[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 148 (Friday, August 1, 1997)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 41730-41758]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-19697]



[[Page 41729]]

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Part IV





Department of Transportation





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Federal Aviation Administration



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14 CFR Part 108



Aircraft Operator Security; Proposed Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 1997 / 
Proposed Rules  

[[Page 41730]]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 108

[Docket No. 28978; Notice No. 97-12]
RIN 2120-AD-45


Aircraft Operator Security

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: This notice proposes to amend the existing airplane operator 
security rules. It would revise certain applicability provisions, 
definitions, and terms; reorganize these rules into subparts containing 
related requirements; and incorporate some requirements already 
implemented in air carrier approved security programs. Specifically, 
this proposal would increase the number of air carriers that must have 
security programs to include all that enplane from or deplane into a 
sterile area. Further, it would clarify the following: Training 
requirements for air carrier security personnel; procedures for 
transporting passengers under armed escort; procedures for allowing law 
enforcement personnel to fly armed; and procedures for air carriers to 
acknowledge receipt of Federal Aviation Administration security 
directives. It would require air carriers to implement and test 
security contingency plans. As these rules should apply to operators of 
rotorcraft as well as fixed-wing aircraft, this proposal would change 
the title of these rules from ``Airplane Operator Security'' to 
``Aircraft Operator Security.'' This proposal is intended to enhance 
security for the traveling public, air carriers, and persons employed 
by or conducting business at public airports by increasing awareness of 
and compliance with civil aviation security measures.

DATES: Comments must be submitted on or before December 1, 1997.

ADDRESSES: Comments on this proposed rulemaking should be mailed or 
delivered, in triplicate, to: Federal Aviation Administration, Office 
of the Chief Counsel, Attention: Rules Docket (AGC-10), Room 915-G, 
Docket No. 28978, 800 Independence Ave., SW., Washington, DC 20591. 
Comments may also be sent electronically to the following internet 
address: [email protected]. Comments may be examined in Room 
915-G between 8:30 a.m. and 5 p.m. weekdays except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Office of Civil Aviation Security 
Policy and Planning, Civil Aviation Security Division (ACP-100), Rhonda 
Hatmaker, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Ave., SW., 
Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-3413.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    Interested persons are invited to participate in this rulemaking by 
submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. 
Comments relating to the environmental, energy, federalism, or economic 
impact that might result from adopting the proposals in this document 
are also invited. Substantive comments should be accompanied by cost 
estimates. Comments should identify the regulatory docket or notice 
number and be submitted in triplicate to the Rules Docket (see 
ADDRESSES). All comments received on or before the closing date for 
comments specified will be considered by the Administrator before 
taking action on this proposed rulemaking. The proposals contained in 
this document may be changed in light of comments received. Comments 
received on this proposal will be available, both before and after the 
closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by 
interested persons. However, the Assistant Administrator has determined 
that air carrier security programs required by part 108 contain 
sensitive security information. As such, the availability of 
information pertaining to airport security programs is governed by 14 
CFR part 191 (Protection of Sensitive Information). A report 
summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel 
concerned with this rulemaking will be filed in the docket. Commenters 
wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments must include a 
self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is 
made: ``Comments to Docket No. 28978.'' The postcard will be date-
stamped and mailed to the commenter.

Availability of NPM

    Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request 
to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 
800 Independence Ave., SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 
267-9677. Communications must identify the notice number of this NPRM.
    An electronic copy of this document may be downloaded using a modem 
and suitable communications software from the FAA regulations section 
of the Fedworld electronic bulletin board service (telephone: 703-321-
3339) or the Federal Register's electronic bulletin board service 
(telephone: 202-512-1661). Internet users may reach the FAA's webpage 
at http://www.faa.gov or the Federal Register's Webpage at http://
www.access.gpo.gov/su__docs for access to recently published documents.
    Persons interested in being placed on the mailing list for future 
NPRM's should request from the above office a copy of Advisory Circular 
No. 11-2A, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Distribution System, which 
describes the application procedure.

Background

    This proposed rule was written before the tragic crash of TWA 800 
on July 17, 1996. That accident raised concerns about the safety and 
security of civil aviation, leading the President to create the White 
House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, headed by the Vice 
President. The Commission issued an initial report on September 9, 
1996, with 20 specific recommendations for improving security. On 
February 12, 1997, The Commission issued its Final Report with 57 
recommendations, 31 of which deal with improving security for 
travelers. In addition, the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 
1996 (Pub. L. 104-264) was signed on October 9, 1996, and directs the 
FAA to amend rules to upgrade civil aviation security.
    The FAA is working to respond to the recommendations of the 
Commission and to carry out the legislation, and has issued several 
proposals. On March 11, 1997, an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
on the certification of screening companies was issued (62 FR 13262, 
March 19, 1997), and on March 14, 1997, the FAA issued a Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking on employment history, verification and criminal 
records checks (62 FR 13262, March 19, 1997). The rules proposed in 
this notice were not written in response to these mandates. However, 
this notice, which proposes to update the overall regulatory structure 
for airport and air carrier security, is the result of a multi-year 
effort involving the FAA, airports and air carriers, and the Aviation 
Security Advisory Committee. The extensive proposed revisions are 
considered to be consistent with the intentions of the mandates, 
contain proposals that industry has identified as necessary or 
appropriate, and outline a new organization for the regulations that 
would assist in developing future changes to the rules. For these 
reasons, the FAA is publishing this proposed

[[Page 41731]]

rule for comment. The FAA anticipates that any final rule based on this 
proposal will incorporate responses to these mandates.

Terrorist Incidents

    On January 15, 1981, 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) part 108 
was issued to separate air carrier security requirements from part 121, 
which contain general safety requirements for large transport category 
aircraft. Historically, the threat of hijacking has been directed 
toward large passenger-carrying aircraft. The security requirements 
needed to protect those aircraft were placed in this new part 108 with 
applicability to scheduled and public charter passenger operations.
    Since its inception, part 108 has been amended on several 
occasions, but the rule has never undergone a comprehensive update. 
During this same period the threat has expanded beyond hijacking to 
include methods of introducing bombs aboard aircraft. The following 
incidents are indicative of this evolution:

