[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 181 (Thursday, September 18, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 49047-49048]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-24967]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
Notice of Safety Advisory
AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of safety advisory.
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SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 97-3 addressing safety
practices to reduce the risk of accidents arising from the
authorization of train movements past stop indications of absolute
signals.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dennis Yachechak, Operating Practices
Specialist, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, FRA, 400 Seventh
Street, SW., RRS-11, Mail Stop 25, Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202-
632-3370), or Nancy L. Goldman, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief
Counsel, FRA, 400 Seventh Street, SW., RCC-12, Mail Stop 10,
Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202-632-3167).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A fatal head-on collision between a Union
Pacific Railroad Company (UP) freight train and an unattended, runaway
UP locomotive consist near Fort Worth, Texas, on August 20, 1997, has
caused FRA to focus on railroad operating rules and procedures
pertaining to protection against conflicting train movements when train
dispatchers and control operators authorize movements past a stop
indication of an absolute signal.
FRA and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) are
investigating the accident. FRA has also initiated an in-depth and
comprehensive analysis of train dispatcher procedures employed by UP.
FRA inspection teams are on UP's property to conduct safety assurance
reviews on all aspects of the issue. The facts and findings developed
in the investigations will be published when the individual
investigations are complete.
The collision occurred in single track, centralized traffic control
(CTC) territory. Preliminary FRA findings indicate that an unoccupied
UP locomotive consist unintentionally rolled out of a controlled siding
eastward onto a main track. A UP dispatcher noticed on his computer
screen that the siding switch was out of correspondence, and that the
main track segment beyond the switch was occupied. At least three
times, the dispatcher radioed the runaway light locomotive consist, in
an attempt to contact a crewmember. Not getting a response, the
dispatcher then contacted a signal maintainer. Meanwhile, a UP control
operator at Fort Worth, authorized a westbound freight train to pass a
stop indication of an absolute signal at the west end of Centennial
Yard in Fort Worth, and proceed onto the main track at restricted
speed. Subsequently, the runaway light locomotive consist struck the
westbound freight train at a speed of approximately 60 miles per hour.
The UP engineer and engineer pilot were killed, and the UP conductor
was seriously injured.
Operating Practices
FRA rules require each railroad to periodically instruct its
employees on the meaning and application of the railroad's operating
rules (49 CFR 217.11), and also require each railroad to periodically
conduct operational tests and inspections to determine the extent of
compliance with its code of operating rules, timetables, and timetable
special instructions (49 CFR 217.9).
UP train dispatcher rule 20.6 pertains to movements in adjoining
territories and requires that, ``Train dispatchers must not issue track
warrants, track bulletins, or instructions or take any action that may
affect safe train operation on another train dispatcher's territory
unless the dispatchers reach an understanding.'' Rule 9.12.1 of the
General Code of Operating Rules pertains to CTC Territory and requires
that, ``At a signal displaying a Stop indication, if no conflicting
movement is evident, the train will be governed as follows: Before
authorizing the train to proceed, the control operator must know that
the route is properly lined and no conflicting movement is occupying or
authorized to enter the track between that signal and the next absolute
signal governing movement or the end of CTC where applicable.''
Initial findings of the FRA investigation of the collision
indicate, in part, that the train dispatcher and control operator did
not communicate with each other as to the cause of the stop indication
on the absolute signal at the west end of Centennial Yard. It appears
that the train dispatcher did not contact the control operator of the
adjoining territory and inform him of the track occupancy. Likewise, it
appears that the control operator did not verify the cause of the stop
indication by determining whether a conflicting movement was occupying
the track segment between that signal and the next absolute signal
governing movement, before authorizing the westbound train to pass the
stop indication.
Recommended Action
FRA believes that the likelihood of further accidents, such as the
one that occurred on the UP on August 20, 1997, would be greatly
reduced by the inclusion of certain additional measures into the
railroads' operating procedures. Therefore, FRA recommends that:
1. As soon as possible, but preferably within seven calendar days
of the date of publication of this Safety Advisory in the Federal
Register, each railroad should:
(a) Ensure that a railroad operating supervisor personally contacts
each train dispatcher and control operator responsible for controlling
train
[[Page 49048]]
movements, and in a face-to-face meeting:
(i) Informs them of the circumstances surrounding the UP accident
described above;
(ii) Reemphasizes the importance of complying with existing
operating rules and procedures pertaining to the authorization of train
or engine movements past a stop indication; and
(iii) Reemphasizes rules and procedures that ensure that train
dispatchers and control operators, dispatchers and other dispatchers,
or control operators and other control operators are communicating with
each other and with enough specificity to prevent conflicting
movements. FRA recommends that such one-time face-to-face meetings be
held in addition to the periodic instruction required by 49 CFR 217.11.
(b) Review train dispatcher and control operator procedures in
order to determine if any gaps exist, particularly as they relate to
necessary communication with adjoining territories.
(c) Revise operating rules and train dispatcher procedures as
needed to assure that gaps do not exist.
2. As part of the tests and inspections required by 49 C.F.R.
217.9, each railroad should conduct operational tests and inspections
to ensure compliance with operating rules and train dispatcher/control
operator procedures pertaining to authorization to pass a stop
indication and dispatcher/control operator communication.
FRA may modify Safety Advisory 97-3, issue additional safety
advisories, or take other appropriate necessary action to ensure the
highest level of safety on the Nation's railroads.
Issued in Washington, DC, on September 15, 1997.
Edward R. English,
Director, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance.
[FR Doc. 97-24967 Filed 9-17-97; 8:45 am]
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