[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 210 (Thursday, October 30, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 58756-58758]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-28756]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 70-7002]


Notice of Amendment to Certificate of Compliance GDP-2 for the 
U.S. Enrichment Corporation, Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, 
Portsmouth, Ohio

    The Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, has 
made a determination that the following amendment request is not 
significant in accordance with 10 CFR 76.45. In making that 
determination, the staff concluded that: (1) there is no change in the 
types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may 
be released offsite; (2) there is no significant increase in individual 
or cumulative occupational radiation exposure; (3) there is no 
significant construction impact; (4) there is no significant increase 
in the potential for, or radiological or chemical consequences from, 
previously analyzed accidents; (5) the proposed changes do not result 
in the possibility of a new or different kind of accident; (6) there is 
no significant reduction in any margin of safety; and (7) the proposed 
changes will not result in an overall decrease in the effectiveness of 
the plant's safety, safeguards, or security programs. The

[[Page 58757]]

basis for this determination for the amendment request is described 
below.
    The NRC staff has reviewed the certificate amendment application 
and concluded that it provides reasonable assurance of adequate safety, 
safeguards, and security and compliance with NRC requirements. 
Therefore, the Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and 
Safeguards, is prepared to issue an amendment to the Certificate of 
Compliance for the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PORTS). The 
staff has prepared a Compliance Evaluation Report which provides 
details of the staff's evaluation.
    The NRC staff has determined that this amendment satisfies the 
criteria for a categorical exclusion in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22. 
Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact 
statement or environmental assessment need be prepared for this 
amendment.
    USEC or any person whose interest may be affected may file a 
petition, not exceeding 30 pages, requesting review of the Director's 
Decision. The petition must be filed with the Commission not later than 
15 days after publication of this Federal Register Notice. A petition 
for review of the Director's Decision shall set forth with 
particularity the interest of the petitioner and how that interest may 
be affected by the results of the decision. The petition should 
specifically explain the reasons why review of the Decision should be 
permitted with particular reference to the following factors: (1) the 
interest of the petitioner; (2) how that interest may be affected by 
the Decision, including the reasons why the petitioner should be 
permitted a review of the Decision; and (3) the petitioner's areas of 
concern about the activity that is the subject matter of the Decision. 
Any person described in this paragraph (USEC or any person who filed a 
petition) may file a response to any petition for review, not to exceed 
30 pages, within 10 days after filing of the petition. If no petition 
is received within the designated 15-day period, the Director will 
issue the final amendment to the Certificate of Compliance without 
further delay. If a petition for review is received, the decision on 
the amendment application will become final in 60 days, unless the 
Commission grants the petition for review or otherwise acts within 60 
days after publication of this Federal Register Notice.
    A petition for review must be filed with the Secretary of the 
Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001, Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, or may be 
delivered to the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW, Washington, DC, by the above date.
    For further details with respect to the action see: (1) the 
application for amendment and (2) the Commission's Compliance 
Evaluation Report. These items are available for public inspection at 
the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L 
Street, NW, Washington, DC, and at the Local Public Document Room.
    Date of amendment request: June 9, 1997.
    Brief description of amendment: The proposed amendment, in 
accordance with a commitment made in the USEC certificate application, 
revises Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) 2.1.3.5 entitled ``Autoclave 
Shell High Pressure Containment Shutdown,'' to account for the added 
capability to separately test inner and outer loop containment valves 
on autoclaves in buildings X-342, X-343, and X-344.
    The Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant uses thirteen autoclaves in 
buildings X-342, X-343 and X-344 to feed, transfer and sample 
UF6. These autoclaves were designed and constructed in 
accordance with ASME Section VIII and are utilized to confine 
UF6 and any reaction products in the event of a major 
UF6 release inside an autoclave. Steam used to heat a 
UF6 cylinder within an autoclave is typically controlled at 
approximately 5 psig. However, if a large UF6 release occurs 
inside an autoclave, its internal pressure could rise to as high as 90 
psig very rapidly. To ensure that the contents of a release are 
confined inside the autoclave, except for that which is released due to 
the proper operation of the autoclave pressure relief system (rupture 
disc rated at near 150 psig and relief valve), each line which 
penetrates the autoclave boundary is equipped with at least two valves 
that can serve as isolation valves. These close automatically to 
isolate the autoclave in the event of high internal pressure; the 
actuation pressure being less than or equal to 15 psig.
    As noted in the Description of Noncompliance for Issue 3 of the 
``Plan for Achieving Compliance with NRC Regulations at the Portsmouth 
Gaseous Diffusion Plant'' Revision 3 (Compliance Plan) dated July 9, 
1996, the capability to pressure decay test the autoclave containment 
valves (i.e., inner and outer loop valves) separately did not exist. 
According to item 1 of the Plan of Action and Schedule (POA) for Issue 
3 of the Compliance Plan, USEC was committed to providing this 
capability before July 1, 1997, and submitting to the NRC, a revised 
TSR to reflect the new autoclave containment valve configuration. In 
addition, the POA stated that until the capability to separately test 
the inner and outer loop containment valve is provided, the applicable 
TSR requirement will be to declare an autoclave inoperable and taken 
out of service when, in any mode of operation, either containment valve 
is determined to be inoperable or, in the heating mode, either pressure 
instrument channel is determined to be inoperable. According to USEC's 
certificate amendment request, since this capability has been provided, 
the Action conditions of TSR 2.1.3.5 should allow completion of the 
current operating cycle if only one instrument channel, or one 
containment isolation valve on one or more autoclave penetrations, is 
operable. However, if both instrument channels or all containment 
isolation valves on any one autoclave penetration are inoperable, then 
TSR 2.1.3.5 requires USEC to shut down the autoclave within one hour.

