[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 231 (Tuesday, December 2, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 63732-63736]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-31517]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-382]


Entergy Operations, Inc.; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of 
Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant 
Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. 
NPF-38 issued to Entergy Operations Inc., (the licensee) for operation 
of the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, located in St. Charles 
Parish, Louisiana.
    The proposed amendment would increase the Spent Fuel Pool storage 
capacity and increase the maximum fuel enrichment from 4.9 w/o (nominal 
weight percent) to 5.0 w/o U-235. This proposed modification will be 
accomplished by removing the existing racks in the Spent Fuel Pool and 
replacing them with higher density racks. The neutron absorber (BORAL) 
for the new racks, has been licensed by the NRC for use in other 
nuclear power plant spent fuel storage applications.
    Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission 
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
    The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment 
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the 
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of 
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) 
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; 
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As 
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of 
the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented 
below.
    1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    In the analysis of the safety issues concerning the expanded pool 
storage capacity, the following previously postulated accident 
scenarios have been considered:
    a. A spent fuel assembly drop in the Spent Fuel Pool.

[[Page 63733]]

    b. Loss of Spent Fuel Pool cooling flow.
    c. A seismic event.
    d. An accidental drop of a fully loaded fuel shipping cask.
    The probability that any of the accidents in the above list can 
occur is not significantly increased by the modification itself. The 
probabilities of a seismic event or loss of Spent Fuel Pool cooling 
flow are not influenced by the proposed changes. The probabilities of 
accidental fuel assembly or shipping cask drops are primarily 
influenced by the methods used to lift and move these loads. The method 
of handling loads during normal plant operations remains unchanged, 
since the same equipment (i.e., Spent Fuel Handling Machine and Cask 
Handling Crane) and procedures will be used. A new offset handling tool 
will be required to access some storage rack cells located adjacent to 
the pool walls. The grapple mechanism, procedures, and fuel 
manipulation methods will be very similar to those used by the standard 
fuel handling tool on the Spent Fuel Handling Machine. Therefore, this 
tool does not represent a significant change in the methods used to 
lift or move fuel in the Fuel Handling Building. Since the methods used 
to move loads during normal operations remain nearly the same as those 
used previously, there is no significant increase in the probability of 
an accident.
    During rack removal and installation, all work in the pool area 
will be controlled and performed in strict accordance with specific 
written procedures. Any movement of fuel assemblies required to be 
performed to support the modification (e.g., removal and installation 
of racks) will be performed in the same manner as during normal 
refueling operations. Shipping cask movements will not be performed 
during the modification period.
    Accordingly, the proposed modification does not involve a 
significant increase in the probability of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    The consequences of the previously postulated scenarios for an 
accidental drop of a fuel assembly in the Spent Fuel Pool have been re-
evaluated for the proposed change. The results show that the postulated 
accident of a fuel assembly striking the top of the storage racks will 
not distort the racks sufficiently to impair their functionality. The 
resulting structural damage to a falling assembly and/or a stored 
assembly has been determined to remain unchanged. The minimum 
subcriticality margin, Keff less than or equal to 0.95, will be 
maintained. The structural damage to the Fuel Handling Building, pool 
liner, and fuel assembly resulting from a fuel assembly drop striking 
the pool floor or another assembly located within the racks remains 
unchanged. The resulting structural damage to these items subsequent to 
this event is not influenced by the proposed changes. The radiological 
