Federal Register, Volume 62 Issue 184 (Tuesday, September 23, 1997)

[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 184 (Tuesday, September 23, 1997)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 49728-49824]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-24713]

[[Page 49727]]

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Part II

Department of Transportation

_______________________________________________________________________

Federal Railroad Administration

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49 CFR Part 216, et al.

Passenger Equipment Safety Standards; Proposed Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 /
Proposed Rules

[[Page 49728]]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Parts 216, 223, 229, 231, 232, and 238

[FRA Docket No. PCSS-1, Notice No. 2]
RIN 2130-AA95

Passenger Equipment Safety Standards

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: FRA is proposing a rule establishing comprehensive Federal
safety standards for railroad passenger equipment. The proposed rule
contains requirements concerning equipment design and performance
criteria related to passenger and crew survivability in the event of a
passenger train accident; the inspection, testing, and maintenance of
passenger equipment; and the safe operation of passenger train service.
The proposed rule is designed to address the safety of passenger train
service in an environment where technology is advancing, and equipment
is being designed for operation at higher speeds. The rule would amend
existing regulations concerning special notice for repairs, safety
glazing, locomotive safety, safety appliances, and railroad power
brakes as applied to passenger equipment.
The proposed rule does not apply to tourist and historic railroad
operations. However, after consulting with the excursion railroad
associations to determine appropriate applicability in light of
financial, operational, or other factors unique to such operations, FRA
may prescribe requirements for these operations that are different from
those affecting other types of passenger operations.

DATES: (1) Written comments: Written comments must be received on or
before November 24, 1997. Comments received after that date will be
considered by FRA and the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards Working
Group to the extent possible without incurring substantial additional
expense or delay. The docket will remain open until the Working Group
proceedings are concluded. Requests for formal extension of the comment
period must be made by November 7, 1997.
(2) Public hearing: FRA intends to hold a public hearing to allow
interested parties the opportunity to comment on specific issues
addressed in the NPRM. The date and location of the hearing will be set
forth in a forthcoming notice that will be published in the Federal
Register. Anyone who desires to make an oral statement at the hearing
must notify the Docket Clerk by telephone (202-632-3198), and must
submit three copies of the oral statement that he or she intends to
make at the hearing. The notification should also provide the Docket
Clerk with the participant's mailing address. FRA reserves the right to
limit participation in the hearings of persons who fail to provide such
notification. The date by which the Docket Clerk must be notified about
the oral statement and receive copies of it will be set forth in the
notice announcing the hearing.

ADDRESSES: Written comments should identify the docket number and must
be submitted in triplicate to the Docket Clerk, Office of Chief
Counsel, Federal Railroad Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,
Mail Stop 10, Washington, D.C. 20590. Persons desiring to be notified
that their comments have been received by FRA should submit a stamped,
self-addressed postcard with their comments. The Docket Clerk will
indicate on the postcard the date on which the comments were received
and will return the card to the addressee. Written comments will be
available for examination, both before and after the closing date for
written comments, during regular business hours in Room 7051 of FRA
headquarters at 1120 Vermont Avenue, N.W., in Washington, D.C.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Edward Pritchard, Acting Staff
Director, Motive Power and Equipment Division, Office of Safety
Assurance and Compliance, FRA, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Mail Stop 25,
Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone: 202-632-3362); Daniel Alpert, Trial
Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Mail
Stop 10, Washington, D.C. (telephone: 202-632-3186); or Thomas
Herrmann, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 400 Seventh
Street, S.W., Mail Stop 10, Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone: 202-632-
3167).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

To enhance rail safety, the Secretary of Transportation convened a
meeting of representatives from all sectors of the rail industry in
September, 1994. As one of the initiatives arising from this Rail
Safety Summit, the Secretary announced that DOT would begin developing
safety standards for rail passenger equipment over a five-year period.
In November, 1994, Congress adopted the Secretary's schedule for
implementing rail passenger equipment regulations and included it in
the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1994 (the Act), Pub.
L. No. 103-440, 108 Stat. 4619, 4623-4624 (November 2, 1994). Section
215 of the Act, as now codified at 49 U.S.C. 20133, requires:

(a) MINIMUM STANDARDS.--The Secretary of Transportation shall
prescribe regulations establishing minimum standards for the safety
of cars used by railroad carriers to transport passengers. Before
prescribing such regulations, the Secretary shall consider--
(1) The crashworthiness of the cars;
(2) Interior features (including luggage restraints, seat belts,
and exposed surfaces) that may affect passenger safety;
(3) Maintenance and inspection of the cars;
(4) Emergency response procedures and equipment; and
(5) Any operating rules and conditions that directly affect
safety not otherwise governed by regulations.

The Secretary may make applicable some or all of the standards
established under this subsection to cars existing at the time the
regulations are prescribed, as well as to new cars, and the
Secretary shall explain in the rulemaking document the basis for
making such standards applicable to existing cars.
(b) INITIAL AND FINAL REGULATIONS.--(1) The Secretary shall
prescribe initial regulations under subsection (a) within 3 years
after the date of enactment of the Federal Railroad Safety
Authorization Act of 1994. The initial regulations may exempt
equipment used by tourist, historic, scenic, and excursion railroad
carriers to transport passengers.
(2) The Secretary shall prescribe final regulations under
subsection (a) within 5 years after such date of enactment.
(c) PERSONNEL.--The Secretary may establish within the
Department of Transportation 2 additional full-time equivalent
positions beyond the number permitted under existing law to assist
with the drafting, prescribing, and implementation of regulations
under this section.
(d) CONSULTATION.--In prescribing regulations, issuing orders,
and making amendments under this section, the Secretary may consult
with Amtrak, public authorities operating railroad passenger
service, other railroad carriers transporting passengers,
organizations of passengers, and organizations of employees. A
consultation is not subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5
U.S.C. App.), but minutes of the consultation shall be placed in the
public docket of the regulatory proceeding.

The Secretary of Transportation has delegated these rulemaking
responsibilities to the Federal Railroad Administrator. 49 CFR 1.49(m).
Consistent with the intent of Congress that FRA consult with the
railroad industry in prescribing these regulations, FRA invited various
organizations to participate in a working

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group to focus on the issues related to railroad passenger equipment
safety and assist FRA in developing Federal safety standards. The
Passenger Equipment Safety Standards Working Group (or the ``Working
Group'') first met on June 7, 1995, \1\ and continues to meet in
support of this rulemaking. This proposed rule was developed by FRA in
consultation with the Working Group, and FRA will again convene the
Working Group to consider comments received in response to this Notice
and develop the final rule. Notice of any Working Group meetings will
be available through the FRA Docket Clerk.
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\1\ This date was incorrectly identified as June 6, 1995, in the
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (61 FR 30672, June 17, 1996).
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The Working Group has evolved since its initial meeting, and its
membership currently includes representatives from the following
organizations:

American Association of Private Railroad Car Owners, Inc. (AAPRCO),
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials
(AASHTO),
American Public Transit Association (APTA),
Association of American Railroads (AAR),
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE),
Brotherhood Railway Carmen (BRC),
FRA,
Federal Transit Administration (FTA) of DOT,
National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak),
National Association of Railroad Passengers (NARP),
Railway Progress Institute (RPI),
Safe Travel America (STA),
Transportation Workers Union of America (TWU), and
United Transportation Union (UTU).

The Working Group is chaired by FRA, and supported by FRA program,
legal, and research staff, including technical personnel from the Volpe
National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe Center) of the Research
and Special Programs Administration of DOT. FRA has included vendor
representatives designated by RPI as associate members of the Working
Group. FRA has also included the AAPRCO as an associate Working Group
member. The National Transportation Safety Board has designated staff
members to advise the Working Group.
In developing proposed safety standards for passenger equipment
operating at speeds greater than 125 mph but not exceeding 150 mph, FRA
formed a subgroup (the ``Tier II Equipment Subgroup'') of Working Group
members representing interests associated with the provision of rail
passenger service at such high speeds. FRA invited representatives from
organizations including Amtrak, the BLE, BRC, RPI, and UTU to
participate in this effort.
In accordance with 49 U.S.C. 20133(d), the evolving positions of
the Working Group members--as reflected in the minutes of the group's
meetings and associated documentation, together with data provided by
the members during their deliberations-- have been placed in the public
docket of this rulemaking.
On June 17, 1996, FRA published an Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (ANPRM) concerning the establishment of comprehensive safety
standards for railroad passenger equipment (61 FR 30672). The ANPRM
provided background information on the need for such standards, offered
preliminary ideas on approaching passenger safety issues, and presented
questions on various topics including: system safety programs and
plans; passenger equipment crashworthiness; inspection, testing, and
maintenance requirements; training and qualification requirements for
mechanical personnel and train crews; excursion, tourist, and private
equipment; commuter equipment and operations; train make-up and
operating speed; tiered safety standards; fire safety; and operating
practices and procedures.
FRA's commitment to developing proposed regulations through the
Working Group necessarily influenced the role and purpose of the ANPRM.
FRA specifically asked that members of the Working Group not respond
formally to the ANPRM. The issues and ideas presented in the ANPRM had
already been placed before the Working Group, and the Working Group had
commented on drafts of the ANPRM. As a result, FRA solicited the
submission of written comments that might be of assistance in
developing a proposed rule from interested persons not involved in the
Working Group's deliberations.
FRA received 12 comments in response to the ANPRM, including a
request from a member of the Working Group to extend the ANPRM's
comment period. In addition, the United States Small Business
Administration (SBA) commented that the length of the comment period
was inadequate for the industry, especially small railways, to prepare
a thorough response to the ANPRM. FRA had closed the comment period on
July 9, 1996, so that all comments could be shared with the Working
Group before its meeting on July 10, 1996.
Although FRA did not formally extend the comment period, comments
received after the closing date of the comment period have been shared
with the Working Group at subsequent meetings. Such comments have been
considered (and identified in this Notice) to the extent possible
without incurring additional delay in preparing this Notice. Moreover,
the Working Group is broadly representative of interests involved in
the provision of intercity and commuter rail service nationwide, and
its members had the opportunity to comment on the issues raised in the
ANPRM before the document's publication, as noted above.

Need for Safety Standards

Effective Federal safety standards for freight equipment have long
been in place, but equivalent Federal standards for passenger equipment
do not currently exist. The AAR sets industry standards for the design
and maintenance of freight equipment that add materially to the safe
operation of this equipment. Industry standards for the safety of
railroad passenger equipment have been in place since the early part of
this century, as noted by the AAPRCO in comment on the ANPRM. However,
over the years, the AAR has discontinued the development and
maintenance of passenger equipment standards.
Passenger railroads do offer the traveling public one of the safest
forms of transportation available. In the five-year period 1991-1995,
there were 1.07 passenger fatalities for every billion miles a
passenger was transported by rail. However, accidents continue to
occur, often as a result of factors beyond the control of the passenger
railroad. Further, the rail passenger environment is rapidly changing.
Worldwide, passenger equipment operating speeds are increasing. Several
passenger trainsets designed to European standards have been proposed
for operation at high speeds in the United States. In general, these
trainsets do not meet the structural or operating standards that are
common practice for current North American equipment. FRA believes that
adherence to such standards by the nation's passenger railroads has in
large measure contributed to the high level of safety at which rail
passenger service is currently operated. However, these standards do
not have the force of regulation.
In general, the North American railroad operating environment
requires passenger equipment to operate commingled with very heavy and
long freight trains, often over track with frequent grade crossings
used by heavy highway equipment. European passenger operations are
intermingled with freight equipment of lesser weight than in North
America. In many cases, highway-rail grade crossings also pose

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lesser hazards to passenger trains in Europe due to lower highway
vehicle weight. European passenger equipment design standards may
therefore not be appropriate for the North American rail environment.
FRA must become more active to ensure that passenger trains
continue to be designed, built, and operated with a high level of
safety. A clear set of Federal safety and design standards for
passenger equipment tailored to the nation's operating environment is
needed to provide for the safety of future rail operations and to
facilitate sound planning for those operations.

Passenger Train Safety Hazards

Passenger trains are exposed to a variety of safety hazards. Some
of these hazards are endemic to the nation's rail passenger operating
environment, as noted above, and result from the operation of passenger
trains commingled with freight trains, often over track with frequent
grade crossings used by heavy highway equipment.
Collisions with a wide range of objects may occur at various speeds
under a number of different circumstances. In addition to freight
trains and highway vehicles, these objects include maintenance-of-way
equipment and other passenger trains. Although most of these collisions
occur only in the normal running direction of the train, impact into
the side of the train can occur, especially at the junction of rail
lines and at highway-rail grade crossings.
A passenger train collision with another train concerns FRA because
of the potential for significant harm demonstrated in actual accidents.
On February 16, 1996, a near-head-on collision occurred
between Maryland Rail Commuter Service (MARC) train 286 and Amtrak
train 29 on track owned by CSX Transportation, Inc., (CSXT) at Silver
Spring, Maryland. The MARC train was operating with a cab car (a car
which provides passenger seating, as well as a location from which the
train is operated) as the lead car in the train, followed by two
passenger coaches and a locomotive pushing the consist. The collision
separated the left front corner of the cab car from the roof to its
sill plate, and tore off much of the forward left side of the car body.
Three crewmembers and eight passengers were fatally injured, and 13
other occupants of the MARC train sustained injuries. (FRA Accident
Investigation Report (Report) B-3-96.)
On February 9, 1996, a near-head-on collision occurred
between New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., trains 1254 and 1107
on the borderline of Secaucus and Jersey City, New Jersey. Two
crewmembers and one passenger were fatally injured, and 35 other people
sustained injuries. The passenger fatality and most of the nonfatal
injuries to passengers occurred on train 1254, which was operating with
the cab car forward, followed by four passenger coaches and a
locomotive pushing the consist. (FRA Report B-2-96.)
On January 18, 1993, Northern Indiana Commuter
Transportation District (NICTD) trains 7 and 12 collided corner-to-
corner in Gary, Indiana. The left front corners and adjacent car body
sidewall structures were destroyed on both of the lead cars in each
train. Seven passengers died, and 95 people sustained injuries. (NTSB/
Railroad Accident Report (RAR)-93/03.)
The exposure of passenger trains to hazards associated with sharing
common rights-of-way with freight trains has been demonstrated in
recent accidents, and a past disastrous accident.
On February 15, 1995, an Amtrak train traveling at 58 mph
struck a shifted load of steel ``I'' beams extending from a Union
Pacific Railroad Company freight train stopped in a siding at Borah,
Idaho. The Amtrak train's six passenger coaches were raked with a steel
beam which penetrated the outer layer of the car bodies at various
points. Although no passengers were injured, the Amtrak train's two
locomotives were significantly damaged, and two crewmembers were
injured. (FRA Report C-14-95.)
On May 16, 1994, an Amtrak train derailed after striking
an intermodal trailer which had fallen or was falling from a CSXT
freight train travelling northbound on an adjacent track at Selma,
North Carolina. The lead locomotive of the Amtrak train rolled over,
and the assistant engineer was killed. The engineer sustained serious
injuries, and 120 other occupants of the Amtrak train reported
injuries. (NTSB/RAR-95/02.)
On January 4, 1987, an Amtrak train collided with the rear
of a Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) train near Chase,
Maryland, when it unexpectedly entered the track ahead of the Amtrak
train, which had been travelling between 120 and 125 mph only a few
seconds earlier. The Amtrak train's two locomotives and three front
passenger cars were destroyed in the collision. The engineer and 15
passengers aboard the Amtrak train were fatally injured, and 174 other
persons aboard the train were injured. (NTSB/RAR-88/01.)
The exposure of passenger trains to hazards associated with
operating over frequent highway-rail grade crossings, used by heavy
highway vehicles, has also been demonstrated in numerous accidents.
On January 16, 1996, a Massachusetts Bay Transportation
Authority (MBTA) train being operated by Amtrak struck a loaded
tractor-trailer which had become lodged in a grade crossing in
Wakefield, Massachusetts. Twenty-two passengers were taken to hospitals
by ambulance or air. (FRA Report C-4-96.)
On October 3, 1995, a Metro-North Commuter Railroad
Company (Metro-North) train with a cab car in the lead struck a loaded
tractor-trailer which had become lodged in a grade crossing near
Milford, Connecticut. Two crewmembers and 24 passengers were injured.
(FRA Report C-60-95.)
On September 21, 1995, an Amtrak train traveling at 81 mph
struck a loaded tractor-trailer at a highway-rail grade crossing near
Indiantown, Florida. The assistant engineer was killed, and five other
persons onboard the train were injured. (FRA Report C-56-95.)
On November 30, 1993, an Amtrak train derailed after
striking an 82-ton turbine being transported by a 184-foot long vehicle
which was fouling a grade crossing near Intercession City, Florida.
Fifty-eight of the train's passengers and crewmembers were injured.
(NTSB Highway Accident Report 95/01.)
In addition to collisions involving passenger trains striking
highway vehicles, highway vehicles may also strike passenger trains.
According to FRA's Rail-Highway Grade Crossing Accident/Incident
database, 13.8% of all highway-rail grade crossing collisions involving
passenger trains from 1986 through 1995 occurred when the highway
vehicle struck the passenger train. This accounts for 388 such
occurrences out of 2,820 highway-rail grade crossing collisions
involving passenger trains in this period. In commenting on the ANPRM,
the Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) had asked
that FRA clarify the statement that 25 percent of all highway-rail
grade crossing accidents involve a highway vehicle striking the side of
a train. See 61 FR 30692. Though this higher figure does include
accidents involving both freight and passenger trains, the potential
for a highway vehicle to strike a passenger train is real.
The WSDOT also requested that FRA document how many ``heavy''
highway vehicles were involved in highway-rail grade crossing accidents
in which highway vehicles struck passenger trains. Over the same ten-
year period from 1986 through 1995, 52 of the 388 occurrences in which
a highway vehicle

[[Page 49731]]

struck a passenger train involved a heavy highway vehicle. For purposes
of this analysis, FRA considered the number of heavy highway vehicles
which struck passenger trains to consist of all those vehicles
identified as a ``Truck-Trailer'' (12) and one-half the number of those
vehicles identified as a ``Truck'' (79), as specified according to Form
FRA F 6180.57--Rail-Highway Grade Crossing Accident/Incident Report.
Passenger trains are also vulnerable to accidents caused by
defective railroad track structure and vehicle interaction with the
rail structure.
On August 3, 1994, an Amtrak train derailed while
travelling at approximately 79 mph on Conrail trackage near Batavia,
New York, because of the dynamic interaction between a material
handling car and a flattened rail head. Five of the derailed passenger
cars descended a railroad embankment and came to rest on their sides.
One-hundred-and-eight passengers and ten crewmembers were injured.
(NTSB/RAR-96/02.)
On July 31, 1991, an Amtrak train derailed while
travelling at 80 mph over CSXT trackage in Lugoff, South Carolina, when
a switch point leading to a parallel auxiliary track unexpectedly
opened under the Amtrak train. The derailed passenger cars collided
with the first of nine hopper cars stored on the auxiliary track. The
collision caused the wheel set from the first hopper car to penetrate
the last passenger car. Eight passengers were fatally injured, and 12
passengers sustained serious injuries. (NTSB/RAR-93/02.)
Moreover, passenger trains are vulnerable to accidents caused by
vandalism and sabotage.
On October 9, 1995, an Amtrak train derailed near Hyder,
Arizona, while operating at 50 mph on Southern Pacific Transportation
Company trackage because the railroad track structure had been
sabotaged. The derailment killed an Amtrak employee who occupied a
passenger car which had rolled over onto its side. Seventy-eight
passengers were also injured. (FRA Report C-62-95.)
On May 21, 1993, an Amtrak train traveling at
approximately 45 mph derailed after striking two pieces of steel pipe
which had been lodged between the rails of a turnout near Opa-Locka,
Florida. Six of the train's passengers and crewmembers were injured.
(FRA Report C-34-93.)
On August 12, 1992, an Amtrak train traveling at 79 mph
derailed at Newport News, VA, after being unexpectedly diverted into a
railroad siding because of a vandalized track switch. Seventy of the
train's passengers and crewmembers were injured. (FRA Report C-52-92.)
Regardless of the cause of an accident, the occupants of a
passenger train may risk harm caused by the crushing of the occupant
compartment, in which the occupants themselves are crushed, and local
penetration into the occupant compartment, where an object intrudes
into the occupant compartment and directly strikes an occupant, as
demonstrated in the Amtrak accident in Lugoff, South Carolina.
Passenger train occupants are also vulnerable to harm from collisions
within the train's interior, including loose objects inside the train,
such as baggage. For example, the NTSB determined that at least two
passengers in a lounge car were injured when they were struck by
displaced pedestal seats as a result of the Intercession City, Florida,
grade crossing collision on November 30, 1993. The seat columns on four
pedestal seats had separated from their floor attachments, allowing
them to be projected forward.
A variety of threats to passengers are also posed by fire, broken
glazing, electrical shock, and submergence. These dangers may arise
following a train derailment or collision, with potentially
catastrophic results.
On September 22, 1993, an accident occurred when an Amtrak
train travelling at approximately 72 mph derailed after striking a
girder that had been displaced when a towboat, pushing six barges,
struck a railroad bridge near Mobile, Alabama. The train's three
locomotives, the baggage and dormitory cars, and two of its six
passenger cars fell into the water. Forty-two passengers and five
crewmembers were killed. All passengers died from asphyxia due to
drowning, and the train's three locomotive engineers died from asphyxia
and blunt force trauma while inside the lead locomotive that became
filled with mud. Two other employees died from smoke inhalation inside
the dormitory coach car which had caught on fire. (NTSB Railroad-Marine
Accident Report 94/01.)
Further, in the 1996 Silver Spring, Maryland, train collision
between the MARC and Amtrak trains, fire erupted after the fuel tank of
one of the Amtrak locomotives was breached. Fuel oil spilled into the
MARC train's cab car through the openings in the torn car body. The
forward section of the cab car was incinerated.
Some dangers to passenger train occupants, such as fire and smoke,
may also arise independently without being associated with a train
collision or derailment.
On June 23, 1982, a fire started onboard an Amtrak
passenger train in a sleeping car travelling en route to Los Angeles,
California. As a result of the fire and smoke, two passengers died, two
passengers were seriously injured, and 59 other occupants of the train
were treated for smoke inhalation. (NTSB/RAR-83/03.)

Development of Passenger Train Safety Program

This rulemaking is part of several related and complementary
efforts by FRA that will contribute to rail passenger safety. FRA has
proposed regulations governing emergency preparedness and emergency
response procedures for rail passenger service in a separate rulemaking
proceeding, designated as FRA No. PTEP-1. See 62 FR 8330, Feb. 24,
1997. In addition, FRA has formed a separate working group (the
Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness Working Group) to assist FRA in
the development of such regulations. This related proceeding is also
addressing some of the issues FRA identified in the ANPRM on passenger
equipment safety. Persons wishing to receive more information regarding
this other rulemaking should contact Mr. Edward R. English, Director,
Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, FRA, 400 Seventh Street,
S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone number: 202-632-3349), or David
H. Kasminoff, Esq., Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 400
Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone: 202-632-3191).
Further, in response to the New Jersey Transit and MARC train
accidents in early 1996, FRA issued Emergency Order No. 20 (Notice No.
1) on February 20, 1996, requiring prompt action to immediately enhance
passenger train operating rules and emergency egress and to develop an
interim system safety plan addressing the safety of operations that
permit passengers to occupy the leading car in a train. 61 FR 6876,
Feb. 22, 1996. Both the New Jersey Transit and MARC train accidents
involved operations where a cab car occupied the lead position in a
passenger train. The Emergency Order explained that in collisions
involving the front of a passenger train, operating with a cab car in
the forward position or a multiple unit (MU) locomotive, i.e., a self-
propelled locomotive with passenger seating, presents an increased risk
of severe personal injury or death as compared with locomotive-hauled
service when the locomotive occupies the lead position in the train and
thereby acts as a buffer for the trailing passenger cars. This risk is
of particular

[[Page 49732]]

concern where operations are conducted at relatively higher speeds,
where there is a mix of various types of trains, and where there are
numerous highway-rail crossings over which large motor vehicles are
operated. Accordingly, the Emergency Order required in particular that
``railroads operating scheduled intercity or commuter rail service * *
* conduct an analysis of their operations and file with FRA an interim
safety plan indicating the manner in which risk of a collision
involving a cab car is addressed.'' 61 FR 6879.
The Emergency Order also noted that there is a need to ensure that
emergency exits are clearly marked and in operable condition on all
passenger lines, regardless of the equipment or train control system
used. Although FRA Safety Glazing Standards, 49 CFR Part 223, require
that passenger cars have a minimum of four emergency window exits
``designed to permit rapid and easy removal during a crisis
situation,'' the Silver Spring accident raised concerns that at least
some of the occupants of the MARC train attempted unsuccessfully to
exit through the windows. The Emergency Order requires ``that any
emergency windows that are not already legibly marked as such on the
inside and outside be so marked, and that a representative sample of
all such windows be examined to ensure operability.'' 61 FR 6880. On
February 29, 1996, FRA issued Notice No. 2 to Emergency Order No. 20 to
refine three aspects of the original order, including providing more
detailed guidance on the emergency egress sampling provision. 61 FR
8703, Mar. 5, 1996.
In addition, FRA submitted a report to Congress on locomotive
crashworthiness and working conditions on September 18, 1996, and
subsequently referred the issues raised in the report to the Railroad
Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC). FRA established RSAC in March of
1996, to provide FRA with advice and recommendations on railroad safety
matters. See 61 FR 9740, Mar. 11, 1996. RSAC consists of 48 individual
representatives, drawn from 27 organizations representing various rail
industry perspectives, and two associate nonvoting representatives from
the agencies with railroad safety regulatory responsibility in Canada
and Mexico. RSAC will make recommendations as to the best way to
address the findings of the report to Congress, including voluntary
initiatives, and regulatory standards where appropriate. As a result,
FRA may initiate a separate rulemaking proposing equipment safety
requirements for both conventional freight and passenger locomotives.
In the context of improving railroad communications, RSAC has
established a working group to specifically address communication
facilities and procedures, with a strong emphasis on passenger train
emergency requirements. FRA expects that group will report
recommendations to RSAC early in 1997. FRA anticipates that those
recommendations will address the issue of whether there should be
redundant communications capability on all passenger trains.

Scope of the Proposed Rule

Through this Notice, FRA proposes to establish a comprehensive set
of necessary safety regulations for railroad passenger equipment. These
safety standards will improve the safety of rail passenger service.
In commenting on the ANPRM, the General Railway Signal Corporation
(GRS) expressed concern that FRA has focused on equipment
crashworthiness without sufficiently addressing crash avoidance. GRS
noted that the underlying systems which can provide crash avoidance and
the related systems safety elements involving a vitally integrated
crash avoidance control system include much more than the elements
onboard a train.
As explained in the ANPRM (61 FR 30683), and as is evident in
Emergency Order No. 20, FRA recognizes that rail passenger safety does
involve the safety of the railroad system as a whole, including the
track structure, signal and train control systems, operating
procedures, and station- and platform-to-train interface design--in
addition to passenger equipment safety. To that end, FRA has active
rulemaking and research projects in a variety of contexts that address
non-equipment aspects of passenger railroad safety, including signal
and train control systems. Nevertheless, this proposed rule is designed
to address the specific statutory mandate that minimum safety standards
be prescribed for the safety of cars used to transport railroad
passengers. Signal and train control systems are not the focus of this
rulemaking.
FRA received comments from the SBA and on behalf of the Minnesota
Transportation Museum, Inc., about this rulemaking's effect on tourist,
scenic, historic, and excursion railroads. The proposed rule does not
apply to these railroads. Instead, the proposed rule applies to
railroads that provide intercity passenger and commuter service. A
joint FRA/industry working group formed under RSAC is currently
developing recommendations regarding the applicability of FRA
regulations, including this one, to tourist, scenic, historic, and
excursion railroads. After appropriate consultation with the excursion
railroad associations takes place, passenger equipment safety
requirements for these operations may be proposed by FRA that are
different from those affecting other types of passenger train
operations. Any such requirements proposed by FRA will be part of a
separate rulemaking proceeding.

Approach

The proposed regulations are principally designed to apply to two
groups of equipment. The first group is identified as Tier I equipment
and consists of railroad passenger equipment operated at speeds not
exceeding 125 mph. The second group is identified as Tier II equipment
and consists of railroad passenger equipment operated at speeds greater
than 125 mph but not exceeding 150 mph. FRA is not proposing a rule of
general applicability for railroad passenger equipment operated at
speeds exceeding 150 mph. FRA believes that the safety of such
passenger equipment must be addressed in a rule of a particular
applicability for an individual railroad.
The speed break points between Tier I and Tier II equipment have
been chosen because most of the nation's intercity passenger and
commuter rail equipment has demonstrated an ability to operate safely
at speeds up to 125 mph. Nevertheless, FRA recognizes that most of this
same equipment is currently operated only at speeds of 110 mph or less.
As a result, the proposed rule contains particular suspension system
safety requirements for passenger equipment operating at speeds above
110 mph but not exceeding 125 mph, near the transition range from Tier
I to Tier II requirements.
Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 20133(a), FRA may apply some or all of the
proposed standards to passenger cars existing at the time the
regulations are published, as well as to new cars, but FRA must explain
the basis for applying any such standards to existing cars. FRA
believes that passenger railroad equipment operating in permanent
service in the United States has established a good safety record,
proving its compatibility with the operating environment. Moreover, FRA
seeks to maximize the benefits resulting from the passenger railroad
industry's investment in any safety requirements which FRA may impose
through this rule. Accordingly, to be cost effective, most of the
proposed requirements would apply only to new or rebuilt equipment.

[[Page 49733]]

However, certain features routinely incorporated in existing designs
would be required at an earlier date than the more innovative features
proposed by this rule. Further, where appropriate, rebuilt equipment
would be required to comply with specific requirements.
FRA intends that the rules proposed in this NPRM lead to the
issuance of initial passenger equipment safety regulations, which are
required by statute to be issued by November 2, 1997. See 49 U.S.C.
20133(b)(1). FRA will propose additional rules for passenger equipment
in a second NPRM principally when the results of further research are
available. FRA intends that the second NPRM lead to the issuance of
final regulations by November 2, 1999, thereby completing the
rulemaking within the five-year period required by law. See 49 U.S.C.
20133(b)(2). To that end, FRA convened a meeting of the Working Group
on December 10-11, 1996, at the Volpe Center in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, to determine and set priorities for the research
necessary to address unresolved safety issues identified in prior
Working Group meetings. Moreover, FRA hopes that the establishment of
final regulations in 1999 will be furthered by APTA's own initiative to
develop and maintain recommended industry standards for rail passenger
equipment. APTA's effort is being carried out through the Passenger
Rail Equipment Safety Standards (PRESS) Task Force, and APTA has
invited FRA, FTA, the NTSB, equipment manufacturers, engineering and
consulting firms, rail labor, and others with an interest in rail
passenger equipment to work with it in developing and effectuating the
recommended standards. This represents a substantial and continuing
investment by member commuter authorities in the safety of rail
passenger service.

System Safety

FRA believes that passenger railroads should carefully evaluate
their operations with a view toward enhancing the safety of those
operations. The importance of formal safety planning has been
recognized in Emergency Order No. 20 and the proposed rule on passenger
train emergency preparedness. As noted, Emergency Order No. 20, Notice
No. 1, required that ``railroads operating scheduled intercity or
commuter rail service . . . conduct an analysis of their operations and
file with FRA an interim safety plan indicating the manner in which
risk of a collision involving a cab car is addressed.'' 61 FR 6879.
In a letter to FRA dated June 24, 1996, Mr. Donald N. Nelson,
President of Metro-North and Chairperson of APTA's Commuter Railroad
Committee, announced that commuter railroads are committed to seeking
additional opportunities to ensure the safety of their operations
beyond efforts such as those made to comply with the interim system
safety plan requirements of Emergency Order No. 20. Mr. Nelson
explained in particular that commuter railroads will examine and ensure
the safety of their operations by adopting a comprehensive system
safety plan that:
(a) Defines the overall safety effort, how it is to be implemented
and the staff required to maintain it;
(b) Establishes the safety interface within the railroad, as well
as with its key outside agencies;
(c) Clearly indicates Senior Management support for implementing
the safety plan and the railroad's overall commitment to safety;
(d) Establishes the safety philosophy of the organization and
provides the means for implementation;
(e) Defines the authority and responsibilities of the safety
organization and delineates the safety related authority and
responsibilities of other departments; and
(f) Incorporates safety goals and objectives into the overall
corporate strategic plan.

(APTA's Commuter Railroad Committee letter at pages 1 and 2.) Further,
the system safety plan is intended to be updated through periodic
safety reviews of all operations.
In a letter to FRA dated October 21, 1996, Mr. Donald N. Nelson
submitted for FRA's review APTA's ``Manual for the Development of a
System Safety Plan for Commuter Railroads'' (APTA Manual). The APTA
Manual is intended to assist commuter railroads in adopting a
comprehensive system safety plan by September 1, 1997. In addition,
Amtrak recently began a corporate system safety program initiative to
make system safety formally an integral part of Amtrak's operations.
The value of the system safety process is rapidly being recognized and
accepted by the passenger railroad industry.
The System Safety Society (the ``Society''), which provided
detailed comments in response to the ANPRM, observed that the use of
the systems approach to safety is very actively followed in many other
industries. The Society noted that the implementation of system safety
plans has been observed to improve safety by reducing accidents and
incidents. Further, the Society explained that safety plans are usually
updated annually to maintain their utility because of technological
improvements and other changed circumstances, including changes in the
operating environment, rules and regulations.
The proposed rule contains system safety requirements to be applied
to all intercity passenger and commuter rail equipment. Although FRA
initially considered addressing system safety requirements for Tier I
and Tier II equipment separately, FRA decided to propose system safety
requirements which can be applied generally to all types of passenger
equipment. Each individual railroad would be required to develop a
system safety plan and a system safety program tailored to its specific
operation, including train speed. The plan required by this part would
be developed as part of a comprehensive system safety process to which
commuter railroads are already committed.
Through the system safety process, each railroad would be required
to identify, evaluate, and seek to eliminate or reduce the hazards
associated with the use of passenger equipment over the railroad
system. In particular, the proposed rule would require that each
intercity passenger and commuter railroad prepare a system safety plan
addressing, at a minimum:
Fire protection;
Software safety;
Equipment inspection, testing, and maintenance;
Employee training and qualifications; and
Pre-revenue service acceptance testing of equipment.

However, because FRA is also proposing a comprehensive set of
mandatory, equipment safety standards in this rule, FRA is generally
not proposing to enforce every element of a railroad's system safety
plan. The section-by-section analysis identifies those portions of the
system safety plan that will be enforced by FRA. Commenters are
requested to address whether FRA should mandate the contents of system
safety plans, whether the areas identified by FRA are appropriate,
whether additional areas should be added, and whether FRA should
enforce other portions of the system safety plans and, if so, which
portions. Should the proposed rule require that system safety plans be
comprehensive and address the entire railroad system in which the
equipment operates? Should the emergency preparedness planning
requirements contained in proposed 49 CFR part 239 (See the Passenger
Train Emergency Preparedness rulemaking,

[[Page 49734]]

designated as FRA No. PTEP-1 (62 FR 8330, Feb. 24, 1997)) be expressly
integrated with the system safety planning requirements contained in
this proposed part (49 CFR part 238)?
APTA, citing to the fact that the commuter railroads have
voluntarily agreed to adopt system safety plans, has objected to FRA
issuing any regulations governing such plans. Commenters are requested
to address APTA's suggestion that the commuter railroads be allowed to
regulate themselves in this area. FRA understands that APTA's system
safety approach will be more comprehensive than what FRA is proposing
and address each commuter railroad's system more as an integrated
whole, not focused principally on rail equipment. FRA will carefully
consider the comments received in deciding what approach to take in the
final rule with respect to system safety plans.
Passenger railroads should seek to employ all means necessary to
reduce the risks associated with the use of passenger equipment over
their systems such as by improving the crashworthiness of their
equipment or by imposing operational limitations on its use. Further,
because many passenger railroads operate at least in part as a tenant
on the right-of-way of another railroad and may not in themselves be
able to control some of the major system hazards, as demonstrated when
an intermodal trailer from a CSXT freight train struck an Amtrak train
operating on an adjacent track in Selma, North Carolina, all railroads
are encouraged to exploit ways to reduce the risks associated with rail
travel to their employees, passengers, and the general public.

Emergency Egress and Access

During the NTSB's investigation of the February 16, 1996, collision
between the MARC and Amtrak trains in Silver Spring, Maryland, that
agency identified unsafe conditions on MARC's rail cars that had been
manufactured by Sumitomo. Concerned that the unsafe conditions
identified on these rail cars may exist on other commuter lines subject
to FRA oversight, on March 12, 1996, the NTSB recommended that FRA:

Inspect all commuter rail equipment to determine whether it has:
(1) easily accessible interior emergency quick-release mechanisms
adjacent to exterior passageway doors; (2) removable windows or kick
panels in interior and exterior passageway doors; and (3)
prominently displayed retroreflective signage marking all interior
and exterior emergency exits. If any commuter equipment lacks one or
more or these features, take appropriate emergency measures to
ensure corrective action until these measures are incorporated into
minimum passenger car safety standards. (Class I, Urgent Action) (R-
96-7)

(In a letter to FRA dated June 24, 1996, the NTSB announced that it has
added ``Safety of Passengers in Railroad Passenger Cars'' to its list
of ``Most Wanted'' transportation safety improvements.)
In the discussion accompanying the safety recommendation, the NTSB
expressed concern that emergency quick-release mechanisms for the
exterior side doors on MARC's Sumitomo rail cars are located in a
secured cabinet some distance from the doors that they control, and the
emergency controls for each door are not readily accessible and
identifiable. Each cabinet door was secured by two fasteners, requiring
a screwdriver or coin to open. The NTSB believes that the emergency
quick-release mechanisms for exterior doors on MARC rail cars should be
well marked and relocated, so that they are immediately adjacent to the
door which they control and readily accessible for emergency escape.

Access to Emergency Door-Release for Power-0perated Doors

In response to the NTSB's recommendation, FRA inspected a total of
1,250 pieces of equipment in use on 16 commuter organizations. In
addition to MARC rail cars, FRA found that some commuter railroads
operate cars with power doors equipped with emergency door-release
levers located inside cabinets requiring special tools to enter. In
large part, these railroads have committed to the voluntary elimination
of latches requiring tools or other implements to access the emergency-
release levers on power-operated doors.
FRA convened a joint meeting of the Passenger Equipment Safety
Standards Working Group and the Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness
Working Group on March 26, 1996, to discuss the NTSB's recommendations
and incorporate the Safety Board's findings, as appropriate, into each
working group's rulemaking. In accordance with the consensus of the
working groups, FRA is proposing in Secs. 238.237 and 238.441 of the
rule that train passengers and crewmembers be able to access door-
release mechanisms without the use of any tool or other implement.

Relocation of Emergency Door-Release

NTSB advisors to the Working Group clarified that the
recommendation to relocate emergency door-release mechanisms refers to
exterior side doors located in end vestibules partitioned from the
passenger compartment of the rail vehicle. If emergency door-release
mechanisms are located inside the passenger compartments of such
vehicles, exiting the vehicles in an emergency through side doors in
the vestibules may be complicated as passengers try to locate the
mechanisms and move between the vestibule and passenger compartment
areas.
In response to the NTSB's safety recommendation, passenger
railroads that operate rail equipment with end vestibules have agreed
to relocate emergency door-release mechanisms so that they are located
adjacent to the doors which they control. However, agreement could not
be reached on a time-table for retrofitting existing equipment. APTA
has proposed that the retrofit be required on all such passenger
equipment when it is overhauled in the course of each railroad's
equipment overhaul cycle. APTA anticipates that under this process
retrofitting the entire fleet of affected equipment will be
accomplished within 10 to 15 years.
FRA believes that the retrofit must be accomplished sooner to
ensure the safety of passenger train occupants. Consequently, FRA is
proposing in Sec. 238.237 that for equipment operated at speeds not
exceeding 125 mph (Tier I equipment), within two years of the effective
date of the final rule each powered, exterior side door in a vestibule
that is partitioned from the passenger compartment of a passenger car
be equipped with a manual override that is: (1) capable of opening the
door without power from inside the car; (2) located adjacent to the
door which it controls; and (3) designed and maintained so that a
person may access the override device from inside the car without
requiring the use of any tool or other implement.
FRA expects that railroads will expedite this retrofit program and
believes that this retrofit can be completed well in advance of the 2-
year deadline. APTA maintains that the supply industry cannot provide
the necessary materials to complete the retrofit in such time without
unreasonable increases in costs, and believes that a 3 to 5 year time
frame is needed. (Commenters are requested to address whether a shorter
or longer time period should be established and, if so, provide the
rationale for the time period that the commenter recommends. Railroads
are requested to identify the number of cars that are not yet
retrofitted.) Further, before any equipment may be introduced for
service at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 150 mph (Tier II

[[Page 49735]]

equipment), FRA is proposing in Sec. 238.441 that each powered,
exterior side door on a passenger car be equipped with a manual
override meeting the above and additional requirements.
FRA believes that the cost of meeting the retrofit requirement will
be $3.7 million dollars, and recognizes that it is not clear whether
the occupants of the MARC train in the Silver Spring, Maryland,
accident could have opened the vestibule exterior side doors after the
collision, assuming that the emergency-release had been employed. The
NTSB did note that the left and right rear exterior side doors of the
first car and the front interior end door and the right front exterior
door of the second car on the MARC train were jammed. However, FRA
believes it must institute the retrofit requirement to decrease the
risk that passengers cannot rapidly exit a train in a life-threatening
situation.
FRA recognizes that passenger railroads have located door-release
mechanisms away from the doors which they control to discourage
passengers from exiting trains in non-emergency situations. When no
emergency is present, passengers exiting trains along the railroad
right-of-way unnecessarily risk exposure to oncoming trains, electrical
hazards, and other dangerous conditions. In consequence, the proposed
rule permits railroads to protect emergency door-release mechanisms
from casual or inadvertent use with a cover or a screen. However, the
cover or screen must be capable of removal by a 5th-percentile female
without the use of any tool or other implement. If the method of
removing the protective cover or screen entails breaking or shattering
it, the cover or screen shall be scored, perforated, or otherwise
weakened so that a 5th-percentile female can penetrate the cover or
screen with a single blow of her fist without injury to her hand.

Additional Egress Issues

The NTSB noted that none of the car doors on the MARC train
involved in the Silver Spring, Maryland, accident had removable windows
or pop-out emergency escape panels (``kick panels'') for use in an
emergency. In addition, the NTSB stated that several train passengers
were unaware of the locations of emergency exits, and none knew how to
operate them. The NTSB found that the interior emergency window decals
were not prominently displayed and that one car had no interior
emergency window decals. Also, the exterior emergency decals were often
faded or obliterated, and the information on them, when legible,
directed emergency responders to another sign at the end of the car for
instructions on how to open emergency exits.
Through the issuance of Emergency Order No. 20, FRA has addressed
on an interim basis the inspection of required emergency exits, and
emergency exit signage and marking. Further, FRA is proposing
requirements concerning the marking of emergency exits, as well as
instructions for their use, in the related rulemaking on passenger
train emergency preparedness. FRA shares the NTSB's concern about
passenger egress in an emergency; however, FRA believes that the NTSB's
suggestion to install kick panels is best limited to interior doors to
ensure passage through a train in an emergency--and not applied to
exterior doors.
To the best of FRA's knowledge, the concept of kick panels has not
been utilized in North American rail equipment. Installing kick panels
below the window levels in exterior doors was evaluated by FRA, with
concurrence from the joint working groups, as unacceptable for safety
reasons. Because passenger railroads have encountered recurring
situations in which passengers have inappropriately exited moving
trains, leading to death or serious injury, introducing kick panels in
exterior doors would create an unacceptable risk of inadvertent use,
particularly by children. Penetration of occupied areas by objects from
the outside is also a potential concern.
Use of kick panels to open passageways through a train has merit.
If panels can be made sufficiently large without decreasing the
functionality of doors in normal operation, such a feature may
facilitate evacuation through the length of the train if exterior side
doors are jammed. Evacuation throughout the length of the train is
often the safest route of egress in situations such as fires,
derailments in multiple track territory, and incidents in third-rail
powered commuter service. Accordingly, FRA is proposing in Sec. 238.441
of the rule that Tier II passenger car end doors be equipped with a
kick-out panel, pop-out window or other similar means of egress in the
event the doors will not open.
Unlike a Tier II passenger train which should operate as a fixed
unit, the interchangeable use of some cab cars and MU locomotives as
leading and trailing units on a Tier I passenger train will complicate
analyzing the efficacy of installing such panels on Tier I equipment.
It would be unacceptable to have a removable panel at the point of a
train where objects or fluids might enter the vehicle as a result of a
highway-rail grade crossing accident or other collision. As a result,
FRA will further examine the concerns involving the use of kick panels
on Tier I equipment in the second phase of this rulemaking.
Additional emergency egress and access topics addressed in this
proposed rule are discussed below in the Emergency Systems section of
this preamble. Emergency egress and access topics are also addressed in
the related rulemaking on passenger train emergency preparedness. See
62 FR 8330, Feb. 24, 1997.

Power Brake Inspection and Testing

In 1992, Congress amended the Federal rail safety laws by adding
certain statutory mandates related to power brake safety. These
amendments specifically address the revision of the power brake
regulations and state in pertinent part:

(r) POWER BRAKE SAFETY.--(1) The Secretary shall conduct a
review of the Department of Transportation's rules with respect to
railroad power brakes, and not later than December 31, 1993, shall
revise such rules based on such safety data as may be presented
during that review.
* * * * *
Pub. L. No. 102-365, Sec. 7; codified at 49 U.S.C. 20141, superseding
45 U.S.C. 431(r).
In response to the statutory mandate, various recommendations to
improve power brake safety, and due to its own determination that the
power brake regulations were in need of revision, FRA published an
ANPRM on December 31, 1992, concerning railroad power brake safety. See
57 FR 62546. The ANPRM provided background information and presented
questions on various subjects related to intercity passenger and
commuter train operations, including: training of testing and
inspection personnel; electronic braking systems; cleaning, oiling,
testing, and stenciling (COT&S) requirements; performance of brake
inspections; and high speed passenger train brakes. Following
publication of the ANPRM, FRA conducted a series of public workshops.
The ANPRM and the public workshops were intended as fact-finding tools
to elicit views of those persons outside FRA charged with ensuring
compliance with the power brake regulations on a day-to-day basis.
Furthermore, on July 26, 1993, the NTSB made the following
recommendation to FRA: ``Amend the power brake regulations, 49 Code of
Federal Regulations 232.12, to provide appropriate guidelines for
inspecting brake equipment on modern passenger

[[Page 49736]]

cars.'' (R-93-16). The recommendation arose out of the NTSB's
investigation of the December 17, 1991, derailment of an Amtrak
passenger train in Palatka, Florida. The derailed equipment struck two
homes and blocked a street north of the Palatka station. The derailment
resulted in eleven passengers sustaining serious injuries and 41 others
receiving minor injuries. In addition, five members of the operating
crew and four onboard service personnel received minor injuries. By
letter dated September 16, 1993, FRA told the NTSB that it was in the
process of reviewing and rewriting the power brake regulations and
would consider the NTSB's recommendation during the process.
Based on comments and information received, FRA published an NPRM
in 1994 regarding revision of the power brake regulations which
contained specific requirements related to intercity passenger and
commuter train operations. These specific requirements included:
general design requirements; movement of defective equipment; employee
qualifications; inspection and testing requirements; single car testing
requirements and periodic maintenance; operating requirements; and
requirements for the introduction of new train brake system technology.
See 59 FR 47722-47753, September, 16, 1994.
Following publication of the 1994 NPRM (59 FR 47676), FRA held a
series of public hearings in 1994 to allow interested parties the
opportunity to comment on specific issues addressed in the 1994 NPRM.
Public hearings were held in Chicago, Illinois, on November 1-2; in
Newark, New Jersey, on November 4; in Sacramento, California, on
November 9; and in Washington, D.C. on December 13-14, 1994. These
hearings were attended by numerous railroads; organizations
representing railroads; labor organizations; rail shippers; and State
governmental agencies. Due to the strong objections raised by a large
number of commenters, FRA announced by notice published on January 17,
1995, that it would defer action on the 1994 NPRM and permit the
submission of additional comments prior to making a determination as to
how it would proceed in this matter. See 60 FR 3375.
Based on these considerations and after review of all the comments
submitted, FRA determined that in order to limit the number of issues
to be examined and developed in any one proceeding it would proceed
with the revision of the power brake regulations via three separate
processes. In light of the testimony and comments received on the 1994
NPRM, emphasizing the differences between passenger and freight
operations and the brake equipment utilized by the two, FRA decided to
separate passenger equipment power brake standards from freight
equipment power brake standards. As passenger equipment power brake
standards are a logical subset of passenger equipment safety standards,
FRA requested the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards Working Group to
assist FRA in developing appropriate power brake standards for
passenger equipment and then decided that they would be included in
this NPRM. See 49 U.S.C. 20133(c). In addition, a second NPRM covering
freight equipment power brake standards would be developed with the
assistance of FRA's Railroad Safety Advisory Committee. See 61 FR
29164, June 7, 1996. Furthermore, in the interest of public safety and
due to statutory as well as internal commitments, FRA determined that
it would separate the issues related to two-way end-of-train-telemetry
devices from both the passenger and freight issues. FRA convened a
public regulatory conference and published a final rule on the subject
on January 2, 1997. See 62 FR 278.
Beginning in December of 1995, the Passenger Equipment Safety
Standards Working Group adopted the additional task of attempting to
develop power brake standards applicable to intercity passenger and
commuter train operations and equipment. The Working Group met on four
separate occasions in the last six months, which consisted of ten days
of meetings, with a good portion of these meetings being devoted to
discussion of power brake issues. From the outset, a majority of the
members, as well as FRA, believed that any requirements developed by
the group regarding the inspection and testing of the brake equipment
should not vary significantly from the current requirements and should
be consistent with current industry practice.
FRA's accident/incident data related to intercity passenger and
commuter train operations support the assumption that the current
practices of these operations in the area of power brake inspection,
testing, and maintenance are for the most part sufficient to ensure the
safety of the public. Between January 1, 1990 and October 31, 1996,
there were only five brake related accidents involving commuter and
intercity passenger railroad equipment. No casualties resulted from any
of these accidents and the total damage to railroad equipment totaled
approximately $650,000, or $96,000 annually. In addition, between
January 1, 1995 and October 31, 1996, FRA inspected approximately
13,000 commuter and intercity passenger rail units for compliance with
49 CFR part 232. The defect ratio for these units during this period
was approximately 0.8 percent. Furthermore, during this same period FRA
inspected approximately 6,300 locomotives for compliance with 49 CFR
part 229. The brake defect ratio for these units was approximately 4.65
percent. Consequently, the defect ratio for brake related defects on
locomotives and other passenger equipment during this period was
approximately 2.08 percent.
The existing regulations covering the inspection and testing of the
braking systems on passenger trains are contained in 49 CFR part 232.
The current regulations do provide some requirements relevant to
passenger train operations, including: initial terminal inspection and
testing, intermediate inspections, running tests, and general
maintenance requirements. See 49 CFR 232.12, 232.13(a), 232.16, and
232.17. However, most of the existing regulations are written to
address freight train operations and do not sufficiently address the
unique operating environment of commuter and intercity passenger train
operations or the equipment currently being used in those operations.
Therefore, it has been necessary for FRA to provide interpretations of
some of the current regulations in order to address these unique
concerns.
Currently, all non-MU (multiple unit) commuter trains that do not
remain connected to a source of compressed air overnight and all MU
commuter trains equipped with RT-5 or similar brake systems must
receive an initial terminal inspection of the brake system pursuant to
Sec. 232.12(c)-(j) prior to the train's first departure on any given
calendar day. All non-MU commuter trains that remain connected to a
source of compressed air overnight are permitted to receive an initial
terminal inspection of the brake system sometime during each 24-hour
period in which they are used. Furthermore, all intercity passenger
trains must receive an initial terminal inspection of the brake system
at the point where they are originally made up and must receive an
intermediate inspection in accordance with Sec. 232.12(b) every 1,000
miles.
As noted previously, most of the members of the Working Group
believed that any requirements developed by the group regarding the
inspection and testing of the brake equipment should not vary
significantly from the current requirements and should be consistent

[[Page 49737]]

with current industry practice. However, the Working Group was unable
to reach consensus on power brake standards, despite the positing of
multiple alternatives, use of a facilitator, and the foundation
provided by the 1994 NPRM. The Working Group identified and discussed
options with which the agency and labor can agree, and others with
which FRA and the railroads can agree. However, bridging the gap
between those various options proved elusive. Consequently, as the
Working Group could not reach any type of consensus on the inspection
and testing requirements, it was determined that FRA would address
these issues unilaterally, based on the information and discussions
provided by the Working Group and the information gathered from the
1994 NPRM. FRA is interested in receiving comments on the brake tests
that it has developed given the differences in the positions of the
various parties.
The Working Group discussed various options regarding the types of
brake inspections that should be required as well as when and how these
inspections should be performed. Labor representatives, particularly
the BRC, insisted that a comprehensive power brake inspection (i.e.,
something similar to the initial terminal brake inspections currently
required under Sec. 232.12(c)-(j)) must be performed prior to a train's
first run on a given calendar day. The BRC expressed concern that, as
equipment lays over between the evening commuter cycle and the first
trip of the morning, vandalism, weather changes, or other factors could
affect the integrity of the air brake system. The BRC also believes
that it is necessary for the first inspection of the day to determine
whether the brake shoes and the disc pads actually apply as intended.
The BRC further contends that in order to perform a comprehensive
inspection equivalent to an initial terminal inspection the train must
be walked or otherwise inspected on a car-to-car basis. In addition,
the BRC contends that these principal inspections should be performed
only by carmen or other qualified mechanical personnel as they are the
only employees sufficiently trained to perform these inspections.
Representatives of intercity passenger and commuter railroads
expressed the desire to have the flexibility to conduct a comprehensive
in-depth inspection of the train brake system sometime during the day
in which the equipment is utilized. These parties argued that safety
would be better served by allowing the railroads the flexibility to
conduct these inspections on a daily basis as it would allow the
railroads to conduct the inspections at locations that are more
conducive to permitting a full inspection of the equipment than many of
the outlying locations where trains are stationed overnight and where
the ability to observe all the equipment may be hampered. It is further
contended that, if trains are required to received the equivalent of an
initial terminal inspection at these outlying points, then many of
these inspections may be performed by individuals not as fully
qualified as a mechanical inspector. Whereas, if the railroads are
allowed some flexibility in conducting these type of inspections, then
the equipment can be moved to a location where a fully qualified
mechanical inspector can perform a detailed brake inspection under
optimum conditions, perhaps in conjunction with a daily mechanical
inspection.
Several parties also pointed out that, with proper maintenance,
``tread brake units'' and other friction brake components, commonly
used in commuter train operations, are highly reliable and that the
non-functioning of any individual unit would in no way compromise the
overall safety of the train. Furthermore, permitting the inspection of
these types of brake components in the middle of the day, rather than
at the beginning of the day, involves no greater safety risk to
passengers because friction brake systems and their components degrade
in performance based largely on use, and nothing short of a continuous
brake inspection can guarantee 100-percent performance at all times.
Railroad representatives suggested an inspection scheme that would
permit an in-depth, comprehensive brake inspection to be performed
sometime during the day in which the equipment is used with a brake
inspection being performed prior to the first run of the day verifying
the continuity of the trainline by performing a set and release on the
rear car of the train. In addition, one commuter railroad also
requested relief from performing Class I inspections on trains operated
in weekend service due to the shortage of mechanical inspectors
currently employed on those shifts.
Based on consideration of the discussions held in the Working Group
meetings, outlined above, as well as information obtained in relation
to the 1994 NPRM, FRA proposes to abandon the terminology related to
the power brake inspection and testing requirements contained in the
current regulations, which is generally based on the locations where
the inspections and tests are performed (i.e., initial terminal,
intermediate locations). In its stead, FRA proposes to identify various
classes of inspections based on the duties and type of inspection
required, such as: Class I; Class IA; and Class II. This is similar to
the approach taken by FRA in the 1994 NPRM. See 59 FR 47736-40. FRA
believes that this type of classification system will avoid confusion
with the power brake inspection and testing requirements applicable to
freight operations and will avoid the connotations historically
attached to the current terminology. FRA also believes this approach is
better suited for providing operational flexibility to commuter
operations while maintaining the safety provided by the current
inspection and testing requirements. Although FRA proposes a change in
the terminology used to describe the various power brake inspections
and tests, the requirements of these inspections and tests will closely
track the current requirements with some modifications made to address
the unique operating environment of, and equipment operated in,
commuter and intercity passenger train service. Members of the Working
Group appeared receptive to this kind of classification system and
discussed various options using some of this terminology. Consequently,
FRA proposes four different types of brake inspections to be performed
by commuter and intercity passenger railroads some time during the
operation of the equipment. FRA proposes the terms ``Class I,'' ``Class
IA,'' ``Class II,'' and ``running brake test'' to identify the four
types of brake inspections required by this proposal.
FRA also proposes to divide passenger train operations into two
distinct types for purposes of brake inspections and testing. FRA
recognizes that there are major differences in the operations of
commuter or short-distance intercity passenger trains, and long-
distance intercity passenger trains. Commuter and short-distance
intercity passenger trains tend to operate for fairly short distances
between passenger stations and generally operate in relatively short
turn-around service between two terminals several times in any given
day. In contrast, long-distance intercity passenger trains tend to
operate for long distances, with trips between the beginning terminal
and ending terminal taking a day or more and traversing multiple states
with relatively long distances between passenger stations.
Consequently, FRA proposes to use and define the terms ``commuter
train,'' ``short-distance intercity passenger train,'' and ``long-
distance intercity passenger train'' in order to identify the
inspection and

[[Page 49738]]

testing requirements associated with each. For the most part, commuter
and short-distance intercity passenger trains are treated similarly,
whereas, long-distance intercity passenger trains have slightly
different proposed inspection and testing requirements. In addition,
FRA proposes slightly different requirements with regard to the
movement of defective equipment in long-distance intercity passenger
trains (see the discussion below on the ``Movement of Equipment with
Defective Brakes'').
APTA, in its comments on a draft of the NPRM, expressed opposition
to the proposed Class IA brake test. APTA's position is that brake
tests prior to a train's first departure in any day should be limited
to a pre-departure set and release followed by a running test of the
brakes. APTA also expresses the belief that the proposed NPRM Class I
and Class II requirements go well beyond existing brake inspection
processes and that which is required for safety, and that these
requirements will increase costs dramatically.

A. Commuter and Short-Distance Intercity Passenger Trains Require a
Class I Brake Test Sometime During a Day the Equipment Is Used

The proposed Class I brake test basically requires an inspection
similar to an initial terminal inspection as currently described at
Sec. 232.12(c)-(j), but is somewhat more extensive and specifically
aimed at the types of equipment being used in commuter and intercity
passenger train service. A Class I brake test would require an
inspection of the application and release of the friction brakes on
each side of each car as well as an inspection of the brake shoes,
pads, discs, rigging, angle cocks, piston travel, and brake indicators
if the equipment is so equipped. The Class I brake test would also
require testing of the communication signal system and the emergency
braking control devices. In addition, all supplemental braking systems
would be required to be inspected and be working. In recognition of the
advanced technology and various designs used in many of these
operations, which make observation of the piston travel virtually
impossible, FRA proposes to permit the inspection of the piston travel
to be conducted either through direct observation or by observation of
a brake actuator or the clearance between the brake shoe and the wheel.
Furthermore, FRA proposes to require a brake pipe leakage test only
when leakage will affect service performance.
Although FRA agrees with the position advanced by many labor
representatives that some sort of car-to-car inspection must be made of
the brake equipment prior to the first run of the day, FRA does not
agree that it is necessary to perform a full Class I brake test before
the first run in order to ensure the proper functioning of the brake
equipment. As FRA proposes that Class I brake tests be a comprehensive
inspection of the braking system, including the proper operation of
supplemental braking systems, FRA believes that commuter and short-
distance intercity passenger train operations must be permitted some
flexibility in conducting these inspections. Consequently, FRA proposes
to require that commuter and short-distance intercity passenger train
operations perform a Class I brake test sometime during the calendar
day in which the equipment is used. FRA believes that the flexibility
permitted by this proposed requirement will allow these railroads to
move equipment to locations that are most conducive to the inspection
of the brake equipment and would allow these railroads to combine the
daily mechanical inspections with this brake inspection for added
efficiency.
Furthermore, as FRA intends for these Class I brake inspections to
be in-depth inspections of the entire braking system which most likely
will be performed only one time in any given day in which the equipment
is used, FRA believes that these inspections must be performed by
individuals possessing not only the knowledge to identify and detect a
defective condition in all of the brake equipment required to be
inspected but also the knowledge to recognize the interrelational
workings of the equipment and the ability to ``troubleshoot'' and
repair the equipment. Therefore, FRA proposes that only qualified
mechanical inspectors be permitted to perform Class I brake tests.
Currently, initial terminal air brake inspections are conducted
prior to the first run of the day on 554 commuter train sets by
mechanical inspectors and on 168 commuter train sets by train crews or
other personnel who could not be fully qualified as mechanical
inspectors. Typically, commuter and short-distance intercity passenger
trains receive more than one initial terminal test each day, even if
this is not required due to the equipment being left ``off air.'' See
49 CFR 232.12(a). Often these additional tests are conducted sometime
during the middle of the day by train crews or mechanical employees.
Although most commuter and short-distance intercity operations
voluntarily perform an initial terminal brake inspection with
mechanical employees some time during the day, there is no requirement
to do so. In addition, there is a certain percentage of equipment where
the principal brake inspections are currently being performed strictly
by train crews rather than by mechanical employees. Consequently, FRA
believes that the proposed requirement incorporates the current best
practices of the industry and will, at a minimum, ensure that the
braking systems on all commuter and short-distance intercity equipment
will be inspected at least once each day by a fully qualified
mechanical inspector.
FRA has not proposed any special provisions for weekend operations
as suggested by some members of the Working Group. FRA recognizes this
is a difficult issue. Existing operations generally involve using
particular sets of equipment on only one day during the weekend to
avoid the need to refuel. On the one hand, there is no specific data
suggesting that existing weekend operations involving inspections
exclusively by train crew members have created a safety hazard. Yet,
the rationale for requiring daily attention by mechanical forces, a
proposition generally accepted by Working Group members, would appear
to apply equally to weekend periods. FRA believes that adjustments
might be made to weekend operations that might avoid significant new
expense while providing expert attention to inspection of the
equipment. Accordingly, FRA seeks additional information on the costs
and benefits of requiring that Class I brake inspections and daily
mechanical inspections be conducted by qualified mechanical inspectors,
as well as any suggestions for alternative means of addressing this
issue.

