[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 213 (Tuesday, November 4, 1997)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 59561-59565]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-29125]
========================================================================
Rules and Regulations
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains regulatory documents
having general applicability and legal effect, most of which are keyed
to and codified in the Code of Federal Regulations, which is published
under 50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510.
The Code of Federal Regulations is sold by the Superintendent of Documents.
Prices of new books are listed in the first FEDERAL REGISTER issue of each
week.
========================================================================
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 213 / Tuesday, November 4, 1997 /
Rules and Regulations
[[Page 59561]]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 25
[Docket No. NM-25; Special Conditions No. 25-ANM-16A]
Special Conditions: Boeing Model 747 Series Airplanes; Overhead
Crew Rest Area
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.
ACTION: Amended special conditions.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: These amended special conditions are issued to the Boeing
Commercial Airplane Company for the Model 747 series airplanes. This
airplane has a novel or unusual design feature associated with the
overhead crew rest area. Special Conditions No. 25-ANM-16 were issued
on November 13, 1987, addressing this installation. On January 23,
1997, Boeing applied for a type design change which proposes to add an
additional feature; the installation of curtains or partitions in the
crew rest area. Since the applicable airworthiness regulations,
including those contained in Special Conditions No. 25-ANM-16, do not
contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for this particular
design feature, these amended special conditions contain the additional
safety standards which the Administrator finds necessary to establish a
level of safety equivalent to that established by the airworthiness
standards for transport category airplanes.
EFFECTIVE DATE: October 23, 1997.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Greg Dunn, FAA, Transport Standards
Staff, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton,
WA 98055-4056; telephone (425) 227-2799, or facsimile (425) 227-1149.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
On December 17, 1986, the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company
applied for a change to Type Certificate No. A20WE to include Model 747
series airplanes with overhead crew rest areas installed. The crew rest
area was to be installed above the main passenger cabin in the vicinity
of the Number 5 passenger door. This is an area that had not been used
for this purpose in any previous transport category airplane. Due to
the novel or unusual features associated with the installation of those
crew rest areas, Special Conditions No. 25-ANM-16 were issued on
November 13, 1987, to provide a level of safety equal to that
established by the regulations incorporated by reference in the type
certificate. Upon issuance, Special Conditions No. 25-ANM-16 became
part of the regulations incorporated by reference in Type Certificate
No. A20WE for Boeing 747 series airplanes.
Boeing Commercial Airplane Group now proposes certification of
overhead crew rest areas that would be divided into three sections by a
hard partition and a curtain. These crew rest areas, which would be in
the same location, would be designated for in-flight use only and would
include additional novel or unusual design features not incorporated in
the previous crew rest areas. Because of these additional features, the
regulations incorporated by reference in Type Certificate No. A20WE,
including Special Conditions 25-ANM-16, do not contain adequate or
appropriate safety standards. Special Conditions 25-ANM-16 would,
therefore, be amended to contain the additional safety standards found
necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established
in the regulations.
Discussion
A hard partition separates the crew rest area into forward and aft
sections while a door in the partition provides access between the
forward and aft sections. A curtain slides in the forward and aft
directions to visually divide the aft section of the crew rest area.
Item 3 of Special Conditions No. 25-ANM-16 requires that a stairway be
installed between the main deck and the crew rest area. Additionally,
there must be an alternate evacuation route for occupants of the crew
rest area, located on the opposite side of the crew rest area or
sufficiently separated within the compartment from the stairway. The
installation of a hard partition creates an area within the crew rest
area which does not have a means of egressing directly to the main
cabin.
In addition to the partition, a curtain has been added to the crew
rest area which further breaks up the crew rest area into sections.
This was not considered in Special Conditions No. 25-ANM-16. The
curtain and partition installation also reduces the accessibility to
the emergency equipment and communication controls, and has the
potential to prevent the occupants from being able to easily locate the
primary and secondary escape means. This could cause additional
confusion during an emergency.
Since the installation of a door in the crew rest area raises
concerns about operational reliability during an in-flight emergency
and since the related paragraphs of Sec. 25.819 from which the original
special conditions were developed require two evacuation routes, design
features must be provided to assure that occupants of the forward
section will be able to vacate the crew rest area in the event of an
in-flight emergency. Additional emergency equipment and two-way
communication equipment will also be required in the forward section
since the equipment in the aft area will not be readily accessible to
the forward section occupants in the event of an in-flight emergency.
A limitation in the Airplane Flight Manual or other suitable means
requiring that crewmembers be trained in the use of the evacuation
routes would be required.
