program shall define the method by which the Railroad measures the 
knowledge and skills of all employees who perform safety-related 
duties.
    (d) With regard to the types of employees for whom specific 
qualification requirements are set forth in this Subpart, the 
Railroad's training program shall be designed and implemented to ensure 
that those employees meet those requirements.
    (e) The Railroad's personnel qualification training program for 
locomotive engineers shall follow the requirements set forth in 49 CFR 
part 240.
    (f) The Railroad may not permit any individual, whether an employee 
of the Railroad or of a contractor, to perform the functions described 
in this Subpart unless that individual meets the qualification 
standards of this Subpart and has been trained in a program that is 
designed to ensure that the individual meets those requirements.
    (g) All records required by this Subpart shall be maintained by the 
Railroad and available for FRA review for the duration of an employee's 
employment.

Track Personnel


Sec. 243.703  Personnel qualifications for track maintenance and 
inspection personnel.

    (a) General. The Railroad shall designate qualified individuals 
responsible for the maintenance and inspection of track in compliance 
with the safety requirements prescribed in Subpart D of this Part. Each 
designated individual, including contractors and their employees, must 
meet the minimum qualifications set forth in this Subpart.
    (b) Recordkeeping. With respect to the designation of individuals 
under this section, the Railroad shall maintain written records of:
    (1) Each designation in effect;
    (2) The basis for each designation, including but not limited to:
    (i) The exact nature of any training courses attended and the dates 
thereof;
    (ii) The manner in which the Railroad has determined a successful 
completion of that training course, including test scores or other 
qualifying results;


Sec. 243.705  Personnel qualified to supervise track restoration and 
renewal.

    (a) Each individual designated to supervise restorations and 
renewals of track shall have:
    (1) At least five years of responsible supervisory experience in 
railroad track maintenance of FRA track Class 4 or higher, and the 
successful completion of a course offered by the employer or by a 
college level engineering program, supplemented by special on-the-job 
training that emphasizes the techniques to be employed in the 
supervision, restoration, and renewal of high speed track;
    (2) A combination of at least one year of responsible supervisory 
experience in track maintenance in FRA Track Class 4 or higher and the 
successful completion of a minimum of 80 hours of specialized

[[Page 65569]]

training in the maintenance of high speed track provided by the 
employer or by a college level engineering program, supplemented by 
special on-the-job training provided by the employer with emphasis on 
the maintenance of high speed track; or
    (3) A combination of at least two years of experience in track 
maintenance in FRA Track Class 4 or higher and the successful 
completion of a minimum of 120 hours of specialized training in the 
maintenance of high speed track provided by the employer or by a 
college level engineering program supplemented by special on the job 
training provided by the employer with emphasis on the maintenance of 
high speed track.
    (b) Each individual designated to supervise restorations and 
renewals of track shall demonstrate annually to the Railroad that the 
individual:
    (1) Knows and understands the requirements of Subpart D of this 
Part;
    (2) Can detect deviations from those requirements; and
    (3) Can prescribe appropriate remedial action to correct or safely 
compensate for those deviations.
    (c) Each individual designated to supervise restorations and 
renewals of track shall have written authorization from the Railroad to 
prescribe remedial actions to correct or safely compensate for 
deviations from the requirements of Subpart D of this Part and shall 
have successfully completed a recorded examination on Subpart D as part 
of the qualification process.


Sec. 243.707  Personnel qualified to inspect track.