B. Commuter and Short-Distance Intercity Passenger Trains Require at
Least a Class IA Brake Test Prior to the Train's First Departure in Any
Given Day

Although FRA agrees with the position advanced by many labor
representatives that some sort of car-to-car inspection must be made of
the brake equipment prior to the first run of the day, FRA does not
agree that it is necessary to perform a full Class I brake test in
order to ensure the proper functioning of the brake equipment in all
situations. However, contrary to the position espoused by APTA, FRA
believes that something more than just a determination that the brakes
on the rear car set and release is necessary.
Currently, the quality of initial terminal tests performed by train
crews is likely adequate to determine that

[[Page 49739]]

brakes apply on each car. However, most commuter equipment utilizes
``tread brake units'' in lieu of cylinders and brake rigging of the
kind prevalent on freight and some intercity passenger cars. It is
undoubtedly the case that train crew members do not verify application
of the brakes by tapping brake shoes while the brakes are applied, the
only effective means of determining that adequate force is being
applied. This is one reason why the subject railroads typically conduct
redundant initial terminal tests at other times during the day.
Further, train crews are not asked to inspect for wheel defects and
other unsafe conditions, nor should they be asked to do so, given the
conditions under which they are asked to inspect and the training they
receive.
FRA proposes that, at a minimum, a Class IA brake test be performed
prior to a commuter or short-distance intercity passenger train's first
departure on any given day. FRA believes that the proposed Class IA
brake is sufficiently detailed to ensure the proper functioning of the
brake system yet not so intensive that it requires individuals to
perform an inspection for which they are not qualified.
The proposed Class IA brake test is somewhat less comprehensive
than a Class I brake test but includes a detailed inspection of the
brake system to verify the continuity of the brake system and the
proper functioning of the brake valves on each car. A Class IA brake
test would be similar to the intermediate brake inspection currently
required for freight trains prescribed at Sec. 232.13(d)(1). A Class IA
brake test would generally require a walking inspection of the set and
release of the brakes on each car; however, the proposal would allow
brake indicators to be used to verify the set and release if the
railroad determines that operating conditions pose a safety hazard to
an inspector walking along the train. The Class IA brake test would
also require a leakage test if leakage affects service performance, as
well as an inspection of: angle cocks; piston travel, if determinable;
brake indicators; emergency brake control devices; and communication of
brake pipe pressure changes at the rear of train to the controlling
locomotive. FRA believes that a qualified mechanical inspector or a
properly trained and qualified train crew member could perform a Class
IA brake test.

C. Long-distance Intercity Passenger Trains Require a Class I Brake
Test Prior to Departure From an Originating Terminal and Once Each
Calendar Day the Equipment Is Used or Every 1,500 Miles, Whichever
Occurs First

As noted above, FRA recognizes the differences between commuter or
short-distance intercity operations and long-distance intercity
passenger train operations. Long-distance intercity passenger trains do
not operate in shorter turn around service over the same sections of
track on a daily basis for the purpose of transporting passengers from
major centers of employment. Instead, these trains tend to operate for
extended periods of time, over long distances with greater distances
between passenger stations and terminals. Further, these trains may
operate well over 1,000 miles in any 24 hour period. Thus, the
opportunity for conducting inspections on these trains is somewhat
diminished. Therefore, FRA believes that a thorough inspection of the
braking system on these types of operations must be conducted prior to
the train's departure from an initial starting terminal. Consequently,
FRA will not permit the use of Class IA brake tests for these trains
and proposes to require that a Class I brake inspection be performed on
long-distance intercity passenger trains prior to departure from an
initial terminal. FRA does not believe there would be any significant
burden placed on these operations as the current regulations require
that an initial terminal inspection be performed at these locations.
Furthermore, virtually all of the initial terminal inspections
currently conducted on these types of trains are performed by
individuals who would be considered qualified mechanical employees
under this proposal.
FRA also recognizes that these long-distance intercity passenger
trains could conceivably travel over 3,000 miles if Class I inspections
were required only once every 24 hours the equipment is in service as
proposed for commuter and short-distance intercity passenger trains.
Thus, FRA believes that some outside mileage limit must be placed on
these trains between brake inspections. Currently, a passenger train is
permitted to travel no further than 1,000 miles from its initial
terminal, at which point it must receive an intermediate inspection of
brakes that includes application of the brakes and the inspection of
the brake rigging to ensure it is properly secured. See 49 CFR
232.12(b). However, in recognition of the improved technology used in
passenger train brake systems combined with the comprehensive nature of
the proposed Class I brake tests and mechanical safety inspections both
being performed by qualified mechanical inspectors, FRA proposes to
permit long-distance passenger trains to travel up to 1,500 miles
between Class I brake tests. Consequently, FRA proposes to eliminate
the 1,000-mile inspection for these trains and proposes to require that
the proposed Class I brake test be performed once every calendar day
that the equipment is used or every 1,500 miles, which every occurs
first.

D. The Brake Inspection and Testing Intervals for Long-distance
Intercity Passenger Trains Apply to All Tier II Equipment Regardless of
Whether the Equipment is Used in Short- or Long-distance Intercity
Trains

FRA also proposes to apply the brake inspection and testing
intervals proposed for long-distance passenger trains to all Tier II
equipment (i.e., equipment operating at speeds greater than 125 mph but
not exceeding 150 mph) regardless of whether it is used in short- or
long-distance intercity trains. As FRA proposes to permit operators of
Tier II equipment to develop inspection and testing criteria and
procedures, these operations will be required to develop a brake test
that is equivalent to a Class I brake test for Tier II equipment. Due
to the speeds at which this equipment will be allowed to operate, FRA
believes it is a necessity that an equivalent Class I brake test be
performed on Tier II equipment before it departs from its initial
terminal. Likewise, FRA proposes to require that the equivalent Class I
brake test be performed every calendar day in which the equipment is
used or every 1,500 miles, whichever comes first.

E. Class II Brake Test Required Where Minor Changes to a Train Consist
Occur

In addition to the proposed Class I and Class IA brake tests, FRA
also proposes a Class II brake test. The proposed Class II brake test
is an inspection intended to verify the continuity of the train brake
system and is similar to the intermediate terminal inspection currently
prescribed at Sec. 232.13(a). A Class II brake test would basically
require a set and release of the brakes on the rear car. The proposed
Class II test would be required in those circumstances where minor
changes to a train consist occur. These include the change of a control
stand, the removal of cars from the consist, the addition of previously
tested cars, and the situations in which an operator first takes
control of the train.

[[Page 49740]]

F. Running Brake Tests

FRA also proposes to require a running brake test as soon as
conditions safely permit it to be conducted after a train receives a
Class I, Class IA, or Class II brake test. FRA believes that this test
should be conducted in accordance with each railroad's operating rules.
The ``running brake test'' requirement is similar to the ``running
test'' requirements currently contained at Sec. 232.16.

Movement of Equipment With Defective Brakes

The current regulations do not contain requirements pertaining to
the movement of equipment with defective power brakes. The movement of
equipment with these types of defects is currently controlled by a
specific statutory provision originally enacted in 1910, which states:

(a) GENERAL.--A vehicle that is equipped in compliance with this
chapter whose equipment becomes defective or insecure nevertheless
may be moved when necessary to make repairs, without a penalty being
imposed under section 21302 of this title, from the place at which
the defect or insecurity was first discovered to the nearest
available place at which the repairs can be made--
(1) On the railroad line on which the defect or insecurity was
discovered; or
(2) At the option of a connecting railroad carrier, on the
railroad line of the connecting carrier, if not further than the
place of repair described in clause (1) of this subsection.

49 U.S.C. 20303(a) (emphasis added).
Although there is no limit contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303 as to the
number of cars with defective equipment that may be hauled in a train,
FRA has a longstanding interpretation which requires that, at a
minimum, 85 percent of the cars in a train have operative brakes. FRA
bases this interpretation on another statutory requirement which
permits a railroad to use a train only if ``at least 50 percent of the
vehicles in the train are equipped with power or train brakes and the
engineer is using the power or train brakes on those vehicles and on
all other vehicles equipped with them that are associated with those
vehicles in a train.'' 49 U.S.C. 20302(a)(5)(B). As originally enacted
in 1903, section 20302 also granted the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) the authority to increase this percentage, and in 1910 the ICC
issued an order increasing the minimum percentage to 85 percent. See 49
CFR 232.1, which codified the ICC order.
As virtually all freight cars are presently equipped with power
brakes and are operated on an associated trainline, the statutory
requirement is in essence a requirement that 100 percent of the cars in
a train have operative power brakes, unless being hauled for repairs
pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 20303. Consequently, FRA currently requires that
equipment with defective or inoperative air brakes makeup no more than
15 percent of the train and that, if it is necessary to move the
equipment from where the railroad first discovered it to be defective,
the defective equipment be moved no further than the nearest place on
the railroad's line where the necessary repairs can be made or, at the
option of the receiving carrier, to a repair point that is no further
than the repoint on the delivering line.
The requirements regarding the movement of equipment with defective
or insecure brakes noted above can and do create safety hazards as well
as operational difficulties in the area of commuter and intercity
passenger railroad operations. As the provisions regarding the movement
of defective brake equipment were written almost a century ago, they do
not address the realities of these types of operations in today's
world. Strict application of the requirements has the potential of
causing major disruptions of service which result in the creation of
serious safety and security problems. For example, requiring repairs to
be made at the nearest location where the necessary repairs can be made
could result in passengers being discharged between stations where
adequate facilities for their safety are not available or in the
overcrowding of station platforms and trailing trains due to
discharging passengers from a defective train at a location other than
the passenger's destination. In addition, strict application of the
statutory requirements could result in the moving of trains with
defective brake equipment against the current of traffic during busy
commuting hours. Irregular movements of this type increase the risk of
collisions on the railroad. Furthermore, many of today's commuter train
operations often utilize six cars or less in trains and in many
instances operate just two-car trains. Consequently, the necessity to
cut out the brakes on one car can easily result in noncompliance with
the 85-percent requirement for hauling the car for repairs, thus
prohibiting the train's movement and resulting in the same type of
safety problems noted above.
FRA has attempted to recognize the nature of commuter and intercity
passenger operations and the importance of addressing the safety of
passengers, as well as avoiding disruption of this service, when
applying the requirements regarding the movement of equipment with
defective brakes on a day-to-day basis. In addition, the
representatives of commuter and intercity passenger train operations
participating in this proceeding have requested that the regulations be
brought up to date, recognizing that brakes will have to be cut out en
route from time to time (e.g., because of damage from debris placed on
the track structure or because of sticking brakes) and that
contemporary braking systems and established stopping distances provide
a very considerable margin of safety. Furthermore, speed restrictions
can readily be used to compensate for the loss of brakes on a minority
of cars. FRA believes that affirmatively recognizing appropriate
movement restrictions would actually enhance safety, since compliance
with the existing restrictions is potentially unsafe.
Representatives from APTA proposed a method of updating the current
requirements regarding the movement of commuter passenger equipment
with defective brakes to bring them more in line with the realities of
today's operations. The Working Group discussed the proposal at length,
making various revisions. Although the Working Group did not reach
consensus on the issue, FRA believes that the proposed requirements are
within the scope of options discussed by the group. FRA believes that
the proposed restrictions are very conservative and effectively ensure
a high level of safety in light of the reliability of braking systems
currently used in commuter and intercity passenger train operations.
FRA recognizes that some of the proposed restrictions are not in
accord with the requirement contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303(a) that cars
with defective or insecure brakes be moved to the ``nearest'' location
where the necessary repairs can be made. However, FRA does have
authority under 49 U.S.C. 20306, entitled ``Exemption for technological
improvements,'' to establish the proposed restrictions. Section 20306
provides:

[T]he Secretary of Transportation may exempt from the
requirements of this chapter railroad equipment or equipment that
will be operated on rails, when those requirements preclude the
development or implementation of more efficient railroad
transportation equipment or other transportation innovations under
existing law.

This provision was originally enacted as a part of the Rock Island
Railroad Transition and Employee Assistance Act to authorize the use of
RoadRailer trailers as freight cars. See Pub. L. 96-

[[Page 49741]]

254 (May 30, 1980). Although it could be argued that the purpose of the
provision is too narrow to comprehend the instant application, FRA
believes that the use of the provision as contemplated in this proposal
is consistent with the authority granted the Secretary of
Transportation in 49 U.S.C. 20306. As noted previously, the statutory
requirements regarding the movement of equipment with defective brake
equipment were written nearly a century ago and, in FRA's opinion, were
focused generally on the operation of freight equipment and did not
contemplate the types of commuter and intercity passenger train
operations currently prevalent throughout the nation. Since the
original enactment in 1910 of the provisions now codified at 49 U.S.C.
20303(a), there have been substantial changes both in the nature of the
operations of passenger trains as well as in the technology used in
those operations.
Contemporary passenger equipment incorporates various types of
advanced braking systems; in some cases these include electrical
activation of brakes on each car (with pneumatic application through
the train line available as a backup). Dynamic brakes are also
typically employed to limit thermal stresses on friction surfaces and
to limit the wear and tear on the brake equipment. Furthermore, the
brake valves and brake components used today are far more reliable than
was the case several decades ago. In addition to these technological
advances, the brake equipment used in commuter and intercity passenger
train operations incorporate advanced technologies not found with any
regularity in freight operations. These include:
The use of brake cylinder pressure indicators which
provide a reliable indication of the application and release of the
brakes.
The use of disc brakes which provide shorter stopping
distances and decrease the risk of thermal damage to wheels.
The ability to effectuate a graduated release of the
brakes due to a design feature of the brake equipment which permits
more flexibility and more forgiving train control.
The ability to cut out brakes on a per-axle or per-truck
basis rather than a per car basis, thus permitting greater use of those
brakes that are operable.
The use of a pressure-maintaining feature on each car
which continuously maintains the air pressure in the brake system,
thereby compensating for any leakage in the trainline and preventing a
total loss of air in the brake system.
The use of a separate trainline from the locomotive main
reservoir to continuously charge supply reservoirs independent of the
brake pipe train line.
Brake ratios that are 2\1/2\ times greater than the brake
ratios of loaded freight cars.
Although some of the technologies noted above have existed for
several decades, most of the technologies were not in wide spread use
until after 1980. Furthermore, most of the noted technological advances
just started to be integrated into one efficient and reliable braking
system within the last decade. In addition to the technological
advances, commuter and intercity passenger train operations have
experienced considerable growth in the last 15 years necessitating the
need to provide more reliable and efficient service to the riding
public. Since 1980, the number of commuter operations providing rail
service has almost doubled and the number of daily passengers serviced
by passenger operations has more than doubled over the same time
period. Furthermore, commuter and intercity passenger train operations
conduct more frequent single car tests, COT&S, and maintenance of the
braking systems than is generally the practice in the freight industry.
Consequently, the technology incorporated into the brake equipment used
in today's commuter and intercity passenger train operations has
increased the reliability of the braking system and permits the safe
operation of the equipment for extended distances even though a portion
of the braking system may be inoperative or defective.
In the face of these technological advances, FRA believes it is
appropriate to utilize the authority granted by 49 U.S.C. 20306 and
exempt commuter and intercity passenger train operations from the
specific restriction contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303(a) requiring the
movement of equipment with defective or insecure brakes to the nearest
location where the necessary repairs could be made and proposes various
restrictions on the movement of this type of equipment which FRA
believes are more conducive to safe operations.
In utilizing the authority granted pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 20306, the
Secretary is required to make ``findings based on evidence developed at
a hearing,'' unless there is ``an agreement between national railroad
labor representatives and the developer of the new equipment or
technology.'' FRA is confident that, after notice and opportunity for
public comment, oral and written, the record will support a finding
that the proposed provisions are ``in the public interest and
consistent with railroad safety,'' the basic test for waiving safety
requirements issued under other, general provisions of the code. See 49
U.S.C. 20103(d). It should be noted that the exemption granted to these
operations does not include an exemption from 49 U.S.C. 20303(c), which
contains the liability provisions attendant with the movement equipment
with defective or insecure safety appliances, including power brakes.
Consequently, the liability provisions contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303(c)
will be applicable to a railroad when hauling equipment with defective
or insecure power brakes pursuant to the requirements proposed by FRA
in this notice.
FRA also proposes to exempt commuter and intercity passenger train
operations from its longstanding interpretation, based on 49 U.S.C.
20302(a)(5)(B) and 49 CFR 232.1 noted above, prohibiting the movement
of a train if more than 15 percent of the cars in the train have
defective, insecure, or inoperative brakes. As discussed previously,
such a limitation is overly burdensome and has the potential of
creating safety hazards due to the short length of the trains commonly
operated in commuter and intercity passenger service.
Based on the preceding discussions, FRA proposes various
restrictions on the movement of vehicles with defective brake equipment
which allow commuter and intercity passenger train operations to take
advantage of the efficiencies created due to the advanced braking
systems these operations employ as well as the improvements made in
brake equipment over the years, while ensuring if not enhancing the
safety of the traveling public. FRA proposes to permit trains to be
operated with up to 50 percent inoperative brakes to the next forward
passenger station or terminal based on the percentage of operative
brakes, which may result in movements past locations where the
necessary repairs could be made. However, to ensure the safety of these
trains with lower percentages of operative brakes, FRA also proposes
various speed restrictions and other operating restrictions, based on
the percentage of operative brakes. FRA believes that the proposed
speed restrictions are very conservative and ensure a high level of
safety. In fact, test data establish that with the proposed speed
restrictions the stopping distances of those trains with lower
percentages of operative brakes are shorter than if the trains were
operating at normal speed and had 100 percent operative brakes.
Consequently, FRA believes that the proposed approach to the movement
of

[[Page 49742]]

equipment with defective brakes not only enhances the overall safety of
train operations but benefits both the railroads, by providing
operational flexibility, and the traveling public, by permitting them
to get to their destinations in a more expedient and safe fashion. (The
proposed restrictions on the movement of equipment with defective
brakes are discussed in detail in the section-by-section analysis
below.)
Although FRA proposes to exempt all commuter and passenger
operations from the specific statutory requirement contained in 49
U.S.C. 20303(a), it should be noted that in reality the exemption being
proposed is fairly limited. In FRA's view, many of the proposed methods
for moving defective equipment are consistent, if not in accordance,
with the current statutory requirement. For example, FRA proposes to
permit a passenger train with 50-75 percent operative brakes to be
moved at reduced speed to the next forward passenger station. Although
the percentage of operative brakes is lower than currently permitted by
FRA's longstanding agency interpretation (which FRA believes is fully
compensated for by the proposed speed restrictions), FRA believes that
the movement of the defective equipment to the next passenger station
is in accordance with the statutory requirement as the safety of the
passengers must be considered in determining the nearest location where
necessary repairs can be made. In addition, permitting passenger trains
to continue to the next forward location where the necessary repairs
can be performed is also consistent with the statutory requirement as
such movement is necessary to ensure the safety of the traveling public
by protecting them from the hazards incident to performing movements
against the current of traffic. Furthermore, the proposed movement
provisions related to long-distance intercity passenger trains and
long-distance Tier II equipment are consistent with the current
statutory requirements as the proposal permits the movement of
defective brake equipment on these trains only to the next passenger
station or the next repair location, with various speed restrictions
depending on the percentage of operative brakes. Due to the unique
technologies used on the brake systems of these operations and the
unique operating environments, the facilities and personnel necessary
to conduct proper repairs on this equipment are somewhat specialized
and limited. Thus, FRA proposes to require the operators of these
trains to designate the locations where repairs will be made to the
equipment.
Some of the members of the Working Group, particularly those
representing labor organizations, expressed concern that any alteration
of the movement for repair provisions made in the context of commuter
and intercity passenger train operations may have a spillover effect
into the freight industry. FRA wishes to make clear that it has no
intention, at this time, of exempting freight operations from the
requirements relating to the movement of defective equipment contained
in 49 U.S.C. 20303. As noted above, many of the advanced brake system
technologies currently used in passenger service are not used in the
freight context. Furthermore, even if freight operations were to make
similar advances in the braking equipment they employ, this development
on the freight side may not create the efficiencies created in the
passenger train context since the operating environments of freight
trains and passenger trains differ significantly. Finally, the special
safety considerations relative to passengers are not present in freight
operations.

Structural Standards

To help ensure the survivability of a passenger train accident, FRA
is proposing comprehensive, minimum safety standards for the structural
design of rail passenger equipment. Under current regulations, MU
locomotives must comply with minimum structural design requirements,
see 49 CFR 229.141; however, no comparable set of Federal structural
design requirements apply to other forms of passenger equipment.
Moreover, FRA believes that existing structural design requirements for
MU locomotives should be revised, particularly those concerning MU
locomotives operating in trains having a total empty weight of less
than 600,000 pounds, see Sec. 229.141(b), because train operation has
significantly changed since these requirements were first promulgated.
The requirements contained in the proposed rule for the structural
design of Tier I and Tier II equipment are specified below in the
section-by-section analysis. These requirements include safety
standards for the following:
Anti-climbers--to prevent vehicles in a passenger train
from overriding or telescoping into one another;
Collision posts--to protect against the crushing of a
passenger vehicle's occupied areas in the event of a collision or
derailment;
Corner posts--to protect passenger vehicles in corner-to-
corner collisions and impacts with objects intruding upon the clearance
envelope;
Rollover strength--to prevent significant deformation of
the normally occupied spaces of a vehicle in the event it rolls onto
its side or roof;
Side impact strength--to resist penetration of a passenger
vehicle's side structure from a side collision with an object such as a
highway vehicle or a freight car; and
Truck to car body attachment--to prevent separation of
trucks from car bodies during collisions or derailments.

Corner Posts

Requirements concerning corner posts on rail passenger equipment
have been the subject of an NTSB safety recommendation. Following the
January 18, 1993, NICTD corner-to-corner train collision in Gary,
Indiana, the NTSB expressed concern about the adequacy of the corner
post structure in self-propelled passenger cars (MU locomotives) that
allows significant inward car body intrusion and subsequent serious
injuries and fatalities in a corner-to-corner collision. The NTSB noted
that, while MU locomotives must comply with Federal structural design
requirements which include providing for the protection of vulnerable
areas of the car body in a head-on collision, Federal regulations do
not address structural requirements for corner posts which protect the
car body in a corner-to-corner collision. Based on its investigation,
the NTSB recommended that FRA:

In cooperation with the Federal Transit Administration and the
American Public Transit Association, study the feasibility of
providing car body corner post structures on all self-propelled
passenger cars and control cab locomotives to afford occupant
protection during corner collisions. If feasible, amend the
locomotive safety standards accordingly. (Class II, Priority Action)
(R-93-24)

The Working Group has recommended that minimum corner post
structural design requirements be proposed for both locomotives and
rail cars designed to carry passengers, regardless whether the rail
cars are self-propelled or have control compartments. FRA is proposing
such a requirement in this rule and thereby extending the scope of the
NTSB's safety recommendation, which is expressly limited to self-
propelled rail cars. This action recognizes passenger exposure in
accidents such as the one in Lugoff, South Carolina, on July 31, 1991.
There, eight passengers were killed following incursion of a freight
car into

[[Page 49743]]

the side of two Amtrak coaches beginning at the corner of each car.
For cab cars, material improvements in actual end structure design
with respect to corner posts must await completion of further research.
Research completed to date indicates that improvements in strength
alone will not prevent casualties in accidents at higher closing speeds
such as those in the Silver Spring, Maryland, and Secaucus, New Jersey,
accidents.

Fuel Tank Standards

Locomotive fuel tanks are vulnerable to damage from collisions,
derailments, and debris on the roadbed due to their location on the
underframe and between the trucks of locomotives. Damage to the tank
frequently results in spilled fuel, creating the safety problem of an
increased risk of fire and the environmental problem of cleanup and
restoration of the spill site. Although 49 CFR 229.71 does require a
minimum clearance of 2.5 inches between the top of the rail and the
lowest point on a part or appliance of a locomotive, which includes
fuel tanks, FRA regulations do not address the safety of fuel tanks in
particular.
In 1992, the NTSB issued a report identifying concerns regarding
safety problems caused by diesel fuel spills from ruptured or punctured
locomotive fuel tanks. Entitled ``Locomotive Fuel Tank Integrity Safety
Study,'' the NTSB report cited in particular a collision involving an
Amtrak train and an MBTA commuter train on December 12, 1990, as both
trains were entering a station in Boston, Massachusetts. (NTSB Safety
Study-92/04.) Fuel spilled from a tank which had separated from an
Amtrak locomotive during the collision. The fuel ignited. Smoke and
fumes from the burning diesel fuel filled the tunnel, increasing the
hazard level in the post-crash phase of the accident, and hindering
emergency response activity. As a result of the safety study, the NTSB
made several safety recommendations to FRA, including in particular
that FRA:

Conduct, in conjunction with the Association of American
Railroads, General Electric, and the Electro-Motive Division of
General Motors, research to determine if the locomotive fuel tank
can be improved to withstand forces encountered in the more severe
locomotive derailment accidents or if fuel containment can be
improved to reduce the rate of fuel leakage and fuel ignition.
Consideration should be given to crash or simulated testing and
evaluation of recent and proposed design modifications to the
locomotive fuel tank, including increasing the structural strength
of end and side wall plates, raising the tank higher above the rail,
and using internal tank bladders and foam inserts. (Class II,
Priority Action) (R-92-10)
Establish, if warranted, minimum performance standards for
locomotive fuel tanks based on the research called for in
recommendation R-92-10. (Class III, Longer Term Action) (R-92-11)

The NTSB reiterated Safety Recommendation R-92-10 in a letter to FRA
dated August 28, 1997, conveying the NTSB's final safety
recommendations arising from the February 16, 1996, collision between a
MARC commuter train and an Amtrak passenger train. During the
collision, the fuel tank on the lead Amtrak locomotive ruptured
catastrophically. The fuel sprayed into the exposed interior of the
MARC cab control car and ignited, engulfing the car. (Letter at 12.)
As explained in FRA's report to Congress on locomotive
crashworthiness and working conditions, FRA believes that fuel tank
design has a direct impact on safety. Minimum performance standards for
locomotive fuel tanks should be included in Federal safety regulations.
Accordingly, FRA is proposing that AAR Recommended Practice RP-506 be
incorporated into Sec. 238.223 of the proposed rule for external fuel
tanks on Tier I passenger locomotives. FRA believes that RP-506
represents a good interim safety standard for Tier I passenger
locomotives. Further, FRA is proposing more demanding fuel tank safety
standards for Tier II passenger equipment in Sec. 238.423 of the
proposed rule. Additionally, it is anticipated that RSAC will address
the safety of locomotive fuel tanks used on freight equipment, thereby
furthering the safety of rail passenger trains which operate commingled
with freight trains.
FRA invites comments whether the proposed rule should also require
that locomotive fuel tanks be compartmentalized. The Working Group
specifically discussed requiring whether the interior of fuel tanks be
divided into a minimum of four separate compartments so that a
penetration in the exterior skin of any one compartment results in loss
of fuel only from that compartment. The Working Group recommended that
such a requirement be addressed in the second phase of the rulemaking,
to allow for additional research to remedy fuel feeding disruptions
that may result from the compartmentalization of fuel tanks. Commenters
are therefore requested to provide the results of specific research and
operating experience showing how compartmentalization can be
practically accomplished. Commenters are also asked to explain why the
issue of compartmentalization should or should not be addressed in the
final rule of this first phase of the rulemaking.

Rim-Stamped Straight-Plate Wheels

On January 13, 1994, a Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Circus
(Ringling Bros.) train operating on CSXT trackage derailed while
passing through Lakeland, Florida. Two circus employees were killed,
and 15 received minor injuries. The NTSB determined that the probable
cause of the accident was the fatigue failure of a thermally damaged
straight-plate wheel due to fatigue cracking that initiated at a stress
raiser associated with a stamped character on the wheel rim. (NTSB/RAR-
95/01.)
Noting that tread braking is a significant source of wheel
overheating and thermal damage; straight-plate wheels are vulnerable to
thermal damage; and rim stamping provides a stress concentration for
crack initiation, the NTSB recommends as a result of its investigation
that FRA ``[p]rohibit the replacement of wheels on any tread-braked
passenger railroad car with rim-stamped straight-plate wheels.'' (Class
II, Priority Action) (R-95-1).
FRA agrees that rim stamping of straight-plate wheels can lead to
wheel failure when subjected to heat from tread braking. Rim-stamping
was banned by the AAR in 1978, and FRA does not believe that rim-
stamped straight-plate wheels are in use on Amtrak or the nation's
commuter railroads. Nevertheless, in the event such wheels are in fact
in use, FRA proposes to prohibit the use of rim-stamped straight-plate
wheels on all equipment, whether tread-braked or not, used in intercity
passenger or commuter service as of January 1, 1998. In a letter to the
NTSB dated February 21, 1995, Ringling Bros. itself announced that it
has removed all rim-stamped straight-plate wheels on tread-braked
passenger cars from its circus trains. (Appendix D, NTSB/RAR-95/01.)
At this time, FRA is not proposing to prohibit the use of rim-
stamped straight-plate wheels on private passenger cars hauled in
intercity passenger or commuter trains. Private passenger cars are
generally not highly utilized in comparison to intercity passenger or
commuter equipment. According to a comment received from the AAPRCO,
the average private car, qualified to operate on Amtrak, probably
operates less than 4,000 miles per year, and a few may exceed 50,000
miles per year. Further, in a letter to the NTSB dated December 2,
1994, Amtrak stated that it only operates private cars that are
registered with Amtrak and are subject to a regular inspection by
Amtrak-approved inspectors. Amtrak observed that it ``has not
experienced any

[[Page 49744]]

problems on the private cars that operate on Amtrak trains with wheels
that are rim-stamped.'' (Appendix E, NTSB/RAR-95/01.)
However, FRA is requiring that rim-stamped straight-plate wheels
not be used as a replacement wheelset on a private car. As part of this
rulemaking, FRA may further address the use of rim-stamped straight-
plate wheels on private cars hauled in intercity passenger or commuter
trains.

Fire Safety

In 1984, FRA published guidelines recommending testing methods and
performance criteria for the flammability, smoke emission, and fire
endurance characteristics for categories and functions of materials to
be used in the construction of new or rebuilt rail passenger equipment.
See 49 FR 33076, Aug. 20, 1984; 49 FR 44582, Nov. 7, 1984. The
guidelines mirrored fire safety guidelines developed by the Urban Mass
Transit Administration (UMTA) of DOT (now the Federal Transit
Administration).
The intent of the guidelines is to prevent fire ignition and to
maximize the time available for passenger evacuation if fire does
occur. FRA later reissued the guidelines in 1989 to update the
recommended testing methods. See 54 FR 1837, Jan. 17, 1989. Testing
methods cited in the current FRA guidelines include those of the
American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM) and the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA). In particular, the ASTM and FAA testing
methods provide a useful screening device to identify materials that
are especially hazardous.
FRA sought comments in the ANPRM on the need for more thorough
guidelines or Federal regulations concerning fire safety (61 FR 30696).
FRA noted that fire resistance, detection, and suppression technologies
have all advanced since the guidelines were first published. In
addition, FRA explained that a trend toward a systems approach to fire
safety is evident in most countries with modern rail systems. In
response, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) commented
that perhaps more thorough guidelines are needed, or at least should be
evaluated. A private citizen also responded that, at a minimum,
guidelines which are more in depth and ``well thought out''--based on
current system safety procedures and available fire safety engineering
techniques--are needed to address the fire safety concerns FRA raised
in the ANPRM. The commenter noted in particular that Federal
maintenance standards related to fire safety are necessary to ensure
that materials carefully qualified for use in rail passenger vehicles
because of their fire safety characteristics are not replaced with
either substandard materials or materials whose origin and fire
performance cannot be determined.
The proposed rule addresses fire safety by making FRA's fire safety
guidelines mandatory for the construction of new passenger equipment as
well as the refurbishing of existing equipment. In addition, the
proposed rule would require that fire safety be furthered through a
fire protection plan and program carried out by each operating
railroad. This effort would include conducting a fire safety analysis
of existing passenger equipment and taking appropriate action to reduce
the risk of personal injuries. In the second phase of this rulemaking,
FRA anticipates improving upon the safety standards contained in the
existing fire safety guidelines through ongoing research.
Currently, the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) is conducting research under the direction of FRA and the Volpe
Center involving the fire safety of rail passenger vehicles. The NIST
project, scheduled for completion in 1998, will investigate the use of
alternative fire testing methods and computer hazard assessment models
to identify and evaluate approaches to passenger train fire safety. The
evaluation will examine the effects and tradeoffs of passenger car and
system design (including materials), fire detection and suppression
systems, and passenger egress time. A peer review committee has been
established to provide project guidance and review interim results and
reports. The committee includes representatives from FRA, the Volpe
Center, the NFPA, builders of rail passenger vehicles, producers of
materials, Amtrak and commuter railroads, and testing laboratories.
In the first phase of the NIST project, selected materials which
satisfy the testing methods referenced in FRA's fire safety guidelines
will be evaluated using a different testing instrument, the ASTM 1354
Cone Calorimeter. The Cone Calorimeter provides a measurement of heat
release rate (the amount of energy that a material produces while
burning), specimen mass loss, smoke production, and combustion gases.
For a given confined space such as a rail car interior, the air
temperature and risk of harm to passengers are increased as the heat
release rate increases. As a result, even if passengers do not come in
direct contact with a fire, they may likely be injured from the high
temperatures, high heat fluxes, and large amounts of toxic gases
emitted by materials involved in the fire.
The NIST testing will help develop performance criteria for
materials using the Cone Calorimeter in a context similar to that
provided in the FRA fire safety guidelines. In addition, unlike data
derived from the testing methods referenced in the current FRA
guidelines, heat release rate and other measurements obtained from the
Cone Calorimeter can be used in a fire modeling methodology to evaluate
the contribution of materials to the overall fire safety of a passenger
train. Data gathered from the NIST testing will be used in the second
phase of the project to perform a fire hazard analysis of selected
passenger train fire scenarios. The analysis will employ computer
modeling to assess the impact on passenger train fire safety for a
range of construction materials and system design. In the final phase
of the project, selected real-scale proof testing of assemblies
representing rail passenger equipment will be performed to verify the
bench-scale (small-scale) criteria and hazard analysis studies in
actual end use configurations. This research effort thus follows upon
FRA-sponsored studies by the National Bureau of Standards in 1984 and
the NIST in 1993 which noted among their findings that the performance
of individual components of a rail passenger car in a real-world fire
environment may be different from that experienced in bench-scale tests
due to vehicle geometry and materials interaction.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\2\ ``Fire Tests of Amtrak Passenger Rail Vehicle Interiors.''
(NBS Technical Note 1193, May 1984); ``Fire Safety of Passenger
Trains: A Review of U.S. and Foreign Approaches.'' (DOT/FRA/ORD-93/
23-DOT-VNTSC-FRA-93-26, December, 1993). The 1993 report is
available to the public through the National Technical Information
Service, Springfield, VA 22161. A copy of both reports have been
placed in the public docket for this rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The NFPA publishes a standard (NFPA 130) covering fire protection
requirements for fixed guideway transit systems and for life safety
from fire in transit stations, trainways, vehicles, and outdoor
maintenance and storage areas. (A copy of the 1995 edition of this
standard has been placed in the public docket for this rulemaking.)
However, this standard does not apply to passenger railroad systems
including those that provide commuter service (NFPA 130 1-1.2). An APTA
representative on the Working Group who is also an NFPA member has
initiated an NFPA-sponsored task force to revise the scope of NFPA 130
to cover all passenger rail transportation systems, including intercity
and

[[Page 49745]]

commuter rail, and revise other provisions as necessary. (Copies of the
correspondence concerning the establishment of this task force have
also been placed in the public docket.) FRA and the Working Group will
evaluate the results of this effort for application to this rulemaking.

Safety Glazing Standards

Existing regulations found in 49 CFR part 223 provide minimum
requirements for glazing materials in order to protect railroad
passengers and employees from injury as a result of objects striking
the windows of locomotives, cabooses, and passenger cars. Noting some
possible concerns with these requirements, FRA sought comment on
whether these standards should be revised and requested information on
any glazing-related injuries to passenger train occupants (61 FR
30696).
The Sierracin/Sylmar Corporation (Sierracin) commented that rail
glazing meeting much higher impact and ballistic requirements is
currently available, economically viable, and in fact in use by a few
rail agencies (mass transit and commuter rail) here in the United
States. Among its observations in particular, Sierracin noted that the
strength of the glazing frame could quite easily be tested. Further, it
explained that from its experience as a glazing manufacturer it is
aware of very few ballistic attacks on trains, and such attacks have
been limited to the side windows of locomotives or coach cars or both--
not to end-facing windows. In addition, Sierracin pointed out that
since the impact energy of an object is a function of velocity, an
object's destructive capability increases as the speed of the surface
it impacts increases.
FRA believes that existing safety glazing requirements have largely
proven effective in passenger service at speeds up to 125 mph. In fact,
FRA is concerned that less stringent requirements would create
vulnerability to objects thrown at trains as well as the risk of
ejection of passengers during train derailments. Because the safety
glazing standards do not address the performance of the frame which
attaches the glazing to the car body, FRA is proposing frame
performance requirements for all passenger equipment. Moreover, FRA
believes that more stringent glazing requirements are necessary or
passenger equipment operating at speeds greater than 125 mph because of
the increased destructive potential of an object impacting equipment
operating at such speeds. Additionally, improved marking and periodic
inspection of emergency windows are being addressed in FRA's emergency
preparedness rulemaking.

Train Interior Safety Features

A review of the accident/incident data, related to fatalities and
injuries on passenger trains for the period of 1972 to 1973, indicates
that collapse of the equipment structure and the loss of sufficient
space for the passengers to ride out the collision is the principal
cause of fatality in train accidents, resulting in approximately 63
percent of the fatalities and 27 percent of the serious injuries. Fire
and post-collision conditions result in 30 percent of the fatalities
and 16 percent of the serious injuries. Thus, collapse of the equipment
structure, fire, and post-collision conditions account for 93 percent
of the fatalities and 43 percent of the serious injuries. To address
these major causes of fatalities and injuries, FRA is proposing
comprehensive requirements related to structural design, fire
protection, and emergency exits. As discussed above, FRA believes these
proposed requirements will aid in reducing the number of fatalities and
injuries by minimizing the collapse of equipment, reducing the
likelihood of fire, and ensuring accessible and operable emergency
exits.
Prior research also indicates, however, that passengers striking
interior objects in trains, principally during collisions and
derailments, accounts for 57 percent of the serious injuries and 7
percent of the fatalities occurring on passenger trains. \3\ Therefore,
as an initial measure to reduce these numbers, FRA proposals include
requiring that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\3\ Rail Safety/Equipment Crashworthiness,'' M.J. Reiley, R.H.
Jines, & A.E. Tanner. (FRA/ORD-77/73, Vol. I, July 1978).''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Passenger seats and other interior fittings be securely
attached to the car body;
Interior fittings in a passenger car be recessed or flush-
mounted;
Overhead storage racks provide restraint for stowed
articles; and
Sharp edges be padded or otherwise avoided.
Overall, FRA's proposed requirements rely on ``compartmentalization''
or ``passive restraints'' (i.e., requiring no action to be taken on the
part of the occupant) as a passenger protection strategy. The proposed
requirements are based on the current available research, discussed in
detail below, which indicates that during a collision the interior
environment of a passenger coach is substantially less hostile than the
interiors of automobiles and aircraft. In fact, current research
indicates that the interior of a typical intercity passenger coach
without active restraints provides a level of protection to the
occupants that is at least as high as that provided to automobile and
transport aircraft passengers with active restraints.
Some research indicates that there may be a potential for even a
greater level of passenger protection if lap belts and shoulder
harnesses are utilized on passenger trains. In fact, FRA is proposing
that lap belts and shoulder harnesses be required in the cab of a Tier
II train, as recommended by the Tier II Equipment Subgroup. Due to the
high strength of the cab and its forward location near the expected
point of impact in many different collision scenarios, decelerations
experienced by crewmembers in the cab of Tier II trains may be high.
Accordingly, members of the subgroup believed that restraints for the
crewmembers could provide a significant benefit. FRA requests
information and comment from interested parties as to whether there is
any existing research or experience which would justify proposing
active seat restraints in the current stage of this rulemaking.
However, FRA believes more research is necessary in this area in order
to determine the feasibility and effectiveness of such active
restraints as well as the impact on seat design and strength. Although
FRA currently proposes a passenger protection strategy based on
compartmentalization, FRA will be undertaking an aggressive research
and testing program to determine the feasibility and effectiveness of
active restraints such as lap belts and shoulder harnesses. If this
research indicates that these types of active restraints are a viable
and feasible means of providing additional protection to the riding
public, then FRA will propose the use of such restraints in the second
NPRM on passenger equipment scheduled for development in 1998.

Discussion

The principal means of protecting occupants during accidents
include ``friendly'' (``delethalized'') interior arrangements and
occupant restraints, such as lap belts, shoulder harnesses and airbags.
Occupant protection devices which require some action on the part of
the occupant, such as buckling a seatbelt, are termed ``active
devices,'' while protection devices which require no action, such as
automobile door-mounted shoulder harnesses and airbags, are termed
``passive devices.'' Both active and passive occupant protection
strategies

[[Page 49746]]

act to limit the decelerations and to distribute the loads imparted to
occupants during an accident. Typical passenger protection strategies
in automobiles include airbags, lap belts and shoulder harnesses, and
friendly lower dashboard designs which limit thigh loads imparted
during a collision. Typical passenger protection strategies in
transport category aircraft, intended to protect passengers during
accidents occurring during takeoff or landing, include seatbelts and
friendly design of the seatback or bulkhead ahead of the occupant which
limit the decelerations of the occupant's head.
The passenger protection devices incorporated into a vehicle must
allow occupants to survive the deceleration of the volume within which
they are contained. The decelerations of the occupant volume of an
automobile in a collision can reach a peak of approximately 30 g's,
while the decelerations of transport-category aircraft during a landing
accident can reach 18 g's. In order to assure a high likelihood of
survival for such high decelerations, the use of occupant restraints
are required in automobiles and transport aircraft. The peak
deceleration of passenger rail coach equipment is 8 g's for a head on
collision. Figure 1 shows the time histories of the occupant volume
decelerations for a Ford Taurus colliding into a rigid barrier at 35
mph, ⁴ a transport category aircraft during a landing
accident, ⁵ and a rail passenger coach during a train-to-
train collision at 70 mph. ⁶ During a collision, the
interior of a passenger train is inherently a less hostile environment
than those of an automobile or aircraft, owing to the relatively low
deceleration of the occupant volume.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\4\ New Car Assessment Program Test #2312. DOT/NHTSA, 1996. A
copy of this test has been placed in the public docket for this
rulemaking.
\5\ The Effect of Aircraft Size on Cabin Floor Dynamic Pulses.''
G. Wittlin, L. Neri. (DOT/FAA/CT-88/15, March 1990). The report is
available to the public through the National Technical Information
Service, Springfield, VA 22161. A copy of the report has also been
placed in the public docket for this rulemaking.
\6\ ``Crashworthiness of Passenger Trains.'' (DOT-VNTSC-FRA-96-
5, September 1996). The report has not yet been published, but a
copy of the report has been placed in the public docket for this
rulemaking.

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[[Page 49747]]

BILLING CODE 4910-06-C

Simulation studies of occupant impacts with interiors have been
conducted in support of this rulemaking effort, and have been placed in
the public docket for this rulemaking.\7\ Simulation results include
detailed time-histories of occupant motions and the forces imparted to
occupants during a collision. These motions and forces have been
evaluated for the potential for fatality using the criteria employed by
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and the FAA
in their regulatory requirements for passenger protection in
automobiles and transport-category aircraft, respectively. The
principal criteria employed by NHTSA and the FAA are the Head Injury
Criteria (HIC), which relate the deceleration of the occupant's head to
the potential for fatality, and the Chest Deceleration, which relates
the deceleration of the occupant's chest (heart) with the potential for
fatality. The maximum limit prescribed by NHSTA and the FAA for the HIC
is 1000, and 60 g's for Chest Deceleration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\7\ ``Evaluation of Selected Crashwortiness Strategies for
Passenger Trains.'' D. Tyrell, K. Severson-Green, & B. Marquis.
National Academy Press, Transportation Research Record No. 1989,
July 1995; ``Analysis of Occupant Protection Strategies in Train
Collisions.'' D. Tyrell, K. Severson, & B. Marquis. American Society
of Mechanical Engineers, AMD-Vol. 210/BED-Vol. 30, pp. 539-557,
1995; ``Crashworthiness Testing of Amtrak's Traditional Coach
Seat.'' D. Tyrell K. Severson. (DOT/FRA/ORD-96/08--DOT-VNTSC-FRA-96-
11, October 1996); and ``Crashworthiness of Passenger Trains.'' See
note 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Passenger rail equipment interior configurations studied include
rows of forward-facing seats without passenger restraints, with seat
belts, and with seatbelts and shoulder harnesses. The seat design
employed in these studies is a typical intercity passenger coach seat,
for which the floor attachment is sufficient not to fail during the
simulated collision. (The occupant protection strategy in which
occupant motion during the collision is restricted by fixed equipment
such as seats and bulkheads is termed ``compartmentalization.'') Table
1 summarizes the results for passengers seated in the first coach of a
locomotive-led consist, initially traveling at 70 mph, which collides
head-on with a stationary locomotive-led consist. These data indicate
that without restraints, the interior of a typical intercity passenger
coach provides a level of protection to the occupants at least as high
as that provided to automobile and transport aircraft passengers with
restraints, while lap and shoulder belts provide the highest level of
protection.

Table 1.--Selected Results, Interior Simulation Studies
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No restraint Lap belt Lap and shoulder NHTSA and FAA Max.
(compartmenta- ----------------------- belts permitted values
lization) -------------------------------------------
---------------------- HIC Chest g's
HIC Chest g's HIC Chest g's HIC Chest g's
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
50th percentile male, Seat ahead Upright....................... 241 20 141 23 21 9 1000 60
50th percentile male, Seat ahead Reclined...................... 401 36 1428-2089 26 21 9 1000 60
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The data in Table 1 indicate that lap belts alone result in a
greater likelihood of fatal head injury for certain occupants if the
seat ahead of the occupant is reclined. This is owing to the lap-belted
occupant striking the top of the seatback ahead. Struck in this manner,
the seat is stiff and the head deceleration is large, resulting in a
high likelihood of head injury. The head of an unrestrained occupant
will strike the rear of the seatback ahead of the occupant, along with
the knees of the occupant. Struck in this manner, the seat is
relatively soft, the impact forces are distributed over the occupant's
body, and the decelerations experienced by the occupant are within
survivable levels. The head on an occupant restrained by a lap belt and
a shoulder harness will not strike an interior surface, and the
deceleration of an occupant so restrained is relatively low. The
motions of an unrestrained occupant, an occupant restrained by a lap
belt, and an occupant restrained by a lap belt and a shoulder harness
are sketched in Figure 2.

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[[Page 49748]]

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BILLING CODE 4910-06-C

The potential effectiveness of occupant restraints in protecting
passengers has been inferred from available information on what types
of injury occur during passenger train accidents and the equipment
involved in causing these injuries. Available criteria which relate
these forces and motions to the range of injuries resulting from rail
passenger accidents are limited in number and reliability. For example,
there is only one accepted criterion for evaluating back injury (an
axial load criterion employed by the FAA) while there are many
potential modes of back injury, including twisting and excessive
flexion. The two principal considerations in inferring the potential
effectiveness are the likelihood that the occupant is in a seat and is
able to use the restraint, and the potential that the type of injury is
prone to prevention or reduction in severity with an occupant
restraint.
Table 2 lists the types of injuries, their frequency of occurrence
from 1972 to 1973 (see note 3), and the potential effectiveness of
occupant restraints. The likely causes of back injury are the seats
becoming unlocked and swiveling during an accident and standing
passengers subject to falling. Leg, knee, and thigh injuries are
potentially caused by leg entrapment beneath the seat ahead of the
occupant. Neck injuries are likely the result of ``whiplash'' effects
of low seat backs during accidents. The potential effectiveness of
occupant restraints can be inferred from the type of injury. For
example, seat belts may reduce the occurrence and severity of back
injury owing to the longitudinal decelerations from collisions, but may
not reduce the occurrence and severity of back injury owing to the
lateral accelerations associated with derailment or for a standing
passenger falling.

Table 2.--Injury Types, Number of Occurrences, and Potential Effectiveness of Occupant Restraint
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Potential/effectiveness
Number of -----------------------------------------------------------------
Injury type Occurrences, No Restraints
1972-73 (Compartment- Lap Belts Lap belts and
alization) shoulder harnesses
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Back............................ 195 Medium.............. Medium.............. High
Leg/Knee/Thigh.................. 140 Low................. Medium.............. Medium
Neck............................ 126 Medium.............. Low................. Medium
Head............................ 94 Medium.............. Low................. High
Arm/Hand........................ 89 Low................. Low................. Low
Chest........................... 64 Medium.............. Medium.............. Medium
Shoulder........................ 61 Medium.............. Medium.............. Medium
Hip/Pelvis...................... 40 Medium.............. High................ High
Face/Nose....................... 38 Medium.............. Low................. High
Foot/Ankle...................... 27 Low................. Medium.............. Medium
Abdomen......................... 19 Medium.............. Medium.............. Medium
Side............................ 15 Medium.............. Medium.............. High
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Table 3 lists the equipment involved in injury over this same
period (see note 3). The likelihood that an occupant was in a seat
immediately prior to the injury can be inferred from the type of
equipment. For example, the potential effectiveness of occupant
restraints protecting occupants from injury with food service and
lavatory equipment-- the most likely equipment to be involved with
injury--is low because such equipment is not located near passenger
coach seats. Appropriate measures to assure that such equipment is
``friendly'' during a collision may potentially reduce the severity of
injuries associated with food service and lavatory equipment. In fact,
since the time of the study, Amtrak has taken significant steps to
secure food service equipment and provides for better retention of
luggage in overhead storage racks. Further, lavatory design has also
been improved in the newer generations of Amtrak equipment.

[[Page 49749]]

Table 3.--Equipment Involved in Injury, Frequency of Occurrence, and Potential Effectiveness of Occupant
Restraint
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Frequency Potential effectiveness
of --------------------------------------------------------------------
Equipment involved in injury occurrence No restraints Lap belts and
(percent) (compartmentalization) Lap belts shoulder harnesses
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Food Service and Lavatory 27.5 Medium................... Low................ Low
Equipment.
Bulkheads, Doors, Window Frames 20 Medium................... Low................ Low
Seats.......................... 16 High..................... High............... High
Floor.......................... 10.2 Medium................... Medium............. Medium
Window Glass................... 10.2 Medium................... Medium............. Medium
Tables Counters................ 7.2 Low...................... Low................ Low
Hand Rail...................... 2.9 Low...................... Low................ Low
Entrance Platform.............. 2.9 Low...................... Low................ Low
Luggage........................ 1.5 Low...................... Low................ Low
Cabinets....................... 1.5 Low...................... Low................ Low
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Conclusions from the research conducted to date on passenger
protection in train collisions are that lap belts alone may potentially
increase fatalities in train collisions; compartmentalization can
provide a level of protection for rail passengers at least as effective
as that provided by current regulations for automobile and transport-
category aircraft passengers; and that lap belts and shoulder
restraints provide the highest level of occupant protection of those
protection strategies studied.
Current FRA research plans include efforts for developing the means
of implementing seat belts and shoulder restraints in intercity and
commuter passenger rail equipment and efforts for optimizing
compartmentalization for a wide range of occupant sizes, from infants
to large adults, and a wide range of interior configurations, including
those of food service cars and lavatories in addition to coach car
seating configurations. Issues to be addressed in research on
implementing seat belts and shoulder restraints include:
The development of a seat structure design with sufficient
integrity to sustain the loads imparted by the restraints during
collisions;
The potential for increased injury of unrestrained
occupants striking such strengthened seatbacks and the hard points
necessary for lap and shoulder belt securement;
The potential for increased injury to occupants who misuse
the seat and shoulder belts (e.g., placement of the shoulder belt
behind the occupant), The development of mechanisms for adjusting the
height location of the shoulder restraint to prevent strangulation of
occupants of small stature, including children;
The overall effectiveness in reducing injury owing to
occupant impacts with the interior; and
The manufacturing costs for a seat which can support the
loads imparted by the restraints during collisions.
Although FRA's research and development budget is somewhat limited,
FRA is committed to completing the following items within approximately
the next 12 months:
Preliminary cost/benefit analysis on lap belts and
shoulder harnesses;
Preliminary hazard analysis; and
Preliminary qualitative engineering feasibility work on
new seat and belt designs, including cost estimates.
The results of this research will be followed by a final cost/
benefit review and will be available when FRA begins the development of
the second NPRM on passenger equipment standards.
Based on current research results, the proposed interior passenger
protection requirements for Tier I and II passenger equipment rely on
compartmentalization as a passenger protection strategy. Research
results indicate that during a collision the interior environment of a
passenger coach is substantially less hostile than the interiors of
automobiles and aircraft. Owing to this lower hostility of the
passenger collision environment, the interior of a typical intercity
passenger coach can provide a level of protection to passengers without
restraints at least as effective in preventing fatality as the
protection provided to automobile and transport aircraft passengers
with restraints. Such a strategy has the benefits of being passive,
requiring no action to be taken on the part of the occupants, of being
effective for a range of occupant sizes, and potentially being
effective in a wide range of interior configurations. If the results of
ongoing research indicate that lap belts and shoulder restraints can
provide a greater level of protection for passengers than
compartmentalization, while being cost-effective, then FRA will
consider requiring passenger restraints in the second NPRM.

Crash Energy Management

FRA is proposing that Tier II equipment be designed with a crash
energy management system. Crash energy management is an equipment
design technique to provide a controlled deformation and collapse of
designated sections of the unoccupied volumes of a passenger train to
absorb the energy from a collision. This allows collision energy to
dissipate before any structural damage occurs to the occupied volumes
of a passenger train and reduces the decelerations experienced by
passengers and crewmembers in a collision, thereby mitigating the force
of any collisions with objects in a train's interior, such as seats.
In a report prepared by the Volpe Center, the crash energy
management approach was found to offer significant safety
benefits.⁸ For example, the Volpe Center report found the
crash energy management approach significantly more effective in
preserving occupant volume in a head-on collision at a relative speed
above 70 mph between two trains propelled by power cars (locomotives)
than when the trains did not employ such an approach. Moreover, for the
full range of collision speeds, the crash energy management design
provided a significantly gentler initial deceleration of the passenger
train occupants than when the trains did not employ such an approach.
Further, the crash energy management designed power car train is more
compatible with existing equipment. It serves as a softer collision
surface to a conventionally designed train owing to the collision
energy absorbed as the

[[Page 49750]]

unoccupied volumes of the power car train intentionally crush.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\8\ Crashworthiness of Passenger Trains.'' (DOT-VNTSC-FRA-96-5,
September 1996). See Note 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Emergency Systems

In addition to the proposed requirements concerning emergency
egress and access discussed above, FRA is considering and proposing
other requirements to mitigate harm to passenger train occupants in
emergency situations.

Emergency Lighting

In a passenger train emergency, inadequate lighting may make it
difficult or impossible to read emergency information, to locate doors
and emergency exits, and to move about within the train's interior.
Rapid egress from the passenger train may be inhibited, and rescue
efforts hampered. Further, a private citizen commented in response to
the ANPRM that passengers can be very frightened when a train's head-
end power shuts down at night or in a darkened station, and there is no
onboard emergency lighting for the passengers' security. Accordingly,
the proposed rule requires in Sec. 238.123 that all new or rebuilt
passenger equipment be equipped with an emergency lighting system. FRA
is also considering requiring that auxiliary portable lighting be
available for assistance in a passenger train emergency. FRA may
prescribe requirements for such lighting in either the final rule of
this rulemaking or in the final rule of FRA's complementary rulemaking
on passenger train emergency preparedness.

Emergency Communication: To the Train Control Center

FRA is considering requirements for emergency communication
equipment on passenger trains. In Working Group discussions, the UTU
emphasized that passenger trains should be equipped with both a primary
and a redundant means to communicate with a railroad control center.
The UTU and BRC also stressed that both means of communication should
be required to operate properly before a passenger train is dispatched.
The ability to communicate in an emergency is important for all
trains--freight and passenger. For example, because passenger trains
operate commingled with freight trains, the ability of a freight train
crew to notify a railroad control center of an emergency involving its
train may prevent a collision with an oncoming passenger train. As
noted above, FRA is currently engaged in revising the Radio Standards
and Procedures in 49 CFR part 220 through the Railroad Communications
Working Group established under the RSAC. Although FRA anticipates that
this separate effort will establish minimum safety requirements with
respect to communications equipment for all train service, it should be
noted that intercity passenger and commuter railroads already make
extensive provision for ensuring communication capabilities during
emergencies.

Emergency Communication: Within the Train

FRA is proposing in Sec. 238.437 that Tier II passenger trains be
equipped with a means of emergency communication throughout the train.
This will enable crewmembers to provide passengers with information and
instructions in an emergency.
FRA has decided to limit this proposal to Tier II passenger trains,
however, because such trains are intended to operate as a fixed unit,
unlike Tier I passenger trains. Whereas an emergency system to
communicate throughout the train may be more easily provided for a
train which remains as a fixed unit, the interchangeability of
passenger cars and locomotives raises practical considerations about
the compatibility of communications equipment in a Tier I passenger
train. FRA will seek to address these considerations and further
examine requirements concerning emergency communication within a Tier I
train in the second phase of the development of passenger equipment
safety standards.

Emergency Window Exits

As noted, under 49 CFR part 223 equipment designed to carry
passengers must be equipped with a minimum of four emergency window
exits which permit rapid and easy removal during a crisis. FRA is
proposing in Secs. 238.235 and 238.439 to strengthen this requirement
by making certain, for example, that passenger cars be equipped with
four window exits on each main level of each car. FRA is also proposing
that each compartment in a sleeping car be equipped with at least one
emergency window exit. Above all, the proposed rule requires that each
emergency window exit be easily operable without requiring the use of
any tool or other implement to facilitate passenger egress in an
emergency.
FRA notes that Canadian passenger equipment typically contain more
than four emergency window exits, and that MARC is requiring that at
least half of all windows in each passenger car be available for use
during an emergency. Commenters are requested to address the issue of
whether the final rule should require additional emergency window exits
in a passenger car.
Commenters are also requested to address what size requirements for
emergency window exits FRA should impose in the final rule. FRA is
currently proposing that Tier I equipment have a minimum, unobstructed
emergency window exit opening of 24 inches horizontally by 18 inches
vertically, and that Tier II equipment have a minimum, unobstructed
emergency window exit opening of 30 inches horizontally by 30 inches
vertically. The Tier II Equipment Subgroup, including Amtrak,
recommended the latter requirement for application to Tier II
equipment. However, the full Working Group advised against imposing
such a requirement on Tier I equipment. Although FRA would prefer that
all emergency window exits afford the larger opening, the Tier I
equipment proposal provides the minimum opening needed for a fully-
equipped emergency response worker to gain access to the interior of a
train, according to the NFPA.

Roof Hatches or Clearly Marked Structural Weak Points

In an emergency, roof hatch exits on railroad passenger equipment
may facilitate the rapid egress of passengers. However, APTA and Amtrak
have raised concerns about requiring such exits on passenger equipment.
Allowing access to the roof of a passenger train can be particularly
dangerous, especially when the train operates in electrified territory.
As an alternative, passenger equipment could be designed with a clearly
marked structural weak point in the roof to provide quick access for
emergency personnel. Access to and egress from passenger equipment
would be facilitated, without the risk of allowing passengers immediate
access to the roof when no emergency is present.
As recommended by the Tier II Equipment Subgroup, the proposed rule
requires in Sec. 238.439 that Tier II equipment either be equipped with
roof hatches or be designed with clearly marked structural weak points
in the roof to permit quick access for properly equipped emergency
personnel. The proposed rule does not contain such requirements for
Tier I equipment, however. There was no consensus within the full
Working Group to recommend that such requirements be included. FRA will
consider such requirements for Tier I equipment in the second phase of
the rulemaking, and the Working Group agreed to do so as well. FRA does
believe that the safety of Tier

[[Page 49751]]

I passenger trains will still be significantly advanced by the other
requirements for emergency egress and access contained in this proposed
rule.

Additional Passenger Train Safety Issues

As detailed below in the section-by-section analysis, the proposed
rule will also address additional passenger train safety issues
including:
Equipment (non-brake) inspection, testing, and
maintenance;
Suspension system safety;
Operating cab controls;
Safety appliances;
Electrical system safety;
Software and hardware safety, and
Introduction of new technology.
Further, in consultation with the Working Group, FRA has identified
issues to address in the second phase of this rulemaking which may lead
FRA to propose additional standards for Tier I equipment in a future
NPRM. Although certain issues have already been noted above, such as
improvements in cab car end structure design, other issues include
crash energy management requirements and increased side impact strength
requirements for car bodies. FRA intends that the Working Group advise
FRA as to which requirements make sense for application to Tier I
equipment and which requirements already proposed in this NPRM should
be strengthened. It is anticipated that any operational experience
gained from the use of Tier II equipment will assist the Working Group
in this effort.

June 1997 NTSB Safety Recommendations

On June 17, 1997, the NTSB announced a series of safety
recommendations as a result of its investigation of the collision
between MARC train 286 and Amtrak train 29 in Silver Spring, Maryland,
on February 16, 1996. While its investigation was still ongoing, the
NTSB issued an urgent safety recommendation (R-96-7) to FRA on March
12, 1996. As explained earlier in the preamble, FRA convened a joint
meeting of the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards Working Group and
the Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness Working Group on March 26,
1996, to discuss this recommendation and incorporate the Safety Board's
initial findings into each working group's rulemaking, as appropriate.
This urgent recommendation has been fully considered and is reflected
in this NPRM as well as the NPRM on Passenger Train Emergency
Preparedness that was published on February 24, 1997 (see 62 FR 8330).
Though the Safety Board has reiterated portions of its earlier,
urgent recommendation, FRA has not yet had the opportunity to discuss
with the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards Working Group the full
array of June 1997 recommendations pertaining to passenger equipment
safety. However, for the consideration of interested parties, FRA has
set forth below for public comment the recent NTSB recommendations
relevant to this rulemaking. In particular, the NTSB has recommended
that FRA:
Require all passenger cars to have easily accessible
interior emergency quick-release mechanisms adjacent to exterior
passageway doors and take appropriate emergency action to ensure
corrective action until these measures are incorporated into minimum
passenger car safety standards.
Require all passenger cars to have either removable
windows, kick panels, or other suitable means for emergency exiting
through the interior and exterior passageway doors where the door could
impede passengers exiting in an emergency and take appropriate
emergency measures to ensure corrective action until these measures are
incorporated into minimum passenger car safety standards.
Issue interim standards for the use of luminescent or
retro-reflective material or both to mark all interior and exterior
emergency exits in all passenger cars as soon as possible and
incorporate the interim standards into minimum passenger car safety
standards.
Require all passenger cars to contain reliable emergency
lighting fixtures that are each fitted with a self-contained
independent power source and incorporate the requirements into minimum
passenger car safety standards.
Provide promptly a prescribed inspection and test cycle to
ensure the proper operation of all emergency exit windows as well as
provide that the 180-day inspection and maintenance test cycle is
prescribed in the final rule.
Require that all exterior emergency door release
mechanisms on passenger cars be functional before a passenger car is
placed in revenue service, that the emergency door release mechanism be
placed in a readily accessible position and marked for easy
identification in emergencies and derailments, and that these
requirements be incorporated into minimum passenger car safety
standards.
Require that a comprehensive inspection of all commuter
passenger cars be performed to independently verify that the interior
materials of these cars meet the expected performance requirements for
flammability and smoke emissions characteristics.

FRA has specifically responded in Sec. 238.105 (Fire protection
program) of this NPRM to the Board's recent recommendation concerning
the flammability and smoke emission characteristics of interior
materials in existing passenger cars.

APTA Comments

As explained earlier in the preamble, under the authority of 49
U.S.C. 20133(d) FRA developed the proposed rule in consultation with a
Working Group that included Amtrak, individual commuter railroads, and
APTA, which represents the interests of commuter railroads in
regulatory matters. On March 19, 1997, following the last full meeting
of the Working Group, FRA sent a draft of the NPRM to Working Group
members and advisors for their review and comment as to whether the
rule inaccurately reflected the Working Group's recommendations in a
significant way. By letter dated April 28, 1997, APTA requested a
meeting with FRA to address its significant concerns about a number of
substantive items in the NPRM, as well as the process used to develop
the NPRM. A meeting took place on May 23, 1997, at which time APTA
provided FRA with extensive written comments on the draft NPRM. These
comments have been placed in the public docket for this rulemaking,
along with a summary of the meeting. FRA has also included a number of
APTA's comments in this NPRM for the consideration of interested
parties, and FRA invites all interested parties to address APTA's
comments while commenting on the proposed rule.

