[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 224 (Thursday, November 20, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 62097-62107]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-30505]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration
[FRA Docket No. 87-2, Notice. No. 5]
RIN 2130-AB20


Automatic Train Control and Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement 
System; Northeast Corridor Railroads

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Proposed order of particular applicability.

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SUMMARY: FRA is proposing to issue an order of particular applicability 
requiring all trains operating on the north end of the Northeast 
Corridor (NEC) between Boston, Massachusetts and New York, New York, to 
be controlled by locomotives equipped to respond to a new advanced 
civil speed enforcement system (ACSES) in addition to the automatic 
train control (ATC) system that is currently required on the NEC. The 
proposed order also contains performance standards for the cab signal/
ATC and ACSES systems on the NEC. The order would authorize increases 
in certain maximum authorized train speeds and safety requirements 
supporting improved rail service.

DATES: Written comments must be received by January 20, 1998. Comments 
received after the comment period has closed will be considered to the 
extent possible without incurring additional delay. A request for a 
public hearing must be received by December 22, 1997.

ADDRESSES: Written comments should be submitted to Ms. Renee Bridgers, 
Docket Clerk, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., 
Washington, D.C. 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: W.E. Goodman, Staff Director, Signal 
and Train Control Division, Office of Safety, FRA, 400 Seventh Street, 
S.W., Washington, D.C., 20590 (telephone (202) 632-3353), or Patricia 
V. Sun, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., 
Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone (202) 632-3183).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Statutory Authority

    FRA has both discrete and plenary legal authority to require that 
all trains operating on the NEC be equipped with automatic train 
control devices. FRA has broad legal authority to ``prescribe 
regulations, and issue orders for every area of railroad safety * * 
*.'' 49 U.S.C. 20103. Section 20502 of Title 49, United States Code 
specifically provides that ``[w]hen the Secretary of Transportation 
decides after an investigation that it is necessary in the public 
interest, the Secretary may order a railroad carrier to install * * * a 
signal system that complies with the requirements of the Secretary.'' 
As originally enacted and prior to formal codification, this provision 
referred to ``automatic train stop, train control, and/or other similar 
appliances, methods, and systems intended to promote the safety of 
railroad operation * * *.'' This authority has been previously invoked 
to require the installation of signal systems on 49 specific railroads 
and to require all railroads desiring to operate at high speeds to 
install signal systems of varying degrees of sophistication consonant 
with those higher speeds.

Background--Development of the NEC

    The National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) provides 
service over the NEC from Washington, D.C., to Boston, Massachusetts. 
Amtrak owns or dispatches most of the NEC, which it shares with several 
commuter authorities and freight railroads. Maximum track speeds on 
certain segments of the NEC south of New York City (the ``South End'') 
are limited to 125 miles per hour (mph) for Metroliner equipment. 
Current speeds north of New York City (the ``North End'') range up to 
110 mph.
    Amtrak is currently undertaking a major improvement project on the 
NEC, with particular emphasis on completion of electrification, 
installation of concrete ties and high-speed turnouts, elimination of 
some remaining highway-rail crossings, and other modifications 
concentrated between New Haven, Connecticut, and Boston. These 
improvements are designed to facilitate service utilizing high-speed 
trainsets (HST's) at speeds up to 150 (mph). Similar service would also 
be implemented on the south end of the NEC, with the initial increase 
in maximum speed expected to be from 125 mph to 135 mph. During 1999, 
Amtrak will begin taking delivery of HST's expected to qualify for 
operation through curves at higher levels of

[[Page 62098]]

unbalance (and thus higher speeds) than conventional trains.
    Increases in operating speeds would be accomplished during a period 
of continued traffic growth. Commuter and intercity trains are expected 
to increase in number over the next 20 years. Local freight traffic is 
expected to increase on the North End, and recent proposals for the 
sale of Consolidated Rail Corporation have given rise to the 
possibility that freight operations on the South End, particularly in 
Maryland, might increase.
    In its planning for implementation of high-speed service between 
New Haven and Boston, FRA recognized that a more secure train control 
system would be required to address the increased potential for 
collisions associated with increased traffic density. As planning for 
South End service growth matures, similar conclusions are likely. 
Although this proposed order does not address territory owned and 
dispatched by the MTA Metro-North Railroad between New Rochelle, New 
York, and New Haven similar concerns may arise in that territory as 
intercity service increases.
    FRA is concerned that planning for high-speed service not occur in 
isolation from measures that can reasonably address increased traffic 
densities. Future increases in traffic is one factor that will drive 
future innovative technology.

Proposed Signal and Train Control Enhancements

    Providing signalization for high-speed intercity service will 
require implementation of an enhanced cab signal/speed control system. 
The new system must allow for higher train speeds while providing 
sufficient gradations of intermediate speeds to allow efficient 
movement of other scheduled trains operating in the conventional speed 
range. Reasonable interoperability of existing and new on-board 
equipment is also desirable to provide for the continued use of 
existing on-board equipment which will be used only at conventional 
speeds.
    Amtrak presently uses a four-aspect continuous cab signal/speed 
control system. Amtrak proposes to replace this system with a new nine-
aspect continuous cab signal/speed control, referred to in this order 
as ``cab signal/ATC,'' and an intermittent transponder civil speed 
enforcement system providing for train operations of up to 150 mph; 
intermediate speeds of 125, 100, 80, 60, 45, and 30 mph; and a positive 
stop feature. Amtrak calls the new transponder-based portion of this 
system, which would provide positive stop and civil speed enforcement 
capability, the ``Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System'' (ACSES).

9-Aspect Cab Signal System

    The cab signal/ATC portion of the new system will employ two 
carrier frequencies, 100 Hz, compatible with existing equipment, and 
250 Hz. Both frequencies will be coded at standard rates of 75, 120, 
180, and 270 cycles per minute. Upgraded equipment will be able to take 
advantage of the 150 mph code rate for maximum authorized speed, the 80 
mph code rate for high speed diverging moves, and separate 45/40 and 30 
mph speed commands for limited and medium speed turnouts.
    Although existing four-aspect equipment will not be able to take 
advantage of these additional features, it can continue to operate as 
it does today. Instead of diverging through a high speed turnout at 80 
mph, this equipment will diverge at 45 mph (passenger trains) or 40 mph 
(freight). In addition to the conventional diesel-electric and straight 
electric trains currently traveling on the NEC, FRA anticipates that 
new HST's will be used to minimize the run time between Boston, New 
York, and Washington. The first stage of the installation of the 9-
aspect system involves conventional electronic coded track circuits. 
The next stage involves the conversion of these electronic track 
circuits for use in electrified territory. No civil speed restrictions 
will be reflected in this cab signal/ATC system. There will be no 
positive stop aspect or indication associated with the cab signal/ATC 
system other than a stop signal displayed at home signal locations. The 
cab signal/ATC system provides control based on track and route 
conditions ahead. It will operate as a stand alone system with an 
interface to the brake valve to enforce speed control.

