[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 213 (Tuesday, November 4, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 59750-59752]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-29140]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-302]


Florida Power Corporation; Crystal River Nuclear Generating Plant 
Unit 3, Exemption

I.

    Florida Power Corporation (the licensee) is the holder of Facility 
Operating License No. DPR-72, which authorizes operation of the Crystal 
River Nuclear Generating Plant Unit 3 (CR3). The license provides, 
among other things, that the licensee is subject to all rules, 
regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect.
    The facility is of a pressurized water reactor type and is located 
in Citrus County, Florida.

II.

    In its letter dated June 21, as supplemented November 22, 1996, the 
licensee requested an exemption from the Commission's regulations.
    Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, part 50, Appendix A, 
``General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,'' Criterion 3, 
``Fire Protection,'' specifies that ``Structures, systems, and 
components important to safety shall be designed and located to 
minimize, consistent with other safety requirements, the probability 
and effect of fires and explosions.'' 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R sets 
forth the fire protection features required to satisfy the general 
design Criterion 3 of the Commission's regulations. Pursuant to 10 CFR 
part 50, Appendix R, Section III, Paragraph G, design features shall be 
established that are capable of limiting fire damage so that one train 
of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions is 
free of fire damage. Specifically, 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, 
Paragraph III.G.2.c requires (if Paragraphs III.G.2.a or b are not 
applicable) enclosure of cable and equipment and associated non-safety 
circuits of one redundant train in a fire barrier having a 1-hour 
rating; in addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression 
system shall be installed in the fire area.
    The current CR3 design includes Thermo-Lag fire barriers which do 
not provide the level of fire resistance required by NRC regulations. 
As part of its program for resolving Thermo-Lag issues, the licensee 
has determined that the Thermo-Lag material used as a fire barrier for 
the protection of certain safe shutdown cables located in certain 
elevations of the auxiliary and intermediate buildings does not qualify 
as 1-hour fire rated barriers. In lieu of upgrading the existing 
Thermo-Lag fire barriers to satisfy the 1-hour fire rating requirement, 
the licensee proposes to implement an enhanced automatic fire 
suppression system coverage for these specific fire zones. The licensee 
indicates that its proposed enhanced automatic fire suppression system 
coverage coupled with the existing Thermo-Lag barriers and other 
defense-in-depth features will ensure that one train of equipment 
necessary to achieve hot shutdown remains free of fire damage. An 
exemption from 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III, Paragraph 
G.2.c., is required to allow the use of the existing Thermo-Lag 
material that has less than a 1-hour fire rating, for the specific 
cables and equipment located in certain elevations of the auxiliary and 
intermediate buildings. By letter dated June 21, as supplemented 
November 22, 1996, the licensee submitted the exemption request.
    This exemption does not address the licensee's request relating to 
the requirements for battery powered lighting in areas for the 
operation of safe shutdown equipment.

III.

Discussion

    The exemption request is for the following fire zones: auxiliary 
building fire area AB-95-3B and G, AB-119-6A (elevations 95 and 119) 
and the intermediate building fire area IB-119-201A (elevation 119). 
Automatic sprinkler protection and automatic fire detection designed 
and installed in accordance with the applicable National Fire 
Protection Association (NFPA) codes and standards are provided in these 
fire zones. The licensee, in its response to the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff's request for additional information 
(RAI) dated September 24, 1996, identified no significant deviations 
from the applicable NFPA codes and standards that would adversely 
affect system performance. The licensee has proposed upgrading the 
existing automatic sprinkler protection in each of these zones to 
compensate for the existing Thermo-Lag fire barriers. The licensee has 
determined that the existing Thermo-Lag fire barriers, coupled with the 
enhanced sprinkler protection and administrative controls, provide an 
adequate level of fire protection. The staff's evaluation of the 
licensee's exemption request is discussed below.