Section-by-Section Analysis

Amendments to 49 CFR Part 216

Part 216 currently authorizes certain FRA and participating State
inspectors to issue Special Notices for Repair, under specified
conditions, for freight cars with defects under the part 215,
locomotives with defects under parts 229 or 230 or 49 U.S.C. chapter
207, and track with defects under part 213. The proposed revisions to
part 216 would create a fourth category of Special Notices for Repair:
for passenger equipment with defects under part 238. In summary, if the
inspector determines that the noncomplying passenger equipment is
``unsafe for further service'' and issues the proposed Special Notice,
it would require the railroad to take the passenger equipment out of
service, to make repairs to bring the equipment into compliance with
part 238, and to report the repairs to

[[Page 49752]]

FRA. The revisions would also make conforming changes to part 216
reflecting this new enforcement tool.
Finally, these proposed revisions include various technical
amendments to update part 216 to reflect the following: (1) internal
organizational changes within FRA; (2) the division of former part 230,
Locomotive Inspection Regulations, into parts 229 and 230 and the
redesignation of those portions of former part 230 related to non-steam
locomotives as part 229, Railroad Locomotive Safety Standards; and (3)
the repeal, reenactment without substantive change, and recodification
of the Federal railroad safety laws in 1994. See 45 FR 21092, Mar. 31,
1980; Pub. L. 103-272, July 5, 1994.

Amendments to 49 CFR Parts 223, 229, 231, and 232

FRA proposes conforming changes to the applicability sections of
FRA's Safety Glazing Standards, Railroad Locomotive Safety Standards,
Railroad Safety Appliance Standards, and railroad power brakes and
drawbars regulations that were necessitated by proposed provisions of
new part 238. In the final rule, FRA may adjust the application of
provisions in parts 215, 223, 229, 231, or 232, or possibly delete
provisions in those parts, to avoid duplication of provisions in part
238. FRA has not proposed deletion of passenger train brake test and
maintenance requirements from part 232 because proposed part 238 would
not cover certain operations subject to part 232, e.g., tourist,
historic, scenic, and excursion railroad operations on the general
system. If any provision in parts 215, 223, 229, 231, or 232 is deleted
in the final rule, FRA will revise the schedule of civil penalties for
the affected part by removing the entry for the provision deleted.
Because such penalty schedules are statements of policy, notice and
comment are not required prior to their issuance. See 5 U.S.C.
553(b)(3)(A).

49 CFR Part 238

(APTA is concerned that the proposed record keeping and reporting
requirements in subparts A-D are extensive and significantly exceed
current railroad practice, without any corresponding safety benefit.
Commenters are requested to address APTA's concern.)
Subpart A--General
Sec. 238.1 Purpose and scope. Paragraph (a) states the purpose of
the rule to be the prevention of accidents involving railroad passenger
equipment and the mitigation of the consequences of accidents involving
railroad passenger equipment, to the extent such accidents cannot be
prevented. Paragraph (b) states that these regulations provide minimum
standards for the subjects addressed. Railroads and other persons
subject to this part may adopt more stringent requirements, so long as
they are not inconsistent with this part.
Sec. 238.3 Application. As a general matter, in paragraphs (a)(1)
and (a)(2), FRA proposes that this rule apply to all railroads that
operate intercity passenger train service on the general railroad
system of transportation or provide commuter or other short-haul
passenger train service in a metropolitan or suburban area; that is,
the rule will apply to commuter or other short-haul service described
in paragraph (a)(2) regardless of whether that service is connected to
the general railroad system. A public authority that indirectly
provides passenger train service by contracting out the actual
operation to another railroad or independent contractor would be
regulated by FRA as a railroad under the provisions of the proposed
rule. Paragraph (a)(3), read in conjunction with paragraph (c)(1),
means that rapid transit operations in an urban area that are connected
to the general railroad system of transportation would also be covered
by this part. Paragraph (b) makes explicit the liability imposed by
statute, 49 U.S.C. 20303, on a railroad that owns track over which
another railroad hauls or uses equipment with a power brake or safety
appliance defect. Under paragraph (b), a railroad that permits
operations over its trackage by passenger equipment subject to this
part that does not comply with a power brake provision of this part or
a safety appliance provision of this part is subject to the power brake
and safety appliance provisions of this part with respect to such
operations that it permits.
This section contains no explicit reference to private cars. Rather
than addressing the scope of applicability of part 238 to private cars
in this section, FRA has indicated in the particular substantive
sections of the rule whether private cars are covered, according to the
terms of those sections. FRA proposes to apply certain requirements of
the rule to private cars that operate on railroads subject to this
part. FRA has taken into account the burden imposed by requiring
private car owners and operators to conform to the requirements of this
part. Further, FRA recognizes that private cars are often hauled by
railroads such as Amtrak and commuter railroads which often impose
their own safety requirements on the operation of the private cars.
Accordingly, FRA intends to limit the application of the proposed rule
only to those requirements necessary to ensure the safe operation of
the passenger train that is hauling the private car. For instance,
private cars will be subject to brake inspection, testing, and
maintenance requirements.
The proposed rule is structured to apply to intercity and commuter
service, but not to tourist, scenic, historic, and excursion
operations. The term ``tourist, scenic, historic, or excursion
operations'' is defined in Sec. 238.5 to mean ``railroad operations
that carry passengers, often using antiquated equipment, with the
conveyance of the passengers to a particular destination not being the
principal purpose.'' The term refers to the particular physical
operation, not to the nature of the railroad company as a whole that
conducts the operation. As a result, part 238 would exempt not only a
recreational train ride by a tourist railroad company that employed
five people but also a recreational train ride by the Union Pacific
Railroad Company, a Class I freight railroad. FRA has not yet had the
opportunity to fully consult with tourist and historic railroad
operators and their associations to determine the appropriate
applicability of the provisions contained in the proposed rule to such
railroad operations. The Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of
1994 directs FRA to examine the unique circumstances of tourist
railroads when establishing safety regulations. The Act, which amended
49 U.S.C. 20103, states that:

In prescribing regulations that pertain to railroad safety that
affect tourist, historic, scenic, or excursion railroad carriers,
the Secretary of Transportation shall take into consideration any
financial, operational, or other factors that may be unique to such
railroad carriers. The Secretary shall submit a report to Congress
not later than September 30, 1995, on actions taken under this
subsection.

Pub. L. No. 103-440, Sec. 217, 108 Stat. 4619, 4624, November 2, 1994.
In its 1996 report to Congress entitled ``Regulatory Actions Affecting
Tourist Railroads,'' FRA responded to the direction in the statutory
provision and also provided additional information related to tourist
railroad safety for consideration of the Congress.
Section 215 of the 1994 Act specifically permits FRA to exempt
equipment used by tourist, historic, scenic, and excursion railroads to
transport passengers from the initial regulations that must be
prescribed by November 2, 1997. 49 U.S.C.

[[Page 49753]]

20133(b)(1). FRA is addressing the passenger equipment safety concerns
for these unique types of operations through the Tourist and Historic
Railroads Working Group formed under RSAC. Any requirements proposed by
FRA for these operations will be part of a separate rulemaking
proceeding.
Sec. 238.5 Definitions. This section contains a set of definitions
to introduce the regulations. FRA intends these definitions to clarify
the meaning of important terms as they are used in the text of the
proposed rule. Several of the definitions involve new or fundamental
concepts which require further discussion.
``Brake indicator'' means a device, actuated by brake cylinder
pressure, which indicates whether brakes are applied or released on a
car. The use of brake indicators in the performance of brake tests is a
controversial subject. Rail labor organizations correctly maintain that
brake indicators are not fully reliable indicators of brake application
and release on each car in the train. Further, railroads correctly
maintain that reliance on brake indicators is necessary because
inspectors cannot always safely observe brake application and release.
FRA believes that brake indicators serve an important role in the
performance of brake tests. FRA has specified three different types of
brake tests--Class I, Class IA, and Class II (described below)--that
must be performed on passenger equipment. Railroads should perform
Class I brake tests so that the inspector is able to actually observe
brake application and release. However, FRA believes that during the
performance of a Class IA brake test, railroads may rely on brake
indicators if they determine that the inspector cannot safely make a
direct observation of the brake application or release.
``Primary brake'' and ``secondary brake'' are complementary
definitions. ``Primary brake'' refers to ``those components of the
train brake system necessary to stop the train within the signal
spacing distance without thermal damage to friction braking surfaces,''
while ``secondary brake'' refers to ``those components of the train
brake system which develop supplemental brake retarding force that is
not needed to stop the train within signal spacing distances or to
prevent thermal damage to wheels.'' FRA provides these definitions to
help draw the line between safety and economics of brake systems.
Railroads have long held that the dynamic portion of a blended brake is
not a safety system. Under the provisions proposed in this rule,
railroads must demonstrate through testing and analysis that the
dynamic brake fits the definition of a secondary brake. Defective
primary braking systems are a serious safety problem that railroads
must address immediately. Defective secondary braking systems, as
defined in Sec. 238.5, are not a serious safety concern, because, by
definition, their failure does not result in unacceptable thermal
inputs into friction brake components. Accordingly, FRA proposes to
allow railroads more flexibility in dealing with defective secondary
braking systems.
Three brake tests are fundamental to this proposed rule. A ``Class
I brake test'' means a complete passenger train brake system test as
further specified in Sec. 238.313. The Class I test is the most
complete test. It must be done once a day by qualified mechanical
inspectors as opposed to train crews. The Class I test is intended to
replace the current initial terminal brake test. See 49 CFR 232.12 (c)-
(j). The proposed Class I test is much more tailored to the specific
designs of passenger equipment than the initial terminal brake test
that is required now.
A ``Class IA brake test'' means a test and inspection (as further
specified in Sec. 238.315) of the air brake system on each car in a
passenger train to ensure the air brake system is 100 percent
effective. The Class IA test is a somewhat less complete test than the
Class I test. However, the Class IA test is equivalent to the current
initial terminal brake test. An important difference between the Class
I and Class IA tests is that the Class IA test may be performed by
train crews as long as they have been qualified by the railroad to do
so. The Class IA test allows commuter railroads the flexibility to have
trains depart their first run of the day from an outlying point without
having to station qualified mechanical inspectors at all outlying
points. If railroads take advantage of the flexibility offered by the
Class IA test, they must follow up with a Class I test sometime during
the day.
A ``Class II train brake test'' means a test (as further specified
in Sec. 238.317) of brake pipe integrity and continuity from
controlling locomotive to rear car. The proposed Class II brake test is
a simple set-and-release test intended to replace the passenger train
intermediate terminal air brake test. See 49 CFR 232.13(b). The Class
II test is also tailored to the special design of the passenger
equipment.
The concept of ``ordered'' or ``date ordered'' is vital to the
correct application of this proposed rule. The terms mean the date on
which notice to proceed is given by a procuring railroad to a
contractor or supplier for new equipment. Many of the provisions of the
proposed rule, particularly structural requirements, will apply only to
newly constructed equipment. When FRA proposes to apply requirements
only to passenger equipment ordered on or after January 1, 1999, or
placed in service for the first time on or after January 1, 2001, FRA
intends to grandfather any piece of equipment that is both ordered
before January 1, 1999, and placed in service for the first time before
January 1, 2001. FRA believes this approach will allow railroads to
avoid any costs associated with changes to existing orders and yet
limit the delay in realizing the safety benefits of the requirements
proposed in this rule.
FRA's proposed definition of ``passenger car'' goes beyond its
traditional meaning. ``Passenger car'' means a unit of rolling
equipment to provide transportation for members of the general public
and includes a self-propelled car designed to carry passengers,
baggage, mail, or express. This term includes a cab car, an MU
locomotive, and a passenger coach. A cab car and an MU locomotive are
also a ``locomotive'' under this rule. ``Passenger coach'' means a unit
of rolling equipment intended to provide transportation for members of
the general public that is without propelling motors and without a
control stand; therefore, passenger coaches are a subset of passenger
cars.
``Control stand'' is defined in The Railroad Dictionary of Car and
Locomotive Terms (Simmons-Boardman Publishing Corp. 1980), as ``[t]he
upright column upon which the throttle control, reverser handle,
transition lever, and dynamic braking control are mounted within
convenient reach of the engineer on a locomotive. The air gauges and
some switches are also included on the control stand.''
``Passenger equipment'' is the most inclusive definition. It means
all powered and unpowered passenger cars, locomotives used to haul a
passenger car, and any other unit of rail rolling equipment hauled in a
train with one or more passenger cars and includes a (1) Passenger
coach, (2) cab car, (3) MU locomotive, (4) private car, (5) locomotive
not intended to provide transportation for members of the general
public that is used to power a passenger train, and (6) any non-self-
propelled vehicle hauled in a train with one or more passenger cars,
including a freight car hauled in a train with one or more passenger
cars. The term therefore covers a baggage car, mail car, or express
car.

[[Page 49754]]

The terms ``passenger station'' and ``terminal'' are crucial to the
interpretation of the proposed rule for movement of defective
equipment. ``Passenger station'' means a location designated in the
railroad's timetable where passengers are regularly scheduled to get on
or off any train. By contrast, ``terminal'' means a train's starting
point or ending point of a single scheduled trip, where passengers may
embark or disembark a train; normally, a ``terminal'' is a point where
the train would reverse direction or change destinations.
Under certain carefully controlled conditions, FRA proposes to
permit a passenger train with defective equipment to move to the next
forward passenger station or terminal. This flexibility is allowed to
prevent railroads from discharging passengers in potentially unsafe
locations and to minimize schedule impacts where this can safely be
done.
The concepts of ``qualified person'' and ``qualified mechanical
inspector'' are vital to interpreting the proposed inspection, testing,
and maintenance provisions of the rule. A ``qualified person'' is a
person determined by the railroad to have the knowledge and skills
necessary to perform one or more functions required under this part.
With the proper training, a train crewmember could be a qualified
person.
A ``qualified mechanical inspector'' is a ``qualified person'' who
as a part of the training, qualification, and designation program
required under Sec. 238.111 has received instruction and training that
includes ``hands-on'' experience (under appropriate supervision or
apprenticeship) in one or more of the following functions: trouble-
shooting, inspection, testing, and maintenance or repair of the
specific train brake and other components and systems for which the
inspector is assigned responsibility. Further, the mechanical inspector
must be a person whose primary responsibility includes work generally
consistent with those functions and is designated to (1) Conduct Class
I brake tests under this part; (2) inspect MU locomotives or other
passenger cars for compliance with this part; or (3) determine whether
equipment not in compliance with this part may be moved safely and, if
so, under what conditions. A train crewmember would not be a qualified
mechanical inspector. (APTA believes that the proposed definition of
``qualified mechanical inspector'' adds nothing to safety, dictates
work rules, and creates unnecessary restricted jobs with limited
duties.)
FRA includes a clear definition of ``qualified person'' to allow
railroads the flexibility of having train crews perform Class IA and
Class II brake tests. A qualified person must be trained and designated
as able to perform the types of brake inspections and tests that the
railroad assigns to him or her. However, a qualified person need not
have the extensive knowledge of brake systems or components or be able
to trouble-shoot and repair them. The qualified person is the
``checker.'' He or she must have the knowledge and experience necessary
to be able to identify brake system problems.
FRA provides a clear definition of qualified mechanical inspector
so that a differentiation can be made between the thorough brake test
and inspection performed by a professional mechanical employee, and the
less comprehensive brake checks performed by train crews. Under FRA's
proposal, only qualified mechanical inspectors are permitted to perform
the required calendar day inspections and Class I brake tests under
this part. This definition largely rules out the possibility of train
crewmembers becoming a qualified mechanical inspector. Part of the
definition requires the primary job of a qualified mechanical inspector
to be inspection, testing, or maintenance of passenger equipment. FRA
intends the definition to allow the members of the trades associated
with testing and maintenance of equipment such as carmen, machinists,
and electricians to become qualified mechanical inspectors. However,
membership in labor organizations or completion of apprenticeship
programs associated with these crafts is not required to be a qualified
mechanical inspector. The two primary qualifications are possession of
the knowledge required to do the job and a primary work assignment
inspecting, testing, or maintaining the equipment.
Discussions conducted in the Working Group meetings revealed that
railroad operators believe these definitions are too restrictive and
will require training beyond the minimum needed for many employees to
do their jobs. On the other hand, the representatives of labor
organizations maintain that this approach will allow unqualified train
crewmembers to conduct tests and inspections that should be performed
only by mechanical employees.
FRA believes the proposed rule strikes the correct balance between
these conflicting points of view. FRA agrees with labor representatives
that mechanical employees generally conduct a more thorough inspection
than train crewmembers. As a result, the rule calls for a daily Class I
brake test and mechanical inspection performed by qualified mechanical
inspectors. At the same time, FRA agrees with railroad operators that
properly trained train crews are capable of performing brake tests and
have been doing so effectively for years. As a result, the proposed
rule grants flexibility to railroads to use properly trained train
crewmembers to perform certain brake tests.
``System safety'' is another concept that forms a foundation for
the proposed rule. System safety means the application of design,
operating, technical, and management techniques and principles
throughout the life cycle of a system to reduce hazards and unsafe
conditions to the lowest level possible through the most effective use
of the available resources. FRA proposes that each railroad implement a
system safety program to identify and manage safety risks. The system
safety program would generate data to be used to make safety decisions.
The risk identification and analysis portion of the system safety
program would help demonstrate an alternate means of achieving
equivalent safety when a proposed operation does not fully comply with
the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards.
Definitions of the various types of trains covered by the proposed
standards are extremely important to understand how FRA proposes that
the rule be applied. The most general definition is that of a
``passenger train.'' The proposed definition makes two points very
clear. First, the proposed rule does not apply to tourist and excursion
railroads; and, second, the provisions of the rule do apply to non-
passenger carrying units included in a passenger train.
An important distinction highlighted in these definitions is the
difference between a ``long-distance intercity passenger train'' and a
``short-distance intercity passenger train.'' ``Long-distance intercity
passenger train'' means a passenger train that provides service between
large cities more than 125 miles apart and is not operated exclusively
in the National Railroad Passenger Corporation's (Amtrak) Northeast
Corridor. ``Short-distance intercity passenger train'' means a
passenger train that provides service exclusively on the Northeast
Corridor or between cities that are not more than 125 miles apart. This
distinction attempts to recognize the special set of operating
conditions on the Northeast Corridor in light of the need to treat
long-distance trains differently than short-distance trains.
Additionally, APTA has advised FRA that there are

[[Page 49755]]

commuter rail systems that operate trains over 100 miles in distance on
a single run, and thus recommended the use of the 125-mile distance in
these definitions.
The definition of the term ``in service'' is modeled after the
definition of that term in the Railroad Freight Car Safety Standards.
See 49 CFR 215.5(e). Passenger equipment that is in service includes
passenger equipment ``in passenger service,'' meaning ``carrying, or
available to carry, fare-paying passengers,'' as well as all other
passenger equipment unless it falls into one of four categories;
specifically, unless the passenger equipment--

(a) Is being handled in accordance with Secs. 238.15, 238.17,
238.305(c)(5), or 238.503(f), as applicable;
(b) Is in a repair shop or on a repair track;
(c) Is on a storage track and is not carrying passengers; or
(d) Has been delivered in interchange but has not been accepted
by the receiving railroad.

The term ``in service'' is important because if the train or passenger
equipment is not in service, it is not subject to a part 238 civil
penalty.
The last definition that warrants discussion is ``vestibule.'' FRA
proposes ``vestibule'' to mean an area of a passenger car that normally
does not contain seating and that leads from the seating area to the
side exit doors. The definition of ``vestibule'' is important to
determine the requirements for the location of side door emergency-
release mechanisms.
Sec. 238.7 Waivers. This section sets forth the procedures for
seeking waivers of compliance with the requirements of this rule.
Requests for such waivers may be filed by any interested party. In
reviewing such requests, FRA conducts investigations to determine if a
deviation from the general criteria can be made without compromising or
diminishing rail safety.
FRA recognizes that circumstances may arise when the operation of
passenger equipment that does not meet the standards proposed in this
rule is appropriate and in the public interest. FRA would entertain
petitions for waiver to allow operation of equipment that does not
fully comply with the proposed standards, provided the petitioner can
demonstrate that the equipment will operate at a level of safety
equivalent to that afforded by the provision of this part that is
sought to be waived, i.e., demonstrate ``equivalent safety.''
Equivalent safety may be afforded by features that compensate for
equipment that does not meet these standards. Equivalent safety is met
when railroad employees, passengers, and the general public are no more
at risk from passenger equipment that does not meet the requirements of
this part, but is protected by compensating features, than when the
equipment meets the requirements of this part.
Some of the structural requirements that FRA is proposing would
prohibit the operation of most light rail vehicles if the operation is
connected to the general railroad system on or after January 1, 1998;
however, FRA does not intend to completely foreclose the possibility of
the operation of such equipment. FRA is aware of arrangements by which
light rail service is conducted during the day, with freight operations
conducted at night. FRA will entertain petitions for waiver of the
structural requirements from operators of such ``time-separated''
service.
FRA proposes that the risk assessment portion of the system safety
program be used to demonstrate equivalent safety. The burden would be
on the petitioning railroad to perform a comparative risk assessment
and to prove equivalent safety. FRA has experience with two instances
involving different passenger equipment operations where a comparative
risk assessment has been used successfully. Amtrak commissioned a
comparative risk assessment between current Northeast Corridor
operations and proposed operations involving the American Flyer
trainset at speeds up to 150 mph. The risk assessment demonstrated that
proposed countermeasures such as enhancements to the train control
system and the increased structural strength and the crash energy
management design of the American Flyer should compensate for the
increased operating speed. The comparative risk assessment
quantitatively showed that passengers were no more at risk travelling
on the American Flyer at 150 mph on the Northeast Corridor than if they
were travelling on an existing Amtrak passenger train at a lesser speed
on the same corridor.
The second instance is the proposed Florida Overland Express (FOX)
operation of a French TGV high speed rail system in Florida. FOX
performed a comparative risk assessment of three operations: the
American Flyer on the Northeast Corridor, the TGV on high speed lines
in France, and the proposed FOX operation in Florida. See FRA Docket:
RM Pet. 97-1. The analysis showed the TGV operation in France to pose
less risk to passengers than the American Flyer trainset on the
Northeast Corridor and the proposed FOX operation to be even safer than
the TGV in France. The FOX risk assessment suggested that collision
avoidance provided by a dedicated right-of-way with no grade crossings
more than compensated for the increased speed and decreased structural
strength of the proposed equipment.
FRA cites these two instances as examples of what is expected to
demonstrate equivalent safety for proposed operations where the
equipment does not meet the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards. FRA
would expect an analysis showing the effectiveness of clearly
compensating features, such as closing grade crossings, providing
absolute separation of lighter rail equipment from heavy rail
equipment, or using highly capable signal and train control systems
that significantly reduce the probability of accidents caused by human
error. FRA would provide advice and guidance to organizations wishing
to demonstrate equivalent safety, but the burden of performing a
comparative risk assessment and establishing that the operation
provides equivalent safety is on the entity proposing to operate
equipment that does not comply with this part.
Sec. 238.9 Responsibility for compliance. General compliance
requirements are proposed in this section. Paragraph (a). Paragraphs
(a)(1) and (a)(2) prohibit a railroad subject to part 238 from
committing a series of specified acts with respect to a train or a
piece of passenger equipment while the train or passenger equipment is
in service if it has a condition that does not comply with part 238 or
if it has not been inspected and tested as required by part 238. In
particular, consistent with 49 U.S.C. chapter 203, under which the
provision is proposed, paragraph (a)(1) imposes a strict liability
standard with respect to violations of the safety appliance and power
brake provisions of part 238. In addition to the acts prohibited by
paragraph (a)(2) (that is, the use, haul, offering in interchange, or
accepting in interchange of defective or not properly inspected
equipment), paragraph (a)(1) prohibits a railroad from merely
permitting the use or haul on its line of such equipment if it does not
conform with the safety appliance and power brake provisions. See
Sec. 238.3(b). By contrast, paragraph (a)(2) imposes a lower standard
of liability for using, hauling, delivering in interchange, or
accepting in interchange a train or passenger equipment that is
defective or not properly inspected, in violation of another provision
of this part; a railroad subject to this part is liable only if it
knew, had notice, or

[[Page 49756]]

should have known of the existence of either the defective condition of
the equipment or the failure to inspect and test. Finally, paragraph
(a)(3) establishes a strict liability standard for noncompliance with
any other provision of this part, for example, the requirement to adopt
a written system safety plan under Sec. 238.103.
Paragraph (b). In accordance with the ``use'' or ``haul'' language
previously contained in the Safety Appliance Acts (49 U.S.C. chapter
203) and with FRA's general rulemaking authority under the Federal
railroad safety laws, FRA proposes in paragraph (b) that passenger
equipment will be considered ``in use'' prior to departure but after it
receives or should have received the necessary tests and inspections
required for movement. FRA will no longer wait for a piece of equipment
with a power brake defect to be hauled before issuing a violation, a
practice frequently criticized by the railroads. FRA believes that this
approach will increase FRA's ability to prevent the movement of
defective equipment that creates a potential safety hazard to both the
public and railroad employees. FRA does not feel that this approach
increases the railroads' burden since equipment should not be operated
if it is found in defective condition in the pre-departure tests and
inspections, unless permitted by the regulations.
Paragraph (c). This paragraph clarifies FRA's position that the
requirements contained in the proposed rules are applicable not only to
any ``railroad'' subject to this part but also to any ``person,'' as
illustrated in Sec. 238.11, that performs any function required by the
proposed rules. Although various sections of the proposed rule address
the duties of a railroad, FRA intends that any person who performs any
action on behalf of a railroad or any person who performs any action
covered by the proposed rule is required to perform that action in the
same manner as required of a railroad or be subject to FRA enforcement
action. For example, private car owner and contract shippers that
perform duties covered by these proposed regulations would be required
to perform those duties in the same manner as required of a railroad.
Sec. 238.11 Civil penalties. Section 238.11 identifies the civil
penalties that FRA may impose upon any person, including a railroad or
an independent contractor providing goods or services to a railroad,
that violates any requirement of this part. These penalties are
authorized by 49 U.S.C. 21301, 21302, and 21304. The penalty provision
parallels penalty provisions included in numerous other safety
regulations issued by FRA. Essentially, any person who violates any
requirement of this part or causes the violation of any such
requirement will be subject to a civil penalty of at least $500 and not
more than $10,000 per violation. Civil penalties may be assessed
against individuals only for willful violations; where a grossly
negligent violation or a pattern of repeated violations creates an
imminent hazard of death or injury to persons, or causes death or
injury, a penalty not to exceed $20,000 per violation may be assessed.
In addition, each day a violation continues will constitute a separate
offense. Finally, a person may be subject to criminal penalties under
49 U.S.C. 21311 for knowingly and willfully falsifying reports required
by these regulations. FRA believes that the inclusion of penalty
provisions for failure to comply with the regulations is important in
ensuring that compliance is achieved.
The final rule will include a schedule of civil penalties as
appendix A to this part. Because such penalty schedules are statements
of policy, notice and comment are not required prior to their issuance.
See 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(A). Nevertheless, commenters are invited to
submit suggestions to FRA describing the types of actions or omissions
under each regulatory section that would subject a person to the
assessment of a civil penalty. Commenters are also invited to recommend
what penalties may be appropriate, based upon the relative seriousness
of each type of violation.
Sec. 238.13 Preemptive effect. Proposed Sec. 238.13 informs the
public as to FRA's views regarding what will be the preemptive effect
of the final rule. While the presence or absence of such a section does
not in itself affect the preemptive effect of a final rule, it informs
the public concerning the statutory provision which governs the
preemptive effect of the rule. Section 20106 of title 49 of the United
States Code provides that all regulations prescribed by the Secretary
relating to railroad safety preempt any State law, regulation, or order
covering the same subject matter, except a provision necessary to
eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard that is not
incompatible with a Federal law, regulation, or order and that does not
unreasonably burden interstate commerce. With the exception of a
provision directed at an essentially local safety hazard, 49 U.S.C.
20106 will preempt any State regulatory agency rule covering the same
subject matter as the regulations proposed today when issued as final
rules.
Sec. 238.15 Movement of passenger equipment with defective power
brakes. This section contains the proposed requirements for movement of
passenger equipment with a power brake defect without civil penalty
liability under this part. (Railroads remain liable, however, ``in a
proceeding to recover damages for death or injury of a railroad
employee arising from the movement of'' the defective equipment. See 49
U.S.C. 20303(c).) A ``power brake defect,'' as defined in paragraph
(a), ``is a condition of a power brake component, or other primary
brake component, that does not conform with this'' rule. The term does
not include a failure to properly inspect such a component.
The Passenger Equipment Safety Standards Working Group did not
reach a consensus on the requirements proposed in this section;
however, the Working Group did agree that passenger operations needed
some flexibility to get passengers to their destination or, at a
minimum, to a location where passengers can safely disembark. The
proposed requirements regarding the movement of passenger equipment
with defective power brakes are based on the extensive discussions and
information presented in the Working Group meetings and in response to
the previous NPRM on power brakes.
As previously noted in the general discussion, FRA proposes to
utilize the authority granted in 49 U.S.C. 20306 to exempt passenger
train operations covered by this part from the statutory requirements
contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303(a) permitting the movement of equipment
with defective or insecure brakes only if various requirements are met,
including the requirement that the movement for repair be only to the
nearest location where the necessary repairs can be made. FRA believes
that the granting of this exemption is justified based on the
technological advances made in the brake systems and equipment used in
passenger operations, and is necessary for these operations to make
efficient use of the technological advances and protect the safety of
the riding public.
FRA also proposes to exempt passenger train operations from a long-
standing agency interpretation, based on a 1910 Interstate Commerce
Commission order codified at 49 CFR 232.1, that prohibits the movement
of a train for repairs under 49 U.S.C. 20303 if less than 85 percent of
the train's brakes are operative. As noted in the previous discussion,
many passenger operations utilize a small number of cars in their
trains and the necessity to cut out the brakes on just one car can
easily result in noncompliance. FRA

[[Page 49757]]

believes that speed restrictions can readily be used to compensate for
the loss of brakes on a minority of cars.
Paragraph (b)(1). This paragraph addresses the movement for repair
of equipment with a power brake defect found during a Class I or IA
brake test or, for Tier II equipment, the equivalent of a Class I or IA
brake test. This paragraph allows railroads the flexibility to move
passenger equipment with a power brake defect found during such a test
if the following three conditions are satisfied: (1) if the train is
moved for purposes of effecting repair of the defect, without
passengers; (2) the applicable operating restrictions set forth in
paragraph (d) are complied with; and (3) the information concerning the
defect is recorded on a tag affixed to the equipment or in an automated
defect tracking system as specified in paragraph (c)(2).
Paragraph (b)(2). This paragraph permits railroads to move, for
purposes of scrapping or sale, passenger equipment with a power brake
defect found during a Class I or IA brake test (or the Tier II
equivalent) if each of the following conditions is satisfied: if the
movement is without passengers, if the speed of the movement is 15 mph
or less, and if the railroad's air brake or power brake instructions
are followed when making the movement. This provision allows railroads
to move surplus equipment without having to request permission for one-
time moves from FRA, as is currently required. FRA has not had any
serious safety concerns with the methods currently used by railroads to
move this equipment and does not believe its limited resources should
be tied up in approving these types of moves.
Paragraph (c), generally. This paragraph addresses the use of
passenger equipment with a power brake defect that develops en route
from a location where a Class I or IA brake test (or the Tier II
equivalent) was performed on the equipment. The two basic requirements
are that at the location where the railroad first finds the defect,
specified information (such as the nature of the defect and the
destination where the defect will be repaired) must be placed on tags
attached to the equipment or in a computer tracking system and that the
railroad must observe the applicable operating restrictions in
paragraph (d). A third requirement, found in paragraph (c)(3) is a
special, applying only if the defect causes any brakes to be cut out.
Paragraph (c)(2) requires that equipment being hauled for repairs
be adequately identified. Currently, there is no requirement that
equipment with defective power brakes be tagged or otherwise
identified, although most railroads voluntarily engage in such
activity. Furthermore, the current regulations regarding freight cars
and locomotives contain tagging requirements for the movement of
equipment not in compliance with those parts. See 49 CFR 215.9 and
229.9. Consequently, FRA proposes to require the identification of
equipment with defective power brakes through either the traditional
tags which are placed in established locations on the equipment or by
an automated tracking system developed by the railroad. FRA proposes
certain information which must be contained whichever method is used by
a railroad. FRA believes that the proposed tagging or tracking
requirements add reliability, accountability, and enforceability for
the timely and proper repair of equipment with defective power brakes.
In addition, under paragraph (c)(3), if the defect causes the
brakes on the equipment to be cut out, then the railroad must first
find out what percentage of the power brakes in the train are cut out
or inoperative in some other way, using the formula in paragraph
(d)(1). Next, the railroad must notify the dispatcher of the percentage
of operative brakes and the movement restrictions imposed by paragraph
(d), inform the railroad's mechanical desk or department about the
brake defect, and walk the train to confirm the percentage of operative
brakes at the next point where it is safe to do so.
Paragraph (d)(1). This paragraph explains the term ``inoperative
power brakes'' and proposes a new method for calculating the percentage
of operative power brakes (operative primary brakes) in a train.
Regarding the term itself, a cut-out power brake is an inoperative
power brake, but the failure or cutting out of a secondary brake system
(as defined in Sec. 238.5) does not result in inoperative power brakes.
For example, failure of dynamic brakes does not render a power brake
inoperative unless the dynamic brakes are in fact primary brakes.
Although the statute discusses the percentage of operative brakes in
terms of a percentage of vehicles, the statute was written nearly a
century ago and at that time the only way to cut out the brakes on a
car or locomotive was to cut out the entire unit. See 49 U.S.C.
20302(a)(5)(B). Today, virtually every piece of equipment used in
passenger service can have the brakes cut out on a per-truck or per-
axle basis. Consequently, FRA merely proposes a method of calculating
the percentage of operative brakes based on the design of passenger
equipment used today, and thus, a means to more accurately reflect the
true braking ability of the train as a whole. FRA believes that the
proposed method of calculation is consistent with the intent of
Congress when it drafted the statutory requirement and simply
recognizes the technological advancements made in braking systems over
the last century. Consequently, FRA proposes to permit the percentage
of operative brakes to be determined by dividing the number of axles in
the train with operative brakes by the total number of axles in the
train. Furthermore, for equipment utilizing tread brake units (TBU),
FRA proposes that the percentage of operative brakes be determined by
dividing the number of operative TBUs by the total number of TBUs.
Paragraphs (d)(2)-(d)(4), generally. These paragraphs propose
various speed and other operating restrictions based on the percentage
of operative brakes in order to permit passenger railroads the
flexibility to efficiently move passengers without compromising safety.
FRA believes that the proposed movement restrictions actually enhance
the safety of the riding public. The proposed requirements retain the
basic principle that a train carrying passengers shall not depart a
location where a major brake inspections or tests are performed on that
train unless the train has 100 percent operational brakes.
FRA recognizes that there are major differences in the operations
of commuter or short-distance intercity passenger trains, and long-
distance intercity passenger trains. Commuter and short-distance
intercity passenger trains tend to operate fairly short distances
between passenger stations and generally operate in relatively short
turn-around service between two terminals several times in any given
day. On the other hand, long-distance intercity passenger trains tend
to operate for long distances, with trips between the beginning
terminal and ending terminal taking a day or more and traversing
multiple States with relatively long distances between passenger
stations. Consequently, FRA proposes slightly different requirements
with regard to the movement of defective brake equipment in long-
distance intercity passenger trains.
FRA believes that passenger railroads can safely and efficiently
operate trains with en route brake failures under the strict set of
conditions proposed. FRA has long held that the industry can safely
operate trains at normal track speeds with as low as 85 percent
effective brakes as long as the inoperative brakes were due to failures
which occurred en route or due to

[[Page 49758]]

defective cars being picked up en route and being moved for repairs.
The only change being proposed to current practice is the additional
flexibility for certain passenger operations to move the equipment past
a location capable of performing the repairs.
Paragraph (d)(2). This paragraph proposes operating requirements
for the movement of any passenger train that develops en route brake
failures resulting in 74 to 50 percent operative brakes. In these
circumstances, FRA proposes to allow the trains to proceed only to the
next passenger station at a reduced speed, not to exceed 20 mph, to
discharge passengers before proceeding, without passengers, to the
nearest location where the necessary repairs can be made. This
provision recognizes the dangers of unloading passenger at locations
other than passenger stations by allowing railroads to move the
equipment to a location with the facilities to handle the discharge of
passengers. Furthermore, engineering evidence and test data demonstrate
that the reduced speed more than compensates for the reduced braking
force. At the reduced speed, even with only 50 percent effective
brakes, a train is able to stop in a much shorter distance than the
same train traveling at the maximum operating speed with 100 percent
operative brakes.
Paragraph (d)(3)(i). FRA also proposes to permit commuter, short-
distance intercity, and short-distance Tier II passenger trains
experiencing en route brake failures resulting in 84 to 75 percent
operative brakes to continue in service to the next terminal prior to
being moved without passengers to the nearest location were repairs can
be made. However, in these circumstances, FRA proposes that the speed
of the train must be reduced to 50 percent of the train's maximum
operating speed or 40 mph, whichever is less. Engineering evidence and
test data demonstrate that the reduced speed more than compensates for
the reduced braking force. At the reduced speed, even with only 75
percent effective brakes, a train is able to stop in a much shorter
distance than the same train traveling at the maximum operating speed
with 100 percent operative brakes.
Paragraph (d)(3)(ii). FRA proposes to permit commuter and short-
distance intercity passenger trains that develop defective brake
equipment en route resulting in 99 to 85 percent operative brakes, the
flexibility to move the defective equipment to the next terminal where
passengers can be unloaded, prior to the defective equipment being
moved to the nearest location were repairs can be made. During Working
Group meetings, APTA presented engineering evidence and test data that
demonstrated that stopping distances remained well within signal
spacing distances with a large margin of safety even for trains with as
low as 85 percent effective brakes.
Paragraph (d)(4). As noted above, most long-distance intercity
passenger trains, both in Tier I and Tier II, have considerable
distances between their starting terminal and their ending terminal,
thus FRA does not intend to provide these operations the latitude to
move those large distance with defective equipment entrained. This
paragraph permits the movement of defective brake equipment in these
trains only to the nearest forward location designated as a repair
location for this equipment by the operating railroad in the list
required by Sec. 238.19(d). FRA also proposes to permit long-distance
intercity passenger trains to continue in service past a designated
repair location to the next forward passenger station only if the
designated repair location does not have the facilities to safely
unload passengers. Although FRA proposes to permit the continued
operation of long-distance intercity passenger trains that develop en
route brake failures resulting in 99 to 85 percent operative brakes at
normal speeds, FRA proposes a speed restriction of no greater than 40
mph when the en route brake failures result in 84 to 75 percent
operative brakes. Therefore, although long-distance intercity passenger
trains do not have the flexibility to continue in service to the next
terminal, these trains do gain flexibility in being permitted to move a
greater percentage of defective equipment than currently allowed and
are able to move that equipment to the next forward repair location
rather than the ``nearest'' repair location as currently required. 49
U.S.C. 20303(a). As noted previously, FRA believes that the safety of
the traveling public mandates the flexibility of permitting passenger
trains to continue to the next forward repair location or passenger
station because requiring trains to reverse directions and perform back
hauls to the nearest repair location increases the risk of collision on
the railroad.
APTA, in its comments on a draft of the NPRM, agreed that many of
the defects need to be repaired but do not require stopping the car or
immediately taking it out of service. Commenters are requested to
address APTA's concern.
Sec. 238.17 Movement of passenger equipment with other than power
brake defects. This section contains the proposed requirements for the
movement of passenger equipment with a condition not in compliance with
part 238, excluding a power brake defect and including a safety
appliance defect, without civil penalty liability under this part.
(Railroads remain liable, however, under 49 U.S.C. 20303(c), as
described in the discussion of the previous section.)
The Working Group was unable to reach full consensus on the
requirements contained in this section. There are currently no
statutory or regulatory restrictions on the movement of passenger cars
with defective conditions that are not power brake or safety appliance
defects. The proposed provisions contained in this section are similar
to the provisions for moving defective locomotives and freight cars
currently contained in 49 CFR 229.9 and 215.9, respectively. As these
provisions have generally worked well with regard to the movement of
defective locomotives and freight cars and in order to maintain
consistency, FRA has modeled the proposed movement requirements on
those existing requirements. FRA proposes to allow passenger railroads
the flexibility to continue to use equipment with non-safety-critical
defects until the next scheduled calendar day exterior mechanical
inspection. However, FRA intends the calendar day mechanical inspection
to be the tool used by railroads to repair all reported defects and to
prevent continued use of defective equipment to carry passengers.
(Compare Sec. 238.17(b) with Sec. 238.17(c).)
FRA intends for 49 CFR 229.9 to continue to govern the movement of
locomotives used in passenger service which develop defective
conditions, not covered by part 238, that are not in compliance with
part 229. In the final rule, FRA will make any necessary conforming
amendments to part 229 in order to remove provisions that will now be
covered in this part or to make inapplicable to locomotives subject to
part 238 provisions of part 229 that will now be covered in part 238.
Part 229 will continue to cover (non-steam) locomotives that are used
by the tourist railroads until such railroads are covered by part 238.
FRA also does not intend to alter the current statutory
requirements contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303 regarding the movement of
passenger equipment with defective or insecure safety appliances. See
proposed Secs. 238.229, 238.429, 238.431. Consequently, in paragraph
(d), FRA proposes to require that passenger equipment that develops a
defective or insecure safety appliance continue to be subject to all
the

[[Page 49759]]

statutory restrictions on its movement. Under the current statutory
language--

A vehicle that is equipped in compliance with this chapter whose
equipment becomes defective or insecure nevertheless may be moved
when necessary to make repairs * * * from the place at which the
defect or insecurity was first discovered to the nearest available
place at which the repairs can be made-
(1) on the railroad line on which the defect or insecurity was
discovered; or
(2) at the option of a connecting railroad carrier, on the
railroad line of the connecting carrier, if not farther than the
place of repair described in clause (1) of this subsection.

49 U.S.C. 20303(a). It should be noted that the proposed requirement
applicable to Tier I equipment merely references the Railroad Safety
Appliance Standards (49 CFR part 231); however, FRA has proposed
separate safety appliance requirements for Tier II passenger equipment.
See proposed Secs. 238.429 and 238.431.
FRA proposes that passenger equipment that is found with conditions
not in compliance with this part, other than power brake defects, be
moved only after a qualified mechanical inspector has determined that
the equipment is safe to move and determined any restrictions necessary
for the equipment's safe movement. FRA also proposes to allow railroads
to move equipment based on an assessment made by a qualified mechanical
inspector in communication with on-site personnel. FRA proposes this
allowance based on the reality that mechanical personnel are not
readily available at every location on a railroad's line of road.
However, FRA further proposes that if a qualified mechanical inspector
does not actually inspect the equipment to determine that it is safe to
move, then, at the first forward location where a qualified mechanical
inspector is on duty, an inspector will perform a physical inspection
of the equipment to confirm the initial assessment made while in
communication with on-site personnel previously. Paragraph (c)(3)
requires tracking of the defect in either of two ways. One option is to
tag the equipment in a manner similar to what is currently required
under Sec. 215.9 for freight cars. The second option is to record the
specified information in an automated tracking system. The latter
alternative is offered to provide railroads some flexibility and in
recognition of advances made in electronic recordkeeping.
Under paragraph (c), FRA proposes that after a mechanical inspector
verifies that a noncomplying piece of equipment is safe to remain in
passenger service, that piece of equipment may remain in passenger
service until its next calendar day mechanical inspection. However,
under paragraph (b), equipment containing noncomplying conditions at
the time of the calendar day mechanical inspection may be moved from
that location only if the noncomplying conditions are repaired or if
all of the following conditions are satisfied: (1) if the equipment is
moved out of passenger service and in a non-revenue train for the
purpose of effectuating the repairs; (2) if the requirements of
paragraphs (c)(2) and (c)(3) (regarding tagging and notification) are
satisfied; and (3), in the case of a safety appliance defect, if the
special conditions of paragraph (d) are met. As discussed previously,
FRA has intentionally provided railroads wide flexibility in where and
when it will perform the calendar day mechanical inspection in order to
permit railroads to get the equipment to locations most conducive to
conducting the inspections. Thus, FRA intends for calendar day
mechanical inspections of passenger equipment to be conducted at
locations where qualified mechanical inspectors are available and where
virtually any necessary repair can be made. Consequently, FRA does not
believe that the proposed restrictions on the movement of noncomplying
equipment will be overly burdensome to the industry.
Paragraph (d) states the special statutory restrictions on the
movement of passenger equipment with a safety appliance defect.
APTA, in its comments on a draft of the NPRM, agreed that many of
the defects need to be repaired but do not require shopping the car or
immediately taking it out of service. APTA further noted that this
section does not take into account the fact-based maintenance cycles
for equipment, subsystems, and components as the introduction of
technology outpaces the regulatory process. Commenters are requested to
address APTA's concerns.
Sec. 238.19 Reporting and tracking defective equipment. This
section contains the reporting and tracking requirements that passenger
railroads must maintain regarding defective passenger equipment. The
Working Group did not reach consensus on the requirements proposed in
this section. FRA proposes to require that each railroad develop and
maintain a system for reporting and tracking equipment defects. FRA
proposes that for each equipment defect discovered by the railroad on
equipment used by the railroad the system record: the number by which
the equipment is identified, type of defect, when the defect occurred,
the determination made by a qualified mechanical inspector on how to
handle the defect, and finally how and when the defect was corrected.
FRA has not proposed any specific method or means by which a railroad
should gather and maintain the required information. FRA believes that
each railroad is in the best position to determine the method of
obtaining the required information which is most efficient and
effective based on its specific operation. Thus, railroads could
maintain this information electronically in conjunction with their
automated tracking system, if so desired.
FRA believes that reporting and tracking of defective equipment are
essential features of any effective system safety program. Railroad
managers are able to utilize such systems to ensure that the railroad
complies with safety regulations, does not use unsafe equipment, makes
needed repairs, and has failure data to make reliability-based
decisions on maintenance intervals. Furthermore, most passenger
railroads currently have some sort of reporting and tracking system in
place. FRA recognizes that some railroads may have to incur additional
initial costs to develop or improve defect reporting and tracking
systems; however, FRA believes these costs can be recouped through the
increased operating efficiency that an effective recording and tracking
system provides.
Paragraph (b) requires that railroads maintain the required
information for a period equal to one periodic maintenance interval for
each specific type of equipment as described in the railroad's system
safety plan. FRA believes that this minimum retention period will
ensure that the records remain available when they are most needed, but
will not place a burdensome record storage requirement on railroads.
However, FRA strongly encourages railroads to keep these records for
longer periods of time because they form the basis for future
reliability-driven decisions concerning test and maintenance intervals.
Paragraph (d) requires railroads operating long-distance passenger
trains to list the locations where repairs can be made to the
equipment. FRA believes that the operators are in the best position to
determine which locations have the necessary expertise to handle the
repairs of the somewhat advanced braking systems utilized in passenger
trains. FRA also proposes a broad performance-based requirement that
railroads operating this equipment designate a sufficient number of
repair locations to ensure the safe and timely

[[Page 49760]]

repair of the equipment. FRA intends to fine a railroad for violating
this proposed requirement or take other enforcement action if, based on
its expertise and experience, FRA believes the railroad is failing to
designate an adequate number repair locations.
Sec. 238.21 Special approval procedure. This section states the
procedures to be followed when seeking to obtain FRA approval of a pre-
revenue service acceptance testing plan under Secs. 238.113 or 238.603
or an alternative standard under Secs. 238.115 (``Fire safety''),
238.223 (``Fuel tanks''), 238.309 (``Periodic brake equipment
maintenance''), 238.311 (``Single car test''), 238.405 (``Longitudinal
static compressive strength''), or 238.427 (``Suspension system'').
Procedures for obtaining FRA approval of inspection, testing, and
maintenance programs for Tier II equipment under Sec. 238.503 are found
at Sec. 238.505.
Subpart B--System Safety and General Requirements
Sec. 238.101 Scope. This subpart contains the system safety
program requirements to be applied to all passenger equipment subject
to this part. Although FRA initially considered addressing system
safety requirements for Tier I and Tier II equipment separately, FRA is
proposing broad, minimum requirements which can be applied to all types
of passenger railroad systems. Therefore, separate requirements are not
needed.
The Working Group did not reach consensus on the system safety
requirements as they apply to Tier I equipment, but strong support
exists among Working Group members to apply formal system safety
planning to Tier I equipment. The Tier II Subgroup did reach full
consensus on the system safety program requirements as they apply to
Tier II equipment.
Tier I and Tier II passenger equipment is used in a heavy rail
environment that includes a mixture of freight and rail passenger
traffic and highway-rail grade crossings used by heavy highway
vehicles. Such an environment makes reliance on collision avoidance
risky. As a result, crashworthiness must be designed into the
equipment.
However, situations may arise where requiring strict adherence to
either the Tier I standards or the Tier II standards may prevent rail
passenger transportation that is in the public interest. As a result,
FRA intends that the system safety planning process allow railroads to
develop approaches to providing rail passenger transportation that do
not meet all the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards but compensate by
providing safety equivalency to that provided by meeting the full set
of equipment safety standards. For example, a rail passenger operator
would be allowed to seek relief from some of the structural standards
based on a dedicated right-of-way or an advanced signaling system.
However, the burden of demonstrating safety equivalency based on a
comprehensive risk assessment falls squarely on the organization
proposing the rail passenger operation that does not meet all the
equipment standards.
The system safety plan must be a living document that evolves with
the passenger rail system, and the system safety program detailed in
the plan should be enforced until the system is decommissioned.
Ideally, the system safety program would be in place at the inception
of the system. This allows the maximum benefit of the program to be
achieved. Tier II equipment and major new purchases of Tier I equipment
will allow system safety planning to be used in the design and
development phase of the new equipment. However, for the most part,
Tier I system safety programs must be tailored to existing operations
and equipment.
The system safety approach can be instituted at any point in the
life cycle of a passenger rail system. APTA currently publishes a
voluntary system safety program guide. Several APTA members, which
operate existing Tier I equipment, instituted this system safety
program on their existing rail systems. APTA periodically audits these
programs and provides the operating authority with feedback on how well
the system safety program has been implemented. As previously noted,
APTA has suggested that commuter railroads be allowed to regulate
themselves in this area, and that FRA not issue any regulations
governing such plans. See preamble discussion; in the preamble FRA
asked a variety of questions that commenters should address regarding
the need for system safety plans, and if such plans should be required
what their contents should contain and whether FRA should enforce the
various elements of the plans.
In addition, Amtrak recently started a corporate system safety
program initiative to make a formal system safety program an integral
part of the way Amtrak conducts business. The value of the formal
system safety process is rapidly being recognized by the passenger
railroad industry and is becoming an accepted way of doing business.
Sec. 238.103 General system safety requirements. Paragraph (a)
requires each railroad operating equipment subject to this part to
adopt and annually update a system safety plan and implement a system
safety program using MIL-STD-882(C) as a guide. MIL-STD-882(C) is a
military standard issued by the Department of Defense that describes
system safety planning and system safety programs used by the Unites
States military for procuring and operating weapon systems. See also
the discussion under Sec. 238.5 of this section-by-section analysis.
FRA does not attempt to dictate to railroads how to apply this
guidance. Railroads should tailor their application of the guidance to
their unique safety needs and operating scenarios.
Paragraphs (b)-(d) describe the various elements required to be
included in the plan. In particular, paragraph (e) requires the
operating railroad to document how the design meets safety requirements
and to track how safety issues were raised and resolved. This is a
necessary step to demonstrate that risks were identified and eliminated
or mitigated.
Paragraph (f) requires the system safety plan to describe how
operational limitations are to be imposed if the design cannot meet
certain safety requirements. Operational limits are the least desirable
and thus the last means considered to reduce a safety risk.
Paragraph (g) establishes the dates by which the operating railroad
must adopt a system safety plan for each of the three categories of
passenger equipment.
Paragraph (h) obliges the railroad to allow FRA to inspect and copy
its system safety plan and the documentation required by paragraph (e).
Sec. 238.105 Fire protection program. Paragraph (a) requires that
the operating railroad's system safety program address the fire safety
of new equipment during the design stage so as to reduce the risk of
harm due to fire on such equipment to an acceptable level as defined in
MIL-STD-882(C). Paragraph (b) requires that railroads make a written
analysis of the fire protection problem. These paragraphs require the
operating railroad to ensure that good fire protection practice is used
during the design and operation of the equipment. Using this good
practice will allow the FRA fire safety regulations to be kept to a
minimum. Four elements of this analysis correspond to required action
under Sec. 238.115, ``Fire safety': the installation of overheat
detectors, a fire or smoke detection system, and a fixed, automatic,
fire-suppression system where the railroad's written analysis
determines they are required and compliance with the railroad's written

[[Page 49761]]

procedures for the inspection, testing, and maintenance of fire safety
systems and equipment that such procedures designate as mandatory. See
Sec. 238.115(c)-(f).
Paragraph (c) requires the operating railroad to exercise
reasonable care to assure that the system developer follows the design
criteria and performs the tests required by the railroad's fire safety
program during the design of new equipment. To fulfill this obligation
in part, the operating railroad must include fire safety requirements
in each of its contracts for the purchase of new equipment.
Paragraph (d) requires that existing passenger equipment and
operations be subjected to a fire safety analysis similar to that
proposed for new equipment in paragraphs (a)-(c). A preliminary fire
safety analysis would be required within the first year. This effort
would constitute an overview of the fleet and service environments,
together with known elements of risk (e.g., tunnels). For any category
of equipment and service identified as possibly presenting unacceptable
risk, a full analysis and any necessary remedial action would be
required within the following year. A full fire safety analysis,
including review of the extent to which interior materials in all
existing cars comply with the test performance criteria for
flammability and smoke emission characteristics contained in Appendix B
to this part or alternative standards approved by FRA under this part,
would be required within 4 years. This overall review would closely
parallel and reinforce the passenger train emergency preparedness
planning effort that will be mandated under a separate docket (see 62
FR 8330; February 24, 1997).
This paragraph responds to NTSB concerns announced on June 17,
1997, in adopting its report on the collision of the MARC commuter
train with Amtrak's Capitol Limited at Silver Spring, Maryland, and
approving related recommendations. Among 13 recommendations to be
addressed to FRA was the following:

Require that a comprehensive inspection of all commuter
passenger cars be performed to independently verify that the
interior materials in these cars meet the expected performance
requirements for flammability and smoke emissions characteristics.

The Abstract of Final Report did not include any express finding that
materials in the MARC cab car did not meet FTA/FRA criteria for
flammability and smoke emission characteristics. However, FRA
understands that the full report may point to the introduction of some
non-standard materials during refurbishing and repair of the car. The
Board did find as follows:

19. Because other commuter passenger cars may also have interior
materials that may not meet specified performance criteria for
flammability and smoke emission characteristics, the safety of
passengers in those cars could be at risk.
20. The federal guidelines on the flammability and smoke
emission characteristics and the testing of interior materials do
not provide for the integrated use of passenger car interior
materials and, as a result, are not useful in predicting the safety
of the interior environment of a passenger car in a fire.

FRA believes that existing fire safety guidelines have continuing
value for their specific purpose. Those guidelines are proposed for
codification in Sec. 238.115 as the best currently available criteria
for analysis of individual materials, and NTSB representatives on the
working group have not suggested alternative proposals. However, as
explained in the preamble, FRA is conducting research through the
National Institute of Standards and Technology to address the
interaction of materials and other aspects of fire safety from a
broader, systems approach. This philosophy is embodied in proposed
Sec. 238.105(a)-(c) with respect to new equipment. Based on this
ongoing research, FRA may propose new fire safety performance criteria
in the second phase of this rulemaking.
FRA agrees with the Board that steps must be taken to minimize fire
safety vulnerabilities in the existing rail passenger equipment fleet.
Present fire safety guidelines are advisory and were not introduced by
FRA until 1984. Even in recent years, passenger railroads have been
free to utilize non-compliant materials (particularly during interior
refurbishment funded locally without FTA support). It is appropriate
for each commuter authority and Amtrak to evaluate the mix of
materials, possible sources of ignition, and potential fire
environments--including tunnels, cuts and elevated structures where
evacuation to the outside of the vehicle may be difficult or
ineffectual in reducing the risk of injury--relevant to the risk of
injury due to fire or smoke exposure.
FRA is concerned in particular with the risk arising from the
operation of cab cars forward and MU locomotives. Due to their position
in the lead of a passenger train, these vehicles are more greatly
exposed to the risk of fire from collisions with other rail vehicles as
well as highway vehicles at grade crossings. In a collision, fire may
erupt from the fuel tanks of both the rail and highway vehicles, and
also from tanks used by highway vehicles that transport loads of
flammable material. The level of risk on each railroad corresponds to
the number of highway-rail grade crossings, density of rail traffic,
and opportunities for collisions.
FRA requests comments on the costs and benefits associated with the
approach contained in paragraph (d) should railroads be successful in
establishing the categorical framework assumed for the analysis. Is the
period of time allowed adequate to complete a review of the existing
fleet and differing operating environments? To what extent does
available fire safety literature adequately support this undertaking?
What difficulties will be faced in identifying the source and current
characteristics of interior materials, particularly in older cars and
cars that have been transferred from the initial purchaser? In cars
that have been refurbished by the railroad's own shop or a contract
shop?
Sec. 238.107 Software safety program. This section provides
requirements for the software portion of the system safety program and
ties the system safety program to Sec. 238.121, which describes the
requirements for software that controls safety features of Tier I or
Tier II equipment.
Sec. 238.109 Inspection, testing, and maintenance program. This
section contains the general requirements for the railroad's program
for inspecting, testing, and maintaining Tier I equipment. (The
inspection, testing, and maintenance program for Tier II equipment is
covered under Sec. 238.503.) FRA's goal is a set of standards to ensure
that the equipment remains safe as it wears and ages, to protect the
workers who perform the inspection, testing, and maintenance tasks, and
to provide flexibility enough to allow individual railroads to adapt
the maintenance standards to their own unique operating environment.
FRA based the proposed requirements on the extensive discussions and
information presented in the Working Group meetings.
Paragraph (a) requires a railroad that operates Tier I passenger
equipment subject to this part to provide to FRA, if requested,
particulars about its inspection, testing, and maintenance program for
that equipment, including the following:
Safety inspection procedures, intervals and
criteria;Washington, DC
Testing procedures and intervals;
Scheduled preventive maintenance intervals;
Maintenance procedures; and
Training of workers who perform the tasks.

[[Page 49762]]

Since FRA does not dictate the contents of the program, individual
railroads retain much flexibility to tailor the program to their
individual needs and experience. At the same time, FRA believes this
requirement is an important component of the overall system safety
program and the approach will cause railroads to re-examine their
inspection, testing, and maintenance procedures to determine that they
are adequate to ensure that the safety-related components of their
equipment are not deteriorating over time. This approach represents
good business practice and in most cases merely formalizes what
passenger railroads are already doing. However, FRA believes this
section will provide valuable guidance to regional governments or
coalitions attempting to establish new commuter rail service.
Paragraph (b) defines broadly the types of conditions that can
endanger the safety of the crew, passengers, or equipment that the
inspection, testing, and maintenance program should be designed to
prevent or to detect and correct. Beyond promulgating and enforcing an
extensive set of Federal safety regulations on this subject, FRA is not
proposing to specify how a railroad should prevent or detect these
conditions. Instead, the proposed standards leave these details to be
developed by each individual railroad.
Paragraph (c) establishes a link between scheduled maintenance
intervals and the system safety program. Scheduled maintenance
intervals should be set so that worn parts are replaced before they
fail. Initial intervals should be based on manufacturer's
recommendations. As operating experience is gained, FRA believes that
accumulated reliability data should be used as the basis for changing
preventive maintenance intervals on safety-critical components. This
standard will encourage railroads to keep reliability records on
safety-critical components that will provide confidence that any safety
or economic trade-offs have a firm basis.
Paragraph (d) requires operating railroads to adopt standard
operating procedures, in writing, on how to safely perform all safety-
critical inspection, testing, and maintenance tasks. This provision is
intended to provide protection to the workers who perform these tasks.
Inspecting, testing and maintaining rail passenger equipment involves
many inherently dangerous tasks. FRA does not intend to prescribe to
how to perform these tasks. The proposed standard requires each
individual railroad to think through how to safely perform these tasks
and to develop procedures that are safe under its individual set of
working conditions. Standard operating procedures can be a key
component of a training program to ensure new employees know how to do
their jobs safely.
Sec. 238.111 Training, qualification, and designation program.
This section contains the proposed training, qualification, and
designation requirements for workers (that is, both railroad employees
and contractors as defined in the section) who perform inspection,
testing, and maintenance tasks. FRA believes that worker training,
qualification, and designation are central to a safe operation.
Labor organizations representing mechanical employees believe that
only employees who receive a long-term apprenticeship and on-the-job
training--typical of their membership--are qualified to perform
inspection, testing, and maintenance tasks. Labor organizations
representing operating employees (train crews) believe the work of
inspecting and testing is largely outside the scope of work that should
be performed by their members, and that railroads do not provide
adequate training to their members for them to effectively inspect and
test equipment.
Operating railroads believe a different level of skills is needed
for simple inspections and tests (``checkers'') than is required for
trouble-shooting and correction of problems (``maintainers''). As a
practical reality, operating railroads make the point that they cannot
afford to train their entire inspection, testing, and maintenance work
force to be highly-skilled maintainers. Operating railroads claim that
operating employees can be easily trained to perform the less complex
inspection and testing tasks and in fact have been performing these
tasks effectively for years.
Mechanical employee labor organizations counter this point with a
strong belief that operating employees--lacking the experience and
trained eye of a mechanical employee--perform a cursory inspection that
misses defects or problems that would be caught by a mechanical
employee.
As a result of these widely different points of view, the Working
Group failed to reach overall consensus on the requirements contained
in this section. FRA based the proposed requirements on the extensive
discussions and information presented in the Working Group meetings as
the merits and drawbacks of various approaches to setting the safety
standards covered in this section were debated.
Paragraph (a) requires railroads to establish and comply with a
training, qualification, and designation program for employees and
contractors who perform safety-related inspection, testing, or
maintenance tasks under this part. ``Contractor,'' in this context,
means ``a person under contract with the railroad or an employee of a
person under contract with the railroad.'' Paragraph (b) lists the
steps that must be followed in developing a training, qualification,
and designation program.
FRA believes that the list of general requirements enumerated in
this section informs railroads what their training, qualification, and
designation program must do reasonably to ensure that employees know
how to keep the equipment running safely. Most passenger railroads have
training programs in place that meet or come close to meeting these
proposed requirements. The list of actions that FRA proposes would
compel railroads to evaluate their operation and focus their training
resources where the need is greatest.
FRA recognizes that some passenger railroads will be forced to
place a greater emphasis on training and qualifications than they have
in the past, and this requirement will result in additional costs for
those railroads. However, the proposed rule allows the railroads the
flexibility that they need to provide only that training which an
employee needs for a specific job. The proposed rule does not require
the ``checkers'' to receive the intensive training needed for the
``maintainers.'' The training can be tailored to the need. Across the
industry as a whole, this proposal will not require extensive changes
in the way passenger railroads currently operate. But it will prevent
railroads from using minimally trained and unqualified people to
perform crucial safety tasks.
Benefits can be gained from this increased investment in training.
Better inspections will be performed, resulting in the running of less
defective equipment, which translates to a better safety record.
Equipment conditions requiring maintenance attention are more likely to
be found while the equipment is at a maintenance or yard site where
repairs can be more easily done. Trouble-shooting will take less time.
More maintenance will be done right the first time, resulting in cost
savings due to less rework.
APTA, in commenting on a draft of the NPRM, believes that this
section's requirements are overly detailed in scope, content, and
record keeping. APTA maintains that broad interpretation of the
regulation could lead to arbitrary enforcement resulting in
misdirection of training resources. In

[[Page 49763]]

addition, APTA contends that the proposal adds costs without a
corresponding safety benefit--the cost to develop and implement the
training programs and the cost to hire additional work force to perform
the duties of those employees attending the required training classes.
Commenters are invited to address APTA's concerns.
Sec. 238.113 Pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan. This
section provides requirements for pre-revenue service testing of
passenger equipment and ties the system safety program to subpart G,
which describes the requirements for the introduction of new technology
that could affect safety systems of Tier II passenger equipment. These
tests are extremely important in that they are the culmination of all
the safety analysis and component tests of the system safety program.
The pre-revenue service tests are intended to demonstrate the
effectiveness of the system safety program and prove that the equipment
can be operated safely in its intended environment.
For equipment that has not previously been used in revenue service
in the United States, paragraph (a) requires the operating railroad to
develop a pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan and obtain FRA
approval of the plan under the procedures stated in Sec. 238.21 before
beginning testing. Previous testing of the equipment at the
Transportation Test Center, on another railroad, or elsewhere will be
considered by FRA in approving the test plan. Paragraph (b) requires
the railroad to fully execute the tests required by the plan, to
correct any safety deficiencies identified by FRA, and to obtain FRA's
approval to place the equipment in revenue service prior to introducing
the equipment in revenue service. Paragraph (c) requires the railroad
to comply with any operational limitations imposed by FRA. Paragraph
(d) requires the railroad to make the plan available to FRA for
inspection and copying. Paragraph (e) enumerates the elements that must
be included in the plan. FRA believes this set of steps and the
documentation required by this section are necessary to ensure that all
safety risks have been reduced to a level that permits the equipment to
be used in revenue service.
In lieu of the requirements of paragraphs (a) through (e),
paragraph (f) provides for an abbreviated testing procedure for
equipment that has previously been used in revenue service in the
United States. The railroad need not submit a test plan to FRA;
however, a description of the testing shall be kept by the railroad and
made available to FRA for inspection and copying.