The additional safety standards are contained in Item 13 of these
amended special conditions. Items 1 through 12 are standards already
adopted in Special Conditions No. 25-ANM-16.
Type Certification Basis
The Type Certification Basis for the Boeing Model 747 series prior
to the 747-400 is Part 25 of the FAR effective February 1, 1965, as
amended by Amendments 25-1 through 25-8, plus Amendments 25-15, 25-17,
25-18, 25-20, and 25-39, with certain exceptions and several sets of
special conditions, which are identified in Type Certificate Data Sheet
No. A20WE. These
[[Page 59562]]
exceptions are not pertinent to the subject of overhead crew rest
areas.
The regulations incorporated by reference in Type Certificate No.
A20WE for the Boeing Model 747-400 series airplanes include Part 25 of
the FAR as amended by Amendments 25-1 through 25-59, with certain
exceptions not relevant to the installation of an overhead crew rest
area.
In addition, the regulations incorporated by reference for all 747
series include the noise certification requirements of Part 36 of the
FAR, emission standards, and a number of special conditions, including
Special Conditions No. 25-ANM-16.
If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness
regulations (i.e., Part 25 as amended) do not contain adequate or
appropriate safety standards for the Boeing Model 747 because of a
novel or unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed
under the provisions of Sec. 21.16.
Special conditions, as appropriate, are issued in accordance with
Sec. 11.49 of the FAR after public notice, as required by Secs. 11.28
and 11.29(b), and become part of the type certification basis in
accordance with Sec. 21.101(b)(2).
Discussion of Comments
Notice of Proposed Special Conditions No. SC-97-4-NM for the Boeing
Model 747 series airplanes, was published in the Federal Register on
August 28, 1997 (62 FR 45589). Fourteen comments (from 4 different
commenters) were received.
Four comments were submitted by The Boeing Company. One seeks to
limit the applicability of the new requirements in Item 13 to new
designs and wants clarification that prior certified designs should be
exempt from the revisions to the special condition. The FAA is not
aware of any previously certified crew rest configurations that are
divided into sections by a partition with a door. However, the FAA
agrees that the requirements of Item 13 are only applicable to new
designs. Existing designs approved by Type Certificate (TC) or by
Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) are not required to be modified and
can continue to be delivered without any retroactive changes. Any new
TC or STC projects that modify an existing crew rest area or install a
crew rest area into a previously certificated aircraft will be required
to comply with the new requirements contained in Item 13, if the rest
area is divided into sections. Since Item 13 contains requirements
pertaining only to crew rest areas that are divided into sections, the
requirements for crew rest areas not divided into sections are
unchanged.
Another comment suggests that Item 13, paragraph a., should be
revised to prevent confusion. Paragraph a. states, ``* * * there must
be an audible alert concurrent with automatic presentation of
supplemental oxygen masks in each section of the crew rest, * * *''.
Currently it is unclear whether the alerting method and/or the
supplemental oxygen masks are required in each section of the crew rest
area. The intent of paragraph a. was to require automatically presented
supplemental oxygen in each section of the crew rest area. The
presentation of the supplemental oxygen masks must be accompanied by an
alert that can be heard in each section of the crew rest area.
Paragraph a. has been revised to allow one alerting device to serve
more than one section, provided it can clearly be heard in each
section. Paragraph a. has also been clarified to identify that the
supplemental oxygen masks are required in each section of the crew rest
area.
Another comment objects to the requirement in Item 13, paragraph
e., that requires doors installed between partitions to be frangible
from either direction. It was proposed to change the requirement to
state that, ``All doors installed must be designed to preclude anyone
from being trapped inside the compartment.'' This proposed revision
identifies door performance criteria rather than a specific design
solution. The proposed revision is also consistent with the requirement
that was applied to the 777-200 Lower Lobe Attendant Rest. For this
crew rest area, Boeing proposes alternate means to open the partition
door in the event it is jammed or inoperable. The door can be removed
from the aft side by disconnecting the hinge pins. From the front side
the striker mechanism can be defeated to open the door and access the
evacuation routes. The FAA concurs with the comment. These alternative
means of opening a jammed or blocked door are acceptable, and that
consideration should be given to designs that meet the proposed
performance criteria rather than require partition doors to be
frangible from both sides. Item 13, paragraph e., of these amended
special conditions has been revised accordingly.