    (a) Each individual designated to inspect track for defects, shall 
have:
    (1) At least five years of responsible experience inspecting track 
in FRA Track Class 4 or above, and the successful completion of a 
course offered by the Railroad or by a college level engineering 
program, supplemented by special on-the-job training that emphasizes 
the techniques to be employed in the inspection of high speed track; or
    (2) A combination of at least one year of responsible experience in 
track inspection in FRA Class 4 or above and the successful completion 
of a minimum of 80 hours of specialized training in the inspection of 
high speed track provided by the Railroad or by a college level 
engineering program, supplemented by special on-the-job training 
provided by the Railroad with emphasis on the inspection of high speed 
track; or
    (3) A combination of at least two years of experience in track 
maintenance in FRA Class 4 or above and the successful completion of a 
minimum of 120 hours of specialized training in the inspection of high 
speed track provided by the Railroad or from a college level 
engineering program, supplemented by special on-the-job training 
provided by the Railroad with emphasis on the inspection of high speed 
track.
    (b) Each individual designated to inspect track for defects shall 
demonstrate annually to the Railroad that the individual:
    (1) Knows and understands the requirements of Subpart D of this 
Part;
    (2) Can detect deviations from those requirements; and
    (3) Can prescribe appropriate remedial action to correct or safely 
compensate for those deviations.
    (c) Each individual designated to inspect track for defects shall 
have written authorization from the Railroad to prescribe remedial 
actions to correct or safely compensate for deviations from the 
requirements in Subpart D of this Part and shall have successfully 
completed a recorded examination on Subpart D as part of the 
qualification process.


Sec. 243.709  Personnel qualified to inspect and restore continuous 
welded rail.

    (a) Individuals designated under Secs. 243.705 and 243.707 may 
inspect continuous welded rail track (CWR) or supervise the 
installation, adjustment, and maintenance of CWR in accordance with the 
written procedures established by the Railroad, provided they have:
    (1) Current qualifications under either Sec. 243.705 or 
Sec. 243.707;
    (2) Successfully completed a training course of at least eight 
hours duration developed specifically for the application of written 
CWR procedures issued by the Railroad; and
    (3) Demonstrated to the Railroad that the individual:
    (i) Knows and understands the requirements of those written CWR 
procedures;
    (ii) Can detect deviations from those requirements; and
    (iii) Can prescribe appropriate remedial action to correct or 
safely compensate for those deviations.
    (b) Individuals designated to inspect CWR or supervise the 
installation, adjustment, and maintenance of CWR shall have written 
authorization from the Railroad to prescribe remedial actions to 
correct or safely compensate for deviations from the requirements in 
those procedures and must have successfully completed a recorded 
examination on those procedures as part of the qualification process. 
The recorded examination may be written, or in the form of a computer 
file with the results of an interactive training course.

Signal Personnel


Sec. 243.711  Personnel qualifications for signal maintenance and 
inspection personnel.

    (a) General. The Railroad shall designate qualified individuals 
responsible for the maintenance and inspection of the signal system in 
compliance with the safety requirements prescribed in Subpart C of this 
Part. Each designated individual, including contractors and their 
employees, shall meet the minimum qualifications set forth in this 
Subpart.
    (b) Recordkeeping. With respect to the designation of individuals 
under this section, the Railroad shall maintain written records of:
    (1) Each designation in effect;
    (2) The basis for each designation, including but not limited to:
    (i) The exact nature of any training courses attended and the dates 
thereof;
    (ii) The manner in which the Railroad has determined a successful 
completion of that training course, including test scores or other 
qualifying results;
    (3) Signal inspections made by each individual as required by 
Subpart C. These records must be made available for inspection and 
copying by the Federal Railroad Administrator during regular business 
hours.


Sec. 243.713  Personnel qualified signal inspector.

    (a) Each individual designated to inspect the Railroad's signal 
system shall have:
    (1) Six or more years of signal maintenance experience that 
includes specialized training in each three-year period provided by the 
Railroad; or
    (2) Four or more years of signal maintenance experience, and an 
associate degree in electrical engineering or related technical 
specialization, that includes training in each three-year period 
provided by the Railroad; or
    (3) Two or more years of signal maintenance experience and a 
bachelor's degree in electrical engineering or related technical 
specialization, that includes training in each three-year period 
provided by the Railroad.
    (b) Each individual designated to inspect the signal system for 
defects shall demonstrate annually to the Railroad that the individual:
    (1) Knows and understands the requirements of subpart C;
    (2) Can detect deviations from those requirements; and

[[Page 65570]]

    (3) Can prescribe appropriate remedial action to correct or safely 
compensate for those deviations.


