[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 160 (Tuesday, August 19, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 44138-44146]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-21855]
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Antitrust Division
United States v. Allied Waste Industries, Inc.; Proposed Final
Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement
Notice is hereby given pursuant to the Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. Secs. 16 (b) through (h), that a Complaint,
Stipulation and Order and a proposed Final Judgment, an Amended
Complaint, Notice of Filing an Amended Complaint and proposed Final
Judgment, and a Competitive Impact Statement have been filed with the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Fort
Worth Division in United States and State of Texas v. Allied Waste
Industries, Inc., Civil Action No. 497-CV 564 E.
On July 14, 1997, the United States and State of Texas filed a
Complaint naming Allied Waste Industries, Inc. and USA Waste Services,
Inc. as defendants. On July 15, 1997, a Stipulation and Order were
filed and entered along with a proposed Final Judgment. Pursuant to the
Stipulation and Order, an Amended Complaint, and an amended proposed
Final Judgment both of which dropped USA Waste Service, Inc. as a
defendant, were filed on July 29, 1997. A Competitive Impact Statement
was also filed on July 29, 1997. The Complaint and Amended Complaint
alleged that the proposed acquisition by Allied Waste Industries, Inc.
(``Allied'') of the Crow Landfill in Tarrant County, Texas from USA
Waste Services, Inc. would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. Sec. 18. The amended proposed Final Judgment, filed the same
time as the Amended Complaint, requires Allied to, among other things,
to divest more than 1.4 million cubic yards of landfill space over a
five-to-ten year period at the two landfills Allied will own in the
Tarrant County area after the acquisition; to accept waste at each of
the two Allied
[[Page 44139]]
landfills in the Tarrant County area from haulers not affiliated with
Allied on non-price terms and conditions identical to those provided to
Allied; and to sell additional landfill space in the event that Allied
expands its capacity at the Crow Landfill or develops a new landfill
near the Crow Landfill within the next ten years.
Public comment is invited within the statutory 60-day comment
period. Such comments and response thereto will be published in the
Federal Register and filed with the Court. Comments should be directed
to J. Robert Kramer, Chief, Litigation II Section, Antitrust Division,
United States Department of Justice, 1401 H Street, NW, Suite 3000,
Washington, DC 20530 (telephone: 202-307-0924).
Copies of the Complaint, Stipulation and Order, Amended Complaint,
Notice of Filing Amended Complaint and Proposed Final Judgment, the
proposed Final Judgment, and the Competitive Impact Statement are
available for inspection in Room 215 of the U.S. Department of Justice,
Antitrust Division, 325 7th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20530, (202)
514-2841. Copies for these materials may be obtained upon request and
payment of a copying fee.
Constance K. Robinson,
Director of Operations.
United States District Court, Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth
Division
United States of America and State of Texas, Plaintiffs, v.
Allied Waste Industries, Inc., and USA Waste Services, Inc.
Defendants. Civil Action No.: 497-CV-564 E.
Stipulation and Order
It is stipulated by and between the undersigned parties, through
their respective attorneys, that:
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this
action and over each of the parties hereto, and venue of this action is
proper in the Northern District of Texas.
2. The parties consent that a Final Judgment in the form hereto
attached may be filed and entered by the Court, upon the motion of any
party or upon the Court's own motion, at any time after compliance with
the requirements of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act (15
U.S.C. Sec. 16(b)-(h)), and without further notice to any party or
other proceedings, provided that plaintiff United States has not
withdrawn its consent, which it may do at any time before the entry of
the proposed Final Judgment by serving notice thereof on defendants and
by filing that notice with the Court.
3. The defendants shall abide by and comply with the provisions of
the proposed Final Judgment pending entry of the Final Judgment, or
until expiration of time for all appeals of any court ruling declining
entry of the proposed Final Judgment and shall, from the date of the
signing of this Stipulation, comply with all the terms and provisions
of the proposed Final Judgment thereof as though the same were in full
force and effect as an order of the Court.
4. This Stipulation shall apply with equal force and effect to any
amended proposed Final Judgment agreed upon in writing by the parties
and submitted to the Court. In the event that, as contemplated by
defendants, the assets which are the subject of the Complaint and
proposed Final Judgment (``the Crow Landfill'') are transferred by
defendant USA Waste Services, Inc. (``USA Waste'') to defendant Allied
Waste Industries, Inc. (``Allied'') subsequent to the Court entering
this Stipulation and prior to the entry of the attached Final Judgment,
than an amended Complaint and amended proposed Final Judgment which do
not name USA Waste as a defendant in either pleading shall be filed
herein and submitted to the Court.
5. In the event plaintiff United States withdraws its consent, as
provided in paragraph 2 above, or if the proposed Final Judgment is not
entered pursuant to this Stipulation, the time has expired for all
appeals of any Court ruling declining entry of the Final Judgment, and
if the Court has not otherwise ordered continued compliance with the
terms and provisions of the Final Judgment, then the parties are
released from all further obligations under this Stipulation, and the
making of this Stipulation shall be without prejudice to any party in
this or any other proceeding.
6. Allied represents that the divestiture ordered in the proposed
Final Judgment can and will be made, and that it will later raise no
claims of hardship or difficulty as grounds for asking the court to
modify any of the divestiture provisions contained therein.
7. The parties request that the Court acknowledge the terms of this
Stipulation by entering the Order in this pleading. Respectfully
submitted.
For Plaintiff United States of America:
Joel I. Klien,
Acting Assistant Attorney General.
Donna E. Patterson,
Counselor to the Assistant Attorney General.
Charles E. Biggo,
Senior Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General.
Constance K. Robinson,
Director of Operations.
J. Robert Kramer II,
PA Bar #23963.
Willie L. Hudgins,
DC Bar #37127.
David R. Bickel.
DC Bar #393409.
Michael K. Hammaker,
DC Bar #233684
Attorneys, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 1401 H St.,
N.W., Suite 3000, Washington, D.C. 20530, (202) 307-0924, (202) 307-
6283 (Facsimile)
Paul E. Coggins,
United States Attorney.
Marc W. Barta,
TX Bar #01838200, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Northern District of Texas,
801 Cherry Street, Ste. 1700, Fort Worth, TX 76102-6897, (817) 978-
3291, (817) 978-6351 (Facsimile)
Dated: July 14, 1997.