--June 14, 1985: Trans World Airlines (TWA) Flight 847 was hijacked 
from Athens, Greece. The hijacking lasted 17 days before the terrorists 
released the aircraft and its remaining hostages in Beirut, Lebanon. A 
U.S. Navy diver was killed by the hijackers.
--April 2, 1986: A bomb placed onboard TWA Flight 840 detonated en 
route from Rome, Italy. Four passengers were killed but the aircraft 
made a landing in Athens, Greece.
--May 30, 1986: Conspiracy to bomb an Air India jet. The Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) and Canadian authorities uncovered a terrorist 
conspiracy to bomb an Air India jet departing from JFK International 
Airport. Five individuals were charged with sabotage, but only two were 
convicted. These two individuals were sentenced to life imprisonment.
--September 5, 1986: Terrorist assault on Pan American (Pan Am) Flight 
73, in Karachi, Pakistan as the aircraft waited to depart. The four 
terrorists were dressed similar to airport security personnel and drove 
a van resembling an airport vehicle alongside the aircraft. The 
flightcrew was able to escape while the terrorists stormed the 
aircraft. After 17 hours of negotiations, the aircraft's auxiliary 
power unit failed. Anticipating an attack by security forces, the 
terrorists opened fire on the massed passengers killing 22 persons and 
injuring 125 others before security forces could intervene.
--November 29, 1987: Korean Airlines Flight 858. A bomb placed onboard 
detonated over the Indian Ocean. All 115 persons aboard were killed.
--April 5, 1988: Kuwait Airways Flight 422 was hijacked en route from 
Bangkok, Thailand. The hijackers finally left the aircraft 15 days 
later in Algiers, Algeria, after the Kuwait government refused to 
release prisoners in exchange for hostages. The hijackers had killed 
two Kuwaiti passengers to emphasize their demands.
--December 21, 1988: The bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. All 243 
passengers and 16 crew on board, plus 11 persons on the ground at 
Lockerbie, Scotland, were killed. Subsequent inspection of the 
reconstructed aircraft determined that a device consisting of plastic 
explosives inside a tape cassette player, was concealed in checked 
luggage. Individuals working for the Government of Libya are 
responsible for the bombing. One conspirator was the former manager of 
the Libyan Arab Airlines (LAA) office in Valletta, Malta and retained 
full access to the airport. Using this access privilege and other 
knowledge gained as representatives of LAA, the conspirators bypassed 
security checks at Valletta's Luqa airport and inserted the suitcase 
containing the bomb into baggage of an Air Malta flight to Frankfurt, 
Germany.
--September 19, 1989: Union de Transports Aeriens (UTA) Flight 772 was 
destroyed by an explosion over Niger, 10 months after the Pan Am 
explosion over Lockerbie. All 171 persons on board were killed.
--November 27, 1989: A bomb placed in the cabin area onboard Avianca 
Flight 203 detonated over Colombia, destroying the aircraft in-flight. 
One hundred and seven passengers and crew were killed.
--December 11, 1994: Bombing of Philippine Flight 434. The bomb 
detonated en route to Tokyo from Cebu. One passenger was killed. 
Investigation of this act revealed an increased threat in early 1995 to 
U.S. carriers operating in the Asia-Pacific region. Ramzi Ahmed Yousef 
has been convicted of bombing Philippine Airline Flight 433 and for 
conspiracy to bomb U.S. flag aircraft.

    Terrorism has been, for the most part, a phenomenon afflicting U.S. 
interests overseas, and the threat to U.S. civil aviation is assessed 
to be higher abroad than it is domestically. The World trade Center 
bombing in February 1993, however, indicates that terrorism is also a 
very real threat in the United States, and may be on the rise.
    Ramzi Ahmed Yousef has been convicted of the bombing of Philippine 
Airline Flight 434 (December 11, 1994) and for conspiring to bomb U.S.-
flag aircraft. Authorities believe that Yousef and his co-conspirators, 
acted on their own volition, in opposition to U.S. foreign policy in 
the Middle East, and that they were assisted by local radical 
sympathizers in the Philippines and the United States. Their 
conspiracies are indicative of an emerging trend in terrorism 
characterized by terrorist elements operating without traditional 
organizational structure or state sponsorship.
    The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) characterizes such 
terrorists as seeking a ``common political, social, economic, or 
personal objective which transcends nation-state boundaries.'' The U.S. 
Department of State, commenting on global terrorism trends notes that 
``terrorism by extremist individuals or groups claiming to act for 
religious motives'' continue to dominate international terrorism.\1\
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    \1\ For further analysis of the terrorist threat, please refer 
to the following public documents: Terrorism in the United States: 
1994, U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
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    The number of international terrorist attacks against US interests 
fell between 1995 and 1996, although incidents involving American 
targets still represented more than 24% of the total attacks worldwide 
in 1996. Domestically, the FBI asserts that the U.S. is not immune to 
international terrorism, describing the terrorist threat as ``real and 
potentially lethal.'' The FAA views these developments as cause for 
concern.\2\
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    \2\ Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1995, U.S. Department of 
State, April 1996. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1996, U.S. 
Department of State, April 1997.
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    In addition, individual acts of revenge or criminality must be 
considered since the consequences of such acts can be just as deadly. 
For example:
    November 15, 1979: The bombing of American Airlines flight 444, en 
route from Chicago to Washington, DC. An improvised explosive device 
concealed in a mail package in the baggage compartment malfunctioned 
and partially detonated. The explosion resulted in damage to the 
aircraft and treatment of 12 passengers for smoke inhalation. The 
bombing was attributed to the Unabomber.

--December 7, 1987: The destruction of Pacific Southwest Airlines (PSA) 
Flight 1771. Flight 1771 crashed after a recently terminated airline 
employee boarded the Los Angeles-

[[Page 41732]]

 San Francisco flight with a handgun, shot one passenger (his former 
supervisor), the flightcrew, flight attendant, and presumably himself. 
As a result, all 38 passengers and five crew on board were killed. The 
fired employee retained his airline ID after his dismissal and used it 
to bypass the passenger screening checkpoint.

    June 27, 1995: A letter was received from the Unabomber threatening 
to blow up an aircraft departing Los Angeles International Airport 
(LAX) within six days. The FAA responded to the threat by directing 
additional security countermeasures to be put into effect at LAX. The 
six days elapsed without incident.

Response to Terrorist Incidents

    The incidents discussed above have led to concerted efforts to 
strengthen aviation security around the world and to strengthen the 
security procedures of U.S. air carriers. The FAA has responded to 
threats to the civil aviation system by issuing extensive amendments, 
examples of which are described below, to air carrier security programs 
as prescribed by part 108.
    The FAA issued two emergency amendments to part 108 in the 
aftermath of the 1985 terrorist attack on TWA Flight 847. A new 
Sec. 108.10 (50 FR 28892, July 16, 1985) required air carriers to use 
Ground Security Coordinators and In-flight Security Coordinators; a new 
Sec. 108.14 (50 FR 27924, July 8, 1985) mandated the transportation of 
Federal Air Marshals (FAM's) on designated flights.
    In February 1986, the Secretary of Transportation directed a 
comprehensive review of aviation security policy and practices. Air 
carrier security programs were extensively amended to implement the 
recommendations from this review.
    In December 1987, the FAA issued another emergency amendment 
following the PSA Flight 1771 crash. This amendment limited the 
application of special procedures that had allowed airline and airport 
employees to enter sterile area past screening points without 
inspection.
    In 1989, the FAA issued further amendments to air carrier security 
programs. A new Sec. 108.18 (54 FR 28982, July 10, 1989) required air 
carrier compliance with Security Directives issued by the FAA in 
response to a threat; a new Sec. 108.20 (54 FR 36938, Sept 5, 1989) 
established the framework for the use of Explosives Detection Systems 
at certain airports.
    In addition, the FAA issued two amendments to part 108. One 
amendment, Sec. 108.19(a), (56 FR 27866, June 17, 1991) required the 
notification of flight and cabin crewmembers of threats to the security 
of their flight. A second amendment, Sec. 108.31 (56 FR 41412, August 
20, 1991), established minimum standards for the hiring, continued 
employment, and contracting for air carrier and airport employees 
engaged in security-related activities.
    The FAA added a new Sec. 108.33 (60 FR 51854, October 3, 1995). 
This section establishes the FAA's authority and procedures for 
conducting personnel background investigations as a basis for granting 
airline industry contractor employees access privileges to restricted 
operations areas of airports.
    On August 4, 1989, former President Bush established the Commission 
on Aviation Security and Terrorism.\3\ The Commission was tasked with 
making an assessment of the overall effectiveness of the U.S. civil 
aviation security system.
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    \3\ President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, 
Report to the President, Government Printing Office, May 1990.
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    The Commission's final report of May 15, 1990, made a number of 
recommendations for improving the U.S. civil aviation security program. 
The Commission was critical of the domestic U.S. civil aviation 
security system for failing to provide the proper level of protection 
for the traveling public and urged major reforms. Specifically, the 
Commission recommended that the ``FAA initiate immediately the planning 
and analysis necessary to phase additional security measures into the 
domestic system over time.'' The Commission's report prompted the 
Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990 (Pub. L. 101-604), which was 
enacted on November 16, 1990. It mandated many changes to air carrier 
security programs as well as Federal staffing and reporting procedures. 
The Act required implementation of many of the Commission's 
recommendations.
    The proposed revisions to part 108 respond to Federal reports. In 
September 1993, the Office of the Inspector General (IG) and the U.S. 
Department of Transportation issued a report critical of certain 
aspects of the FAA's oversight of airport security systems.\4\ In 
January 1994, the General Accounting Office (GAO) issued a report 
suggesting further actions the FAA could take to improve civil aviation 
security.\5\
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    \4\ DOT Office of Inspector General, Audit of Airport Security, 
Federal Aviation Administration, Report No. RF-FA-3-105, September 
20, 1993.
    \5\ United States General Accounting Office, Report to 
Congressional Committees, Aviation Security: Additional Actions 
Needed to Meet Domestic and International Changes, January 1994. 
Hereafter cited as `GAO Report.'
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    The IG report found significant deficiencies in the effectiveness 
of access control and challenge procedures at five U.S. airports. The 
report recommended that airport and air carrier implementation of 
procedures for access control and challenge be strengthened, stressing 
that the FAA must take steps to increase air carrier employees' 
awareness and responsibility for those procedures.
    In January of 1994, the FAA responded to the report by meeting with 
representatives of airport, air carrier, and airport tenant management 
and employee groups and unions to discuss the IG's findings and to 
emphasize the need for improved employee security awareness.
    The response has been an industry-wide commitment to address the 
identified weaknesses and improve compliance. In particular, many 
airports and air carriers have improved their training programs and 
instituted programs to provide individual incentives for compliance and 
escalating disciplinary action for instances of non-compliance. 
Compliance at those airports which have instituted such programs 
improved markedly.
    Separately, the GAO issued a report entitled, ``Aviation Security-
Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and International 
Challenges'' in response to a Congressional inquiry on FAA's efforts to 
implement the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990. GAO found that 
the FAA has taken important steps in response to the Act and cited 
additional actions that should be taken to enhance the FAA's security 
programs and iniatives. These actions include--(1) pilot-testing of new 
procedures before implementation, (2) strengthening human factors 
research and its application, and (3) making systematic analytical use 
of information that the FAA collects during air carrier and airport 
security inspections.
    Similar to the IG report, the GAO report highlighted the need for 
the FAA to increase industry employee's overall awareness for security 
measures. The report concluded that the FAA must refine training and 
procedures for personnel to increase sensitivity to security 
requirements. The FAA agrees that complacency must be combated, and 
considers improved employee training and increased accountability to be 
part of the solution. Specific responses to issues raised by these 
reports in this notice are discussed below in the ``Section-by-Section 
Analysis.''

