[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 178 (Monday, September 15, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 48318-48320]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-24380]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket 70-7002]


Notice of Amendment to Certificate of Compliance GDP-2 for the 
U.S. Enrichment Corporation (Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, 
Portsmouth, Ohio)

    The Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, has 
made a determination that the following amendment request is not 
significant in accordance with 10 CFR 76.45. In making that 
determination the staff concluded that (1) there is no change in the 
types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may 
be released offsite; (2) there is no significant increase in individual 
or cumulative occupational radiation exposure; (3) there is no 
significant construction impact; (4) there is no significant increase 
in the potential for, or radiological or chemical consequences from, 
previously analyzed accidents; (5) the proposed changes do not result 
in the possibility of a new or different kind of accident; (6) there is 
no significant reduction in any margin of safety; and (7) the proposed 
changes will not result in an overall decrease in the effectiveness of 
the plant's safety, safeguards or security programs. The basis for this 
determination for the amendment request is shown below.
    The NRC staff has reviewed the certificate amendment application 
and concluded that it provides reasonable assurance of adequate safety, 
safeguards, and security, and compliance with NRC requirements. 
Therefore, the Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and 
Safeguards, is prepared to issue an amendment to the Certificate of 
Compliance for the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant. The staff has 
prepared a Compliance Evaluation Report which provides details of the 
staff's evaluation.
    The NRC staff has determined that this amendment satisfies the 
criteria for a categorical exclusion in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22. 
Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact 
statement or environmental assessment need be prepared for this 
amendment.
    USEC or any person whose interest may be affected may file a 
petition, not exceeding 30 pages, requesting review

[[Page 48319]]