Sec. 243.715  Personnel qualified as signal maintainer.

    (a) Each individual designated as a signal maintainer by the 
Railroad shall complete a training program during the first two years 
of employment by the Railroad. Upon successful completion of the 
training program, the signal maintainer shall be authorized to work in 
the proximity of high voltage lines and on signal equipment.
    (b) When required to maintain the signal system for defects, each 
individual designated must demonstrate annually to the Railroad that 
the individual:
    (1) Knows and understands the requirements of subpart C;
    (2) Can detect deviations from those requirements; and
    (3) Can prescribe appropriate remedial action to correct or safely 
compensate for those deviations.


Sec. 243.717  Personnel qualified to supervise signal inspectors and 
maintainers.

    When required to supervise the inspection and maintenance of signal 
systems, each designated supervisor must:
    (a) Successfully complete the program that covers the employees 
they supervise; and
    (b) Exercise oversight to ensure that all of the identified tasks 
are performed in accordance with the Railroad's qualification program.

Rolling Stock Personnel


Sec. 243.719  Personnel qualifications for rolling stock personnel.

    (a) General. The Railroad shall designate qualified individuals 
responsible for the inspection and maintenance of the Railroad's 
rolling stock. Each designated individual, including contractors and 
their employees, shall meet the minimum qualifications set forth in 
this section.
    (b) Recordkeeping. With respect to the designation of individuals 
under this section, the Railroad shall maintain written records of:
    (1) Each designation in effect;
    (2) The basis for each designation, including but not limited to:
    (i) The exact nature of any training courses attended and the dates 
thereof;
    (ii) The manner in which the Railroad has determined a successful 
completion of that training course, including test scores or other 
qualifying results;
    (c) The Railroad's qualification program for rolling stock 
personnel shall, at a minimum:
    (1) Identify the safety-related tasks that shall be performed on 
each type of equipment that the Railroad operates;
    (2) Include written procedures for the performance of the tasks 
identified;
    (3) Identify the skills and knowledge necessary to perform each 
task;
    (4) Include classroom and ``hands-on'' lessons designed to impart 
the skills and knowledge identified as necessary to safely perform each 
task;
    (5) Require periodic refresher training at an interval not to 
exceed three years that includes classroom and ``hands-on'' training, 
as well as testing; and
    (6) Include new equipment in the qualification and designation 
program prior to its introduction to revenue service.


Sec. 243.721  Personnel qualified to inspect and maintain rolling 
stock.

    Each designated individual required to inspect and maintain rolling 
stock shall, at a minimum:
    (a) Successfully complete the training course that covers the 
equipment and tasks for which they are responsible;
    (b) Pass a written examination covering the equipment and tasks for 
which they are responsible; and
    (c) Successfully demonstrate ``hands-on'' capability to perform the 
assigned tasks on the type of equipment to which they are assigned.


Sec. 243.723  Personnel qualified to supervise the inspection and 
maintenance of rolling stock.

    Each individual designated to supervise the inspection and 
maintenance of rolling stock personnel shall, at a minimum:
    (a) Successfully complete the program that covers the employees 
that they supervise;
    (b) Exercise oversight to ensure that all the identified tasks are 
performed in accordance with the Railroad's qualification program.

Subpart I--Power Distribution


Sec. 243.801  Warning signs.

    (a) The Railroad shall post warning signs concerning the danger of 
high voltage lines along the right-of-way, at regular intervals not to 
exceed 183 m (600 ft).
    (b) The Railroad shall post warning signs concerning the danger of 
high voltage lines at all underpasses and overpasses.
    (c) The Railroad shall attach warning signs concerning the danger 
of high voltage lines to each catenary mast, at a height of 1.2 to 1.5 
m (4 to 5 ft).
    (d) The Railroad shall post warning signs concerning the danger of 
high voltage lines on catenary masts that are adjacent to all 
overpasses. These warning signs shall be positioned so that they are 
clearly visible from the overpass.