[[Page 41733]]

The Role of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee

    The Department of Transportation and the FAA are convinced that the 
aviation industry and general public should have input into the 
development of future aviation security measures and issues. On April 
3, 1989, the Secretary of Transportation announced the formation of a 
national aviation security advisory committee under the provisions of 
the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Title 5 U.S. Code, Appendix II).
    The Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) was formed to 
examine all areas of civil aviation security and to ensure a higher 
degree of safety for the traveling public by recommending improvement 
of aviation security equipment and procedures. The ASAC is chaired by 
the FAA's Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation Security and makes 
recommendations to the FAA Administrator. Committee membership 
represents a balance of Federal government, aviation industry, and 
consumer advocacy groups, including:

1. Air Courier Conference by America
2. Air Line Pilots Association International
3. Air Transport Association of America
4. Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association
5. Airport Law Enforcement Agencies Network
6. Airports Council International, Inc.
7. Allied Pilots Association
8. American Association of Airport Executives
9. Association of Flight Attendants
10. Aviation Consumer Action Project
11. Aviation Security Contractors Association
12. Cargo Airline Association
13. Families of PanAm 103 Lockerbie
14. International Airline Passengers Association
15. National Air Carrier Association, Inc.
16. National Air Transportation Association
17. Regional Airline Association
18. U.S. Department of Defense (Policy Board on Federal Aviation)
19. U.S. Department of Justice (Federal Bureau of Investigation)
20. U.S. Department of State
21. U.S. Department of Transportation (Office of Intelligence and 
Security and Federal Aviation Administration Technical Center)
22. U.S. Department of the Treasury (Customs Service, Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, and Secret Service)
23. U.S. Postal Service
24. Victims of PanAm Flight 103

    All ASAC meetings are open to the public and are announced in the 
Federal Register. Meetings are typically held three times a year. 
Members of the public are permitted to attend and appear before the 
committee, subject to reasonable limitations of space and time.
    The FAA invited the ASAC to comment on the underlying issues and 
potential solutions associated with the revision of parts 107 and 108. 
In December 1993, the FAA sought the ASAC's input on a ``discussion 
paper'' that presented a broad scope of security issues and concerns. A 
copy of this paper is filed in the FAA public docket of this Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM).
    To address the issues raised in the discussion paper, the ASAC 
formed two subcommittees to develop recommendations on airport and air 
carrier security issues, respectively, and provided the FAA formal 
recommendations on March 15, 1994. Individual ASAC members also 
provided comments on issues when their respective organizations 
differed from the position taken by the committee. The views of the 
ASAC and of individual committee members were then forwarded to the FAA 
with an overall recommendation that security regulations should remain 
flexible and contain only general security performance standards. 
Specific recommendations are addressed individually in the ``Section-
by-Section Analysis.''
    The ASAC's Part 108 Working Group and the ASAC's Carriage of 
Weapons Task Force recommendations for part 108 covered subjects such 
as the applicability of security programs to helicopter and all-cargo 
operations, revised definitions affecting the applicability of security 
programs for charter operations, clarification of procedures for the 
transporting of passengers under armed escort, and elimination of 
confusion surrounding the circumstances allowing law enforcement 
personnel to fly armed. The contributions of the ASAC are noted in the 
``Section-by-Section Analysis'' portion of this NPRM.

Discussion of the Proposed Rule

    This proposed revision of part 108 would comprehensively update air 
carrier security regulations to more efficiently and effectively 
address terrorist and other criminal threats to civil aviation. This 
proposed action would incorporate both procedures currently in air 
carrier security programs and new security procedures, in a manner that 
is intended to allow regulated entities and individuals to understand 
their responsibilities more readily. Lastly, the proposed revision 
would incorporate certain new measures that would provide for better 
security. For example, the proposed revision would make individuals 
directly accountable to the FAA for violating certain regulations and 
would require air carriers to include in their security programs 
specific disciplinary action and penalties to be taken with employees 
or tenants that do not comply with security requirements. Through these 
changes, the FAA hopes to create a more effective mixture of individual 
and corporate responsibility for complying with security regulations.
    Security measures needed to counter the changing threat posed by 
international terrorism are generally implemented through changes to 
air carrier security programs. These programs are not public documents, 
which protests the measures from compromise, and they can be changed 
quickly to respond to threats and improve security as needed. The 
security requirements that do not need to be protected from disclosure, 
however, can be placed in this proposed rule to afford interested 
parties the opportunity to comment on them.
    Also, certain proposed changes to the rule, such as expanding part 
108 to include private charter operations, which is discussed below in 
the ``Section-by-Section Analysis'' of this proposal, can only be 
changed by amending the applicability of the rule.
    Airport security programs required by part 107 also have been 
amended extensively since 1985. The FAA proposes to revise part 107, 
which governs airport security, concurrently with this part. The 
rulemakings will proceed in tandem. All references to proposed part 107 
in this preamble are intended to refer to the concurrently proposed 
revision of part 107.
    The proposed revisions of part 108 and part 107 represent a 
comprehensive approach toward upgrading the security requirements of 
the civil aviation system. The intent of these proposed revisions is to 
foster consistency and standardization throughout the national civil 
aviation security program. Where possible, the revisions of part 108 
and part 107 propose nearly identical language to enhance, clarify, or 
propose security measures for implementation by both air carriers and 
airport operators.
    Changes to definitions in proposed Sec. 108.3 and Sec. 107.3 are 
intended to promote a common understanding within the aviation 
community when