dose at the exclusion area boundary will increase due to the changes in 
fuel enrichment and burnup. The previously calculated doses to the 
thyroid and whole body were 0.47 and 0.11 rem, respectively. The new 
thyroid and whole body doses based on the proposed change will be 0.553 
and 0.304, respectively. These dose levels are extremely small when 
compared to the levels required by 10 CFR 100. Therefore, the increase 
in dose is not considered a significant increase in consequence. Thus, 
the results of the postulated fuel drop accidents remain acceptable and 
do not represent a significant increase in consequences from any of the 
same previously evaluated accidents.
    The consequences of a loss of Spent Fuel Pool cooling have been 
evaluated and found to have no increase. The concern with this accident 
is a reduction of Spent Fuel Pool water inventory from bulk pool 
boiling resulting in uncovering fuel assemblies. This situation would 
lead to fuel failure and subsequent significant increase in offsite 
dose. Loss of spent fuel pool cooling at Waterford 3 is mitigated by 
ensuring that a sufficient time lapse exists between the loss of forced 
cooling and uncovering fuel. This period of time is compared against a 
reasonable period to re-establish cooling or supply an alternative 
water source (such as fire water). Evaluation of this accident usually 
includes determination of the time to boil. This time period is much 
less than the onset of any significant increase in offsite dose, since 
once boiling begins it would have to continue unchecked until the pool 
surface was lowered to the point of exposing active fuel. The time to 
boil represents the onset of loss of pool water inventory and is 
commonly used as a gage for establishing the comparison of consequences 
before and after a refueling project. The heat up rate in the Spent 
Fuel Pool is a nearly linear function of the fuel decay heat load. The 
fuel decay heat load will increase subsequent to the proposed changes 
because of the increase in the number of assemblies and higher fuel 
burnups. The heat up rate established for the limiting normal heat load 
conditions prior to reracking was 5.41 deg.F per hour. This would 
result in the pool temperature increasing from the maximum normal 
temperature of 140  deg.F to boiling in a period of 13.3 hours. The 
heat up rate established for the limiting normal heat load conditions 
subsequent to the proposed changes has been determined as 13.6  deg.F 
per hour. This would result in the pool temperature increasing from the 
maximum normal temperature of 140  deg.F to boiling in a period of 5.3 
hours.
    This time to boil comparison was made for limiting normal heat load 
conditions. However, the end of this period of time does not represent 
the onset of any significant increase in offsite doses. As stated 
above, this consequence would result subsequent to fuel being uncovered 
through unchecked boiling and resulting water level drop of 
approximately 24.5 feet from normal surface to the top of the fuel 
storage racks. This depth is conservative, since the top of active fuel 
is below this level. Subsequent to the proposed changes under limiting 
normal heat loads the time lapse between the onset of unchecked boiling 
and uncovering of the racks has been determined to exceed 50 hours.
    As stated above in the safety assessment, subsequent to reracking, 
the time to boil after loss of forced cooling in the most severe 
scenario is 2.89 hours (the ensuing rate of evaporative loss would not 
result in the fuel being uncovered until after an additional 34 hours, 
which is 168 hours after reactor shutdown). However, the design basis 
limiting pool heat load under these conditions actually decreases after 
the proposed modification, because of conservatisms previously used to 
determine the heat load for this condition. Therefore, the calculated 
time to boil in this most severe scenario will increase subsequent to 
the proposed modification. In the unlikely event that all pool cooling 
is lost, sufficient time will be available subsequent to the proposed 
changes for the operators to provide alternate means of cooling (i.e., 
fire water) before fuel is uncovered. Therefore, the proposed changes 
represents no increase in the consequences of loss of pool cooling.
    The consequences of a design basis seismic event are not increased. 
The consequences of this accident are evaluated on the basis of 
subsequent fuel damage or compromise of the fuel storage or building 
configurations leading to radiological or criticality concerns. The new 
racks have been analyzed in their new configuration and found safe 
during seismic motion. Fuel has been determined to remain intact and 
the storage racks maintain the fuel and fixed poison configurations

[[Page 63734]]