For Plaintiff State of Texas:
Dan Morales,
Attorney General of Texas.
Jorge Vega,
First Assistant Attorney General.
Laquita A. Hamilton,
Deputy Attorney General for Litigation.
Paul Elliott,
Chief Consumer Protection Division.
Mark Tobey,
Assistant Attorney General, Chief Antitrust Section.
Amy R. Krasner,
Assistant Attorney General, TX Bar #00791050.
Office of the Attorney General of Texas, P.O. Box 12548, Austin, TX
78711-2548, (512) 463-2185, (512) 320-0975
Dated: July 14, 1997.
For Defendant USA Waste Services, Inc.:
James R. Weiss,
DC Bar #379798, Preston Gates Ellis & Rouvelas Meeds LLP, Suite 500,
1735 New York Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20006-5209, (202) 662-8400,
(202) 789-0988 (Facsimile)
Attorneys for USA Waste Services, Inc.
Date: July 11, 1997.
James D. McCarthy,
TX Bar #13367700, Hughes & Luce, 1717 Main Street, Suite 2800, Dallas,
TX 75201, (214) 939-5441, (213) 939-6100 (Facsimile)
Local Counsel for USA Waste Services, Inc.
Date: July 14, 1997.
[[Page 44140]]
For Defendant Allied Waste Industries, Inc.:
Tom D. Smith,
DC Bar #221986, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Metropolitan Square, 1450 G
Street, NW., Washington, DC 20005-2088, (202) 879-3900, (202) 737-2832
(Facsimile)
Attorneys for Allied Waste Industries, Inc.
Date: July 11, 1997.
Thomas R. Jackson,
TX Bar #10496700, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, 2300 Trammel Crow Center,
2001 Ross Avenue, Dallas, TX 75202-2958, (214) 220-3939, (214) 969-5100
(Facsimile)
Local Counsel For Allied Waste Industries, Inc.
Date: July 11, 1997.
Upon Review of this Stipulation by the parties, the Court
acknowledges by this Order that the parties have consented to the terms
specified in this Stipulation and the entry of the Final Judgment
subject to the provisions of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act
(15 U.S.C. Sec. 16 (b)--(h)).
So ordered on this 15th day of July, 1997.
Eldon B. Mahon,
United States District Court Judge.
Certification of Service
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing has been served upon
the attorneys for USA Waste Services, Inc., the attorneys for Allied
Waste Industries, Inc, and the Office of the Attorney General of the
State of Texas, by placing a copy in the U.S. Mail, directed to each of
the above-named parties at the addresses given below, this 14th day of
July, 1997.
USA Waste Services, Inc., c/o James R. Weiss, Preston, Gates, Suite
500, 1735 New York Ave., NW., Washington, DC 20006
USA Waste Services, Inc., c/o James D. McCarthy, Hughes & Luce, 1717
Main Street, Suite 2800, Dallas, TX 75201
Allied Waste Industries, Inc., c/o Tom D. Smith, Jones, Day, Reavis, &
Pogue, Metropolitan Square, 1450 G Street, NW., Washington, DC 20005-
2088
Allied Waste Industries, Inc., c/o Thomas R. Jackson, Jones, Day,
Reavis & Pogue, 2300 Trammel Crow Center, 2001 Ross Avenue, Dallas, TX
75202-2598
State of Texas: Amy Krasner, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Section, Office of the Attorney General of Texas, P.O. Box 12548,
Austin, TX 78711-2548
David R. Bickel,
Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 1401 H
Street, N.W., Suite 3000, Washington, D.C. 20530, (202) 307-0924, (202)
307-6283 (Facsimile).
United States District Court, Northern District of Texas, Forth Worth
Division
United States of America and State of Texas, Plaintiffs, v.
Allied Waste Industries, Inc. Defendant. Civil Action No.: 497-CV
564 E. Filed 7/29/97.
Final Judgment
Whereas, plaintiffs, United States of America (``United States'')
and the State of Texas (``Texas''), having filed their Complaint herein
on July 11, 1997, and Amended Complaint on July 29, 1997, and
plaintiffs and defendant Allied Waste Industries, Inc. (``Allied''), by
its attorneys, having consented to the entry of this Final Judgment
without trial or adjudication of any issue of fact or law herein, and
without this Final Judgment constituting any evidence against or an
admission by any party with respect to any issue of law or fact herein;
And Whereas, defendant Allied has agreed to be bound by the
provisions of this Final Judgment pending its approval by the Court;
And Whereas, prompt and certain divestiture of certain assets to
assure that competition is not substantially lessened is the essence of
this agreement;
And Whereas, the parties intend to require Allied to divest
Airspace Assets as specified herein;
And Whereas, defendant has represented to plaintiffs that the
divestiture required below can and will be made and that Allied will
later raise no claims of hardship or difficulty as grounds for asking
the Court to modify any of the terms contained below;
Now, Therefore, before the taking of any testimony, and without
trial or adjudication of any issue of fact or law herein, and upon
consent of the parties hereto, it is hereby Ordered, Adjudged, and
Decreed as follows:
I. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action
and over each of the parties hereto. The Complaint states a claim upon
which relief may be granted against the defendant under Section 7 of
the Clayton Act, as amended (15 U.S.C. Sec. 18).
II. Definitions
As used in this Final Judgment:
A. ``Allied'' means defendant Allied Waste Industries, Inc., a
Delaware corporation with its headquarters in Phoenix, Arizona, and its
successors and assigns, their subsidiaries, affiliates, directors,
officers, managers, agents and employees.
B. ``USA Waste'' means USA Waste Services, Inc., a Delaware
corporation with its headquarters in Houston, Texas, and its successors
and assigns, their subsidiaries, affiliates, directors, officers,
managers, agents and employees.
C. ``Tarrant County Area'' means the Texas counties of Tarrant,
Johnson and Denton.
D. ``Crow Landfill'' means that landfill also known as the Fort
Worth Landfill and located in Tarrant County at 7797 Confederate Park
Road, Fort Worth, Texas 76108.