[[Page 41734]]

used in these respective regulations. Moreover, the proposed 
definitions for both parts 108 and 107 take into account the need to 
clarify the division of responsibility between air carriers and airport 
operators for the implementation of aviation security measures.
    Proposed Sec. 108.5 and Sec. 107.7 would clarify the authority of 
the Administrator to conduct inspections or tests to determine air 
carrier compliance with 49 U.S.C. Subtitle VII, and the regulations, 
and the air carrier's and airport operator's obligation to provide FAA 
Special Agents the necessary access and identification medium to 
conduct inspections.
    Proposed Sec. 108.9 and Sec. 107.11 contain language that would 
prohibit persons from interfering with or compromising required 
security methods or procedures. Further, new language proposed in 
Sec. 108.103 and Sec. 107.103(a) would require the inclusion of a 
security compliance program within an airport operator's and air 
carrier's security program.
    Proposed Sec. 108.105 and Sec. 107.105 reflect similar procedural 
language for the approval and amendment of security programs. Proposed 
Sec. 108.223 and Sec. 107.209 would require the airport operators and 
air carriers to establish accountability standards for identification 
media.
    Finally, language is proposed in both notices to expand training 
requirements to include personnel performing security-related duties 
(proposed Sec. 108.227 and Sec. 107.211), to incorporate similar 
sections for the implementation of contingency plans (proposed 
Sec. 108.307 and Sec. 107.301), and to require compliance with Security 
Directives (proposed Sec. 108.305 and Sec. 107.303).

Section-by-Section Analysis

Title and Organization of Proposed Part 108

    It is proposed to change the title from Airplane Operator Security 
to Aircraft Operator Security as this part would apply to operators of 
rotorcraft as well as fixed-wing aircraft. All references to 
``airplane'' in this part would be changed to ``aircraft.''
    Proposed Secs. 108.1 through 108.3 would have revised texts but 
would retain the same numbers. Subsequent sections would be reorganized 
to place related requirements into common subparts. To do so would 
require a change in the current numbering scheme of part 108. For 
example, current Secs. 108.5, 108.7, and 108.25 contain provisions 
regarding security programs. Under this proposal, these sections would 
be renumbered as new Secs. 108.101, 108.103, and 108.105 under subpart 
B entitled ``Security Program.'' In this notice, the FAA has also 
revised or modified certain sections where necessary, including some 
changes to titles of some current sections. Many proposed changes are 
intended only to place related requirements in logical order or reflect 
requirements previously implemented in air carrier approved security 
programs. Other changes, discussed below, are based on an FAA review of 
part 108 and experience with current requirements.
    Throughout the proposed rule, references are made to 49 U.S.C. 
Subtitle VII. This statute is the recodification of FAA's authority to 
prescribe aviation security regulations previously found in the Federal 
Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. App. 1301 et seq.

Subpart A--General

Section 108.1  Applicability

    As noted above in ``Discussion of the Proposed Rule'' recent events 
indicate that terrorism is a credible threat in the U.S. Currently, 
part 108 does not apply to private charter operations, and excludes 
helicopter operations from the requirements of part 108. This notice 
proposes, in Sec. 108.1(a)(1), to extend the application of part 108 to 
private charter operations when passengers are enplaned from or 
deplaned into sterile areas, and to remove the exclusion of 
applicability to helicopter operations. The FAA believes that this 
proposed notice will enhance the security of the sterile area by 
minimizing the opportunity for transfer or introduction of dangerous or 
deadly weapons into the sterile area by unscreened persons disembarking 
from private charter or helicopter operations into the sterile area.
    In response to the FAA's December 1993 discussion paper on air 
carrier issues and concerns, the ASAC's Part 108 Working Group 
commented that helicopter operators should be permitted to voluntarily 
participate in an air carrier security program. The Part 108 Working 
Group noted that some helicopter activities place operators in direct 
contact with part 121 operations. This occurs when helicopter 
passengers disembark in the secure areas of terminals and when 
helicopter operators interline with larger air carriers. The part 108 
Working Group believes that, to expedite the handling of such 
passengers through secure areas without diminishing the security of the 
sterile area, part 108 should permit helicopter operators to 
participate in the security program. The FAA concurs with the opinion 
of the part 108 Working Group. Any operators that enter the secured 
areas, that enplane from or deplane into a sterile area, or that use 
screening checkpoints, impact the security of all operations, and 
should have written and approved security programs. Accordingly, this 
notice proposes extending the applicability of Sec. 108.1 to private 
charter operations and, under certain specified conditions, helicopter 
operations to adopt and implement a security program.
    Currently, part 108 does not apply to all-cargo operations. 
However, some all-cargo operators have requested and have been issued 
security programs. This permits them to take direct responsibility for 
security measures in some of airports, rather than having the airport 
carry out the measures. This notice proposes to specifically provide 
for all-cargo operations to voluntarily adopt and implement security 
programs as described under Sec. 108.101 below. This proposed language 
would be advantageous to the operations of the all-cargo operator and 
would allow the all-cargo operator to directly receive Security 
Directives from the FAA, thereby increasing the timely implementation 
of any enhanced security measures required by the FAA.
    Part 108 currently refers to the ``Director of Civil Aviation 
Security'' as the official who oversees civil aviation security 
operations and approves airport security programs. Under internal FAA 
reorganization, the current title of this position is Associate 
Administrator for Civil Aviation Security; however, the recent 
recodification of the FAA's statutory authority revised this title to 
Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation Security. As such, 
paragraphs (a)(1) and (b) of this section would use the title 
``Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation Security.'' In addition, 
paragraph (b) would clarify that the Deputy Assistant Administrator for 
Civil Aviation Security, or any individual formally designated, could 
act in the capacity of the Assistant Administrator. The duties of the 
Assistant Administrator could be further delegated.

Section 108.3  Definitions

    For purposes of part 108, Sec. 108.3 would be revised to include 
terms commonly used within the aviation community and to update current 
terms used in existing Sec. 108.3. The introductory text of this 
proposed section would make the definitions in proposed part 107 also 
apply to this part.
    The following definitions would be added: Accepted security 
program,

[[Page 41735]]

Approved security program, Assistant Administrator, and Principal 
security inspector. The following definitions would be revised: 
Passenger-seating configuration, Private charter, Public charter, 
Scheduled passenger operations, and Sterile area.
    The definition for ``certificate holder'' in existing Sec. 108.3 
would be deleted. For purposes of this part all references to 
``certificate holder'' would be replaced with ``air carrier.'' The 
definition of ``air carrier'' is defined under 14 CFR part 1, 
Definitions and Abbreviations. The FAA believes that using the term 
``air carrier'' is necessary in order to simplify intent and to avoid 
any confusion in terms among the various categories of certificates 
issued by the FAA.

Section 108.5  Inspection Authority

    Under this proposal, existing Sec. 108.5 entitled ``Security 
Program: Adoption and implementation'' would be renumbered as new 
Sec. 108.101 under new Subpart B, Security Programs. Proposed 
Sec. 108.5 would be completely revised and placed under new Subpart A, 
General. This proposed section would combine the evidence of compliance 
requirements of existing Sec. 108.27 with the FAA's statutory authority 
to conduct inspections, investigations, and tests.
    In this proposed Sec. 108.5, language similar to that found in 
Sec. 121.81(a) would be included in proposed paragraph (a) to make 
clear that the Administrator has authority to conduct inspections or 
tests to determine air carrier compliance with the air carrier security 
program, part 108, 49 CFR part 175, and 49 U.S.C. Subtitle VII.
    The authority for the FAA to conduct inspections necessary to gauge 
compliance with Federal security requirements has, on occasion, been 
challenged by air carriers. The proposed new language is intended to 
resolve any confusion regarding FAA's authority to conduct such 
inspections under Title 49 U.S.C. Subtitle VII.
    Proposed paragraph (b) would restate the language of existing 
Sec. 108.27. Proposed paragraph (c) would clarify the operator's 
obligation to provide FAA Special Agents the necessary access and 
identification medium to conduct inspections. This proposed requirement 
would not be extended to any FAA employee other than Special Agents. 
Special Agents are those FAA employees who are authorized to conduct 
inspections of airport and air carrier security operations and who must 
possess and present valid FAA-issued credentials. There are some 
inspections and investigations that a Special Agent can accomplish only 
with unescorted access to the critical security area and restricted 
operations area. The FAA will provide criteria for ascertaining the 
validity of Special Agents' credentials in non-regulatory guidance 
materials. However, air carriers may be required to accept FAA Form 
8000-39 as valid identification media.