Another comment seeks to change the requirements contained in Item
13, paragraph f. This paragraph requires two-way voice communication
equipment and additional emergency equipment in each section of a crew
rest created by the installation of a hard partition with a door. The
proposed revision suggests that the additional equipment should only be
required in section(s) that did not provide an escape route to the main
deck. The rationale was that the overall area of the crew rest is
unchanged, so the only reason the additional equipment would be needed
is if the partition door were inoperable (blocked or jammed). If the
door were blocked or jammed, the alternate escape route could be used,
precluding the necessity for the additional two-way communication
equipment and emergency equipment. The FAA disagrees this is the only
reason to install the additional equipment. There are several other
scenarios that the FAA has considered. There may be a need for the main
deck flightcrew to alert the occupants of the crew rest area to an in-
flight emergency in the passenger cabin. In this case, a phone in each
section needs to be readily accessible. Another situation that may
occur is the need for additional emergency equipment to fight a fire
just outside a partition door. Accepting this comment could result in
circumstances where a flight attendant may be forced to evacuate a crew
rest area rather than retrieve the emergency equipment and fight a
fire. This would be unacceptable. In this type of an emergency the two-
way voice communication equipment is also necessary so that backup
personnel can be contacted.
Two comments were received from a company that modifies aircraft
interiors by STC projects. One comment was similar to the previously
addressed comment regarding the requirements for frangible doors. The
commenter thinks the requirement for a two-way frangible door is too
restrictive and that other means of preventing entrapment within a
compartment should be allowed. The commenter suggests that Item 13,
paragraph e., could be applied to a lavatory door installed in the crew
rest area. For an application such as a lavatory door, it was suggested
that a removable panel in the door could adequately provide a means by
which entrapment could be prevented. As discussed previously, the FAA
agrees that other means to prevent entrapment should be considered and
has revised Item 13, paragraph e., accordingly.
This commenter also suggests that the requirement for additional
emergency equipment contained in Item 13, paragraph f., should not be
applied to a small section such as a lavatory, since a lavatory is not
expected to be occupied for extended periods of time. The FAA agrees
with this comment and has revised Item 13, paragraph f., accordingly.
In addition, Item 13, paragraph f., has also been revised using
[[Page 59563]]
the above rationale to remove the requirement for additional two-way
voice communication equipment in areas that are only meant to be
temporarily occupied.
A representative from the Association of Flight Attendants (AFA)
submitted several comments. A summary of the AFA's position is that a
crew rest area that is divided into sections by partitions and doors
does not provide the same level of safety as the ``open'' configuration
that was initially certified.
One comment from the AFA was that the hard partition and curtain
block the lines of sight within the crew rest area. The visual
obstructions could then reduce the situational awareness within the
individual sections, should an emergency develop. The example given by
the commenter is that with the previously approved open area, if a fire
were to break out, all occupants would be able to immediately assess
conditions throughout the crew rest area. The commenter also expresses
concern that the partition and curtains would limit visibility of the
primary and secondary evacuation routes. Although the situational
awareness from visibility between the sections may be reduced, the
FAA's position is that the new requirements for additional smoke
detectors, decompression alarms, two-way voice communication equipment,
and public address (PA) systems audible in each section adequately
compensate for the reduced visibility. These systems will adequately
alert the crew rest area occupants to emergencies in the crew rest area
and to emergencies on the main deck of the aircraft.
In order to compensate for reduced visibility of the escape routes,
exit signs have been required in each section of the crew rest area to
assist the occupants in locating the primary exit. It should also be
noted that the occupants of this crew rest area are required by Item 12
of these special conditions to receive additional training in the use
of both the primary and alternate evacuation routes. After considering
the requirement for additional occupant training, the additional signs
required by Item 13, paragraphs d. and e., and the small confines of
the overhead crew rest area, it has been determined that the
installation of the hard partition and curtain are very unlikely to
create a situation where the occupants would not be able to locate
either of the escape routes. To assure that future installations don't
propose what could be envisioned as a maze within the overhead crew
rest area, Item 13, paragraph e., prohibits arrangements that would
require the occupants to pass through more than one door before
reaching the primary exit.
Another comment opposes installation of the partition door because
of concerns for entrapment and the potential of the door to become a
barrier to evacuation. There is no specific time requirement for
evacuating the overhead crew rest area since it is not allowed to be
occupied for taxi, takeoff and landing. Boeing has conducted
certification testing that has shown that the door in the hard
partition can be opened or removed should the door become blocked or
jammed. The hinge pins can be removed from the aft side, and the
striker mechanism can be defeated from the forward side; these
operations can be accomplished in several seconds and are contrary to
comments suggesting these features are difficult to operate. Since the
door can be opened or removed in several seconds, the door cannot be
considered an entrapment hazard or an impediment to egress. It should
be noted that similar hinge pin designs and striker defeat mechanisms
have been previously approved for other crew rest areas and lavatories.