[[Page 59751]]

Auxiliary Building Hallway AB-95-3BA
    This zone is the main east/west corridor for this elevation of the 
auxiliary building. The corridor is approximately 9 feet wide and the 
ceiling is approximately 26 feet above the floor level. An open 
stairway at the east end of this fire zone leads up to elevation 119 of 
the auxiliary building (AB 119-6A) and is open to adjacent fire zones 
at each end. The remainder of the zone is bounded by 3-hour fire walls 
on the north, east, and west. The ceiling and floor are also 3-hour 
fire rated barriers. The south wall is a non-fire rated concrete 
barrier with unsealed penetrations. The fire hazards in this zone 
include cables, electrical cabinets and an air conditioning unit. The 
safe shutdown circuits located in this zone are associated with the 
makeup system and battery charging. The unprotected redundant circuits 
are within 5 feet of the Thermo-Lag protected cables. The fire 
protection features provided for this zone include a wet pipe sprinkler 
system, hose station, and smoke detection. The licensee has performed 
an engineering evaluation that concluded that the Thermo-Lag fire 
barriers in this zone have an equivalent fire rating of 23 to 48 
minutes.
Auxiliary Building Hallway AB-95-3G
    This is a north/south corridor providing access to the make-up pump 
cubicles. This zone is enclosed by non-fire rated concrete walls 
ranging from 24 to 36 inches thick. The floor and ceiling are 3-hour 
rated fire barriers. The fire hazards in this zone include cables and 
electrical cabinets. The safe shutdown circuits located in this zone 
are associated with the makeup system and battery charging. The 
unprotected redundant circuits are within 1 foot of the Thermo-Lag 
protected cables. The fire protection features provided for this zone 
include a wet pipe sprinkler system, hose station, and smoke detection. 
The licensee has performed an engineering evaluation that concluded 
that the Thermo-Lag fire barriers in this zone have an equivalent fire 
rating of 23 to 48 minutes.
Auxiliary Building Hallway AB-95-3G
    This zone is the main east/west corridor for this elevation of the 
auxiliary building. The corridor is approximately 9 feet wide and 40 
feet high. An open stairway at the east end of this fire zone leads 
down to elevation 95 of the auxiliary building (AB-95-3B) and is open 
to adjacent fire zones at each end. The remainder of the zone is 
enclosed by 3-hour fire walls on the north, east and west side, a 3-
hour fire rated floor and a 36-inch thick concrete non-fire rated 
ceiling and south wall. The fire hazards in this zone include cables 
and fan motors. The safe shutdown circuits located in this area are 
associated with the makeup system, heating ventilation and air 
conditioning (HVAC), instrumentation, battery charging and essential 
power supplies. The unprotected redundant circuits are greater than 20 
feet from the Thermo-Lag protected cables; however, intervening 
combustibles are present. The fire protection features provided for 
this zone include a wet pipe sprinkler system, hose station, and smoke 
detection. The licensee has performed an engineering evaluation that 
concluded that the Thermo-Lag fire barriers in this zone have an 
equivalent fire rating of 23 to 39 minutes.
Intermediate Building Industrial Cooler Room IB-119-201A
    This zone connects the industrial room cooler to the auxiliary 
building and is located between the turbine building and the reactor 
building. The corridor is a narrow hallway with a ceiling approximately 
26 feet high. This zone is separated from the turbine building by a 3-
hour rated wall. The zone is also separated from the reactor building 
by a non-fire rated concrete wall approximately 42 inches thick. The 
east side of this zone is adjacent to fire zone IB-119-201B, separated 
by a ``jailbar'' door. The fire hazards in this zone include cables and 
electrical cabinets. The safe shutdown circuits located in this zone 
are associated with instrumentation. The unprotected redundant circuits 
are within 3 feet of the Thermo-Lag protected cables. The fire 
protection features provided for this zone include a wet pipe sprinkler 
system, hose station, and smoke detection. The licensee has performed 
an engineering evaluation that concluded that the Thermo-Lag fire 
barriers in this zone have an equivalent fire rating of 22 to 36 
minutes.
Intermediate Building Personnel Hatch IB-119-201B
    This zone connects the industrial cooler room with the auxiliary 
building. The floor area is approximately 1100 square feet. The north, 
east and part of the south wall have a 3-hour fire rating. The 
remaining portion of the south wall is the reactor building non-fire 
rated concrete wall approximately 42 inches thick. The fire hazards in 
this zone are cables and protective clothing storage. The safe shutdown 
circuits located in this zone are associated with instrumentation. The 
unprotected redundant circuits are within 20 feet of the Thermo-Lag 
protected cables. The fire protection features provided for this zone 
include a wet pipe sprinkler system, hose station, and smoke detection. 
The licensee has performed an engineering evaluation that concluded 
that the Thermo-Lag fire barriers in this zone have an equivalent fire 
rating of 22 to 36 minutes.

IV.