ACSES

    In contrast to the modified cab signal system, the ACSES will 
provide new safety functions that--with limited exceptions--are not 
currently provided. For purposes of civil speed control, permanent 
wayside transponders would be placed in sets (normally two to a set) at 
convenient, accessible locations in the center of the track approaching 
speed restriction zones. The transponders would be passive devices 
requiring no energy source other than that transmitted from a passing 
train. Each permanent transponder set would contain encoded information 
about speed restrictions ahead, including: (i) The distance to the 
beginning of the speed restriction; (ii) the target speed; (iii) the 
type of speed restriction; (iv) the average grade between the location 
where the speed reduction must begin and the location where the reduced 
speed must be reached; (v) the distance to the next permanent 
transponder set location; and (vi) necessary sync and check bytes to 
allow for message verification. Since the number of discrete codes 
available is large, it would be possible to provide speed and distance 
information for more than one speed restriction at a time.
    The two transponders in a set are used to determine which message 
the train should accept, determined by the direction of the train as 
follows: the train would receive the appropriate message from the order 
in which the transponders in the set are read, e.g., if ``A'' is 
encountered first, the message for movement in the direction from ``A'' 
to ``B'' would be received; if ``B'' is encountered first, the message 
for the opposite direction, from ``B'' to ``A,'' will be received.
    At distant signals prior to interlocking home signals and control 
points in high-speed territory, dynamic transponders would be provided. 
These transponders would communicate the status of the home signal 
providing for positive stop enforcement.
    Each locomotive, power car, and non-powered control car would be 
equipped with a transmitter/receiver, an antenna mounted under the 
vehicle, an axle generator (to measure speed and distance traveled), an 
on-board computer, and an aspect display unit. The vehicle would 
continuously transmit a signal which, when received by a wayside 
transponder, would cause the transponder to transmit back its encoded 
message. The on-board equipment would then decode this message and the 
on-board computer would calculate the braking distance based on the 
present speed of the train, the information received from the 
transponder set, and the standard Amtrak reduction braking curves with 
a 12.5% safety factor compensated for grade together with an 8-second 
reaction time. When the train reaches the calculated distance from the 
speed restriction, an audible alarm would sound and the new speed would 
be digitally displayed in the cab of the vehicle. The engineer must 
acknowledge the alarm. If the train is above the speed required by the 
profile generator inside the on-board computer, the engineer would be 
required to bring the train down to the required speed. Failure to do 
so would result in an automatic penalty application of the brakes which 
can only be released when the train is below the required speed.

[[Page 62099]]

    The on-board computer would be programmed to calculate speed and 
braking distance based on the type of equipment it is mounted on. A 
high performance train, such as a tilt body train, would be allowed to 
run at a higher speed around a curve than conventional passenger 
equipment if consistent with allowed unbalance. A safe default speed 
would be provided in the railroad operating rules in the case of tilt 
body equipment failure or ACSES failure.
    Temporary speed restrictions would be entered into the civil speed 
enforcement on-board computer at the beginning of the run. Normally the 
speed restrictions would be entered by a data radio located at 
strategic entrances and locations along the NEC. In the event that the 
data radio is inoperative, the engineer would be able to enter the 
information from the paper Form D he or she receives that lists all 
temporary speed restrictions.
    In the fully deployed system, data radio transmitters would be 
provided at all interlockings in equipped territory, permitting 
updating of temporary restrictions and verification that on-board 
information is complete. Crews would continue to receive paper Form 
D's, and temporary speed boards would be provided. An alternative 
approach to enforcement of temporary restrictions has also been posited 
by Amtrak. Under this approach, portable speed restriction transponder 
sets would be utilized to enforce temporary speed restrictions. 
Temporary transponder sets would be placed at braking distance for the 
worst case trains. All trains operating at maximum authorized speed 
that encounter a temporary transponder set would immediately begin to 
reduce to the speed called for on the transponder so distance to go, 
ruling grade, or distance to the next transponder information will not 
be necessary. When a temporary transponder set is encountered, it would 
not reset the ``next transponder location window'' information in the 
on-board computer, and the on-board equipment would continue to look 
for the next permanent transponder set. All permanent transponder sets 
are ``linked'' in that each set identifies the location of the next set 
in the chain, but temporary transponders are not part of this linkage.
    For the immediate future, only some Amtrak power units will respond 
to all of the new frequencies of the cab signal/ATC system. Those units 
would receive a maximum 125 mph speed indication where the signal 
system permits. Recently, Amtrak has indicated that some changes to on-
board equipment would be required for other users where Amtrak 
introduces the high-speed cab signal/ATC array (in particular, use of 
the 270 pulses per minute at both 100 and 250 Hz as a new 100 mph code 
and use of 270 pulses per minute at 100 Hz as a code allowing movement 
over #26.5 turnouts at 60 mph). Although the changes in the cab signal 
code rates and carrier frequencies form an important backdrop for this 
proceeding, no approval for these changes is required or implied in 
this proposed order. At the same time, FRA is conscious that existing 
requirements for cab signal/ATC are implicated in Amtrak's migration 
strategy; accordingly, FRA holds open the possibility of resolving any 
necessary issues in the final order should it become apparent that they 
are so interrelated as to defy separate resolution. Further, to the 
extent the proposed changes in code rates and associated arrangements 
may otherwise be considered material modifications subject to approval 
under 49 CFR Part 235, FRA proposes to resolve any related issues in 
this proceeding. (See 49 CFR 235.7(c)(1).)
    Improvements that Amtrak would gain with the new systems are:

--Train speeds of up to 150 mph;
--A high speed diverging aspect (80 mph);
--The efficient handling of both high speed and conventional trains;
--New intermediate speeds between 45 mph and 150 mph;
--The capability for headway improvement in congested commuter areas; 
and
--Practical staging from present wayside and on-board equipment

    Commuter and freight railroads would obviously benefit from 
enhanced safety of Amtrak operations, given the common operating 
environment. Amtrak's implementation of the 9-aspect cab signal system 
would provide increased flexibility to schedule high speed intercity 
service in a way that does not conflict with commuter operations. In 
addition, as the ACSES is implemented on commuter and freight trains, 
the safety of those operations would be enhanced, ensuring that those 
trains do not pass absolute stop signals or operate at excessive speed 
approaching stations or bridges. To the extent equipment design 
permits, commuter operators would also be able to take advantage of 
higher speeds on curves without diminished safety margins if 
flexibility for operation at higher cant deficiencies contained in 
FRA's proposed revisions to its Track Safety Standards in 49 CFR Part 
213 (62 FR 31638; July 3, 1997) is adopted in the final rule.

Implementation

    In order to obtain the maximum benefit from the positive stop and 
civil speed enforcement system prior to its installation on the entire 
NEC, Amtrak has developed a strategy to phase-in installation. The 
initial installations would protect entry to and operations along the 
high speed territory. During the initial phase, the transponders would 
not be installed on non-high speed tracks where flanking protection 
protects against possible encroachment into the adjacent high speed 
tracks. After all installations are in place on high speed tracks and 
on adjacent tracks where flanking protection does not exist, the 
transponder system would be extended to the balance of the NEC. This 
phased-in installation would also allow users of the NEC to defer 
installation of the ACSES system on some of their rolling stock while 
they obtain the necessary internal or external financing.
    A specific application of this interim installation staging 
strategy being considered between New York and Washington, D.C. is to 
operate the new HST's up to 135 mph in specific areas where Metroliners 
currently operate at 125 mph and where signal spacing, catenary and 
track structure are adequate for 135 mph operation of HST's. For 
example, 135 mph operation is possible on Tracks 2 and 3 between 
``County'' Interlocking (MP 32.8, west of New Brunswick, New Jersey) 
and MP 54.0 east of ``Ham'' Interlocking east of Trenton, New Jersey. 
Consideration is being given to initially installing the ``ACSES'' 
transponder based civil speed and positive stop enforcement system only 
on Tracks 2 and 3 between ``County'' (MP 32.8) and ``Ham'' (MP 55.7), 
depending on flanking protection at ``Midway'' (MP 41.3) to divert any 
possible stop signal ``overruns'' away from the path of an HST 
operating over 125 mph on Track 2 or 3.
    In addition to the use of flanking and phased installation, freight 
trains that are not equipped with ACSES will be allowed to operate on 
the NEC at off-peak times when no high speed passenger trains are 
operating in the area. These operations would be within windows that 
have been verified and strictly adhered to. This exception would be 
created to allow the smaller entities to continue to operate prior to 
the equipping of all their equipment.
    This strategy would allow Amtrak to take advantage of some of the 
new HST's capability before the ACSES system is fully installed and 
before all other vehicles can be equipped. These initial installations 
would also give