E. ``Turkey Creek Landfill'' means that landfill located in Johnson
County at Interstate 35 West and Exit 21, P.O. Drawer 0, Alvarado,
Texas 76009.
F. ``Airspace Assets'' means the assets to be divested by Allied in
this Final Judgment. The term means the right to dispose (1) over a
five-year period, beginning on the date of the divestiture, or the life
of the Crow Landfill, whichever is longer, of up to a total of 880,000
cubic yards of waste, measured at the gate house, at the Crow Landfill,
and (2) over a ten-year period, beginning on the date of the
divestiture, of up to a total of 560,000 cubic yards of waste at the
Turkey Creek Landfill. The disposal volumes specified at each landfill
shall be subject to modification in accordance with the provisions of
Sections IV.D(3) and IV.D(4) herein. The aggregate airspace rights at
the Crow Landfill and the Turkey Creek Landfill may be divided and sold
to separate purchasers. In addition, the airspace rights at each
landfill may be sold to more than one purchaser. In any single year,
the purchaser(s) of the airspace rights may not dispose of more than
the Maximum Annual Disposal amount specified in Section II.G.
G. ``Maximum Annual Disposal'' means the maximum amount the
purchaser of the airspace rights may dispose of in one year at the Crow
or Turkey Creek Landfills under an agreement to purchase Airspace
Assets. Based on the total cubic yards specified in Section II.F, the
``Maximum Annual Disposal'' is 275,000 cubic yards at the Crow Landfill
and 125,000 cubic yards at the Turkey Creek Landfill, plus any
increases in the Airspace Assets due to the inclusion of additional
space as required by Sections IV.B, IV.D(3) and IV.D(4). If more than
one company purchases the Airspace Assets at the Crow Landfill, the
Maximum Annual Disposal for each purchaser shall be
[[Page 44141]]
specified in the respective purchase agreement, and the collective
total of all purchasers' Maximum Annual Disposals at the Crow Landfill
shall be no less than 275,000 cubic yards. If more than one company
purchases the Airspace Assets at the Turkey Creek Landfill, the Maximum
Annual Disposal for each purchaser shall be specified in the respective
purchase agreement, and the collective total of all purchasers' Maximum
Annual Disposals at the Turkey Creek Landfill shall be no less than
125,000 cubic yards.
H. ``Independent Hauler'' means any private company (other than
Waste Management of North America, Inc. (``WMI''), Waste Management,
Incorporated (``WMX'') or Allied) or municipality that provides waste
hauling service in the Tarrant County Area.
III. Applicability
A. The provisions of this Final Judgment apply to the defendant
Allied, its successors and assignees, its subsidiaries, affiliates,
directors, officers, managers, agents, and employees, and all other
persons in active concert or participation with any of them who shall
have received actual notice of this Final Judgment by personal service
or otherwise.
B. Allied shall require, as a condition of the sale or other
disposition of all or substantially or all of its assets, or of a
business unit that includes Allied's disposal business in the Tarrant
County Area, that the acquiring party or parties agree to be bound by
the provisions of this Final Judgment.
IV. Divestiture of Assets and Other Terms
A. Allied is hereby ordered and directed, within one hundred twenty
(120) days from the filing of the Complaint in this matter, or within
five (5) days after notice of the entry of this Final Judgment by the
Court, whichever is later, to divest the Airspace Assets as specified
in Section II.F to a firm which is acceptable to the United States, in
its sole determination, after consultation with Texas. Allied is
further ordered and directed to notify plaintiffs in writing
immediately when they have completed the divestitures.
B. Following the date of divestiture, Allied shall maintain
detailed records, subject to inspection by the United States and Texas
in accordance with the provisions of Section IX.
C. If Allied closes the Crow Landfill during the term of any
agreement to purchase Airspace Assets applicable to the Crow Landfill,
Allied shall meet its obligations under each purchase agreement for
Airspace Assets by providing equivalent space at the Turkey Creek
Landfill. The space at the Turkey Creek Landfill shall be provided
under the same terms and conditions which were previously available to
the purchaser(s) at the Crow Landfill, or, at the purchaser's option,
under those disposal terms and conditions previously available to the
purchasers of the Airspace Assets at the Turkey Creek Landfill.
D. Allied is hereby ordered and directed to comply with the
following obligations:
(1) Assurance of Space Letters. Allied will supply, in a timely
manner, any Independent Hauler with a letter assuring a municipality
that the hauler can dispose of that municipality's waste in Allied's
Crow or Turkey Creek Landfills.
(2) Nondiscrimination. Allied agrees that (a) for any hauler or
municipality it has agreed to accept waste from at either the Crow or
Turkey Creek Landfills, and (b) for each purchaser of Airspace Assets
or such persons designated by the purchaser to dispose of waste at the
Crow or Turkey Creek Landfills, it will operate that landfill, gate,
scale house, and disposal area under terms and conditions no less
favorable than those provided to Allied's vehicles or to the vehicles
of any municipality in the Tarrant County Area, except as to price and
credit terms.
(3) Additional Airspace Assets. If Allied obtains a permit within
ten years to expand the Crow Landfill or to develop a new landfill
adjacent to the Crow Landfill, it agrees to sell 20% of the expanded
capacity to the existing Airspace Assets purchaser(s) at rates agreed
to in the original purchase agreement for airspace assets. If the
purchaser(s) does not buy the Additional Airspace Assets, Allied agrees
to offer those assets for sale in the same manner it sold the original
Airspace Assets.
(4) Airspace Asset Minimums. The amounts of waste to be divested
under the sale of the Airspace Assets are minimums and are based on
cubic yards measured at the gate. If the actual remaining capacity at
the Crow Landfill is greater than the original estimate of 4.4 million
gate yards, Allied shall offer to sell (a) at the Crow Landfill, 20% of
the remaining disposal capacity in excess of 4.4 million gate yards,
and (b) at the Turkey Creek Landfill, 10% of the remaining disposal
capacity in excess of 4.4 million gate yards, to the purchaser(s) of
the Airspace Assets at the rates and terms specified in each purchase
agreement for the Airspace Assets.
(5) Approval. Allied will not re-purchase any portion of the
Airspace Assets without approval from the Department of Justice, in its
sole determination, after consultation with Texas.