subsequent to a seismic event. The structural capability of the pool 
and liner will not be exceeded under the appropriate combinations of 
dead weight, thermal, and seismic loads. The Fuel Handling Building 
structure will remain intact during a seismic event and will continue 
to adequately support and protect the fuel racks, storage array, and 
pool moderator/coolant. Thus, the consequences of a seismic event are 
not increased.
    The consequences of a spent fuel cask drop into the Cask Storage 
Pit have been analyzed along with the new rack storage configuration. 
This evaluation concluded that there is no increase in consequences. 
Administrative controls, appropriate changes in load paths, and crane 
travel limits will continue to preclude handling heavy loads above 
stored fuel. Therefore, casks impacting stored fuel is not a postulated 
event. Potential damage to the cask and contained fuel remain 
unchanged, since the pertinent parameters for this analysis (i.e., lift 
height, weight, impact zone configurations, etc.) are not affected by 
the new rack configurations. The floor was reanalyzed to assess the 
effect of the additional loading from higher density fuel storage. It 
was determined that the floor remains intact with minor local crushing 
of concrete. The liner plate would sustain limited damage, which is 
repairable. Leakage would be limited to flow through the leak chase 
system and would be collected at the sump. The Fuel Handling Building 
integrity would not be compromised; therefore, there would be no 
release of contaminated pool water outside of the building. Makeup 
water from the Condensate Storage Pool and/or the Refueling Water 
Storage Tank would be adequate to offset loss of water inventory due to 
any leakages. This accident does not result in any increase in offsite 
or Fuel Handling Building doses. Thus, the proposed changes do not 
represent any increase in the consequences of a postulated spent fuel 
cask drop.
    Therefore, it is concluded that the proposed changes do not 
significantly increase the probability or consequences of any accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident 
from any previously analyzed.
    To assess the possibility of new or different kind of accidents, a 
list of the critical parameters required to ensure safe fuel storage 
was established. Safe fuel storage is defined here as providing an 
environment which would not present any significant threats to workers 
or the general public. In other words, meeting the requirements of 10 
CFR 100 and 10 CFR 20. Any new events which would modify these 
parameters sufficiently to place them outside of the boundaries 
analyzed for normal conditions and/or outside of the boundaries 
previously considered for accidents would be considered a new or 
different accident. The criticality and radiological safety evaluations 
were reviewed to establish the list of critical parameters. The fuel 
configuration and the existence of the moderator/coolant were 
identified as the only two parameters which were critical to safe fuel 
storage. Significant modification of these two parameters represents 
the only possibility of an unsafe storage condition. Once the two 
critical parameters were established, an additional step was taken to 
determine what events (which were not previously considered) could 
result in changes to the storage configuration or moderator/coolant 
presence during or subsequent to the proposed changes. This process was 
adopted to ensure that the possibility of any new or different accident 
scenario or event would be identified.
    Due to the proposed changes, the following events were considered 
as the only events which might represent a new or different kind of 
accident:
    a. An accidental drop of a rack module during construction activity 
in the pool.
    b. Draining the Cask Storage Pit and Refueling Canal through the 
floor drains.
    c. Fuel assembly mispositioning accident in Region 2.
    A construction accident resulting in a rack drop is an unlikely 
event. A new rack lifting rig will be introduced to lift and suspend 
all but one of the racks using the existing Fuel Handling Building 
Cranes. Either a new temporary hoist or a combination of one of the 
existing 15 ton cranes and a lifting bag will be used to lift one of 
the existing eighty cell racks that is adjacent to the east wall of the 
Spent Fuel Pool. The cranes, hoists and lifting rig have been or will 
be designed using the guidance of NUREG-0612 and ANSI N14.6. The 
postulated rack drop event is commonly referred to as a ``heavy load 
drop'' over the pools. Heavy loads will not be allowed to travel over 
any racks containing fuel assemblies. The danger represented by this 
event is that the pool structure will be compromised leading to loss of 
moderator/coolant, which is one of the two critical parameters 
identified above. However, although the analysis of this event has been 
performed and shown to be acceptable, the question of a new or 
different type of event is answered by determining whether heavy load 
drops over the pool have been considered previously. The postulated 
drop of a pool gate was previously evaluated and represents a heavy 
load drop similar to a rack drop. All movements of heavy loads over the 
pool will comply with the applicable administrative controls and 
guidelines (i.e. plant procedures, NUREG-0612, etc.). Therefore, the 
rack drop does not represent a new or different kind of accident.
    The Cask Storage Pit and Refueling Canal both have floor drains 
which will be plugged (a welded closed cover plate) prior to 
installation of the new storage racks in each of the respective areas. 
The plugs will preclude any water loss through the drain system. 
Therefore, draining the Cask Storage Pit and Refueling Canal through 
the floor drains is not a postulated event.
    Fuel assembly mispositioning in Region 2 is an unlikely event, 
since locating assemblies which do not meet the burnup criteria will be 
administratively controlled. Administrative controls will consist of 
developing a checkerboarding storage pattern in the Region 2 racks 
prior to storage or placement of the non-compliant fuel in Region 1 
racks. The Region 2 mispositioning event represents a change from the 
previously analyzed condition, since Waterford 3 currently has only 
Region 1 style storage. Therefore, a new fuel storage configuration is 
possible. However, the event does not represent a new or different kind 
of accident, since fuel assembly mispositioning is possible with the 
existing racks through controlled or uncontrolled (assembly drop) 
lowering of an assembly adjacent to the outside of the storage racks. 
This condition was previously evaluated and found to be acceptable. The 
new event was evaluated using similar techniques with similar 
acceptance criteria and was shown to remain acceptable. Therefore, due 
to the similarity of this new event with that which was previously 
analyzed it is not considered to represent a new or different kind of 
accident.
    The proposed change does not alter the operating requirements of 
the plant or of the equipment credited in the mitigation of the design 
basis accidents. The proposed change does not affect any of the 
important parameters required to ensure safe fuel storage. Therefore, 
the potential for a new or previously unanalyzed accident is not 
created.
    3. Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
    The function of the Spent Fuel Pool is to store the fuel assemblies 
in a