General Requirements

Sec. 238.115 Fire Safety

Paragraph (a) contains the fire safety requirements for materials
used in constructing the interiors of passenger cars and cabs of
locomotive ordered on or after January 1, 1999, or placed in service
for the first time on or after January 1, 2001. Further, as of the
effective date of the final rule, fire safety requirements also apply
to materials used in refurbishing the interiors of passenger cars and
locomotive cabs. Currently, the rail industry follows FRA's fire safety
guidelines as revised on January 17, 1989. See 54 FR 1837. Several
Working Group members believe that current fire safety practice has
worked well in addressing the flammability of passenger car and
locomotive cab interiors. However, since FRA's guidelines were first
established, considerable fire safety and fire resistance testing
technology has developed and some Working Group members believe that
new information is available to improve fire safety.
As discussed earlier in the preamble, FRA is proposing that the
existing fire safety guidelines be made mandatory for the construction
of new equipment as well as the refurbishing of existing equipment, and
they are contained in Appendix B. However, railroads can request, under
Sec. 238.21, FRA approval to utilize alternative standards issued or
recognized by an expert consensus organization. As part of the second
phase of the rulemaking, the Working Group will consider how to apply
new fire safety information to improve the fire safety standards,
including information being gathered by the NIST and the NFPA.
Paragraph (b) requires railroads to obtain certification that
combustible materials to be used in constructing and refurbishing
passenger car and locomotive cab interiors have been tested and comply
with the fire safety standards as specified in paragraph (a) and
Appendix B to this part.
Paragraphs (c) through (e) contain requirements for installing
various detection and suppression equipment when shown to be necessary
by analyses conducted as part of the fire protection program in
Sec. 238.105.
Paragraph (f) requires the railroad to comply with those elements
of its written procedures, under Sec. 238.105(12), for the inspection,
testing, and maintenance of all fire safety systems and equipment that
is has designated as mandatory as part of its fire protection program.
Paragraph (g) requires the railroad, after completing each fire
safety analysis required by Sec. 238.105(d), to take action to reduce
the risk of personal injuries due to fire and smoke exposure as
provided in Sec. 238.105(d).

Sec. 238.117 Protection Against Personal Injury

As recommended by the Working Group, this section contains a
general requirement to protect passengers and crewmembers from moving
parts, electrical shock and hot pipes. This section extends to
passenger equipment not classified as locomotives the protection
against personal injury which applies to locomotives under 49 CFR
229.41. The proposed requirements represent common-sense safety
practice; reflect current industry practice; and should result in no
additional cost burden to the industry. These requirements apply to all
passenger equipment on or after January 1, 1998.

Sec. 238.119 Rim-Stamped Straight-Plate Wheels

This section addresses the NTSB's safety recommendation concerning
the use of rim-stamped straight-plate wheels on tread-braked rail
passenger equipment, as discussed earlier in the preamble. Because a
wheel having a rim-stamped straight-plate character is a sufficient
safety concern in itself, FRA is extending the NTSB's safety
recommendation to apply to all such wheels used on passenger equipment
regardless whether the equipment is tread-braked or not.

Sec. 238.121 Train System Software and Hardware

This section contains the proposed requirements for the hardware
and software that controls train safety functions that is ordered on or
after January 1, 1999, and such systems implemented or materially
modified for new or existing equipment on or after January 1, 2001.
This section reflects the growing role of automated systems to control
passenger train safety functions. FRA had presented for consideration a
rather complex set of software safety requirements in the ANPRM, but
the Working Group recommended simplifying these requirements and
combining them with the requirements for the hardware components of
control systems.
Paragraph (a) proposes a requirement for a formal safety
methodology that includes a Failure Modes, Effects, Criticality
Analysis (FMECA) and full verification tests for all components of
safety system controls. A formal safety analysis that includes full
verification is now standard practice for safety systems that contain
software components.

[[Page 49764]]

In paragraph (b), FRA proposes to require a comprehensive hardware
and software integration testing program to ensure that the hardware
and the software installed in the hardware function together as
intended. Again, this is a practice that has become common for critical
control systems that include both software and hardware.
Paragraph (c) contains a provision for safety-related control
systems driven by computer software to have design features that result
in a safe condition in the event of a computer hardware or software
failure. This is a design feature that is used in aircraft and in
weapon control systems.
These requirements are not complex and will not limit the
flexibility of equipment designers. Yet, they reflect good design
practices that have led to reliable, safe computer hardware and
software control systems in other industries. Computer hardware and
software systems designed to these requirements may require a larger
initial investment to develop, but experience in other industries has
shown that this investment is quickly recovered by significantly
reducing hardware and software integration problems and minimizing
trouble-shooting and debugging of equipment.

Sec. 238.123 Emergency Lighting

Experience gained during rescues conducted after recent passenger
train accidents indicates that emergency lighting systems either did
not work or failed after a short time, greatly hindering rescue
operations. This section requires that passengers cars and locomotives
ordered or rebuilt on or after January 1, 1999, or placed in service
for the first time on or after January 1, 2001, be equipped with
emergency lighting providing a minimum average illumination level of 5
foot-candles at floor level for all potential evacuation routes and a
back-up power feature capable of operation for a minimum of two hours
after loss of normal power. Although members of the Working Group
advised that the lighting intensity requirement be 0.05 foot-candle,
FRA does not believe that 0.05 foot-candle provides enough illumination
for passengers to locate emergency exits, read instructions for their
operation, and operate the exits, as demonstrated by Volpe Center staff
at a Working Group meeting in December, 1996. FRA requests comments
whether the lighting intensity requirement need be 5 foot-candles at
floor level for all potential evacuation routes if the rail vehicle has
a combination of lower intensity floor proximity lighting, similar to
that used on aircraft to mark the exit path, and higher intensity
lighting at the vehicle's exits.
FRA is considering requiring that emergency lighting meeting the
requirements of this section be implemented in existing passenger
equipment sooner than when the equipment is rebuilt. Existing passenger
equipment may not be rebuilt for 20 years or more. FRA therefore
invites comments whether the proposed requirements should be
implemented in existing passenger equipment within a specified time
such as 5 years.
The two-hour time duration for availability of back-up power is
based on experience gained during rescue operations for passenger train
accidents in remote locations. In such accidents, fully-equipped
emergency response forces can take an hour or more to arrive at the
site, and additional time is required to deploy and reach people
trapped or injured in the train. In addition, the back-up power system
must be able to operate in all orientations within 45 degrees of
vertical and after experiencing a shock due to a longitudinal
acceleration of 8g and vertical and lateral accelerations of 4g. The
shock requirement will ensure that the back-up power system has a
reasonable chance of operating after the initial shock caused by a
collision or derailment. FRA originally considered that the back-up
power system be capable of operation within a vehicle in any
orientation. However, members of the Working Group advised that some
battery technologies utilize a liquid electrolyte which can leak when
the battery is tilted. FRA is further considering whether the back-up
power system should be made capable of operation within a vehicle in
any orientation, including allowing railroads to continue using any
existing batteries through their permanent life before implementing
such a requirement on replacement batteries. Commenters are requested
to address this issue.
FRA is further investigating emergency lighting requirements as
part of a systems approach to effective passenger train evacuation
through a research study to be performed by the Volpe Center. FRA
welcomes input from knowledgeable persons as to what emergency lighting
requirements would be appropriate for passenger trains to assist in
passenger evacuation.

Subpart C--Specific Requirements for Tier I Passenger Equipment

Sec. 238.201 Scope
This subpart contains specific requirements for railroad passenger
equipment operating at speeds not exceeding 125 mph. Unless otherwise
specified in the discussion of this subpart and with the following
qualifications, the proposed requirements represent the consensus
recommendations of the Working Group. FRA has proposed the specific
implementation dates for these requirements. Additionally, in
structuring the rule FRA has specified the type of equipment subject to
each requirement more finely than in the Working Group's
recommendations, while at the same time reflecting those
recommendations as closely as possible. Further, FRA has made other
changes to the recommendations to make the proposed requirements more
clear, enforceable, and compatible with other rail safety laws.
Structural standards for new equipment. Unless otherwise specified,
the requirements of this subpart apply only to passenger equipment
ordered on or after January 1, 1999, or placed in service for the first
time on or after January 1, 2001.
The proposed rule also provides that passenger equipment placed in
service for the first time on or after January 1, 1998, unless
otherwise provided in the cited sections, must meet the minimum
structural requirements specified in: Secs. 238.203 (static end
strength); 238.205(a) (anti-climbing mechanism); 238.207 (link between
coupling mechanism and car body); and 238.211(a) (collision posts).
Together, these four proposed requirements are virtually identical to
existing Federal requirements, found in 49 CFR 229.141(a)(1)-(4), that
apply to MU locomotives built new after April 1, 1956, and operated in
trains having a total empty weight of 600,000 pounds or more. These
proposed requirements reflect the current construction practice for
North American passenger equipment, and FRA believes they are minimum
safety requirements for new equipment.
In addition to the structural requirements identified above, the
proposed rule also requires that passenger equipment ordered on or
after January 1, 1999, or placed in service for the first time on or
after January 1, 2001, unless otherwise provided in the cited sections,
comply with other structural requirements specified in:
Secs. 238.205(b) (anti-climbing mechanism for locomotives); 238.209
(forward-facing end structure of locomotives); 238.211(b) (collision
posts for locomotives); 238.213 (corner posts); 238.215 (rollover
strength); 238.217 (side impact strength); 238.219 (truck-to-car-body
attachment); and 238.223 (fuel tanks).

[[Page 49765]]

Structural standards for existing equipment. The proposed rule
would require that passenger equipment (other than private cars, or
vehicles of a special design operating at the rear of a passenger train
and used solely to transport freight) in use on or after January 1,
1998, have a minimum static end strength of 800,000 pounds
(Sec. 238.203). Static end strength is critical in protecting passenger
equipment from crushing in a head-on or rear-end collision, especially
in the North American railroad operating environment that includes
frequent highway-rail grade crossings and the mixed operation of
freight and passenger trains.
FRA is confident that existing North American passenger cars have
been built to basic compressive strength requirements. Beginning in
1939, the AAR recommended that new passenger cars operated in trains of
over 600,000 pounds empty weight have a minimum static end strength of
800,000 pounds, and since 1956, Federal Regulations (49 CFR 229.141)
require that new MU locomotives operated in such trains must meet this
standard.
FRA is considering requiring that one or more of the other
structural requirements for new passenger equipment, discussed above,
be made applicable to existing equipment as soon as one of the
following events occurs: the equipment is sold to another railroad; the
equipment is rebuilt; the equipment reaches 40 years of age; or 10
years after the effective date of the rule. FRA invites comments on:
(1) what equipment would be affected by each of these structural
requirements; (2) the feasibility and costs of retrofitting such
equipment, with costs broken out for each of the different structural
requirements, in the event such triggering events were adopted in the
final rule; (3) whether these triggering events are reasonable, or
whether some other fixed deadline should be established for making one
or more of these structural requirements applicable to existing
passenger equipment; and (4) the safety benefits that could accrue by
making these requirements applicable to existing equipment.
FRA notes that older passenger equipment may not meet the collision
post requirements in Sec. 238.211(a) because of a change in collision
post design following a collision between two Illinois Central Gulf
Railroad commuter trains in Chicago, Illinois, on October 30, 1972.
Moreover, APTA is opposed to making structural requirements applicable
to existing equipment. In particular, APTA has advised FRA that a
significant number of such equipment either may not meet the structural
requirements in Secs. 238.203, 238.205(a), 238.207, and 238.211(a), or
the equipment must undergo potentially costly testing to determine
whether the requirements are met. FRA will discuss with the Working
Group alternatives that would avoid unnecessary expense to document
design features of older equipment.
No new safety appliance requirements. FRA is not proposing new
safety appliance requirements for passenger equipment subject to this
subpart. The safety appliance requirements referenced in Sec. 238.229
continue to apply to such passenger equipment and are noted in this
rule for clarity, on the advice of the Working Group.
Sec. 238.203 Static End Strength
This section contains the requirements for the overall compressive
strength of rail passenger equipment. The proposed requirements make
mandatory the long-standing, North American design practice of
specifying a minimum static end strength of 800,000 pounds, and a
minimum static end strength of 800,000 pounds in the line of draft at
the ends of occupied volumes, without permanent deformation of the car
body structure. This requirement has proven effective in the North
American railroad operating environment that includes frequent highway-
rail grade crossings, mixed operation of freight and passenger trains,
and less than fully-capable signal and train control systems. The
requirement is effective on or after January 1, 1998. Although FRA
would prefer that every vehicle in a passenger train have a minimum
static end strength as specified in this section, FRA recognizes that
imposing this requirement universally may effectively prohibit the use
of some private cars and all auto-carriers and RoadRailer equipment.
To prevent sudden, brittle-type failure of the main structure of
passenger equipment, the proposed rule requires that the body structure
be designed, to the maximum extent possible, to fail by buckling or
crushing, or both, of structural members rather than by fracture of
structural members or failure of structural connections. To allow a
crash energy management design approach to be employed, this
requirement applies only to the occupied volume of the equipment.
Unoccupied volumes may have a lesser static end yield strength.
Sec. 238.205 Anti-Climbing Mechanism
This section contains the vertical strength requirements for anti-
climbing mechanisms on rail passenger equipment. The purpose of the
anti-climbing mechanism is to prevent override or telescoping of one
passenger train unit into another in the event of high compressive
forces caused by a derailment or collision.
FRA is proposing that all passenger equipment placed in service for
the first time on or after January 1, 1998, shall have an anti-climbing
mechanism at each end capable of resisting an upward or downward
vertical force of 100,000 pounds without permanent deformation. When
coupled together in any combination to join two vehicles, AAR Type H
and Type F tight-lock couplers satisfy this requirement. This
requirement incorporates a long-standing industry practice into the
proposed rule.
The proposed rule further requires that the forward end of a
locomotive ordered on or after January 1, 1999, or placed in service
for the first time on or after January 1, 2001, be equipped with an
anti-climbing mechanism capable of resisting an upward or downward
vertical force of 200,000 pounds without failure. This requirement
applies to locomotives or power cars of permanently coupled trains. AAR
Standard S-580, which addresses the crashworthiness of locomotives, has
included this requirement for all locomotives built since August 1990.
FRA believes this industry practice represents sound equipment design.
Sec. 238.207 Link Between Coupling Mechanism and Car Body
This section contains the vertical strength requirements for the
structure that links the coupling mechanism to the car body on
passenger equipment. The purpose of this requirement is to avoid a
premature failure of the draft system so that the anti-climbing
mechanism will have an opportunity to engage.
FRA is proposing that all passenger equipment placed in service for
the first time on or after January 1, 1998, be provided with a coupler
carrier or other coupler-to-car-body linking structure that is designed
to resist a vertical downward thrust from the coupler shank of 100,000
pounds, without permanent deformation for any normal horizontal
position of the coupler.
Sec. 238.209 Forward-Facing End Structure of Locomotives
This section contains the requirement for the covering or skin of
the forward-

[[Page 49766]]

facing end structure of each passenger locomotive ordered on or after
January 1, 1999, or placed in service for the first time on or after
January 1, 2001. The purpose of this requirement is to protect the
occupied area of a locomotive cab, which is especially vulnerable in a
highway-rail grade crossing collision if a fuel tank that is part of or
being transported by a highway vehicle ruptures.
FRA is proposing that the skin covering the forward-facing end of
each passenger locomotive, e.g., a cab car and an MU locomotive, be
equivalent to a \1/2\-inch steel plate with a 25,000 pounds-per-square-
inch yield strength and be designed to inhibit the entry of fluids into
the occupied area of the equipment. Higher yield strength material may
be used to decrease the required thickness of the material provided an
equivalent strength is maintained. AAR Standard S-580 has included this
requirement for all locomotives built since August 1990. From
observations of the improved performance of locomotives during
collisions, FRA believes that this industry standard should become part
of the proposed safety standards.
Sec. 238.211 Collision Posts
This section contains the structural strength requirements for
collision posts. Collision posts provide protection against the
crushing of occupied areas of passenger equipment in the event of a
collision or derailment. This section does not apply to a vehicle of
special design that operates at the rear of a passenger train and is
used solely to transport freight, such as an auto-carrier or
RoadRailer.
Paragraph (a) requires that all passenger equipment placed in
service for the first time on or after January 1, 1998, shall have
either two full-height collision posts at each end where coupling and
uncoupling are expected, each collision post having an ultimate
longitudinal strength of not less than 300,000 pounds; or an equivalent
end structure.
The proposed 300,000-pound strength requirement makes mandatory the
long-standing North American passenger equipment design practice for
collision posts. This requirement has proven effective in the North
American railroad operating environment. This requirement is similar to
that contained in 49 CFR 229.141(a)(4), which applies to MU locomotives
operated in trains having a total empty weight of 600,000 pounds or
more, but also requires the collision posts to be full-height. Full-
height collision posts provide additional protection because they
extend higher than posts attached only at the underframe. Little, if
any, additional cost is imposed on builders by requiring full height
posts. The spacing at approximately the one-third points laterally will
allow both collision posts to be engaged in many collision scenarios.
An equivalent single rear end structure may be used in place of the two
collision posts provided it can withstand the sum of the forces that
each collision post is required to withstand.
Paragraph (b) requires that each locomotive ordered on or after
January 1, 1999, or placed in service for the first time on or after
January 1, 2001, have two forward collision posts, located at
approximately the one-third points laterally, each capable of
withstanding a 500,000-pound longitudinal force without exceeding the
ultimate strength of the joint. In addition, each post must be capable
of withstanding a 200,000-pound longitudinal force exerted 30 inches
above the joint of the post to the underframe, without exceeding its
ultimate strength. AAR Standard S-580 has included this requirement for
all locomotives built since August 1990. From observation of the
improved performance of these locomotives during collisions, FRA
believes this industry practice should become part of the proposed
safety standards.
As an option, an equivalent end structure may be used in place of
the two forward collision posts. The single end structure shall
withstand the sum of the forces that each collision post is required to
withstand. This option is proposed to allow for the design of unitized
or aircraft-type structures.
FRA is proposing that collision posts be required at the ends of
passenger equipment where coupling and uncoupling are expected or where
separation is likely in the event of a violent derailment. Paragraph
(c) provides that if a train is made up of vehicles with articulated
units, collision posts are required only at the ends of the permanently
joined assembly of units, not at the ends of each unit of the assembly.
Articulated units are not likely to experience impacts on other than
the outside ends of the assembly.
Sec. 238.213 Corner Posts
This section contains the requirements for corner posts on
passenger cars, e.g., passenger coaches, cab cars and MU locomotives.
A corner post is the vertical structural member normally located at
the intersection of the end of a rail vehicle with a side of that
vehicle. However, FRA intends for the proposed rule to allow
flexibility so that the corner post may be located at positions other
than the extreme outside corner of a vehicle. For example, on cars
equipped with end vestibules, the corner posts may be located in the
side structure inboard of the side door opening.
The structural parameters proposed for corner post strength
represent the current design practice for passenger cars built for
North American service. They are being proposed as an interim measure
to prevent the introduction of equipment not meeting such requirements.
FRA recognizes that current design practice has proven inadequate to
protect the occupied volume in several recent side-swipe collisions
involving passenger trains with cab cars leading. Crash modeling
suggests that it is not feasible to protect against collisions of the
magnitude that occurred at Secaucus, New Jersey, and Silver Spring,
Maryland, in February of 1996. Nevertheless, stronger corner posts are
necessary to address collisions involving lower closing speeds, and
determining what may be feasible in terms of cost and weight will be a
priority in the second phase of the rulemaking.
Sec. 238.215 Rollover Strength
This section contains the structural requirements intended to
prevent significant deformation of the normally occupied spaces of a
passenger car in the event it rolls onto its side or roof. The proposal
essentially requires the vehicle structure to be able to support twice
the dead weight of the vehicle while the vehicle is resting on its side
or roof. Deformation of sheathing and framing is allowed to the extent
necessary for the vehicle to be supported directly by more substantial
structural members of the frame, including the top chords and side
frames. Analysis has shown that current passenger car design practice
meets this requirement. This requirement has proven effective in
preventing massive structural deformation of cars that have rolled
during collisions or derailments. For this reason, FRA believes this
requirement should be incorporated into the proposed safety standards.
FRA invites comment on whether this requirement should also apply
to locomotives. Representatives from RPI advised that locomotives do
not roll over frequently enough to justify such requirements for
locomotives. Nevertheless, even if a locomotive does not roll over,
this requirement should help protect its roof from crushing if it is
forced to support the weight of another vehicle thrown onto its roof in
an accident.

[[Page 49767]]

Sec. 238.217 Side Impact Strength
This section contains the car body strength requirements intended
to resist penetration of the side structure of a passenger car by a
highway or rail vehicle.
FRA believes that a side impact strength requirement is necessary
because approximately 14% of the grade crossing accidents involving a
passenger train result from a highway vehicle striking the side of the
passenger train. In addition, during a derailment or train-to-train
collision, trains frequently buckle, exposing the sides of cars to
potential impacts during the collision. The proposed requirement was an
AAR recommended design practice for passenger cars, as last revised in
1984, and represents current North American design practice.
In designing a side impact strength requirement for a passenger
car, the objective is to cause the side of the passenger car to be
strong enough so that the car derails rather than collapses when struck
in the side by another rail vehicle or a heavy highway vehicle. FRA
believes that current design practice may not be adequate to meet this
goal. FRA also believes that cars with low floors, such as bi-level
equipment, are particularly vulnerable to penetration when struck in
the side. A more meaningful side impact strength requirement is
necessary and will be a priority in the second phase of the rulemaking,
as research determines what may be feasible in terms of cost and
weight. The proposed requirement is therefore an interim measure to
prevent the introduction or use of equipment not meeting this basic
strength requirement.
Sec. 238.219 Truck-to-Car-Body Attachment
This section contains the truck-to-car-body attachment strength
requirement for passenger equipment. The attachment is required to
resist without failure a 2g vertical force on the mass of the truck and
a force of 250,000 pounds in any horizontal direction. The requirement
for the attachment to resist a horizontal force is intended to allow
the truck to act as an anti-climbing device during a collision. With
the truck attached to the car body, the truck of an overriding rail
vehicle is likely to be caught by the underframe of the overridden rail
vehicle, thus arresting the override. The parameter selected represents
the current design practice that has proven effective in preventing
horizontal shear of trucks from car bodies.
The requirement for the attachment to resist a vertical force is
intended to keep the truck attached if the car body is raised or rolls
over. If the truck remains attached to the car body, the truck is less
likely to be struck by other units of the train. The attachment must
resist, without failure, a force equal to twice the weight of the truck
and all the components attached to the truck. Many types of keepers are
used to keep trucks attached to car bodies. FRA believes that the
majority of them are capable of meeting this requirement.
Sec. 238.221 Glazing
FRA is proposing additional requirements concerning the safety
glazing of passenger equipment subject to the requirements of 49 CFR
part 223. Existing safety glazing requirements for windows have largely
proven effective in passenger service at speeds up to 125 mph. However,
part 223 does not address the performance of the frame which attaches
the glazing to the car body. This section requires the glazing frame to
be capable of holding the glazing in place against all forces which the
glazing is required to resist under part 223. In addition, the glazing
frame must hold the glazing in place against the forces created by air
pressure differences caused when two trains pass at their maximum
authorized speeds in opposite directions at the minimum track
separation for two adjacent tracks. This requirement is intended to
prevent the glazing from being forced from the window opening and
potentially injuring passengers and crewmembers. FRA that believes most
existing passenger equipment subject to part 223 meets these
requirements. However, they should not be left to chance and need to be
required in the equipment design.
Sec. 238.223 Fuel Tanks
This section contains the structural requirements for external and
integral fuel tanks on locomotives ordered on or after January 1, 1999,
or placed in service for the first time after January 1, 2001. A
discussion of fuel tank safety issues is provided above.
External fuel tanks must comply with AAR Recommended Practice-506,
Performance Requirements for Diesel Electric Locomotive Fuel tanks. FRA
believes that RP-506 represents an improvement in fuel tank
crashworthiness and should be incorporated into the proposed standards.
Labor representatives on the Working Group object to a direct
incorporation of industry standards that effectively allow an industry
organization to change a Federal safety standard by changing the
industry standard. FRA agrees and is proposing that the rule
incorporate the industry standard as adopted on July 1, 1995.
Sec. 238.225 Electrical System
This section contains the proposed requirements for the design of
electrical systems on passenger equipment. The Working Group advised
that no single, well-recognized electrical code or set of standards
applied directly to the design of railroad passenger equipment. As a
result, the Working Group recommended broad performance requirements
which reflect common electrical safety practice and are widely
recognized as good electrical design practice. FRA had offered for
comment more detailed electrical system design requirements in the
ANPRM, but as advocated by the Working group the proposed rule is more
performance-oriented and provides wide latitude in equipment design.
FRA believes that this approach helps to ensure good electrical design
practice without imposing unnecessary costs on the industry.
The electrical system requirements include provisions for:
Electrical conductor sizes and properties to provide a
margin of safety for the intended application;
Battery system design to prevent the risk of overcharging
or accumulation of dangerous gases that can cause an explosion;
Design of resistor grids that dissipate energy produced by
dynamic braking with sufficient electrical isolation and ventilation to
minimize the risk of fires; and
Electromagnetic compatibility within the intended
operating environment to prevent electromagnetic interference with
safety-critical equipment systems and to prevent interference of the
rolling stock with other systems along the rail right-of-way.
Sec. 238.227 Suspension System
This section contains the proposed requirements for suspension
system performance of all Tier I passenger equipment on or after
January 1, 1998, and represents the minimum requirements for a safe
operation. In the ANPRM, FRA presented for comment a large set of
fairly detailed suspension system performance requirements very similar
to those now being proposed for Tier II passenger equipment. The
Working Group advised that such an extensive set of requirements was
not needed for Tier I passenger equipment.
Overall, FRA is proposing that all passenger equipment shall
exhibit

[[Page 49768]]

freedom from hunting oscillations at all speeds. Further, FRA is
proposing particular suspension system safety requirements for
passenger equipment operating at speeds above 110 mph but not exceeding
125 mph, near the transition speed range from Tier I to Tier II
requirements. Although FRA believes that for speeds not exceeding 110
mph existing equipment has not demonstrated serious suspension system
stability problems, most of this same equipment is only operated at
speeds that do not exceed 110 mph. Accordingly, when new or existing
passenger equipment is intended for operation above 110 mph, this
equipment must demonstrate stable operation during pre-revenue service
qualification tests at all speeds up to 5 mph in excess of its maximum
intended operating speed under worst-case conditions--including
component wear--as determined by the operating railroad. The Working
Group advised FRA that a single definition of worst-case conditions
could not be applied generally to all railroads; and, as a result, the
definition of worst-case conditions shall be determined by each
railroad based upon its particular operating environment.
Sec. 239.229 Safety Appliances
This section references current safety appliance requirements
contained in 49 U.S.C. chapter 203 and 49 CFR part 231. These existing
requirements continue to apply independently to all Tier I passenger
equipment, and FRA is referencing them here for clarity on the
recommendation of the Working Group.
Sec. 238.231 Brake System
This section contains general brake system performance requirements
that apply on or after January 1, 1998, to Tier I passenger equipment
except as otherwise provided. Although the Working Group did not reach
consensus on these proposed requirements due to the inability of the
group to resolve the brake inspection, testing, and maintenance issues,
the proposed provisions had widespread support among many of the
members of the Working Group. Several of the proposed requirements
contained in this section were included in written positions provided
by both rail labor and management members of the Working Group.
Virtually all of the proposed provisions were discussed in the 1994
NPRM on power brakes. See 59 FR 47676.
Paragraph (a) contains a requirement that the primary braking
system be capable of stopping the train with a service application of
the brakes from its maximum authorized operating speed within the
signal spacing existing on the track. FRA believes that this proposed
requirement is the most fundamental performance standard for any train
brake system. This section merely codifies a requirement which is
current industry practice and is the basis for safe train operation in
the United States.
Paragraph (b) requires that passenger equipment ordered on or after
January 1, 1999, or placed in service for the first time on or after
January 1, 2001, be designed not to require an inspector to place
himself or herself on, under, or between components of the equipment to
observe brake actuation or release. The proposal allows railroads the
flexibility of using a reliable indicator in place of requiring direct
observation of the brake application or piston travel because the
current designs of many passenger car brake systems make direct
observation extremely difficult without the inspector placing himself
or herself underneath the equipment. Brake system piston travel or
piston cylinder pressure indicators have been used with satisfactory
results for many years. Although indicators do not provide 100 percent
certainty that the brakes are effective, FRA believes that they have
proven themselves effective enough to be preferable to requiring an
inspector to assume a dangerous position.
Paragraph (c) proposes to require that an emergency brake
application feature be available at any time and that it produce an
irretrievable stop. This section merely codifies current industry
practice and ensures that passenger equipment will continue to be
designed with an emergency brake application feature. In the 1994 NPRM
on power brakes, FRA proposed a requirement that all trains be equipped
with an emergency application feature capable of increasing the train's
deceleration rate a minimum of 15 percent. See 59 FR 47729. Comments
received in response to that proposal indicated that passenger brake
equipment should provide a deceleration rate with a full service
application that is close to the emergency brake rate and that the
proposed requirement would require the lowering of full service brake
rates, thereby compromising safety and lowering train speeds. Based on
these comments, FRA proposes the current requirement which is in
accordance with suggestions made by several passenger operations.
Paragraph (d) proposes to require that the train brake system
respond as intended to brake control signals and that the brake control
system be designed so that a loss of control signal causes a redundant
control to take over or cause the brakes to apply. These proposed
provisions are fundamental requirements necessary for effective brake
system performance, and a codification of current industry practice.
FRA intends the requirement to apply to all types of brake control
signals, including pneumatic, electric, and radio signals.
Paragraph (e) proposes to prohibit the introduction of alcohol or
other chemicals into the brake line. During periods of extreme cold
weather, railroad employees at times resort to adding alcohol or other
freezing point depressants to the brake line in an attempt to prevent
accumulated moisture in the line from freezing. Virtually every
railroad has a policy against this practice because alcohol and other
chemicals attack the o-rings and gaskets that seal the brake system,
causing them to age or fail prematurely. This practice can lead to
dangerous air leaks and it increases maintenance costs. FRA proposed a
similar requirement in the 1994 NPRM on power brakes and received
numerous comments supporting this provision. See 59 FR 47728.
Paragraph (f) proposes to require that the brake system be designed
and operated to prevent dangerous cracks in wheels. Passenger equipment
wheels are normally heat treated so that the wheel rim is in
compression. This condition forces small cracks that form in the rim to
be closed. Heavy tread braking can heat wheels to the point that a
stress reversal occurs and the wheel rim is in tension to a certain
depth. Rim tension is a dangerous condition because it promotes surface
crack growth. In the 1994 NPRM on power brakes, FRA proposed a wheel
surface temperature limit to prevent this condition. See 59 FR 47729.
Several brake manufacturers and railroads objected to this approach,
claiming that the temperature limit was too conservative and did not
allow for the development of new materials that can withstand higher
temperatures. Based on these comments and concerns, FRA is proposing a
more flexible performance requirement rather than a wheel tread surface
temperature limit. This is an extremely important safety requirement
because a cracked wheel that fails at high speed can have catastrophic
consequences. In addition, the proposed requirement will lead to longer
wheel life, and thus should provide maintenance savings to the
railroads.
Paragraph (g) proposes to require that brake discs be designed and
operated so that the disc surface temperature does not exceed
manufacturer recommendations. In the 1994 NPRM,

[[Page 49769]]

FRA proposed a disc surface temperature limit. See 59 FR 47729. As
noted above, several brake manufacturers and railroads objected to this
approach, claiming that the temperature limit was too conservative and
did not allow for the development of new materials that can withstand
higher temperatures. Based on these comments and concerns, FRA proposes
a more flexible requirement rather than a single disc surface
temperature limit. FRA believes this requirement will lead to longer
disc life, and thus will produce maintenance savings to railroads.
Paragraph (h) proposes to require that, except for a locomotive
that is ordered before January 1, 1999, and placed in service for the
first time before January 1, 2001, and except for a private car, all
passenger equipment shall be equipped with a hand or parking brake that
can be set and released manually and can hold the equipment on the
maximum grade anticipated by the operating railroad. A hand or parking
brake is an important safety feature that prevents the rolling or
runaway of parked equipment. The proposed requirement represents
current industry practice. In the 1994 NPRM on power brakes, FRA
proposed requiring that a hand brake be equipped on cars and
locomotives. See 59 FR 47729. FRA received several comments to that
proposal suggesting that the term ``parking brake'' be added to the
requirement since that is what is used in many passenger operations.
Based on those suggestions, FRA has added the term in this proposal.
Paragraph (i) proposes to require that passenger cars be equipped
with a means for the emergency brake to be applied that is clearly
identified and accessible to passengers. This is a longstanding
industry practice and an important safety feature because crucial time
may be lost requiring passengers sensing danger to find a member of the
train crew to stop the train.
Paragraph (j) contains proposed provisions to ensure that the
dynamic brake does not become a safety-critical device. Railroads have
consistently held that dynamic brakes are not safety devices because
the friction brake alone is capable of safely stopping a train if the
dynamic brake is not available. The proposed provisions include
requiring that the blending of the friction and dynamic brakes be
automatic, that the friction brakes alone be able to stop the train in
the allowable stopping distance, and that a failure of the dynamic
brake does not cause thermal damage to wheels or discs due to the
greater friction braking load. FRA believes that without these
requirements the dynamic brake would most likely become a safety-
critical item and railroads would not be permitted to dispatch trains
unless the dynamic brake were fully operational.
Paragraph (k) proposes to require that either computer modeling or
dynamometer tests be performed to confirm that new brake designs not
result in thermal damage to wheels or discs. Further, if the operating
parameters of the new braking system change significantly, a new
simulation must be performed. This proposal provides a means to ensure
that the requirements proposed in paragraphs (f) and (g) are being
complied with by new brake designs.
Paragraph (l) proposes to require that all locomotives ordered on
or after January 1, 1999, or placed in service for the first time on or
after January 1, 2001, be equipped with effective air coolers or air
dryers on those locomotives that are equipped with air compressors. The
coolers or dryers must be capable of providing air to the main
reservoir with a dew point suppression at least 10 degrees F. below
ambient temperature. FRA and most members in the industry agree that
moisture is a major cause of brake line contamination. Consequently,
reducing moisture leads to longer component life and better brake
system performance. Currently, virtually all passenger railroads
purchase only locomotives equipped with air dryers or coolers.
Therefore, FRA proposes to require the continuation of what it believes
is good industry practice.
Sec. 238.233 Interior Fittings and Surfaces
This section contains proposed requirements concerning interior
fittings and surfaces that apply, as specified in this section, to
passenger cars and locomotives ordered on or after January 1, 1999, or
placed in service for the first time on or after January 1, 2001. This
section should be read in connection with an earlier discussion of
train interior safety features in the preamble.
FRA and NTSB investigations of passenger train accidents have
revealed that luggage, seats, and other interior objects breaking or
coming loose is a frequent cause of injury to passengers and
crewmembers. During a collision, the greatest decelerations and thus
the greatest forces to cause potential failure of interior fitting
attachment points are experienced in the longitudinal direction, i.e.,
in the direction parallel to the normal direction of train travel.
Current practice is to design seats and other interior fittings to
withstand the forces due to accelerations of 6g in the longitudinal
direction, 3g in the vertical direction, and 3g in the lateral
direction. Due to the injuries caused by broken seats and other loose
fixtures, FRA believes that the current design practice is inadequate.
Accordingly, paragraph (a) proposes that each seat in a passenger
car remain firmly attached to the car body when subjected to
individually applied accelerations of 4g in the vertical direction and
4g in the lateral direction acting on the deadweight of the seat or
seats, if a tandem unit. In addition, the attachment must resist a
longitudinal inertial force of 8g acting on the mass of the seat plus
the impact force of the mass of a 95th-percentile male occupant(s)
being decelerated from a relative speed of 25 mph and striking the seat
from behind. By resisting the force of an occupant striking the seat
from behind, a potential domino effect of seats breaking away from
their attachments is avoided.
Paragraph (b) proposes that overhead storage racks provide
longitudinal and lateral restraint for stowed articles to minimize the
potential for these objects to come loose and injure train occupants.
Further, to prevent overhead storage racks from breaking away from
their attachment points to the car body, these racks shall have an
ultimate strength capable of resisting individually applied
accelerations of 8g longitudinally, 4g vertically, and 4g laterally
acting on the mass of the luggage stowed. This mass shall be specified
by each railroad. Paragraph (c) requires that all other interior
fittings in a passenger car be attached to the car body with sufficient
strength to withstand individually applied accelerations of 8g
longitudinally, 4g vertically, and 4g laterally acting on the mass of
the fitting. FRA believes the proposed attachment strength requirements
for seats, overhead storage racks, and other interior fittings will
help reduce the number of injuries to occupants in passenger cars.
Passenger car occupants may also be injured by protruding objects,
especially if the occupants fall or are thrown against such objects
during a train collision or derailment. As a result, FRA is proposing
in paragraph (d) that, to the extent possible, all interior fittings in
a passenger car, except seats, shall be recessed or flush-mounted. Such
fittings do not protrude above interior surfaces and thereby help to
minimize occupant injuries.
Paragraph (e) is a general, common sense prohibition against sharp
edges and corners in a locomotive cab and a passenger car. Just as FRA
is concerned about protruding objects, these surfaces could also injure
passenger train

[[Page 49770]]

occupants. If sharp edges and corners cannot be avoided, they should be
padded to mitigate the consequences of occupant impacts.
Paragraph (f) contains the requirements for floor-mounted cab seats
provided solely for the crewmembers in locomotive cabs. FRA proposes to
require the seat attachment to have an ultimate strength capable of
resisting the loads due to individually applied accelerations of 8g
longitudinally, 4g vertically, and 4g laterally acting on the combined
mass of the seat and its occupant. This requirement is more stringent
than the requirement for seats in passenger cars in paragraph (a)
because the mass of the seat occupant is included in determining the
load that must be resisted. Cab seats designed to this requirement will
allow the use of seat belts and shoulder harnesses to restrain
crewmembers in a collision. Further, when turned backwards during a
collision, seats designed to this requirement can effectively restrain
crewmembers.
Sec. 238.235 Emergency Window Exits
This section should be read with the earlier discussion of
emergency window exits in the preamble. With the exception of paragraph
(b), the requirements in this section are applicable to passenger cars
on or after January 1, 1998, thereby including existing passenger cars.
However, the emergency window exit size requirements in paragraph (b)
are only applicable to passenger cars placed in service for the first
time on or after January 1, 1998. APTA has advised FRA that not all
emergency window exits on existing passenger cars meet the size
requirements of paragraph (b), and FRA invites comment on this point.
This section requires that a single-level passenger car, other than
a passenger car of special design, have a minimum of four emergency
window exits, either in a staggered configuration or with one located
at each end of each side of the car. A bi-level car shall have a
minimum of four emergency window exits on each main level, configured
as above, so that the car has a minimum total of eight emergency window
exits. Safety may be advanced by staggering the configuration of
emergency window exits so that the window exits are located diagonally
across from each other on opposite sides of a car, instead of placing
them directly across from each other. Commenters are invited to address
this issue. In addition, concern has been raised that the seat
arrangement of passenger cars may block access to and the removal of
emergency window exits. Commenters are also requested to address this
issue.
FRA is proposing that each passenger car of special design, such as
a sleeper car, have at least one emergency window exit in each
compartment. Occupants of a sleeper car may have difficulty reaching
the car doors quickly in an emergency from their compartments, for
example, if an emergency window exit is not provided in their
individual sleeping compartments. An emergency window exit is necessary
in each compartment to enable occupants to quickly exit the car when
time is of the essence, especially if the car is submerged.
Each emergency window exit must be easily operable by a 5th-
percentile female without requiring the use of a tool or other
implement. FRA has added to the Working Group's recommendation by
specifying that a 5th-percentile female must be able to easily operate
the emergency exit, thereby making clear the degree to which the exit
need be easily operable by members of the general public. FRA believes
this is consistent with the desire of the Working Group to promote the
safety of the travelling public.
Paragraph (f) is reserved for emergency window exit marking and
operating instruction requirements. These requirements are currently
being addressed in the proposed rule on passenger train emergency
preparedness. See 62 FR 8330, Feb. 24, 1997.
Sec. 238.237 Doors
This section contains the requirements for exterior side doors on
passenger cars. These doors are the primary means of egress from a
passenger train. This section should be read in connection with the
preamble discussion of NTSB safety recommendation (R-96-7) arising from
the 1996 Silver Spring, Maryland accident.
Paragraph (a) requires that within two years of the effective date
of the final rule, each powered, exterior side door in a vestibule that
is partitioned from the passenger compartment of a passenger car shall
be equipped with a manual override that is: capable of opening the door
without power from inside the car; located adjacent to the door which
it controls; and designed and maintained so that a person may access
the override device from inside the car without requiring the use of a
tool or other implement. Passenger cars subject to this requirement
that are not already equipped with such manual override devices must be
retrofitted accordingly. As noted above, FRA's proposal is not a
consensus recommendation of the Working Group.
FRA invites comment on whether the location of the manual override
device should be specified in terms of distance from the door it
controls or some other measure. FRA is proposing that the manual
override device be ``adjacent'' to the door, as stated in the NTSB
safety recommendation. Railroad representatives on the Working Group
have suggested a time performance requirement that includes the time
necessary for locating and opening the door.
Currently, there is no Federal requirement that passenger cars be
equipped with side doors. Accordingly, in paragraph (b) FRA is
proposing that passenger cars ordered on or after January 1, 1999, or
placed in service for the first time on or after January 1, 2001, shall
have a minimum of four side doors, or the functional equivalent, each
permitting at least one 95th-percentile male to pass through at a
single time. Although the Working Group did not discuss this proposal,
FRA believes that such a requirement is necessary, at least as an
interim measure, so that each passenger car have sufficient doorway
openings to allow passengers to quickly exit in a life-threatening
situation. Exiting a passenger car through a window exit is slower.
FRA recognizes that existing designs of passenger cars do not
always provide for four side doors, and the proposed requirement does
not specifically require that passenger cars have four side doors. For
instance, the requirement would be met if a passenger car had two
double-wide doors that permit two 95th-percentile males to pass through
each door at the same time--the functional equivalent of four side
doors having openings of the specified size. FRA is interested in
comments concerning the extent to which existing designs of passenger
cars cannot comply with the proposed requirement, and FRA may modify
the proposal based on the information supplied. As a longer term
approach, FRA is investigating an emergency evacuation performance
requirement similar to that used in commercial aviation where a
sufficient number of emergency exits must be provided to evacuate the
maximum passenger load in a specified time for various types of
emergency situations.
Paragraph (b) also provides that each powered, exterior side door
be equipped with a manual override feature the same as that required in
paragraph (a) for existing equipment, except that the manual override
must also be capable of opening the door from outside the car.

[[Page 49771]]

This requirement is intended to provide quick access to a passenger car
by emergency response personnel, and represents the consensus
recommendation of the Working Group.
FRA is also considering, but has not proposed in this rule, that
for passenger cars ordered on or after January 1, 1999, or placed in
service for the first time on or after January 1, 2001, the status of
each powered, exterior side door shall be displayed to the crew in the
operating cab of the train. Such a proposal had support from Working
Group members and would enable a crewmember in the operating cab to
determine whether train doors are closed before departure, for example.
However, FRA is concerned that railroads operating Tier I passenger
equipment would be unable to meet this requirement. Because Tier I
passenger trains are not intended to operate as a fixed unit and
instead passenger cars are freely switched into and out of such trains,
practical concerns exist about the compatibility of door sensor
equipment in a Tier I passenger train. Commenters are invited to
address this issue.
To make sure that manual override devices are easily accessible by
passengers, FRA is proposing requirements in paragraph (c) addressing
covers and screens used to protect such devices from casual or
inadvertent use. FRA desires to balance the concern that passengers may
unnecessarily exit cars when no emergency is present with the need for
passengers to easily access a door-release mechanism in an emergency.
Although this proposal reflects general discussions within the Working
Group, it is not specifically a Working Group recommendation.
Paragraph (d) is reserved for door marking and operating
instruction requirements. These requirements are currently being
addressed in the proposed rule on passenger train emergency
preparedness. See 62 FR 8330, Feb. 24, 1997.
Sec. 238.239 Automated Monitoring
This section requires on or after January 1, 1998, an operational
alerter or a deadman control in the controlling locomotive of each
passenger train operating in other than cab signal, automatic train
control, or automatic train stop territory. This section further
requires that such locomotives ordered on or after January 1, 1999, or
placed in service for the first time on or after January 1, 2001, must
be equipped with a working alerter. As a result, the use of a deadman
control alone on these new locomotives would be prohibited. The Working
Group recommended that new locomotives be equipped with a working
alerter, and FRA is proposing that existing locomotives also be
equipped with either a working alerter or a deadman control as provided
in paragraph (a).
An alerter will initiate a penalty brake application if it does not
receive the proper response from the engineer. Likewise, a deadman
control will initiate a penalty brake application if the engineer fails
to maintain proper contact with the device. The Working Group discussed
establishing specific setting requirements for alerters or deadman
controls based on maximum train speed and the capabilities of the
signal system. This discussion led to the conclusion that settings
should be left to the discretion of individual railroads as long as
they document the basis for the settings that they select. If the
device fails en route, the proposed rule requires a second person
qualified on the signal system and brake application procedures to be
stationed in the cab or the engineer must be in constant radio
communication with a second crewmember until the train reaches the next
terminal. This is intended to allow the train to complete its trip with
the device's function of keeping the operator alert taken over by
another member of the crew.
Alerters are safety devices intended to verify that the engineer
remains capable and vigilant to accomplish the tasks that he or she
must perform. Equipping passenger locomotives with an alerter is
current industry practice. These devices have proven themselves in
service, and the requirement will not impose an additional cost on the
industry.

Subpart D--Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements of Tier I
Passenger Equipment

Sec. 238.301 Scope
This subpart contains the proposed requirements regarding the
inspection, testing, and maintenance of all types of passenger
equipment operating at speeds of 125 mph or less. FRA originally
considered developing one set of requirements for MU locomotives and
one set for push-pull equipment. However, the Working Group determined
that this approach would be redundant because nearly identical
requirements could be applied to both types of equipment. Consequently,
this subpart includes the proposed requirements for the inspection,
testing, and maintenance of Tier I passenger equipment brake systems as
well as the other mechanical and electrical safety components of Tier I
passenger equipment.
Sec. 238.303 Exterior Calendar Day Mechanical Inspection of Passenger
Cars and Unpowered Vehicles Used in Passenger Trains
This section contains the proposed requirements for an exterior
calendar day mechanical inspection on passenger cars and unpowered
vehicles used in passenger trains that is patterned after a combination
of the current calendar day inspection required for locomotives under
the Railroad Locomotive Safety Standards and the pre-departure
inspection for freight cars under the Railroad Freight Car Safety
Standards. See 49 CFR 229.21 and 215.13, respectively. FRA proposes
that the calendar day mechanical inspection apply to all passenger cars
and all unpowered vehicles used in passenger trains (which includes,
e.g., not only coaches, MU locomotives, and cab cars but also any other
unit of rail rolling equipment used in a passenger train). A mechanical
safety inspection of freight cars has been a longstanding Federal
safety requirement, and FRA believes that the lack of a similar
requirement for passenger equipment creates a serious void in the
current Federal railroad safety standards.
Paragraphs (a) and (b). Rail labor representatives advocate a daily
inspection of all safety-related mechanical components with pass/fail
criteria or limits written into the Federal safety standards much like
the requirements contained in 49 CFR part 215, whereas, APTA and other
passenger railroad representatives strongly maintain that specific
inspection criteria or limits are not necessary. During the ongoing
meeting of the Working Group, FRA repeatedly requested that railroad
representatives provide a recommended list of mechanical components and
criteria for their inspection. These representatives consistently
responded with very broad requirements basically limited to inspections
for obvious and visible defects. Although passenger railroad
representatives do not object to the safety principle of a mechanical
inspection, they do not want their operations to be bound by a rigid
list of components and criteria for the inspection.
FRA agrees with labor representatives that a specific list of
components to be inspected with enforceable inspection or pass/fail
criteria needs to be included as part of the proposed Passenger
Equipment Safety Standards. For several years, Amtrak has been
conducting voluntary mechanical safety inspections of passenger train
components. Amtrak, working in conjunction with FRA, has

[[Page 49772]]

developed a list of components to be inspected and ``go'' ``no go''
inspection criteria for the various components. Amtrak has trained
mechanical employees to conduct these inspections and has issued pocket
guides containing the inspection criteria to all mechanical employees.
FRA commends Amtrak for its progressive and voluntary efforts.
Furthermore, based upon investigations conducted by FRA field
inspectors, it appears that virtually every passenger railroad
currently performs some type of daily mechanical inspection on its
passenger equipment. Consequently, FRA proposes to codify various
requirements and minimum standards for conducting a calendar day
mechanical inspection.
Paragraph (a) requires that each passenger car and each unpowered
vehicle used in a passenger train receive an exterior mechanical safety
inspection at least once each calendar day that the equipment is placed
in service except under the circumstances described in paragraph (d).
Paragraph (b) requires that this inspection be performed by a qualified
mechanical inspector. FRA believes the combination of a daily Class I
brake test and a mechanical safety inspection performed by fully
qualified mechanical employees is a key to safer passenger railroad
operations. Such a practice will most likely detect and correct
equipment problems before they become the source of an accident or
incident resulting in personal injuries or damage to property. FRA
recognizes that this requirement may create a problem for some commuter
railroads that operate trains on weekends or other days when qualified
mechanical inspectors are not scheduled to work. Some railroads may be
forced to schedule qualified mechanical inspectors to work on these
days at additional expense. However, based on independent
investigations performed by FRA, it is believed that the impact of this
proposal will be much less than several railroad representatives have
indicated. Nevertheless, FRA is willing to consider whether to allow
railroads that have demonstrated an ability to operate passenger trains
safely over weekends without a mechanical safety inspection being
performed by qualified mechanical inspectors to continue that practice.
The problem, from FRA's position, is that it is difficult to allow this
flexibility without creating a loophole that could be abused in certain
circumstances. Consequently, FRA solicits detailed comments from
interested parties on whether the granting of such flexibility is even
necessary and on possible methods for providing such flexibility.
Paragraph (c) identifies the components that FRA proposes to be
inspected as part of the exterior daily mechanical safety inspection
and provides measurable inspection criteria for the components. The
railroad is required to ascertain that each passenger car, and each
unpowered vehicle used in a passenger train conforms with the
conditions enumerated in paragraph (c). Deviation from any listed
condition makes the passenger car or unpowered vehicle defective if it
is in service. The Working Group members generally agreed that the
components contained in this section represent valid safety-related
components that should be frequently inspected by railroads. However,
members of the Working Group had widely different opinions regarding
the criteria to be used to inspect these components. Therefore, as FRA
was not provided any clear guidance from the Working Group, FRA
selected inspection criteria based on the locomotive calendar day
inspection and the freight car safety pre-departure inspection required
by 49 CFR parts 229 and 215, respectively. FRA believes that, at a
minimum, passenger cars should receive an inspection which is at least
equivalent to that received by locomotives and freight cars. FRA
solicits comments from interested parties concerning other sets of
mechanical safety inspection criteria. For example, a concern has been
raised by some parties regarding the securement of doors on baggage
cars. Consequently, FRA seeks comments from interested parties on the
necessity to inspect these doors as part of any required daily
mechanical inspection.
APTA believes that this section contains exterior inspection
requirements that cannot be safely or practically performed in the
field. In particular, APTA maintains that the inspections concerning
the draft gear, truck attachment, suspension system, and coupler
knuckle can only be properly performed by placing each car individually
over a repair pit.
FRA intends for the daily mechanical inspection to serve as the
time when the railroad repairs defects that occurred en route. Thus,
this section proposes to require that safety components not in
compliance with this part be repaired before the equipment is permitted
to remain in or return to passenger service. (See Sec. 238.9 for a
discussion of the prohibitions against using passenger equipment
containing defects; and Secs. 238.15 and 238.17 for a discussion of
movement of defective equipment for purposes of repair or sale). The
purpose of the defect reporting and tracking system proposed in
Sec. 238.19 is to have the mechanical forces make all necessary safety
repairs to the equipment before it is cleared for another day of
operation. In other words, FRA intends for the flexibility to operate
defective equipment in passenger service to end at the calendar day
mechanical inspection.
The narrow exception in paragraph (d) allows long-distance
intercity passenger trains that miss a scheduled exterior calendar day
mechanical inspection due to a delay en route to continue in passenger
service to the location where the inspection was scheduled to be
performed. At that point, a calendar day mechanical inspection must be
performed prior to returning the equipment to service of any kind. This
flexibility applies only to the mechanical safety inspections of
coaches. FRA does not intend to relieve the railroad of the
responsibility to perform a locomotive calendar day inspection as
required by 49 CFR part 229.
Paragraph (e) specifies an additional contingent component of the
calendar day exterior mechanical inspection. If a car requiring a
single car test is moved in a train carrying passengers or available to
carry such passengers to a place where the test can be performed, then
the single car test must be performed before or during the exterior
calendar day mechanical inspection.
Secs. 238.305 and 238.307 Interior Calendar Day Mechanical Inspection
and Periodic Mechanical Inspection of Passenger Cars
Section 238.305 requires the performance of an interior inspection
of passenger cars (which includes, e.g., passenger coaches, MU
locomotives, and cab cars) each calendar day that the equipment is used
in service except under the circumstances described in paragraph (d).
Unlike the exterior calendar day mechanical inspection, FRA proposes in
Sec. 238.305(b) to permit the interior inspections of passenger cars to
be performed by ``qualified persons,'' individuals qualified by the
railroad to do so. Thus, these individuals need not meet the definition
of a ``qualified mechanical inspector.''
FRA's original position was to require the interior inspections to
be performed by qualified mechanical inspectors. However, after several
discussions with members of the Working Group and several other
representatives of passenger railroads, FRA determined that the
training and experience typical of qualified mechanical inspectors is
not necessary and often does not apply to

[[Page 49773]]

inspecting interior safety components of passenger equipment. In
addition, the flexibility created by permitting someone less qualified
than a mechanical inspector can reduce the cost of performing the
mechanical safety inspection since the most economical way to
accomplish the mechanical inspection is to combine the exterior
inspection with the Class I brake test and then have a crewmember or
train coach cleaner combine the interior coach inspection with coach
cleaning.
Section 238.305(c) lists various components that FRA proposes to be
inspected as part of the interior daily mechanical safety inspection.
As a minimum, FRA proposes that the following components be inspected:
trap doors; end and side doors; manual door releases; safety covers,
doors and plates; vestibule step lighting; and safety-related signs and
instructions. Consistent with the proposed exterior inspection
requirements, FRA proposes that all en route defects and all
noncomplying conditions must be repaired at the time of the daily
interior inspection in order for the equipment to be placed or remain
in passenger service with the exception of a defect under
Sec. 238.305(c)(5). (See Sec. 238.9 for a discussion of the
prohibitions against using passenger equipment containing defects, and
Sec. 238.17 for a discussion of the movement of defective equipment for
purposes of repair.) Furthermore, Sec. 238.305(d) allows long-distance
intercity passenger trains that miss a scheduled calendar day
mechanical inspection due to a delay en route to continue in passenger
service to the location where the inspection was scheduled.
Initially, FRA considered requiring a more extensive list of
components to be checked at each daily interior inspection. However,
based on discussions conducted with the Working Group, FRA determined
that the daily inspection and repair of some interior items could be
burdensome to the railroads without producing an offsetting safety
benefit. As a result, FRA in Sec. 238.307 proposes a periodic
mechanical inspection for passenger cars (which include, e.g.,
passenger coaches, MU locomotives, and cab cars) in order to reduce the
frequency with which certain components require inspection and repair.
FRA proposes to require that the following components be inspected for
proper operation and repaired, if necessary, as part of the periodic
maintenance of the equipment: emergency lights; emergency exit windows;
seats and seat attachments; overhead luggage racks and attachments;
floor and stair surfaces; and hand-operated electrical switches.
Virtually all passenger railroads currently have defined periodic
maintenance intervals for all of the equipment they operate. These
intervals vary depending on the type of equipment and the service in
which it is used, but typically range from 60 to 180 days. Although FRA
does not intend to limit the railroad's flexibility to set periodic
maintenance intervals, FRA believes that an outside limit must be
placed on the performance of the periodic mechanical inspection. Thus,
FRA proposes that the periodic mechanical inspection be performed at
least every 180 days, as that appears to be the outside limit of
currently established maintenance cycles. As with the daily inspection,
any known defects or conditions not in compliance with this section
which are uncovered by the periodic inspection must be repaired in
order for the equipment to remain in or return to passenger service.
APTA has advised FRA that most of the daily interior inspection
requirements proposed in this section are currently performed as part
of a railroad's own periodic inspection. Moreover, APTA maintains that
the daily interior inspection requirements do not add to safety and
will create delays impacting on-time performance. APTA believes that
many cars with defects found during both the daily interior and
exterior inspections can be operated safely with appropriate
restrictions without first shopping the cars. Commenters are asked to
address the various concerns raised by APTA.
Sec. 238.309 Periodic Brake Equipment Maintenance
This section contains the proposed requirements for the performance
of periodic brake maintenance for various types of passenger equipment,
referred to in the industry as clean, oil, test, and stencil (COT&S).
Paragraph (b) extends the periodic maintenance interval for MU
locomotive fleets that are 100 percent equipped with air dryers and
modern brake systems from 736 days to 1,104 days. The requirement
remains 736 days for fleets that are not 100 percent equipped with air
dryers or that are equipped with older brake systems. FRA bases this
proposed extension on tests conducted by Metro-North and monitored by
FRA field inspectors. These tests revealed that after three years,
brake valves on MU locomotives equipped with air dryers were very clean
and showed little or no signs of deterioration. Based on the results of
these tests, FRA is confident that these valves can safely operate for
three years between periodic maintenance. FRA believes this extension
of the periodic maintenance interval will result in a cost savings to
those railroads that operate MU locomotives equipped with air dryers.
Paragraph (c) extends the periodic maintenance interval on
conventional locomotives equipped with 26-L or equivalent types of
brakes from the current standard of 736 days to 1,104 days. The
required periodic maintenance interval remains at 736 days for
locomotives equipped with other types of brake systems. The proposed
requirement merely makes universal a practice that has been approved by
waiver for several years. See H-80-7. FRA believes that locomotives
equipped with 26-L brakes have demonstrated an ability to operate
safely for three years between periodic maintenance.
Paragraph (d) extends the periodic maintenance interval on
passenger coaches and other unpowered vehicles equipped with 26-C or
equivalent brake systems from 1,104 days to 1,476 days. This extension
is based on tests performed by Amtrak. Based on these tests, FRA
granted Amtrak a waiver for this extension on July 26, 1995. See FRA
Docket No. PB 94-3. Amtrak has operated under the terms of this waiver
for several years with no problems. Consequently, based on Amtrak's
experience, FRA believes all passenger cars with 26-C equipment can
safely be operated for four years between periodic maintenance.
Paragraph (e) proposes that the same extensions applicable to
locomotives and passenger coaches should be applied to control cab cars
that use brake valves that are identical to the 26-C valves used in
passenger cars or the 26-L valves used on locomotives. Consequently,
based on the information and tests conducted on those valves as well as
waivers currently existing, FRA proposes to extend the periodic
maintenance interval for cab cars to 1,476 days or 1,104 days for those
cab cars that use brake systems identical to the 26-C and 26-L,
respectively. This proposed extension is consistent with recent
requests for waivers received by FRA.
A railroad may petition FRA, under Sec. 238.21, to approve
alternative maintenance procedures providing equivalent safety.
Railroads could propose using periodically scheduled single car tests
to extend the time between required periodic maintenance on passenger
coaches. FRA believes that the single car test provides a good
alternative to more frequent periodic