Section 108.7  Falsification

    Under this proposal, existing Sec. 108.7 entitled ``Security 
program: Form, content, and availability'' would be renumbered as new 
Sec. 108.103 under new Subpart B, Security Programs. Proposed 
Sec. 108.7 would be completely revised and would be included under 
Subpart A, General. This section is the same as the current Sec. 108.4 
adopted on November 27, 1996 (61 FR 64242, December 3, 1996).

Section 108.9  Security Responsibilities of Persons

    Under this proposal, existing Sec. 108.9 entitled ``Screening of 
passengers and property'' would be renumbered as new Sec. 108.201 and 
retitled ``Screening of persons, property, and acceptance of cargo'' 
under new Subpart C, Operations. Proposed Sec. 108.9 would be 
completely revised and placed under proposed Subpart A, General.
    The FAA believes that the contribution of individuals to the 
success of the civil aviation security system cannot be overestimated 
and that the regulations must address the responsibility of individuals 
who work within the security system. Therefore, the FAA is proposing to 
prohibit persons from tampering, compromising, or modifying any 
security system, or carrying a deadly or dangerous weapon, explosive, 
or destructive substance into sterile areas, critical security areas, 
or restricted operations areas. Although the air carrier is primarily 
responsible for carrying out statutory and regulatory security 
responsibilities under this part, the FAA believes that it is critical 
that persons employed directly by the air carriers or under contract to 
the air carriers understand the importance of their responsibilities to 
ensure that security measures within the civil aviation system are 
properly implemented.
    This section proposes specific requirements to make persons aware 
of regulatory prohibitions against interfering with or compromising 
security methods or procedures required under this part. Moreover, by 
including these prohibitions in the regulation, this proposed section 
would permit the use of civil penalty action as a means to gain 
compliance under this part by the persons who are employed by the air 
carrier and other persons not under the direct authority of the air 
carrier (such as trespassers).
    While there are some instances in which enforcement action against 
persons may be taken by the FAA, in many cases enforcement action would 
not be appropriate or necessary. The FAA intends, in proposed 
Sec. 108.103, to require the air carrier to include in its security 
program procedures to ensure that persons with unescorted access to 
critical security areas or restricted operations areas will comply with 
the requirements of this section. The FAA anticipates that the air 
carrier would remain the primary party responsible for violations, 
including those committed by their employees and contractors. However, 
in appropriate cases, persons who fail to comply would be subject to 
enforcement action, such as a civil penalty of up to $1,100 per 
violation of these rules.
    The term ``person,'' used throughout this new section and the 
proposed rule, is used as defined in Sec. 1.1, General Definitions, 
which defines person to mean an individual, firm, partnership, 
corporation, company, association, joint-stock association, or 
governmental entity, and includes a trustee, receiver, assignee, or 
similar representative of any of them.
    Proposed paragraph (a) of this new section would prohibit tampering 
or interfering with an air carrier's security system, including 
circumventing access control systems and misusing identification media. 
This proposed paragraph is intended to provide a deterrent which, in 
turn, would promote the effectiveness of the security control measures 
required by this part.
    For instance, many air carriers have invested in personnel 
identification systems as a means of satisfying the requirement to 
control movement under exclusive area agreements. Proposed parts 107 
and 108 would require the use of personnel identification systems in 
both critical security areas and restricted operations areas and would 
set forth minimum standards for personnel identification systems. 
Making persons directly responsible for complying with personnel 
identification media display requirements would significantly promote 
the effectiveness of such identification systems.
    Further, this section would prohibit persons from compromising, or 
rendering less effective, any system implemented in response to the 
various requirements of this part. This prohibition includes similar 
language found in existing Sec. 107.25(f) that prohibits the use of an 
airport-approved

[[Page 41736]]

identification by any person unless it is issued to that person. 
However, the proposed language would expand the prohibition to 
encompass any type of intentional misuse, such as tampering, 
compromise, or modification, of security systems or the unauthorized 
circumvention of these systems. Such acts would include writing on 
walls or doors the combination lock numbers that provide access to 
critical security areas or restricted operations areas, temporarily or 
permanently disabling electronic access systems, and loaning of access 
or identification media which would provide access to, and movement 
within, security sensitive areas of an airport without authorization.
    Under part 108, the responsibility rests with the air carrier for 
ensuring that unauthorized items which may be harmful to civil aviation 
or to the traveling public do not get into the sterile area. The FAA, 
accordingly, believes that the current prohibition found in existing 
Sec. 107.21(a) against persons introducing a deadly or dangerous 
weapon, explosive, or incendiary into sterile areas is more 
appropriately located in part 108. The FAA proposes transferring the 
existing prohibition found in Sec. 107.21(a) to proposed part 108.
    The risk to the traveling public presented by the presence of a 
deadly or dangerous weapon, explosive, or incendiary, or destructive 
substance should not be underestimated. Paragraph (b) of this section, 
as proposed, has been drafted to prohibit the unauthorized possession 
of such weapons or other dangerous items in sterile areas, critical 
security areas, and restricted operations areas. The current rules 
refer to the carriage of ``explosive, incendiary, or deadly or 
dangerous weapons'' in various paces, including existing Sec. 107.21 
and Sec. 108.9. The statute, however, refers to searching persons and 
property for the presence of a ``dangerous weapon, explosive, or other 
destructive substance.'' (See 49 U.S.C. 44902) In order to make more 
clear what items the air carriers search for and what items are 
controlled in various areas secured for the purposes of part 108, the 
FAA proposes to refer throughout the revised part to ``deadly or 
dangerous weapon, explosive, incendiary, or other destructive 
substance.'' This change is proposed in paragraph (b) of this section 
as well as proposed Secs. 108.103, 108.201, and 108.219. The FAA also 
will provide guidance on destructive substances to minimize confusion 
over the applicability of the term ``destructive substance.''
    This section is also intended to prohibit persons from conducting 
unauthorized ``tests'' of air carrier security systems by compromising 
or circumventing any element of the system. Proposed paragraph (c) 
would allow for individuals authorized by the Federal government, 
airport operator, and air carrier to conduct tests and inspections of 
security systems.
    Provisions regarding the carriage of firearms by law enforcement 
officers and other authorized personnel found in existing 
Sec. 107.21(b) would be included in proposed paragraph (d). Paragraph 
(d) proposes that provisions of this section that apply to firearms and 
weapons would not be applicable to law enforcement personnel, Federal 
Air Marshals, and certain individuals authorized in an airport security 
program to carry a weapon, such as armed guards protecting currency or 
valuable shipments. This paragraph would further exempt persons 
properly transporting declared firearms under proposed Sec. 108.213 or 
hazardous materials under 49 CFR part 175 from firearms and weapons 
prohibitions. Proposed paragraph (d)(7) also would exclude from these 
prohibitions weapons and firearms legally carried aboard non-air-
carrier aircraft, such as general aviation pilots operating personal 
aircraft and transporting firearms in compliance with state and local 
laws.
    The concept of requiring persons to be responsible for complying 
with security measures was generally supported by the ASAC, 
particularly the airport operator representatives. Two ASAC members, 
the Air Line Pilots Association and the National Air Transport 
Association, however, expressed reservations about the feasibility of 
enforcing such a requirement and suggested that security resources 
could be better used elsewhere to achieve the same results. 
Nevertheless, by promoting awareness of security responsibilities, this 
proposal also would address the concerns raised by the DOT IG about 
employee awareness of, and compliance with, access control and 
challenge procedures. Further, this proposed section parallels efforts 
to require that persons be accountable for their actions related to the 
dissemination of sensitive security information (62 FR 13736, March 21, 
1997).
    Other federal regulations and statutes may also contain applicable 
security and safety responsibilities of persons, including the 
following: proposed Sec. 108.221, Access investigation; proposed 
Sec. 108.201 Screening of persons and property and acceptance of cargo; 
proposed Sec. 108.213 of this part, Carriage of weapons; part 191 of 
this chapter, Protection of Sensitive Security Information; 49 CFR part 
175, Transportation of hazardous materials; 49 U.S.C. 46302, regarding 
false information involving aircraft piracy, interference with flight 
crew members, carrying a weapon, and other criminal laws; and 49 U.S.C. 
46303, regarding carrying a weapon.