E. As part of the sale of the Airspace Assets, Allied will include
an agreement to accept waste from each purchaser or such persons
designated by the purchaser to dispose of waste at the Crow Landfill or
the Turkey Creek Landfill.
F. Unless the United States, after consultation with Texas,
otherwise consents in writing, divestiture under Section IV.A, or by
the trustee appointed pursuant to Section V, shall be accomplished in
such a way as to satisfy the United States, in its sole determination
after consultation with Texas, that the Airspace Assets can and will be
used by the purchaser as part of a viable, ongoing business engaged in
solid waste disposal in the Tarrant County Area. The divestiture made
by Allied under Section IV.A or by the trustee under Section V.A shall
be made (1) to a purchaser or purchasers that, in the sole judgment of
the United States, has or have the capability and intent of competing
effectively in the Tarrant County Area, and (2) has or have the
managerial, operational, and financial capability to compete
effectively in solid waste disposal in the Tarrant County Area.
G. In accomplishing the divestitures ordered by this Final
Judgment, Allied promptly shall make known, by usual and customary
means, the availability of the Airspace Assets described in this Final
Judgment. Allied shall inform any person making an inquiry regarding a
possible purchase that the sale is being made pursuant to this Final
Judgment and provide such person with a copy of this Final Judgment.
Allied shall also offer to furnish to all bona fide prospective
purchasers, subject to customary confidentiality assurances, all
information regarding the Airspace Assets customarily provided in a due
diligence process except such information subject to attorney-client or
work-product privileges. Allied shall make available such information
to plaintiffs at the same time such information is made available to
any other person. In giving notice of the availability of the Airspace
Assets, Allied shall not exclude any persons bound by any non-compete
obligations to Allied or USA Waste.
H. Allied shall waive any non-compete obligation that would
prohibit
[[Page 44142]]
any person from acquiring the Airspace Assets.
I. Allied shall take all reasonable steps to accomplish quickly the
divestiture contemplated by this Final Judgment.
J. Pursuant to its divestiture of the Airspace Assets, Allied shall
promptly advise the United States and Texas of its method for
determining capacity at the Crow Landfill and for informing
purchaser(s) expeditiously of any increase in the Airspace Assets as
specified in Section IV.D(4). The proposed method shall be subject to
the approval of the United States, in its sole determination, after
consultation with Texas.
V. Appointment of Trustee
A. In the event that Allied has not divested all of the assets
required by Section IV.A, within the applicable time period specified,
the Court shall appoint, on application of the United States, after
consultation with Texas, a trustee selected by the United States to
effect the divestiture required by Section IV.A. After the appointment
of a trustee becomes effective, only the trustee shall have the right
to sell the assets required to be divested pursuant to Section IV.A.
Subject to Sections V.B and VI of this Final Judgment, the trustee
shall have the power and authority to hire at the cost and expense of
Allied any investment banker, attorneys or other agents reasonably
necessary in the judgment of the trustee to assist in the divestiture,
and such professionals or agents shall be solely accountable to the
trustee. The trustee shall have the power and authority to accomplish
the divestiture at the best price then obtainable upon a reasonable
effort by the trustee, subject to the provisions of Section VI of this
Final Judgment, and shall have such other powers as the Court shall
deem appropriate. The trustee shall have the power and authority to
accomplish the divestiture at the earliest possible time to a purchaser
acceptable to the United States, in its sole judgment after
consultation with Texas. Allied shall not object to a sale by the
trustee on any grounds other than the trustee's malfeasance. Any such
objections by Allied must be conveyed in writing to plaintiffs and the
trustee within ten (10) days after the trustee has provided the notice
required under Section VI.
B. The trustee shall serve at the cost and expense of Allied, on
such terms and conditions as the Court may prescribe, and shall account
for all monies derived from the sale of the assets sold by the trustee
and all costs and expenses so incurred. After approval by the Court of
the trustee's accounting, including fees for its services, all
remaining money shall be paid to Allied and the trust shall then be
terminated. The compensation of such trustee shall be reasonable and
based on a fee arrangement providing the trustee with an incentive
based on the price and terms of the divestiture and the speed with
which it is accomplished.
C. Allied shall use its best efforts to assist the trustee in
accomplishing the required divestiture. Subject to a customary
confidentiality agreement, the trustee and any consultants,
accountants, attorneys, and other persons retained by the trustee shall
have full and complete access to the personnel, books, records, and
facilities of the divestiture assets, and Allied shall develop
financial or other information relevant to such assets as the trustee
may reasonably request. Allied shall take no action to interfere with
or to impede the trustee's accomplishment of the divestiture.
D. After its appointment becomes effective, the trustee shall file
monthly reports with the parties and the Court setting forth the
trustee's efforts to accomplish the divestiture ordered under this
Final Judgment, provided, however, that to the extent such reports
contain information that the trustee deems confidential, such reports
shall not be filed in the public docket of the Court. Such reports
shall include the name, address and telephone number of each person
who, during the preceding month, made an offer to acquire, expressed an
interest in acquiring, entered into negotiations to acquire, or was
contacted or made an inquiry about acquiring, the Airspace Assets, and
shall describe in detail each contact with any person during that
period. The trustee shall maintain full records of all efforts made to
divest the Airspace Assets.
E. If the trustee has not accomplished such divestiture within six
months after its appointment becomes effective, the trustee shall
thereupon promptly file with the Court a report setting forth (1) the
trustee's efforts to accomplish the required divestiture, (2) the
reasons, in the trustee's judgment, why the required divestiture has
not been accomplished, and (3) the trustee's recommendations, provided
however, that to the extent such reports contain information that the
trustee deems confidential, such reports shall not be filed in the
public docket of the Court. The trustee shall at the same time furnish
such report of the parties, who shall each have the right to be heard
and to make additional recommendations consistent with the purpose of
the Final Judgment. The Court shall thereafter enter such orders as it
shall deem appropriate in order to carry out the purpose of the Final
Judgment, which shall, if necessary, include extending the trust and
the term of the trustee's appointment.