[[Page 62100]]

operating personnel some solid experience with the new system before it 
is extended throughout the entire NEC.
    Other areas being considered for 135 mph operation with initial 
ACSES installation in this same manner are ``Morris'' (MP 58.4) to MP 
74.0 east of ``Holmes'' (MP 77.2), ``Ragan'' (MP 29.9) to ``Bacon'' (MP 
51.0) with No. 3 track only extended on through ``Bacon'' to MP 56.7 
north of ``Prince'' (MP 57.3), and ``Grove'' (MP 112.6) to ``Landover'' 
(MP 128.8). Taken together as an initial installation in the New York 
to Washington portion of the NEC, 171 track miles of ACSES could 
provide up to 80 route miles of 135 mph operation on the 225 mile run. 
This strategy would provide initial valuable operating benefits and 
experience without sacrificing any of the higher level of safety 
required for trains operating over 125 mph, and without (initially) 
equipping any vehicles other than those trains operating over 125 mph.
    Between New York City and Washington, D.C., Amtrak proposes for the 
present to install the ACSES system only in territory where train 
speeds will exceed 125 mph. Since freight trains do not operate on the 
NEC at speeds over 50 mph, and none of the existing commuter equipment 
operating on the NEC can operate at speeds exceeding 125 mph, Amtrak 
does not view installation of ACSES on freight and commuter equipment 
operating between New York City and Washington, D.C. to be necessary 
during the initial phase. The installation of ACSES between New York 
and Washington, D.C. would provide transponder-based positive stop 
enforcement on all main tracks where speeds exceed 125 mph, and on all 
tracks leading to high-speed tracks where flanking protection is not 
provided.
    Between New Haven and Boston, the ACSES would be installed on all 
main tracks where speeds exceed 110 mph. Ultimately, plans call for 
installation of this system on all main tracks along the NEC where 
speeds currently exceed the 60-80 mph range except for New Rochelle to 
New Haven, a segment controlled by the MTA Metro-North Railroad where 
speeds will not exceed 110 mph.
    Another interim installation concerns the use of #26.5 straight-
frog turnouts. These turnouts are only good for diverging moves at 60 
mph. Amtrak intends to install these turnouts at limited locations 
where there is insufficient space to install the #32.7 turnouts needed 
for diverging moves at 80 mph. Using the 60 mph aspect in the 9-aspect 
cab signal/ATC system requires all equipment to be able to receive and 
decode 270 code.
    To allow for the installation of these 60 mph turnouts in territory 
where all users have not yet upgraded to the full 9-aspect system, 
Amtrak proposes an interim procedure. Until all users have been 
equipped, Amtrak proposes that the cab signal/ATC system will display 
an 80 mph aspect for diverging moves over these turnouts. The ACSES 
passive transponder sets approaching this location and at this location 
would enforce a 60 mph civil speed restriction for all routes through 
the interlocking where the #26.5 turnout is located. An active 
transponder would be located at the distant signal prior to the 
locations where trains must begin to reduce to 60 mph. This active 
transponder would override the 60 mph civil speed command when the 
signal system logic determines that the interlocking is cleared for a 
non-diverging move at a higher speed than 60 mph.
    This scheme requires that all vehicles equipped with the 9-aspect 
cab signal/ATC system also be equipped with ACSES. Existing 4-aspect 
cab signal/ATC systems would enforce 45 mph for passenger trains and 30 
mph for freight trains. This interim arrangement would also be backed 
up by a site specific instruction and an appropriate reflectorized sign 
on the distant signal requiring 60 mph with the display of the ``Cab 
Speed'' aspect. When all vehicles operating in the area are equipped, 
the active transponder can be removed and the 270 code for 60 mph 
installed.
    Under Amtrak's design, the ACSES system would be required to have a 
minimal database for the entire NEC which would enable a train to 
always know where it is within the NEC, which track it is on, what 
permanent speed restrictions apply, and where the next temporary speed 
order would need to be executed. With this capability, the ACSES system 
would be able to perform certain auxiliary functions required by HST's.

Regulatory Approvals Required

    In general, new signal and train control systems must comply with 
FRA's Rules, Standards and Instructions Governing the Installation, 
Inspection, Maintenance, and Repair of Signal and Train Control 
Systems, Devices, and Appliances (49 CFR Part 236). FRA will implement 
any exceptions on a case-by-case basis through the waiver process as 
provided by 49 CFR Part 235. Train operations in excess of 110 miles 
per hour must be authorized by FRA after examination of pertinent 
safety considerations in accordance with 49 CFR 213.9(c). Metroliner 
service on the NEC is conducted in accordance with such an 
authorization.
    In addition, NEC operations are subject to special requirements of 
the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 1988, which mandated that all NEC 
trains be equipped with ``automatic train control systems designed to 
slow or stop a train in response to external signals.'' Sec. 9, Public 
Law 100-342, implemented at 52 FR 44510 (Nov. 19, 1987), 53 FR 1433 
(Jan. 19, 1988), and 53 FR 39834 (Oct. 12, 1988).

Safety Performance Standards

    On May 29, 1992, Amtrak informed FRA of its intention to implement 
a proposed 9-aspect cab signal/speed control system supplemented with 
an intermittent transponder civil speed enforcement system on the NEC. 
On June 23, 1992, FRA notified Amtrak that the proposed system would 
have to comply with Part 236. FRA also suggested the following specific 
performance standards for the ACSES components:
    1. The system must enforce permanent and temporary civil speed 
restrictions (e.g., track curvature, bridges, and slow orders).
    2. All trains operating over the trackage of the proposed system 
must be equipped to respond to the continuous cab signal/speed control 
system and intermittent transponder civil speed enforcement system.
    3. Conflicting aspects or indications may not be displayed in the 
locomotive cab.
    4. The system must enforce the most restrictive speed at any 
location associated with either the civil restriction or cab signal 
aspect.
    5. The system shall include a restricted speed command or code rate 
to permit the train to continue at restricted speed only if this 
command is received. The system shall be arranged so that if the speed 
command is not received the train will be brought to a stop and cannot 
be moved again until some type of apparatus interconnected with the 
train control system and controlled by the dispatcher is used. The 
train may then only travel at restricted speed until a valid speed 
command is received by the on-board train equipment.
    In a September 17, 1992 letter, Amtrak responded to technical 
issues raised at an earlier meeting between Amtrak and FRA. Amtrak 
agreed with performance standards 1, 3, and 4, but had reservations 
concerning performance standard 2 because of the funding needed to 
upgrade commuter and freight corridor users' train control systems. 
Amtrak also questioned the