Sec. 243.803  Clearance requirements.

    Electrical clearance between the catenary system and fixed 
equipment in the right-of-way shall meet all pertinent international 
standards, including UIC 606-2 OR, in order to avoid fault currents.


Sec. 243.805  Catenary connections.

    All catenary masts shall be connected to the ground or the rail, as 
determined by the Railroad's system safety plan. The electrical 
impedance of the connection shall meet the step and touch potential 
requirements given in international standards to protect against an 
electrical shock hazard.


Sec. 243.807  Access to stations.

    Access to supply stations, substations and autotransformer stations 
shall be restricted to authorized personnel only.


Sec. 243.809  Actuators.

    The actuators of high voltage switches shall be designed to protect 
the operator against electrical shock, either direct or induced.


Sec. 243.811  Power feeding.

    (a) The parallel power feeder shall be protected against short 
circuits along the catenary.
    (b) The parallel power feeder shall be protected from over-voltage 
power surges due to lightning and from surges caused by the utility 
system.


Sec. 243.813  Emergency devices.

    (a) The Railroad shall install at each underpass, overpass, 
emergency entrance to the right-of-way, supply station, substation, and 
autotransformer station devices capable of disconnecting and isolating 
power and/or grounding the catenary to the rail that may be used in the 
event of an emergency.
    (b) The Railroad shall install telephones along the right-of-way 
that are connected directly to the central power dispatching center. 
One telephone shall be located at each device provided in accordance 
with paragraph (a) of this section.


Sec. 243.815  Overpass protection.

    The Railroad shall install at each overpass fencing, or other 
suitable protective device or equipment that shall prevent any 
accidental contact with the catenary.


Sec. 243.817  Safety work rules.

    All pertinent safety standards issued by the U.S. Occupational 
Safety and

[[Page 65571]]

Health Administration, concerning personal protective equipment, 
practices, and work rules for employees involved with the electric 
power generation, distribution, and transmission system, shall apply to 
the Railroad. FRA has not exercised jurisdiction over those working 
conditions.


Sec. 243.819  Inspection, testing, and maintenance of the power 
distribution system.

    (a) The Railroad shall establish a training and qualification 
program as requires by Subparts B and H to qualify individuals to 
perform inspections, tests and maintenance of the power distribution 
system. Only qualified individuals shall perform inspections, tests and 
maintenance of the equipment.
    (b) Qualified personnel shall perform a visual inspection of 
performance of the current collection through the pantograph-catenary 
interface.
    (c) Qualified personnel shall perform a walking inspection of each 
suspension and anchoring or supporting structure of the catenary 
system, all switching devices, and all telephones located along the 
right-of-way at least once every four months.
    (d) Qualified personnel shall inspect all emergency shutdown 
devices and all manual switches annually.
    (e) The Railroad shall provide to FRA for review detailed 
information on the inspection, test, and maintenance procedures 
necessary for safe operation of the power distribution equipment. This 
information shall include a detailed description of:
    (1) Safety inspection procedures, requirements, intervals and 
criteria;
    (2) Test procedures and intervals;
    (3) Scheduled preventive maintenance intervals;
    (4) Maintenance procedures;
    (5) Special testing equipment and measuring devices required to 
perform safety inspections and tests; and
    (6) Training and certification of employees and contractors 
qualified to perform safety inspections, testing and maintenance.

Appendix A to Part 243--Schedule of Civil Penalties--[Reserved]

Appendix B to Part 243--Test Performance Criteria for the Flammability 
and Smoke Emission Characteristics of Materials Used in Constructing or 
Refurbishing Locomotive Cab and Passenger Car Interiors