VI. Notification
A. Within two (2) business days following execution of a binding
agreement to divest, including all contemplated ancillary agreements
required to effect any proposed divestiture pursuant to Section IV or V
of the Final Judgment, Allied or the trustee, whichever is then
responsible for effecting the divestiture required herein, shall notify
plaintiffs of the proposed divestiture. If the trustee is responsible,
it shall similarly notify Allied. The notice shall set forth the
details of the proposed transaction and list the name, address, and
telephone number of each person not previously identified who offered
or expressed an interest or desire to acquire any ownership interest in
the Airspace Assets or any of them, together with full details of the
same. Within fifteen (15) days after receipt of the notice, plaintiffs
may request from Allied, the proposed purchasers, or the trustee, if
applicable, additional information concerning the proposed divestiture,
the proposed purchaser or purchasers, and any other potential
purchaser. Allied or the trustee shall furnish the additional
information within fifteen (15) days of the receipt of the request.
Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the notice or within fifteen
(15) days after receipt of the additional information, whichever is
later, the United States, after consultation with Texas, shall notify
in writing Allied and the trustee, if there is one, if it objects to
the proposed divestiture. If the United States fails to object within
the period specified, or if the United States notifies in writing
Allied and the trustee, if there is one, that it does not object, then
the divestiture may be consummated, subject only to Allied's limited
right to object to the sale under Section V.A. Upon objection by Allied
under Section V.A., a divestiture proposed shall not be consummated
unless approved by the Court.
B. Thirty (30) days from the date when the sale of the Crow
Landfill from USA Waste to Allied is consummated, but in no event later
than August 30, 1997, and every thirty (30) days thereafter until the
divestiture has been completed, Allied shall deliver to plaintiffs an
affidavit as to the fact and manner of compliance with Sections IV and
V of this Final Judgment. Each such report shall include, for each
person who during the preceding thirty (30)
[[Page 44143]]
days made an offer, expressed an interest or desire to acquire, entered
into negotiations to acquire, or made an inquiry about acquiring any
ownership interest in the Airspace Assets or any of them, the name,
address, and telephone number of that person and a detailed description
of each contact with that person during that period. Allied shall
maintain full records of all efforts made to divest the Airspace Assets
or any of them.
VII. Financing
Allied shall not finance all or any part of any purchase made
pursuant to Sections IV or V of this Final Judgment without the prior
written consent of the United States, after consultation with Texas.
VIII. Preservation of Assets
Until the divestitures required by the Final Judgment have been
accomplished, Allied shall take all steps necessary to ensure that the
Airspace Assets are fully maintained in operable condition, and shall
maintain and adhere to normal or previously approved repair,
improvement, and maintenance schedules and comply with all federal and
state regulations concerning landfills. Allied shall also take no
action that would jeopardize the sale of the Airspace Assets. Allied
shall appoint a person with oversight responsibility for the
preservation of assets to insure compliance with this section of the
Final Judgment.
IX. Compliance Inspection
For the purpose of determining or securing compliance with this
Final Judgment, and subject to any legally recognized privilege, from
time to time:
A. Duly authorized representatives of the United States or Texas,
including consultants and other persons retained by the plaintiffs,
shall, upon the written request of the Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the Antitrust Division or the Attorney General of the State
of Texas, and on reasonable notice to Allied made to its principal
offices, be permitted:
1. Access during office hours to inspect and copy all books,
ledgers, accounts, correspondence, memoranda, and other records and
documents in the possession or under the control of Allied, which may
have counsel present, relating to any matters contained in this Final
Judgment; and
2. Subject to the reasonable convenience of Allied and without
restraint or interference from them, to interview, either informally or
on the record, Allied's directors, officers, employees, and agents who
may have counsel present, regarding any such matters.
B. Upon the written request of the Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the Antitrust Division or the Attorney General of the State
of Texas made to Allied and USA Waste at its principal offices,
defendant shall submit such written reports, under oath if requested,
with respect to any of the matters contained in this Final Judgment as
may be requested.
C. No information nor any documents obtained by the means provided
in this Section IX shall be divulged by any representative of the
United States or the Office of the Attorney General of Texas to any
person other than a duly authorized representative of the Executive
Branch of the United States or of the Office of the Attorney General of
Texas except in the course of legal proceedings to which the United
States or Texas is a party (including grand jury proceedings), or for
the purpose of securing compliance with this Final Judgment, or as
otherwise required by law.
D. If at the time information or documents are furnished by Allied
to plaintiffs, Allied represents and identifies in writing the material
in any such information or documents for which a claim of protection
may be asserted under Rule 26(c)(7) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and defendant marks each pertinent page of such material,
``Subject to claim of protection under Rule 26(c)(7) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,'' then plaintiffs shall give ten (10) days
notice to Allied prior to divulging such material in any legal
proceeding (other than a grand jury proceeding) to which Allied is not
a party.
X. Retention of Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction is retained by this Court for the purpose of enabling
any of the parties to this Final Judgment to apply to this Court at any
time for such further orders and directions as may be necessary or
appropriate for the construction, implementation, or modification of
any of the provisions of this Final Judgment, for the enforcement of
compliance herewith, and for the punishment of any violations hereof.
XI. Termination
Unless this Court grants an extension, this Final Judgment will
expire on the tenth anniversary of the date of its entry.
XII. Public Interest
Entry of this Final Judgment is in the public interest.
Dated:---------------------------------------------------------------
Court approval subject to procedures of Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 16.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
United States District Judge
United States District Court, Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth
Division
United States of America and State of Texas, Plaintiffs, v.
Allied Waste Industries, Inc., Defendant.
Civil Action No.: 497-CV 564 E.
Competitive Impact Statement
The United States, pursuant to Section 2(b) of the Antitrust
Procedures and Penalties Act (``APPA''), 15 U.S.C. Sec. 16(b)-(h),
files this Competitive Impact Statement relating to the proposed Final
Judgment submitted for entry in this civil antitrust proceeding.