[[Page 49774]]

maintenance. In fact, in the previous NPRM on power brakes, FRA
proposed the elimination of time-based COT&S and in its stead proposed
time intervals for conducting single car tests, ranging from three to
six months, depending on the utilization rate of the passenger
equipment. See 59 FR 47690-47691, 47710-47711, and 47740-47741.
However, comments received and discussions with members of the Working
Group revealed that many passenger railroads would rather perform
periodic maintenance than more frequent single car tests. One reason
for this is that some operators would rather take equipment out of
service every few years and perform the overhaul of the brake system
rather than having equipment out of service for shorter periods every
few months. Therefore, FRA proposes to retain periodic maintenance
intervals but provide the alternative to railroads to propose single
car testing intervals in order to reduce the frequency with which the
periodic maintenance is performed. Consequently, railroads are afforded
some flexibility to determine the type of maintenance approach that
best suits their operations.
Sec. 238.311 Single Car Test
This section contains the proposed requirements for single car
tests of passenger equipment. Although the Working Group failed to
reach consensus on the requirements contained in this section, the
group did agree that single car tests are a valuable tool to
demonstrate that a car's brake system performs correctly after repairs
have been made that could affect the brakes. A major issue raised both
in comments to the previous NPRM on power brakes and by various members
of the Working Group was the method for specifying how the test is to
be performed. Labor representatives objected to specifying the method
of testing by reference to an industry standard that could be changed
unilaterally by the organization that maintains the standard. These
representatives insisted that the requirements specifying how to
conduct the test must be contained in the rule text so that the only
way that changes can be made is through the administrative procedures
required by the formal rulemaking process. FRA agrees and proposes in
paragraph (a) to require that passenger railroads perform the single
car test of the brake system in accordance with AAR Standard S-044
contained in AAR's ``Instruction Pamphlet 5039-4, Supp. 3 (April
1991),'' which is the most recent version of the test description. FRA
also proposes that the special approval process detailed in Sec. 238.21
would be employed to evaluate any proposed changes in this highly
technical procedure.
The single car test proposed in this section has proven effective
in uncovering brake system problems that are the root cause of certain
wheel defects or that have been caused by repairs made to the brake
system. FRA believes that this test has contributed to the current
trend of greater brake system reliability and fewer brake-related
accidents/incidents of passenger equipment. Currently, the regulations
require that a single car test be performed on passenger cars whenever
they are on a shop or repair track. In the previous NPRM on power
brakes, FRA discussed the potential loophole that the current
regulations permit. See 59 FR 47710. Basically, it has the potential of
allowing railroads to avoid the performance of the tests by calling
repair tracks something other than a repair track. Although this is an
issue that has arisen in the freight context, it does appear prudent to
base the requirement to perform a single car test on the type of defect
involved rather than the location where the defect is repaired.
Paragraph (b) lists the wheel defects that would trigger the
requirement to perform a single car test. FRA believes that the
proposed wheel defects indicate some type of braking equipment problem.
FRA believes that merely changing a wheel to correct a wheel defect
that is actually caused by a brake system problem will only lead to a
continuation of the problem on the new wheel and will increase repair
costs to the railroad. A test that checks for the root cause of the
defect is not only a good safety practice, but is a good business
practice that will lead to reduced operating costs.
Paragraph (c) requires a railroad to conduct a single car test if
one or more of the identified brake system components is removed,
repaired, or replaced. This paragraph also proposes that a single car
test be performed if a passenger car or vehicle is placed in service
after having been out of service for 30 or more days. FRA believes that
these requirements will ensure that brake system repairs have been
performed correctly and that the car's brake system will operate as
intended after repairs are made or after the car has been in storage
for extended periods. The proposed requirements are consistent with the
current practices of most passenger railroads.
Paragraph (d) requires that all single car tests be performed by
qualified mechanical inspectors. A single car test is a comprehensive
brake test that requires the skills and knowledge of a professional
mechanical employee. Railroads currently use the ``qualified mechanical
inspector'' as defined by this part to perform single car tests, and
FRA believes that this practice should continue.
Paragraph (e) provides that if a single car test cannot be made at
the point where repairs are made, the car may be moved in service to
the next forward location where the test can be made. The single car
test shall be completed prior to, or as a part of, the car's next
calendar day mechanical inspection.
APTA has advised FRA that the proposed section on single car tests
contains an outdated standard and requires a large number of tests
which do not serve to enhance safety. APTA believes that actual
operating experience does not support a requirement for this level of
testing, and the proposal will increase maintenance costs and require
additional spare vehicles to maintain service. Additionally, APTA
maintains that the proposed regulation provides a disincentive to
updating single car test procedures as needed.
Sec. 238.313 Class I Brake Test
This section contains the proposed requirements related to Class I
brake tests. FRA proposes that the requirements in this section apply
to all passenger coaches, control cab cars, MU locomotives, and all
nonself-propelled vehicles that are part of a passenger train. The
Working Group was unable to reach consensus on the requirements
proposed in this section.
This section proposes to require that a Class I brake test be
performed at least once each calendar day that a piece of equipment is
placed in service. As discussed previously, the Working Group discussed
and debated when and how a Class I brake test should be performed.
Labor representatives stressed the need for a thorough brake test
performed by qualified mechanical inspectors on every passenger train.
These representatives strongly contended that this brake test must be
performed prior to the first daily departure of each passenger train.
On the other hand, representatives of passenger railroads expressed the
desire to have flexibility in conducting a comprehensive brake
inspection, arguing that safety would be better served if railroads
were permitted to conduct these inspections on a daily basis.
Although FRA agrees with the position advanced by many labor

[[Page 49775]]

representatives that some sort of car-to-car inspection must be made of
the brake equipment prior to the first run of the day, FRA does not
agree that it is necessary to perform a full Class I brake test in
order to ensure the proper functioning of the brake equipment. As FRA
proposes that a Class I brake test consist of a comprehensive
inspection of the braking system, including the proper operation of
supplemental braking systems, FRA believes that commuter and short-
distance intercity passenger train operations must be permitted some
flexibility in conducting these inspections. Consequently, FRA proposes
in paragraph (a) to require that commuter and short-distance intercity
passenger train operations perform a Class I brake test sometime during
the calendar day in which the equipment is used.
However, FRA also recognizes the differences between commuter or
short-distance intercity operations and long-distance intercity
passenger train operations. Long-distance intercity passenger trains do
not operate in shorter turnaround service over the same sections of
track on a daily basis for the purpose of transporting passengers from
major centers of employment. Instead, these trains tend to operate for
extended periods of time, over long distances with greater distances
between passenger stations and terminals. Further, these trains may
operate well over 1,000 miles in any 24-hour period, somewhat
diminishing the opportunity for conducting inspections on these trains.
Therefore, FRA believes that a thorough inspection of the braking
system on these types of operations must be conducted prior to the
trains' departure from an initial starting terminal. Consequently, FRA
proposes in paragraph (b) that a Class I brake inspection be performed
on long-distance intercity passenger trains prior to departure from an
initial terminal. FRA does not believe there would be any significant
burden placed on these operations as the current regulations require
that an initial terminal inspection be performed at these locations.
Furthermore, virtually all of the initial terminal inspections
currently conducted on these types of trains are performed by
individuals who would be considered qualified mechanical employees
under this proposal.
FRA also recognizes that these long-distance intercity passenger
trains could conceivably travel over 3,000 miles if Class I inspections
were required only once every 24 hours that the equipment is in
service, as proposed for commuter and short-distance intercity
passenger trains. Thus, FRA believes that some outside mileage limit
must be placed on these trains between brake inspections. Currently, a
passenger train can lawfully travel no further than 1,000 miles from
its initial terminal, at which point it must receive an intermediate
inspection of brakes, which includes application of the brakes to
ensure brake pipe continuity and the inspection of the brake rigging to
ensure it is properly secured. See 49 CFR 232.12(b). However, in
recognition of the improved technology used in passenger train brake
systems, combined with the comprehensive nature of the proposed Class I
brake tests and mechanical safety inspections both being performed by
qualified mechanical inspectors, FRA proposes to require that the
proposed Class I brake test be performed once every calendar day that
the equipment is used or every 1,500 miles, whichever occurs first.
Paragraph (c) requires that the Class I brake tests be performed by
qualified mechanical inspectors. As FRA intends for these Class I brake
inspections to be in-depth inspections of the entire braking system,
which most likely will be performed only one time in any given day in
which the equipment is used, FRA believes that these inspections must
be performed by individuals possessing the knowledge to not only
identify and detect a defective condition in all of the brake equipment
required to be inspected but also the knowledge to recognize the
interrelational workings of the equipment and the ability to trouble-
shoot and repair the equipment. Furthermore, most passenger railroads
currently have a daily brake test performed by mechanical employees so
this requirement is not really a departure from current industry
practice.
FRA recognizes that these requirements may create a problem for
some commuter railroads that operate trains on weekends or other days
when qualified mechanical inspectors are not scheduled to work. Some
railroads may be forced to schedule qualified mechanical inspectors to
work on these days at additional expense. However, based on independent
investigations performed by FRA, it is believed that the impact of this
proposal will be much less than several railroad representatives have
indicated. However, FRA is willing to consider whether to allow
railroads that have demonstrated an ability to operate passenger trains
safely over weekends without a mechanical safety inspection being
performed by qualified mechanical inspectors to continue that practice.
The problem, from FRA's position, is that it is difficult to allow this
flexibility without creating a loophole that could be abused in certain
circumstances. Consequently, FRA solicits detailed comments from
interested parties on whether the granting of such flexibility is even
necessary and on possible methods of providing such flexibility.
Paragraph (d) provides railroads with the option to perform the
Class I brake test either separately or in conjunction with the
calendar day mechanical inspections. FRA proposes this provision simply
to clarify that the two inspections need not be done at the same time
or location as long as they are both performed sometime during the day.
Paragraph (e) prohibits a railroad from using or hauling a
passenger train in passenger service from a location where a Class I
brake test has been performed, or was required to have been performed,
with less than 100 percent operating brakes. (See Sec. 238.15 for a
discussion of movement of defective equipment for purposes of repair or
sale).
Paragraph (f) contains a proposed list of the safety-related items
that must be inspected, tested, or demonstrated as part of a Class I
brake test. This list was developed based on the experience and
knowledge of FRA's motive power and equipment field inspectors familiar
with the operations and inspection practices of passenger operations.
The Working Group extensively discussed the items contained in this
proposal. Paragraph (f)(1) requires that an inspection be conducted on
each side of each car to verify the application and release of each
brake. This requirement is consistent with FRA's longstanding
interpretation of what the current regulations require when conducting
initial terminal and 1,000 brake inspections pursuant to Sec. 232.12.
For clarity and consistency, FRA has explicitly incorporated the
requirement into this proposal.
The requirements included in paragraph (f) which FRA proposes to be
included in a Class I brake test contain two items that would bar the
use of a train that current regulations allow to be placed in service.
These include the requirement that the secondary brake systems must be
fully operational and the requirement that brake indicators must
function as intended. These requirements will require railroads to make
more frequent repairs than are currently required. However, FRA
believes these added costs are necessitated by and offset by the added
flexibility to move defective equipment as well as the ability to use
brake indicators during the performance of

[[Page 49776]]

certain brake tests in lieu of direct observation of the brakes.
Paragraph (g) proposes to require the qualified mechanical
inspector that performs a Class I brake test to record the date, time
and location of the test as well as the number of the controlling
locomotive of the train. This minimal information would be required to
be available in the cab of the controlling locomotive to demonstrate to
the train crew and future inspectors that the train is operating under
a current Class I brake test. Furthermore, the use of such records or
``brake slips'' as they are known in the industry is the current
practice of virtually all passenger railroads. FRA believes that this
recordkeeping requirement adds necessary reliability, accountability,
and enforceability to the inspection requirements proposed in this
section.
Paragraph (h) also proposes to allow long distance, intercity
passenger trains that miss a scheduled Class I brake test due to a
delay en route to proceed to the point where the scheduled brake test
was to be performed. This flexibility prevents Amtrak or other
operators of long distance trains from having to dispatch qualified
mechanical inspectors to the location of a delayed train merely to meet
the calendar day Class I brake test requirement. This is a common sense
exception that will not compromise safety.
Sec. 238.315 Class IA Brake Test
This section contains the proposed requirements regarding Class IA
brake tests. As mentioned previously, although FRA agrees with the
position advanced by many labor representatives that some sort of car-
to-car inspection must be made of the brake equipment prior to the
first run of the day, FRA does not agree that it is necessary to
perform a full Class I brake test in order to ensure the proper
functioning of the brake equipment in all situations. However, contrary
to the position espoused by several railroad representatives, FRA
believes that something more than just a determination that the brakes
on the rear car set and release is necessary.
Currently, the quality of initial terminal tests performed by train
crews is likely adequate to determine that brakes apply on each car.
However, most commuter equipment utilizes ``tread brake units'' in lieu
of cylinders and brake rigging of the kind prevalent on freight and
some intercity passenger cars. It is undoubtedly the case that train
crewmembers do not verify application of the brakes by tapping brake
shoes while the brakes are applied, the only effective means of
determining that adequate force is being applied. This is one reason
why the subject railroads typically conduct redundant initial terminal
tests at other times during the day. Further, train crews are not asked
to inspect for wheel defects and other unsafe conditions, nor should
they be asked to do so, given the conditions under which they are asked
to inspect and the training they receive.
Consequently, paragraph (a) requires that, at a minimum, a Class I
or Class IA brake test be performed prior to a commuter or short-
distance intercity passenger train's first departure on any given day.
FRA believes that the proposed Class IA brake test is sufficiently
detailed to ensure the proper functioning of the brake system, yet not
so intensive that it requires individuals to perform an inspection for
which they are not qualified. FRA proposes in paragraph (a) that a
qualified mechanical inspector or a properly trained and qualified
train crewmember perform a Class IA brake test.
As noted in the discussion of Class I brake tests, FRA recognizes
the differences between commuter or short-distance intercity operations
and long-distance intercity passenger train operations. FRA believes
that a thorough inspection of the braking system on these types of
operations must be conducted prior to each train's departure from an
initial starting terminal. Consequently, FRA will not permit the use of
Class IA brake tests for these trains, and requires that a Class I
brake inspection be performed on long-distance intercity passenger
trains prior to departure from an initial terminal.
Paragraph (a) also requires that a Class IA brake test be performed
prior to placing a train in service if that train has been off a source
of compressed air for more than four hours. This requirement formalizes
a long-standing agency interpretation of the existing power brake
regulations but increases the time limit from two hours to four hours.
Labor representatives maintain that any number of brake system problems
can develop with equipment off air for only a short time, while
management representatives contend that equipment can be left off air
for extended periods of time with no problems. FRA believes the
proposed requirement is a fair compromise that allows railroads some
operating flexibility, but does not allow equipment to be off air
without a new brake test for extended periods of time. As stated in the
previous NPRM on power brakes, FRA agrees that its longstanding
administrative interpretation of allowing cars to be ``off air'' for
only two hours was established prior to the development of new
equipment that has greatly reduced leakage problems. However, contrary
to the contentions of some commenters, FRA does not believe that cars
should be allowed to be ``off air'' for extended periods without being
retested. The longer cars sit without a supply of compressed air
attached, the greater the chances are that the integrity of the system
will be compromised, either by weather conditions or vandalism.
Paragraph (b) allows a commuter or short-distance intercity
passenger train that provides continuing late night service that began
prior to midnight to complete its daily operating cycle after midnight
without performing another Class I or Class IA brake test.
Paragraph (c) allows a Class IA brake test to be performed at a
shop or yard site without needing the test repeated at the first
passenger terminal if the train remains on air and in the custody of
the crew. This provision is an incentive for railroads to conduct the
tests at locations where they can be performed more safely and easily.
FRA believes that a shop or yard location is more conducive for
conducting a proper brake test. Raised platforms and other conditions
frequently found at terminals can make the performance of a brake test
difficult, if not hazardous.
Paragraph (d) permits the Class IA test to be performed by either a
qualified person or a qualified mechanical inspector. Paragraph (e)
prohibits a railroad from using or hauling a passenger train from a
location where a Class IA brake test has been performed, or was
required to have been performed, with less than 100 percent operative
brakes. (See Secs. 238.15-238.17 for a discussion of movement of
defective equipment for purposes of repair or sale). Paragraph (f)
establishes the requirements for conducting a proper Class IA brake
test. It is proposed that a Class IA brake test include: a check that
each brake sets and releases, a test of the emergency brake application
feature, a check of the deadman or other emergency control device, a
check that piston travel is in the nominal range for the type of brake
equipment, and an observation that angle cocks and cutout cocks are
properly set and that brake pipe pressure changes are communicated to
the rear of the train.
Paragraph (g) requires that the inspection of the set and release
of the brakes be performed by walking the train so the inspector
actually observes the set and release of each brake. Labor
representatives strongly contended that this is the only way to do a
proper brake test. They believe that observation of brake indicators
does not give a reliable

[[Page 49777]]

indication of effective brakes because the indicators sense brake
cylinder pressure rather than the force of the brake shoe against the
wheel or the pad against the disc. However, this section proposes to
allow an exception when railroads determine that direct observation of
the set and release can place the inspector in danger. FRA acknowledges
the contention of rail management representatives that conditions at
certain locations where Class IA tests may be performed could place the
inspector in danger if he or she is required to place himself or
herself in a position to actually observe the set and release of each
brake. Where railroads determine this to be the case, FRA will permit
the use of brake indicators for the set and release step of the Class
IA brake test as long as the inspector takes a position where an
accurate observation of the indicators can be made.
Sec. 238.317 Class II Brake Test
This section proposes the requirements regarding how a Class II
brake test is to be performed and contains the proposed conditions for
when a railroad is required to perform the brake test. The Class II
brake test provides passenger railroads the flexibility to continue to
use train crew personnel to perform the limited brake tests required
when minor changes to the train occur. Both labor and management
representatives to the Working Group recognized that train crews are
capable of performing the relatively simple checks required by a Class
II brake test and that the operations of most commuter and passenger
railroads require the flexibility of having operating personnel perform
these tests.
Paragraph (c) requires that passenger trains not depart from Class
II brake tests which are performed at a terminal or a yard with any
brakes known to be cut-out, inoperative, or defective. This requirement
was agreed to by members of the Working Group and is consistent with
the movement for repair provisions contained in this proposal. See
Sec. 238.15. Terminals and yards are generally the best locations
available to a railroad for either conducting repairs or removing a
vehicle from a train. This requirement only applies to brake equipment
which is known to be cut-out, inoperative, or otherwise defective by
the railroad prior to the train's departure from the yard or terminal
where the Class II brake test is performed.
Paragraph (d) requires that a Class II brake test consist of: a
check that the brakes on rear unit of the train apply and release in
response to brake control signals, a test of the emergency brake
application, a test of the deadman pedal or other emergency control
device, and a check that brake pipe pressure changes are properly
communicated at the rear of the train. FRA believes that if the
equipment receives a full Class I brake test and a calendar day
mechanical inspection at some time during each operating day, then
these simple checks are adequate to confirm brake system performance at
intermediate terminals or turning points. This requirement basically
codifies current industry practice.
Sec. 238.319 Running Brake Tests
This section contains the proposed requirements for conducting
running brake tests on the brakes of passenger trains. A running brake
test is merely a brake application at the first safe opportunity to
confirm that the brake system works as expected by the engineer. FRA
proposes that a running brake test be performed in accordance with the
railroad's established operating rules after the train has received a
Class I, Class IA, or Class II brake test as safety permits. FRA
believes that railroads are in the best position to determine when and
where running tests can be safely performed. As most passenger
railroads routinely conduct running brake tests, FRA believes that the
proposal requirement captures an important safety check without
changing current operating practice to any great extent.

Tier II Passenger Equipment Requirements

Most of the requirements proposed for Tier II equipment are based
on lengthy discussions between Amtrak and FRA over safety requirements
for operation of passenger train sets at speeds up to 150 mph in the
Northeast Corridor (NEC). Amtrak voluntarily included many of the
provisions proposed for Tier II equipment in their procurement
specification for American Flyer trainsets--the first Tier II equipment
which should be placed in regular revenue service in the United States.
The process used by the Working Group to discuss proposed Tier II
equipment standards differed from that used for the Tier I standards.
Many members of the full Working Group stated that they will never be
involved in the operation of such high-speed equipment and
participation in Tier II standards was outside their area of interest
and expertise. As a result, the full Working Group recommended the
formation of a smaller subgroup to consider Tier II standards.
Consequently, a subgroup consisting of representatives from Amtrak,
equipment builders, labor organizations, the NTSB and FRA was formed to
consider Tier II equipment safety standards.
The Tier II Equipment Subgroup came very close to reaching full
consensus recommendations on the proposed Tier II safety standards.
Only two exceptions to a full consensus on recommendations resulted
from the process. The first exception involves a disagreement between
Amtrak and labor organizations over the proper use of brake indicator
technology.
The second exception results from a joint meeting between the Tier
II equipment subgroup and the RSAC High Speed Track Standards Working
Group. The purpose of this joint meeting was to ensure that the two
sets of proposed standards not conflict at the wheel-rail interface
where the two sets of standards overlap.
These two exceptions to full consensus will be more fully discussed
under the appropriate section of this section-by-section analysis. In
all other cases, the section-by-section analysis assumes the full
consensus of the Subgroup without actually repeating it as part of each
of the discussions.

Subpart E--Specific Requirements for Tier II Passenger Equipment

Sec. 238.401 Scope

This subpart contains the design and performance requirements for
Tier II passenger equipment operating at speeds exceeding 125 mph but
not exceeding 150 mph. Unless otherwise specified, the proposed
requirements represent the consensus recommendations of the Tier II
Equipment Subgroup with refinements by FRA for clarity, enforceability,
and compatibility with other rail safety laws. For the most part,
compliance with the requirements of this section will be demonstrated
by one-time analysis or initial acceptance tests.
The requirements contained in this subpart have their basis in
discussions between Amtrak and FRA involving safety requirements for
the operation of passenger trainsets at speeds up to 150 mph on the
Northeast Corridor (NEC). Aware that FRA was considering the
development of safety standards for high-speed passenger rail
equipment, Amtrak asked FRA for assistance in developing a set of
safety specifications for the procurement of high-speed trainsets which
would address FRA's safety concerns. As a result, Amtrak's American
Flyer trainsets, scheduled to begin regular passenger service in 1999,
will very likely comply with all of the proposed safety standards in
this subpart.

[[Page 49778]]

Amtrak's discussions with FRA led it to sponsor a risk assessment
of high speed rail passenger systems on the north end of the NEC--from
New York to Boston. The discussions also prompted FRA to sponsor
computer modeling to predict the performance of various equipment
structural designs and configurations in collisions. A copy of the risk
assessment performed by Arthur D. Little, Inc., for Amtrak is included
in the docket of this rulemaking. The risk assessment was based on
existing and predicted future right-of-way configurations and traffic
density patterns. The risk assessment concluded that a significant risk
of collisions at speeds below 20 mph and a risk of collisions at speeds
exceeding 100 mph exist over the 20-year projected operational life of
the American Flyer trainsets--due to heavy and increasing conventional
commuter rail traffic, freight rail traffic on the NEC, highway-rail
grade crossings, moveable bridges, and a history of low speed
collisions in or near stations and rail yards.
Based on the risk assessment and the results of the computer
modeling, Amtrak and FRA determined that reliance on collision
avoidance measures rather than crashworthiness, though the hallmark of
safe high-speed rail operations in several parts of the world, could
not be implemented in corridors like the north end of the NEC. Existing
traffic and right-of-way configurations do not permit implementation of
the same collision avoidance measures that have proven successful in
Europe and Japan. To compensate for the increased risk of a collision,
a more crashworthy trainset design is needed. As a result, the set of
structural design requirements proposed for Tier II passenger equipment
is more stringent than current design practice for North American
passenger equipment or for high-speed rail equipment in other parts of
the world.

Sec. 238.403 Crash Energy Management Requirements

This section requires that each power car and trailer car be
designed with a crash energy management system to dissipate kinetic
energy during a collision. This section should be read with the
discussion of crash energy management in the preamble.
During discussions with Amtrak over the safety provisions for the
American Flyer trainsets, FRA proposed very challenging crash energy
management requirements based on predictions using computer modeling.
Amtrak believed that meeting these requirements would be well beyond
the current state of the art for passenger equipment design, and that
an extensive and costly research and testing program would be required.
As an alternative, Amtrak proposed a crash energy management design
based on the demonstrated, commercially viable design developed by
France and incorporated in the most recent design of the TGV trainset.
FRA believes that Federal safety standards must be capable of
implementation in the design of passenger equipment without driving the
cost of implementation to the point that high speed rail systems are no
longer financially viable.
As a result, paragraph (c) proposes a crash energy management
system capable of absorbing a minimum of 13 megajoules (MJ) of energy
at each end of the trainset. The ability to absorb this energy must be
partitioned as follows: a minimum of 5 MJ by the front end of the power
car ahead of the operator's control compartment; a minimum of 3 MJ by
the power car structure behind the operator's control compartment; and
a minimum of 5 MJ by the unoccupied end of the first trailer car
adjacent to the power car. This requirement can be met using existing
technology. However, it will effectively prevent a conventional cab car
from operating as the lead vehicle in a Tier II passenger train because
such equipment cannot absorb 5 MJ of collision energy ahead of the
train operator's position. Recent accidents involving trains operating
with a cab car forward have demonstrated the vulnerability of this type
of equipment in collisions. FRA believes such equipment should not be
used in the forward position of a train that travels at speeds greater
than 125 mph. Further, FRA is specifically proposing in paragraph (f)
that passenger seating be prohibited in the leading unit of a Tier II
train, though not a specific recommendation of the Subgroup.
Paragraph (e) proposes the analysis process to demonstrate that
equipment meets the crash energy management design performance
requirements. The process allows simplifying assumptions to be made so
computer modeling techniques can be used to confirm compliance.

Sec. 238.405 Longitudinal Static Compressive Strength

This section contains the proposed requirements for longitudinal
compressive strength of power cars and trailer cars. Paragraph (a)
requires the ultimate compressive strength of the underframe of the
power car cab to be a minimum of 2,100,000 pounds. To form an effective
crash refuge, this strength is needed to take advantage of the strength
of the power car's two end frames. Alternate design approaches that
provide equivalent protection are allowed, but the equivalent
protection must be demonstrated through analysis and testing and
approved by the FRA Associate Administrator for Safety under the
provisions of Sec. 238.21.
Paragraph (b) contains the requirements for the static compressive
strength of the occupied volumes of trailer cars. This proposal adopts
the traditional North American design practice of a static strength of
800,000 pounds, without deformation of the underframe. Paragraph (c)
makes clear that unoccupied or lightly occupied volumes of power cars
or trailer cars may have a static end strength of less than 800,000
pounds to accommodate crash energy management designs.
The crash energy management design requirement ensures that the
stronger end structures and the stronger static compressive strength of
the cab of a power car will not make Tier II passenger equipment
incompatible with existing passenger equipment should a collision
between the two different types of equipment occur. The crash energy
management design makes a Tier II passenger train appear as a softer
collision surface to a conventionally designed train owing to the
collision energy absorbed by the Tier II train as its unoccupied
volumes intentionally crush.

Sec. 238.407 Anti-Climbing Mechanism

This section contains the proposed requirements for anti-climbing
mechanisms on power and trailer cars. Paragraph (a) requires a power
car to have a forward anti-climbing mechanism capable of resisting an
upward or downward static vertical force of 200,000 pounds. This
proposal is identical to that required of locomotives by AAR S-580.
However, designs are permitted that require the crash energy management
controlled crushing to occur prior to the anti-climber fully engaging.
Paragraph (b) requires that interior train coupling points between
units, including between units of articulated cars or other permanently
joined units of cars, have an anti-climbing device capable of resisting
an upward or downward vertical force of 100,000 pounds. This is
consistent with current design practice. Paragraph (c) requires the
forward coupler of a power car to resist a vertical downward force of
100,000 pounds for any horizontal position of the coupler without
yielding, and is virtually identical to that provided in 49 CFR
229.141(a) for MU locomotives built new after April 1,

[[Page 49779]]

1956, and operated in trains having a total empty weight of 600,000
pounds or more.

Sec. 238.409 Forward End Structures oF Power Car Cabs

This section contains the proposed requirements for forward end
structures of power car cabs. The forward end structure of a power car
cab plays a vital role in a collision with another object. This
structure must resist override, prevent the entry of fluids into
occupied spaces of the cab, and allow the crash energy management
system to function. The proposed requirements in paragraphs (a)-(c) are
based on a specific end structure design that consists of a full-height
center collision post, two side collision posts located at
approximately the one-third points laterally, and two full-height
corner posts. The proposal includes loading requirements that each of
these structural members must withstand. In addition, the proposal
permits flexibility for using other equipment designs that provide
equivalent structural protection. End structures meeting these
requirements will provide considerably greater protection to the train
operator than provided by existing passenger equipment designs. For
example, much stronger corner posts are proposed here than for Tier I
passenger equipment. FRA believes these end structures help provide a
degree of crashworthiness to compensate for the increased risk
associated with operating at higher speeds.
The front end structure design also includes in paragraph (d) a
skin requirement equivalent to that required by AAR S-580 and proposed
in Sec. 238.209 for Tier I locomotives.

Sec. 238.411 Rear End Structures of Power Car Cabs

The rear end structure of a power car cab provides protection to
crewmembers from intrusion of locomotive machinery or trailing cars
into the occupied volume as a result of a collision or derailment. The
proposed requirements are based on a specific end structure design that
consists of two full-height corner posts (paragraph (a)) and two full-
height collision posts (paragraph (b)). The proposal includes loading
requirements that each of these structural members must withstand.
Further, the proposal permits flexibility for using other equipment
designs that provide equivalent structural protection. The proposed
rear end structure will provide considerably greater protection to the
train operator than that provided by existing passenger equipment
designs. Together, the front and rear end structures proposed in this
rule for a power car cab make the cab a highly survivable crash refuge.

Sec. 238.413 End Structures of Trailer Cars

The proposed requirements in paragraph (a) are based on a specific
end structure design that consists of two full-height corner posts and
two full-height collision posts. The proposal includes loading
requirements that each of these structural members must withstand. The
proposal also allows flexibility for other designs that provide
protection structurally equivalent to the proposed design.
Paragraph (b) makes clear how the requirements proposed in
paragraph (a) apply to a trailer car that consists of multiple
articulated units not designed for uncoupling in other than at a
maintenance shop. The end structure requirements apply only to the two
ends of the entire articulated assembly of units. Paragraph (b)
explains that the interior ends of the individual units of the
articulated assembly need not be equipped with an end structure that
meets the requirements proposed in paragraph (a). Articulated
assemblies have a history of remaining in line during derailments and
collisions and if not designed to be uncoupled, only the exposed ends
of the entire assembly will be exposed to the risks of override.
However, interior units that are merely semi-permanently coupled, but
not articulated, are subject to the proposed end structure requirements
in paragraph (a).
Paragraph (c) contains an additional requirement for trailer cars
designed with an end vestibule. Such designs provide an opportunity for
additional corner post structures inboard of the vestibule side doors.
These corner posts can be supported by the side sill and therefore be
structurally more substantial than the corner posts outboard of the
side doors. The proposal includes loading requirements that these
additional full-height corner posts must withstand. Overall, the double
corner post design provides significantly increased protection to
passengers in such trailer cars.

Sec. 238.415 Rollover Strength

This section contains the proposed requirements for the rollover
strength of power cars and trailer cars. If the occupied volumes of
these vehicles remain intact when they roll onto their side or roof
structures, occupant injury from vehicle collapse will be avoided. The
proposal essentially requires the vehicle structure to support twice
the deadweight of the vehicle as it rests on its side or roof. Minor
deformations of the side and roof sheathing and smaller structural
members are allowed to the extent necessary for the vehicle to be
supported directly by more substantial structural members of the frame.
Passenger equipment constructed to North American design practice
performs well in rollover situations. FRA believes this proposal
captures this design practice.

Sec. 238.417 Side Loads

This section contains the proposed requirements intended to resist
penetration of the side structure of a passenger car by a highway or
rail vehicle. The objective is to make the side of the passenger car
strong enough so that the car derails rather than collapses when struck
in the side by a highway or rail vehicle. If the passenger car moves
sideways (derails), less structural damage and potential to injure
train occupants will result.

Sec. 238.419 Truck-to-Car-Body and Truck Component Attachment

Paragraph (a) requires the truck-to-car-body attachment on Tier II
passenger equipment to resist without failure a vertical force
equivalent to 2g acting on the mass of the truck and a force of 250,000
pounds acting in any horizontal direction. The earlier discussion of
the proposed truck-to-car-body attachment strength requirement in
Sec. 238.219 for Tier I passenger equipment is also applicable here.
Paragraph (b) requires that each component of the truck must remain
attached to the truck when a force equivalent to 2g acting on the mass
of the component is exerted in any direction on that component. Whereas
paragraph (a) is intended to keep the truck attached to the car body,
paragraph (b) is intended to keep truck components attached to the
truck.

Sec. 238.421 Glazing

This section contains the proposed glazing requirements for Tier II
passenger equipment. FRA believes that the higher speed of Tier II
passenger equipment requires more stringent glazing standards than
currently required by 49 CFR part 223.
Paragraph (a) requires each power car and trailer car to be
equipped with glazing meeting the following requirements. First, under
paragraph (a)(1), end-facing glazing shall resist the impact of a 12-
pound solid steel sphere traveling at the maximum speed of the vehicle
in which the glazing will be installed. The test must be conducted so
that the sphere strikes the glazing at the same angle as an object
would strike the

[[Page 49780]]

glazing when installed in a train. To successfully pass the test, the
glazing must neither spall nor be penetrated by the sphere. This test
is similar to the requirements imposed under European glazing standards
for high-speed trains, and should be much more repeatable than the
cinder block test specified in 49 CFR part 223.
Second, under paragraph (a)(2)(i), side-facing glazing shall resist
the impact of a 12-pound solid steel sphere traveling at 15 mph and
impacting at an angle of 90 degrees to the surface of the glazing, with
no penetration or spall. This is a highly repeatable test that
demonstrates whether side-facing glazing can protect occupants from a
relatively heavy object thrown against the side of the train. This test
is more stringent than the large object impact test required for side
facing glazing under 49 CFR part 223.
Third, under paragraph (a)(2)(ii), side-facing exterior glazing
shall resist the impact of a granite ballast stone weighing a minimum
of 0.5 pounds, traveling at 75 mph, and impacting at a 90-degree angle
to the glazing surface, with no penetration or spall. This is a highly
repeatable test to demonstrate whether the glazing can protect
occupants against impact from a common stone found along the railroad
thrown at a speed slightly faster than a human could throw such an
object.
Fourth, under paragraph (a)(3)(i), all exterior glazing shall
resist the single impact of a 9-mm, 147-grain bullet traveling at an
impact velocity of 900 feet per second, with no bullet penetration or
spall. This bullet is a much more common handgun round than the 22-
caliber bullet specified in 49 CFR part 223. The proposed requirement
does represent a balance between the degree of bullet impact protection
and window weight, however. Ballistic tests revealed that a requirement
to resist a round fired at velocities typical of high-powered rifles
requires a glazing thickness that creates a window weight that is
impractical for use as an emergency exit.
Fifth, under paragraph (a)(3)(ii), all exterior glazing shall
demonstrate anti-spalling performance by the use of a 0.001 aluminum
witness plate, placed 12 inches from the glazing surface during all
impact tests. The witness plate must not contain any marks from spalled
glazing particles after any impact test. When impacted on the exterior
surface, glazing currently used in railroad equipment tends to spall
from the inside surface. Several eye injuries to crewmembers have
resulted. FRA believes that the witness plates used in conducting the
spalling tests to qualify current glazing are too thick and have
allowed glazing that actually spalled to pass the test. The witness
plate specified in this paragraph is much thinner and therefore more
sensitive to detecting spall.
Paragraph (b) requires glazing material to be marked to indicate
that it has passed the testing requirements proposed in paragraph. This
marking requirement is similar to that provided in 49 CFR part 223.
Paragraph (c) requires glazing frames to hold the glazing in place
against all the forces which the glazing is required to resist in
paragraph (a). This proposal is intended to prevent the glazing from
being knocked out of its frame by the force of an object striking the
glazing, even though no penetration of the glazing itself occurs. Since
FRA is proposing more stringent impact testing requirements for glazing
in Tier II passenger equipment than for Tier I passenger equipment,
stronger glazing frames will be required to keep the glazing in place
and achieve the additional safety benefit provided by the stronger
glazing.
Paragraph (d) requires the glazing securement components to resist
the forces due to air pressure differences caused by trains passing
with the minimum separation for two adjacent tracks while traveling in
opposite directions, each traveling at maximum speed. The higher speed
of Tier II passenger equipment makes this a more stringent requirement
than proposed for Tier I passenger equipment.
Paragraph (e) requires interior glazing to meet the minimum
requirements of AS1 type laminated glass as defined in American
National Standard ``Safety Code for Glazing Materials for Glazing Motor
Vehicles Operating on Land Highways,'' ASA Standard Z26.1-1966. This
requirement alleviates the need for interior glazing to meet the
stringent impact resistance requirements placed on exterior glazing,
while ensuring that the glazing will shatter in a safe manner like
automotive glazing.
Paragraph (f) requires that each vehicle be stencilled on an
interior wall to indicate that it meets the glazing requirements
contained in this section. This requirement is already provided for
existing equipment in 49 CFR 223.17.

Sec. 238.423 Fuel Tanks

This section contains the proposed requirements for fuel tanks for
fossil-fueled Tier II passenger equipment. FRA is proposing separate
requirements for external fuel tanks, which are traditional, under the
car body fuel tanks, and for internal tanks, which are built into the
structure of the car body.
Paragraph (a) requires the following of external fuel tanks:
A minimum height above the rail;
A minimum penetration resistance for end bulkheads;
A minimum exterior skin strength;
A temperature range to which material properties must not
degrade;
A vent system that prevents spills in any tank
orientation;
Skid surfaces on the bottom of the tank; and
An overall structural strength adequate to support 1\1/2\
times the dead weight of the locomotive without deformation of the
tank.
This set of proposed requirements is based on investigations of
accidents involving fuel tank rupture; analysis and testing of improved
fuel tank designs; reports by railroads of reductions in fuel spills on
locomotives built with more crashworthy fuel tanks; and an analysis of
the common methods of damaging fuel tanks. FRA believes the proposed
requirements will result in significantly fewer fuel spills and fewer
post-collision fires. Although the proposed requirements reduce the
range of a train by adding weight and reducing fuel carrying capacity,
FRA does not believe that this reduced range will impact passenger
train service because food and other supplies will likely need
replenishing first before a train needs refueling.
Paragraph (b) requires that internal fuel tanks be a minimum height
above the rail, be equipped with a vent system that prevents spills in
any tank orientation, and have a minimum penetration resistance of the
bulkheads and skin. Amtrak has included internal fuel tanks in the
design of many new locomotives. Experience with these tanks has shown
them to be much less vulnerable than external fuel tanks due to
protection provided by the structure of the car body. This reduced
vulnerability lessens the need for many of the requirements proposed
for external fuel tanks.

Sec. 238.425 Electrical Systems

This section contains the proposed requirements for electrical
system design. These requirements reflect common electrical safety
practice and are widely recognized as good electrical design practice.
They include provisions for:
Circuit protection against surges, overload and ground
faults;
Electrical conductor sizes and properties to provide a
margin of safety for the intended application;
Battery system design to prevent the risk of overcharging
or accumulation of

[[Page 49781]]

dangerous gases that can cause an explosion;
Design of resistor grids that dissipate energy produced by
dynamic braking with sufficient electrical isolation and ventilation to
minimize the risk of fires; and
Electromagnetic compatibility within the intended
operating environment to prevent electromagnetic interference with
safety-critical equipment systems and to prevent interference of the
rolling stock with other systems along the right-of-way.

Sec. 238.427 Suspension System

Suspension system performance parameters are crucial to the safe
operation of high-speed rail passenger equipment. The suspension system
requirements that FRA is proposing served as safety limits for the
successful demonstrations of the X-2000 and the ICE trainsets on the
NEC at speeds up to 135 mph. These proposed requirements are also part
of the suspension system performance requirements for Amtrak's American
Flyer trainsets.
Safety requirements concerning the wheel-rail interface have
traditionally been addressed as part of the track safety standards. In
parallel with the Tier II Equipment Subgroup's effort to develop high-
speed equipment safety standards, the RSAC Track Working Group
developed an NPRM on track safety standards which includes proposed
high-speed track standards. See 62 FR 36138, Jul. 3, 1997. FRA
sponsored a joint meeting of the Tier II Equipment Subgroup and members
of the Track Working Group focusing on the development of high-speed
track standards to ensure that the two sets of standards not conflict
at the wheel-rail interface, where they overlap. Overall, the two
groups proposed very similar standards, but members of the Track
Working Group recommended some modifications to Tier II passenger
equipment standards so that these standards would dovetail with the
high-speed track standards. FRA has revised the proposed Tier II
passenger equipment standards accordingly, as noted in discussions
below of the specific requirements of this section.
To ensure safe, stable performance and ride quality, paragraph (a)
requires suspension systems to be designed to reasonably prevent wheel
climb, wheel lift, rail rollover, rail shift, and a vehicle from
overturning. These requirements must be met in all operating
environments, and under all track and loading conditions as determined
by the operating railroad. In addition, these requirements must be met
under all track speeds and track conditions consistent with the Track
Safety Standards (49 CFR part 213), up to the maximum operating speed
and maximum cant deficiency of the equipment. These broad suspension
system performance requirements address the operation of equipment at
both high speed over well maintained track and at low speed over lower
classes of track. Suspension system performance requirements are needed
at both high and low speeds as exemplified by recent incidents where
stiff, high-speed suspension systems caused passenger equipment to
derail while negotiating curves in yards at low speeds.
Compliance with paragraph (a) must be demonstrated during pre-
revenue service acceptance testing of the equipment and by complying
with the safety performance standards for suspension systems contained
in Appendix C to this part. Because better ways to demonstrate
suspension system safety performance may be developed in the future,
the rule allows the use of alternative standards to those contained in
Appendix C if they provide equivalent safety and are approved by the
FRA Associate Administrator for Safety under the provisions of
Sec. 238.21.
Paragraph (b) requires the steady-state lateral acceleration of
passenger cars to be less than 0.1g, as measured parallel to the car
floor inside the passenger compartment, under all operating conditions.
Passenger cars shall not operate when the steady-state lateral
acceleration is 0.1g or greater. FRA originally considered limiting the
cant deficiency, but Track Working Group members recommended that the
steady-state lateral acceleration requirement alone is sufficient to
ensure safe operation. The Tier II Equipment Subgroup concurred, and
FRA is proceeding according to these recommendations.
Paragraph (c) requires each truck to be equipped with a permanently
installed lateral accelerometer mounted on the truck frame. If hunting
oscillations are detected, the train must be slowed. The proposal
contained in the paragraph did not have the full support of the Tier II
Equipment Subgroup and the Track Working Group members because of
disagreement over where the accelerometer should be located.
Paragraph (d) provides ride vibration (quality) limits for vertical
accelerations, lateral accelerations, and the combination of lateral
and vertical accelerations. These limits must be met while the
equipment is traveling at the maximum operating speed over its intended
route. The limiting parameters and the means to measure them represent
the consensus recommendations of both working groups and have proven
effective during the demonstrations of the X-2000 and ICE trainsets.
Paragraph (e) provides that compliance with the ride quality
requirements contained in paragraph (d) be demonstrated during the
equipment pre-revenue service qualification tests required under
Sec. 238.113 and Sec. 213.345 of the proposed federal track safety
standards. One of the most important objectives of pre-revenue service
qualification testing is to demonstrate that suspension system
performance requirements have been met.
Paragraph (f) requires bearing overheat sensors to be provided
either on board the equipment or at reasonable wayside intervals. FRA
prefers sensors to be on board the equipment to eliminate the risk of a
hotbox that develops between wayside locations. However, FRA does
recognize that onboard sensors have a history of falsely detecting
overheat conditions that have caused significant operating difficulties
for some passenger railroads.

Sec. 238.429 Safety Appliances

This section contains the proposed requirements for safety
appliances for Tier II passenger equipment. FRA has attempted to
simplify and clarify how the Safety Appliance Standards contained in 49
CFR part 231 and 49 U.S.C. 20302(a) will be applied to Tier II
passenger equipment. The proposed requirements are basically a
restatement of existing requirements but tailored specifically for
application to this new and somewhat unconventional equipment. They
represent the consensus recommendation of the Tier II Equipment
Subgroup.
Paragraph (b) deserves special mention; it proposes to require that
Tier II passenger trains be provided with a parking or hand brake that
can be set and released manually and can hold the equipment on a 3-
percent grade. A hand brake is an important safety feature that
prevents the rolling or runaway of parked equipment.

Sec. 238.431 Brake System

This section contains proposed brake system design and performance
requirements for Tier II passenger equipment, and, except for one
provision, represents the consensus recommendation of the Tier II
Equipment Subgroup. The main issue of concern among Subgroup members
involved the capability of sensor technology used to monitor the
application and release of brakes. Labor

[[Page 49782]]

representatives maintained that a technology that actually measures the
force of brake shoes and pads against wheels and brake discs is
required for a reliable indication of brake application and release.
Railroad operators contended that this technology is not commercially
available and that monitoring pressure in brake cylinders does provide
a reliable indication of brake application and release, particularly
when those cylinders are directly adjacent to the point where brake
friction surfaces are forced together.
Aside from this issue, the rest of the proposed brake system design
and performance requirements received widespread support. In fact,
several of the proposed requirements were contained in written
positions provided by both rail labor and management members of the
Subgroup, and virtually all of the proposed requirements were discussed
in the high-speed passenger equipment section of the 1994 NPRM on power
brakes. See 59 FR 47693-47694, 47699-47700, and 47730. Many of the
requirements proposed in this section are similar to the requirements
proposed for Tier I passenger equipment in Sec. 238.231, thus the
discussion related to that section should be read in conjunction with
the following discussion.
The proposal contained in paragraph (a) is virtually identical to
the proposal related to the braking systems of Tier I passenger
equipment in Sec. 238.231(a).
Paragraph (b) proposes a requirement similar to that proposed in
Sec. 238.231(b) and is intended to protect railroad employees. FRA
believes that inspectors of equipment must be able to ascertain if
brakes are applied or released without placing themselves in a
vulnerable position. The proposed rule allows railroads the flexibility
of using a reliable indicator in place of requiring direct observation
of the brake application or piston travel because the designs of many
of the brake systems used on passenger equipment make direct
observation of the brakes extremely difficult. Brake system piston
travel or piston cylinder pressure indicators have been used with
satisfactory results for many years. Although indicators do not provide
100 percent certainty that the brakes are effective, they have proven
effective enough to be preferable to requiring an inspector to assume a
dangerous position.
Paragraph (c) is virtually identical to the requirement proposed in
Sec. 238.231(c), and is a fundamental brake system performance
requirement that an emergency brake application feature be available at
any time and produce an irretrievable stop. This paragraph proposes an
additional requirement that a means to actuate the emergency brake be
provided at two locations in each unit of the train. This additional
requirement ensures the availability of the emergency brake feature and
is in accordance with the current available design of high-speed
passenger equipment.
Paragraph (d) requires the brake system to be designed to prevent
thermal damage to wheels and brake discs.
Paragraph (e) proposes requirements related to blended braking
systems. These requirements are similar to those proposed in
Sec. 238.231(j). The only additional requirement is that the
operational status of the electric portion of the blended brake be
displayed in the operator's cab. Operators use different train handling
procedures when the electric portion of blended brake is not available.
A very dangerous situation can arise when an operator expects the
electric portion of the blended brake to be available and it is not.
FRA believes that when operations exceed 125 mph either the train must
not be used if the electric portion of the blended brake is not
available, or the train operator must know that the electric portion of
the blended brake is not available so he or she can be prepared to use
compensating train handling procedures. Further, FRA believes that if
the additional heat input to wheels or discs caused by lack of the
electric portion of the blended brake causes thermal damage to these
braking surfaces, then the electric portion of the blended brake should
be considered a required safety feature and, unless it is available,
the equipment should not be used.
Paragraph (f) requires the brake system to allow a disabled train's
pneumatic brakes to be controlled by a conventional locomotive during
rescue operations.
Paragraph (g) requires that Tier II passenger trains be equipped
with an independent brake failure detection system that compares brake
commands to brake system outputs to determine if a failure has
occurred. This paragraph also proposes that the brake failure detection
system report failures to the automated monitoring system, which is
proposed in Sec. 238.445, thus alerting the train operator to potential
brake system degradation so that the operator can take corrective
action such as slowing the train.
Paragraph (h) requires that all Tier II passenger equipment be
provided with an adhesion control system designed to automatically
adjust the braking force on each wheel to prevent sliding during
braking. FRA also proposes to require that the train operator be
alerted in the event of a failure of this system with a wheel slide
alarm that is visual or audible, or both. This proposed feature ties
the adhesion control system to the automated monitoring system and
prevents dangerous wheel slide flat conditions that can be caused when
wheels lock during braking.

Sec. 238.433 Draft System

FRA is proposing that leading and trailing automatic couplers of
Tier II trains be compatible with standard AAR couplers with no special
adapters used. FRA believes that compatibility with standard couplers
is necessary in order that a conventional locomotive could assist in
the rescue of disabled Tier II passenger equipment. In addition,
couplers must include an automatic coupling feature as well as an
uncoupling device that complies with 49 U.S.C. chapter 203, 49 CFR part
231, and 49 CFR 232.2. FRA believes that automatic uncoupling devices
are necessary in order to comply with the intent of the statute so that
employees will not have to place themselves between equipment in order
to perform coupling or uncoupling operations.

Sec. 238.435 Interior Fittings and Surfaces

This section contains proposed requirements for interior fittings
and surfaces. Once survivable space is ensured by basic vehicle
structural strength and crash energy management requirements, the
design of interior features becomes an important factor in preventing
or mitigating injuries resulting from collisions or derailments. Loose
seats, equipment, and luggage are a significant cause of injuries in
passenger train collisions and derailments.
Paragraphs (a) through (c) contain requirements for the design of
passenger car seats and the strength of their attachment to the car
body. These requirements are based on sled tests of passenger coach
seats, seat tests conducted for other modes of transportation, and
computer modeling to predict the results of passenger train collisions.
These provisions include a requirement for shock absorbent material on
the backs of seats to cushion the impact of passengers with the seats
ahead of them.
Paragraph (d) contains the requirements for strength of attachment
of interior fittings and is similar to that proposed in
Sec. 238.233(c).

[[Page 49783]]

Paragraph (e) contains a special requirement for the ultimate
strength of seats and other fittings in the cab of a power car. Due to
the extra strength of the cab, its structure is capable of resisting
forces caused by accelerations that exceed 10g. As a result, benefit
can be gained from a greater longitudinal strength requirement for seat
and other interior fitting attachments. FRA is therefore proposing that
seats and equipment in the cab be attached to the car body with
sufficient strength to resist longitudinal forces caused by an
acceleration of 12g. The lateral and vertical requirements remain 4g.
This requirement does not apply to equipment located outside the cab.
Paragraphs (f) and (g) contain requirements representing good
safety design practice for any type of vehicle.
FRA believes the luggage restraint requirement proposed in
paragraph (h) will prevent many of the injuries caused by flying
luggage that are typical of passenger train collisions and derailments.

Sec. 238.437 Emergency Communication

This section requires an emergency communication system within the
train with back-up power, and is discussed earlier in the preamble.
This safety feature will allow the train crew to provide evacuation and
other instructions to passengers. Such a system can help prevent panic
that can occur during emergency situations. FRA is proposing that
transmission locations be located at both ends of each unit, that the
locations be marked with luminescent material, and that clear
instructions be provided for the use of the emergency communication
system.

Sec. 238.439 Emergency Window Exits and Roof Hatches

Paragraph (a) contains proposed requirements that apply to
emergency window exits on passenger cars. This paragraph is virtually
identical to that proposed for Tier I passenger equipment in
Sec. 238.235, except for the required size of the emergency window
exits. A discussion of emergency window exits and the distinction
between proposed requirements for Tier I and Tier II passenger
equipment is provided earlier in the preamble.
Paragraph (b) requires either a roof hatch or a clearly marked
structural weak point in the roof to provide quick access for properly
equipped emergency personnel. One roof hatch or structural weak point
is required for each power car cab and two roof hatches or structural
weak points for each passenger car. A discussion of roof hatches and
structural weak points is also provided earlier in the preamble. Such
features should aid in removing passengers and crewmembers from a
vehicle that is either on its side or upright in water.
Paragraph (c) is reserved for marking and operating instruction
requirements.

Sec. 238.441 Doors

This section contains the proposed requirements for exterior doors
on Tier II passenger cars. This section should be read with the
discussion of emergency egress and access earlier in the preamble. The
requirements in paragraph (a) are virtually identical to those proposed
in Sec. 238.237(b), except that paragraph (a)(2) requires that the
status of powered, exterior side doors be displayed to the crew in the
operating cab and, if door interlocks are used, the sensors to detect
train motion must nominally be set at 3 mph. Such equipment is well
within current technology. Paragraph (b) requires that powered,
exterior side doors be connected to an emergency back-up power system.
Paragraph (c) is identical to that proposed for Tier I passenger
equipment in Sec. 238.237(c). Paragraph (d) requires passenger
compartment end doors to be equipped with a kick-out panel, pop-out
window, or other means of egress in the event the door will not open.
As discussed above, FRA considered this requirement for both Tier I and
Tier II equipment, but believes such a feature may be dangerous on side
doors because passengers could use the feature inappropriately and
possibly exit from a moving train. However, this feature has a strong
safety benefit for end doors that allow movement from car to car. These
doors are not used to exit the train, and using end doors to exit to
the next car is the preferred mode of evacuating a car.
Paragraph (e) is reserved for door marking and operating
instruction requirements. These requirements are currently being
addressed in the proposed rule on passenger train emergency
preparedness. See 62 FR 8330, Feb. 24, 1997.

Sec. 238.443 Headlights

Because of the high speeds at which Tier II passenger equipment
operates, FRA is proposing that a headlight be directed farther in
front of the train to illuminate a person than is currently required
for existing equipment under 49 CFR 229.125(a). A Tier II passenger
train will travel distances more quickly than a Tier I passenger train,
and the train operator will have less time to react thereby
necessitating earlier awareness of objects on the track.

Sec. 238.445 Automated Monitoring

This section contains the proposed requirements for automated
monitoring of the status or performance of various safety-related
systems. Investigations of past passenger train accidents reveal that
many of them were either fully or partly caused by human error. The
faster operating speeds of Tier II passenger equipment means that the
train operator will have less time to evaluate and react to potentially
dangerous situations. The potential for accidents is increased.
Automated monitoring systems can decrease the risk of accidents by
alerting the operator to abnormal conditions and advising the operator
as to necessary corrective action. Such systems can even be designed to
take corrective action automatically in certain situations. As a
result, FRA is proposing that a Tier II passenger train be equipped
with an automated system to monitor various train systems and
components.
Paragraph (a) requires the train to be equipped to monitor the
performance of a minimum set of safety-related systems and components.
The monitoring system can also be used to provide information for
trouble-shooting and maintenance and to accumulate reliability data to
form the basis for setting required periodic maintenance intervals.
Paragraph (b) requires the operator to be alerted when any of the
monitored parameters are out of predetermined limits. FRA does not
intend to remove the decision from the operating railroad for when
automatic intervention is necessary. However, the operating railroad
should have a valid basis for either leaving response in the hands of
the train operator or making corrective action automatic.
Paragraph (c) requires the monitoring system to be designed with an
automatic self-test feature that notifies the operator that the
monitoring capability is functioning correctly and alerts the operator
that a system failure has occurred. Because operators can become
dependent on automated monitoring systems, they need to know when their
vigilance must be heightened to compensate for a malfunction in this
automated safety tool.

Sec. 238.447 Operator's Controls and Cab Layout

In the ANPRM, FRA offered for comment a detailed set of
requirements concerning cab control systems and interior safety
features for consideration by the industry. However, several members of
the Working Group believed that a number of these requirements

[[Page 49784]]

involved ergonomic issues which do not directly affect safety.
Nonetheless, FRA is proposing in this section extensive requirements
for Tier II cab interior features. The speeds at which Tier II
equipment will operate will press human reaction time, and such
features will contribute to the ability of the crew to operate the
train as safely as possible.
Paragraph (g)(1) deserves special mention; it requires that each
seat provided for a crewmember be equipped with a single-acting, quick-
release lap belt and shoulder harness as defined in Sec. 571.209 of
this title. This proposed requirement is mentioned earlier in the
preamble discussion of train interior safety features.

Subpart F--Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements for Tier
II Passenger Equipment

Currently, there is no operating history with regard to Tier II
equipment, and thus there are no regulations or industry standards
establishing detailed testing, inspection, or maintenance procedures,
criteria, and intervals for the equipment. The railroads and the rail
labor organizations differ on the approach that should be taken in
establishing inspection, testing, and maintenance requirements.
Railroads have long appealed to FRA to move away from detailed
``command and control'' regulations and instead to provide broad safety
performance requirements that afford railroads wide latitude to develop
the operational details. Rail labor organizations, on the other hand,
believe that specific inspection, testing, and maintenance criteria
that cannot be unilaterally changed by railroads are the only way that
safe railroad operation can be assured.
FRA believes that the introduction of a new type of passenger train
equipment offers the opportunity for a fresh start, where perhaps both
of these seemingly conflicting concerns can be resolved. FRA proposes
general guidelines on the process to be used by the operating railroad,
together with the system developer, to develop an inspection, testing,
and maintenance program. The operating railroad and the system
developer together have the best information, expertise, and resources
necessary to develop the details of an effective inspection, testing,
and maintenance program. The operating railroad is thereby granted some
latitude to develop the operational details of the program, using the
system safety process to justify the safety decisions that are made.
However, FRA proposes to exercise final approval of the inspection,
testing, and maintenance program proposed by the operating railroad;
rail labor organizations will be given an opportunity to discuss their
concerns with FRA during the approval process set forth in
Sec. 238.505. Tier II equipment must not be used prior to FRA approval
of an inspection, testing, and maintenance program. Further, FRA
proposes to enforce the safety-critical inspection, testing, and
maintenance procedures, criteria, and maintenance intervals that result
from the approval process.

Sec. 238.501 Scope

This subpart contains inspection, testing, and maintenance
requirements for passenger equipment that operates at speeds exceeding
125 mph but not exceeding 150 mph.

Sec. 238.503 Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements

This section requires the establishment by the railroad of an FRA-
approved inspection, testing, and maintenance program based on a daily
complete brake system test and mechanical safety inspection of the
equipment performed by qualified mechanical inspectors, coupled with a
periodic maintenance program based on a system safety analysis.
Although paragraph (a) proposes some basic requirements to be included
in a program, FRA does not intend to prescribe every detail of what a
program must contain. FRA proposes to require the operating railroad to
develop and justify the details of any program it adopts based on the
specific safety needs and operating environment of the high speed rail
system being developed.
Paragraph (b) would make enforceable, subject to civil penalties
and other enforcement action, the safety-critical inspection, testing,
and maintenance requirements that are identified in the railroad's
program and approved by FRA. ``Safety-critical'' requirements are those
that, if not fulfilled, increase ``the risk of damage to equipment or
personal injury to a passenger, crewmember, or other person.'' See
Sec. 238.5. Under paragraph (k), the railroad must identify which items
in its inspection, testing, and maintenance program are safety-
critical. The railroad must submit the program to FRA under the
procedures of Sec. 238.505. Once these programs are approved by FRA,
this section proposes to make those items identified as safety-critical
enforceable by FRA. FRA agrees with labor representatives to the
Working Group that safety standards are stronger when they contain
specific provisions that can be enforced.
Paragraph (c) requires that the operating railroad develop an
inspection, testing, and maintenance program to ensure that all systems
and components of Tier II passenger equipment are free of general
conditions that endanger the safety of the crew, passengers, or
equipment. FRA has identified the various conditions enumerated in
paragraph (c) that would need to be addressed in the railroad's
program. Consequently, FRA has attempted to define what the inspection,
testing, and maintenance program must accomplish, but not how to
accomplish it.
Paragraph (d) contains the more specific requirements that any
inspection, testing, and maintenance program must incorporate. In
paragraph (d)(1), FRA proposes that Tier II equipment receive the
equivalent of a Class I brake test, as described in Sec. 238.313,
before its departure from an originating terminal and every 1,500 miles
after that or once each calendar day the equipment remains in service.
The test must be performed by a qualified mechanical inspector. For
example, a Tier II train must receive the equivalent of a Class I brake
test at its originating terminal and must receive a second Class I
equivalent brake test after traveling 1,500 miles from the time of the
original Class 1 brake test, whether or not it is the same calendar
day. Furthermore, a Tier II train must receive the equivalent of a
Class I brake test each calendar day it is used in service even if it
has not traveled 1,500 miles since the last Class I equivalent brake
test. Due to the speeds at which this equipment is permitted to
operate, FRA believes that a comprehensive brake test must be performed
prior to the equipment being placed in service.
Paragraph (d)(2) proposes that a complete exterior and interior
mechanical inspection be conducted by qualified mechanical inspectors
at least once each calendar day that the equipment is used. In order to
perform a quality mechanical inspection, railroads must be provided
some flexibility in determining the locations where these inspections
can best be performed. FRA believes that permitting railroads to
conduct these mechanical inspections at any time during the calendar
day provides adequate flexibility to move equipment to appropriate
locations. Trains that miss a scheduled Class I brake test or
mechanical inspection due to a delay en route may proceed to the
location where the Class I brake test or mechanical inspection was
scheduled to be performed. FRA recognizes that, due to the specialized
nature of this

[[Page 49785]]

equipment, proper inspections can only be conducted at a limited number
of locations. FRA also recognizes that trains become delayed en route
due to problems which are not readily foreseeable. Thus, FRA proposes
to permit the continued use of such equipment to the location where the
required inspection was scheduled to be performed.
Paragraph (e) restates Sec. 238.15 and provides a cross-reference
to that section. The paragraph provides that trains developing en route
defective, inoperative, or insecure primary brake equipment be moved in
accordance with the requirements of that section.
Paragraph (f) restates Sec. 238.17 and adds a narrow exception to
that section. The paragraph proposes that Tier II equipment that
develops a defective condition not related to the primary brake be
moved and handled in accordance with the requirements contained in
Sec. 238.17, with one exception. The exception to these requirements
applies to a failure of the secondary portion of the brake that occurs
en route. In those circumstances, FRA proposes that the train may
proceed to the next scheduled equivalent Class I brake test at a speed
no greater than the maximum safe operating speed demonstrated through
analysis and testing for braking with the friction brake alone. At that
location the brake system shall be restored to 100 percent operation
before the train continues in service. This proposal allows extensive
flexibility for the movement of equipment with defective brakes, but
also contains a hard requirement that all brake components be repaired
and the brake system, including secondary brakes, be restored at the
location of the train's next major brake test. FRA believes that this
proposal recognizes the secondary role played by the electric portion
of blended brakes. If the railroad has demonstrated that the friction
brake alone can stop the train within signal spacing without thermal
damage to braking surfaces, then the train may be used at normal
maximum speed in the event of an electric brake failure. This proposal
essentially limits the use of trains without available secondary
braking systems to no more than 48 hours. FRA believes that Sec. 238.17
strikes the correct balance between the need of railroads to transport
passengers to their destination and the need to have equipment with
defects that could lead to more serious safety problems quickly
repaired. This proposed requirement places a heavy responsibility on
qualified mechanical inspectors to exercise their judgment on when and
how equipment is safe to move.
Paragraph (g) would require that scheduled maintenance intervals be
based on the analysis conducted as part of the system safety program
and approved by FRA under the procedures of Sec. 238.505. FRA proposes
to allow the maintenance intervals for safety-critical components to be
changed only when justified by accumulated acceptable operating data.
Changes in maintenance cycles of safety-critical components must be
based on verifiable data made available to all interested parties and
shall be reviewed by FRA. This proposal is another attempt to balance
the needs of the operating railroad to run efficiently and the concern
of rail labor organizations that railroads have the ability to
unilaterally make safety decisions. For a new system with no operating
history, a formal system safety analysis is the only justifiable way to
set initial maintenance intervals. The proposal recognizes that as time
passes and an operating history is developed, a basis for changing
maintenance intervals can be established. However, the decision to make
these changes must have the participation of all the affected parties.
Paragraph (h) would require that the operating railroad establish a
training, qualification, and designation program as defined in the
training program plan under Sec. 238.111 to qualify individuals to
perform safety inspections, tests, and maintenance on the equipment. If
the railroad deems it safety-critical, then only qualified individuals
may perform the safety inspection, test, or maintenance of the
equipment. FRA does not prescribe a detailed training program or
qualification and designation process. Those details are left to the
operating railroad, but FRA must approve the program proposed by the
operating railroad under procedures of Sec. 238.505.
Under paragraph (i), the operating railroad would be obliged to
establish standard procedures for performing all safety-critical
inspections, tests, maintenance, or repair. This paragraph proposes
various broad requirements relating to the content and enforceability
of the standard operating procedures. FRA has drawn on the experiences
of other heavy industries and in the military, where inherently
dangerous tasks are common, which have proven that standard operating
procedures are an effective tool in reducing work-related injuries.
Further, standard operating procedures can form the basis for periodic
safety refresher training. FRA does not propose to prescribe the
detailed procedures to be used. The proposed rule is designed to have
the detailed procedures developed by those with most knowledge of how
to safely perform the tasks: the operators and employees.
Paragraph (j) proposes to require that the operating railroad
establish an inspection, testing, and maintenance quality control
program enforced by railroad or contractor supervisors. In essence,
this creates the need for the operating railroad to perform spot checks
of the work performed by its employee and contract equipment
maintainers to ensure that the work is performed in accordance with
established procedures and Federal requirements. FRA believes this is
an important management function that has a history of being neglected
in the railroad industry.
Paragraph (k) requires the operating railroad to identify each
inspection and testing procedure and criterion and each maintenance
interval that the railroad considers safety-critical.

