[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 181 (Thursday, September 18, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 49047-49048]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-24967]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration


Notice of Safety Advisory

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of safety advisory.

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SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 97-3 addressing safety 
practices to reduce the risk of accidents arising from the 
authorization of train movements past stop indications of absolute 
signals.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dennis Yachechak, Operating Practices 
Specialist, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, FRA, 400 Seventh 
Street, SW., RRS-11, Mail Stop 25, Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202-
632-3370), or Nancy L. Goldman, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief 
Counsel, FRA, 400 Seventh Street, SW., RCC-12, Mail Stop 10, 
Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202-632-3167).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A fatal head-on collision between a Union 
Pacific Railroad Company (UP) freight train and an unattended, runaway 
UP locomotive consist near Fort Worth, Texas, on August 20, 1997, has 
caused FRA to focus on railroad operating rules and procedures 
pertaining to protection against conflicting train movements when train 
dispatchers and control operators authorize movements past a stop 
indication of an absolute signal.
    FRA and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) are 
investigating the accident. FRA has also initiated an in-depth and 
comprehensive analysis of train dispatcher procedures employed by UP. 
FRA inspection teams are on UP's property to conduct safety assurance 
reviews on all aspects of the issue. The facts and findings developed 
in the investigations will be published when the individual 
investigations are complete.
    The collision occurred in single track, centralized traffic control 
(CTC) territory. Preliminary FRA findings indicate that an unoccupied 
UP locomotive consist unintentionally rolled out of a controlled siding 
eastward onto a main track. A UP dispatcher noticed on his computer 
screen that the siding switch was out of correspondence, and that the 
main track segment beyond the switch was occupied. At least three 
times, the dispatcher radioed the runaway light locomotive consist, in 
an attempt to contact a crewmember. Not getting a response, the 
dispatcher then contacted a signal maintainer. Meanwhile, a UP control 
operator at Fort Worth, authorized a westbound freight train to pass a 
stop indication of an absolute signal at the west end of Centennial 
Yard in Fort Worth, and proceed onto the main track at restricted 
speed. Subsequently, the runaway light locomotive consist struck the 
westbound freight train at a speed of approximately 60 miles per hour. 
The UP engineer and engineer pilot were killed, and the UP conductor 
was seriously injured.

Operating Practices

    FRA rules require each railroad to periodically instruct its 
employees on the meaning and application of the railroad's operating 
rules (49 CFR 217.11), and also require each railroad to periodically 
conduct operational tests and inspections to determine the extent of 
compliance with its code of operating rules, timetables, and timetable 
special instructions (49 CFR 217.9).
    UP train dispatcher rule 20.6 pertains to movements in adjoining 
territories and requires that, ``Train dispatchers must not issue track 
warrants, track bulletins, or instructions or take any action that may 
affect safe train operation on another train dispatcher's territory 
unless the dispatchers reach an understanding.'' Rule 9.12.1 of the 
General Code of Operating Rules pertains to CTC Territory and requires 
that, ``At a signal displaying a Stop indication, if no conflicting 
movement is evident, the train will be governed as follows: Before 
authorizing the train to proceed, the control operator must know that 
the route is properly lined and no conflicting movement is occupying or 
authorized to enter the track between that signal and the next absolute 
signal governing movement or the end of CTC where applicable.''
    Initial findings of the FRA investigation of the collision 
indicate, in part, that the train dispatcher and control operator did 
not communicate with each other as to the cause of the stop indication 
on the absolute signal at the west end of Centennial Yard. It appears 
that the train dispatcher did not contact the control operator of the 
adjoining territory and inform him of the track occupancy. Likewise, it 
appears that the control operator did not verify the cause of the stop 
indication by determining whether a conflicting movement was occupying 
the track segment between that signal and the next absolute signal 
governing movement, before authorizing the westbound train to pass the 
stop indication.

Recommended Action

    FRA believes that the likelihood of further accidents, such as the 
one that occurred on the UP on August 20, 1997, would be greatly 
reduced by the inclusion of certain additional measures into the 
railroads' operating procedures. Therefore, FRA recommends that:
    1. As soon as possible, but preferably within seven calendar days 
of the date of publication of this Safety Advisory in the Federal 
Register, each railroad should:
    (a) Ensure that a railroad operating supervisor personally contacts 
each train dispatcher and control operator responsible for controlling 
train

[[Page 49048]]

movements, and in a face-to-face meeting:
    (i) Informs them of the circumstances surrounding the UP accident 
described above;
    (ii) Reemphasizes the importance of complying with existing 
operating rules and procedures pertaining to the authorization of train 
or engine movements past a stop indication; and
    (iii) Reemphasizes rules and procedures that ensure that train 
dispatchers and control operators, dispatchers and other dispatchers, 
or control operators and other control operators are communicating with 
each other and with enough specificity to prevent conflicting 
movements. FRA recommends that such one-time face-to-face meetings be 
held in addition to the periodic instruction required by 49 CFR 217.11.
    (b) Review train dispatcher and control operator procedures in 
order to determine if any gaps exist, particularly as they relate to 
necessary communication with adjoining territories.
    (c) Revise operating rules and train dispatcher procedures as 
needed to assure that gaps do not exist.
    2. As part of the tests and inspections required by 49 C.F.R. 
217.9, each railroad should conduct operational tests and inspections 
to ensure compliance with operating rules and train dispatcher/control 
operator procedures pertaining to authorization to pass a stop 
indication and dispatcher/control operator communication.
    FRA may modify Safety Advisory 97-3, issue additional safety 
advisories, or take other appropriate necessary action to ensure the 
highest level of safety on the Nation's railroads.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on September 15, 1997.
Edward R. English,
Director, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance.
[FR Doc. 97-24967 Filed 9-17-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P