Subpart B--Security Program

Section 108.101  Adoption and Implementation

    As mentioned in the discussion above under proposed Sec. 108.5, 
proposed Sec. 108.101 would be renumbered from current Sec. 108.5 and 
included under new Subpart B, Security Program.
    As discussed above, proposed Sec. 108.1 would be revised to extend 
the application of part 108 to include private charter and helicopter 
operations. The FAA proposes to require helicopter operators to adopt 
and implement a security program under part 108 for the same type of 
passenger operations that require an airplane operator to adopt and 
implement a security program. Private charter operators also would be 
required to adopt and implement a security program for certain 
operations.
    Currently, not all air carrier passenger operations (including 
private charters and helicopter operations) either boarding passengers 
or deplaning passengers through established sterile areas are required 
to implement the same security requirements to ensure full compliance 
with security measures protecting the security of the sterile areas. 
Passengers embarking from, or deplaning through, sterile areas from 
private charters and helicopter operations are subject to the security 
program requirements of the air carrier responsible for the security of 
the sterile area. Security measures of screening passengers from 
private charters and helicopter operations interlining with large 
carriers represent, however, only a portion of the scope of security 
measures needed to maintain the security integrity of the sterile area 
or the ramp area used by private charters and helicopter operations. 
Private charters and helicopter operations assisted by large carrier 
screening and escorting of their enplaning or deplaning passengers 
through the sterile area do not have to address other security measures 
such as specialized crew training, aircraft inspection procedures, 
checked baggage acceptance procedures, or procedures for escorting 
prisoners, to name a few.

[[Page 41737]]

    The ASAC's Part 108 Working Group recommended that the exclusion of 
all-cargo helicopter, and private charter operations from ``security 
program coverage'' should be modified. The operations of all-cargo air 
carriers and helicopter operators should be allowed to participate 
voluntarily in the security program. The Part 108 Working Group also 
observed that the original justification for the differing 
applicability of part 108 to private charter vs. public charter was 
that passengers traveling on private charters, being brought together 
in a common association (e.g., corporation, professional sports team), 
did not generate a security threat to the flight. Accordingly, under 
the current part 108 definition, the Part 108 Working Group indicated 
that application of a security program was unnecessary for private 
charters. The Part 108 Working Group also commented that there have 
been no ``incidents'' to generate a change to part 108 applicability to 
private charters. Other ASAC members commented that private charters do 
not pose a security concern and that security measures should be 
commensurate with the security threat.
    The FAA believes that the security of the sterile area cannot be 
compromised. As previously cited above, the Part 108 Working Group 
noted that some helicopter activities place operators in direct contact 
with part 121 operations. This occurs when helicopter passengers are 
disembarked in the secure areas of terminals and when helicopter 
operators interline with large air carriers. Further, the Part 108 
Working Group expressed belief that any operations that use screening 
checkpoints should have written and approved security programs to 
accomplish that screening. Accordingly, this notice proposes that all 
air carriers that enplane or deplane passengers through sterile areas 
would be required to adopt and implement a security program for those 
operations.
    The fight performance (especially range) of less-than-61 seat 
aircraft has significantly improved since 1981, which may make them 
more attractive to hijackers. Further, the threat to U.S. interests 
outside the U.S. potentially affects the security risk to private 
charter and less-than-61-seat operations. This notice proposes, 
therefore, that U.S. operators of private charter flights with greater 
than 30 passenger seats to any location and all operators regardless of 
the seating capacity of the aircraft on fights to, from, or between 
localities outside the U.S. would be required to adopt a security 
program. This proposal is consistent with the International Civil 
Aviation Organization's (ICAO) security standards. The ICAO standards 
do not differentiate security requirements by aircraft seating 
capacity, and they require the screening of passengers for all 
international flights. However, the threat to such flights is not 
always of sufficient level to require full security measures to be 
taken. Accordingly, this notice proposes that the requirement for these 
carriers to screen passengers and to secure aircraft be implemented 
only when the Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation Security 
notifies the carriers that there is a security threat to that 
operation.

Section 108.103  Form, Content and Availability

    As mentioned in the discussion above under proposed Sec. 108.7, 
proposed Sec. 108.103 would be renumbered from current Sec. 108.7 and 
included under new Subpart B, Security Program. This section proposes 
to modify the list of items required in the security program.
    Paragraph (b) proposes the inclusion of procedures and a curriculum 
to implement an individual accountability compliance program. Through 
the proposed individual accountability compliance program, the air 
carrier would ensure that each of its employees and contractors are 
fully aware of their personal accountability for control and use of 
airport-approved identification media. The program would enhance the 
awareness of their employees and contractors of the methods by which 
the airport operator and the air carrier will monitor compliance of 
persons with the security requirements of part 108. Additionally, this 
notice would require that penalties be imposed on persons who are not 
in compliance, those penalties shall be levied in accordance with the 
standards contained in the air carrier's approved security program.
    This section also would require the air carrier to designate an Air 
Carrier Security Coordinator and the means by which this person can be 
contacted on a 24-hour basis. This proposal would ensure that the FAA 
can contact a responsible security official at the corporate level 
whenever the need arises.
    Paragraph (c) proposes a change from the current requirement that 
air carriers maintain a copy of security documents at each airport 
where security screening is being conducted, to a requirement that air 
carriers ensure the availability of such documents at each airport 
served. The FAA knows that certain types of operations, such as charter 
flights, present logistical problems to the air carriers if they have 
to maintain a copy of their security program at the airport, as 
currently required under part 108, as they may not have a station 
established at that specific airport. Accordingly, the proposed 
requirement would permit the air carrier to have the necessary 
documents available for electronic transmission from another location 
or the necessary documents onboard the aircraft.