Sec. 238.505 Program Approval Procedure

This section contains the procedures a railroad shall follow in
securing FRA approval of its program.

Subpart G--Introduction of New Technology to Tier II Passenger
Equipment

Sec. 238.601 Scope

This subpart contains proposed general requirements for introducing
new technology that affects safety systems of ``existing Tier II
passenger equipment,'' which is defined as Tier II passenger equipment
that has been approved for revenue service by FRA under Sec. 238.21. As
part of the development of the ANPRM in this docket, FRA discussed
extensive requirements for the introduction of new technology. During
Working Group meetings, various group members pointed out that the
requirements presented by FRA were very similar to the requirements of
the system safety program. These members suggested that the proposed
rule could be simplified and made more concise if the system safety
process were used to introduce new technology to existing Tier II
equipment. FRA agrees with this suggestion. FRA may determine that it
is best to integrate subpart G with Sec. 238.113. FRA invites comments
from interested parties on this possible change.

Sec. 238.603 Process to Introduce New Technology

Paragraph (a) requires a major upgrade or introduction of new

[[Page 49786]]

technology that affects the performance of an existing Tier II
passenger equipment safety system to be designed and implemented using
the system safety process prescribed in Sec. 238.101. This proposed
requirement implements the suggestions of Working Group members.
Paragraph (b) requires railroads to follow the procedures set forth
in Sec. 238.21 and obtain FRA's special approval of a pre-revenue
service acceptance testing plan for the existing Tier II passenger
equipment with the upgrade or new technology containing all the
elements prescribed in Sec. 238.113 prior to executing the plan.
Paragraph (c) requires railroads to complete a pre-revenue service
demonstration of the existing equipment with the upgrade or new
technology in accordance with the FRA approved plan, to fulfill all
other requirements of Sec. 238.113, and obtain special approval from
FRA pursuant to Sec. 238.21 prior to using the Tier II equipment with
the upgrade or new technology in revenue service. FRA considers these
requirements extremely important to prevent unknown safety problems
from being introduced along with the new technology.

Appendix A--Schedule of Civil Penalties

This appendix is being reserved until the final rule. At that time
it will include a schedule of civil penalties to be used in connection
with this part. Because such penalty schedules are statements of
policy, notice and comment are not required prior to their issuance.
See 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(A). Nevertheless, commenters are invited to
submit suggestions to FRA describing the types of actions or omissions
under each regulatory section that would subject a person to the
assessment of a civil penalty. Commenters are also invited to recommend
what penalties may be appropriate, based upon the relative seriousness
of each type of violation.

Regulatory Impact

Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

This proposed rule has been evaluated in accordance with existing
policies and procedures and is considered to be significant under both
Executive Order 12866 and DOT policies and procedures (44 FR 11034;
Feb. 26, 1979). FRA has prepared and placed in the docket a regulatory
evaluation of the proposed rule. This evaluation estimates the costs
and consequences of the proposed rule as well as its anticipated
economic and safety benefits. It may be inspected and photocopied
during normal business hours by visiting the FRA Docket Clerk at the
Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, Seventh Floor, 1120 Vermont Avenue, N.W.,
in Washington, D.C. Photocopies may also be obtained by submitting a
written request by mail to the FRA Docket Clerk at the Office of Chief
Counsel, Federal Railroad Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,
Mail Stop 10, Washington, D.C. 20590.
FRA expects that overall the proposed rule will save the passenger
rail industry a Net Present Value (NPV) of approximately $41 million
over the next 20 years. The estimated NPV of the total 20-year costs
associated with the proposed rule is $41,064,095. The estimated NPV of
the total 20-year savings (economic benefits) expected to accrue to the
industry from the proposed rule is $81,612,874. For some passenger rail
operators, the total costs incurred will exceed the total cost savings.
For others, the cost savings will outweigh the costs.
The following table contains estimated 20-year costs and savings
associated with the proposed requirements.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Requirement category Cost
------------------------------------------------------------------------
System Safety Program/Plan:
Initial Filing...................................... $ 359,575
Modifications....................................... 101,974
Auditability/Tracking............................... 159,611
Fire Protection:
New equipment................................... 497,509
Existing equipment (see discussion below)....... 622,486
Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Program........ 525,247
Training Course Development......................... 163,844
Training............................................ 3,778,176
Pre-Revenue Service Testing......................... 496,281
---------------
Total--System Safety............................ 6,704,703
General Design Requirements--Tier I:
Anti-Climbing Mechanism & Link...................... 65,948
Forward Facing End Structure/Collision Posts........ 1,745,407
Rollover Strength................................... 60,927
Glazing............................................. 244,769
Brakes--ease of inspection.......................... 229,390
Interior Fittings................................... 466,449
Emergency Lighting.................................. 1,483,162
Side Doors.......................................... 3,400,297
---------------
Total--Design Requirements...................... 7,696,349
Mechanical Inspections:
Daily Exterior Mechanical Inspections............... 12,526,320
Daily Interior Mechanical Inspections............... 1,567,829
---------------
Total--Inspections.............................. 22,666,895
Brake Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance:
Periodic MU Brake Maintenance....................... (20,052,750)
Periodic Coach Brake Maintenance.................... (5,468,750)
Periodic Cab Car Brake Maintenance.................. (6,158,448)
1,500-Mile Inspection............................... (36,019,648)
Class IA Brake Tests................................ (3,997,281)

[[Page 49787]]

Class II Brake Tests................................ 3,996,147
---------------
Total--Brakes................................... (67,700,730)
Movement of Defective Equipment......................... (9,915,997)
---------------
Total Net Impact.................................... (40,548,780)
------------------------------------------------------------------------

The costs of performing fire safety analyses of existing equipment
are included in the calculations above. However, the costs of modifying
equipment to reduce the risk of personal injuries as required by the
proposed rule are not included in the above figures. These costs could
total between $8.75 to $14 million. The costs depend on the results of
the proposed analyses, which cannot be accurately predicted.
Consequently, the total net impact of the proposed rule could be a
savings of $26,548,780.
In the last six years there have been at least six passenger train
accidents which resulted in more than one train occupant fatality. FRA
does not know the severity or number of commuter or intercity passenger
train accidents that will occur in the future. Although passenger
railroads offer the travelling public one of the safest forms of
transportation available--in the five-year period 1991-1995 there were
1.07 passenger fatalities per billion passenger miles--the potential
for injuries and loss of life in certain situations is very high. FRA
believes that the proposed rule represents a cost-effective approach to
providing a reasonable level of protection against known threats to
human life. Accordingly, FRA believes that it is reasonable to expect
that the measures called for in this proposal would prevent or mitigate
the severity of casualties greater in value than the costs of complying
with the proposed requirements.
FRA is allowing 60 days for comments and invites public comment on
the issue of regulatory impact, and in particular any impact the
proposed rule may have on small entities. FRA seeks comments or data,
or both, to help identify or quantify other factors that may affect the
benefits or costs of the proposal, including alternatives that were not
explored by the Working Group and any costs or benefits associated with
such alternatives.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.)
requires an assessment of the impacts of proposed rules on small
entities. FRA has conducted a regulatory flexibility assessment of this
rule's impact on small entities, and the assessment has been placed in
the public docket for this rulemaking. This proposed rule affects
intercity passenger and commuter railroads, and the proposed provisions
applicable to private cars may affect other entities as well.
Entities impacted by the proposed rule are principally governmental
jurisdictions or transit authorities, which are not small for purposes
of the United States Small Business Administration (i.e., no entity
operates in a locality with a population of under 50,000 people).
Commuter railroads are part of larger transit organizations that
receive Federal funds. FRA does not expect that smaller commuter
railroads will be affected disproportionately. The level of costs
incurred by each organization should vary in proportion to the
organization's size. For instance, railroads with fewer employees and
passenger equipment will have lower costs associated with employee
training and the inspection, testing, and maintenance of passenger
equipment.
Tourist, scenic, historic, and excursion railroad operations are
excepted from the proposed rule. Entities devoted principally to such
operations are smaller railroads. A joint FRA/industry working group
formed under RSAC is currently developing recommendations regarding the
applicability of FRA regulations, including this one, to tourist,
scenic, historic, and excursion railroads. After appropriate
consultation with the excursion railroad associations takes place,
passenger equipment safety requirements for these operations may be
proposed by FRA that are different from those affecting other types of
passenger train operations.
A few provisions of the proposed rule apply to private rail cars.
These consist of requirements concerning protection against personal
injury; rim-stamped straight-plate wheels; suspension system safety;
safety appliances; brake system safety; mechanical inspections; and
brake inspection, testing, and maintenance. FRA has sought to minimize
the burden of the proposed rule on private cars as much as possible,
while considering the safety concerns associated with the use of
private rail cars in passenger trains operated by railroads subject to
the proposed rule. FRA solicits comments or data, or both, to identify
the impacts of these provisions to the extent that those affected by
such provisions are small entities.

Paperwork Reduction Act

The proposed rule contains information collection requirements. FRA
has submitted these information collection requirements to the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) for review and approval in accordance
with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). The
sections that contain the new information collection requirements and
the estimated time to fulfill each requirement are as follows:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total
CFR section Respondent universe Total annual responses Average time per Total annual burden annual
response hours burden cost
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
216.14--Special notice for 17 railroads............... 12 letters........................ 1 hour............... 12 hours............ $408
repairs--passenger equipment.
238.7--Waivers............... 17 railroads............... 12 waivers........................ 2 hours.............. 24 hours............ 816
238.15--Movement of passenger 17 railroads............... 408 cards/tags.................... 5 minutes............ 34 hours............ 1,020
equipment with power brake
defects, and 238.17--
Movement of passenger
equipment with other than
power brake defects.
Conditional requirement...... 17 railroads............... 200 events........................ 3 minutes............ 10 hours............ 300

[[Page 49788]]

238.19--Reporting and 17 railroads............... N/A............................... Usual and customary N/A................. N/A
tracking defective passenger procedure.
equipment.
List of power brake repair 1 railroad................. 1 list............................ 2 hours.............. 2 hours............. 68
points.
Amendments to list....... 1 railroad................. 1update........................... 1 hour............... 1 hour.............. 34
238.21/238.115/238.223(a)/
238.309(2)/238.3 11(a)/
238.427(2)
Petitions for special 17 railroads............... 1 petition........................ 16 hours............. 16 hours............ 544
approval of alternative
standard.
Petitions for special 17 railroads............... 1 petition........................ 24 hours............. 24 hours............ 816
approval of pre-revenue
service acceptance
testing plan.
Statement of interest in Unknown.................... 2 statements...................... 1 hour............... 2 hours............. 68
reviewing special
approvals.
Comments on the petitions Unknown.................... 2 comments........................ 1 hour............... 2 hours............. 122
238.103--General system 17 railroads............... 17 plans.......................... 433 hours............ 7,361 hours......... 355,351
safety requirements.
Amendments to System 17 railroads............... 17 amendments..................... 11 hours............. 187 hours........... 97,801
Safety Plan.
Traceabillity and 17 railroads............... 17 documents...................... 150 hours............ 2,550 hours......... 86,700
Auditability.
238.105--Fire protection
program 238.115--Fire safety
Plan..................... 6 equipment manufacturers.. 4.8 (5 yr. average)............... 224 hours............ 1,075 hours......... 75,725
Subsequent equipment 6 equipment manufacturers.. 4.8 (5 yr. average)............... 60 hours............. 288 hours........... 28,800
orders.
Preliminary fire safety 17 railroads............... 17 documents...................... 128 hours............ 2,184 hours......... 451,344
analysis.
Final fire safety 16 railroads............... 5.3 documents (3 yr. average)..... 68 hours............. 795 hours........... 79,467
analysis.
Fire safety analysis on 17 railroads............... 1 document........................ 8 hours.............. 8 hours............. 800
equipment transfer.
Certification............ 6 equipment manufacturers.. 6 certifications.................. 120 hours............ 720 hours........... 72,000
238.107--Software safety plan 17 railroads............... N/A............................... Usual and customary N/A................. N/A
procedure.
238.109--Inspection, testing,
and maintenance program
Program.................. 17 railroads............... N/A............................... Usual and customary N/A................. N/A
procedure.
Maintenance intervals.... 17 railroads............... 1 change.......................... 88 hours............. 88 hours............ 3,208
Standard procedures for 17 railroads............... 17 procedures..................... 96 hours............. 1,632............... 62,832
safely performing
inspection, testing, and
maintenance or repairs.
Subsequent years--new 1 railroad................. 1 procedure....................... 96 hours............. 96 hours............ 3,696
railroads.
Subsequent years-- 17 railroads............... 17 amendments..................... 19 hours............. 323 hours........... 12,359
railroad annual review
and necessary
modifications.
New equipment purchases.. 6 equipment manufacturers.. 4.8 designs (5 yr. average)....... 120 hours............ 576 hours........... 57,600
238.111 Training,
qualification, and
designation program
Training employees to 17 railroads............... N/A............................... Usual and customary N/A................. N/A
perform brake-related procedure.
inspections, tests, or
maintenance.
Training employees to 17 railroads............... 5,950 employees/235 instructors... 2 hours.............. 12,376 hours........ 368,900
perform daily mechanical
inspections.
Development of Training 17 railroads............... 17 programs....................... 520 hours............ 8,840 hours......... 282,880
Program.
Record keeping........... 17 railroads............... 5,950 records..................... 3 minutes............ 298 hours........... 10,132
238.113--Pre-revenue service 6 equipment manufacturers.. 4.8 plans (5 yr. average)......... 200 hours............ 960 hours........... 83,328
acceptance testing plan.
Subsequent equipment 6 equipment manufacturers.. 4.8 plans (5 yr. average)......... 60 hours............. 288 hours........... 22,464
orders.
Previously used equipment 6 equipment manufacturers.. 4.8 plans (5 yr. average)......... 60 hours............. 288 hours........... 22,464
238.231--Brake System
Identify and mark N/A........................ N/A............................... Usual and customary N/A................. N/A
emergency brake. procedure.
238.239--Automated monitoring 17 railroads............... 17 documents...................... 2 hours.............. 34 hours............ 1,156

[[Page 49789]]

238.303--Exterior calendar N/A........................ N/A............................... Usual and customary N/A................. N/A
day mechanical inspection of procedure.
passenger cars and unpowered
vehicles used in passenger
trains.
238.305--Interior calendar
day mechanical inspection of
passenger cars
Stenciling or marking N/A........................ N/A............................... Usual and customary N/A................. N/A
emergency brake valve. procedure.
Stenciling or marking N/A........................ N/A............................... Usual and customary N/A................. N/A
high voltage equipment. procedure.
Tagging of defective 9 railroads................ 540 tags......................... 1 minute............. 9 hours............. 306
doors.
238.307--Periodic mechanical N/A........................ N/A............................... Usual and customary N/A................. N/A
inspection of passenger cars. procedure.
238.309--Records of periodic N/A........................ N/A............................... Usual and customary N/A................. N/A
maintenance. procedure.
238.313--Class I Brake Test.. N/A........................ N/A............................... Usual and customary N/A................. N/A
procedure.
238.403--Crash energy 1 railroad................. 1 analysis........................ 120 hours............ 120 hours........... 12,000
management requirements.
238.405--Longitudinal static 17 railroads............... 1 design.......................... 20 hours............. 20 hours............ 680
compressive strength.
238.421--Gazing
Marking of glazing N/A........................ N/A............................... Usual and customary N/A................. N/A
material. procedure.
Stenciling requirement... N/A........................ N/A............................... Usual and customary N/A................. N/A
procedure.
238.431--Brake System........ 1 railroad................. 1 analysis........................ 40 hours............. 40 hours............ 1,360
238.437--Emergency 3 car manufacturers........ 3 instructions.................... 1 hour............... 3 hours............. 90
communication.
238.439--Emergency window 3 car manufacturers........ 16 cars marked.................... 15 minutes........... 4 hours............. 120
exits and roof hatches--
Marking.
238.503--Inspection, testing,
and maintenance requirements

238.505--Program approval
procedures
Submission of program.... 1 railroad................. 1 program......................... 80 hours............. 80 hours............ 2,720
Amendments to program.... 1 railroad................. 1 amendment....................... 8 hours.............. 8 hours............. 272
Comments................. 4 unions/individuals....... 4 comments........................ 1 hour............... 4 hours............. 244
Approval................. N/A........................ N/A............................... No disapprovals N/A................. N/A
expected at this
time.
238.603--Process to introduce 1 railroad................. 1 plan............................ 100 hours............ 100 hours........... 3,400
new technology.
Appendix B to Part 238-- 5-6 seat manufacturers..... N/A............................... Usual and customary N/A................. N/A
Labeling requirement. procedure.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

All estimates include the time for reviewing instructions;
searching existing data sources; gathering or maintaining the needed
data; and reviewing the information. Pursuant to 44 U.S.C.
3506(c)(2)(B), FRA solicits comments concerning: whether these
information collection requirements are necessary for the proper
performance of the functions of FRA, including whether the information
has practical utility; the accuracy of FRA's estimates of the burden of
the information collection requirements; the quality, utility, and
clarity of the information to be collected; and whether the burden of
collection of information on those who are to respond, including
through the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of
information technology, may be minimized. For information or a copy of
the paperwork package submitted to OMB contact Ms. Gloria Swanson
Eutsler at 202-632-3318.
Organizations and individuals desiring to submit comments on the
collection of information requirements should direct them to the Office
of Management and Budget, Attention: Desk Officer for the Federal
Railroad Administration, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,
New Executive Office Building, 726 Jackson Place, N.W., Washington,
D.C. 20503, and should also send a copy of their comments to Ms. Gloria
Swanson Eutsler, Federal Railroad Administration, 400 Seventh Street,
S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590.
OMB is required to make a decision concerning the collection of
information requirements contained in this NPRM between 30 and 60 days
after publication of this document in the

[[Page 49790]]

Federal Register. Therefore, a comment to OMB is best assured of having
its full effect if OMB receives it within 30 days of publication. The
final rule will respond to any OMB or public comments on the
information collection requirements contained in this proposal.
FRA is not authorized to impose a penalty on persons for violating
information collection requirements which do not display a current OMB
control number, if required. FRA intends to obtain current OMB control
numbers for any new information collection requirements resulting from
this rulemaking action prior to the effective date of a final rule. The
OMB control number, when assigned, will be announced by separate notice
in the Federal Register.

Environmental Impact

FRA has evaluated these proposed regulations in accordance with its
procedures for ensuring full consideration of the environmental impact
of FRA actions, as required by the National Environmental Policy Act
(42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.), and related directives. This notice meets the
criteria that establish this as a non-major action for environmental
purposes.

Federalism Implications

This proposed rule has been analyzed in accordance with the
principles and criteria contained in Executive Order 12612, and it has
been determined that the proposed rule does not have sufficient
federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism
Assessment. The fundamental policy decision providing that Federal
regulations should govern aspects of service provided by municipal and
public benefit corporations (or agencies) of State governments is
embodied in the statute quoted above (49 U.S.C. 20133). Further, FRA
has consulted with commuter authorities in developing this proposed
rule.

Request for Public Comments

FRA proposes to adopt a new part 238 and to amend parts 216, 223,
229, 231, and 232 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, as set
forth below. FRA solicits comments on all aspects of the proposed rule
whether through written submissions, participation in the public
hearing, or both. FRA may make changes in the final rule based on
comments received in response to this proposed rule.

List of Subjects

49 CFR Part 216

Railroad safety, Special notice for repairs.

49 CFR Part 223

Railroad safety, Glazing standards.

49 CFR Part 229

Railroad safety, Railroad locomotive safety.

49 CFR Part 231

Railroad safety, Railroad safety appliances.

49 CFR Part 232

Railroad safety, Railroad power brakes.

49 CFR Part 238

Railroad safety, Railroad passenger equipment.

The Proposed Rule

In consideration of the foregoing, FRA proposes to amend chapter
II, subtitle B of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations as follows:

PART 216--[AMENDED]

1. The authority citation for part 216 is revised to read as
follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102-20104, 20133, 20137-20138, 20141,
20143, 20301-20302, 20701-20702, 21301-21302, 21304; 49 CFR 1.49(c),
(m).

2. Section 216.1(a) is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 216.1 Application.

(a) This part applies, according to its terms, to each railroad
that uses or operates--
(1) A railroad freight car subject to part 215 of this chapter;
(2) A locomotive subject to 49 U.S.C. chapter 207 (49 U.S.C. 20701-
20703); or
(3) Railroad passenger equipment subject to part 238 of this
chapter.
* * * * *
3. Section 216.3(b) is amended by removing the phrase ``section 206
of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 435)'' and adding
in its place the phrase ``49 U.S.C. 20105''.
4. Section 216.5(c) is amended by adding after ``216.13,'':
``216.14,''.
5. The first sentence of Sec. 216.13(a) is amended by removing the
phrase ``the FRA Locomotive Inspection Regulations set forth in part
230'' and by adding in its place the phrase ``the FRA Railroad
Locomotive Safety Standards set forth in part 229 of this chapter or
the FRA Railroad Locomotive Inspection Regulations set forth in part
230 of this chapter''. The third sentence of Sec. 216.13(a) is amended
by removing the phrase ``part 230'' and adding in its place the phrase
``parts 229 and 230''.
6. Section 216.14 is added to read as follows:

Sec. 216.14 Special notice for repairs--passenger equipment.

(a) When an FRA Motive Power and Equipment Inspector or a State
Equipment Inspector determines that railroad passenger equipment is not
in conformity with one or more of the requirements of the FRA Passenger
Equipment Safety Standards set forth in part 238 of this chapter and
that it is unsafe for further service, he or she notifies the railroad
in writing that the equipment is not in serviceable condition. The
Special Notice sets out and describes the defect or defects that cause
the equipment to be in unserviceable condition. After receipt of the
Special Notice, the railroad shall remove the equipment from service
until it is restored to serviceable condition. The equipment may not be
deemed in serviceable condition until it complies with all applicable
requirements of part 238 of this chapter.
(b) The railroad shall notify in writing the FRA Regional
Administrator for the FRA region in which the Special Notice was issued
when the equipment is returned to service, specifying the repairs
completed.
(c) Railroad passenger equipment subject to a Special Notice may be
moved from the place where it was found to be unsafe for further
service to the nearest available point where the equipment can be
repaired, if such movement is necessary to make the repairs. However,
the movement is subject to the further restrictions of Secs. 238.15 and
238.17 of this chapter.

Sec. 216.1 [Amended]

7. Section 216.17(a) is amended as follows:
a. By adding, after ``216.13'', ``216.14,';
b. By adding, after the word ``locomotive,'' in the third sentence,
the phrase ``railroad passenger equipment,'; and
c. By revising the fifth sentence to read as follows:
``If upon reinspection, the railroad freight car, locomotive, or
passenger equipment is found to be in serviceable condition, or the
track is found to comply with the requirements for the class at which
it was previously operated by the railroad, the FRA Regional
Administrator or his or her agent immediately notifies the railroad,
whereupon the restrictions of the Special Notice cease to be
effective.''
8. In subpart B of part 216, the phrases ``the FRA Regional
Director for Railroad Safety'', ``the FRA Regional Director of Railroad
Safety'', ``a Regional Director'' and ``the Regional Director'' are
removed, and the phrase ``the FRA Regional Administrator'' is added in
their place.

[[Page 49791]]

PART 223--[AMENDED]

9. The authority citation for part 223 is revised to read as
follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102-20103, 20133, 20701-20702, 21301-
21302, 21304; 49 CFR 1.49(c), (m).

10. Section 223.3 is amended by adding paragraph (c) to read as
follows:

Sec. 223.3 Application.

* * * * *
(c) Except for Sec. 223.9(d), this part does not apply to Tier II
passenger equipment as defined in Sec. 238.5 of this chapter (i.e.,
passenger equipment operating at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not
exceeding 150 mph).

PART 229--[AMENDED]

11. The authority citation for part 229 is revised to read as
follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102-20103, 20133, 20137-20138, 20143,
20701-20703, 21301-21302, 21304; 49 CFR 1.49(c), (m).

12 . Section 229.3 is amended by revising paragraph (a) and adding
new paragraphs (c), (d), and (e) to read as follows:

Sec. 229.3 Applicability.

(a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) through (e) of this
section, this part applies to all standard gage railroads.
(b) * * *
(c) Paragraphs (a), (b), and (d) through (h) of Sec. 229.125 do not
apply to Tier II passenger equipment as defined in Sec. 238.5 of this
chapter (i.e., passenger equipment operating at speeds exceeding 125
mph but not exceeding 150 mph).
(d) On or after January 1, 1998, paragraphs (a)(1) and (b)(1) of
Sec. 229.141 do not apply to ``passenger equipment'' as defined in
Sec. 238.5 of this chapter that is subject to part 238 of this chapter.
(e) Paragraphs (a)(2) through (a)(4), and (b)(2) through (b)(4) of
Sec. 229.141 do not apply to ``passenger equipment'' as defined in
Sec. 238.5 of this chapter that is subject to part 238 of this chapter
and placed in service for the first time on or after January 1, 1998.

PART 231--[AMENDED]

13. The authority citation for part 231 is revised to read as
follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102-20103, 20131, 20301-20303, 21301-
21302, 21304; 49 CFR 1.49 (c), (m).

14. Section 231.0 is amended by redesignating paragraphs (c)
through (e) as paragraphs (d) through (f), respectively; by revising
paragraph (a); and by adding a new paragraph (c) to read as follows:

Sec. 231.0 Applicability and penalties.

(a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section,
this part applies to all standard gage railroads.
(b) * * *
(c) Except for the provisions governing uncoupling devices, this
part does not apply to Tier II passenger equipment as defined in
Sec. 238.5 of this chapter (i.e., passenger equipment operating at
speeds exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 150 mph).
* * * * *

PART 232--[AMENDED]

15. The authority citation for part 232 is revised to read as
follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102-20103, 20133, 20141, 20301-20303,
20306, 21301-21302, 21304; 49 CFR 1.49 (c), (m).

16. Section 232.0 is amended by redesignating paragraphs (c)
through (e) as paragraphs (d) through (f), respectively; by revising
paragraph (a); and by adding a new paragraph (c) to read as follows:

Sec. 232.0 Applicability and penalties.

(a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section,
this part applies to all standard gage railroads.
(b) * * *
(c) Except for Secs. 232.2 and 232.21 through 232.25, this part
does not apply to a ``passenger train'' or ``passenger equipment'' as
defined in Sec. 238.5 of this chapter that is subject to part 238 of
this chapter.
* * * * *
17. Part 238 is added to read as follows:

PART 238--PASSENGER EQUIPMENT SAFETY STANDARDS

Subpart A--General

Sec.
238.1 Purpose and scope.
238.3 Application.
238.5 Definitions.
238.7 Waivers.
238.9 Responsibility for compliance.
238.11 Civil penalties.
238.13 Preemptive effect.
238.15 Movement of passenger equipment with power brake defects.
238.17 Movement of passenger equipment with other than power brake
defects.
238.19 Reporting and tracking defective passenger equipment.
238.21 Special approval procedure.

Subpart B--System Safety and General Requirements

238.101 Scope.

System Safety

238.103 General system safety requirements.
238.105 Fire protection program.
238.107 Software safety program.
238.109 Inspection, testing, and maintenance program.
238.111 Training, qualification, and designation program.
238.113 Pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan.

General Requirements

238.115 Fire safety.
238.117 Protection against personal injury.
238.119 Rim-stamped straight-plate wheels.
238.121 Train system software and hardware.

238.123 Emergency lighting.

Subpart C--Specific Requirements for Tier I Passenger Equipment

238.201 Scope.
238.203 Static end strength.
238.205 Anti-climbing mechanism.
238.207 Link between coupling mechanism and car body.
238.209 Forward-facing end structure of locomotives.
238.211 Collision posts.
238.213 Corner posts.
238.215 Rollover strength.
238.217 Side impact strength.
238.219 Truck-to-car-body attachment.
238.221 Glazing.
238.223 Fuel tanks.
238.225 Electrical system.
238.227 Suspension system.
238.229 Safety appliances.
238.231 Brake system.
238.233 Interior fittings and surfaces.
238.235 Emergency window exits.
238.237 Doors.
238.239 Automated monitoring.
Subpart D--Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements for Tier I
Passenger Equipment
238.301 Scope.
238.303 Exterior calendar day mechanical inspection of passenger
cars and unpowered vehicles used in passenger trains.
238.305 Interior calendar day mechanical inspection of passenger
cars.
238.307 Periodic mechanical inspection of passenger cars.
238.309 Periodic brake equipment maintenance.
238.311 Single car test.
238.313 Class I brake test.
238.315 Class IA brake test.
238.317 Class II brake test.
238.319 Running brake test.

Subpart E--Specific Requirements for Tier II Passenger Equipment

238.401 Scope.
238.403 Crash energy management requirements.
238.405 Longitudinal static compressive strength.
238.407 Anti-climbing mechanism.
238.409 Forward end structures of power car cabs.
238.411 Rear end structures of power car cabs.
238.413 End structures of trailer cars.
238.415 Rollover strength.

[[Page 49792]]

238.417 Side loads.
238.419 Truck-to-car-body and truck component attachment.
238.421 Glazing.
238.423 Fuel tanks.
238.425 Electrical system.
238.427 Suspension system.
238.429 Safety appliances.
238.431 Brake system.
238.433 Draft system.
238.435 Interior fittings and surfaces.
238.437 Emergency communication.
238.439 Emergency window exits and roof hatches.
238.441 Doors.
238.443 Headlights.
238.445 Automated monitoring.
238.447 Operator's controls and cab layout.
Subpart F--Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements for Tier
II Passenger Equipment
238.501 Scope.
238.503 Inspection, testing, and maintenance requirements.
238.505 Program approval procedure.
Subpart G--Introduction of New Technology to Tier II Passenger
Equipment
238.601 Scope.
238.603 Process to introduce new technology.
Appendix A to Part 238--Schedule of Civil Penalties [Reserved]
Appendix B to Part 238--Test Performance Criteria for the
Flammability and Smoke Emission Characteristics of Materials Used in
Constructing or Refurbishing Locomotive Cab and Passenger Car
Interiors
Appendix C to Part 238--Suspension System Safety Performance
Standards

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102-20103, 20133, 20141, 20301-20303,
20306, 20701-20702, 21301-21302, 21304; 49 CFR 1.49(c), (m).

Subpart A--General

Sec. 238.1 Purpose and scope.

(a) The purpose of this part is to:
(1) Prevent accidents involving railroad passenger equipment that
cause damage to property, or injury or death to railroad employees,
railroad passengers, or the general public; and
(2) Mitigate the consequences of accidents involving railroad
passenger equipment, to the extent such accidents cannot be prevented.
(b) This part prescribes minimum Federal safety standards for
railroad passenger equipment. This part does not restrict a railroad
from adopting and enforcing additional or more stringent requirements
not inconsistent with this part.

Sec. 238.3 Application.

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, this part
applies to all:
(1) Railroads that operate intercity or commuter passenger train
service on standard gage track which is part of the general railroad
system of transportation;
(2) Railroads that provide commuter or other short-haul rail
passenger train service in a metropolitan or suburban area as described
by 49 U.S.C. 20102(1), including public authorities operating passenger
train service; and
(3) Rapid transit operations in an urban area.
(b) Railroads that permit to be used or hauled on their lines
passenger equipment subject to this part, in violation of a power brake
provision of this part or a safety appliance provision of this part,
are subject to the power brake and safety appliance provisions of this
part with respect to such operations.
(c) This part does not apply to:
(1) Rapid transit operations in an urban area that are not
connected with the general railroad system of transportation;
(2) Circus trains; or
(3) Tourist, scenic, historic, or excursion operations, whether on
or off the general railroad system of transportation.

Sec. 238.5 Definitions.

As used in this part--
AAR means the Association of American Railroads.
Alerter means a device or system installed in the operator cab to
promote continuous, active operator attentiveness by monitoring select
operator-induced control activities. If fluctuation of a monitored
operator control is not detected within a predetermined time, a
sequence of audible and visual alarms is activated so as to
progressively prompt a response by the operator. Failure by the
operator to institute a change of state in a monitored control, or
acknowledge the alerter alarm activity through a manual reset
provision, results in a penalty brake application, bringing the
locomotive or train to a stop.
Anti-climbing mechanism means a device at the ends of adjoining
vehicles in a train that is designed to engage when subjected to large
buff loads to prevent the override of the vehicles.
Bind means restrict the intended movement of one or more brake
system components by reduced clearance, by obstruction, or by increased
friction.
Block of cars means one car or multiple cars in a solid unit
coupled together for the purpose of being added to, or removed from, a
train as a solid unit.
Brake, air or power brake means a combination of devices operated
by compressed air, arranged in a system, and controlled manually,
electrically, or pneumatically, by means of which the motion of a car
or locomotive is retarded or arrested.
Brake control system means the components, including software, that
either automatically or under the control of the engineer control the
retarding force applied to the train by the brake system.
Brake, disc means a retardation system used on some rail vehicles,
primarily passenger equipment, that utilizes flat metal discs as the
braking surface instead of the wheel tread.
Brake, dynamic means a train braking system whereby the kinetic
energy of a moving train is used to generate electric current at the
locomotive traction motors, which is then dissipated through banks of
resistor grids or back into the catenary or third rail system.
Brake, effective means a brake that is capable of producing its
required design retarding force on the train.
Brake indicator means a device, actuated by brake cylinder
pressure, which indicates whether brakes are applied or released.
Brake, inoperative means a primary brake that, for any reason, no
longer applies or releases as intended or is otherwise ineffective.
Brake, on-tread friction means a braking system that uses a brake
shoe that acts on the tread of the wheel to retard the vehicle.
Brake, parking or hand brake means a brake that can be applied and
released by hand to prevent movement of a stationary car or locomotive.
Brake pipe means the system of piping (including branch pipes,
angle cocks, cutout cocks, dirt collectors, hose, and hose couplings)
used for connecting locomotives and all cars for the passage of air to
control the locomotive and car brakes.
Brake, power means ``air brake'' as that term is defined in this
section.
Brake, primary means those components of the train brake system
necessary to stop the train within the signal spacing distance without
thermal damage to friction braking surfaces.
Brake, secondary means those components of the train brake system
which develop supplemental brake retarding force that is not needed to
stop the train within signal spacing distances or to prevent thermal
damage to wheels.
Brake shoes or pads aligned with tread or disc means that the
surface of the brake shoe or pad, respectively, engages the surface of
the wheel tread or disc, respectively, with no more than a \1/4\ inch
overhang.
Braking system, blended means a braking system where the primary
brake and one or more secondary brakes are

[[Page 49793]]

automatically combined to stop the train. If the secondary brakes are
unavailable, the blended brake uses the primary brake alone to stop the
train.
Calendar day means a time period starting at 12:01 am and ending at
midnight on a given date.
Class I brake test means a complete passenger train brake system
test (as further specified in Sec. 238.313) performed by a qualified
mechanical inspector to ensure that the air brake system is 100 percent
effective.
Class IA brake test means a test and inspection (as further
specified in Sec. 238.315) of the air brake system on each car in a
passenger train to ensure the air brake system is 100 percent
effective.
Class II brake test means a test (as further specified in
Sec. 238.317) of brake pipe integrity and continuity from the
controlling locomotive to the rear unit of a passenger train.
Collision posts means members of the end structures of a vehicle
that project upward vertically from the underframe to which they are
securely attached, and that provide protection of occupied compartments
from an object penetrating the vehicle during a collision.
Control valves means that part of the air brake equipment on each
car or locomotive that controls the charging, application, and release
of the air brakes, in response to train line commands.
Corner posts means structural members located at the intersection
of the front or rear surface with the side surface of a vehicle and
which extend vertically from the floor support structure to the roof
support structure. Corner posts may be combined with collision posts to
become part of the end structure.
Crack means a fracture without complete separation into parts,
except that, in a casting, a shrinkage crack or hot tear that does not
significantly diminish the strength of the member is not a crack.
Crash energy management means an approach to the design of rail
passenger equipment which controls the dissipation of energy during a
collision to protect the occupied volumes from crushing and to limit
the decelerations on passengers and crewmembers in those volumes. This
may be accomplished by designing energy-absorbing structures of low
strength in the unoccupied volumes of a rail vehicle or passenger train
to collapse in a controlled fashion, while providing higher structural
strength in the occupied volumes. Energy deflection can also be part of
a crash energy management approach. Crash energy management can be used
to help provide anti-climbing resistance and to reduce the risk of
train buckling during a collision.
Crash refuge means a volume with extreme structural strength
designed to maximize the survivability of crewmembers stationed in the
locomotive cab during a collision.
Crewmember means a railroad employee called to perform service
covered by 49 U.S.C. 21103 and subject to the railroad's operating
rules and program of operational tests and inspections required in
Secs. 217.9 and 217.11 of this chapter.
Critical buckling stress means minimum stress necessary to initiate
buckling of a structural member.
Emergency application means an irretrievable brake application
resulting in the maximum retarding force available from the train brake
system.
End structure means the main support structure projecting upward
from the floor or underframe of a locomotive, passenger car, or other
rail vehicle. The end structure is securely attached to the underframe
at each end of a rail vehicle.
Foul means restrict the intended movement of one or more brake
system components because the component is snagged, entangled, or
twisted.
Fuel tank, integral means a fuel containment volume that is
integral with some other structural element of the locomotive not
designed solely as a fuel container.
Full-height collision post, corner post, or side frame post means
any vertical framing member in the car body structure that spans the
distance between the underframe and the roof at the car body section
where the post is located. For collision posts located at the
approximate third points of an end frame, the term ``full-height''
applies to posts that extend and connect to supporting structural
members in the roof at the location of the posts, or to a beam
connected to the tops of the end-frame and supported by the roof rails
(or anti-telescoping plate), or to both.
Full service application means a brake application which results in
a brake cylinder pressure at the service limiting valve setting or
equivalent.
Glazing, end-facing means a glazing panel located where a line
perpendicular to the exterior surface of the panel makes an angle of 50
degrees or less with the longitudinal center line of the rail vehicle
in which the panel is installed. A glazing panel that curves so as to
meet the definition for both side-facing and end-facing glazing is end-
facing glazing.
Glazing, exterior means a glazing panel that is an integral part of
the exterior skin of a rail vehicle with a surface exposed to the
outside environment.
Glazing frame means the arrangement used to install the glazing
into the structure of a rail vehicle.
Glazing, interior means a glazing panel with no surface exposed to
the outside environment and which is protected from projectiles by the
structure of a rail vehicle.
Glazing, side-facing means a glazing panel located where a line
perpendicular to the exterior surface of the panel makes an angle of
more than 50 degrees with the longitudinal center line of the rail
vehicle in which the panel is installed.
Handrails means safety appliances installed on either side of a
rail vehicle's exterior doors to assist passengers and crew to safely
board and depart the vehicle.
Head end power means power generated on board the locomotive of a
passenger train used for purposes other than propelling the train, such
as cooking, heating, illumination, ventilation and air conditioning.
Hunting oscillations means, for purposes of Tier I equipment,
lateral oscillations of trucks that could lead to a dangerous
instability and, for purposes of Tier II equipment, truck frame lateral
oscillations exceeding 0.8g peak-to-peak for six or more consecutive
oscillations.
In passenger service, when used in connection with passenger
equipment, means passenger equipment subject to this part that is
carrying, or available to carry, fare-paying passengers.
In service, when used in connection with passenger equipment,
means:
(1) Passenger equipment subject to this part that is in passenger
service; and
(2) All other passenger equipment subject to this part, unless the
passenger equipment:
(i) Is being handled in accordance with Secs. 238.15, 238.17,
238.305(c)(5), or 238.503(f), as applicable;
(ii) Is in a repair shop or on a repair track;
(iii) Is on a storage track and is not carrying passengers; or
(iv) Has been delivered in interchange but has not been accepted by
the receiving railroad.
Interior fitting means any auxiliary component in the passenger
compartment which is mounted to the floor, ceiling, sidewalls, or end
walls and projects into the passenger compartment from the surface or
surfaces to which it is mounted. Interior

[[Page 49794]]

fittings do not include side and end walls, floors, door pockets, or
ceiling lining materials, for example.
Lateral means the horizontal direction perpendicular to the
direction of travel of a rail vehicle.
Locomotive means a piece of on-track equipment, other than hi-rail,
specialized maintenance, or other similar equipment, which may consist
of one or more units operated from a single control stand with one or
more propelling motors designed for moving other equipment; with one or
more propelling motors designed to transport freight or passenger
traffic or both; or without propelling motors but with one or more
control stands. This term does not include a locomotive propelled by
steam power unless it is used to haul an intercity or commuter
passenger train.
Locomotive cab means a compartment or space on board a locomotive
where the control stand is located and which is normally occupied by
the engineer when the locomotive is being operated.
Locomotive, cab car means a unit of rolling equipment intended to
provide transportation for members of the general public that is
without propelling motors but with one or more control stands.
Locomotive, controlling means the locomotive from which the
engineer exercises control over the train.
Locomotive, MU means a unit of rolling equipment self-propelled by
any power source, other than steam, and intended to provide
transportation for members of the general public.
Longitudinal means in a direction parallel to the normal direction
of travel of a rail vehicle.
Luminescent material means a material that absorbs light energy
when ambient levels of light are high and emits this stored energy when
ambient levels of light are low, making the material appear to glow in
the dark.
L/V ratio means the lateral force that the flange of a vehicle's
wheel exerts on the rail, divided by the vertical force that the tread
of the same wheel exerts on the rail.
MIL-STD-882C means a military standard issued by the United States
Department of Defense to provide uniform requirements for developing
and implementing a system safety program to identify and then eliminate
the hazards of a system or reduce the associated risk to an acceptable
level.
Occupied volume means the spaces of a rail vehicle or passenger
train where passengers or crewmembers are normally located during
service operation, such as the operating cab and passenger seating and
sleeping areas. Vestibules are typically not considered occupied,
except when in use as a control cab.
Ordered or date ordered means the date on which notice to proceed
is given by a procuring railroad to a contractor or supplier for new
equipment.
Override means to climb over the normal coupling or side buffers
and linking mechanism and impact the end of the adjoining rail vehicle
or unit above the underframe.
Passenger car means a unit of rail rolling equipment intended to
provide transportation for members of the general public and includes a
self-propelled car designed to carry passengers, baggage, mail, or
express. This term includes a passenger coach, cab car, and an MU
locomotive. This term does not include a private car.
Passenger coach means a unit of rail rolling equipment intended to
provide transportation for members of the general public that is
without propelling motors and without a control stand.
Passenger equipment means all powered and unpowered passenger cars,
locomotives used to haul a passenger car, and any other unit of rail
rolling equipment hauled in a train with one or more passenger cars.
Passenger equipment includes a--
(1) Passenger coach,
(2) Cab car,
(3) MU locomotive,
(4) Private car,
(5) Locomotive not intended to provide transportation for a member
of the general public that is used to power a passenger train, and
(6) Any non-self-propelled vehicle hauled in a passenger train,
including a freight car.
Passenger station means a location designated in a railroad's
timetable where passengers are regularly scheduled to get on or off any
train.
Permanent deformation means the undergoing of a permanent change in
shape of a structural member of a rail vehicle.
Piston travel means the amount of linear movement of the air brake
hollow rod (or equivalent) or piston rod when forced outward by
movement of the piston in the brake cylinder or actuator and limited by
the brake shoes being forced against the wheel or disc.
Power car means a rail vehicle that propels a Tier II passenger
train or is the lead vehicle in a Tier II passenger train, or both.
Pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan means a document, as
further specified in Sec. 238.113, prepared by a railroad that explains
in detail how pre-revenue service tests of certain passenger equipment
demonstrate that the equipment meets Federal safety standards and the
railroad's own safety design requirements.
Private car means historical or antiquated rail rolling equipment
that is used only for excursion, recreational, or private
transportation businesses. A private car is not a passenger car.
Qualified mechanical inspector means a qualified person who has
received, as a part of the training, qualification, and designation
program required under Sec. 238.111, instruction and training that
includes ``hands-on'' experience (under appropriate supervision or
apprenticeship) in one or more of the following functions:
troubleshooting, inspection, testing, and maintenance or repair of the
specific train brake and other components and systems for which the
inspector is assigned responsibility. Further, the mechanical inspector
shall be a person whose primary responsibility includes work generally
consistent with the above-referenced functions and is designated to--
(1) Conduct Class I brake tests under this part;
(2) Inspect MU locomotives or other passenger cars for compliance
with this part; or
(3) Determine whether equipment not in compliance with this part
may be moved safely and, if so, under what conditions.
Qualified person means a person determined by a railroad to have
the knowledge and skills necessary to perform one or more functions
required under this part. The railroad determines the qualifications
and competencies for employees designated to perform various functions
in the manner set forth in this part.
Railroad means any form of non-highway ground transportation that
runs on rails or electromagnetic guideways, including:
(1) Commuter or short-haul rail passenger service in a metropolitan
or suburban area and commuter railroad service that was operated by the
Consolidated Rail Corporation on January 1, 1979; and
(2) High speed ground transportation systems that connect
metropolitan areas, without regard to whether those systems use new
technologies not associated with traditional railroads. The term
``railroad'' is also intended to mean a person that provides railroad
transportation, whether directly or by contracting out operation of the
railroad to another person. The term does not include rapid transit
operations in an urban area that are not connected to the general
railroad system of transportation.

[[Page 49795]]

Rebuilt means equipment undergoing overhaul identified by the
railroad as a capital expense under the Surface Transportation Board's
accounting standards.
Refresher training means periodic retraining required by a railroad
for employees or contractors to remain qualified to perform specific
equipment inspection, testing, or maintenance functions.
Repair point means a location designated by a railroad where
repairs of the type necessary occur on a regular basis. A repair point
has, or should have, the facilities, tools, and qualified mechanical
employees required to make the necessary repairs. A repair point need
not be staffed continuously.
Respond as intended means to produce the result that a device or
system is designed to produce.
Rollover strength means strength needed to protect the structural
integrity of a rail vehicle in the event the vehicle leaves the track
and impacts the ground on its side or roof.
Roof rail means the longitudinal structural member at the
intersection of the side wall and the roof sheathing.
Running brake test means a test (as further specified in
Sec. 238.319) of a train system or component while the train is in
motion to verify that the system or component functions as intended.
Safety appliance means an appliance required under 49 U.S.C.
chapter 203, excluding power brakes. The term includes automatic
couplers, hand brakes, sill steps, handholds, handrails, or ladder
treads made of steel or a material of equal or greater mechanical
strength used by the traveling public or railroad employees that
provides a means for safely coupling, uncoupling, or ascending or
descending passenger equipment.
Safety-critical component or system means a component or system
that, if not available, increases the risk of damage to equipment or
injury to a passenger, crewmember, or other person.
Safety-critical task means a task that, if not performed correctly,
increases the risk of damage to equipment or injury to a passenger,
crewmember, or other person.
Safety inspection criteria means a measurement limit or observation
threshold used to trigger the duty under this part to take corrective
action to prevent a serious safety problem from developing.
Measurements may be taken manually or by reliable sensors.
Semi-permanently coupled means coupled by means of a drawbar or
other coupling mechanism that requires tools to perform the uncoupling
operation. Coupling and uncoupling of each such unit in a train can be
performed safely only while at a maintenance or shop location where
personnel can safely get under a unit or between units.
Shear strength means the ability of a structural member to resist
forces or components of forces acting perpendicular to compression or
tension forces, or both, in the member.
Shock absorbent material means material designed to prevent or
mitigate injuries due to impact by yielding and absorbing much of the
energy of impact.
Side posts means main vertical structural elements in the sides of
a rail vehicle.
Side sills means that portion of the underframe or side at the
bottom of the rail vehicle side wall.
Single car test means a comprehensive test (as further specified in
Sec. 238.311) of the functioning of all critical brake system
components installed on an individual passenger car or unpowered
vehicle, other than a passenger car, hauled in a passenger train.
Single car test device means a device capable of controlling the
application and release of the brakes on an individual passenger car or
an unpowered vehicle, other than a passenger car, hauled in a passenger
train through pneumatic or electrical means.
Skin means the outer covering on a fuel tank or the front of a
locomotive, including a cab car and an MU locomotive, excluding the
windows and forward-facing doors. The skin may be covered with another
coating of a material such as fiberglass.
Spall, glazing means small pieces of glazing that fly off the back
surface of glazing when an object strikes the front surface.
Spot checks means random checks of train inspections, tests, or
maintenance operations conducted by qualified supervisors.
Standard procedures means a description of the step-by-step process
to be used to safely accomplish a safety-critical or potentially
hazardous task.
System means a composite of equipment, computer programs, people,
facilities, procedures, and documentation which are integrated to
perform a specific operational function in a specific environment.
System developer means the entity responsible for developing
equipment or a system so that it may be approved for use in service.
System safety means the application of design, operating,
technical, and management techniques and principles throughout the
system's life cycle to reduce hazards and unsafe conditions to the
lowest level possible through the most effective use of the available
resources.
System safety plan means a document that states in detail the
techniques, procedures, and tests to follow to reduce hazards and
unsafe conditions to the lowest level possible through the most
effective use of available resources. The system safety plan is used as
part of the design process for new equipment to ensure that the
equipment meets all Federal safety standards and the railroad's own
safety requirements.
System safety program means the activities described in the system
safety plan to be performed to ensure that the railroad's passenger
equipment meets all Federal safety standards and the railroad's own
safety design requirements.
Telescope means override an adjoining rail vehicle or unit and
penetrate into the interior of that adjoining vehicle or unit because
of compressive forces.
Terminal means a starting point or ending point of a single
scheduled train trip, where passengers may get on or off a train.
Normally the location is a point where the train would reverse
direction or change destinations.
Tier I means operating at speeds not exceeding 125 mph.
Tier II means operating at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not
exceeding 150 mph.
Tourist, scenic, historic, or excursion operations are railroad
operations that carry passengers, often using antiquated equipment,
with the conveyance of the passengers to a particular destination not
being the principal purpose.
Trailer car means a unit of rail rolling equipment that neither
propels a Tier II passenger train nor is the leading unit in a Tier II
passenger train. A trailer car is normally without a control stand and
is normally occupied by passengers.
Train means a locomotive unit or locomotive units coupled, with or
without cars. For the purposes of the provisions of this part related
to power brakes, the term ``train'' does not include such equipment
when being used in switching movements (as defined in Sec. 231.30(b) of
this chapter) of less than one mile.
Train brake communication line means the communication link between
the locomotive and cars in a train by which the brake commands are
transmitted. This may be a pneumatic pipe, electrical line, or radio
signal.
Train, commuter means a passenger train providing commuter service
within an urban, suburban, or metropolitan area. The term includes a

[[Page 49796]]

passenger train provided by an instrumentality of a State or a
political subdivision of a State.
Train, long-distance intercity passenger means a passenger train
that provides service between large cities more than 125 miles apart
and is not operated exclusively in the National Railroad Passenger
Corporation's Northeast Corridor.
Train, passenger means a train that transports or is available to
transport members of the general public. If a train is composed of a
mixture of passenger and freight equipment, that train is a passenger
train for purposes of this part.
Train, short-distance intercity passenger means a passenger train
that provides service exclusively on the National Railroad Passenger
Corporation's Northeast Corridor or between cities that are not more
than 125 miles apart.
Train, Tier II passenger means a short-distance or long-distance
intercity passenger train providing service at speeds that include
exceeding 125 mph but do not exceed 150 mph.
Trainset, passenger means a passenger train including the
locomotive(s) or power car(s) and passenger cars that are semi-
permanently coupled to operate as a single unit. The individual
components are uncoupled only for emergencies or maintenance.
Transverse means in a direction perpendicular to the normal
direction of travel of a railroad vehicle.
Ultimate strength means the load at which a structural member
fractures or ceases to resist any load.
Uncoupling mechanism means the arrangement for operating the
coupler by any means.
Underframe means the lower horizontal support structure of a car
body.
Unit means rail rolling equipment of any type or, in the context of
articulated equipment, ``unit'' means a piece of equipment located
between two trucks.
Unit body (monocoque) design or unistructure means a type of
vehicle construction where the shell or skin acts as a single unit with
the supporting frame to resist and transmit the loads acting on the
vehicle.
Unoccupied volume means the spaces of a rail vehicle or passenger
train which do not contain seating and are not normally occupied by
passengers or crewmembers.
Vehicle, rail means a car, locomotive, tender, or similar vehicle.
Vestibule means an area of a passenger car that normally does not
contain seating, that leads from the seating area to the side exit
doors.
Witness plate means a thin foil placed behind a piece of glazing
undergoing an impact test. Any material spalled or broken from the back
side of the glazing will dent or mark the witness plate.
Yard means a system of tracks within defined limits provided for
the making up of trains, storing of cars, and other purposes.
Yard air test means a train brake system test conducted using a
source of compressed air other than a locomotive.
Yield strength means the ability of a structural member to resist a
change in length caused by a heavy load. Exceeding the yield strength
may cause permanent deformation of the member.

Sec. 238.7 Waivers.

(a) Any person may petition the Federal Railroad Administration for
a waiver of compliance with any requirement prescribed in this part.
(b) Each petition for a waiver under this section shall:
(1) Be filed in the manner required by part 211 of this chapter;
(2) Contain the information required by part 211 of this chapter;
and
(3) Provide appropriate data or analysis, or both, establishing
that a waiver is warranted under applicable statutory criteria as well
as a description of the measures proposed to be taken to provide a
level of safety equivalent to that afforded by the provision of this
part that is sought to be waived.

Sec. 238.9 Responsibility for compliance.

(a) A railroad subject to this part shall not--
(1) Use, haul, permit to be used or hauled on its line, offer in
interchange, or accept in interchange any train or passenger equipment,
while in service,
(i) That has one or more conditions not in compliance with a safety
appliance or power brake provision of this part; or
(ii) That has not been inspected and tested as required by a safety
appliance or power brake provision of this part; or
(2) Use, haul, offer in interchange, or accept in interchange any
train or passenger equipment, while in service,
(i) That has one or more conditions not in compliance with a
provision of this part, other than the safety appliance and power brake
provisions of this part, if the railroad has actual knowledge of the
facts giving rise to the violation, or a reasonable person acting in
the circumstances and exercising reasonable care would have that
knowledge; or
(ii) That has not been inspected and tested as required by a
provision of this part, other than the safety appliance and power brake
provisions of this part, if the railroad has actual knowledge of the
facts giving rise to the violation, or a reasonable person acting in
the circumstances and exercising reasonable care would have that
knowledge; or
(3) Violate any other provision of this part.
(b) For purposes of this part, passenger equipment will be
considered in use prior to departure but after it has received, or
should have received, the inspection required under this part for
movement and is deemed ready for service.
(c) Although many of the requirements of this part are stated in
terms of the duties of a railroad, when any person (including, but not
limited to, a contractor performing safety-related tasks under contract
to a railroad subject to this part) performs any function required by
this part, that person (whether or not a railroad) is required to
perform that function in accordance with this part.

Sec. 238.11 Civil penalties.

Any person (including but not limited to a railroad; any manager,
supervisor, official, or other employee or agent of a railroad; any
owner, manufacturer, lessor, or lessee of railroad equipment, track, or
facilities; any employee of such owner, manufacturer, lessor, lessee,
or independent contractor) who violates any requirement of this part or
causes the violation of any such requirement is subject to a civil
penalty of at least $500, but not more than $10,000 per violation,
except that: Penalties may be assessed against individuals only for
willful violations, and, where a grossly negligent violation or a
pattern of repeated violations has created an imminent hazard of death
or injury to persons, or has caused death or injury, a penalty not to
exceed $20,000 per violation may be assessed. Each day a violation
continues shall constitute a separate offense. Appendix A to this part
contains a schedule of civil penalty amounts used in connection with
this part.

Sec. 238.13 Preemptive effect.

Under 49 U.S.C. 20106, issuance of the regulations in this part
preempts any State law, rule, regulation, order, or standard covering
the same subject matter, except for a provision directed at an
essentially local safety hazard if that provision is consistent with
this part and does not impose an undue burden on interstate commerce.

Sec. 238.15 Movement of passenger equipment with power brake defects.

(a) General. This section contains the requirements for moving
passenger equipment with a power brake defect

[[Page 49797]]

without liability for a civil penalty under this part. Railroads remain
liable for the movement of passenger equipment under 49 U.S.C.
20303(c). For purposes of this section, Sec. 238.17, and Sec. 238.503,
a ``power brake defect'' is a condition of a power brake component, or
other primary brake component, that does not conform with this part.
(Passenger cars and other passenger equipment classified as locomotives
under part 229 of this chapter are also covered by the movement
restrictions contained in Sec. 229.9 of this chapter for those
defective conditions covered by part 229 of this chapter.)
(b) Limitations on movement of passenger equipment containing a
power brake defect found during a Class I or IA brake test. Except as
provided in paragraph (c) of this section (dealing with brakes that
become defective en route after a Class I or IA brake test was
performed), a commuter or passenger train that has in its consist
passenger equipment containing a power brake defect found during a
Class I or IA brake test (or, for Tier II trains, the equivalent) may
only be moved, without civil penalty liability under this part--
(1) If all of the following conditions are met:
(i) The train is moved for purposes of repair, without passengers;
(ii) The applicable operating restrictions in paragraph (d) of this
section are observed; and
(iii) The passenger equipment is tagged, or information is
recorded, as prescribed in paragraph (c)(2) of this section; or
(2) If the train is moved for purposes of scrapping or sale of the
passenger equipment that has the power brake defect, and without
passengers; if the movement is at a speed of 15 mph or less; and if the
movement conforms with the railroad's air brake or power brake
instructions.
(c) Limitations on movement of passenger equipment in passenger
service that becomes defective en route after a Class I or IA brake
test. Passenger equipment hauled or used in service in a commuter or
passenger train that develops a power brake defect while en route to
another location after receiving a Class I or IA brake test (or, for
Tier II trains, the equivalent) may be hauled or used by a railroad for
repair, without civil penalty liability under this part, if the
applicable operating restrictions set forth in paragraph (d) of this
section are complied with and all of the following requisites are
satisfied:
(1) En route defect. At the time of the train's Class I or IA brake
test, the passenger equipment in the train was properly equipped with
power brakes that comply with this part. The power brakes on the
passenger equipment become defective while it is en route to another
location.
(2) Record. At the place where the railroad first discovers the
defect, a tag or card is placed on both sides of the defective
passenger equipment, or an automated tracking system is provided, with
the following information about the defective passenger equipment:
(i) The reporting mark and car or locomotive number;
(ii) The name of the inspecting railroad;
(iii) The name of the inspector;
(iv) The inspection location and date;
(v) The nature of each defect;
(vi) The destination of the equipment where it will be repaired;
and
(vii) The signature, if possible, and job title of the person
reporting the defective condition.
(3) Conditional requirement. In addition, if an en route failure
causes power brakes to be cut out on passenger equipment, the railroad
shall:
(i) Determine the percentage of operative power brakes in the train
based on the number of brakes known to be cut out or otherwise
inoperative, using the formula specified in paragraph (d)(1) of this
section;
(ii) Notify the dispatcher of the percent of operative brakes and
movement restrictions on the train imposed by paragraph (d) of this
section;
(iii) Notify the mechanical department or desk of the failure; and
(iv) Confirm the percentage of operative brakes by a walking
inspection at the next location where the railroad reasonably judges
that it is safe to do so.
(d) Operating restrictions based on percent operative power brakes
in train. (1) Computation of percent operative power brakes.--(i)
Except as specified in paragraphs (d)(1) (ii) and (iii) of this
section, the percentage of operative power brakes in a train shall be
determined by dividing the number of axles in the train with operative
power brakes by the total number of axles in the train.
(ii) For equipment with tread brake units (TBUs), the percentage of
operative power brakes shall be determined by dividing the number of
operative TBUs by the total number of TBUs.
(iii) Each cut-out axle on a locomotive that weighs more than
200,000 pounds shall be counted as two cut-out axles for the purposes
of calculating the percentage of operative brakes. Unless otherwise
specified by the railroad, the friction braking effort over all other
axles shall be considered uniform.
(iv) The following brake conditions not in compliance with this
part are not considered inoperative power brakes for purposes of this
section:
(A) Failure or cutting out of secondary brake systems;
(B) Inoperative or otherwise defective handbrakes or parking
brakes;
(C) Excessive piston travel that does not render the power brakes
ineffective; and
(D) Power brakes overdue for inspection, testing, maintenance, or
stencilling under this part.
(2) All passenger trains developing 50-74 percent operative power
brakes. A passenger train that develops inoperative power brake
equipment resulting in at least 50 percent but less than 75 percent
operative power brakes may be used only as follows:
(i) The train may be moved in passenger service only to the next
forward passenger station;
(ii) The speed of the train shall be restricted to 20 mph or less;
(iii) After all passengers are discharged, the defective equipment
shall be moved directly to the nearest location where the necessary
repairs can be made; and
(iv) If the power brakes on the front or rear unit in the train are
inoperative, a qualified person shall be stationed at the handbrake on
this unit.
(3) Commuter, short-distance intercity, and short-distance Tier II
passenger trains developing 75-99 percent operative power brakes.
(i) 75-84 percent operative brakes. Commuter, short-distance
intercity, and short-distance Tier II passenger trains which develop
inoperative power brake equipment resulting in at least 75 percent but
less than 85 percent operative brakes may be used only as follows:
(A) The train may be moved in passenger service only to the next
forward terminal;
(B) The speed of the train shall be restricted to 50 percent of the
train's maximum allowable speed or 40 mph, whichever is less;
(C) After discharging passengers, the defective equipment shall be
moved directly to the nearest location where the necessary repairs can
be made; and
(D) If the brakes on the front or rear unit in a train are
inoperative, a qualified person shall be stationed at the handbrake on
this unit.
(ii) 85-99 percent operative brakes. Commuter, short-distance
intercity, and short-distance Tier II passenger trains which develop
inoperative power brake equipment resulting in at least 85

[[Page 49798]]

percent but less than 100 percent operative brakes may only be used as
follows:
(A) The train may be moved in passenger service only to the next
forward terminal;
(B) After all passengers are discharged, the defective cars shall
be moved directly to the nearest location where the necessary repairs
can be made; and
(C) If the brakes on the front or rear unit in a train are
inoperative, a qualified person shall be stationed at the handbrake on
this unit.
(4) Long-distance intercity and long-distance Tier II passenger
trains developing 75-99 operative power brakes.
(i) 75-84 percent operative brakes. Long-distance intercity and
long-distance Tier II passenger trains which develop inoperative power
brake equipment resulting in at least 75 percent but less than 85
percent operative brakes may be used only if all of the following
restrictions are observed:
(A) The train may be moved in passenger service only to the next
forward repair location identified for repair of that equipment by the
railroad operating the equipment in the list required by
Sec. 238.19(d); however, if the next forward repair location does not
have the facilities to handle the safe unloading of passengers, the
train may be moved past the designated repair location in service only
to the next forward passenger station in order to facilitate the
unloading of passengers;
(B) The speed of the train shall be restricted to 50 percent of the
train's maximum allowable speed or 40 mph, whichever is less;
(C) After discharging passengers, the defective equipment shall be
moved directly to the nearest location where the necessary repairs can
be made; and
(D) If the brakes on the front or rear unit in a train are
inoperative, a qualified person shall be stationed at the handbrake on
this unit.
(ii) 85-99 percent operative brakes. Long-distance intercity and
long-distance Tier II passenger trains which develop inoperative power
brake equipment resulting in at least 85 percent but less than 100
percent operative brakes may be used only if all of the following
restrictions are observed:
(A) The train may be moved in passenger service only to the next
forward repair location identified for repair of that equipment by the
railroad operating the equipment in the list required by
Sec. 238.19(d); however, if the next forward repair location does not
have the facilities to handle the safe unloading of passengers, the
train may be moved past the designated repair location in service only
to the next forward passenger station in order to facilitate the
unloading of passengers;
(B) After passengers are discharged, the defective cars shall be
moved directly to the nearest location where the necessary repairs can
be made; and
(C) If the brakes on the front or rear unit in a train are
inoperative, a qualified person shall be stationed at the handbrake on
this unit.
(e) Special Notice for Repair. Nothing in this section authorizes
the movement of passenger equipment subject to a Special Notice for
Repair under part 216 of this chapter unless the movement is made in
accordance with the restrictions contained in the Special Notice.