[[Page 62101]]

need to equip certain user vehicles with a full microprocessor scanning 
system if the user trains did not operate at speeds in excess of 100 
mph, civil speed reductions in the territory operated were relatively 
few, and civil speeds could be controlled by the continuous cab signal 
enforcement system without adversely impacting train schedules or on-
time performance.
    Amtrak also requested relief from performance standard 5, which 
requires an enforced stop at interlocking signals with an advance track 
configuration that would not establish high speed track fouling, where 
the maximum authorized speed does not exceed 45 mph through an 
interlocking arrangement or terminal. The system would still contain a 
recurring 15 second audible warning and a 20 second acknowledge 
requirement while operating at restricted speed.
    At a meeting on September 20, 1994, the Northeast Corridor Safety 
Committee, a federal advisory committee chartered pursuant to the Rail 
Safety Enforcement and Review Act of 1992, considered the issue of an 
enhanced NEC train control system and agreed with draft performance 
specifications similar to those set forth above. The draft performance 
standards placed before the Committee included equipping of all 
movements in high-speed territory. However, the issue of increased 
speeds south of New York City was not discussed, since Amtrak had not 
proposed to increase speeds on the South End at that time. The 
Committee was in general agreement that the current cab signal/ATC 
system should be supplemented, as proposed by Amtrak, in connection 
with NEC improvements.

Discussion

Safety Need

    Increases in train speed, in the traffic density planned for both 
intercity and commuter service, and in the potential for increased 
freight operations over a portion of the NEC territory would increase 
the risk of a severe accident on the NEC unless compensating measures 
are taken. These risks fall into four general categories requiring 
separate analysis, three of which are pertinent here.
    The first risk is of a train-to-train collision. Although the 
existing cab signal/ATC system on the NEC provides a very high level of 
safety, some risks remain. The cab signal/ATC system currently in use 
on the NEC does not enforce a positive stop at signals displaying a 
stop aspect, nor does it require acknowledgment of the restricting 
aspect every 20 seconds. Instead, the engineer receives one warning 
that must be acknowledged when a ``zero'' code rate is experienced. 
Thus, the principal hazard is not that a train operating under a 
restricted speed code could strike another train. Rather, it is that a 
slower train could move through the control point into the path of a 
high-speed train. This could happen if the engineer of the train 
subject to the stop signal experienced an incident of micro sleep, 
accompanied by a conditioned response of acknowledging the warning, was 
distracted, or was impaired. Less likely to occur, but still possible, 
is a scenario where an engineer or a third party acts recklessly. This 
scenario must be taken seriously in light of recent acts of domestic 
terrorism.
    Clearly, equipping only high-speed trains with on-board equipment 
responsive to the ACSES system is insufficient by itself to prevent 
collisions at key control points. Only by equipping all trains can the 
safe movement of high-speed trains be reasonably ensured. Amtrak's 
observation that positive stop capability need only be provided at 
locations providing access to high-speed track appears to have merit, 
however.
    The second risk is of an overspeed derailment which may result in 
direct harm or harm flowing from a resulting impact with other trains 
or fixed objects. Currently, locations on the NEC where signal speed 
restrictions are higher than the overturning speed of the curve are 
protected by special speed control features specific to those 
locations. As speeds rise for both intercity and commuter trains, the 
number of track segments requiring special control will increase. 
Allowances for higher levels of unbalance (implicit in the 
flexibilities proposed in the July 3 Track Safety Standards Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)) would also create potential exposure that 
does not currently exist. The speed control features of the ACSES will 
deal effectively and economically with this potential safety exposure, 
while providing all passenger operators on the corridor with the 
potential for reduced trip times.
    The third risk is of an impact with track forces or their 
equipment. This risk is endemic to all rail operations, but increased 
speed drives up potential severity and reduces the warning time of a 
train's approach. Unlike revenue rolling stock, many pieces of 
maintenance-of-way equipment will not reliably shunt or activate a 
signal system. Further, although great care is taken to ensure that 
workers and their equipment are protected from train movements, human 
error in issuing or executing such authorities can occur.
    Although the recently published final rule for Roadway Worker 
Safety will help to control this risk (61 FR 65959; December 16, 1996 
), a train control system with the capability to provide automatic 
warning to the train of the presence of workers or equipment prior to 
visual sighting could significantly drive down the risk of harm to both 
roadway workers and train occupants. This is of particular concern on a 
high-speed railroad with very dense operations and close track centers, 
conditions that prevail on much of the NEC.
    The ACSES system incorporates portable transponder technology that 
can provide a second layer of safety for roadway workers and their 
equipment. Further, temporary speed restrictions would be entered into 
the on-board ACSES computer, providing for automatic enforcement even 
if temporary transponders are misplaced or vandalized. These features 
should increase the safety of those conventional and high-speed trains 
that are equipped with on-board computers.
    A fourth risk accentuated by higher speeds is increased severity of 
an accident resulting from an undetected incursion into the right of 
way or clearance envelope, including possible displacement or 
undermining of track structure. This fourth risk is not addressed in 
this proceeding since the Northeast Corridor Safety Committee will 
evaluate this issue in a separate ``system safety'' proceeding to be 
held at a later date. However, the data radio element of the ACSES 
system provides a possible communication path for hazard detection 
information (in addition to the cab signal system).

Technical Issues

    In Amtrak's proposed system, the brake and propulsion interface 
between the ACSES and the locomotive would be similar to that utilized 
in conventional cab signal/ATC systems. The interface would be separate 
and distinct from the interface used by the cab signal/ATC system. The 
failure of either the cab signal/ATC system or the ACSES would not 
prevent the remaining functioning system from performing its intended 
operation and displaying the proper on-board aspect. Both the signal 
speed and the civil speed would be displayed with the lower of the two 
speeds to be enforced.
    FRA questions the need or prudence of displaying both speeds and 
continues to gather information on this design. Comment is requested 
regarding the

[[Page 62102]]

appropriate means of displaying system information to the locomotive 
engineer.
    The new transponder-based system would provide for enforcement of 
permanent civil speed restrictions (curves, bridges, etc.) and 
temporary speed restrictions (slow orders) in five MPH increments, as 
well as enforcement of stop aspects at interlocking home signals. Once 
the train is stopped, current plans call for the system to require the 
train to remain stopped for 30 seconds at which time the engineer will 
operate a stop override button and allow movement of the train, with 
the audible alarm requiring acknowledgment every 20 seconds. FRA is 
aware that some locomotive engineers may find repetitive acknowledgment 
of this feature distracting during low-speed movements through terminal 
areas and requests comments regarding possible alternative 
arrangements.
    FRA discussed with Amtrak a feature under which a controlled 
release would be encrypted into the on-board computer at the time of 
departure to ensure that movement could not be made past stop aspects 
at home signals without a secure means of authorization. Amtrak opposed 
this approach, arguing that the train should remain under the control 
of the engineer, who may have a more complete and current understanding 
of considerations pertinent to the safety of the train movement. For 
instance, if a structure or vehicle adjacent to the wayside was on 
fire, it would be necessary to move the train to avoid a hazard to the 
passengers and crew. Nevertheless, FRA believes operation of a train 
where a positive stop is required should occur only after the engineer 
cuts out or overrides the ACSES through a mechanism located away from 
the engineer's console, the location and/or operation of which would 
require special knowledge available only to a person authorized to 
operate the override. Amtrak has endeavored to respond to this concern 
in designing the ACSES.

Text and Analysis of Proposed Orders

    For purposes of clarity and convenience, the text of the proposed 
order is interspersed with explanations and analysis. The text of the 
proposed order is printed in italics. FRA reserves the right to revise 
and augment the proposed order upon final issuance and invites comments 
on all issues relevant to the subject matter of the order.