I. Nature and Purpose of the Proceeding
On July 14, 1997, the United States filed a civil antitrust
Complaint alleging that the proposed acquisition by Allied Waste
Industries, Inc. (``Allied'') of the Crow Landfill in Tarrant County,
Texas from USA Waste Industries, Inc. (``USA Waste'') would violate
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 18. An Amended Complaint
was filed on July 29, 1997. The Complaint alleges that Allied and USA
Waste are two of only four competitors in the greater Tarrant County
area that operate commercial landfills for the disposals of municipal
solid waste (``MSW'') generated in Tarrant County. If the acquisition
were consummated, there would be only three operators competing to
dispose of MSW generated in Tarrant County, and that loss of
competition would likely result in consumers paying higher prices for
waste disposal and hauling and receiving fewer or lesser quality
services. MSW disposal is a service which involves the receiving of
waste at landfills from haulers which have collected paper, food,
construction material and other solid wastes from homes, businesses and
industries, and transported that waste to a landfill. The payer for
relief in the Complaint seeks: (1) a judgment that the proposed
acquisition would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act; and (2) a
permanent injunction preventing Allied from acquiring the Crow Landfill
from USA Waste.
When the Complaint was filed, the United States also filed a
proposed settlement that would permit Allied to complete its
acquisition of USA Waste's Crow Landfill, but require certain
divestitures of Airspace Assets and other terms that will preserve
competition in the relevant market. This settlement consists of a
Stipulation and Order and a proposed Final Judgment.
[[Page 44144]]
The proposal Final Judgment requires Allied to sell the right to
dispose of waste at the Crow Landfill being acquired by Allied from USA
Waste, and at Allied's Turkey Creek Landfill in Johnson County. In
particular, Allied is ordered to (1) divest up to a total of 880,000
cubic yards of disposal space, measured at the gate house, at the Crow
Landfill over a five year period or the life of the Crow Landfill,
whichever is longer; and (2) divest up to a total of 560,000 cubic
yards of disposal space at the Turkey Creek Landfill over a ten year
period (together, ``Airspace Assets''). The Airspace Assets may be
divided and sold to separate purchasers. In any single year, the
purchaser(s) of the Airspace Assets may not dispose of more than the
Maximum Annual Disposal amounts specified in the Final Judgment, which
is 275,000 cubic yards at Crow and 125,000 cubic yards at Turkey Creek.
Allied is also required to supply, in a timely manner, any
Independent Hauler with a letter assuring the municipality that the
hauler can dispose of that municipality's waste in Allied's Crow or
Turkey Creek Landfills. Allied has agreed to nondiscrimination terms.
It will accept waste from haulers not affiliated with Allied under
conditions no less favorable than those provided to Allied's vehicles.
Further, if Allied obtains a permit within ten years to expand the Crow
Landfill or to develop a new landfill adjacent to the Crow Landfill, it
agrees to sell 20% of the expanded capacity to the existing Airspace
Assets purchaser(s) at the rates and terms specified in the original
Airspace Assets purchase agreement. If the purchaser does not buy the
assets, Allied will offer it for sale in the same manner it sold the
original Airspace Assets.
The amounts of disposal space to be divested are minimums and are
based on cubic yards measured at the gate. If the actual remaining
capacity of the Crow Landfill is greater than 4.4 million cubic yards,
Allied must offer for sale 20% of the additional capacity at the Crow
Landfill and 10% of the additional capacity at the Turkey Creek
Landfill at the rates and terms specified in the original Airspace
Assets purchase agreement(s). Allied will not re-purchase any portion
of the assets without approval from the Department of Justice after
consultation with Texas.
The plaintiffs and defendant have stipulated that the proposed
Final Judgment may be entered after compliance with the APPA. Entry of
the proposed Final Judgment would terminate the action, except that the
Court would retain jurisdiction to construe, modify, or enforce the
provisions of the proposed Final Judgment and to punish violations
thereof.
II. Description of the Events Giving Rise to the Alleged Violation
A. The Defendant and the Proposed Transaction
Allied is among the ten largest solid waste hauling and disposal
companies in the nation, and serves municipal, commercial, industrial
and residential customers in 22 states. USA Waste is the third largest
in the nation, and serves the same type of customers in 32 states. In
1996, Allied had total revenues of over $806 million and USA Waste had
total revenues of over $1 billion.
On March 7, 1997, Allied agreed to acquire the Crow Landfill and
other assets from USA Waste. This transaction, which would take place
in the highly concentrated MSW disposal market at commercial landfills
in the greater Tarrant County area, precipitated the government's suit.
B. Product and Geographic Markets
The requirements imposed by Texas law and regulations limit the
means by which MSW can be properly disposed. Landfills that are open to
the general public, or ``commercial landfills,'' generally accept MSW
from anyone or anywhere. Disposal of MSW at these commercial landfills
is a line of commerce and a relevant product market. Landfills that
accepts MSW from only certain areas, such as Arlington, Grand Prairie,
and the City of Fort Worth landfills or ``captive landfills,'' are not
viewed by most haulers of MSW to be substitutes for commercial
landfills which includes Tarrant County, northern Johnson County, and
southern Denton County. One of the captive landfills, the City of Fort
Worth landfill, primarily accepts waste hauled to it from private
individuals rather than commercial haulers.
The cost of transporting MSW to a landfill site can be a
substantial component of the cost of disposal. Total disposal costs may
account for as much as 50 percent of the actual amount charged by a
hauler for its collection services, hence limiting the areas where MSW
can be economically transported and disposed of by haulers. The
geographic location of landfills and associated transportation costs
create localized markets for the disposal of MSW.
Due to the high costs of transporting MSW, and the substantial
travel time to other landfills based on distance or congested roadways,
haulers of MSW generated in Tarrant County are limited to those
commercial landfills located in the greater Tarrant County area, which
includes Tarrant County, northern Johnson County, and southern Denton
County. The four operators of commercial landfills in the relevant
geographic market to which haulers of MSW generated in Tarrant County
turn to dispose of MSW are USA Waste, which owns the Crow Landfill;
Allied, which owns the Turkey Creek Landfill; WMI, which owns both the
Westside Landfill and DFW Landfill; and the City of Farmers Branch,
which owns the Camelot Landfill.
C. Harm to Competition as a Consequence of the Acquisition
The Complaint alleges that the transaction would have the following
effects, among others: that competition generally in providing disposal
at commercial landfills to haulers of MSW generated in Tarrant County
would be lessened substantially; that actual and potential competition
between Allied and USA Waste in providing disposal at commercial
landfills to haulers of MSW generated in Tarrant County will be
eliminated; and that competition for the hauling of MSW generated in
Tarrant County may be substantially lessened.