Section 108.105  Approval and Amendments

    Under this proposal, existing Sec. 108.25 entitled ``Approval of 
security programs and amendments'' would be renumbered as new 
Sec. 108.105 under new Subpart B, Security Program. Proposed 
Sec. 107.105 prescribes the same approval and amendment procedures.
    To provide for the timely response to a security threat to civil 
aviation, and in accordance with existing practice, proposed 
Sec. 108.105 would delegate approval of security programs or amendments 
to the Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation Security. To 
formalize the existing practice, emergency amendments to approved air 
carrier security programs would also be issued by the Assistant 
Administrator. The notice proposes to expand this section to include 
greater specificity and similarity in the procedures for the amendment 
process for both part 108 and part 107 of this chapter.
    In addition to prescribing procedures for approval of security 
programs required under existing Sec. 108.25, proposed paragraph (a) 
provides for the Administrator to dispose of any petition within 30 
days of receipt.
    Paragraph (b) of this new section would prescribe procedures for an 
air carrier to request an amendment to its air carrier security program 
now covered under existing Sec. 108.25. Currently Sec. 108.25(c) states 
that the FAA will either approve or deny the request within 15 days. 
The proposal extends this time period to provide the FAA with a more 
realistic period in which to conduct a comprehensive review of the 
proposed amendment to an air carrier security program. Under this 
proposal, the FAA would have 45 days after receipt for approval or 
denial of the proposed amendment. The proposed rule also notes that the 
amendment process may take longer than 45 days if the proposed 
amendment is modified or denied. These language changes are intended to 
allow extra time for the FAA to discuss these changes with the air 
carriers.
    Retention of the FAA's existing procedures to amend an air carrier 
security program is proposed in paragraphs (c) and (d). Two significant 
changes, however, are being proposed to

[[Page 41738]]

the existing procedures of Sec. 108.25: (1) A new requirement for air 
carriers to submit petitions for reconsideration no later than 15 days 
before the effective date of the amendment, and (2) a clarification 
that a petition for reconsideration does not stay the effective date of 
an emergency amendment. These changes also are proposed to ensure a 
timely and efficient exchange of information.
    The ASAC recommended that any amendment issued by the FAA to an air 
carrier security program include an expiration date. The committee was 
concerned that the FAA may use the amendment process to circumvent the 
rulemaking process and suggested that the FAA be required to initiate a 
formal rulemaking if it wished the provisions of the amendment to 
continue after the expiration date.
    When there is information that cannot be discussed in a public 
forum, amendment of the security program provides a means to impose and 
implement a new requirement. The FAA does not believe it would be in 
the best interest of the traveling public to require a rulemaking for 
every amendment to an air carrier security program, but will establish 
internal procedures to periodically review amendments to ensure that 
their inclusion in the security program, rather than part 108, is 
appropriate.

Subpart C--Operations

Section 108.201  Screening of Persons and Property, and Acceptance of 
Cargo

    The White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security 
recommended, and the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 
required, that the FAA certify screening companies providing security 
screening. This proposal does not respond to these mandates, however, 
as noted above, the FAA has issued an Advance Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking on certification of screening companies.
    Air carriers currently air required to screen all persons entering 
a sterile area through a screening checkpoint. As mentioned in the 
discussion above under proposed Sec. 108.9, proposed Sec. 108.201 would 
be renumbered from current Sec. 108.9 and included under new Subpart C, 
Operations. It is also proposed to change the title of this section 
from ``Screening of passengers and property'' to ``Screening of persons 
and property, and acceptance of cargo'' to indicate that all persons, 
and not just passengers, are required to be screened as they enter the 
sterile area through a screening checkpoint.
    To facilitate the transit of air carrier employees who have already 
been subjected to other security systems, the proposed section would 
provide that persons who are authorized unescorted access to an airport 
critical security area may enter a sterile area from a public area 
using security procedures proposed in Sec. 107.207, ``Access control 
systems'' under the parallel NPRM that revises part 107. The proposed 
language of Sec. 107.207 would establish performance standards for 
access control points that are now found in existing Sec. 107.14.
    Proposed Sec. 108.201(b) would require the air carrier to ``detect 
and prevent'' instead of the current requirement to ``prevent to 
deter,'' the carriage aboard aircraft or entry into a sterile area of 
any explosive, incendiary, deadly or dangerous weapon, or destructive 
substance on or about individuals or their accessible property. The 
proposed language more definitively describes the air carriers' duties 
regarding screening of persons and property. It is based on existing 
procedures under the air carrier approved security programs that 
basically require the air carrier to ``detect and prevent'' or be 
subject to compliance enforcement action.
    The requirements proposed in Sec. 108.201(d),(e), and (f) would 
transfer unchanged from existing Secs. 107.20 and 107.21. These 
existing sections require the individual to submit to screening of 
their person and property and restrict the carriage of firearms into 
sterile areas to those persons required to have the weapons in 
performance of their duties, law enforcement officers traveling armed 
aboard aircraft, and persons specifically authorized under an approved 
security program. Since control of the sterile area and screening are 
the air carriers' responsibilities, these requirements are more 
appropriate to this part than part 107.
    The ASAC's Part 107 Working Group recommended that the part 107 
provision not be transferred to part 108 insofar as the ``objective of 
this prohibition is the protection of sterile areas, rather than air 
carriers. . .'' The Part 108 Working Group did not comment on this 
issue.
    The requirements that are proposed to be moved from part 107 to 
part 108 apply to individuals. They deal with activity at the screening 
checkpoint, in the sterile area, and aboard the aircraft. Because the 
air carriers primarily are responsible for these areas, the FAA 
believes that it is appropriate to locate the rules applying to 
individuals along with the rules applying to the air carriers.
    Proposed Sec. 108.201(h) would require air carriers to prevent the 
carriage of any explosive or incendiary on board an aircraft in any 
form. Although current security procedures applicable to the acceptance 
of cargo for transport on board passenger aircraft are contained in the 
air carriers' approved security program, the basic requirement to apply 
security measures to cargo is not currently in the rule and this 
proposal would correct that omission.

Section 108.203  Use of Metal Detection Devices.

    Metal detection devices (MDD's) (such as walk-through metal 
detectors) have long been an integral part of the passenger screening 
system. Testing, calibration, and operational requirements for MDD's 
are currently incorporated in the air carrier's security program. This 
proposed new section would be included under new Subpart C, Operations, 
and would require the air carrier to use equipment that meets the 
calibration standard set by the FAA and to conduct screening with MDD's 
in accordance with its approved security program. This section would 
not change the current security program requirements.

Section 108.205  Use of X-ray Systems

    Under this proposal, existing Sec. 108.17 entitled ``Use of X-ray 
systems'' would be renumbered to proposed Sec. 108.205 and included 
under new Subpart C, Operations.
    In proposed Sec. 108.205, the FAA would update the technical 
standards for X-ray systems. The reference incorporating American 
Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) Standard F-792-82 would be 
updated to reflect the current ASTM Standard, F-792-88 (Reapproved with 
an amendment in 1993). In addition, references to Food and Drug 
Administration regulations governing cabinet X-ray systems manufactured 
before April 25, 1974, are no longer necessary and, therefore, would be 
deleted.
    Under this proposal, application of Sec. 108.205 would be extended 
to X-ray systems under the air carrier's operational control at 
airports outside the U.S. as currently required in security programs. 
Air carriers at designated foreign locations are now required to 
perform X-ray inspection of baggage and suspect items. X-ray systems 
used for this purpose should meet the same standards as X-ray systems 
used to inspect baggage in the U.S. to ensure that the prescribed 
security measures are equally effective. X-ray systems owned and/or 
operated by government authorities or government-mandated security 
companies at foreign airports and not

[[Page 41739]]

under the operational control of the air carrier would not be subject 
to the proposed regulation.
    The FAA is proposing to omit the current requirement in 
Sec. 108.17(a)(4) that the air carrier issue to each operator of an X-
ray system an individual personal dosimeter to measure exposure to X-
rays, and evaluate it every month. In 1975 the FAA first adopted rules 
regarding the use of X-ray machines to screen carry-on baggage. At that 
time, the use of X-ray systems for this purpose was relatively new, and 
the FAA took a number of steps to evaluate the safety and environmental 
impact of these systems. Although the experts who submitted comments 
did not find it was necessary for operators of the equipment to wear 
dosimeters, the FAA's rules included such a requirement. The FAA now 
proposes to remove this requirement based on the determination of those 
agencies with the expertise.
    The Food and Drug Administration regulates cabinet X-ray machines 
of the type used under part 108. Those rules, found at 21 CFR 1020.40, 
do not require that operators use dosimeters. The Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration has regulations for protection of persons in 
areas with certain levels of ionizing radiation, but these rules do not 
apply to low levels involved with the cabinet X-ray systems used under 
part 108. Some states may have regulations regarding the use of X-ray 
equipment, and may require the use of dosimeters.
    The X-ray machines used under part 108 are required to be tested 
regularly. Further, the X-ray machines used today use lower levels of 
radiation than they did when the FAA rules were first adopted. Since 
1975 the FAA has been aware of no incident in which a person received 
excess radiation from X-ray machines used for screening under an FAA-
approved program.
    Accordingly, it does not appear that there is a need for the FAA to 
require the operators of X-ray equipment to use dosimeters, and the FAA 
proposes to remove this requirement. Air carriers would still be 
required to comply with any requirements of another Federal agency or 
state government regarding the use of dosimeters.
    This notice proposes the deletion of the term ``passengers'' under 
Sec. 108.205(e) and substitutes the term ``persons'' in recognition 
that, during daily operations, passengers are not the only category of 
individuals to enter a sterile area through a screening checkpoint with 
an X-ray system.