of the Director's Decision. The petition must be filed with the 
Commission not later than 15 days after publication of this Federal 
Register Notice. A petition for review of the Director's Decision shall 
set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner and how 
that interest may be affected by the results of the decision. The 
petition should specifically explain the reasons why review of the 
Decision should be permitted with particular reference to the following 
factors: (1) the interest of the petitioner; (2) how that interest may 
be affected by the Decision, including the reasons why the petitioner 
should be permitted a review of the Decision; and (3) the petitioner's 
areas of concern about the activity that is the subject matter of the 
Decision. Any person described in this paragraph (USEC or any person 
who filed a petition) may file a response to any petition for review, 
not to exceed 30 pages, within 10 days after filing of the petition. If 
no petition is received within the designated 15-day period, the 
Director will issue the final amendment to the Certificate of 
Compliance without further delay. If a petition for review is received, 
the decision on the amendment application will become final in 60 days, 
unless the Commission grants the petition for review or otherwise acts 
within 60 days after publication of this Federal Register Notice.
    A petition for review must be filed with the Secretary of the 
Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001, Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, or may be 
delivered to the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW, Washington, DC, by the above date.
    For further details with respect to the action see (1) the 
application for amendment and (2) the Commission's Compliance 
Evaluation Report. These items are available for public inspection at 
the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L 
Street, NW, Washington, DC, and at the Local Public Document Room.
    Date of amendment request: May 16, 1997.
    Brief description of amendment: The proposed amendment reduces the 
minimum depth design feature requirement for Borosilicate glass Raschig 
rings (neutron poison) from 12 inches to 6 inches in Scale Pits 1A and 
2 as stated in Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) 2.5.4.4 entitled 
``Scale Pit Raschig Rings,'' for the Extended Range Product (ERP) 
facility at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant. The proposed 
amendment request is required to allow proper operation of the scale 
mechanism at the ERP 1A station. The request for reduction of the 
minimum depth of Raschig rings for ERP 2 station is to maintain 
consistency of administrative control on this neutron poison parameter.
    Basis for finding of no significance: 1. The proposed amendment 
will not result in a change in the types or significant increase in the 
amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite.
    Borosilicate glass Raschig rings are contained in ERP Scale Pits 1A 
and 2 as enhancements to other primary criticality controls. 
Modification to the minimum depth requirement would not result in 
significantly increasing the potential for unconfinement of 
UF6 which could lead to an increase in effluents that may be 
released offsite. On the contrary, retaining the required Raschig rings 
depth at ERP 1A station to at least 12 inches may cause improper 
operation of the scale which performs the safety function of measuring 
cylinder weight. When heated for sampling or some other purpose, an 
overfilled cylinder could rupture and release a large quantity of 
UF6.
    2. The proposed amendment will not result in a significant increase 
in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
    Based on the staff's review of the adequacy of contingency analysis 
for all credible process upsets, reliability of controls, and adequacy 
of control independence (common-mode failures), the staff has 
determined that the proposed amendment will not significantly increase 
the risk of a criticality accident. The basis for the staff's 
conclusion is based on the following controls and requirements:
    a. To maintain the integrity of the UF6 pressure 
boundary, which provides geometry and mass control, USEC is committed 
to applying appropriate quality assurance requirements to process gas 
piping and equipment (including valves).
    b. To provide moderation control, scale pits are inspected weekly 
for the presence of liquids. Any liquid found, is transferred out of 
the scale pits appropriately.
    c. Maximum uranium enrichment of ten percent is ensured by the use 
of in-line gamma and mass spectrometers or via samples if the 
spectrometers are not operational.
    d. Raschig rings in the scale pits are inspected for settling and 
damage at least on an annual basis. USEC is also committed to 
maintaining the Raschig rings according to other requirements of ANSI/
ANS-8.5 entitled ``Use of Borosilicate-glass Raschig Rings as a Neutron 
Absorber in Solutions of Fissile Material.''
    e. The scale pits are required to be maintained free of uranium 
buildup.
    f. To prevent recirculating cooling water (RCW), which can act as a 
moderator, from entering the coolant system, the pressure of the RCW is 
maintained at least 5 psi lower than the coolant system. A pressure 
switch is provided to automatically trip the UF6 withdrawal 
compressor if this minimum pressure differential requirement is not 
maintained.
    g. Smoke detectors are provided in ERP to monitor for 
UF6 releases. A UF6 out-leakage detection system 
has the capability of automatically isolating the pigtail if two smoke 
detector heads detect smoke at the withdrawal station. When these smoke 
detectors are not operational, a smoke watch is maintained. The pigtail 
isolation system can also be manually actuated from outside ERP.
    h. The maximum UF6 pressure at the ERP station is 
maintained below 60 psia.
    i. Prior to withdrawing UF6 into a product cylinder, a 
cold pressure check of the cylinder is performed. The cylinder is 
rejected if the pressure is greater than ten inches of mercury which 
provides indication of the probable presence of moderator or a 
hydrocarbon which can explosively react with UF6. The 
cylinder is also visually inspected for damage and weighed before being 
attached to the pigtail.
    j. The staff independently reviewed and found acceptable, USEC's 
assumptions and calculations leading to the conclusion that for a large 
UF6 release in ERP, the heat generated by the exothermic 
reaction of UF6 with water vapor in ERP will not be 
sufficient to actuate the sprinkler system which could introduce 
moderator into the scale pits.
    k. There is a specific coolant pressure TSR Safety Limit (SL) of 
440 psig. The purpose of this limit is to prevent the over 
pressurization and rupture of the coolant system which could result in 
the subsequent release of UF6 due to over pressurization and 
subsequent rupture of the UF6 containment boundary.
    l. There are specific TSR Limiting Conditions of Operation (LCOs), 
Action Statements for conditions where LCOs are exceeded, and 
Surveillance Requirements (SRs), dealing with (1) minimum number of 
operable smoke detectors/alarms to detect and indicate a release of 
UF6; (2) coolant high pressure relief to ensure that the TSR 
SL