Should Allied acquire the Crow Landfill, there will be only three
landfill operators in the relevant market. The elimination of one of
such a small number of significant competitors will significantly
increase the likelihood that consumers will face higher prices and poor
quality service for the disposal of MSW generated in Tarrant County.
Allied and USA Waste compete with each other and with other
companies to provide MSW disposal services in the greater Tarrant
County area. That competition has resulted in lower waste disposal
prices to haulers, which in turn has permitted those haulers to compete
more effectively for business in Tarrant County. The elimination of
competition resulting from the proposed acquisition of the Crow
Landfill by Allied will likely result in price increases for the
disposal of MSW generated in Tarrant County.
Using a measure of market concentration called the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (``HHI''), which is defined and explained in Appendix
A, the post-acquisition HHI, based on the amount of waste from Tarrant
County disposed of in 1996 at the five landfills in the relevant
geographic market, would exceed 3500, with an increase in the HHI of
over 400. This number is likely understated because the capacity
limitations on the Camelot Landfill limit
[[Page 44145]]
its ability to provide a competitive constraint. Thus, an acquisition
by Allied of the Crow Landfill would substantially increase
concentration in the market.
Obtaining regulatory approval for either a new landfill or the
expansion of an existing landfill in the greater Tarrant County area is
a costly and time consuming process that can take several years. Entry
by a new landfill or through the expansion of an existing one would not
be timely, likely or sufficient to prevent harm to competition.
Allied is also engaged in the collection and hauling of waste in
the relevant geographic market. Allied and WMI are the dominant haulers
in the relevant geographic market and account for roughly 80% of the
hauling by private firms in Tarrant County. Post-acquisition, Allied
would have an increased incentive to raise disposal prices to rival
haulers in Tarrant County, to create a substantial barrier for entry to
new haulers, or selectively to raise prices to punish or impede
independent haulers who attempt to compete with it in Tarrant County.
III. Explanation of the Proposed Final Judgment
The provisions of the proposed Final Judgment are designed to
eliminate the anticompetitive effects of the acquisition of the Crow
Landfill by Allied from USA Waste.
The proposed Final Judgment requires the Airspace Assets to be
divested within one hundred twenty (120) days from the filing of the
complaint, or within five (5) days after notice of the entry of the
Final Judgment. The Airspace Assets will be divested to a purchaser, or
purchasers, who demonstrate to the sole satisfaction of the United
States (after consultation with the State of Texas) that the assets
will be used as part of an ongoing business engaged in solid waste
disposal. If allied fails to sell the Airspace Assets, a trustee will
be appointed. The Final Judgment provides that Allied will pay all
costs and expenses of the trustee. The trustee's commission will be
structured so as to provide an incentive for the trustee based on the
price obtained and the speed with which divestiture is accomplished.
After his or her appointment becomes effective, the trustee will file
monthly reports with the parties and the Court, setting forth the
trustee's efforts to accomplish divestiture. If the trustee has not
accomplished the divestiture within six months of its appointment, the
trustee and the parties will make recommendations to the Court which
shall enter such orders as appropriate in order to carry out the
purpose of the trust, including extending the trust or the term of the
trustee's appointment.
The relief sought in the Complaint has been tailored to insure that
it will protect consumers of hauling services and MSW disposal services
at commercial landfills from the higher prices and poorer quality
service that might otherwise result from the acquisition.
IV. Remedies Available to Potential Private Litigants
Section 4 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 15) provides that any
person who has been injured as a result of conduct prohibited by the
antitrust laws may bring suit in federal court to recover three times
the damages the person has suffered, as well as costs and reasonable
attorneys' fees. Entry of the proposed Final Judgment will neither
impair nor assist the bringing of any private antitrust damage action.
Under the provisions of Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C.
Sec. 16(a)), the proposed Final Judgment has no prima facie effect in
any subsequent private lawsuit that may be brought against defendant.
V. Procedures Available for Modification of the Proposed Final Judgment
The United States and defendant have consented that a proposed
Final Judgment may be entered by the Court after compliance with the
provisions of the APPA, provided that the United States has not
withdrawn its consent. The APPA conditions entry of a Final Judgment
upon the Court's determination that the proposed Final Judgment is in
the public interest. The APPA provides a period of at least 60 days
preceding the effective date of the proposed Final Judgment within
which any person may submit to the United States written comments
regarding the proposed Final Judgment. Any person who wishes to comment
should do so within sixty (60) days of the date of publication of this
Competitive Impact Statement in the Federal Register. The United States
will evaluate and respond to the comments. All comments will be given
due consideration by the Department of Justice, which remains free to
withdraw its consent to the proposed Judgment at any time prior to
entry. The comments and the response of the United States will be filed
with the Court and published in the Federal Register. Written comments
should be submitted to: J. Robert Kramer II, Chief, Litigation II
Section, Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice, 1401
H Street, NW., Suite 3000, Washington, DC 20530.
The proposed Final Judgment provides that the Court retains
jurisdiction over this action, and the parties may apply to the Court
for any order necessary or appropriate for the modification,
interpretation, or enforcement of the Final Judgment.
VI. Alternatives to the Proposed Final Judgment
The United States considered, as an alternative to the proposed
Final Judgment, a full trial on the merits against defendant Allied.
The United States could have brought suit and sought preliminary and
permanent injunctions against Allied's acquisition. The United States
is satisfied, however, that the divestiture of the described assets and
the other terms specified in Part I and in the proposed Final Judgment
will encourage viable MSW disposal competitors in the greater Tarrant
County area. The United States is satisfied that the proposed relief
will prevent the acquisition from having anticompetitive effects in
this market. The divestiture of Airspace Assets Space and the other
proposed terms will restore the market to a structure that existed
prior to the acquisition and will preserve the existence of independent
hauling competitors in the area.