[[Page 63735]]

subcritical and coolable configuration through all environmental and 
abnormal loadings, such as an earthquake or fuel assembly drop. The new 
rack design must meet all applicable requirements for safe storage and 
be functionally compatible with the Spent Fuel Pool.
    EOI has addressed the safety issues related to the expanded pool 
storage capacity in the following areas:
    a. Material, mechanical, and structural considerations.
    b. Nuclear criticality.
    c. Thermal-hydraulic and pool cooling.
    The mechanical, material and structural designs of the new racks 
have been reviewed in accordance with the applicable provisions of the 
NRC Guidance entitled ``Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and 
Handling Applications''. The rack materials used are compatible with 
the spent fuel assemblies and the Spent Fuel Pool environment. The 
design of the new racks preserves the proper margin of safety during 
abnormal loads such as a dropped assembly and tensile loads from a 
stuck assembly. It has been shown that such loads will not invalidate 
the mechanical design and material selection to safely store fuel in a 
coolable and subcritical configuration.
    The methodology used in the criticality analysis of the expanded 
Spent Fuel Pool meets the appropriate NRC guidelines and the ANSI 
standards (GDC 62, NUREG 0800, Section 9.1.2, NRC Guidance entitled, 
``Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and Handling 
Applications'', Reg. Guide 1.13, and ANSI ANS 8.17). The margin of 
safety for subcriticality is maintained by having the neutron 
multiplication factor equal to, or less than, 0.95 under all accident 
conditions, including uncertainties. This criterion is the same as that 
used previously to establish criticality safety evaluation acceptance 
and remains satisfied for all analyzed accidents. Therefore, the 
accepted margin of safety remains the same.
    The thermal-hydraulic and cooling evaluation of the pool 
demonstrated that the pool can be maintained below the specified 
thermal limits under the conditions of the maximum heat load and during 
all credible accident sequences and seismic events. The pool 
temperature will not exceed 140  deg.F during the worst single failure 
of a cooling pump. The maximum local water temperature in the hot 
channel will remain below the boiling point. The fuel will not undergo 
any significant heat-up after an accidental drop of a fuel assembly on 
top of the rack blocking the flow path. A loss of cooling to the pool 
will allow sufficient time (5.3 hours for the limiting normal heat 
load) for the operators to intervene and line up alternate cooling 
paths and the means of inventory make-up before the onset of pool 
boiling. The thermal limits specified for the evaluations performed to 
support the proposed change are the same as those which were used in 
the previous evaluations. Therefore, the accepted margin of safety 
remains the same.
    Thus, it is concluded that the changes do not involve a significant 
reduction in the margin of safety.
    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination.
    Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the 
expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances 
change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely 
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, 
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of 
the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that 
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final 
determination will consider all public and State comments received. 
Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal 
Register a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing 
after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this 
action will occur very infrequently.
    Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and 
Directives Branch, Division of Freedom of Information and Publications 
Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and 
page number of this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also 
be delivered to Room 6D22, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, 
Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. 
Copies of written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public 
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.
    The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to 
intervene is discussed below.
    By January 2, 1998, the licensee may file a request for a hearing 
with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility 
operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this 
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding 
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to 
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene 
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice 
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested 
persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is 
available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public 
document room located at the University of New Orleans Library, 
Louisiana Collection, Lakefront, New Orleans, LA 70122. If a request 
for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above 
date, the Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, 
designated by the Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety 
and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; 
and the Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 
will issue a notice of hearing or an appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the 
Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of 
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the 
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be 
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition 
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of 
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person 
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been 
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of 
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended

[[Page 63736]]

petition must satisfy the specificity requirements described above.
    Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to 
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions 
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must 
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be 
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a 
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise 
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the 
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the 
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references 
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is 
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those 
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information 
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material 
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within 
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be 
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A 
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these 
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be 
permitted to participate as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
    If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final 
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The 
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves 
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the 
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the 
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance 
of the amendment.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a 
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place 
before the issuance of any amendment.
    A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must 
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and 
Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public 
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, 
by the above date. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the 
Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to N.S. Renolds, Esq., Winston & Stran, 
1400 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005-3502, attorney for the 
licensee.
    Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended 
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not 
be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding 
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the 
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the 
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).
    The Commission hereby provides notice that this a proceeding on an 
application for a license amendment falling within the scope of section 
134 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), 42 U.S.C. 10154. 
Under section 134 of the NWPA, the Commission, at the request of any 
party to the proceeding, must use hybrid hearing procedures with 
respect to ``any matter which the Commission determines to be in 
controversy among the parties.'' The hybrid procedures in section 134 
provide for oral argument on matters in controversy, preceded by 
discovery under the Commission's rules, and the designation, following 
argument, of only those factual issues that involve a genuine and 
substantial dispute, together with any remaining questions of law, to 
be resolved in an adjudicatory hearing. Actual adjudicatory hearings 
are to be held on only those issues found to meet the criteria of 
section 134 and set for hearing after oral argument.
    The Commission's rules implementing section 134 of the NWPA are 
found in 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart K, ``Hybrid Hearing Procedures for 
Expansion of Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Capacity at Civilian Nuclear 
Power Reactors'' (published at 50 FR 41670, October 15, 1985) to 10 CFR 
2.1101 et seq. Under those rules, any party to the proceeding may 
invoke the hybrid hearing procedures by filing with the presiding 
officer a written request for oral argument under 10 CFR 2.1109. To be 
timely, the request must be filed within 10 days of an order granting a 
request for hearing or petition to intervene. (As outlined above, the 
Commission's rules in 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart G, and 2.714 in 
particular, continue to govern the filing of requests for a hearing or 
petitions to intervene, as well as the admission of contentions.) The 
presiding officer shall grant a timely request for oral argument. The 
presiding officer may grant an untimely request for oral argument only 
upon showing of good cause by the requesting party for the failure to 
file on time and after providing the other parties an opportunity to 
respond to the untimely request. If the presiding officer grants a 
request for oral argument, any hearing held on the application shall be 
conducted in accordance with the hybrid hearing procedures. In essence, 
those procedures limit the time available for discovery and require 
that an oral argument be held to determine whether any contentions must 
be resolved in adjudicatory hearing. If no party to the proceedings 
requests oral argument, or if all untimely requests for oral argument 
are denied, then the usual procedures in 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart G, 
apply.
    For further details with respect to this action, see the 
application for amendment dated March 27, 1997, as supplemented on 
April 3, and November 13, 1997, which is available for public 
inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public 
document room located at the University of New Orleans Library, 
Louisiana Collection, Lakefront, New Orleans, LA 70122.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 20th day of November 1997.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Chandu P. Patel,
Project Manager, Project Directorate IV-1, Division of Reactor 
Projects--III/IV, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 97-31517 Filed 12-1-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P