[[Page 48320]]

of 440 psig is not exceeded; (3) pigtail isolation system to limit the 
UF6 release to less than 127 pounds in case of a pigtail 
failure; (4) assay monitoring to ensure that the TSR specified maximum 
assays for the accumulators and cylinders are not exceeded; (5) 
cylinder cart movement restrictions to ensure that a cylinder is not 
moved while it is connected to the withdrawal manifold; (6) liquid 
UF6 cylinder movement methods and restrictions to minimize 
the risk of a liquid UF6 cylinder drop and rupture; (7) 
UF6 cylinder weight monitoring to ensure that the TSR 
specified fill weights are not exceeded; and (8) restrictions on 
heating solidified UF6 plugs to prevent pipe rupture that 
could be caused by local liquefaction and expansion.
    m. There are specific general design feature requirements and 
associated SRs related to (1) design, construction, testing and 
maintenance to ensure that the intended functions of UF6 
cylinders and pigtails are met so that they do not fail during normal 
operations; (2) cylinder lifting cranes and fixtures to ensure that a 
cylinder is not dropped and ruptured; and (3) Raschig rings in scale 
pits to enhance criticality safety.
Consequently, there will be no significant increase in a risk of a 
criticality accident which could significantly increase individual or 
cumulative occupational radiation exposures.
    3. The proposed amendment will not result in a significant 
construction impact.
    The proposed amendment does not involve any construction, 
therefore, there will be no construction impacts.
    4. The proposed amendment will not result in a significant increase 
in the potential for, or radiological or chemical consequences from, 
previously analyzed accidents.
    For similar reasons (adequacy of contingencies, reliability of 
controls, and unlikelihood of common-mode failures) provided in the 
assessment of criterion 2, the proposed amendment will not 
significantly increase the risk of a criticality accident. Therefore, 
the proposed amendment will not significantly increase the potential 
for, or radiological or chemical consequences from, previously analyzed 
accidents.
    5. The proposed amendment will not result in the possibility of a 
new or different kind of accident.
    Based on the adequacy of contingencies, reliability of controls, 
and unlikelihood of common-mode failures provided in the assessment of 
criterion 2, the NRC staff has determined that the proposed amendment 
will not result in the possibility of a new or different kind of 
accident.
    6. The proposed amendment will not result in a significant 
reduction in any margin of safety.
    For similar reasons (adequacy of contingencies, reliability of 
controls, and unlikelihood of common-mode failures) provided in the 
assessment of criterion 2, the proposed amendment will not 
significantly increase the risk of a criticality accident. In addition, 
the amendment is required to ensure proper operability of the ERP 1A 
scale, which performs the safety function of measuring the weight of 
the cylinder as it is being filled. Properly and safely weighing the 
cylinder is necessary to ensure safety of the facility. Therefore, the 
proposed amendment will not result in a significant reduction in any 
margin of safety.
    7. The proposed amendment will not result in an overall decrease in 
the effectiveness of the plant's safety, safeguards or security 
programs.
    For similar reasons (adequacy of contingencies, reliability of 
controls, unlikelihood of common-mode failures, and operability of ERP 
1A scale) provided in the assessment of criteria 2 and 6, the proposed 
amendment will not significantly increase the risk of a criticality or 
UF6 release accident. Therefore, the proposed amendment will 
not result in a decrease in the plant's overall safety program.
    The staff has not identified any safeguards or security related 
implications from the proposed amendment. Therefore, the proposed 
amendment will not result in an overall decrease in the effectiveness 
of the plants safeguards or security programs.
    Effective date: The amendment to GDP-2 will become effective 30 
days after issuance by NRC.
    Certificate of Compliance No. GDP-2: Amendment will incorporate a 
revised requirement of a General Design Feature contained in the 
Technical Safety Requirements.
    Local Public Document Room location: Portsmouth Public Library, 
1220 Gallia Street, Portsmouth, Ohio 45662.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 2nd day of September 1997.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
William F. Kane,
Acting Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and 
Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 97-24380 Filed 9-12-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P