Sec. 238.17 Movement of passenger equipment with other than power
brake defects.

(a) General. This section contains the requirements for moving
passenger equipment with other than a power brake defect. (Passenger
cars and other passenger equipment classified as locomotives under part
229 of this chapter are also covered by the movement restrictions
contained in Sec. 229.9 of this chapter for those defective conditions
covered by part 229 of this chapter.)
(b) Limitations on movement of passenger equipment containing
defects found at time of calendar day inspection. Except as provided in
Sec. 238.305(c)(5), passenger equipment containing a condition not in
conformance with this part at the time of its calendar day mechanical
inspection may be moved from that location for repair if all of the
following conditions are satisfied:
(1) When the defective equipment is moved, it is not in passenger
service and is in a non-revenue train;
(2) The requirements of paragraphs (c)(2) and (c)(3) of this
section are met;
(3) The special requirements of paragraph (d) of this section, if
applicable, are met.
(c) Usual limitations on movement of passenger equipment that
develops defects en route. Except as provided in Sec. 238.503(f),
passenger equipment that develops en route to its destination, after
its calendar day inspection was performed and before its next calendar
day mechanical inspection was performed, any defect not in compliance
with this part, other than a power brake defect, may be moved only if
the railroad complies with all of the following requirements and, if
applicable, the special requirements in paragraph (d) of this section:
(1) Prior to movement of the defective equipment, a qualified
mechanical
inspector shall determine if it is safe to move the equipment in
passenger service and, if so, the maximum speed and other restrictions
necessary for safely conducting the movement. If appropriate, these
determinations may be made based upon a description of the defective
condition provided by a crewmember.
(2) Prior to movement of the defective equipment, the qualified
mechanical inspector shall notify the crewmember in charge of the
movement of the defective equipment, who in turn shall inform all other
crewmembers of the presence of the defective condition(s) and the
maximum speed and other restrictions determined under paragraph (c)(1)
of this section. The movement shall be made in conformance with such
restrictions.
(3) The railroad shall maintain a record of all defects reported
and their subsequent repair in the defect tracking system required in
Sec. 238.19. In addition, prior to movement of the defective equipment,
a tag or card placed on both sides of the defective equipment, or an
automated tracking system, shall record the following information about
the defective equipment:
(i) The reporting mark and car or locomotive number;
(ii) The name of the inspecting railroad;
(iii) The name of the inspector, inspection location, and date;
(iv) The nature of each defect;
(v) Movement restrictions and safety restrictions, if any;
(vi) The destination of the equipment where it will be repaired;
and
(vii) The signature, if possible, as well as the job title and
location of the person making the determinations required by this
section.
(4) At the first location possible, a qualified mechanical
inspector shall perform a physical inspection of the defective
equipment to verify the description of the defect provided by the crew.
After a qualified mechanical inspector verifies that the defective
equipment is safe to remain in service, the defective equipment that
develops a condition not in compliance with this part while en route
may continue in passenger service not later than the next calendar day
mechanical inspection, if the requirements of this paragraph are
otherwise fully met.
(d) Special requisites for movement of passenger equipment with
safety appliance defects. Consistent with 49 U.S.C. 20303, passenger
equipment with

[[Page 49799]]

a safety appliance not in compliance with this part or with part 231 of
this chapter, if applicable, may be moved--
(1) If necessary to effect repair of the safety appliance;
(2) From the point where the safety appliance defect was first
discovered by the railroad to the nearest available location on the
railroad where the necessary repairs required to bring the passenger
equipment into compliance can be made or, at the option of the
receiving railroad, the equipment may be received and hauled for repair
to a point on the receiving railroad's line no farther than the point
on the delivering railroad's line where the repair of the defect could
have been made; and
(3) If a tag placed on both sides of the passenger equipment or an
automated tracking system contains the information required under
paragraph (c)(3) of this section.
(e) Special Notice for Repair. Nothing in this section authorizes
the movement of equipment subject to a Special Notice for Repair under
part 216 of this chapter unless the movement is made in accordance with
the restrictions contained in the Special Notice.

Sec. 238.19 Reporting and tracking defective passenger equipment.

(a) General. Each railroad shall have in place a reporting and
tracking system for passenger equipment with a defect not in
conformance with this part that:
(1) Records the identification number of the defective equipment;
(2) Records the date the defect occurred;
(3) Records the nature of the defect;
(4) Records the determination made by a qualified mechanical
inspector on whether the equipment is safe to run;
(5) Records the name of the qualified mechanical inspector making
such a determination;
(6) Records any operating restrictions placed on the equipment; and
(7) Records repairs made and the date that they were made.
(b) Retention of records. At a minimum, each railroad shall keep
the records described in paragraph (a) of this section for one periodic
maintenance interval for each specific type of equipment as described
in the railroad's system safety plan. FRA strongly encourages railroads
to keep these records for longer periods of time because they form the
basis for future reliability-driven decisions concerning test and
maintenance intervals.
(c) Availability of records. Railroads shall make defect reporting
and tracking records available to FRA upon request.
(d) List of power brake repair points. Railroads operating long-
distance intercity and long-distance Tier II passenger equipment shall
designate locations, in writing, where repairs to passenger equipment
with a power brake defect will be made and shall provide the list to
FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety and make it available to FRA
for inspection and copying upon request. Railroads operating these
trains shall designate a sufficient number of repair locations to
ensure the safe and timely repair of passenger equipment. These
designations shall not be changed without at least 30 days' written
notice to FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety.

Sec. 238.21 Special approval procedure.

(a) General. The following procedures govern consideration and
action upon requests for special approval of alternative standards
under Secs. 238.115, 238.223, 238.309, 238.311, 238.405, or 238.427 and
for special approval of pre-revenue service acceptance testing plans
under Sec. 238.113 or Sec. 238.603. (Requests for approval of programs
for the inspection, testing, and maintenance of Tier II passenger
equipment are governed by Sec. 238.505.)
(b) Petitions for special approval of alternative standard. Each
petition for special approval of an alternative standard shall
contain--
(1) The name, title, address, and telephone number of the primary
person to be contacted with regard to review of the petition;
(2) The alternative proposed, in detail, to be substituted for the
particular requirements of this part;
(3) Appropriate data or analysis, or both, establishing that the
alternative will provide an equivalent level of safety; and
(4) A statement affirming that the railroad has served a copy of
the petition on designated representatives of railroad employees,
together with a list of the names and addresses of the persons served.
(c) Petitions for special approval of pre-revenue service
acceptance testing plan. Each petition for special approval of a pre-
revenue service acceptance testing plan shall contain--
(1) The name, title, address, and telephone number of the primary
person to be contacted with regard to review of the petition; and
(2) The elements prescribed in Sec. 238.113.
(d) Service. (1) Each petition for special approval under paragraph
(b) or (c) of this section shall be submitted in triplicate to the
Associate Administrator for Safety, Federal Railroad Administration,
400 7th Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590.
(2)(i) Service of each petition for special approval of an
alternative standard under paragraph (b) of this section shall be made
on the following:
(A) Designated employee representatives responsible for the
equipment's operation, inspection, testing, and maintenance under this
part;
(B) Any organizations or bodies that either issued the standard
incorporated in the section(s) of this part to which the special
approval pertains or issued the alternative standard that is proposed
in the petition; and
(C) Any other person who has filed with FRA a current statement of
interest in reviewing special approvals under the particular
requirement of this part at least 30 days but not more than 5 years
prior to the filing of the petition.
(ii) If filed, a statement of interest shall be filed with FRA's
Associate Administrator for Safety and shall reference the specific
section(s) of this part in which the person has an interest.
(e) Federal Register notice. FRA will publish a notice in the
Federal Register concerning each petition under paragraph (b) of this
section.
(f) Comment. Not later than 30 days from the date of publication of
the notice in the Federal Register concerning a petition under
paragraph (b) of this section, any person may comment on the petition.
(1) Each comment shall set forth specifically the basis upon which
it is made, and contain a concise statement of the interest of the
commenter in the proceeding.
(2) Three copies of each comment shall be submitted to the
Associate Administrator for Safety, Federal Railroad Administration,
400 7th Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590.
(3) The commenter shall certify that a copy of the comment was
served on each petitioner.
(g) Disposition of petitions. (1) If FRA finds that the petition
complies with the requirements of this section and that the proposed
plan is acceptable or changes are justified, the petition will be
granted, normally within 90 days of its receipt. If the petition is
neither granted nor denied within 90 days, the petition remains pending
for decision. FRA may attach special conditions to the approval of the
petition. Following the approval of a petition, FRA may reopen
consideration of the petition for cause stated.
(2) If FRA finds that the petition does not comply with the
requirements of this section and that the proposed plan is not
acceptable or that the proposed

[[Page 49800]]

changes are not justified, the petition will be denied, normally within
90 days of its receipt.
(3) When FRA grants or denies a petition, or reopens consideration
of the petition, written notice is sent to the petitioner and other
interested parties.

Subpart B--System Safety and General Requirements

Sec. 238.101 Scope.

This subpart contains system safety requirements for each railroad
that operates passenger equipment and general requirements for the
safety of all railroad passenger equipment subject to this part.

System Safety

Sec. 238.103 General system safety requirements.

(a) By the dates specified in paragraph (g) of this section, each
railroad operating passenger equipment subject to this part shall adopt
a written system safety plan that describes the railroad's system
safety program, using MIL-STD-882(C) as a guide. The system safety plan
shall be updated annually.
(b) For the procurement of new passenger equipment, the system
safety plan shall describe the system safety program to be conducted as
part of the equipment design and development process to ensure that all
safety issues and Federal safety requirements are identified,
addressed, and documented. The documentation shall include
certification in writing by the manufacturer that the passenger
equipment meets the design requirements of this part. The system safety
plan shall also describe the system safety program to be conducted as
part of the maintenance, overhaul, and operation of all passenger
equipment by that railroad. The system safety program should ensure
that safety issues are considered as important as cost and performance
issues in the design, development, maintenance, overhaul, and operation
of the equipment.
(c) The system safety plan shall be the principal safety document.
It shall be used as guidance or, as applicable, requirements for the
development and operation of equipment and subsystems. At a minimum,
the system safety plan shall address:
(1) Fire protection;
(2) Software safety;
(3) Inspection, testing, and maintenance;
(4) Training and qualifications; and
(5) Pre-revenue service acceptance testing.
(d) The system safety plan shall describe the approaches and
processes to be used to:
(1) Identify all safety requirements, including Federal
requirements governing the design of passenger equipment and its
supporting systems;
(2) Evaluate the total system, including hardware, software,
testing, and support activities, to identify known or potential safety
hazards over the life cycle of the equipment;
(3) Identify safety issues during design reviews;
(4) Eliminate or reduce the risk posed by the hazards identified;
(5) Monitor and track the progress made toward resolving safety
issues, reducing hazards, and meeting safety requirements; and
(6) Develop a program of testing or analysis, or both, to
demonstrate that safety requirements have been met.
(e) As part of the system safety program, adequate documentation
shall be maintained to audit how the design and operation of new
equipment meets safety requirements and to track how safety issues are
raised and resolved.
(f) The system safety plan shall address how operational
limitations may be imposed on the use of equipment if the equipment
design cannot meet certain safety requirements.
(g) Dates. (1) The portion of the system safety plan applicable to
existing passenger equipment shall be adopted no later than [one year
after the effective date of the final rule].
(2) The portion of the system safety plan applicable to passenger
equipment to be procured by the railroad that is already in the design
and development process before the effective date of the final rule
shall be adopted no later than [one year after the effective date of
the final rule].
(3) The portion of the system safety plan applicable to passenger
equipment to be procured by the railroad that is not yet in the design
and development process on [the effective date of the final rule] shall
be adopted before commencing the design and development of new
equipment.
(h) The railroad's system safety plan and documentation required by
paragraph (e) of this section shall be available for inspection and
copying by FRA.

Sec. 238.105 Fire protection program.

(a) The operating railroad shall include in its system safety
program fire safety considerations and features in the design of new
passenger equipment that reduce the risk of equipment damage and
personal injuries due to fires to an acceptable level as defined in
MIL-STD-882(C).
(b) As part of the system safety program, each railroad operating
passenger equipment subject to this part shall complete a thorough
written analysis of the fire protection problem. In conducting this
analysis, the railroad shall--
(1) Ensure that good fire protection practice is used as part of
the equipment design process.
(2) Take effective steps to design equipment to be sufficiently
fire resistant to detect a fire and allow the evacuation of equipment
before fire, smoke, or toxic fumes cause injury to a passenger or
crewmember.
(3) Identify, analyze, and prioritize the fire hazards inherent in
the design of equipment.
(4) Document and explain how safety issues were resolved in
relation to cost and performance issues in the design of equipment to
minimize the risk of each fire hazard.
(5) Describe the analysis and tests necessary to demonstrate how
the fire protection approach taken in the design of equipment will
enable a train to meet the fire protection standards of this part and
of the railroad's system safety plan.
(6) Describe the analysis and tests necessary to select materials
which provide sufficient fire resistance to reasonably ensure adequate
time to detect a fire and safely evacuate a train.
(7) Reasonably ensure that a ventilation system does not contribute
to the lethality of a fire.
(8) Identify in writing which train components are at risk of being
a source of fire and which require overheat protection. As prescribed
in Sec. 238.115(c), overheat detectors shall be installed in all
components where the analysis determines that such equipment is
necessary. If overheat protection is not provided for a component at
risk of being a source of fire, the written rationale and justification
for the decision shall be included as part of the system safety program
documentation.
(9) Identify in writing all unoccupied train compartments that
contain equipment or material posing a fire hazard, and analyze the
benefit provided by including a fire or smoke detection system in each
compartment identified. As prescribed in Sec. 238.115(d), fire or smoke
detectors shall be installed in unoccupied compartments where the
analysis determines that such equipment is necessary to ensure
sufficient time for the safe evacuation of a train. The written
analysis shall explain why a fire or smoke detector is not necessary,
if the decision is made not to install one in

[[Page 49801]]

any of the unoccupied compartments identified as a potential source of
fire.
(10) Perform an analysis of the occupied and unoccupied spaces
which require portable fire extinguishers. The analysis shall include
the proper type and size of fire extinguisher for each location.
(11) Identify in writing all unoccupied train compartments that
contain equipment or material which poses a fire hazard. On a case-by-
case basis, the benefit provided by including a fixed, automatic fire-
suppression system in each compartment identified shall be analyzed.
The type and size of the automatic fire-suppression system for each
necessary application shall be determined. As prescribed in
Sec. 238.115(e), a fixed, automatic fire suppression system shall be
installed in unoccupied compartments where the analysis determines it
is necessary and practical to ensure sufficient time for the safe
evacuation of the train. The analysis shall provide the reasoning why a
fixed, automatic fire-suppression system is not necessary or practical
if the decision is made not to install one in any of the unoccupied
compartments identified in the plan.
(12) Develop and adopt written procedures for the inspection,
testing, and maintenance of all fire safety systems and equipment. As
prescribed in Sec. 238.115(f), the railroad shall comply with those
procedures that it designates as mandatory.
(c) The operating railroad shall reasonably ensure in its contracts
for the purchase of new equipment that the system developer follows the
design criteria and performs the tests required by the fire protection
part of the railroad's system safety plan and program.
(d)(1) Not later than 365 days following [the effective date of the
final rule] each passenger railroad shall complete a preliminary fire
safety analysis for each category of existing rail equipment and
current rail service.
(2) Not later than 730 days following [the effective date of the
final] rule each such railroad shall--
(i) Complete a final fire safety analysis (equivalent to that
required for new equipment in this section) for any category of
existing equipment and service evaluated during the preliminary fire
safety analysis as likely presenting an unacceptable risk of personal
injury, including consideration of the extent to which interior
materials comply with the test performance criteria for flammability
and smoke emission characteristics contained in Appendix B to this part
or alternative standards approved by FRA under this part; and
(ii) Take remedial action to reduce the risk of personal injuries
to an acceptable level in any such category.
(3) Within 1460 days following the effective date of the final
rule, the railroad shall complete a fire safety analysis for all
categories of equipment and service. In completing this analysis, the
railroad shall, to the extent practicable, determine the extent to
which remaining interior materials comply with the test performance
criteria for flammability and smoke emission characteristics contained
in Appendix B to this part or alternative standards approved by FRA
under this part and, based on the fire safety analysis, take remedial
action to reduce the risk of personal injuries to an acceptable level
in any such category.
(4) Where possible prior to transferring existing equipment to a
new category of service, but in no case more than 90 days following
such a transfer, the passenger railroad shall complete a new fire
safety analysis taking into consideration the change in railroad
operations and shall effect prompt action to reduce any identified risk
to an acceptable level.
(5) As used in this paragraph, ``category of rail equipment and
current rail service'' shall be determined by the railroad based on
relevant fire safety risks, including available ignition sources,
presence or absence of heat/smoke detection systems, known variations
from required interior material test performance criteria or
alternative standards approved by FRA, and availability of rapid and
safe egress to the exterior of the vehicle under conditions secure from
fire, smoke, and other hazards.

Sec. 238.107 Software safety program.

(a) The operating railroad shall develop and maintain a software
safety program to guide the design, development, testing, integration,
and verification of computer programs used to control or monitor
equipment safety functions.
(b) The software safety program shall:
(1) Treat system software that controls or monitors safety
functions as safety-critical unless a completely redundant, failsafe,
non-software means to provide the same function is provided; and
(2) Include a description of how the following tasks will be
accomplished, or objectives achieved, to ensure safe, reliable system
software used to monitor or perform safety functions:
(i) The software design process used;
(ii) The software design documentation to be produced;
(iii) A software hazard analysis;
(iv) Software safety reviews;
(v) Software hazard monitoring and tracking;
(vi) Hardware and software integration safety tests; and
(vii) Demonstration of overall software safety as part of the pre-
revenue service tests of equipment.
(c) The operating railroad shall ensure that the system developer
follows the design criteria and performs the tests required by the
software safety part of the system safety program. To fulfill this
obligation in part, the operating railroad shall include software
safety requirements in each of its contracts for the purchase of new
equipment or new components of existing equipment that contain safety-
critical software.
(d) The operating railroad shall follow the software safety
procedures required by the software safety part of the system safety
program.

Sec. 238.109 Inspection, testing, and maintenance program.

With respect to Tier II passenger equipment operated by a railroad,
fulfillment of the requirements of Sec. 238.503 to file an inspection,
testing, and maintenance program with FRA satisfies the requirement of
Sec. 238.103(c)(3) to address the railroad's inspection, testing, and
maintenance program for such equipment in the railroad's system safety
plan.
The following provisions of this section apply only to Tier I
equipment operated by the railroad.
(a) General. Each railroad shall provide to FRA, upon request,
detailed information, consistent with the requirements of this part, on
the inspection, testing, and maintenance procedures necessary for the
railroad to safely operate Tier I equipment. This information shall
include a detailed description of:
(1) Safety inspection procedures, intervals, and criteria;
(2) Test procedures and intervals;
(3) Scheduled preventive maintenance intervals;
(4) Maintenance procedures; and
(5) Special testing equipment or measuring devices required to
perform safety inspections and tests.
(b) General inspection, testing, and maintenance procedures. The
inspection, testing, and maintenance program shall contain procedures
reasonably to ensure that all systems and components of the equipment
are free of all general conditions that endanger the safety of the
crew, passengers, or equipment, including procedures to ensure that all
systems and components of the equipment are

[[Page 49802]]

free of the following conditions that endanger the safety of the crew,
passengers, or equipment:
(1) A continuous accumulation of oil or grease;
(2) Improper functioning of a component;
(3) A crack, break, excessive wear, structural defect, or weakness
of a component;
(4) A leak;
(5) Use of a component or system under a condition that exceeds
that for which the component or system is designed to operate; and
(6) Insecure attachment of a component.
(c) Maintenance intervals. Initial scheduled maintenance intervals
should be based on analysis completed as part of the system safety
program. The intervals should be changed only when justified by
accumulated, verifiable operating data.
(d) Standard procedures for safely performing inspection, testing,
and maintenance, or repairs. Each railroad shall establish written
standard procedures for performing all safety-critical or potentially
hazardous equipment inspection, test, maintenance, or repair tasks.
These standard procedures shall be available to FRA upon request and
shall:
(1) Describe in detail each step required to safely perform the
task;
(2) Describe the knowledge necessary to safely perform the task;
(3) Describe any precautions that shall be taken to safely perform
the task;
(4) Describe the use of any safety equipment necessary to perform
the task;
(5) Be approved by the railroad's chief mechanical officer;
(6) Be approved by the railroad's official responsible for safety;
(7) Be enforced by supervisors with responsibility for
accomplishing the tasks; and
(8) Be reviewed annually by the railroad.

Sec. 238.111 Training, qualification, and designation program.

(a) Each railroad shall adopt and comply with a training,
qualification, and designation program for employees and contractors
that perform safety-related inspections, tests, or maintenance of
passenger equipment. For purposes of this section, a ``contractor'' is
defined as a person under contract with the railroad or an employee of
a person under contract with the railroad.
(b) As part of this program, the railroad shall, at a minimum:
(1) Identify the safety-related tasks that must be performed on
each type of equipment that the railroad operates;
(2) Develop written procedures for the performance of the tasks
identified;
(3) Identify the skills and knowledge necessary to perform each
task;
(4) Develop a training course that includes classroom and ``hands-
on'' lessons designed to impart the skills and knowledge identified as
necessary to perform each task;
(5) Require all employees and contractors to successfully complete
the training course that covers the equipment and tasks for which they
are responsible;
(6) Require all employees and contractors to pass a written
examination covering the equipment and tasks for which they are
responsible;
(7) Require all employees and contractors to demonstrate ``hands-
on'' capability to perform their assigned tasks on the type equipment
to which they are assigned;
(8) Require supervisors to complete the program that covers the
employees that they supervise;
(9) Require supervisors to exercise oversight to ensure that all
the identified tasks are performed in accordance with the railroad's
written procedures;
(10) Designate in writing that each employee and contractor has the
knowledge and skills necessary to perform the safety-related tasks that
are part of his or her job;
(11) Require periodic refresher training at an interval not to
exceed three years that includes classroom and ``hands-on'' training,
as well as testing;
(12) Add new equipment to the qualification and designation program
prior to its introduction to revenue service; and
(13) Maintain records adequate to demonstrate that each employee
and contractor performing safety-related tasks on passenger equipment
is currently qualified to do so. These records shall be adequate to
distinguish the qualifications of the employee or contractor as a
qualified person or as a qualified mechanical inspector.

Sec. 238.113 Pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan.

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (f), before using passenger
equipment for the first time on its system the operating railroad shall
submit a pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan containing the
information required by paragraph (e) of this section and obtain the
approval of the FRA Associate Administrator for Safety, under the
procedures specified in Sec. 238.21.
(b) After receiving FRA approval of the pre-revenue service testing
plan and before introducing the passenger equipment into revenue
service, the operating railroad shall:
(1) Adopt and comply with such FRA-approved plan, including fully
executing the tests required by the plan;
(2) Report to the FRA Associate Administrator for Safety the
results of the pre-revenue service acceptance tests;
(3) Correct any safety deficiencies identified by FRA in the design
of the equipment or in the inspection, testing, and maintenance
procedures or, if safety deficiencies cannot be corrected by design
changes, agree to comply with any operational limitations that may be
imposed by the Associate Administrator for Safety on the revenue
service operation of the equipment; and
(4) Obtain FRA approval to place the equipment in revenue service.
(c) The operating railroad shall comply with any such operational
limitations imposed by the Associate Administrator for Safety.
(d) The plan shall be made available to FRA for inspection and
copying upon request.
(e) The plan shall include all of the following elements:
(1) An identification of any waivers of FRA or other Federal safety
regulations required for the tests or for revenue service operation of
the equipment.
(2) A clear statement of the test objectives. One of the principal
test objectives shall be to demonstrate that the equipment meets the
safety design and performance requirements specified in this part when
operated in the environment in which it is to be used.
(3) A planned schedule for conducting the tests.
(4) A description of the railroad property or facilities to be used
to conduct the tests.
(5) A detailed description of how the tests are to be conducted.
This description shall include:
(i) An identification of the equipment to be tested;
(ii) The method by which the equipment is to be tested;
(iii) The criteria to be used to evaluate the equipment's
performance; and
(iv) The means by which the test results are to be reported to FRA.
(6) A description of any special instrumentation to be used during
the tests.
(7) A description of the information or data to be obtained.
(8) A description of how the information or data obtained is to be
analyzed or used.
(9) A clear description of any criteria to be used as safety limits
during the testing.

[[Page 49803]]

(10) A description of the criteria to be used to measure or
determine the success or failure of the tests. If acceptance is to be
based on extrapolation of less than full level testing results, the
analysis to be done to justify the validity of the extrapolation shall
be described.
(11) A description of any special safety precautions to be observed
during the testing.
(12) A written set of standard operating procedures to be used to
ensure that the testing is done safely.
(13) Quality control procedures to ensure that the inspection,
testing, and maintenance procedures are followed.
(14) Criteria to be used for the revenue service operation of the
equipment.
(15) A description of any testing of the equipment that has
previously been performed.
(f) For passenger equipment that has previously been used in
revenue service in the United States, the railroad shall test the
equipment on its system, prior to placing it in revenue service, to
ensure the compatibility of the equipment with the operating system
(track, signals, etc.) of the railroad. A description of such testing
shall be retained by the railroad and made available to FRA for
inspection and copying upon request.

General Requirements

Sec. 238.115 Fire safety.

(a)(1) All materials used in constructing the interior of both a
passenger car and a cab of a locomotive ordered on or after January 1,
1999, or placed in service for the first time on or after January 1,
2001, shall meet the test performance criteria for flammability and
smoke emission characteristics contained in Appendix B to this part or
alternative standards issued or recognized by an expert consensus
organization after special approval of FRA's Associate Administrator
for Safety under Sec. 238.21.
(2) On or after [the effective date of the final rule], all
materials used in refurbishing the interior of a passenger car and a
locomotive cab shall meet the test performance criteria for
flammability and smoke emission characteristics contained in Appendix B
to this part or alternative standards issued or recognized by an expert
consensus organization after special approval of FRA's Associate
Administrator for Safety under Sec. 238.21. Refurbishing includes
replacing an individual component such as a seat cushion.
(3) For purposes of this section the interior of a passenger car
and a locomotive cab includes walls, floors, ceilings, seats, doors,
windows, electrical conduits, air ducts, and any other internal
equipment.
(b) A railroad shall require certification that combustible
materials to be used in constructing or refurbishing passenger car and
locomotive cab interiors have been tested by a recognized independent
testing laboratory and that the results comply with the requirements of
paragraph (a) of this section.
(c) Overheat detectors shall be installed in all components of
passenger equipment where the written analysis required by
Sec. 238.105(b)(8) determines that such equipment is necessary.
(d) Fire or smoke detectors shall be installed in unoccupied
compartments of a train if the analysis required by Sec. 238.105(b)(9)
determines that such equipment is necessary to ensure sufficient time
for the safe evacuation of the train.
(e) A fixed, automatic fire suppression system shall be installed
in unoccupied compartments of a train if the analysis required by
Sec. 238.105(b)(11) determines that such a system is necessary and
practical to ensure sufficient time for the safe evacuation of the
train.
(f) The railroad shall comply with those elements of its written
procedures, under Sec. 238.105(b)(12), for the inspection, testing, and
maintenance of all fire safety systems and equipment that it has
designated as mandatory.
(g) After completing each fire safety analysis required by
Sec. 238.105(d), the railroad shall take action to reduce the risk of
personal injuries as provided in that paragraph.

Sec. 238.117 Protection against personal injury.

On or after January 1, 1998, all moving parts, high voltage
equipment, electrical conductors and switches, and pipes carrying hot
fluids or gases on all passenger equipment shall be appropriately
equipped with interlocks or guards to minimize the chance of personal
injury.

Sec. 238.119 Rim-stamped straight-plate wheels.

(a) On or after January 1, 1998, no railroad shall place or
continue in service any vehicle equipped with a rim-stamped straight-
plate wheel, except for a private car.
(b) A rim-stamped straight-plate wheel shall not be used as a
replacement wheel on a private car operated in a passenger train.

Sec. 238.121 Train system software and hardware.

Electrical and electronic systems, including software components,
used to control safety functions of passenger equipment shall be
treated as safety-critical by the operating railroad. Safety-critical
systems utilized in equipment ordered on or after January 1, 1999, and
such systems implemented or materially modified for new or existing
equipment on or after January 1, 2001, shall conform with the following
requirements:
(a) A formal safety methodology shall be used to develop electrical
and electronic control systems that control safety functions for
computer hardware and software. The safety methodology shall include a
Failure Modes, Effects, Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and verification
tests for all components of the control system and its interfaces for
computer hardware and software.
(b) A comprehensive hardware and software integration program for
safety-critical systems shall be adopted and complied with to ensure
that the software functions as intended when installed in a hardware
system identical to that to be used in service.
(c) Safety-related control systems driven by computer software
shall include hardware and software design features that result in a
safe condition in the event of a computer hardware or software failure.

Sec. 238.123 Emergency lighting.

(a) This section applies to each locomotive and passenger car
ordered or rebuilt on or after January 1, 1999, or placed in service
for the first time on or after January 1, 2001. This section applies to
each level of a bi-level unit.
(b) Emergency lighting shall be provided and shall include the
following:
(1) An illumination level of a minimum of 5 foot-candles at floor
level for all potential passenger and crew evacuation routes from the
equipment; and
(2) A back-up power system capable of:
(i) Operating in all equipment orientations within 45 degrees of
vertical;
(ii) Operating after the initial shock of a collision or derailment
resulting in the following individually applied accelerations:
(A) Longitudinal: 8g;
(B) Lateral: 4g; and
(C) Vertical: 4g; and
(iii) Operating all emergency lighting for a period of at least two
hours.

[[Page 49804]]

Subpart C--Specific Requirements for Tier I Passenger Equipment

Sec. 238.201 Scope.

This subpart contains requirements for railroad passenger equipment
operating at speeds not exceeding 125 miles per hour. As stated in
Sec. 238.229, all such passenger equipment remains subject to the
safety appliance requirements contained in Federal statute at 49 U.S.C.
chapter 203 and in FRA regulations at part 231 and Sec. 232.2 of this
chapter. Unless otherwise specified, these requirements only apply to
passenger equipment ordered on or after January 1, 1999, or placed in
service for the first time on or after January 1, 2001.

Sec. 238.203 Static end strength.

(a) Except as further specified in this paragraph and paragraph (b)
of this section, on or after January 1, 1998, all passenger equipment
shall have a minimum static end strength of 800,000 pounds without
permanent deformation of the car body structure. This requirement does
not apply to either--
(1) A private car or
(2) A vehicle of special design that operates at the rear of a
passenger train and is used solely to transport freight, such as an
auto-carrier or a RoadRailer.
(b) On or after January 1, 1998, each locomotive and passenger car
shall have a minimum static end strength of 800,000 pounds on the line
of draft at the ends of occupied volumes without permanent deformation
of the car body structure. The static end strength of unoccupied
volumes may be less than 800,000 pounds if a crash energy management
design is used.
(c) When overloaded in compression, the car body structure of
passenger equipment shall be designed, to the maximum extent possible,
to fail by buckling or crushing, or both, of structural members rather
than by fracture of structural members or failure of structural
connections.

Sec. 238.205 Anti-climbing mechanism.

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, all
passenger equipment placed in service for the first time on or after
January 1, 1998, shall have at both the forward and rear ends an anti-
climbing mechanism capable of resisting an upward or downward vertical
force of 100,000 pounds without failure. When coupled together in any
combination to join two vehicles, AAR Type H and Type F tight-lock
couplers satisfy this requirement.
(b) Each locomotive ordered on or after January 1, 1999, or placed
in service for the first time on or after January 1, 2001, shall have
an anti-climbing mechanism at its forward end capable of resisting an
upward or downward vertical force of 200,000 pounds without failure, in
lieu of the forward end anti-climbing mechanism requirements described
in paragraph (a) of this section.

Sec. 238.207 Link between coupling mechanism and car body.

All passenger equipment placed in service for the first time on or
after January 1, 1998, shall have a coupler carrier designed to resist
a vertical downward thrust from the coupler shank of 100,000 pounds for
any normal horizontal position of the coupler, without permanent
deformation.

Sec. 238.209 Forward-facing end structure of locomotives.

The skin covering the forward-facing end of each locomotive shall
be:
(a) Equivalent to a \1/2\-inch steel plate with a 25,000 pounds-
per-square-inch yield strength--material of a higher yield strength may
be used to decrease the required thickness of the material provided an
equivalent level of strength is maintained;
(b) Designed to inhibit the entry of fluids into the occupied cab
area of the equipment; and
(c) Be affixed to the collision posts or other main vertical
structural members of the forward-facing end structure so as to add to
the strength of the end structure.

Sec. 238.211 Collision posts.

(a) Except as further specified in this paragraph and paragraphs
(b) and (c) of this section--
(1) All passenger equipment placed in service for the first time on
or after January 1, 1998, shall have either:
(i) Two full-height collision posts, located at approximately the
one-third points laterally, at each end where coupling and uncoupling
are expected. Each collision post shall have an ultimate longitudinal
shear strength of not less than 300,000 pounds at a point even with the
top of the underframe member to which it is attached. If reinforcement
is used to provide the shear value, the reinforcement shall have full
value for a distance of 18 inches up from the underframe connection and
then taper to a point approximately 30 inches above the underframe
connection; or
(ii) An equivalent end structure that can withstand the sum of
forces that each collision post is required to withstand. For analysis
purposes, the required forces may be assumed to be evenly distributed
at the end structure at the underframe joint.
(2) This paragraph does not apply to a vehicle of special design
that operates at the rear of a passenger train and is used solely to
transport freight, such as an auto-carrier or a RoadRailer.
(b) Each locomotive, including a cab car and an MU locomotive,
ordered on or after January 1, 1999, or placed in service for the first
time on or after January 1, 2001, shall have at its forward end, in
lieu of the structural protection described in paragraph (a) of this
section, either:
(1) Two forward collision posts, located at approximately the one-
third points laterally, each capable of withstanding:
(i) A 500,000-pound longitudinal force at the point even with the
top of the underframe, without exceeding the ultimate strength of the
joint; and
(ii) A 200,000-pound longitudinal force exerted 30 inches above the
joint of the post to the underframe, without exceeding the ultimate
strength; or
(2) An equivalent end structure that can withstand the sum of the
forces that each collision post is required to withstand.
(c) If a vehicle consists of articulated units, the end structural
protection requirements in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section apply
only to the ends of the permanently joined assembly of units, not to
each end of each unit so joined.

Sec. 238.213 Corner posts.

(a) Each passenger car shall have at each end of the vehicle two
full-height corner posts capable of resisting without failure a
horizontal load of 150,000 pounds at the point of attachment to the
underframe and a load of 20,000 pounds at the point of attachment to
the roof structure. The orientation of the applied horizontal loads
shall range from longitudinal inward to transverse inward. The corner
posts may be positioned near the occupied volume of the rail vehicle to
provide protection or structural strength to the occupied volume.
(b) Each corner post shall resist a horizontal load of 30,000
pounds applied 18 inches above the top of the floor without permanent
deformation. The orientation of the applied horizontal loads shall
range from longitudinal inward to transverse inward.

Sec. 238.215 Rollover strength.

(a) Each passenger car shall be designed to rest on its side and be
uniformly supported at the top (``roof rail''), the bottom (``side
sill'') chords of the side frame, and, if bi-level, the intermediate
floor rail. The allowable

[[Page 49805]]

stress for occupied volumes for this condition shall be one-half yield
or one-half the critical buckling stress, whichever is less.
(b) Each passenger car shall also be designed to rest on its roof
so that any damage in occupied areas is limited to roof sheathing and
framing. Deformation to the roof sheathing and framing is allowed to
the extent necessary to permit the vehicle to be supported directly on
the top chords of the side frames and end frames. Other than roof
sheathing and framing, the allowable stress for occupied volumes for
this condition shall be one-half yield or one-half the critical
buckling stress, whichever is less.

Sec. 238.217 Side impact strength.

Each passenger car shall comply with the following:
(a) Side posts and corner braces. (1) For ``modified girder,''
``semi-monocoque,'' or truss construction, the sum of the section
moduli--about a longitudinal axis, taken at the weakest horizontal
section between the side sill and side plate--of all posts and braces
on each side of the car located between the body corner posts shall be
not less than 0.30 multiplied by the distance in feet between the
centers of end panels.
(2) For ``modified girder'' or ``semi-monocoque'' construction
only, the sum of the section moduli--about a transverse axis, taken at
the weakest horizontal section between side sill and side plate--of all
posts, braces and pier panels, to the extent available, on each side of
the car located between body corner posts shall be not less than 0.20
multiplied by the distance in feet between the centers of end panels.
(3) The center of an end panel is the point midway between the
center of the body corner post and the center of the adjacent side
post.
(b) Sheathing. (1) Outside sheathing of mild, open-hearth steel
when used flat, without reinforcement (other than side posts) in a side
frame of ``modified girder'' or ``semi-monocoque'' shall not be less
than \1/8\ inch nominal thickness. Other metals may be used of a
thickness in inverse proportion to their yield strengths.
(2) Outside metal sheathing of less than \1/8\ inch thickness may
be used only if it is reinforced so as to produce at least an
equivalent sectional area at a right angle to reinforcements as that of
the flat sheathing specified in paragraph (b)(1) of this section.
(3) When the sheathing used for truss construction serves no load-
carrying function, the minimum thickness of that sheathing shall be not
less than 40 percent of that specified in paragraph (b)(1) of this
section.

Sec. 238.219 Truck-to-car-body attachment.

Passenger equipment shall have a truck-to-car-body attachment with
an ultimate strength sufficient to resist without failure a force of 2g
vertical on the mass of the truck and a force of 250,000 pounds in any
horizontal direction. For purposes of this section, the mass of the
truck includes axles, wheels, bearings, the truck-mounted brake system,
suspension system components, and any other components attached to the
truck by design.

Sec. 238.221 Glazing.

(a) Passenger equipment shall comply with the applicable Safety
Glazing Standards contained in part 223 of this chapter, if required by
that part.
(b) Glazing securement components shall hold the glazing in place
against all forces described in part 223 of this chapter. Securement
components shall remain held to the car body structure against these
same forces.
(c) Glazing securement components shall be designed to resist the
forces due to air pressure differences caused when two trains pass at
the minimum separation for two adjacent tracks, while traveling in
opposite directions, each train traveling at the maximum authorized
speed.

Sec. 238.223 Fuel tanks.

(a) External fuel tanks. External locomotive fuel tanks shall
comply with AAR Recommended Practice-506, Performance Requirements for
Diesel Electric Locomotive Fuel Tanks (as adopted July 1, 1995), or an
industry standard providing at least equivalent safety if approved by
FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety under Sec. 238.21.
(b) Integral fuel tanks. Integral fuel tanks shall be positioned in
a manner to reduce the likelihood of accidental penetration from
roadway debris or collision.
(1) The vent system spill protection systems of integral fuel tanks
shall be designed to prevent them from becoming a path of fuel loss for
any tank orientation due to a locomotive overturning.
(2) The bulkheads and skin of integral fuel tanks shall at a
minimum be made of steel plate 3/8 of an inch thick with a 25,000-lb
yield strength, or made of material with an equivalent strength. Skid
plates are not required. Higher yield strength material may be used to
decrease the thickness of the material as long as an equivalent
strength is maintained.

Sec. 238.225 Electrical system.

All passenger equipment shall comply with the following:
(a) Conductors. Conductor sizes shall be selected on the basis of
current-carrying capacity, mechanical strength, temperature,
flexibility requirements, and maximum allowable voltage drop. Current-
carrying capacity shall be derated for grouping and for operating
temperature.
(b) Main battery system. (1) The main battery compartment shall be
isolated from the cab and passenger seating areas by a non-combustible
barrier.
(2) Battery chargers shall be designed to protect against
overcharging.
(3) If batteries are of the type to potentially vent explosive
gases, the battery compartment shall be adequately ventilated to
prevent the accumulation of explosive concentrations of these gases.
(c) Power dissipation resistors. (1) Power dissipating resistors
shall be adequately ventilated to prevent overheating under worst-case
operating conditions as determined by each railroad.
(2) Power dissipation grids shall be designed and installed with
sufficient isolation to prevent combustion.
(3) Resistor elements shall be electrically insulated from resistor
frames, and the frames shall be electrically insulated from the
supports that hold them.
(d) Electromagnetic interference and compatibility. (1) The
operating railroad shall ensure electromagnetic compatibility of the
safety-critical equipment systems with their environment.
Electromagnetic compatibility may be achieved through equipment design
or changes to the operating environment.
(2) The electronic equipment shall not produce electrical noise
that affects the safe performance of train line control and
communications or wayside signaling systems.
(3) To contain electromagnetic interference emissions, suppression
of transients shall be at the source wherever possible.
(4) All electronic equipment shall be self-protected from damage or
improper operation, or both, due to high voltage transients and long-
term over-voltage or under-voltage conditions. This includes protection
from both power frequency and harmonic effects as well as protection
from radio frequency signals into the microwave frequency range.

Sec. 238.227 Suspension system.

On or after January 1, 1998--

[[Page 49806]]

(a) All passenger equipment shall exhibit freedom from hunting
oscillations at all speeds.
(b) All passenger equipment intended for service above 110 mph
shall demonstrate stable operation during pre-revenue service
qualification tests at all speeds up to 5 mph in excess of the maximum
intended operating speed under worst-case conditions--including
component wear--as determined by the operating railroad.

Sec. 238.229 Safety appliances.

All passenger equipment continues to be subject to the safety
appliance requirements contained in Federal statute at 49 U.S.C.
chapter 203 and in FRA regulations at part 231 and Sec. 232.2 of this
chapter.

Sec. 238.231 Brake system.

Except as otherwise provided in this section, on or after January
1, 1998, the following requirements apply to all passenger equipment
and passenger trains.
(a) A passenger train's primary brake system shall be capable of
stopping the train with a service application from its maximum
authorized operating speed within the signal spacing existing on the
track over which the train is operating.
(b) The brake system design of passenger equipment ordered on or
after January 1, 1999, or placed in service for the first time on or
after January 1, 2001, shall not require an inspector to place himself
or herself on, under, or between components of the equipment to observe
brake actuation or release.
(c) Passenger equipment shall be provided with an emergency
application feature that produces an irretrievable stop, using a brake
rate consistent with prevailing adhesion, passenger safety, and brake
system thermal capacity. An emergency application shall be available at
any time, and shall be initiated by an unintentional parting of the
train.
(d) A passenger train brake system shall respond as intended to
signals from train brake control line or lines. Control lines shall be
designed so that failure or breakage of a control line will cause the
brakes to apply or will result in a default to control lines that meet
this requirement.
(e) Introduction of alcohol or other chemicals into the air brake
system of passenger equipment is prohibited.
(f) The operating railroad shall require that the design and
operation of the brake system results in wheels that are free of
condemnable cracks.
(g) Disc brakes shall be designed and operated to produce a surface
temperature no greater than the safe operating temperature recommended
by the disc manufacturer and verified by testing or previous service.
(h) Except for a locomotive that is ordered before January 1, 1999,
and placed in service for the first time before January 1, 2001, and
except for a private car, all passenger equipment shall be equipped
with a hand or parking brake that shall be:
(1) Capable of application or activation by hand;
(2) Capable of release by hand; and
(3) Capable of holding the loaded unit on the maximum grade
anticipated by the operating railroad.
(i) Passenger cars shall be equipped with a means to apply the
emergency brake that is accessible to passengers and located in the
vestibule or passenger compartment. The emergency brake shall be
clearly identified and marked.
(j) Locomotives equipped with blended brakes shall be designed so
that:
(1) The blending of friction and dynamic brake to obtain the
correct retarding force is automatic;
(2) Loss of power or failure of the dynamic brake does not result
in exceeding the allowable stop distance;
(3) The friction brake alone is adequate to safely stop the train
under all operating conditions; and
(4) Operation of the friction brake alone does not result in
thermal damage to wheels or disc rotor surface temperatures exceeding
the manufacturer's recommendation.
(k) For new designs of braking systems, the design process shall
include computer modeling or dynamometer simulation of train braking
that shows compliance with paragraphs (f) and (g) of this section over
the range of equipment operating speeds. Changes in operating
parameters shall require a new simulation prior to implementing the
changes.
(l) Locomotives ordered on or after January 1, 1999, or placed in
service for the first time on or after January 1, 2001, shall be
equipped with effective air coolers or dryers that provide air to the
main reservoir with a dew point at least 10 degrees F. below ambient
temperature.

Sec. 238.233 Interior fittings and surfaces.

(a) Each seat in a passenger car shall be securely fastened to the
car body so as to withstand an individually applied acceleration of 4g
acting in the vertical and in the lateral direction on the deadweight
of the seat or seats, if a tandem unit. A seat attachment shall have an
ultimate strength capable of resisting the longitudinal inertial force
of 8g acting on the mass of the seat plus the impact force of the mass
of a 95th-percentile male occupant(s) being decelerated from a relative
speed of 25 mph and striking the seat from behind.
(b) Overhead storage racks in a passenger car shall provide
longitudinal and lateral restraint for stowed articles. Overhead
storage racks shall be attached to the car body with sufficient
strength to resist loads due to the following individually applied
accelerations acting on the mass of the luggage stowed as determined by
the railroad:
(1) Longitudinal: 8g;
(2) Vertical: 4g; and
(3) Lateral: 4g.
(c) Other interior fittings within a passenger car shall be
attached to the car body with sufficient strength to withstand the
following individually applied accelerations acting on the mass of the
fitting:
(1) Longitudinal: 8g;
(2) Vertical: 4g; and
(3) Lateral: 4g.
(d) To the extent possible, all interior fittings in a passenger
car, except seats, shall be recessed or flush-mounted.
(e) Sharp edges and corners in a locomotive cab and a passenger car
shall be either avoided or padded to mitigate the consequences of an
impact with such surfaces.
(f) Each floor-mounted seat provided exclusively for a crewmember
assigned to occupy the cab of a locomotive shall be secured to the car
body with an attachment having an ultimate strength capable of
withstanding the loads due to the following individually applied
accelerations acting on the mass of the seat and the crewmember
(ranging from a 5th-percentile female to a 95th-percentile male)
occupying it:
(1) Longitudinal: 8g;
(2) Lateral: 4g; and
(3) Vertical: 4g.

Sec. 238.235 Emergency window exits.

Except as provided in paragraph (b), the following requirements
apply to all passenger cars on or after January 1, 1998--
(a) Except as provided in paragraphs (d) and (e) of this section,
each passenger car shall have a minimum of four emergency window exits,
either in a staggered configuration or with one located at each end of
each side of the car.
(b) Each emergency window exit in a passenger car placed in service
for the first time on or after January 1, 1998, shall have a minimum
unobstructed opening with dimensions of 24 inches horizontally by 18
inches vertically.
(c) Each emergency window exit shall be easily operable by a 5th-
percentile female without requiring the use of a tool or other
implement.

[[Page 49807]]

(d) If the car is bi-level, each main level shall have a minimum of
four emergency window exits, either in a staggered configuration or
with one located at each end of each side of the car.
(e) Each passenger car of special design, such as a sleeping car,
shall have at least one emergency window exit in each compartment.
(f) Marking and instructions. [Reserved]

Sec. 238.237 Doors.

(a) Within 2 years of the effective date of the final rule, each
powered, exterior side door in a vestibule that is partitioned from the
passenger compartment of a passenger car shall be equipped with a
manual override that is:
(1) Capable of opening the door without power from inside the car;
(2) Located adjacent to the door which it controls; and
(3) Designed and maintained so that a person may access the
override device from inside the car without requiring the use of a tool
or other implement.
(b) Each passenger car ordered on or after January 1, 1999, or
placed in service for the first time on or after January 1, 2001, shall
have a minimum of four side doors, or the functional equivalent of four
side doors, each permitting at least one 95th-percentile male to pass
through at a single time.¹ Each powered, exterior side door
shall be equipped with a manual override that is:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\1\ The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Accessibility
Specifications for Transportation Vehicles also contain requirements
for doorway clearance (See Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part
38).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(1) Capable of opening the door without power from both inside and
outside the car;
(2) Located adjacent to the door which it controls; and
(3) Designed and maintained so that a person may access the
override device from both inside and outside the car without requiring
the use of a tool or other implement.
(c) A railroad may protect a manual override device used to open a
powered, exterior door with a cover or a screen capable of removal by a
5th-percentile female without requiring the use of a tool or other
implement. If the method of removing the protective cover or screen
entails breaking or shattering it, the cover or screen shall be scored,
perforated, or otherwise weakened so that a 5th-percentile female can
penetrate the cover or screen with a single blow of her fist without
injury to her hand.
(d) Marking and instructions. [Reserved]

Sec. 238.239 Automated monitoring.

(a) Except as further specified in this paragraph, on or after
January 1, 1998, a working alerter or deadman control shall be provided
in the controlling locomotive of each passenger train operating in
other than cab signal, automatic train control, or automatic train stop
territory. If the controlling locomotive is ordered on or after January
1, 1999, or placed into service for the first time on or after January
1, 2001, a working alerter shall be provided.
(b) Alerter or deadman control timing shall be set by the operating
railroad taking into consideration maximum train speed and capabilities
of the signal system. The railroad shall document the basis for setting
alerter or deadman control timing and make this documentation available
to FRA upon request.
(c) If the train operator does not respond to the alerter or
maintain proper contact with the deadman control, it shall initiate a
penalty brake application.
(d) The following procedures apply if the alerter or deadman
control fails en route:
(1) A second person qualified on the signal system and brake
application procedures shall be stationed in the cab; or
(2) The engineer shall be in constant communication with a second
crewmember until the train reaches the next terminal.

Subpart D--Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements for
Tier I Passenger Equipment

Sec. 238.301 Scope.

This subpart contains requirements pertaining to the inspection,
testing, and maintenance of passenger equipment operating at speeds not
exceeding 125 miles per hour. The requirements in this subpart address
the inspection, testing, and maintenance of the brake system as well as
other mechanical and electrical components covered by this part.

Sec. 238.303 Exterior calendar day mechanical inspection of passenger
cars and unpowered vehicles used in passenger trains.

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, each
passenger car and each unpowered vehicle used in a passenger train
shall receive an exterior mechanical safety inspection at least once
each calendar day that the equipment is placed in service. (Note: The
exterior inspection of a passenger car classified as a locomotive under
part 229 of this chapter shall be in accordance with this part as well
as part 229 of this chapter.)
(b) The exterior calendar day mechanical safety inspection shall be
performed by a qualified mechanical inspector as defined in Sec. 238.5.
(c) As part of the exterior inspection, the railroad shall verify
conformity with the following conditions, and nonconformity with any
such condition renders the passenger car or unpowered vehicle used in a
passenger train defective whenever discovered in service:
(1) Products of combustion are released entirely outside the cab
and other compartments.
(2) All battery containers are vented and all batteries are kept
from gassing excessively.
(3) Each coupler is in the following condition:
(i) The distance between the guard arm and the knuckle nose is not
more than 5\1/8\ inches on standard type couplers (MCB contour 1904) or
more than 5\5/16\ inches on D&E couplers;
(ii) Sidewall or pin bearing bosses and the pulling face of the
knuckles are not broken or cracked;
(iii) The coupler assembly is equipped with anti-creep protection;
(iv) The free slack in the coupler or drawbar not absorbed by
friction devices or draft gears is not more than \1/2\ inch;
(v) The coupler carrier is not broken or cracked;
(vi) The yoke is not broken or cracked; and
(vii) The draft gear is not broken.
(4) A device is provided under the lower end of all drawbar pins
and articulated connection pins to prevent the pin from falling out of
place in case of breakage.
(5) The suspension system, including the spring rigging, is in the
following condition:
(i) Protective construction or safety hangers are provided to
prevent spring planks, spring seats, or bolsters from dropping to the
track structure in event of a hanger or spring failure;
(ii) The top (long) leaf or any of the other three leaves of the
elliptical spring is not broken, except when a spring is part of a nest
of three or more springs and none of the other springs in the nest has
its top leaf or any of the other three leaves broken;
(iii) The outer coil spring or saddle is not broken;
(iv) The equalizers, hangers, bolts, gibs, or pins are not cracked
or broken;
(v) The coil spring is not fully compressed when the car is at
rest;

[[Page 49808]]

(vi) The shock absorber is not broken or leaking clearly formed
droplets of oil or other fluid; and
(vii) Air bags or other pneumatic suspension system components
inflate or deflate, as applicable, correctly and otherwise operate as
intended.
(6) All trucks are in the following condition:
(i) Equipped with a device or securing arrangement to prevent the
truck and car body from separating in case of derailment;
(ii) All tie bars are not loose;
(iii) All center castings, motor suspension lugs, equalizers,
hangers, gibs, or pins are not cracked or broken; and
(iv) The truck frame is not broken and is not cracked in a stress
area that may affect its structural integrity.
(7) All side bearings are in the following condition:
(i) All friction side bearings with springs designed to carry
weight do not have more than 25 percent of the springs in any one nest
broken;
(ii) All friction side bearings do not run in contact unless
designed to carry weight; and
(iii) The maximum clearance of all side bearings does not exceed
the manufacturer's recommendation.
(8) All wheels do not have any of the following conditions:
(i) A single flat spot that is 2\1/2\ inches or more in length, or
two adjoining spots that are each two or more inches in length;
(ii) A gouge or chip in the flange that is more than 1\1/2\ inches
in length and \1/2\ inch in width;
(iii) A broken rim, if the tread, measured from the flange at a
point \5/8\ of an inch above the tread, is less than 3\3/4\ inches in
width.
(iv) A shelled-out spot 2\1/2\ inches or more in length, or two
adjoining spots that are each two or more inches in length;
(v) A seam running lengthwise that is within 3\3/4\ inches of the
flange;
(vi) A flange worn to a \7/8\ inch thickness or less, gauged at a
point \3/8\ of an inch above the tread;
(vii) A tread worn hollow \5/16\ inch or more;
(viii) A flange height of 1\1/2\ inches or more measured from the
tread to the top of the flange;
(ix) A rim less than 1 inch thick;
(x) A crack or break in the flange, tread, rim, plate, or hub;
(xi) A loose wheel; or
(xii) A weld.
(9) No part or appliance of a passenger coach, except the wheels,
is less than 2\1/2\ inches above the top of the rail.
(10) All unguarded, noncurrent-carrying metal parts subject to
becoming charged are grounded or thoroughly insulated.
(11) All jumpers and cable connections are in the following
condition:
(i) All jumpers and cable connections between coaches, between
locomotives, or between a locomotive and a coach are located and
guarded in a manner that provides sufficient vertical clearance.
Jumpers and cable connections may not hang with one end free;
(ii) The insulation is not broken or badly chafed;
(iii) No plug, receptacle, or terminal is broken; and
(iv) No strand of wire is broken or protruding.
(12) All doors and cover plates guarding high voltage equipment are
marked ``Danger--High Voltage'' or with the word ``Danger'' and the
normal voltage carried by the parts so protected.
(13) All buffer plates are in place.
(14) If so equipped, all diaphragms are in place and properly
aligned.
(15) All secondary braking systems are working.
(d) A long-distance intercity passenger train that misses a
scheduled exterior calendar day mechanical inspection due to a delay en
route may continue in service to the location where the inspection was
scheduled to be performed. At that point, an exterior calendar day
mechanical inspection shall be performed prior to returning the
equipment to service. This flexibility applies only to the exterior
mechanical safety inspections required by this section, and does not
relieve the railroad of the responsibility to perform a calendar day
inspection on a unit classified as a ``locomotive'' under part 229 of
this chapter as required by Sec. 229.21 of this chapter.
(e) Cars requiring a single car test in accordance with
Sec. 238.311 that are being moved in service to a location where the
single car test can be performed shall have the single car test
completed prior to, or as a part of, the calendar day mechanical
inspection.

Sec. 238.305 Interior calendar day mechanical inspection of passenger
cars.

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, each
passenger car shall receive an interior mechanical safety inspection at
least once each calendar day that it is placed in service.
(b) The interior daily mechanical inspection shall be performed by
a qualified person or a qualified mechanical inspector.
(c) As part of the daily interior mechanical inspection, the
railroad shall verify conformity with the following conditions, and
nonconformity with any such condition renders the car defective
whenever discovered in service, except as provided in paragraph (c)(5)
of this section:
(1) All fan openings, exposed gears and pinions, exposed moving
parts of mechanisms, pipes carrying hot gases and high-voltage
equipment, switches, circuit breakers, contactors, relays, grid
resistors, and fuses are in non-hazardous locations or equipped with
guards to prevent personal injury.
(2) The words ``Emergency Brake Valve'' are legibly stenciled or
marked near each brake pipe valve or shown on an adjacent badge plate.
(3) All doors and cover plates guarding high voltage equipment are
marked ``Danger--High Voltage'' or with the word ``Danger'' and the
normal voltage carried by the parts so protected.
(4) All trap doors safely operate and securely latch in place in
both the up and down position.
(5) All end doors and side doors operate safely and as intended. If
all of the following conditions are satisfied, the car may remain in
passenger service until the next interior calendar day mechanical
inspection is due at which time the appropriate repairs shall be made:
(i) A qualified person or a qualified mechanical inspector
determines that the repairs necessary to bring a door into compliance
cannot be performed at the time the interior mechanical inspection is
conducted;
(ii) A qualified person or a qualified mechanical inspector
determines that it is safe to move the equipment in passenger service;
and
(iii) A tag is prominently displayed on the door indicating that
the door is defective.
(6) All safety-related signage is in place and legible.
(7) All vestibule steps are illuminated.
(8) All manual door releases are in place based on a visual
inspection.
(d) A long-distance intercity passenger train that misses a
scheduled calendar day interior mechanical inspection due to a delay en
route may continue in service to the location where the inspection was
scheduled to be performed. At that point, an interior calendar day
mechanical inspection shall be performed prior to returning the
equipment to service.

Sec. 238.307 Periodic mechanical inspection of passenger cars.

(a) Railroads shall conduct periodic inspections of passenger cars
as required by this section and as warranted by data developed under
Secs. 238.103 and 238.109. A periodic

[[Page 49809]]

inspection conducted under part 229 of this chapter satisfies the
requirement of this section with respect to the features inspected.
(b) The periodic inspection program shall specifically include the
following interior features, which shall be inspected not less
frequently than each 180 days. At a minimum, this inspection shall
determine that:
(1) Floors of passageways and compartments are free from oil,
water, waste, or any obstruction that creates a slipping, tripping, or
fire hazard, and floors are properly treated to provide secure footing.
(2) Emergency lighting systems are operational.
(3) With regard to switches:
(i) All hand-operated switches carrying currents with a potential
of more than 150 volts that may be operated while under load are
covered and are operative from the outside of the cover;
(ii) A means is provided to display whether the switches are open
or closed; and
(iii) Switches not designed to be operated safely while under load
are legibly marked with the voltage carried and the words ``must not be
operated under load''.
(4) Seats and seat attachments are not broken or loose.
(5) Luggage racks are not broken or loose.
(6) All beds and bunks are not broken or loose, and all restraints
or safety latches and straps are in place and function as intended.
(7) A representative sample of emergency window exits on its cars
properly operate, in accordance with the requirements of Sec. 239.107
of this chapter.
(8) All manual door releases operate as intended.
(c) Nonconformity with any of the conditions set forth in this
section renders the car defective whenever discovered in service.

Sec. 238.309 Periodic brake equipment maintenance.

(a) General. (1) This section contains the minimum intervals at
which the brake equipment on various types of passenger equipment shall
be periodically cleaned, repaired, and tested. This maintenance
procedure requires that all of the equipment's brake system pneumatic
components that contain moving parts and are sealed against air leaks
be removed from the equipment, disassembled, cleaned, and lubricated
and that the parts that can deteriorate with age be replaced.
(2) A railroad may petition FRA's Associate Administrator for
Safety to approve alternative maintenance procedures providing
equivalent safety, in lieu of the requirements of this section. The
petition shall be filed as provided in Sec. 238.21.
(b) MU locomotives. The brake equipment of each MU locomotive shall
be cleaned, repaired, and tested at intervals in accordance with the
following schedule:
(1) Every 736 days if the MU locomotive is part of a fleet that is
not 100 percent equipped with air dryers.
(2) Every 1,104 days if the MU locomotive is part of a fleet that
is 100 percent equipped with air dryers and is equipped with PS-68, 26-
C, 26-L, PS-90, CS-1, RT-5A, GRB-1, CS-2, or 26-R brake systems. (This
listing of brake system types is intended to subsume all brake systems
using 26 type, ABD, or ABDW control valves and PS68, PS-90, 26B-1, 26C,
26CE, 26-Bl, 30CDW, or 30ECDW engineer's brake valves.)
(3) Every 736 days for all other MU locomotives.
(c) Conventional locomotives. The brake equipment of each
conventional locomotive shall be cleaned, repaired, and tested at
intervals in accordance with following schedule:
(1) Every 1,104 days for a locomotive equipped with a 26-L or
equivalent brake system.
(2) Every 736 days for a locomotive equipped with other than a 26-L
or equivalent brake system.
(d) Passenger coaches and other unpowered vehicles. The brake
equipment on each passenger coach and each other unpowered vehicle used
in a passenger train shall be cleaned, repaired, and tested at
intervals in accordance with following schedule:
(1) Every 1,476 days for a coach or vehicle equipped with a 26-C or
equivalent brake system.
(2) Every 1,104 days for a coach or vehicle equipped with other
than a 26-C or equivalent brake system.
(e) Cab cars. The brake equipment of each cab car shall be cleaned,
repaired, and tested in accordance with the following schedule:
(1) Every 1,476 days for that portion of the cab car brake system
using brake valves that are identical to the passenger coach 26-C brake
system;
(2) Every 1,104 days for that portion of the cab car brake system
using brake valves that are identical to the locomotive 26-L brake
system; and
(3) Every 732 days for all other types of cab car brake valves.
(f) Records of periodic maintenance. The date and place of the
cleaning, repairing, and testing required by this section shall be
recorded on Form FRA 6180-49A or a similar form developed by the
railroad containing the same information, and the person performing the
work and that person's supervisor shall sign the form. Alternatively,
the railroad may stencil the vehicle with the date and place of the
cleaning, repairing, and testing and maintain an electronic record of
the person performing the work and that person's supervisor. A record
of the parts of the air brake system that are cleaned, repaired, and
tested shall be kept in the railroad's files, the cab of the
locomotive, or a designated location in the passenger car until the
next such periodic test is performed.