Evaluation

    A fire on the 95 or 119 elevations of the auxiliary building could 
cause the loss of the redundant divisions of the makeup system, HVAC, 
instrumentation, battery charging or essential power supplies. A fire 
on the 119 elevation of the intermediate building could cause the loss 
of redundant divisions of instrumentation needed to achieve and 
maintain safe shutdown following a fire.
    The licensee has committed to upgrade the existing sprinkler 
protection on elevations 95 and 119 of the auxiliary building and on 
elevation 119 of the intermediate building in the vicinity of the 
Thermo-Lag fire barriers that are the subject of this exemption 
request. The additional sprinkler protection, coupled with the existing 
automatic detection and suppression, and manual fire suppression 
capability provided in these fire zones, would provide reasonable 
assurance that an exposure fire from in situ or transient combustible 
materials in the vicinity of the Thermo-Lag fire barriers will not 
challenge the barriers, such that damage to redundant divisions of 
systems and instrumentation needed to achieve and maintain safe 
shutdown following a fire will not occur. Due to variations in the 
important parameters of the installed Thermo-Lag barriers from the 
tested barriers, and deviations in the conduct of the industry-
sponsored fire endurance tests from the guidance provided in Supplement 
1 to Generic Letter 86-10, the equivalent fire resistance rating of the 
Thermo-Lag fire barriers at Crystal River Unit 3, that are the subject 
of this exemption request, is indeterminate. However, based on data 
obtained from industry-sponsored fire test programs, the staff 
estimates that the existing Thermo-Lag barriers would provide a minimum 
of 20 minutes of fire resistance. The licensee has committed to 
maintain the Thermo-Lag fire barriers that are the subject of this 
request in place. Automatic wet pipe sprinkler protection that is 
designed, installed and maintained in accordance with NFPA 13, 
``Installation of Sprinkler Systems,'' have historically

[[Page 59752]]

demonstrated a high reliability in controlling fires during the 
incipient stage, thereby limiting fire damage and propagation until 
extinguishment can be achieved through manual actions. The licensee has 
stated that an upgrade of the existing Thermo-Lag fire barriers to 
achieve literal compliance with the regulation is not feasible due to 
the locations of the raceways; however, the protection provided by the 
existing Thermo-Lag and supplemented with fire suppression capability 
by the additional sprinkler heads would protect one train of safe 
shutdown cables and satisfy the underlying purpose of the rule. On the 
basis of its review and evaluation of the technical information 
provided in the licensee's exemption request and the licensee's 
response to the request for additional information, the NRC staff 
concludes that the licensee's proposed alternative means of protection 
coupling the existing barriers with enhanced suppression capability 
provides a level of safety equivalent to that prescribed by the 
regulation.

V.

    Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by 
any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from 
the requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when (1) the exemptions are 
authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health or 
safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security; and 
(2) when special circumstances are present. Special circumstances are 
present whenever, according to 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), ``Application of 
the regulation in the particular circumstances would not serve the 
underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to achieve the 
underlying purpose of the rule.''
    The underlying purpose of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section 
III.G, Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability, is to ensure the 
capability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions during and 
after any postulated fire in the plant. The staff has concluded that 
the licensee's proposed alternative means of protection, as described 
in its request for exemption from the technical requirements of Section 
III.G.2.c for auxiliary building fire area AB-95-3B and G, AB-119-6A 
(elevations 95 and 119) and the intermediate building fire area IB-119-
201A (elevation 119), would provide reasonable assurance that a level 
of safety equivalent to that specified by the regulation would be met. 
Therefore, application of the one hour barrier requirement under the 
above circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose 
of the rule.

VI.

    In consideration of the foregoing, the NRC staff has concluded that 
the licensee's proposed use of an enhanced automatic fire suppression 
system coverage for these specific areas in lieu of upgrading the 
existing Thermo-Lag fire barriers to satisfy the 1-hour fire rating 
requirement, is authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to 
public health and safety and is consistent with the common defense and 
security. The NRC staff has determined that there are special 
circumstances present, as specified in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), in that 
application of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III G.2.c, is not 
necessary in order to achieve the underlying purpose of this 
regulation.
    Accordingly, the Commission hereby grants, pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.12(a), the requested exemption. The granting of this exemption is 
contingent upon (1) the installation of the enhanced fire suppression 
capability as described in the licensee's request, and (2) maintaining 
in place the existing fire barriers that are the subject of this 
exemption.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the 
granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect on the 
quality of the human environment (62 FR 56207).
    This exemption is effective upon issuance.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 29th day of October 1997.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Collins,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 97-29140 Filed 11-3-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P