Proposed Effective Date

    As discussed above, Amtrak anticipates beginning receipt of the new 
HST's in 1999. FRA proposes to make this Order effective on October 1, 
1999, to enable Amtrak to rapidly utilize the new system's improvements 
while allowing other users of the NEC to phase-in installation.

Scope and Applicability

    This order supplements existing regulations at 49 CFR Part 236 and 
existing orders for automatic train control on the Northeast Corridor 
(NEC). This order applies in territory where Amtrak has installed 
wayside elements of the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System 
(ACSES), permitting high-speed operations under the conditions set 
forth below. All railroads operating on high-speed tracks in such 
equipped territory, or on tracks providing access to such high-speed 
tracks, shall be subject to this order, including the following 
entities operating or contracting for the operation of rail service--

Connecticut Department of Transportation;
Consolidated Rail Corporation;
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority;
National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak); and
Providence and Worcester Railroad Co.

    Explanation and Analysis. Amtrak has undertaken the planning and 
installation of the ACSES as part of its capital program for intercity 
service on the NEC, consistent with legislation providing for improved 
rail service in the region. The proposed order would require all 
carriers operating in ACSES territory to equip their controlling 
locomotives with operative on-board equipment. This equipment would 
consist of a transponder scanner, an on-board computer, a display unit 
for the locomotive engineer, and appropriate interface with the cab 
signal/train control apparatus.
    The exception would be trackage on the South End where access is 
barred to non-ACSES-equipped trainsets and where increases in the 
maximum speed will be from 125 mph to 135 mph. In this instance, only 
Amtrak trains would be required to be equipped.
    FRA views the distinctions between required signal and train 
control features on the north and south portions of the NEC to be 
temporary. The proposed order would allow increases in train speeds 
without any reduction in safety. Over time, the ACSES system should be 
completed and used by all operators throughout the NEC for routes where 
speeds exceed 110 mph on any segment, enhancing safety throughout the 
NEC. In fact, New Jersey Transit Rail Operations (NJT) has indicated 
its intention to equip its controlling locomotives with an Advanced 
Speed Enforcement System (ASES), deriving safety advantages both on the 
NEC and on certain of its lines where the ASES system can be used as an 
intermittent train stop system. As Amtrak, North End operators and NJT 
demonstrate the benefits and reliability of the system, progress toward 
universal upgrading of the NEC signal and train control system will be 
fostered. At a later date, FRA may amend this order to require more 
extensive use of this new safety technology. This will be determined by 
increases in traffic and types of equipment used on the NEC.

Definitions. For Purposes of This Order--

    ``High-speed track'' means (1) a track on the main line of the 
Northeast Corridor (NEC) between New Haven, Connecticut, and Boston, 
Massachusetts (``North End'') where the maximum authorized train speed 
for any class of train is in excess of 110 miles per hour or (2) a 
track on the main line of NEC between Washington, D.C., and New York 
City, New York (``South End''), where the authorized train speed for 
any class of train exceeds 125 mph.
    Explanation and Analysis. Operations on the North End are conducted 
on two main tracks, while additional main tracks are available on 
portions of the South End. Operations are already highly dense on the 
North End, and projections for the future indicate significant 
increases in traffic, both freight and passenger. Track curvature on 
the North End exceeds the average curvature on the South End, resulting 
in greater potential concern for compliance with civil speed 
restrictions. Accordingly, FRA proposes to distinguish between the two 
operations for purposes of determining applicability of new performance 
requirements.
    ``Signal and train control system'' refers to the automatic cab 
signal/automatic train control system (cab signal/ATC) in effect on the 
NEC at the date of issuance of this order, as supplemented by 
``ACSES,'' together with such modifications as Amtrak shall make 
consistent with this order.

Performance Standards

    The following performance standards and special requirements apply:

[[Page 62103]]

1. Except as provided in paragraph 10(b), the signal and train control 
system shall enforce both permanent and temporary civil speed 
restrictions (e.g., track curvature, bridges, and slow orders) on all 
high-speed tracks and immediately adjacent tracks.
    Explanation and analysis. The ACSES system can prevent derailments 
and collisions with fixed structures or on-track personnel or equipment 
that might result from overspeed operation. Accordingly, permanent 
civil speed enforcement and temporary speed enforcement are proposed.
    Existing features of the cab signal/ATC system on the NEC provide 
intermittent civil speed enforcement at key locations where signal 
speeds exceed overturning speeds or where station operations require 
special protection. However, as speeds are increased, civil speed 
enforcement will become an issue at additional locations. The ACSES 
would permit higher operating speeds while maintaining a high level of 
safety.
    The existing signal system would not enforce temporary speed 
restrictions, such as slow orders over defective track or protections 
for roadway workers. By using temporarily placed transponders, and by 
entering restrictions into the on-board computer by milepost, the ACSES 
could provide excellent protection for train movements and workers and 
equipment on or adjacent to live tracks. All trains equipped with on-
board ACSES units would benefit from this feature.
    The proposed order suggests that this requirement should be 
extended to tracks adjacent to high-speed tracks. The effective 
operating envelope for high-speed tracks includes immediately adjacent 
tracks. Derailments on those tracks could endanger high-speed 
operations.
2. Except as provided in paragraph 10(b), all trains operating on high-
speed track, immediately adjacent track, or track providing access to 
high-speed track shall be equipped to respond to the continuous cab 
signal/speed control system and intermittent transponder civil speed 
enforcement/positive stop system. Freight trains that are not equipped 
with ACSES will be allowed to operate on the NEC at off-peak times when 
no high-speed passenger trains are operating in the area.
    Explanation and analysis. As noted above, the ACSES system could 
provide potential benefits for all users of the NEC. However, this 
proposed order would only require equipping trains on the North End, 
where trains are operated on high-speed tracks, or on immediately 
adjacent tracks providing access to high-speed tracks.
    The benefits of equipping high-speed trains are obvious. The 
benefits of equipping conventional speed trains that operate on high-
speed tracks include enforcement of civil speed restrictions, temporary 
speed restrictions, and positive stop features. The benefits of 
equipping conventional speed trains that operate on immediately 
adjacent tracks providing access to high-speed tracks may derive 
primarily from enforcement of positive stop features. If a train is 
prevented from inappropriately proceeding through a junction and onto a 
high-speed track, the safety of the subject train and the safety of the 
oncoming high-speed train are equally assured. As a practical matter, 
FRA believes that few trains required to be equipped under this 
proposal would not make use of high-speed tracks. Again, comment is 
specifically requested regarding whether any circumstances exist under 
which trains would be required to be equipped exclusively because they 
operate on adjacent tracks or on tracks providing access to high-speed 
tracks. (See, also, paragraph 10(b), below.)
3. No conflicting aspects or indications shall be displayed in the 
locomotive cab.
    Explanation and analysis. The proposed order would require that 
consistent information be displayed to the locomotive engineer. Amtrak 
plans to implement this principle, while providing information from 
both the cab signal/ATC system and the ACSES, by displaying both of the 
resulting maximum speeds. The controlling (most restrictive) limit 
would be displayed at twice the brightness of the other speed. The cab 
signal aspect would also be displayed.
    FRA believes that Amtrak's proposed display (details of which are 
contained in the program description placed in the docket of this 
proposed order) is appropriate for a hybrid system such as this. 
However, it should be noted that the amount of apparently conflicting 
information provided to the locomotive engineer may be substantial. In 
particular, the engineer (who may operate non-equipped trains on 
certain days and equipped trains on other days) will have to contend 
with 9-aspect cab signal information that differs from the wayside 
signal and potentially the wayside or overhead speed boards, ACSES 
information, and at least two systems requiring acknowledgment of 
audible warnings (the alerting device and the combined cab signal/ATC/
ACSES unit). Is this information excessive? Should a simpler display of 
the most safety critical information be provided as the default 
condition?
4. The system must enforce the most restrictive speed at any location 
associated with either the civil/temporary restriction or cab signal 
aspect.
    Explanation and analysis. This requirement states the obvious 
requirement that the most restrictive of the limitations indicated by 
the cab signal/ATC or ACSES system must be enforced.
5. At interlocking home signals and control points on high-speed tracks 
or protecting switches providing access to high-speed tracks, the 
signal and train control system shall enforce a positive stop short of 
the signal or fouling point when the signal displays an absolute stop. 
The system shall function such that the train will be brought to a 
complete stop and cannot be moved again until the first of the 
following events shall occur: (1) The signal displays a more permissive 
aspect; or (2) in the event of a system malfunction, or system penalty, 
at least 30 seconds shall have elapsed since the train came to a 
complete stop, the engineer has received verbal authority to proceed 
from the dispatcher, and the engineer has activated an override or 
reset device that is located where it cannot be activated from the 
engineer's accustomed position in the cab. The train may then only 
travel at restricted speed until a valid speed command is received by 
the on-board train equipment.
    Explanation and analysis. Providing for normal and extraordinary 
movements past a signal that previously required an absolute stop using 
a hybrid cab signal/ATC/ACSES arrangement has proven to be one of the 
most challenging issues in the design of the new system. As originally 
conceived by Amtrak, in the normal case ACSES would enforce a positive 
stop by use of an active transponder near the distant signal that would 
read the cab signal code (``0''), recognize that the home signal is 
capable of displaying an absolute stop, and enforce a positive stop 
even if the home signal actually displayed a restricting indication 
(permitting movement through the location at up to 15 mph), unless a 
greater than zero code rate was detected upon reaching the ``cut 
section'' in which the home signal was located. This arrangement 
appeared to have several disadvantages. First, stops would be required 
where presently none are required. This could be a significant issue in 
freight

