[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 160 (Tuesday, August 19, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 44153-44154]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-21896]



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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-271]


In the Matter of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation 
(Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station); Exemption

I

    The Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (VYNPC, the licensee) 
is the holder of Facility Operating License No. DPR-28, which 
authorizes operation of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (the 
facility) at power levels no greater than 1593 megawatts thermal. The 
facility is a single-unit boiling-water reactor located at the 
licensee's site in Windham County, Vermont.
    The License provides, among other things, that the Vermont Yankee 
Nuclear Power Station is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders 
of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) now or hereafter 
in effect.

II

    On November 19, 1980, the Commission published a revised Section 10 
CFR 50.48 and a new Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 regarding fire 
protection features of nuclear power plants. The revised Section 50.48 
and Appendix R became effective on February 17, 1981. Section III of 
Appendix R contains 15 subsections, lettered A through O, each of which 
specifies requirements for a particular aspect of the fire protection 
features at a nuclear power plant.
    Sections III.G and III.L are the subject of the licensee's 
exemption request. Section III.G.3 specifies that fire detection and 
suppression be installed in areas using alternative safe shutdown. Low 
fire loadings and fire paths clear of combustibles in fire zones RB-1, 
RB-2, RB-3, and RB-4 diminish the importance of full fire detection and 
suppression capability in these fire zones. Section III.L.1.(c) 
requires that alternative and dedicated shutdown capability be able to 
achieve and maintain hot shutdown. Use of the automatic 
depressurization system (ADS), which is proposed by the licensee, 
requires cooling below hot shutdown temperatures, contrary to Section 
III.L.1.(c). Section III.L.2.b requires that coolant level be 
maintained above the top of the core, which is not possible with the 
licensee's proposed use of the ADS and low pressure injection systems 
(either core spray [CS] or low-pressure injection system) to achieve 
and maintain hot shutdown.
    The licensee requested an exemption from these requirements to 
allow the use of the ADS in conjunction with low-pressure injection 
systems as a means of achieving post-fire safe-shutdown conditions in 
fire zones RB-1, RB-2, RB-3, and RB-4 when offsite power is not 
available.
    Section III.L.3 requires that alternative shutdown capability 
accommodate conditions where offsite power is not available for 72 
hours. Onsite power can be restored to service in 30 minutes. Two 
offsite power sources exist in addition to the Vernon tie-line, which 
can be placed in service in 10 minutes. Without the Vernon tie-line, 
which is actually off site, the plant cannot accommodate conditions in 
the first 30 minutes following loss of offsite power.
    The licensee requested an exemption to allow the use of the Vernon 
tie-line as an alternative to the onsite emergency diesel generator for 
fire events involving the control room, the cable spreading room, and 
fire zones RB-1, RB-2, RB-3, and RB-4 when offsite power is not 
available.

III

    By letter dated April 4, 1996, as supplemented by letters dated May 
21, 1996, November 4, 1996, December 13, 1996, January 8, 1996 (sic 
[1997]), January 15, 1997, February 19, 1997, May 16, 1997, and August 
7, 1997, VYNPC, the licensee for Vermont Yankee, requested exemptions 
from certain technical requirements of Section III.G and Section III.L 
of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.
    The licensee requested exemptions (1) from the technical 
requirements of Section III.G.1.a and Section III.L.2 of Appendix R to 
allow the use of the ADS in conjunction with low-pressure injection 
systems (either CS or low-pressure coolant injection [LPCI]) as a means 
of achieving post-fire safe shutdown conditions in reactor building 
fire zones RB-1, RB-2, RB-3, and RB-4; (2) from the technical 
requirements of Section III.L.3 of Appendix R to allow the use of the 
Vernon tie-line as an alternative to the onsite emergency diesel 
generator for fire events involving the control room, the cable 
spreading room, and fire zones RB-1, RB-2, RB-3, and RB-4 when offsite 
power is not available; and (3) from the technical requirements of 
Section III.G.3 of Appendix R to the extent that it requires that fire 
detection and fixed fire suppression be provided in areas for which an 
alternative safe-shutdown capability is provided for fire zones RB-1, 
RB-2, RB-3, and RB-4.
    On the basis of the NRC staff's evaluation, and contingent on the 
installation of additional fire detection capability (as the licensee 
committed to in its submittal of January 15, 1997, and May 16, 1997), 
the staff concluded that the detection and suppression capabilities for 
fire zones RB-1, RB-2, RB-3, and RB-4 are adequate to protect against 
fire hazards in the zones. The staff concluded further that a 
postulated fire in reactor building fire zones RB-1, RB-2, RB-3, and 
RB-4 would not prevent the operators from achieving and maintaining 
safe shutdown. Therefore, contingent on the installation of the 
additional fire detection capability in fire zone RB-4, the licensee 
should be granted an exemption from Section III.G.3 of Appendix R to 10 
CFR Part 50 for reactor building fire zones RB-1, RB-2, RB-3, and RB-4.
    On the bases of the technical evaluation contained in the appended 
Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) technical evaluation report (TER), 
and the NRC staff's evaluation of the Vermont Yankee fire protection 
capabilities, the staff concluded that the licensee's revised shutdown 
strategy for reactor building fire zones RB-1, RB-2, RB-3, and RB-4 
(use of ADS with either LPCI or CS) and the redesignation of these fire 
zones as areas requiring an alternative shutdown capability provide an 
acceptable level of safe-shutdown protection. In addition, on the basis 
of the technical evaluation contained in the BNL TER, the staff 
concluded that the Vernon tie line provides an acceptable alternative 
to power from an onsite emergency diesel generator when normal sources 
of offsite power are not available for (1) a fire in the control room 
or the cable spreading room that forces control room evacuation and (2) 
a fire in reactor building fire zones RB-1, RB-2, RB-3, or RB-4 that 
requires the use of the alternative post-fire safe-shutdown strategy. 
Therefore, exemptions should be granted for Sections III.L.1.(c), 
III.L.2.b, and III.L.3 of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.

