[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 191 (Thursday, October 2, 1997)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 51624-51626]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-26123]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Research and Special Programs Administration

49 CFR Part 192

[Docket No. RSPA-97-2879; Notice 1]


Remotely Controlled Valves on Natural Gas Pipeline Facilities

AGENCY: Research and Special Programs Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of public meeting.

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SUMMARY: The Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) 
invites representatives of industry, state and local government, and 
the public to an open meeting on the use of remotely controlled valves 
(RCVs) on natural gas pipeline facilities. Congress mandated the use of 
RCVs on interstate natural gas pipeline facilities if it is determined 
as a result of a survey and assessment that the use of RCVs is 
technically and economically feasible and would reduce risks associated 
with a rupture of a natural gas pipeline facility. The purpose of this 
meeting is to gather information and discuss issues relevant to the 
survey and assessment.

DATES: The public meeting will be held on October 30, 1997, beginning 
at 9:00 a.m. Persons who want to participate in the public meeting 
should call (202) 366-4046 or e-mail their name, affiliation, and phone 
number to [email protected] before close of business October 
17, 1997. The public meeting is open to all interested parties, but 
RSPA may limit participation because of space considerations and the 
need to obtain a wide range of views.

ADDRESSES: The meeting will be held in Houston, Texas at the Adam's 
Mark Hotel, 2900 Briarpark Drive at Westheimer. The hotel's telephone 
number is (713) 978-7400.

WRITTEN COMMENTS: Anyone may submit written comments. Persons who are 
unable to attend the public meeting may submit written comments on or 
before the deadline of November 28, 1997. Interested persons should 
submit as part of their written comments all material that is relevant 
to a statement of fact or argument. Late filed comments will be 
considered so far as practicable.
    Send written comments to the Docket Facility, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, Plaza 401, 400 Seventh Street SW, Washington, DC 20590-
0001. Comments should identify the docket number (RSPA-97-2879). 
Commenters should submit an original and one copy. Commenters wishing 
to receive

[[Page 51625]]