[[Page 62104]]

operations, since enforcement of unnecessary stop commands could in 
some cases result in unacceptable in-train forces. Second, movements 
past a stop signal that became restricting after the stop would have to 
be made by overriding the positive stop. Third, these arrangements 
would inevitably lead to demands for release of the positive stop from 
the engineer's position in the cab, potentially defeating the concept 
intended to be implemented by FRA when conversations with Amtrak were 
initiated on this subject in 1992.
    To avoid distracting or fatiguing the engineer, and to ensure that 
the override function is not regarded as a feature to be casually 
employed, it appears to be more appropriate to restrict the use of the 
reset or override button to that of instances of system failures, on-
board or wayside. Efficiency also suggests permitting the train to 
proceed when a train receives an indication more favorable than 
absolute stop (a consideration of interest particularly to those 
commuter authorities that would be subject to the proposed order). 
Accordingly, FRA proposed that the train control system function in 
greater harmony with the wayside signals. This could be accomplished in 
a number of ways.
    First, it should be possible to place one or more additional 
transponders that derive information directly from the circuits 
controlling the home signal. Amtrak indicates that this approach could 
be complicated by the varying stopping distances of trains using the 
NEC, but in principle the approach seems feasible. If this approach 
were to be employed, these transponders should be placed to control 
speed approaching the signal while providing information concerning 
more favorable aspects as a means of releasing the absolute stop 
automatically. Second, it should be possible to use a steady 250 Hz to 
release the stop when the signal upgrades to restricting. This would 
require modifications to the signal system at each home signal and 
control point. Third, data radio could be used on the wayside to 
provide precise signal status (notwithstanding the zero code read by 
the cab signal system) when the signal is at ``Stop and Proceed,'' or 
``Restricting.'' Any of these options would allow the movement past a 
restricting signal without the use of a reset or override button by the 
engineer.
    Amtrak agreed, at a June 4, 1997 meeting, to accelerate the 
development of the ACSES data radio feature to reduce the need to 
operate the ``Stop Override'' button to only those instances in which 
some sort of system failure has occurred and the train must be moved. 
The data radio feature located at the interlocking and known as a 
Mobile Communication Package (MCP) would broadcast a message to the 
approaching train that is track specific, direction specific, and 
location specific that would automatically release the stop-override 
feature without the engineer having to operate the ``Stop Override'' 
button when the home signal displays ``Stop and Proceed.'' The message 
would only be transmitted and only be effective when the train is 
between the distant signal and the home signal of the interlocking. If 
the signal displays ``Restricting,'' the MCP data radio would broadcast 
a similar message to the approaching train that would relieve the train 
from actually having to stop. While the additional time frame and cost 
to develop the data radio encoder and to install these encoders along 
with the MCP radios at all interlockings in ACSES territory is not yet 
known, it is clear that this is the only method, among those that have 
been proposed, with long-range potential to truly enhance the future 
operation of ACSES on the Northeast Corridor. As the additional time 
frame to develop the data radio/encoder override release feature is not 
yet known, and as the schedule to begin high speed rail operations in 
1999 is very tight, FRA recognizes that some relief concerning 
operation of the ``Stop Override'' button may be required, particularly 
should Amtrak seek approval for limited operations to 135 mph on the 
south end during 1998. FRA feels that a clear plan for migration with 
timetables should be submitted prior to the granting of increased 
speeds.
6. Failure modes of the system will allow for train movements at 
reduced speeds, as follows:
    a. Failure of Cab Signal/ATC System: In the event of failure of the 
cab signal/ATC system on board a train, the cab signal/ATC system will 
be cut out; however, the ACSES system shall remain operative and 
enforce the 79 mph speed limit. If intermediate wayside signals are 
provided, the train will continue to operate at speeds not exceeding 79 
mph subject to indications of the wayside signal system. In territory 
without fixed automatic block signals, trains will run on special 
``Clear to Next Interlocking'' signals. When failure occurs after a 
train has entered such a block, it will proceed at restricted speed to 
the next interlocking and may not pass the home signal, regardless of 
the aspect displayed, until the flashing lunar ``Clear to Next 
Interlocking'' signal is displayed. The train may then pass the signal 
and proceed at 79 mph. The speed limit shall be enforced by the 
Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System (ACSES). At the next distant 
signal the train must begin braking, preparing to stop at the next home 
signal unless a flashing lunar signal with the letter ``N'' is 
displayed indicating that the ``Clear to Next Interlocking'' signal is 
already displayed ahead.
    Explanation and analysis. The cab signal/ATC portion of the system 
would be cut out under operating rules which meet Sec. 236.567 
requirements. The operation of trains when the cab signal/ATC portion 
of the system was failed and/or cut out would be enhanced by the ACSES 
still being in operation. The ACSES central processing unit (CPU) would 
receive a message from the cab signal/ATC CPU through a vital link that 
the cab signal/ATC is cut in and not failed. If the ACSES does not 
receive this message, a speed of 79 mph is locked in and the display is 
dark, other than the 79 mph displayed in the civil speed portion, which 
is enforced. Temporary and permanent speed restrictions and positive 
stop at home signal locations would continue to be enforced by the 
ACSES system.
b. ACSES failure. If the on-board ACSES fails en route, it must be cut 
out in a similar manner to the cab signal/ATC system. The engineer will 
be required to notify the dispatcher that the civil speed/positive stop 
enforcement system has been cut out. When given permission to proceed, 
the train must not exceed 125 mph (South End) or 110 mph (North End). 
All trains with a cut out ACSES system will operate at conventional 
train speeds.
    Explanation and analysis. After considering how to proceed when the 
ACSES must be cut out on a train, the proposed order specifies minimal 
requirements, which would require that trains fall back to existing 
maximum speeds in the territories. However, this approach cannot 
provide positive stop capability or compensate for higher curving 
speeds that may be allowed using tilt HST's. All trains with a cut out 
ACSES would operate at conventional train speeds whether they are tilt 
train equipment or conventional equipment. The vital link between CPUs 
mentioned in 6.(a) above would inform the signal CPU that the civil 
speed CPU was cut out or failed. FRA has inquired whether a default 
speed limit could be ``enforced'' through the signal speed enforcement 
system when the ACSES is failed and/or cut out, and Amtrak responded 
that this could be accomplished. The maximum speed to