    This appendix provides the performance standards for testing the 
flammability and smoke emission characteristics of materials used in 
constructing or refurbishing locomotive cab and passenger car 
interiors, in accordance with the requirements of Sec. 243.413.
    (a) Definitions.
    Critical radiant flux (CRF) means, as defined in ASTM E-648, a 
measure of the behavior of horizontally-mounted floor covering 
systems exposed to a flaming ignition source in a graded radiant 
heat energy environment in a test chamber.
    Flame spread index (IS) means, as defined in ASTM E-
162, a factor derived from the rate of progress of the flame front 
(FS) and the rate of heat liberation by the material 
under test (Q), such that (IS) = (FS)  x  Q.
    Flaming dripping means periodic dripping of flaming material 
from the site of material burning or material installation.
    Flaming running means continuous flaming material leaving the 
site of material burning or material installation.
    Specific optical density (DS) means, as defined in 
ASTM E-662, the optical density measured over unit path length 
within a chamber of unit volume, produced from a specimen of unit 
surface area, that is irradiated by a heat flux of 2.5 watts/
cm2 for a specified period of time.
    Surface flammability means the rate at which flames will travel 
along surfaces.
    (b) Required test procedures and performance criteria.
    The materials used in locomotive cabs and passenger cars shall 
be tested according to the procedures and performance criteria set 
forth in the following table. In all instances, the most recent 
version of the test procedures or the revision in effect at the time 
a vehicle is ordered should be employed in the evaluation of the 
materials specified.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Category               Function of material           Test procedure           Performance criteria 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger seats, Sleeping and    Cushions, Mattresses 1,  ASTM D-3675                    Is25        
 dining car components.           2, 5, 9 *.              ASTM E-662                     Ds (1.5)100;
                                                                                          Ds (4.0)175
                                 Seat and/or Mattress     ASTM E-162                     Is35        
                                  Frame 1, 5, 8.          ASTM E-662                     Ds (1.5)100;
                                                                                          Ds (4.0)200
                                 Seat and Toilet Shroud,  ASTM E-162                     Is35        
                                  Food Trays 1, 5.        ASTM E-662                     Ds (1.5)100;
                                                                                          Ds (4.0)200
                                 Seat Upholstery,         FAR 25.853 (Vertical)          Flame Time10
                                  Mattress Ticking and    ASTM E-662                      sec; Burn length1, 2,                                  thn-eq>6 inch         
                                  3, 5.                                                  Ds (4.0)250 
                                                                                          coated; Ds (4.0)100 uncoated   
Panels.........................  Wall 1, 5, 10..........  ASTM E-162                     Is35        
                                                          ASTM E-662                     Ds (1.5)100;
                                                                                          Ds (4.0)200
                                 Ceiling 1, 5, 10.......  ASTM E-162                     Is35        
                                                          ASTM E-662                     Ds (1.5)100;
                                                                                          Ds (4.0)200
                                 Partition, Tables and    ASTM E-162                     Is35        
                                  Shelves 1, 5.           ASTM E-662                     Ds (1.5)100;
                                                                                          Ds (4.0)200
                                 Windscreen 2, 5........  ASTM E-162                     Is35        
                                                          ASTM E-662                     Ds (1.5)100;
                                                                                          Ds (4.0)200
                                 HVAC Ducting 1, 5......  ASTM E-162                     Is35        
                                                          ASTM E-662                     Ds (1.5)100 
                                 Window 4, 5............  ASTM E-162                     Is100       
                                                          ASTM E-662                     Ds (1.5)100;
                                                                                          Ds (4.0)200
                                 Light Diffuser 5.......  ASTM E-162                     Is100       
                                                          ASTM E-662                     Ds (1.5)100;
                                                                                          Ds (4.0)200
Flooring.......................  Structural 6...........  ASTM E-119                     Pass                   
                                 Covering 7, 10.........  ASTM E-648                     CRF0.5 w/cm2
                                                          ASTM E-662                     Ds (1.5)100;
                                                                                          Ds (4.0)200
Insulation.....................  Thermal 1, 2, 5........  ASTM E-162                     Is25        
                                                          ASTM E-662                     Ds (1.5)100 
                                 Acoustic 1, 2, 5.......  ASTM E-162                     Is25        
                                                          ASTM E-662                     Ds (1.5)100 
Elastomers.....................  Window Gaskets, Door     ASTM C-542                     Pass                   
                                  Nosing, Diaphragms,     ASTM E-662                     Ds (1.5)100;
                                  Roof Mat  1.                                            Ds (4.0)200