VII. Standard of Review Under the APPA for Proposed Final Judgment
The APPA requires that proposed consent judgments in antitrust
cases brought by the United States be subject to a sixty-day comment
period, after which the Court shall determine whether entry of the
proposed Final Judgment ``is in the public interest.'' In making that
determination, the Court may consider--
(1) The competitive impact of such judgment, including
termination of alleged violations, provisions for enforcement and
modification, duration or relief sought, anticipated effects of
alternative remedies actually considered, and any other
considerations bearing upon the adequacy of such judgment;
(2) The impact of entry of such judgment upon the public
generally and individuals alleging specific injury from the
violations set forth in the complaint including consideration of the
public benefit, if any, to be derived from a determination of the
issues at trial.
15 U.S.C. Sec. 16(e) (emphasis added). As the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit recently held, the APPA permits a Court to
consider, among other things, the relationship between the remedy
secured and the specific allegations set forth in the government's
complaint, whether the
[[Page 44146]]
decree is sufficiently clear, whether enforcement mechanisms are
sufficient, and whether the decree may positively harm third parties.
See United States v. Microsoft, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
In conducting this inquiry, ``the Court is nowhere compelled to go
to trial or to enage in extended proceedings which might have the
effect of vitiating the benefits of prompt and less costly settlement
through the consent decree process.'' 1 Rather,
\1\ 119 Cong. Rec. 24598 (1973). See, United States v. Gillette
Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 715 (D.Mass.1975). A ``public interest''
determination can be made properly on the basis of the Competitive
Impact Statement and Response to Comments filed pursuant to the
APPA. Although the APPA authorizes the use of additional procedures,
15 U.S.C. Sec. 16(f), those procedures are discretionary. A court
need not invoke any of them unless it believes that the comments
have raised significant issues and that further proceedings would
aid the court in resolving those issues. See, H.R. 93-1463, 93rd
Cong. 2d Sess. 8-9, reprinted in (1974) U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
6535, 6538.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
absent a showing of corrupt failure of the government to discharge
its duty, the Court, in making its public interest finding, should .
. . carefully consider the explanations of the government in the
competitive impact statement and its responses to comments in order
to determine whether those explanations are reasonable under the
circumstances.
United States v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc., 1977-1 Trade Cas. para.
61,508, at 71,980 (W.D. Mo. 1977).
Accordingly, with respect to the adequacy of the relief secured by
the decree, a Court may not ``engage in an unrestricted evaluation of
what relief would best serve the public.'' United States v. BNS, Inc.,
858 F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) quoting United States v. Bechtel
Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083
(1981); see also, Microsoft, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir.1995). Precedent
requires that
the balancing of competing social and political interests affected
by a proposed antitrust consent decree must be left, in the first
instance, to the discretion of the Attorney General. The court's
role in protecting the public interest is one of insuring that the
government has not breached its duty to the public in consenting to
the decree. The court is required to determine not whether a
particular decree is the one that will best serve society, but
whether the settlement is ``within the reaches of the public
interest.'' More elaborate requirements might undermine the
effectiveness of antitrust enforcement by consent
decree.2
\2\ United States v. Bechtel, 648 F.2d at 666 (citations
omitted) (emphasis added); see United States v. BNS, Inc., 858 F.2d
at 463; United States v. National Broadcasting Co., 449 F. Supp.
1127, 1143 (C.D. Cal. 1978); United States v. Gillette Co., 406 F.
Supp. at 716. See also United States v. American Cyanamid Co., 719
F.2d at 565.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed Final Judgment, therefore, should not be reviewed
under a standard of whether it is certain to eliminate every
anticompetitive effect of a particular practice or whether it mandates
certainty of free competition in the future. Court approval of a final
judgment requires a standard more flexible and less strict than the
standard required for a finding of liability. ``[A] proposed decree
must be approved even if it falls short of the remedy the court would
impose on its own, as long as it falls within the range of
acceptability or is `within the reaches of public interest.' (citation
omitted).'' 3
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ United States v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp.
131, 150 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States,
460 U.S. 1001 (1983) quoting United States v. Gillette Co., supra,
406 F. Supp. at 716; United States v. Alcan Aluminum, Ltd., 605 F.
Supp. 619, 622 (W.D. Ky 1985).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
VIII. Determinative Documents
There are no determinative materials or documents within the
meaning of the APPA that were considered by the United States in
formulating the proposed Final Judgment.
Respectfully submitted,
For Plaintiff United States of America:
J. Robert Kramer II,
PA Bar #23963.
Willie L. Hudgins,
DC Bar #37127.
Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division
David R. Bickel,
DC Bar #393409.
Michael K. Hammaker,
DC Bar #233684.
Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 1401 H
St., N.W., Suite 3000, Washington, D.C. 20530, 202-307-0924, 202-
307-6283 (Facsimile)
Paul E. Coggins,
United States Attorney.
for
Marc. W. Barta,
TX Bar #01838200, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Northern District of Texas,
801 Cherry Street, Ste. 1700, Fort Worth, TX 76102-6897, 817-978-3291,
817-978-6351 (Facsimile).
Dated: July 29, 1997.
Certification of Service
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing has been served upon
the attorneys for USA Waste Service, Inc., the attorneys for Allied
Waste Industries, Inc, and the Office of the Attorney General of the
State of Texas, by placing a copy in the U.S. Mail, directed to each of
the above-named parties at the addresses give below, this 29th day of
July, 1997.
USA Waste Services, Inc., c/o James R. Weiss, Preston, Gates, Suite
500, 1735 New York Ave., NW., Washington, DC 20006
USA Waste Services, Inc., c/o James D. McCarthy, Hughes & Luce, 1717
Main Street, Suite 2800, Dallas, TX 75201
Allied Waste Industries, Inc., c/o Tom D. Smith, Jones, Day, Reavis &
Pogue, Metropolitan Square, 1450 G Street, NW., Washington, DC 20005-
2088
Allied Waste Industries, Inc., c/o Thomas R. Jackson, Jones, Day,
Reavis & Pogue, 2300 Trammel Crow Center, 2001 Ross Avenue, Dallas, TX
75202-2598
State of Texas: Amy Krasner, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Section, Office of the Attorney General of Texas, P.O. Box 12548,
Austin, TX 78711-2548
David R. Bickel,
Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 1401 H
Street, N.W., Suite 3000, Washington, D.C. 20530, (202) 307-0924, (202)
307-6283 (Facsimile).
[FR Doc. 97-21855 Filed 8-18-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-11-M