[[Page 62105]]

be enforced by the cab signal system if ACSES is cut out is 125 mph. 
This places a premium on compliance with operating rules developed 
specifically for this purpose (copies of which are available in the 
public docket). Comment is requested regarding appropriate measures, 
recognizing that electronic failures and damage to scanners from refuse 
on the track structure will result in ACSES failures.
c. Cab signals/ATC & ACSES failure. If the cab signal/ATC system and 
the ACSES both fail en route, the systems shall be cut out and the 
train shall proceed as provided in 49 CFR Sec. 236.567.
    Explanation and analysis. When the signal and train control system 
fails and/or is cut out en route, Sec. 236.567 sets forth the 
procedures and restrictions that shall be followed.

    Where an automatic train stop, train control, or cab signal 
device fails and/or is cut out enroute, train may proceed at 
restricted speed or if an automatic block signal system is in 
operation according to signal indication but not to exceed medium 
speed, to the next available point of communication where report 
must be made to a designated officer. Where no automatic block 
signal system is in use train shall be permitted to proceed at 
restricted speed or where automatic block signal system is in 
operation according to signal indication but not to exceed medium 
speed to a point where absolute block can be established. Where an 
absolute block is established in advance of the train on which the 
device is inoperative train may proceed at not to exceed 79 miles 
per hour.

These procedures are used with present train control systems, both on 
the NEC and throughout the Nation and have proven to be a reliable and 
safe method when the signal and train control system fails and/or is 
cut out.
d. Wayside signal system failure. If the wayside signal system fails, 
train operation will be at restricted speed to a point where absolute 
block can be established in advance of the train. Where absolute block 
is established in advance of the train, the train may proceed at speeds 
not to exceed 79 mph.
    Explanation and analysis. The carrier's operating rules shall 
effect these requirements. In the case of a wayside signal system 
failure the ACSES would still be functioning, giving trains an added 
portion of safety, but it would still be necessary to establish an 
absolute block and proceed not to exceed 79 mph. The ACSES would 
enforce the 79 mph speed, as well as civil and temporary speed 
restrictions and positive stops.
e. Missing transponder. If a transponder is not detected where the 
equipment expected to find the next transponder, the train must not 
exceed 125 mph (North End) or 110 mph (South End) until the next valid 
transponder is encountered. The 125/110 mph speed restriction will be 
enforced by the system and ``--'' will be displayed to indicate that 
the civil speed is unknown. The audible alarm for civil speeds will 
sound and must be acknowledged. Speed restrictions previously entered 
into the system, whether temporary or permanent, will be displayed at 
the proper time and continue to be enforced. If the missing transponder 
is a positive stop enforcement transponder at the distant signal to an 
interlocking, then the system will treat the missing transponder as if 
it were present and a stop will be required. Since the previous 
transponder will have transmitted the distance to the stop location, 
the stop shall be enforced unless a cab signal is received that 
indicates the interlocking signal is displaying an aspect more 
favorable than ``Stop,'' ``Stop & Proceed,'' and ``Restricting.'' The 
125/110 mph speed restriction will also be enforced regardless of 
whether the cab signal aspect is being received.
    Explanation and analysis. Permanent transponders would be 
programmed with information that includes distance to the next 
transponder. Wheel rotations would be logged to determine train 
position between transponders. If a transponder is missing (or is not 
successfully read), speeds would be slowed to 125 or 110 mph, depending 
upon the territory involved, until the next valid transponder is 
detected.
    8. When it becomes necessary to cut out the cab signal/ATC system, 
the ACSES, or both, these systems shall be considered inoperative until 
the engine has been repaired, tested and found to be functioning 
properly. Repairs shall be made before dispatching the unit on any 
subsequent trip.
    9. Other requirements applicable to the system are as follows:
a. Aspects in the cab shall have only one indication and one name and 
will be shown in such a way as to be understood by the engine crew. 
These aspects shall be shown by lights and/or illuminated letters or 
numbers.
b. Entrances to the main line can be protected by electrically locked 
derails if the speed limit is 15 mph or less. A transponder set shall 
cut in the ACSES prior to movement through the derail and onto the main 
line. If the speed limit is greater than 15 mph, a positive stop will 
be required. At entrances from a signaled track, the ACSES shall be cut 
in prior to the distant signal and a positive stop enforced at the home 
signal.
c. An on-board event recorder shall record, in addition to the required 
functions of Sec. 229.5(g) [of FRA's Railroad Locomotive Safety 
Standards (49 CFR Part 229)], the time at which each transponder is 
encountered, the information associated with that transponder, and each 
use of the positive stop override. These functions may be incorporated 
within the on-board computer, or as a stand alone device, but shall 
continue to record speeds and related cab signal/ATC data, even if 
ACSES has failed and/or is cut out. The event recorder shall meet all 
requirements of Sec. 229.135.
    Explanation and analysis. FRA has determined that event recorders 
enhance railroad safety. Whether they are used to aid accident 
analysis, to monitor locomotive engineers' performance, or to monitor 
equipment performance, event recorders provide data that are free from 
bias, free from the inconsistent powers of human observation, and free 
from the possible taint of self-interest. There has been no question of 
the cab signal/ATC events being recorded; what FRA is ensuring is that 
the ACSES portion of the system is recorded and made available as well.
    10. The following maximum speeds apply on the NEC in territory 
subject to this order:

[[Page 62106]]

a. In ACSES territory where all trains operating on high-speed tracks, 
adjacent tracks, and tracks providing access to high-speed tracks are 
equipped with cab signal/ATC and ACSES, qualified and ACSES-equipped 
trainsets otherwise so authorized may operate at maximum speeds not 
exceeding 150 mph. The maximum speed over any highway-rail crossing 
shall not exceed 80 mph.
b. In ACSES territory between Washington, D.C., and New York City, New 
York, where access to any high-speed track is barred by switches locked 
in the normal position and a parallel route to the high-speed track is 
provided, at crossovers from adjacent tracks, and where no junctions 
providing direct access exist, qualified and ACSES-equipped trainsets 
otherwise so authorized may operate to a maximum speed not exceeding 
135 mph on such track; and provisions of this order requiring other 
tracks and trains to be equipped with the ACSES do not apply.
    Explanation and analysis. Currently maximum speeds for trains on 
the general rail system are limited to 110 miles per hour. Under a 
waiver, Amtrak operates Metroliner service between New York and 
Washington at speeds up to 125 miles per hour. This proposed order 
would allow Amtrak to increase its speeds on the South End of the NEC 
to 135 miles per hour by installing the ACSES transponders on the 
wayside and equipping new high-speed trainsets with on-board scanners 
and computers. Other users of Amtrak's South End high-speed tracks 
would not be required to be equipped for the present, but would benefit 
from the higher level of safety associated with Amtrak operations. As 
noted above, other users have already begun to recognize the value of 
the ACSES technology, and eventual equipping of all NEC users is 
expected (but would not be required under this order).
    On the North End, maximum speeds top out at 110 mph. No waiver 
exists for high-speed service. This order would authorize operation of 
qualified trainsets at up to 150 miles per hour in territory where 
Amtrak has installed ACSES on the wayside, provided Amtrak and other 
users are equipped. This authority would apply equally to the North and 
South Ends provided the specified conditions are met.
    Speeds over highway-rail crossings would be limited to 80 mph, the 
maximum speed planned under the NEC program until very recently. This 
limit is lower than the 110 mph cap included in current guidelines for 
high-speed corridors (absent barrier and presence detection systems 
tied into the signal system). Density of NEC operations and the 
increased possibility that a collision with a motor vehicle might cause 
a secondary collision between trains operating at combined very high 
closing speeds suggests the need for appropriate caution. FRA reserves 
the right to allow higher speeds over individual highway-rail crossings 
after demonstration by Amtrak that appropriate safety measures have 
been implemented.
    The phrase ``otherwise authorized,'' as applied to trains, refers 
to equipment qualified for higher speeds in track/vehicle interaction 
limits proposed in FRA's Track Safety Standards NPRM. Metroliner 
equipment is currently authorized to operate up to 125 miles per hour. 
FRA anticipates that the new American Flyer trainsets will be qualified 
to operate up to 150 miles per hour. It is possible that other 
equipment presently operating on the NEC might be qualified to operate 
at higher than conventional speeds under the procedures of the proposed 
Track Safety Standards revisions.
    At present, specific regulatory action applicable only to the NEC 
includes conditional waiver authority for operation of Metroliner 
equipment to 125 miles per hour and requirements for use of the cab 
signal/ATC system by all operators. FRA reserves the right to merge 
some or all of these provisions in the final order. Comment is 
requested regarding the appropriateness of doing so.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 was enacted by Congress to 
ensure that small entities are not unnecessarily and disproportionately 
burdened by Government regulations. FRA certifies that this proposed 
order would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities. As explained below in the Regulatory Impact 
Analysis, the proposed order would limit its hours of application to 
minimize impact on the only small entity affected, the Providence and 
Worcester Railroad.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), Public Law No. 
104-13, section 2, 109 Stat. 163 (1995) (codified as revised at 44 
U.S.C. 3501-3520), and its implementing regulations, 5 CFR Part 1320, 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) does not need to approve 
information collection requirements that affect nine or fewer 
respondents. FRA has determined that information collection 
requirements in this proposed order would affect only five railroads, 
and that therefore OMB approval is not required.

Regulatory Impact

Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

    This rule has been evaluated in accordance with existing policies 
and procedures. It is believed that the rule will be determined to be 
non-significant under both Executive Order 12866 and DOT policies and 
procedures (44 FR 11034; February 26, 1979). FRA has prepared and 
placed in the docket a regulatory analysis addressing the economic 
impact of the proposed rule. Document inspection and copying facilities 
are available at 1120 Vermont Avenue, 7th Floor, Washington, D.C. 
Photocopies may also be obtained by submitting a written request to the 
FRA Docket Clerk at Office of Chief Counsel, Federal Railroad 
Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590.
    FRA has analyzed the benefits and costs of upgrading the signal 
systems in the NEC to the ACSES system. The NEC has many unique 
aspects, and many of the economic issues arising in analysis of this 
proposal are extremely complicated. It appears that there would be 
significant safety costs were FRA not to order significant upgrades to 
the signal systems in the NEC.
    Amtrak and NJT have sound business reasons for adopting the 
proposed transponder-based system, but safety benefits will also accrue 
in large measure to society. FRA estimates that societal direct safety 
benefits will be more than $200,000,000. The system will cost 
approximately $95,000,000 (an amount which will accrue over several 
years, approximately $36,000,000 of which will be imposed directly by 
this order, implementing the first phase) so the net benefit will be 
approximately $105,000,000. There will also be benefits beyond the 
direct safety benefits, such as the ability to improve traffic flow and 
to divert traffic from modes with greater societal costs. There will 
also be benefits from the improvement and demonstration of advanced 
signal technology.
    This proposed order would facilitate the orderly introduction of 
enhanced passenger rail service on the NEC, consistent with Congress' 
statutory direction. The order would recognize Amtrak's investment in 
development and deployment of advanced technology that will enforce 
civil speed restrictions and positive stops at key locations along the 
railroad. Amtrak is also making significant investments in a new 9-

[[Page 62107]]

 aspect signal system and improvements in track and structures that 
will benefit all NEC users through more efficient operations and 
improved safety.
    The proposed order would require that controlling locomotives 
(including electrical multiple-unit vehicles and cab cars) on the NEC 
be equipped with on-board ACSES equipment. This burden would fall on 
commuter railroads, freight railroads, and Amtrak, in proportion to the 
number of trains those entities operate on the NEC. A risk assessment 
study conducted for Amtrak and discussed with other NEC interests in 
the Northeast Corridor Safety Committee illustrated the importance of a 
more secure train control system in avoiding any increase in system 
risk as train movements and speeds increase on the North End over the 
coming decades.
    One on-board ACSES unit is expected to cost approximately $40,000. 
North End users exclusive of Amtrak are expected to require 
approximately 450 units, for a total cost of about $18,000,000. Each of 
these users will experience direct benefits in safety and liability 
avoidance. Potential benefits could result from higher average train 
speeds if the proposed higher levels of unbalance in the Track Safety 
Standards NPRM are adopted.
    FRA has considered the proposed system's effect on small entities. 
Only one small entity, the Providence and Worcester Railroad (PW), will 
be affected. To minimize the impact on this small freight railroad, FRA 
will limit the hours of application of the proposed order to allow the 
PW to continue operations without equipping most of its fleet with new 
ACSES units.

Proceedings on This Proposed Order

    FRA seeks public comment on this proposed order and related 
matters, including any authorization that may be required for Amtrak to 
implement a modified cab signal system on the NEC. FRA has placed in 
the docket of this proceeding copies of Amtrak's program description 
for the ACSES system, proposed operating rules for use in conjunction 
with the system, and other related information, including current 
Amtrak projections for operating speeds over highway-rail crossings on 
the North End.
    No public hearing is presently planned in this proceeding. However, 
FRA will convene such a hearing if a request is received within 45 days 
from publication of this notice. FRA does intend to convene the 
Northeast Corridor Safety Committee following the close of the comment 
period to consider public comments received and provide advice for 
resolving remaining issues. FRA will provide notice of this meeting, 
which will be open to the public, and will include the minutes of the 
meeting in the docket of this proceeding.

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20103, 20107, 20501-20505 (1994); and 49 
CFR 1.49 (f), (g), and (m).

    Issued in Washington, D.C. on November 17, 1997.
Donald M. Itzkoff,
Deputy Administrator, Federal Railroad Administration.
[FR Doc. 97-30505 Filed 11-19-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P