Basis for Finding of No Significance

    1. The proposed amendment will not result in a change in the types 
or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be 
released offsite.
    Each line penetration for the thirteen autoclaves at PORTS, has at 
least two valves, that when actuated, would isolate the autoclaves. In 
addition, each autoclave has, as part of the autoclave shell high 
pressure containment shutdown system, two independent high pressure 
containment actuation channels. The proposed change to TSR 2.1.3.5 
allows completion of the current autoclave operating cycle if one 
instrument channel, or one containment isolation valve on one or more 
autoclave penetrations, is inoperable. It is noted that the proposed 
TSR 2.1.3.5 still requires at least two channels and two isolation 
valves on each autoclave penetration to be operable prior to initiating 
a new operating cycle. Allowing an autoclave cycle to be completed, 
with one instrument channel and one containment valve operable, instead 
of requiring it to be shut down within one hour, will not result in a 
change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any 
effluents that may be released offsite for the reasons given in the 
following paragraph.
    The UF6 containment boundaries provided by the cylinder, 
pigtail and valves inside an autoclave, and steam and UF6 
reaction product confinement boundaries provided by the autoclave shell 
and piping and valves out to and

[[Page 58758]]

including the second containment valve, are designated as ``Q'' 
systems. As such, USEC is required to apply the highest level of 
quality control (ASME NQA-1) to ensure that the pressure boundaries 
within these systems are maintained. Taking into consideration the 
applicable safety features (administrative and installed hardware) for 
preventing and mitigating UF6 releases associated with 
autoclaves, and past operational history at PORTS, the staff concludes 
that a major accidental release of UF6 inside an autoclave 
is highly unlikely. The probability of inoperability of a containment 
valve or an instrument channel during an operating cycle is also low 
(none have been reported since March 3, 1997). According to the 
surveillance requirements of TSR 2.1.3.5, these containment valves are 
required to be calibrated semiannually at or below 15 psig, and to be 
quarterly functionally tested and separately pressure decay tested at 
90 psig with an acceptable leak rate of 10 psig/hour or 12 standard 
cubic feet per minute. It should be noted that requiring an autoclave 
to prematurely shut down prior to completing an operating cycle could 
introduce added risk by necessitating additional handling of cylinders 
containing liquid UF6 for feed, sampling and transfer 
autoclaves, or by introducing cascade process upsets for feed 
autoclaves.
    The staff has concluded that since completing the current operating 
cycle following inoperability of one instrument channel or one 
containment valve on an autoclave penetration will not significantly 
increase the risk of a UF6 release, this amendment will not 
result in a significant change in the types or significant increase in 
the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite.
    2. The proposed amendment will not result in a significant increase 
in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
    For the reasons provided in the assessment of criterion 1, the 
proposed amendment will not significantly increase the risk of a 
UF6 release. Therefore, allowing an autoclave cycle to be 
completed, instead of requiring it to be shut down within one hour 
after discovery of one inoperable instrument channel or containment 
valve, will not result in a significant increase in individual or 
cumulative occupational radiation exposures.
    3. The proposed amendment will not result in a significant 
construction impact.
    The proposed amendment does not involve any construction, 
therefore, there will be no construction impacts.
    4. The proposed amendment will not result in a significant increase 
in the potential for, or radiological or chemical consequences from, 
previously analyzed accidents.
    For the reasons provided in the assessment of criterion 1, the 
proposed amendment will not significantly increase the risk of a 
UF6 release. Therefore, allowing an autoclave cycle to be 
completed, instead of requiring it to be shut down within one hour 
after discovering one inoperable instrument channel or containment 
valve, will not significantly increase the potential for, or 
radiological or chemical consequences from, previously analyzed 
accidents.
    5. The proposed amendment will not result in the possibility of a 
new or different kind of accident.
    Based on the staff's review of the proposed amendment, no new or 
different accidents were identified.
    6. The proposed amendment will not result in a significant 
reduction in any margin of safety.
    For the reasons provided in the assessment of criterion 1, the 
proposed amendment will not significantly increase the risk of a 
UF6 release. Based on the staff's review of the proposed 
amendment, the staff concludes that there will be no significant 
reduction of any margin of safety.
    7. The proposed amendment will not result in an overall decrease in 
the effectiveness of the plant's safety, safeguards, or security 
programs.
    For similar reasons provided in the assessment of criterion 1, the 
proposed amendment will not significantly increase the risk of a 
UF6 release. In addition, the staff has not identified any 
criticality related implications from the proposed amendment. Based on 
the staff's review of the proposed amendment, the staff concludes that 
there will be no decrease in the effectiveness of the overall plant's 
safety program.
    The staff has not identified any safeguards or security related 
implications from the proposed amendment. Therefore, the proposed 
amendment will not result in an overall decrease in the effectiveness 
of the plant's safeguards, or security programs.
    Effective date: The amendment to GDP-2 will become effective 60 
days after issuance by NRC.
    Certificate of Compliance No. GDP-2: Amendment will revise the 
Technical Safety Requirements.
    Local Public Document Room location: Portsmouth Public Library, 
1220 Gallia Street, Portsmouth, Ohio 45662.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 23d day of October 1997.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Carl J. Paperiello,
Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 97-28756 Filed 10-29-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P