[[Page 65572]]

                                                                                                                
Exterior Plastic Components....  End Cap, Roof Housings   ASTM E-162                     Is35        
                                  1, 5.                   ASTM E-662                     Ds (1.5)100;
                                                                                          Ds (4.0)200
Component Box Covers...........  Interior, Exterior       ASTM E-162                     Is35        
                                  Boxes 1, 3, 5.          ASTM E-662                     Ds (1.5)100;
                                                                                          Ds (4.0)200
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Materials tested for surface flammability must not exhibit any flaming running or flaming dripping.         
\2\ The surface flammability and smoke emission characteristics must be demonstrated to be permanent by washing,
  if appropriate, according to FED-STD-191A Textile Test Method 5830.                                           
\3\ The surface flammability and smoke emission characteristics must be demonstrated to be permanent by dry-    
  cleaning, if appropriate, according to ASTM-D-2724. Materials that cannot be washed or dry cleaned must be so 
  labeled and meet the applicable performance criteria after being cleaned as recommended by the manufacturer.  
\4\ For double window glazing, only the interior glazing must meet the materials requirements specified herein; 
  the exterior need not meet those requirements.                                                                
\5\ ASTM E-662 maximum test limits for smoke emission (specified optical density) must be measured in either the
  flaming or non-flaming mode, depending on which mode generates the most smoke.                                
\6\ Structural flooring assemblies must meet the performance criteria during a nominal test period determined by
  the railroad property. The nominal test period must be twice the maximum expected period of time, under normal
  circumstances, for a vehicle to come to a complete, safe stop from maximum speed, plus the time necessary to  
  evacuate all passengers from a vehicle to a safe area. The nominal test period must not be less than 15       
  minutes. Only one specimen need be tested. A proportional reduction may be made in the dimensions of the      
  specimen provided that it represents a true test of its ability to perform as a barrier against under-car     
  fires. Penetrations (ducts, etc.) must be designed against acting as passageways for fire and smoke.          
\7\ Flooring covering must be tested in accordance with ASTM E-648 with its padding, if the padding is used in  
  actual installation.                                                                                          
\8\ Arm rests, if foamed plastic, are tested as cushions and, if hard material, are tested as a seat back       
  shroud.                                                                                                       
\9\ Testing is performed without upholstery.                                                                    
\10\ Carpeting on walls and ceilings is to be considered wall and ceiling panel materials, respectively.        

    (c) The sources of test procedures specified in the table are as 
follows:
    (1) Leaching Resistance of Cloth, FED-STD-191A-Textile Test 
Method 5830. (Available from: General Services Administration 
Specifications Division, Building 197 Washington Navy Yard, 
Washington, D.C. 20407.)
    (2) Federal Aviation Administration Vertical Burn Test, FAR-
25.853.
    (3) American Society for Testing Materials (ASTM):
    (i) Specification for Gaskets, ASTM C-542.
    (ii) Surface Flammability of Flexible Cellular Materials Using a 
Radiant Heat Energy Source, ASTM D-3675.
    (iii) Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials, ASTM E-
119.
    (iv) Surface Flammability of Materials Using a Radiant Heat 
Energy Source, ASTM E-162.
    (v) Bonded and Laminated Apparel Fabrics, ASTM D-2724.
    (vi) Critical Radiant Flux of Floor Covering Systems Using a 
Radiant Heat Energy Source, ASTM E-648.
    (vii) Specific Optical Density of Smoke Generated by Solid 
Materials, ASTM E-662. (Available from: American Society for Testing 
Materials, 1916 Race Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103.)

Appendix C to Part 243--Railroad Safety--Critical Operating Rules 
[Reserved]

    Issued in Washington, D.C. this 24th day of November, 1997.
Jolene M. Molitoris,
Federal Railroad Administrator.
[FR Doc. 97-31457 Filed 12-11-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P