Sec. 238.311 Single car test.

(a) Single car tests of all passenger cars and all unpowered
vehicles used in passenger trains shall be performed in accordance with
the AAR Standard S-044 contained in AAR ``Instruction Pamphlet 5039-4,
Supplement 3'' (April 1991), or an alternative procedure approved by
FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety under Sec. 238.21.
(b) A railroad shall perform a single car test of the brake system
of a car or vehicle described in paragraph (a) of this section when the
car or vehicle is found with one or more of the following wheel
defects:
(1) Built-up tread;
(2) Slid flat wheel;
(3) Thermal cracks;
(4) Overheated wheel; or
(5) Shelling.
(c) Except as provided in paragraph (e) of this section, a railroad
shall perform a single car test of the brake system of a car or vehicle
described in paragraph (a) of this section when:
(1) The car or vehicle is placed in service after having been out
of service for 30 days or more;
(2) The trainline is repaired; or
(3) One or more of the following conventional air brake equipment
items is removed, repaired, or replaced:
(i) Brake reservoir;
(ii) Brake cylinder;
(iii) Piston assembly;
(iv) Vent valve;
(v) Quick service valve;
(vi) Brake cylinder release valve;
(vii) Modulating valve or slack adjuster;
(viii) Relay valve;
(ix) Angle cock or cutout cock;
(x) Service portion;
(xi) Emergency portion; or
(xii) Pipe bracket.
(d) Each single car test required by this section shall be
performed by a qualified mechanical inspector.
(e) If the single car test cannot be made at the point where
repairs are made, the car may be moved in

[[Page 49810]]

passenger service to the next forward location where the test can be
made. The single car test shall be completed prior to, or as a part of,
the car's next calendar day mechanical inspection.

Sec. 238.313 Class I brake test.

(a) Each commuter and short-distance intercity passenger train
shall receive a Class I brake test once each calendar day that the
train is placed or remains in passenger service.
(b) Except as provided in paragraph (h) of this section, each long-
distance intercity passenger train shall receive a Class I brake test:
(1) Prior to the train's departure from an originating terminal;
and
(2) Every 1,500 miles or once each additional calendar day,
whichever occurs first, that the train remains in continuous passenger
service.
(c) Each Class I brake test shall be performed by a qualified
mechanical inspector.
(d) Each Class I brake test may be performed either separately or
in conjunction with the calendar day mechanical inspection required
under Sec. 238.303.
(e) Except as provided in Sec. 238.15(b), a railroad shall not use
or haul a passenger train in passenger service from a location where a
Class I brake test has been performed, or was required by this part to
have been performed, with less than 100 percent operative brakes.
(f) A Class I brake test shall determine and ensure that:
(1) The friction brakes apply and remain applied on each car in the
train until a release of the brakes has been initiated on each car in
response to train line electric, pneumatic, or other signals. This test
shall include a verification that each side of each car's brake system
responds properly to application and release signals;
(2) The brake shoes or pads are firmly seated against the wheel or
disk with the brakes applied;
(3) Piston travel is within prescribed limits, either by direct
observation, observation of an actuator, or by observation of the
clearance between the brake shoe and the wheel with the brakes
released;
(4) The communicating signal system is tested and known to be
operating as intended;
(5) Each brake shoe is securely fastened and aligned in relation to
the wheel;
(6) The engineer's brake valve or controller will cause the proper
train line commands for each position or brake level setting;
(7) Brake pipe leakage does not exceed 5 pounds-per-square-inch per
minute if leakage will affect service performance;
(8) The emergency brake application and deadman pedal or other
emergency control devices function as intended;
(9) Each brake shoe or pad is not below the minimum thickness
established by the railroad. This thickness shall not be less than the
minimum thickness necessary to safely travel the maximum distance
allowed between Class I brake system tests;
(10) Each angle cock and cutout cock is properly positioned;
(11) Brake rigging does not bind or foul so as to impede the force
delivered to a brake shoe, impede the release of a brake shoe, or
otherwise adversely affect the operation of brake system;
(12) If the train is equipped with electropneumatic brakes, an
electropneumatic application of the brakes is made and that the train
is walked to determine that the brakes on each car in the train
properly apply;
(13) Each brake disc is free of cracks;
(14) If the equipment is provided with a brake indicator, the brake
indicator operates as intended; and
(15) The communication of brake pipe pressure changes at the rear
of the train is verified.
(g) A qualified mechanical inspector that performs a Class I brake
test on a train shall place in the cab of the controlling locomotive of
the train a written statement, which shall be retained in the cab until
the next Class I brake test is performed and which shall contain the
following information:
(1) Date and time the Class I brake test was performed;
(2) Location where the test was performed; and
(3) The number of the controlling locomotive of the train.
(h) A long-distance, intercity passenger train that misses a
scheduled calendar day Class I brake test due to a delay en route may
proceed to the point where the Class I brake test was scheduled to be
performed. A Class I brake test shall be completed at that point prior
to placing the train back in service.

Sec. 238.315 Class IA brake test.

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b)(1) of this section, either
a Class I or Class IA brake test shall be performed:
(1) Prior to the first morning departure of each commuter or short-
distance intercity passenger train; and
(2) Prior to placing a train in service that has been off a source
of compressed air for more than four hours.
(b) A commuter or short-distance intercity passenger train that
provides continuing late night service that began prior to midnight may
complete its daily operating cycle after midnight without performing
another Class I or Class IA brake test. A Class I or Class IA brake
test shall be performed on such a train before it starts a new daily
operating cycle.
(c) A Class I or Class IA test may be performed at a shop or yard
site and need not be repeated at the first passenger terminal if the
train remains on a source of compressed air and in the custody of the
train crew.
(d) The Class IA test shall be performed by either a qualified
person or a qualified mechanical inspector as defined in Sec. 238.5.
(e) Except as provided in Sec. 238.15(b), a railroad shall not use
or haul a passenger train in passenger service from a location where a
Class IA brake test has been performed, or was required by this part to
have been performed, with less than 100 percent operative brakes.
(f) In performing a Class IA brake test, it shall be determined
that:
(1) Brake pipe leakage does not exceed 5 pounds-per-square-inch per
minute if brake pipe leakage will affect service performance;
(2) Each brake sets and releases by inspecting in the manner
described in paragraph (g) of this section;
(3) The emergency brake application and the deadman pedal or other
emergency control devices function as intended;
(4) Each angle cock and cutout cock is properly set;
(5) To the extent determinable, piston travel is within the nominal
range for the type of brake equipment; and
(6) Brake pipe pressure changes at the rear of the train are
properly communicated to the controlling locomotive.
(g) In determining whether each brake sets and releases--
(1) The inspection of the set and release of the brakes shall be
completed by walking the train to directly observe the set and release
of each brake, if the railroad determines that such a procedure is
safe.
(2) If the railroad determines that operating conditions pose a
safety hazard to an inspector walking the brakes, brake indicators may
be used to verify the set and release on cars so equipped. However, the
observation of the brake indicators shall not be made from the cab of
the locomotive. The inspector shall position himself or herself to be
able to accurately observe the indicators.

[[Page 49811]]

Sec. 238.317 Class II brake test.

(a) A Class II brake test shall be performed on a passenger train
when any of the following events occur:
(1) Whenever the control stand used to control the train is
changed;
(2) When previously tested units are added to or removed from the
train; and
(3) When an operator first takes charge of the train, except for
face-to-face relief.
(b) A Class II brake test shall be performed by a qualified person
or a qualified mechanical inspector.
(c) A railroad shall not use or haul a passenger train in passenger
service from a terminal or yard where a Class II brake test has been
performed, or was required by this part to have been performed, with
any of the brakes known to be cutout, inoperative, or defective.
(d) In performing a Class II brake test on a train, a railroad
shall determine that:
(1) The brakes on the rear unit of the train apply and release in
response to a signal from the engineer's brake valve or controller of
the leading or controlling unit;
(2) The emergency brake application and deadman pedal or other
emergency control devices function as intended; and
(3) Brake pipe pressure changes are properly communicated at the
rear of the train.

Sec. 238.319 Running brake test.

(a) As soon as conditions safely permit, a running brake test shall
be performed on each passenger train after the train has received, or
was required under this part to have received, either a Class I, Class
IA, or Class II brake test.
(b) The running brake test shall be conducted in accordance with
the railroad's established operating rules, and shall be made by
applying brakes in a manner that allows the engineer to ascertain
whether the brakes are operating properly.
(c) If the engineer determines that the brakes are not operating
properly, the engineer shall stop the train and follow the procedures
provided in Sec. 238.15.

Subpart E--Specific Requirements for Tier II Passenger Equipment

Sec. 238.401 Scope.

This subpart contains specific requirements for railroad passenger
equipment operating at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 150
mph. As stated in Sec. 238.433(b), all such passenger equipment remains
subject to the requirements concerning couplers and uncoupling devices
contained in Federal statute at 49 U.S.C. chapter 203 and in FRA
regulations at part 231 and Sec. 232.2 of this chapter. The
requirements of this subpart are effective on the effective date of the
final rule.

Sec. 238.403 Crash energy management requirements.

(a) Each power car and trailer car shall be designed with a crash
energy management system to dissipate kinetic energy during a
collision. The rash energy management system shall provide a controlled
deformation and collapse of designated sections within the unoccupied
volumes to absorb collision energy and to reduce the decelerations on
passengers and crewmembers resulting from dynamic forces transmitted to
occupied volumes.
(b) The design of each unit shall consist of an occupied volume
located between two normally unoccupied volumes. Where practical,
sections within the unoccupied volumes shall be designed to be
structurally weaker than the occupied volume. During a collision, the
designated sections within the unoccupied volumes shall start to deform
and eventually collapse in a controlled fashion to dissipate energy
before any structural damage occurs to the occupied volume.
(c) At a minimum, the train shall be designed to meet the following
requirements:
(1) Thirteen megajoules (MJ) shall be absorbed at each end of the
train through the controlled crushing of unoccupied or occasionally
occupied spaces, and of this amount a minimum of 5 MJ shall be absorbed
outboard of the operator's cab in each power car;
(2) A minimum of an additional 3 MJ shall be absorbed by the power
car structure between the operator's cab and the first trailer car; and
(3) The end of the first trailer car adjacent to each power car
shall absorb a minimum of 5 MJ through controlled crushing.
(d) For a 30-mph collision of a train on tangent, level track with
an identical stationary train:
(1) The deceleration of the occupied compartments of each trailer
car shall not exceed 10g; and
(2) When seated anywhere in the train, the velocity at which a
50th-percentile male contacts the seat back ahead of him shall not
exceed 25 mph.
(e) Compliance with paragraphs (a) through (d) of this section
shall be demonstrated by analysis using a dynamic collision computer
model. For the purpose of demonstrating compliance, the following
assumptions shall be made:
(1) The train remains upright, in-line, and with all wheels on the
track throughout the collision; and
(2) Resistance to structural crushing following the force-versus-
distance function determined during the structural analysis required
under Sec. 238.103 as part of the design of the train.
(f) Passenger searing shall not be permitted in the leading unit of
a Tier II train.

Sec. 238.405 Longitudinal static compressive strength.

(a) To form an effective crash refuge for crewmembers occupying the
cab of a power car, the longitudinal ultimate compressive strength of
the underframe of the cab of a power car shall be a minimum of
2,100,000 pounds unless equivalent protection to crewmembers is
provided under an alternate design approach, validated through analysis
and testing, approved by the FRA Associate Administrator for Safety
under the provisions of Sec. 238.21.
(b) The longitudinal compressive strength of the underframe of the
occupied volume of each trailer car shall be a minimum of 800,000
pounds without deformation. To demonstrate compliance with this
requirement, the 800,000-pound load shall be applied to the underframe
of the occupied volume as it would be transmitted to the underframe by
the full structure of the vehicle.
(c) Unoccupied or lightly occupied volumes of a power car or a
trailer car designed to crush as part of the crash energy management
design are not subject to the requirements of this section.

Sec. 238.407 Anti-climbing mechanism.

(a) Each power car shall have an anti-climbing mechanism at its
forward end capable of resisting an upward or downward static vertical
force of 200,000 pounds. A power car constructed with a crash energy
management design is permitted to crush in a controlled manner before
the anti-climbing mechanism fully engages.
(b) Interior train coupling points between units, including between
units of articulated cars or other permanently joined units of cars,
shall have an anti-climbing mechanism capable of resisting an upward or
downward vertical force of 100,000 pounds.
(c) The forward coupler of a power car shall be attached to the car
body to resist a vertical downward force of 100,000 pounds for any
horizontal position of the coupler without yielding.

[[Page 49812]]

Sec. 238.409 Forward end structures of power car cabs.

This section contains the design requirements for the forward end
structure of the cab of a power car. (A conceptual implementation of
this end structure is provided in Figure 1.)
(a) Center collision post. The forward end structure shall have a
full-height center collision post, or its structural equivalent,
capable of withstanding the following:
(1) A shear load of 500,000 pounds at its joint with the underframe
without exceeding the ultimate strength of the joint;
(2) A shear load of 150,000 pounds at its joint with the roof
without exceeding the ultimate strength of the joint; and
(3) A horizontal, longitudinal force of 300,000 pounds applied at a
point on level with the bottom of the windshield without exceeding the
yield or the critical buckling stress.
(b) Side collision posts. The forward end structure shall have two
side collision posts, or their structural equivalent, located at
approximately the one-third points laterally, each capable of
withstanding the following:
(1) A shear load of 500,000 pounds at its joint with the underframe
without exceeding the ultimate strength of the joint; and
(2) A horizontal, longitudinal force of 300,000 pounds, applied at
a point on level with the bottom of the windshield, without exceeding
the yield or the critical buckling stress.
(c) Corner posts. The forward end structure shall have two full-
height corner posts, or their structural equivalent, each capable of
withstanding the following:
(1) A horizontal, longitudinal or lateral shear load of 300,000
pounds at its joint with the underframe, without exceeding the ultimate
strength of the joint;
(2) A horizontal, lateral force of 100,000 pounds applied at a
point 30 inches up from the underframe attachment, without exceeding
the yield or the critical buckling stress; and
(3) A horizontal, longitudinal or lateral shear load of 150,000
pounds at its joint with the roof, without exceeding the ultimate
strength of the joint.
(d) Skin. The skin covering the forward-facing end of each power
car shall be:
(1) Equivalent to a \1/2\-inch steel plate with a 25,000 pounds-
per-square-inch yield strength--material of a higher yield strength may
be used to decrease the required thickness of the material provided an
equivalent level of strength is maintained.
(2) Securely attached to the end structure.
(3) Sealed to prevent the entry of fluids into the occupied cab
area of the equipment.

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Sec. 238.411 Rear end structures of power car cabs.

This section contains design requirements for the rear end
structure of the cab of a power car. (A conceptual implementation of
this end structure is provided in Figure 2.)
(a) Corner posts. The rear end structure shall have two full-height
corner posts, or their structural equivalent, each capable of
withstanding the following:
(1) A horizontal, longitudinal or lateral shear load of 300,000
pounds at its joint with the underframe without exceeding the ultimate
strength of the joint; and
(2) A horizontal, longitudinal or lateral shear load of 80,000
pounds at its joint with the roof without exceeding the ultimate
strength of the joint.
Collision posts. The rear end structure shall have two full-height
collision posts, or their structural equivalent, each capable of
withstanding the following:
(1) A horizontal, longitudinal shear load of 750,000 pounds at its
joint with the underframe without exceeding the ultimate strength of
the joint; and
(2) A horizontal, longitudinal shear lead of 75,000 pounds at its
joint with the roof without exceeding the ultimate strength of the
joint.

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Sec. 238.413 End structures of trailer cars.

(a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section,
the end structure of a trailer car shall be designed to include the
following elements, or their structural equivalent. (A conceptual
implementation of this end structure is provided in Figure 3.)
(1) Corner posts. Two full-height corner posts, each capable of
withstanding the following:
(i) A horizontal, longitudinal shear load of 150,000 pounds at its
joint with the underframe without exceeding the ultimate strength of
the joint;
(ii) A horizontal, longitudinal or lateral force of 30,000 pounds
applied at a point 30 inches up from the underframe attachment without
exceeding the yield or the critical buckling stress; and
(iii) A horizontal, longitudinal or lateral shear load of 20,000
pounds at its joint with the roof without exceeding the ultimate
strength of the joint.
(2) Collision posts. Two full-height collision posts each capable
of withstanding the following:
(i) A horizontal, longitudinal shear load of 300,000 pounds at its
joint with the underframe without exceeding the ultimate strength of
the joint; and
(ii) A horizontal, longitudinal shear load of 60,000 pounds at its
joint with the roof without exceeding the ultimate strength of the
joint.
(b) If the trailer car consists of multiple articulated units not
designed for uncoupling other than in a maintenance shop, the end
structure requirements of paragraph (a) of this section apply only to
the ends of the entire car, not to the ends of each unit comprising the
multi-unit car.
(c) If the trailer car is designed with a vestibule, the vestibule
inboard end structure shall be designed with two full-height corner
posts, or their structural equivalent, each capable of withstanding the
following (A conceptual implementation of this end structure is
provided in Figure 4.):
(1) A horizontal, longitudinal shear load of 200,000 pounds at its
joint with the underframe without exceeding the ultimate strength of
the joint;

[[Page 49815]]

(2) A horizontal, lateral force of 30,000 pounds applied at a point
30 inches up from the underframe attachment without exceeding the yield
or the critical buckling stress;
(3) A horizontal, longitudinal force of 50,000 pounds applied at a
point 30 inches up from the underframe attachment without exceeding the
yield or the critical buckling stress; and
(4) A horizontal, longitudinal or lateral shear load of 20,000
pounds at its joint with the roof without exceeding the ultimate
strength of the joint.
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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP23SE97.005

BILLING CODE 4910-06-C

Sec. 238.415 Rollover strength.

(a) Each power car shall be designed to rest on its side and be
uniformly supported at the top (``roof rail'') and the bottom (``side
sill'') chords of the side frame. The allowable stress for occupied
volumes for this condition shall be one-half yield or one-half the
critical buckling stress, whichever is less.
(b) Each passenger car and power car shall also be designed to rest
on its roof so that any damage in occupied areas is limited to roof
sheathing and framing. Deformation to the roof sheathing and framing is
allowed to the extent necessary to permit the vehicle to be supported
directly on the top chords of the side frames and end frames. Other
than roof sheathing and framing, the allowable stress for occupied
volumes for this condition shall be one-half yield or one-half the
critical buckling stress, whichever is less.

Sec. 238.417 Side loads.

(a) The single-level passenger car body structure shall be designed
to resist an inward transverse load of 80,000 pounds of force applied
to the side sill and 10,000 pounds of force applied to the belt rail
(horizontal members at the bottom of the window opening in the side
frame).
(b) These loads shall be considered to be applied separately over
the full vertical dimension of the specified member for a distance of 8
feet in the direction of the length of the car.
(c) The allowable stress shall be the lesser of the yield stress or
the critical buckling stress with local yielding of the side skin
allowed.
(d) The connections of the side frame to the roof and underframe
shall support these loads.

Sec. 238.419 Truck-to-car-body and truck component attachment.

(a) The ultimate strength of the truck-to-car-body attachment for
each unit in a train shall be sufficient to resist without failure a
vertical force equivalent to 2g acting on the mass of the truck and a
force of 250,000 pounds acting in any horizontal direction.

[[Page 49817]]

(b) Each component of a truck (which include axles, wheels,
bearings, the truck-mounted brake system, suspension system components,
and any other components attached to the truck by design) shall remain
attached to the truck when a force equivalent to 2g acting on the mass
of the component is exerted in any direction on that component.

Sec. 238.421 Glazing.

(a) Each power car and trailer car shall be equipped with certified
glazing meeting the following requirements:
(1) End-facing exterior glazing shall resist the impact of a 12-
pound solid steel sphere at the maximum speed at which the vehicle will
operate, at an angle equal to the angle between the glazing surface as
installed and the direction of travel, with no penetration or spall.
(2) Side-facing exterior glazing shall resist the impact of a:
(i) 12-pound solid steel sphere at 15 mph, at an angle of 90
degrees to the surface of the glazing, with no penetration or spall;
and
(ii) A granite ballast stone weighing a minimum of 0.5 pounds,
traveling at 75 mph and impacting at a 90-degree angle to the glazing
surface, with no penetration or spall.
(3) All exterior glazing shall:
(i) Resist a single impact of a 9-mm, 147-grain bullet traveling at
an impact velocity of 900 feet per second, with no bullet penetration
or spall; and
(ii) Demonstrate anti-spalling performance by the use of a .001
aluminum witness plate, placed 12 inches from the glazing surface
during all impact tests. The witness plate shall contain no marks from
spalled glazing particles after any impact test.
(b) Each individual unit of glazing material shall be permanently
marked, prior to installation, in such a manner that the marking is
clearly visible after the material has been installed. The marking
shall include:
(1) The words ``FRA TYPE IH'' for end-facing glazing or ``FRA TYPE
IIH'' for side-facing glazing, to indicate that the material has
successfully passed the testing requirements of paragraph (a) of this
section;
(2) The name of the manufacturer; and
(3) The type or brand identification of the material.
(c) Glazing securement components shall hold the glazing in place
against the forces described in paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(3) of
this section.
(d) Glazing securement components shall be designed to resist the
forces due to air pressure differences caused when two trains pass at
the minimum separation for two adjacent tracks, while traveling in
opposite directions, each train traveling at the maximum authorized
speed.
(e) Interior equipment glazing shall meet the minimum requirements
of AS1 type laminated glass as defined in American National Standard
``Safety Code for Glazing Materials for Glazing Motor Vehicles
Operating on Land Highways,'' ASA Standard Z26.1-1966.
(f) Each vehicle that is fully equipped with glazing materials that
meet the requirements of paragraphs (a) through (e) of this section
shall be stencilled on an interior wall as follows: ``Fully Equipped
with FRA Part 238 Glazing'' or similar words conveying that meaning, in
letters at least \3/8\ of an inch high.

Sec. 238.423 Fuel tanks.

(a) External fuel tanks. (1) With all locomotive wheels resting on
the ties beside the rail, the lowest point of an external fuel tank
shall clear an 8\1/2\-inch combined height of the tie plate and rail by
a minimum of 1\1/2\ inches. (This requirement results in a minimum 10-
inch vertical distance from the lowest point on the wheel tread to the
lowest point on the external fuel tank.)
(2) The end bulkheads of external fuel tanks shall at a minimum be
equivalent to a 1-inch thick steel plate with a 25,000 pounds-per-
square-inch yield strength--material of a higher yield strength may be
used to decrease the required thickness of the material provided an
equivalent level of strength is maintained.
(3) The skin of external fuel tanks shall at a minimum be
equivalent to a \1/2\-inch thick steel plate with a 25,000 pounds-per-
square-inch yield strength--material of a higher yield strength may be
used to decrease the required thickness of the material provided an
equivalent level of strength is maintained.
(4) The material used for construction of external fuel tank
exterior surfaces shall not exhibit a decrease in yield strength or
penetration resistance in the temperature range of 0 to 160 degrees F.
(5) External fuel tank vent systems shall be designed to prevent
them from becoming a path of fuel loss in the event a tank is placed in
any orientation due to a locomotive overturning.
(6) The bottom surface of an external fuel tank shall be equipped
with skid surfaces to prevent sliding contact with the rail or the
ground from easily wearing through the tank.
(7) The structural strength of an external fuel tank shall be
adequate to support 1\1/2\ times the dead weight of the locomotive
without deformation of the tank.
(b) Internal fuel tanks. (1) Internal fuel tanks shall have their
lowest point at least 18 inches above the lowest point on the
locomotive wheel tread and shall be enclosed by, or shall be part of,
the locomotive structure.
(2) Internal fuel tank vent systems shall be designed to prevent
them from becoming a path of fuel loss in the event a tank is placed in
any orientation due to a locomotive overturning.
(3) Internal fuel tank bulkheads and skin shall at a minimum be
equivalent to a \3/8\-inch thick steel plate with a 25,000-pound yield
strength--material of a higher yield strength may be used to decrease
the required thickness of the material provided an equivalent level of
strength is maintained. Skid plates are not required.

Sec. 238.425 Electrical system.

(a) Circuit protection. (1) The main propulsion power line shall be
protected with a lightning arrestor, automatic circuit breaker, and
overload relay. The lightning arrestor shall be run by the most direct
path possible to ground with a connection to ground of not less than
No. 6 AWG. These overload protection devices shall be housed in an
enclosure designed specifically for that purpose with the arc chute
vented directly to outside air.
(2) Head end power, including trainline power distribution, shall
be provided with both overload and ground fault protection.
(3) Circuits used for purposes other than propelling the equipment
shall be connected to their power source through circuit breakers or
equivalent current-limiting devices.
(4) Each auxiliary circuit shall be provided with a circuit breaker
located as near as practical to the point of connection to the source
of power for that circuit; however, such protection may be omitted from
circuits controlling safety-critical devices.
(b) Main battery system. (1) The main batteries shall be isolated
from the cab and passenger seating areas by a non-combustible barrier.
(2) Battery chargers shall be designed to protect against
overcharging.
(3) Battery circuits shall include an emergency battery cut-off
switch to completely disconnect the energy stored in the batteries from
the load.
(4) If batteries are of the type to potentially vent explosive
gases, the batteries shall be adequately ventilated to prevent
accumulation of explosive concentrations of these gases.
(c) Power dissipation resistors. (1) Power dissipating resistors
shall be

[[Page 49818]]

adequately ventilated to prevent overheating under worst-case operating
conditions.
(2) Power dissipation grids shall be designed and installed with
sufficient isolation to prevent combustion between resistor elements
and combustible material.
(3) Power dissipation resistor circuits shall incorporate warning
or protective devices for low ventilation air flow, over-temperature,
and short circuit failures.
(4) Resistor elements shall be electrically insulated from resistor
frames, and the frames shall be electrically insulated from the
supports that hold them.
(d) Electromagnetic interference and compatibility. (1) The
operating railroad shall ensure electromagnetic compatibility of the
systems critical to the safety of equipment with their environment.
Electromagnetic compatibility can be achieved through equipment design
or changes to the operating environment.
(2) The electronic equipment shall not produce electrical noise
that interferes with trainline control and communications or with
wayside signaling systems.
(3) To contain electromagnetic interference emissions, suppression
of transients shall be at the source wherever possible.
(4) Electrical and electronic systems of equipment shall be capable
of operation in the presence of external electromagnetic noise sources.
(5) All electronic equipment shall be self-protected from damage or
improper operation, or both, due to high voltage transients and long-
term over-voltage or under-voltage conditions.

Sec. 238.427 Suspension system.

(a) General requirements. (1) Suspension systems shall be designed
to reasonably prevent wheel climb, wheel lift, rail rollover, rail
shift, and a vehicle from overturning to ensure safe, stable
performance and ride quality. These requirements shall be met in all
operating environments, and under all track conditions and loading
conditions as determined by the operating railroad. These requirements
shall be met at all track speeds and over all track qualities of track
consistent with the Track Safety Standards in part 213 of this chapter,
up to the maximum operating speed and maximum cant deficiency of the
equipment.
(2) Passenger equipment shall meet the safety performance standards
for suspension systems contained in Appendix C to this part or
alternative standards providing equivalent safety if approved by the
FRA Associate Administrator for Safety under the provisions of
Sec. 238.21.
(b) Lateral accelerations. Passenger cars shall not operate under
conditions that result in a steady-state lateral acceleration of 0.1g
(measured parallel to the car floor inside the passenger compartment)
or greater.
(c) Hunting oscillations. Each truck shall be equipped with a
permanently installed lateral accelerometer mounted on the truck frame.
The accelerometer output signals shall be calibrated and filtered, and
shall pass through signal conditioning circuitry designed to determine
if hunting oscillations of the truck are occurring. If hunting
oscillations are detected, the train monitoring system shall provide an
alarm to the operator, and the train shall be slowed to a speed 5 mph
less than the speed at which the hunting oscillations stopped.
(d) Ride vibration (quality). While traveling at the maximum
operating speed over the intended route, the train suspension system
shall be designed to:
(1) Limit the vertical acceleration, as measured by a vertical
accelerometer mounted on the car floor, to no greater than 0.55g single
event, peak-to-peak;
(2) Limit the lateral acceleration, as measured by a lateral
accelerometer mounted on the car floor, to no greater than 0.3g single
event, peak-to-peak; and
(3) Limit the combination of lateral acceleration (L) and vertical
acceleration (V) occurring within any time period of 2 consecutive
seconds as expressed by the square root of
(V²⁺^L2) to no greater than 0.604, where L may not
exceed 0.3g and V may not exceed 0.55g.
(e) Compliance. Compliance with the requirements contained in
paragraph (d) of this section shall be demonstrated during the
equipment pre-revenue service acceptance tests required under
Sec. 238.113 and [proposed] Sec. 213.345 of this chapter.
(f) Overheat sensors. Overheat sensors for each equipment bearing
shall be provided. The sensors may be on board or placed at reasonable
wayside intervals.

Sec. 238.429 Safety appliances.

(a) Couplers. (1) The leading and the trailing ends of semi-
permanently coupled trainsets shall be equipped with an automatic
coupler that couples on impact and uncouples by either activation of a
traditional uncoupling lever or some other type of uncoupling mechanism
that does not require a person to go between the equipment units.
(2) Automatic couplers and uncoupling devices on the leading and
trailing ends of semi-permanently coupled trainsets may be stored
within a removable shrouded housing.
(3) If the units in a train are not semi-permanently coupled, both
ends of each unit shall be equipped with an automatic coupler, that
couples on impact and uncouples by either activation of a traditional
uncoupling lever or some other type of uncoupling mechanism that does
not require a person to go between the equipment units.
(b) Hand brakes. Except as provided in paragraph (f) of this
section, Tier II trains shall be equipped with a parking or hand brake
that can be applied and released manually that is capable of holding
the train on a 3-percent grade.
(c) Safety appliance mechanical strength and fasteners.
(1) All handrails, handholds, and sill steps shall be made of 1-
inch diameter steel pipe or \5/8\-inch thickness steel or a material of
equal or greater mechanical strength.
(2) All safety appliances shall be securely fastened to the car
body structure with mechanical fasteners that have mechanical strength
greater than or equal to that of a \1/2\-inch diameter SAE steel bolt
mechanical fastener.
(i) Safety appliance mechanical fasteners shall have mechanical
strength and fatigue resistance equal to or greater than a \1/2\-inch
diameter SAE steel bolt.
(ii) Mechanical fasteners shall be installed with a positive means
to prevent unauthorized removal. Self-locking threaded fasteners do not
meet this requirement.
(iii) Mechanical fasteners shall be installed to facilitate
inspection.
(d) Handrails and handholds. Except as provided in paragraph (f) of
this section:
(1) Handrails shall be provided for passengers on both sides of all
steps used to board or depart the train.
(2) Exits on a power vehicle shall be equipped with handrails and
handholds so that crewmembers can get on and off the vehicle safely.
(3) Throughout their entire length, handrails and handholds shall
be a contrasting color to the surrounding vehicle body.
(4) The maximum distance above the top of the rail to the bottom of
vertical handrails and handholds shall be 51 inches and the minimum
distance shall be 21 inches.
(5) Vertical handrails and handholds shall be installed to continue
to a point at least equal to the height of the top edge of the control
cab door.

[[Page 49819]]

(6) The minimum hand clearance distance between a vertical handrail
or handhold and the vehicle body shall be 2\1/2\ inches for the entire
length.
(7) All vertical handrails and handholds shall be securely fastened
to the vehicle body.
(8) If the length of the handrail exceeds 60 inches, it shall be
securely fastened to the power vehicle body with two fasteners at each
end.
(e) Sill steps. Except as provided in paragraph (f) of this
section:
(1) Each power vehicle shall be equipped with a sill step below
each exterior door as follows:
(i) The sill step shall have a minimum cross-sectional area of \1/
2\ by 3 inches.
(ii) The sill step shall be made of steel or a material of equal or
greater strength and fatigue resistance.
(iii) The minimum tread length of the sill step shall be 10 inches.
(iv) The minimum clear depth of the sill step shall be 8 inches.
(v) The outside edge of the tread of the sill step shall be flush
with the side of the car body structure.
(vi) Sill steps shall not have a vertical rise between treads
exceeding 18 inches.
(vii) The lowest sill step tread shall be not more than 20 inches
above the top of the track rail.
(viii) Sill steps shall be a color which contrasts with the
surrounding power vehicle body color.
(ix) Sill steps shall be securely fastened.
(x) At least 50 percent of the tread surface area of each sill step
shall be open space.
(xi) The portion of the tread surface area of each sill step which
is not open space and is normally contacted by the foot shall be
treated with an anti-skid material.
(f) Exceptions.
(1) If the units of the equipment are semi-permanently coupled,
with uncoupling done only at maintenance facilities, the equipment
units that are not required by paragraph (a) of this section to be
equipped with automatic couplers need not be equipped with sill steps
or end or side handholds that would normally be used to safely perform
coupling and uncoupling operations.
(2) If the units of the equipment are not semi-permanently coupled,
the units shall be equipped with hand brakes, sill steps, end
handholds, and side handholds that meet the requirements contained in
Sec. 231.14 of this chapter.
(3) If two trainsets are coupled to form a single train that is not
semi-permanently coupled (i.e., that is coupled by an automatic
coupler), the automatically coupled ends shall be equipped with hand
brakes, sill steps, end handholds, and side handholds that meet the
requirements contained in Sec. 231.14 of this chapter. If the trainsets
are semi-permanently coupled, these safety appliances are not required.
(g) Optional safety appliances. Safety appliances installed at the
option of the railroad shall be firmly attached with mechanical
fasteners and shall meet the design and installation requirements
provided in this section.

Sec. 238.431 Brake system.

(a) A passenger train's brake system shall be capable of stopping
the train from its maximum operating speed within the signal spacing
existing on the track over which the train is operating under worst-
case adhesion conditions.
(b) The brake system shall be designed to allow an inspector to
determine that the brake system is functioning properly without having
to place himself or herself in a dangerous position on, under, or
between the equipment.
(c) Passenger equipment shall be provided with an emergency
application feature that produces an irretrievable stop, using a brake
rate consistent with prevailing adhesion, passenger safety, and brake
system thermal capacity. An emergency application shall be available at
any time, and shall be initiated by an unintentional parting of the
train. A means to initiate an emergency brake application shall be
provided at two locations in each unit of the train.
(d) The brake system shall be designed to prevent thermal damage to
wheels and brake discs. The operating railroad shall demonstrate
through analysis and test that no thermal damage results to the wheels
or brake discs under conditions resulting in maximum braking effort
being exerted on the wheels or discs.
(e) The following requirements apply to blended braking systems:
(1) Loss of power or failure of the dynamic brake does not result
in exceeding the allowable stop distance;
(2) The friction brake alone is adequate to safely stop the train
under all operating conditions;
(3) The operational status of the electric portion of the brake
system shall be displayed for the train operator in the control cab;
and
(4) The operating railroad shall demonstrate through analysis and
testing the maximum operating speed for safe operation of the train
using only the friction brake portion of the blended brake with no
thermal damage to wheels or discs.
(f) The brake system design shall allow a disabled train's
pneumatic brakes to be controlled by a conventional locomotive, during
rescue operation, through brake pipe control alone.
(g) An independent failure-detection system shall compare brake
commands with brake system output to determine if a failure has
occurred. The failure detection system shall report brake system
failures to the automated train monitoring system.
(h) Passenger equipment shall be provided with an adhesion control
system designed to automatically adjust the braking force on each wheel
to prevent sliding during braking. In the event of a failure of this
system to prevent wheel slide within preset parameters, a wheel slide
alarm that is visual or audible, or both, shall alert the train
operator in the cab of the controlling power car to wheel-slide
conditions on any axle of the train.

Sec. 238.433 Draft system.

(a) Leading and trailing automatic couplers of trains shall be
compatible with standard AAR couplers with no special adapters used.
(b) All passenger equipment continues to be subject to the
requirements concerning couplers and uncoupling devices contained in
Federal Statute at 49 U.S.C. chapter 203 and in FRA regulations at part
231 and Sec. 232.2 of this chapter.

Sec. 238.435 Interior fittings and surfaces.

(a) The seat back in a passenger car shall be designed to
withstand, with deflection but without total failure, the load of a
seat occupant who is a 95th-percentile male accelerated at 8g impacting
the seat back.
(b) The seat back in a passenger car shall include shock-absorbent
material to cushion the impact of occupants with the seat ahead of
them.
(c) The ultimate strength of a seat attachment to a passenger car
body shall be of sufficient strength to withstand the following
individually applied accelerations acting on the mass of the seat plus
the mass of a seat occupant who is a 95th-percentile male:
(1) Longitudinal: 8g;
(2) Lateral: 4g; and
(3) Vertical: 4g.
(d) Other interior fittings shall be attached to the passenger car
body with sufficient strength to withstand the following individually
applied accelerations acting on the mass of the fitting:
(1) Longitudinal: 8g;
(2) Lateral: 4g; and
(3) Vertical: 4g.

[[Page 49820]]

Fittings that can be expected to be impacted by a person during a
collision, such as tables between facing seats, shall be designed for
the mass of the fitting plus the mass of the number of occupants who
are 95th-percentile males that could be expected to strike the fitting.
(e) The ultimate strength of the interior fittings and equipment in
power car control cabs shall be sufficient to resist without failure
loads due to the following individually applied accelerations acting on
the mass of the fitting or equipment:
(1) Longitudinal: 12g;
(2) Lateral: 4g; and
(3) Vertical: 4g.
(f) To the extent possible, interior fittings, except seats, shall
be recessed or flush-mounted. Corners and sharp edges shall be avoided
or otherwise padded.
(g) Energy-absorbent material shall be used to pad surfaces likely
to be impacted by occupants during collisions or derailments.
(h) Luggage stowage compartments shall be of the enclosed, aircraft
type with ultimate strength sufficient to resist loads due to the
following individually applied accelerations acting on the mass of the
luggage that the compartments are designed to accommodate:
(1) Longitudinal: 8g;
(2) Lateral: 4g; and
(3) Vertical: 4g.

Sec. 238.437 Emergency communication.

A means of emergency communication throughout a train shall be
provided and shall include the following:
(a) Transmission locations that are clearly marked with luminescent
material at each end of each unit adjacent to the unit end doors;
(b) Clear and understandable operating instructions at or near each
transmission location; and
(c) Back-up power for a minimum time period of two hours.

Sec. 238.439 Emergency window exits and roof hatches.

(a) Emergency window exits. Except as provided in paragraphs (a)(3)
and (a)(4) of this section, each passenger car shall have a minimum of
four emergency window exits, either in a staggered configuration or
with one located at each end of each side of a passenger car.
(1) Each sealed emergency window exit on a passenger coach shall
have a minimum free opening of 30 inches horizontally by 30 inches
vertically.
(2) Each emergency window exit shall be easily operable by a 5th-
percentile female without requiring the use of a tool or other
implement.
(3) If the passenger car is bi-level, each main level shall have a
minimum of four emergency window exits, either in a staggered
configuration or with one located at each end of each side on each
level.
(4) Each passenger car of special design, such as a sleeping car,
shall have at least one emergency window exit in each compartment.
(b) Roof hatches. (1) Each power car cab shall have a minimum of
one roof hatch emergency entrance location with either a minimum
opening of 18 inches by 24 inches or a clearly marked structural weak
point in the roof to provide a minimum opening of the same dimensions
to provide quick access for properly equipped emergency personnel.
(2) Each passenger car shall be equipped with a minimum of two roof
hatch emergency entrance locations with either a minimum opening of 18
inches by 24 inches or two clearly marked structural weak points in the
roof to provide a minimum opening of the same dimensions to provide
quick access for properly equipped emergency personnel.
(c) Marking and instructions. [Reserved]

Sec. 238.441 Doors.

(a) Each passenger car shall have a minimum of four side doors, or
the functional equivalent of four side doors, each permitting at least
one 95th-percentile male to pass through at a single time.²
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\2\ The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Accessibility
Specifications for Transportation Vehicles also contain requirements
for doorway clearance (See Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part
38).
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(1) Each powered, exterior side door shall be equipped with a
manual override that is:
(i) Capable of opening the door without power from both inside and
outside the car;
(ii) Located adjacent to the door which it controls; and
(iii) Designed and maintained so that a person may access the
override device from both inside and outside the car without the use of
any tool or other implement.
(2) The status of each powered, exterior side door shall be
displayed to the crew in the operating cab. If door interlocks are
used, the sensors used to detect train motion shall be nominally set to
operate at 3 mph.
(b) Each powered, exterior side door shall be connected to an
emergency back-up power system.
(c) A railroad may protect a manual override device used to open a
powered, exterior door with a cover or a screen capable of removal by a
5th-percentile female without requiring the use of a tool or other
implement. If the method of removing the protective cover or screen
entails breaking or shattering it, the cover or screen shall be scored,
perforated, or otherwise weakened so that a 5th-percentile female can
penetrate the cover or screen with a single blow of her fist without
injury to her hand.
(d) Passenger compartment end doors shall be equipped with a kick-
out panel, pop-out window, or other similar means of egress in the
event the door will not open.
(e) Marking and instructions. [Reserved]

Sec. 238.443 Headlights.

Each power car shall be equipped with at least two headlights. Each
headlight shall produce no less than 200,000 candela. One headlight
shall be focused to illuminate a person standing between the rails at
800 feet under clear weather conditions. The other headlight shall be
focused to illuminate a person standing between the rails at 1500 feet
under clear weather conditions.

Sec. 238.445 Automated monitoring.

(a) Each passenger train shall be equipped to monitor the
performance of the following systems or components:
(1) Reception of cab signals and train control signals;
(2) Truck hunting;
(3) Dynamic brake status;
(4) Friction brake status;
(5) Fire detection systems;
(6) Head end power status;
(7) Alerter or deadman control;
(8) Horn and bell;
(9) Wheel slide;
(10) Tilt system, if so equipped; and
(11) On-board bearing-temperature sensors, if so equipped.
(b) The operator shall be alerted when any of the monitored
parameters are out of predetermined limits. In situations where the
system safety analysis indicates that operator-reaction time is crucial
to safety, immediate automatic corrective action such as limiting the
speed of the train shall be taken.
(c) The monitoring system shall be designed with an automatic self-
test feature that notifies the operator that the monitoring capability
is functioning correctly and alerts the operator that a system failure
has occurred.

Sec. 238.447 Operator's controls and cab layout.

(a) Operator controls in the power vehicle or control cab shall be
arranged

[[Page 49821]]

to be comfortably within view and within easy reach when the operator
is seated in the normal train control position.
(b) The control panels shall be laid out to minimize the chance of
human error.
(c) Control panel buttons, switches, levers, knobs, and the like
shall be distinguishable by sight and by touch.
(d) An alerter shall be provided. If not acknowledged, the alerter
shall cause a brake application to stop the train.
(e) Cab information displays shall be designed with the following
characteristics:
(1) Simplicity and standardization shall be the driving criteria
for design of formats for the display of information in the cab;
(2) Essential, safety-critical information shall be displayed as a
default condition;
(3) Operator selection shall be required to display other than
default information;
(4) Cab or train control signals shall be displayed for the
operator; and
(5) Displays shall be readable from the operators's normal position
under all lighting conditions.
(f) The cab layout shall be arranged to meet the following
requirements:
(1) The crew has an effective field of view in the forward
direction and to the right and left of the direction of travel;
(2) Field-of-view obstructions due to required structural members
are minimized; and
(3) The crew's position in the cab is located to permit the crew to
be able to directly observe traffic approaching the train from either
side of the train.
(g) Each seat provided for a crewmember shall be:
(1) Equipped with a single acting, quick-release lap belt and
shoulder harness as defined in Sec. 571.209 of this title;
(2) Secured to the car body with an attachment having an ultimate
strength capable of withstanding the loads due to the following
individually applied accelerations acting on the mass of the seat and
the crewmember occupying it:
(i) Longitudinal: 12g;
(ii) Lateral: 4g; and
(iii) Vertical: 4g;
(3) Designed so all adjustments have the range necessary to
accommodate a 5th-percentile female to a 95th-percentile male;
(4) Equipped with lumbar support that is adjustable from the seated
position;
(5) Equipped with force-assisted, vertical-height adjustment,
operated from the seated position;
(6) Equipped with a manually reclining seat back, adjustable from
the seated position;
(7) Equipped with an adjustable headrest; and
(8) Equipped with folding, padded armrests.
(h) Sharp edges and corners shall be eliminated from the interior
of the cab, and interior surfaces of the cab likely to be impacted by a
crewmember during a collision or derailment shall be padded with shock-
absorbent material.

Subpart F--Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements for
Tier II Passenger Equipment

Sec. 238.501 Scope.

This subpart contains inspection, testing, and maintenance
requirements for railroad passenger equipment that operates at speeds
exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 150 mph.

Sec. 238.503 Inspection, testing, and maintenance requirements.

(a) General. Under the procedures provided in Sec. 238.505, each
railroad shall obtain FRA approval of a written inspection, testing,
and maintenance program for Tier II passenger equipment prior to
implementation of that program and prior to commencing passenger
operations using that equipment. As further specified in this section,
the program shall describe in detail the procedures, equipment, and
other means necessary for the safe operation of the passenger
equipment, including:
(1) Safety inspection procedures, intervals, and criteria;
(2) Testing procedures and intervals;
(3) Scheduled preventive-maintenance intervals;
(4) Maintenance procedures;
(5) Special testing equipment or measuring devices required to
perform safety inspections and tests; and
(6) The training, qualification, and designation of employees and
contractors to perform safety inspections, tests, and maintenance.
(b) Compliance. After the railroad's inspection, testing, and
maintenance program is approved by FRA under Sec. 238.505, the railroad
shall adopt the program and shall perform--
(1) The inspections and tests of power brakes and other primary
brakes as described in the program;
(2) The other inspections and tests described in the program in
accordance with the procedures and criteria that the railroad
identified as safety-critical; and
(3) The maintenance tasks described in the program in accordance
with the procedures and intervals that the railroad identified as
safety-critical.
(c) General safety inspection, testing, and maintenance procedures.
The inspection, testing, and maintenance program under paragraph (a) of
this section shall contain the railroad's written procedures to ensure
that all systems and components of in service equipment are free of any
general condition that endangers the safety of the crew, passengers, or
equipment. These procedures shall protect against:
(1) A continuous accumulation of oil or grease;
(2) Improper functioning of a component;
(3) A crack, break, excessive wear, structural defect, or weakness
of a component;
(4) A leak;
(5) Use of a component or system under a condition that exceeds
that for which the component or system is designed to operate; and
(6) Insecure attachment of a component.
(d) Specific safety inspections. The program under paragraph (a) of
this section shall specify that all Tier II passenger equipment shall
receive thorough safety inspections in accordance with the following
standards:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (d)(3) of this section, the
equivalent of a Class I brake test contained in Sec. 238.313 shall be
conducted prior to a train's departure from an originating terminal and
every 1,500 miles or once each calendar day, whichever comes first,
that the train remains in continuous service.
(i) Class I equivalent brake tests shall be performed by qualified
mechanical inspectors.
(ii) Except as provided in Sec. 238.15(b), a railroad shall not use
or haul a Tier II passenger train in passenger service from a location
where a Class I equivalent brake test has been performed, or was
required by this part to have been performed, with less than 100
percent operative brakes.
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (d)(3) of this section, a
complete safety exterior and interior mechanical inspection, in
accordance with the railroad's inspection program, shall be conducted
by qualified mechanical inspectors at least once during each calendar
day the equipment is used in service.
(3) Trains that miss a scheduled Class I brake test or mechanical
inspection due to a delay en route may proceed to the point where the
Class I brake test or mechanical inspection was scheduled to be
performed.
(e) Movement of trains with power brake defects. Movement of trains
with

[[Page 49822]]

a power brake defect as defined in Sec. 238.15 (any primary brake
defect) shall be governed by Sec. 238.15.
(f) Movement of trains with other defects. Movement of trains that
with a defect other than a power brake defect shall be conducted in
accordance with Sec. 238.17, with the following exception. When a
failure of the secondary brake on a Tier II passenger train occurs en
route, that train may remain in service until its next scheduled
calendar day Class I brake test equivalent at a speed no greater than
the maximum safe operating speed demonstrated through analysis and
testing for braking with the friction brake alone. The brake system
shall be restored to 100 percent operation before the train departs
that inspection location.
(g) Maintenance intervals. The program under paragraph (a) of this
section shall include the railroad's initial scheduled maintenance
intervals for Tier II equipment based on an analysis completed as part
of the system safety program. The maintenance interval of a safety-
critical component shall be changed only when justified by accumulated,
verifiable operating data and approved by FRA's Associate Administrator
for Safety under Sec. 238.505 before the change takes effect.
(h) Training, qualification, and designation program. The program
under paragraph (a) of this section shall describe the training,
qualification, and designation program, as defined in the training
program plan under Sec. 238.111, established by the railroad to qualify
individuals to inspect, test, and maintain the equipment.
(1) If the railroad deems it safety-critical, then only qualified
individuals shall inspect, test, and maintain the equipment.
(2) Knowledge of the standard procedures described in paragraph (i)
of this section shall be required to qualify an employee or contractor
to perform an inspection, testing, or maintenance task under this part.
(i) Standard procedures for safely performing inspection, testing,
maintenance, or repairs. The program under paragraph (a) of this
section shall include the railroad's written standard procedures for
performing all safety-critical equipment inspection, testing,
maintenance, or repair tasks. These standard procedures shall:
(1) Describe in detail each step required to safely perform the
task;
(2) Describe the knowledge necessary to safely perform the task;
(3) Describe any precautions that must be taken to safely perform
the task;
(4) Describe the use of any safety equipment necessary to perform
the task;
(5) Be approved by the railroad's chief mechanical officer;
(6) Be approved by the railroad's official responsible for safety;
(7) Be enforced by supervisors with responsibility for
accomplishing the tasks; and
(8) Be reviewed annually by the railroad.
(j) Quality control program. Each railroad shall establish an
inspection, testing, and maintenance quality control program enforced
by railroad or contractor supervisors to reasonably ensure that
inspections, tests, and maintenance are performed in accordance with
Federal safety standards and the procedures established by the
railroad.
(k) Identification of safety-critical items. In the program under
paragraph (a) of this section, the railroad shall identify all
inspection and testing procedures and criteria as well as all
maintenance intervals that the railroad deems to be safety-critical.

Sec. 238.505 Program approval procedure.

(a) Submission. Not less than 90 days prior to commencing passenger
operations using Tier II passenger equipment, each railroad to which
this subpart applies shall submit for approval an inspection, testing,
and maintenance program for that equipment meeting the requirements of
this subpart with the Associate Administrator for Safety, Federal
Railroad Administration, 400 7th Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590.
If a railroad seeks to amend an approved program, the railroad shall
file with FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety a petition for
approval of such amendment not less than 60 days prior to the proposed
effective date of the amendment. A program responsive to the
requirements of this subpart or any amendment to the program shall not
be implemented prior to FRA approval.
(1) Each program or amendment under Sec. 238.503 shall contain:
(i) The information prescribed in Sec. 238.503 for such program or
amendment;
(ii) The name, title, address, and telephone number of the primary
person to be contacted with regard to review of the program or
amendment; and
(iii) A statement affirming that the railroad has served a copy of
the program or amendment on designated representatives of railroad
employees, together with a list of the names and addresses of persons
served.
(2) Each railroad shall serve a copy of each submission to FRA on
designated representatives of railroad employees responsible for the
equipment's operation, inspection, testing, and maintenance under this
subpart.
(b) Comment. Not later than 45 days from the date of filing the
program or amendment, any person may comment on the program or
amendment.
(1) Each comment shall set forth specifically the basis upon which
it is made, and contain a concise statement of the interest of the
commenter in the proceeding.
(2) Three copies of each comment shall be submitted to the
Associate Administrator for Safety, Federal Railroad Administration,
400 7th Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590.
(3) The commenter shall certify that a copy of the comment was
served on the railroad.
(c) Approval. (1) Within 60 days of receipt of each initial
inspection, testing, and maintenance program, FRA will conduct a formal
review of the program. FRA will then notify the primary railroad
contact person and the designated employee representatives in writing
whether the inspection, testing, and maintenance program is approved
and, if not approved, the specific points in which the program is
deficient. If a program is not approved by FRA, the railroad shall
amend its program to correct all deficiencies and resubmit its program
with the required revisions not later than 45 days prior to commencing
passenger operations.
(2) FRA will review each proposed amendment to the program within
45 days of receipt. FRA will then notify the primary railroad contact
person and the designated employee representatives in writing whether
the proposed amendment has been approved by FRA and, if not approved,
the specific points in which the proposed amendment is deficient. The
railroad shall correct any deficiencies and file the corrected
amendment prior to implementing the amendment.
(3) Following initial approval of a program or amendment, FRA may
reopen consideration of the program or amendment for cause stated.

Subpart G--Introduction of New Technology to Tier II Passenger
Equipment

Sec. 238.601 Scope.

This subpart contains general requirements for introducing new
technology that affects a safety system of existing Tier II passenger
equipment. For purposes of this subpart, ``existing Tier II passenger
equipment'' is Tier II

[[Page 49823]]

passenger equipment that has been approved for revenue service by the
FRA Associate Administrator for Safety under the procedures of
Sec. 238.21.

Sec. 238.603 Process to introduce new technology.

(a) If a railroad plans a major upgrade or introduction of new
technology on existing Tier II passenger equipment, as defined in
Sec. 238.601, that affects the performance of a safety system on such
equipment, such major upgrade or introduction of new technology shall
be designed and implemented using the system safety process prescribed
in Sec. 238.101.
(b) Under the procedures of Sec. 238.21, each railroad shall obtain
special approval from the FRA Associate Administrator for Safety of a
pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan, under Sec. 238.113, for
existing Tier II passenger equipment with a major upgrade or new
technology that affects the performance of a safety system on such
equipment, prior to implementing the plan. ``New passenger equipment,''
for purposes of Sec. 238.113, includes existing Tier II passenger
equipment with such a major upgrade or new technology.
(c) Each railroad shall complete a pre-revenue service
demonstration of such passenger equipment described in paragraph (b) of
this section in accordance with the approved plan, shall fulfill all of
the other requirements prescribed in Sec. 238.113, and shall obtain
special approval from the FRA Associate Administrator for Safety under
the procedures of Sec. 238.21 prior to using such passenger equipment
in revenue service.

Appendix A to Part 238--Schedule of Civil Penalties [Reserved]

Appendix B to Part 238--Test Performance Criteria for the
Flammability and Smoke Emission Characteristics of Materials Used
in Constructing or Refurbishing Locomotive Cab and Passenger Car
Interiors

This appendix provides the performance standards for testing the
flammability and smoke emission characteristics of materials used in
constructing or refurbishing locomotive cab and passenger car
interiors, in accordance with the requirements of Sec. 238.115.
(a) Definitions.
Critical radiant flux (CRF) means, as defined in ASTM E-648, a
measure of the behavior of horizontally-mounted floor covering
systems exposed to a flaming ignition source in a graded radiant
heat energy environment in a test chamber.
Flame spread index (Is) means, as defined in ASTM E-
162, a factor derived from the rate of progress of the flame front
(Fs) and the rate of heat liberation by the material
under test (Q), such that Is = Fs x Q.
Specific optical density (Ds) means, as defined in
ASTM E-662, the optical density measured over unit path length
within a chamber of unit volume, produced from a specimen of unit
surface area, that is irradiated by a heat flux of 2.5 watts/
cm² for a specified period of time.
Surface flammability means the rate at which flames will travel
along surfaces.
Flaming running means continuous flaming material leaving the
site of material burning or material installation.
Flaming dripping means periodic dripping of flaming material
from the site of material burning or material installation.
(b) Required test procedures and performance criteria.
The materials used in locomotive cabs and passenger cars shall
be tested according to the procedures and performance criteria set
forth in the following table. In all instances, the most recent
version of the test procedures or the revision in effect at the time
a vehicle is ordered should be employed in the evaluation of the
materials specified.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Function of material Test procedure Performance criteria
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger seats, Sleeping and Cushions, Mattresses ASTM D-3675 IS 25
dining car components. ^{1, ^{2, ^{5, ^{9. ASTM E-662 DS (1.5)
100; DS (4.0) 175
Seat and/or Mattress ASTM E-162 IS 35
Frame ^{1, ^{5, ^{8. ASTM E-662 DS (1.5)
100; DS (4.0) 200
Seat and Toilet ASTM E-162 IS 35
Shroud, Food Trays ^{1, ASTM E-662 DS (1.5)
^{5. 100; DS (4.0) 200
Seat Upholstery, FAR 25.853 (Vertical) Flame Time 10 sec.; Burn
Covers, Curtains ^{1, length 6
^{2, ^{3, ^{5. inch
DS (4.0)
250 coated; DS (4.0)
100
uncoated
Panels............................. Wall ^{1, ^{5, ^{10......... ASTM E-162 IS 35
ASTM E-662 DS (1.5)
100; DS (4.0) 200
Ceiling ^{1, ^{5, ^{10...... ASTM E-162 IS 35
ASTM E-662 DS (1.5)
100; DS (4.0) 200
Partition, Tables and ASTM E-162 IS 35
Shelves ^{1, ^{5. ASTM E-662 DS (1.5)
100; DS (4.0) 200
Windscreen ^{1, ^{5....... ASTM E-162 IS 35
ASTM E-662 DS (1.5)
100; DS (4.0) 200
HVAC Ducting ^{1, ^{5..... ASTM E-162 IS 35
ASTM E-662 DS (1.5)
100
Window ^{4, ^{5........... ASTM E-162 IS 100
ASTM E-662 DS (1.5)
100; DS (4.0) 200
Light Diffuser ^{5...... ASTM E-162 IS 100
ASTM E-662 DS (1.5)
100; DS (4.0) 200
Flooring........................... Structural ^{6.......... ASTM E-119 Pass
Covering ^{7, ^{10........ ASTM E-648 CRF 0.5 w/
ASTM E-662 cm ^{2
DS (1.5 )
100; DS (4.0) 200
Insulation......................... Thermal ^{1, ^{2, ^{5....... ASTM E-162 IS 25
ASTM E-662 DS (1.5)
100
Acoustic ^{1, ^{2, ^{5...... ASTM E-162 IS 25
ASTM E-662 DS (1.5)
100
Elastomers......................... Window Gaskets, Door ASTM C-542 Pass
Nosing, Diaphragms, ASTM E-662 DS (1.5)
Roof Mat. ^{1. 100; DS (4.0) 200
Exterior Plastic Components........ End Cap, Roof Housings ASTM E-162 IS 35
^{1, ^{5. ASTM E-662 DS (1.5)
100; DS (4.0) 200

[[Page 49824]]

Component Box Covers............... Interior, Exterior ASTM E-162 IS 35
Boxes^{1, ^{3, ^{5. ASTM E-662 DS (1.5)
100; DS (4.0) 200
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Materials tested for surface flammability must not exhibit
any flaming running or flaming dripping.
2. The surface flammability and smoke emission characteristics
must be demonstrated to be permanent by washing, if appropriate,
according to FED-STD-191A Textile Test Method 5830.
3. The surface flammability and smoke emission characteristics
must be demonstrated to be permanent by dry-cleaning, if
appropriate, according to ASTM D-2724. Materials that cannot be
washed or dry cleaned must be so labeled and meet the applicable
performance criteria after being cleaned as recommended by the
manufacturer.
4. For double window glazing, only the interior glazing must
meet the materials requirements specified herein; the exterior need
not meet those requirements.
5. ASTM E-662 maximum test limits for smoke emission (specified
optical density) must be measured in either the flaming or non-
flaming mode, depending on which mode generates the most smoke.
6. Structural flooring assemblies must meet the performance
criteria during a nominal test period determined by the railroad
property. The nominal test period must be twice the maximum expected
period of time, under normal circumstances, for a vehicle to come to
a complete, safe stop from maximum speed, plus the time necessary to
evacuate all passengers from a vehicle to a safe area. The nominal
test period must not be less than 15 minutes. Only one specimen need
be tested. A proportional reduction may be made in the dimensions of
the specimen provided that it represents a true test of its ability
to perform as a barrier against under-car fires. Penetrations
(ducts, etc.) must be designed against acting as passageways for
fire and smoke.
7. Floor covering must be tested in accordance with ASTM E-648
with its padding, if the padding is used in actual installation.
8. Arm rests, if foamed plastic, are tested as cushions and, if
hard material, are tested as a seat back shroud.
9. Testing is performed without upholstery.
10. Carpeting on walls and ceilings is to be considered wall and
ceiling panel materials, respectively.
(c) The sources of test procedures specified in the table are as
follows:
(1) Leaching Resistance of Cloth, FED-STD-191A-Textile Test
Method 5830. (Available from: General Services Administration
Specifications Division, Building 197 Washington Navy Yard,
Washington, D.C. 20407.)
(2) Federal Aviation Administration Vertical Burn Test, FAR-
25.853.
(3) American Society for Testing Materials (ASTM):
(i) Specification for Gaskets, ASTM C-542.
(ii) Surface Flammability of Flexible Cellular Materials Using a
Radiant Heat Energy Source, ASTM D-3675.
(iii) Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials, ASTM E-
119.
(iv) Surface Flammability of Materials Using a Radiant Heat
Energy Source, STM E-162.
(v) Bonded and Laminated Apparel Fabrics, ASTM D-2724.
(vi) Critical Radiant Flux of Floor Covering Systems Using a
Radiant Heat Energy Source, ASTM E-648.
(vii) Specific Optical Density of Smoke Generated by Solid
Materials, STM E-662.
(Available from: American Society for Testing Materials, 1916
Race Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103.)

Appendix C to Part 238--Suspension System Safety Performance
Standards

This appendix contains the minimum suspension system safety
performance standards for Tier II passenger equipment as required by
Sec. 238.427. These requirements shall be the basis for evaluating
suspension system safety performance until an industry standard
acceptable to FRA is developed and approved under the procedures
provided in Sec. 238.21.
Passenger equipment suspension systems shall be designed to
limit the lateral and vertical forces and lateral to vertical (L/V)
ratios, for the time duration required to travel six feet at any
operating speed or over any class of track, under all operating
conditions as determined by the railroad, as follows:
1. The maximum single wheel lateral to vertical force (L/V)
ratio shall not exceed Nadal's limit as follows:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP23SE97.006

where: =flange angle (deg).
=coefficient of friction of 0.5.

2. The net axle lateral force shall not exceed 0.5 times the
static vertical axle load.
3. The vertical wheel/rail force shall be greater than 10
percent of the static vertical wheel load.
4. The sum of the vertical wheel loads on one side of any truck
shall be greater than 20 percent of the static vertical axle load.
This shall include the effect of a crosswind allowance as specified
by the railroad for the intended service.
5. The maximum truck side L/V ratio shall not exceed 0.5.
6. When stopped on track with a uniform 6-inch superelevation,
vertical wheel loads, at all wheels, shall be greater than 60
percent of the nominal vertical wheel load on level track.

Issued in Washington, D.C., on September 12, 1997.
Jolene M. Molitoris,
Federal Railroad Administrator.
[FR Doc. 97-24713 Filed 9-22-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}