A comment was also made that the door hinge pins should be
relocated to the forward side of the partition door in conjunction with
relocating the striker defeat mechanism to the aft side. There was no
supportive reasoning provided for this recommendation, although it
appears that the commenter believes that in the event the door is
blocked or inoperable, it would be easier to evacuate the forward
section of the crew rest area by removing the door from it's hinges
than by defeating the striker mechanism. As was previously stated, the
door design proposed by Boeing has been reviewed by the FAA, and has
been found to provide an acceptable means to prevent entrapment.
Another comment suggests that a crash axe should be required in the
forward compartment as a backup to the striker defeat mechanism. This
suggestion will not be added to these special conditions. The partition
door proposed by Boeing has been designed so that it cannot be jammed
as a result of aircraft structural failure. Even if the door were
jammed, it is possible to defeat the striker mechanism to gain access
to the aft section of the crew rest area. If for some reason it were
not possible to operate the striker defeat mechanism, the occupants of
the forward section of the crew rest area could still use the two-way
voice communication equipment required by Item 13, paragraph f., to
summon additional help. Since this area is not allowed to be occupied
for taxi, takeoff, and landing, there is no immediate need to be able
to evacuate to the main deck. For this reason, the two-way voice
communication equipment is considered an adequate backup to the striker
defeat mechanism.
A comment was also submitted regarding the requirement for one
additional protective breathing equipment (PBE) in the forward section
of the crew rest. Concern was expressed that one additional PBE
installed in the forward section of the crew rest area would not
adequately protect all the occupants. The PBE's that are installed in
the forward and aft sections are intended to be used for firefighting,
not for providing breathable air for each crew rest occupant. There are
no other crew rest areas that require one PBE per occupant. In the
event of a fire in the crew rest area, it would be expected that one or
two flight attendants would don the protective breathing equipment and
stay to fight the fire while the others quickly evacuated to the main
deck. For this reason, the one additional PBE in the forward section
provides the same level of safety for a divided crew rest as has been
provided for the previously certified open crew rest in that its
installation assures accessibility of the emergency equipment deemed
most critical, within each section of the crew rest area.
Another comment suggests that the leg rests on the double seats
located directly aft of the partition door should be required to be
stowed when not in use. For the Boeing 747-400 that was reviewed by the
AFA, instructional placards have been installed that require the
legrests be stowed in accordance with the commenter's suggestion. It is
the FAA's position that it is not necessary to include this proposal in
the revised special conditions, as the legrests do not affect the
partition door operation and can be quickly stowed by anyone in the aft
section of the crew rest area. As a normal function of certifying new
crew rest configurations, this type of a potential egress hindrance
would be evaluated and appropriate actions would be taken to ensure the
effectiveness of the escape path.
Another comment from the AFA relates a near-fire incident inside a
747-400 crew rest where a blanket started smoldering in a crew rest
bunk after having been in contact with a reading light. The commenter
requests that fire retardant lights and materials be required in this
area. The types of materials allowed in the overhead crew rest area are
already addressed as part of the certification basis of the 747-400
which includes Sec. 25.853, Amendment 59. In addition to the materials
required
[[Page 59564]]
by Sec. 25.853 Amendment 59, the crew rest area is also protected by a
smoke detection system required by Item 10; Item 13, paragraph c.; and
Item 13, paragraph f., that annunciates in the flight deck, even when
the crew rest area is unoccupied. In regard to the specific incident
identified by the commenter, Boeing has made design changes to replace
the style of reading light involved in the near fire incident with a
reading light design that puts out less heat.
One comment was received from the Air Line Pilots Association, who
states that the location of the crew rest area would make it unsuitable
for cockpit crews, but provided no supportive reasoning for its
position.
It is the FAA's position that the additional criteria contained in
Item 13 of these special conditions provides an equal level of safety
for a divided crew rest as that established by the regulations
incorporated by reference in Type Certificate No. A20WE.
Under standard practice, the effective date of final or amended
special conditions would be 30 days after the date of publication in
the Federal Register. However, since delivery of Model 747-400
airplanes with these additional novel or unusual design features is
currently scheduled for October 24, 1997, and because a delay would
significantly affect the applicant's installation and type
certification of the crew rest area, the FAA finds that good cause
exists for making these amended special conditions effective upon
issuance.
Conclusion: This action affects only certain novel or unusual
design features on one model series of airplanes. It is not a rule of
general applicability and affects only the manufacturer who applied to
the FAA for approval of these features on the airplane.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.
The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704.
The Amended Special Conditions
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the following amended special conditions are issued as
part of the type certification basis for the Boeing Model 747 series
airplanes.