confirmation of receipt of their comments must include a stamped, self-
addressed postcard with their comments. The docket clerk will date 
stamp the postcard and return it to the commenter. Comments will be 
available for inspection at the Docket Facility, located on the Plaza 
level of the Nassif Building in Room 401. The Docket Facility is open 
from 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except on Federal 
holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lloyd W. Ulrich, telephone: (202) 366-
4556, FAX: (202) 366-4566, e-mail: [email protected] regarding 
the subject matter of this notice or the Dockets Unit, (202) 366-5046, 
for copies of this notice or other material in the docket.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Accountable Pipeline Safety and 
Partnership Act of 1996 (codified at 49 U.S.C. 60102 (j)) required 
that, ``Not later than June 1, 1998, the Secretary [of Transportation] 
shall survey and assess the effectiveness of remotely controlled valves 
to shut off the flow of natural gas in the event of a rupture of an 
interstate natural gas pipeline facility and shall make a determination 
about whether the use of remotely controlled valves is technically 
feasible and economically feasibility and would reduce risks associated 
with a rupture of an interstate natural gas pipeline facility.''
    ``Not later than one year after the survey and assessment are 
complete, if the Secretary has determined that the use of remotely 
controlled valves is technically and economically feasible and would 
reduce risks associated with a rupture of an interstate natural gas 
pipeline facility, the Secretary shall prescribe standards under which 
an operator of an interstate natural gas pipeline facility must use a 
remotely controlled valve. These standards shall include, but not be 
limited to, requirements for high-density population areas.''
    RSPA is aware of the consequences when a natural gas pipeline that 
has experienced a rupture is not isolated quickly by closing valves on 
either side of the ruptured section. A high pressure gas transmission 
pipeline failure occurred in Edison, New Jersey on March 23, 1994. The 
failure of the 36-inch pipeline resulted in the escaping gas igniting 
and creating a fireball 500 feet high. There was one death and 
approximately 50 injuries. Radiant heat from the fireball ignited the 
roofs of buildings located more than 100 yards from the failure, 
destroyed 128 apartments and resulted in the evacuation of 1,500 
people. The casualties were limited because the few minutes between the 
time of the failure and the explosion allowed residents to vacate the 
area. The gas company using a manually operated valve took 2\1/2\ hours 
to isolate the ruptured section of pipeline, which contributed to the 
severity of the damages.
    The experience in New Jersey resulted in the adoption of a set of 
new rules by the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities (BPU) covering 
the installation, operation, and maintenance of intrastate natural gas 
pipelines in the state of New Jersey. These rules became effective 
March 17, 1997.
    One of the new BPU rules requires each operator to submit a 
Sectionalizing Valve Assessment and Emergency Closing Plan for 
sectionalizing valves in class 3 and class 4 locations 1. 
All valves in class 3 and class 4 locations are to be evaluated and 
prioritized as to the need for installation or retrofitting of a RCV or 
automatically controlled valve (ACV). Each plan is to include training 
of appropriate personnel on emergency plans and procedures. An 
emergency closing drill that simulates shutting down a selected section 
of the pipeline is required once each year. Reports of the closing 
drills are to be submitted to the BPU. RSPA is unaware of similar 
requirements in other states.
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    \1\ A ``Class 3 location'' is defined in 49 CFR 192.5 as any 
class location unit (an area that extends 220 yards on either side 
of the centerline of any continuous 1-mile length of pipeline) that 
has 46 or more buildings intended for human occupancy, or any area 
where the pipeline lies within 100 yards of either a building of 
small well-defined area that is occupied by 20 or more persons on at 
least 5 days a week for 10 weeks in any 12-month period.
    A ``Class 4 location'' is defined in 49 CFR 192.5 as any class 
location unit where buildings with four or more stories above ground 
are prevalent.
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    RSPA is also aware of a comprehensive report sponsored by the Gas 
Research Institute (GRI) on ACVs and RCVs 2. The report 
addresses the evolution of ACVs in the natural gas industry. The report 
specifically addresses the risk of false closures, line section 
blowdown duration, and typical valve spacings. The report stresses the 
unreliability of ACVs because the pipeline failure detection systems 
used to trigger the closure of ACVs often mistake normal operating 
transient conditions as a pipeline failure. The report concludes that 
the installation of ACVs or RCVs will not prevent gas ignition because 
ignition usually occurs within ten minutes of a rupture, long before a 
line section could be blown down, even if it was isolated immediately 
after the rupture. However, early closure can reduce the duration of 
burn down and radiant heating of the area.
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    \2\ Southwest Research Institute, ``Final Report, Remote and 
Automatic Main Line Valve Technology Assessment,'' July 1995, 
Sponsored by the Gas Research Institute (GRI-95/0101).
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    Consistent with the President's Regulatory Reinvention Initiative 
(E.O. 12866), RSPA wants to explore this congressional requirement with 
the maximum stakeholder involvement. Toward this end, RSPA is seeking 
early participation in the survey and assessment process by holding 
this public meeting at which participants, including RSPA staff, may 
exchange views on relevant issues concerning remotely controlled valves 
(RCVs). This public meeting is in partial satisfaction of the ``survey 
and assess'' portion of the Congressional requirement. RSPA hopes the 
public meeting will enable government and industry to reach a better 
understanding of the problems and potential solutions before proposed 
rules are considered.
    RSPA will use the data accumulated as a result of this public 
meeting along with any state experience disclosed during the public 
meeting, and the GRI report on ACVs and RCVs to determine the technical 
and economic feasibility of using RCVs on natural gas pipeline 
facilities.
    Participants at the public meeting are encouraged to focus their 
remarks on the following issues, but may address other issues as time 
permits and in supplementary written comments:
    A. What is the potential value of early detection and isolation of 
a section of pipeline after a failure in terms of enhanced safety and 
reduced property damage?
    B. What are the technical and economic advantages of installing 
RCVs?
    C. What are the technical and economic disadvantages of installing 
RCVs?
    D. What states in addition to New Jersey have adopted regulations 
concerning RCVs on intrastate natural gas pipeline facilities?
    E. If RCVs were required in only high risk areas, what would 
constitute high risk areas and what would be criteria for prioritizing 
from highest to lowest risk?
    F. Document cases where RCVs have malfunctioned causing them to 
close unexpectedly or to not close when commanded by the dispatcher.
    G. Document cases where RCVs operated after an accident to reduce 
the consequences of the accident.
    H. Provide documentation to support or refute the impression that 
when the escaping gas from a failed gas pipeline ignites, it normally 
occurs shortly after the accident, usually less than 10 minutes after 
the accident.


[[Page 51626]]


    Issued in Washington, D.C., on October 24, 1997.
Richard B. Felder,
Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.
[FR Doc. 97-26123 Filed 10-1-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-60-P