IV

    Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2), the Commission will not consider 
granting an exemption unless special circumstances are present. Item 
(ii) of the subject regulation includes special circumstances in which 
application of the subject regulation would not serve the underlying 
purpose of the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying 
purpose of the rule.
    The underlying purpose of Section III.G of Appendix R is to provide 
fire protection of equipment necessary for

[[Page 44154]]

safe-shutdown capability. On the basis of the NRC staff's evaluation 
above and contingent on the installation of additional fire detection 
capability (as the licensee committed to in its submittals of January 
15, 1997, and May 16, 1997), the staff concluded that the detection and 
suppression capabilities for fire zones RB-1, RB-2, RB-3, and RB-4 are 
adequate to protect against the fire hazards in the zones. The staff 
concluded further that a postulated fire in reactor building fire zones 
RB-1, RB-2, RB-3, or RB-4 would not prevent the operators from 
achieving and maintaining safe shutdown. Therefore, contingent on the 
installation of the additional fire detection capability in fire zone 
RB-4, the staff concludes that an exemption should be granted from 
Section III.G.3 of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 for reactor building 
fire zones RB-1, RB-2, RB-3, and RB-4. Accordingly, the Commission has 
determined that pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), special 
circumstances exist for the licensee's requested exemption in that 
imposition of the literal requirements of the regulation in these 
particular circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying 
purpose of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.
    The underlying purpose of Section III.L of Appendix R is to provide 
alternative and dedicated shutdown capability necessary in areas in 
which the fire protection features cannot ensure safe-shutdown 
capability in the event of a fire in that area. On the bases of the 
technical evaluation contained in the appended BNL TER and the NRC 
staff evaluation of the Vermont Yankee fire protection capabilities, 
the staff concluded that the licensee's revised shutdown strategy for 
reactor building fire zones RB-1, RB-2, RB-3, and RB-4 (use of ADS with 
either LPCI or CS) and the redesignation of these fire zones as areas 
requiring an alternative shutdown capability provide an acceptable 
level of safe-shutdown protection. In addition, on the basis of the 
technical evaluation contained in the appended BNL TER, the staff 
concluded that the Vernon tie-line provides an acceptable alternative 
to power from an onsite emergency diesel generator when normal sources 
of offsite power are not available for (1) a fire in the control room 
or the cable spreading room that forces control room evacuation and (2) 
for a fire in reactor building fire zones RB-1, RB-2, RB-3, and RB-4 
that requires the use of the alternative post-fire safe-shutdown 
strategy. Therefore, the staff concludes that exemptions should be 
granted for Sections III.L.1.(c), III.L.2.b, and III.L.3 of Appendix R 
to 10 CFR Part 50. Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, 
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), special circumstances exist in that 
the proposed exemptions to III.L.1(c), III.L.2.b and III.L.3 satisfy 
the underlying purpose of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 and that 
imposition of the literal requirements of the regulation in these 
particular circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying 
purpose of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.
    Further, the staff has concluded that the requested exemption is 
authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health and 
safety, and is consistent with the common defense and security. 
Therefore, contingent upon the addition of additional fire detection 
capability (as the licensee agreed to in its submittals of January 15, 
1997 and May 16, 1997) by December 31, 1997, and contingent upon one 
continuous fire watch monitoring both fire zones RB-3 and RB-4 until 
installation of the additional fire detection capability, the 
Commission hereby grants the request for exemption from the 
requirements of Sections III.G.3, III.L.1(c), III.L.2.b, and III.L.3 of 
Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 described in Section III above.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the 
issuance of this exemption will have no significant impact on the 
quality of the human environment (62 FR 30356).
    This exemption is effective upon issuance.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 12th day of August 1997.

    For The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Collins,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 97-21896 Filed 8-18-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P