1. Occupancy of the overhead crew rest area is limited to a maximum
of 10 crewmembers. Occupancy during taxi, takeoff, or landing is not
permitted.
2. There must be a stairway between the main deck and the crew rest
area and there must be an alternate evacuation route for occupants of
the crew rest area.
The stairway and alternate evacuation route must be located on
opposite sides of the crew rest area or have sufficient separation
within the compartment. The stairway and the alternate evacuation route
must provide for evacuation of an incapacitated person, with
assistance, from the crew rest area to the main deck, must not be
dependent on any powered device, and must be designed to minimize the
possibility of blockage which might result from fire, mechanical or
structural failure. The crewmember procedures for carriage of an
incapacitated person must be established.
3. An exit sign meeting the requirements of Sec. 25.812(b)(1)(i)
must be provided in the crew rest area near the stairway.
4. In the event the airplane's main power system should fail,
emergency illumination of the crew rest area must be automatically
provided. Unless two independent sources of normal lighting are
provided, the emergency illumination of the crew rest area must be
automatically provided if the crew rest area normal lighting system
should fail. The illumination level must be sufficient for the
occupants of the crew rest area to locate, and descend to the main deck
by means of the stairway and/or the alternate evacuation route, and to
read any required operating instructions.
5. There must be a means for two-way voice communication between
crewmembers on the flight deck and occupants of the crew rest area, and
between crewmembers and at least one flight attendant seat on the main
deck and occupants of the crew rest area.
6. There must also be either public address speaker(s), or other
means of alerting the occupants of the crew rest area to an emergency
situation, installed in the crew rest area.
7. There must be a means, readily detectable by occupants of the
crew rest area, that indicates when seat belts should be fastened and
when smoking is prohibited.
8. For each occupant permitted in the crew rest area, there must be
an approved seat or berth that must be able to withstand the maximum
flight loads when occupied.
9. The following equipment must be provided:
a. At least one approved fire extinguisher appropriate to the kinds
of fires likely to occur.
b. One protective breathing device, having TSO-C99 authorization or
equivalent, suitable for firefighting.
c. One flashlight.
10. A smoke detection system that annunciates in the flight deck
and is audible in the crew rest area must be provided.
11. A supplemental oxygen system equivalent to that provided for
main deck passengers must be provided for each seat and berth.
12. There must be a limitation in the Airplane Flight Manual or
other suitable means requiring that crewmembers be trained in the use
of the evacuation routes.
13. The following requirements apply to crew rest areas that are
divided into several sections by the installation of curtains or
partitions.
a. To compensate for lack of crowd awareness, there must be an
aural alert that can be heard in each section of the crew rest area
that accompanies automatic presentation of supplemental oxygen masks in
each section of the crew rest area. The supplemental oxygen masks are
required in each section whether or not seats or berths are installed
in each section. There must also be a means by which the flightcrew can
manually deploy the oxygen masks.
b. A placard is required adjacent to each curtain that visually
divides or separates the overhead crew rest area into small areas to
serve a function of creating privacy. The placard must require that the
curtain(s) remain open when the private area it creates is unoccupied.
The vestibule area adjacent to the stairway is not considered a private
area and, as such, its vacancy does not require a placard.
c. Each crew rest section created by the installation of a curtain
must meet the requirements of items 4, 6, 7, and 10 of these special
conditions with the curtain open or closed.
d. Overhead crew rest areas, which are visually divided to the
extent that evacuation could be affected, must have exit signs meeting
the requirements of Sec. 25.812(b)(1)(i) in each separate area of the
crew rest area which direct occupants to the primary stairway exit.
e. Sections within an overhead crew rest area that are created by
the installation of a rigid partition with a door physically separating
the sections must provide a secondary evacuation route from each
section of the crew rest area to the main deck, or it must be shown
that any door between the sections has been designed to preclude anyone
from being trapped inside the compartment. Any door between the
sections must be shown to be openable when crowded against. There can
be no
[[Page 59565]]
more than one door between each section of a crew rest area and the
primary stairway exit. Exit signs meeting the requirements of
Sec. 25.812(b)(1)(i) that direct occupants to the primary stairway exit
must be provided in each section of the crew rest area.
f. Each smaller area, within the main crew rest area, created by
the installation of a partition with a door must individually meet the
requirements of items 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of these special conditions
with the door open or closed. The requirements of items 5 and 9 are not
applicable to lavatories or other small areas that are not intended to
be occupied for extended periods of time.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on October 23, 1997.
Darrell M. Pederson,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service, ANM-100.
[FR Doc. 97-29125 Filed 11-3-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P