Section 108.207  Use of Explosives Detection Systems

    Under this proposal, existing Sec. 108.20 entitled ``Use of 
Explosives Detection Systems'' would be renumbered as new Sec. 108.207 
and included under new Subpart C, Operations. Other than renumbering 
this section from Sec. 108.20, replacing the reference to Sec. 108.25 
with Sec. 108.105, and replacing ``certificate holder'' with ``air 
carrier,'' no further revisions would be made to this section.

Section 108.209  Employment Standards for Screening Personnel

    Under this proposal, existing Sec. 108.31 entitled ``Employment 
standards for screening personnel'' would be renumbered as new 
Sec. 108.209 and included under new Subpart C, Operations.
    This section proposes that, in the event the air carrier is unable 
to implement this section for screening functions outside the U.S., the 
air carrier shall notify the Administrator of those air carrier 
stations so affected to facilitate resolution of compliance issues with 
this section of part 108.

Section 108.211  Law Enforcement Personnel

    Under this proposal, existing Sec. 108.15 entitled ``Law 
Enforcement Officers'' would be retitled ``Law enforcement personnel,'' 
renumbered as new Sec. 108.211, and included under new Subpart C, 
Operations.
    As mentioned in the discussion of proposed Sec. 108.1, this notice 
proposes to extend the applicability of part 108 to private charter 
operations when passengers are enplaned from or deplaned into sterile 
areas, and remove the exclusion of applicability to helicopter 
operations, Accordingly, part 108 air carriers operating passenger 
service or charter passenger operations at airports not governed under 
proposed Sec. 107.217 would be required, in the absence of the part 107 
airport operator providing law enforcement support, to provide for law 
enforcement personnel in a manner adequate to support its security 
program.
    This notice also proposes extending the applicability of proposed 
Sec. 108.101, under certain circumstances, to scheduled passenger or 
public charter operations with an aircraft having a passenger seating 
configuration of less than 61 seats engaged in operations to, from, or 
outside the U.S.
    The FAA is aware that screening is not required for certain 
operations under proposed Sec. 108.101(a). Nevertheless, in order to 
implement certain security measures under security threat conditions, 
which could include screening, the requirement of the air carrier to 
provide for law enforcement support under this section would be 
revised, Under this proposed section, the requirement for air carriers 
to provide for law enforcement personnel, in a manner adequate to 
support its security program, would be extended to international 
passenger services of less-than-61-seat aircraft that operate under 
proposed Sec. 108.101(a) at airports not governed under proposed 
Sec. 107.217 of this chapter.

Section 108.213  Carriage of Weapons

    Under this proposal, existing Sec. 108.11 entitled ``Carriage of 
Weapons'' would be renumbered as new Sec. 108.213 and would be included 
under new Subpart C, Operations.
    The revised procedure for carrying weapons aboard aircraft by 
authorized law enforcement personnel proposed in this section is 
intended to reduce the number of weapons accessible to passengers 
aboard aircraft. This notice proposes adopting into part 108 the ASAC's 
recommendations to the FAA on this topic that the number of firearms 
authorized to be carried should be reduced to the minimum necessary for 
law enforcement personnel to perform their duties.
    Only those persons performing official duties that meet the 
``need'' criteria described below would be permitted to carry firearms 
aboard the aircraft. The criteria of need to carry firearms aboard 
aircraft are defined in proposed Sec. 108.213(a)(2) as:
    (i) Providing protective escort (assigned to a principal or an 
advance team).
    (ii) Conducting hazardous surveillance operation.
    (iii) Providing prisoner escort.
    (iv) Status as an FBI Special Agent.
    (v) Traveling as an FAA Federal Air Marshal on mission status.
    (vi) Traveling as a law enforcement officer on official duties 
required to report to a new location armed and immediately prepared for 
duty.
    Under proposed Sec. 108.213(a)(4), all such persons flying armed 
would be required to complete a standard training program. The training 
program was recommended by the ASAC as a requirement; a standard course 
of about 2 hours for initial training. Training would cover the basic 
procedures for flying armed and the concerns associated with carriage 
of a firearm aboard an aircraft.
    Further, all such persons flying armed would be required to be a 
Federal law enforcement officer or a ``full time'' municipal, county, 
or state law

[[Page 41740]]

enforcement officer. The term ``full time'' is taken to mean that the 
primary source of earned remuneration by the person is for services 
they have provided in support of law enforcement at the municipal, 
county, or state level.
    The phrase ``full-time employee'' is used to preclude any person 
from flying as an ``armed law enforcement officer'' when that person 
does not receive remuneration from the government entity represented 
and does not meet, or is not required to meet, the training standards 
of a full-time, commissioned law enforcement officer of that 
department.
    To the FAA's knowledge, all full-time, state, and local law 
enforcement officers are required to have extensive state-approved 
training. However, some state and local governments have reserve 
officers, special police, special deputies, or other non-full-time 
officers who may not be required to have the same extensive training. 
The FAA believes that armed persons on aircraft should have the 
extensive training that is required of full-time law enforcement 
officers to provide the most assurance that they can carry out their 
duties in the most professional and safe manner.
    Persons flying armed also would be required to be ``currently 
trained and certified'' and to complete a standard training course. In 
this regard, ``trained and certified'' is used to mean that an 
individual has satisfactorily completed the training required by the 
employing agency or department and, in the case of state and local 
officers, completed the training specified by the responsible 
commission on Peace Officers Standards and Training. Moreover, the 
individual also should have satisfactorily met all specific continuing 
education and training requirements to currently enforce the criminal 
laws of the jurisdiction in which employed.
    The process currently used by armed individuals to board flights is 
made easier when such individuals submit the existing form to the air 
carrier to indicate that they will be traveling armed. It is proposed 
to require the air carrier to provide the information contained in this 
form (e.g., identify of armed individuals, authorization to fly armed, 
itinerary, completion of the FAA course, ``Law Enforcement Officers 
Flying Armed'') to the flight crew of each additional connecting flight 
on the armed individual's itinerary.
    Under proposed Sec. 108.213(a)(4), non-federal law enforcement 
personnel would also be required to submit an original letter which is 
signed by an authorizing official from their employer, confirms to the 
air carrier the need to travel armed, identifies the trip itinerary, 
and provides a statement that the person has completed the training 
program ``Law Enforcement Officers Flying Armed'' as required by the 
FAA.
    The proposed regulation would also require the air carrier, in 
proposed Sec. 108.213(a)(7)(ii), to ensure that the armed person has 
fully completed and signed a form prior to boarding or entering a 
sterile area which states that the person has completed the training 
program ``Law Enforcement Officers Flying Armed'' as required by the 
FAA.
    It is proposed, in Sec. 108.213(b), that for flights where 
screening is not conducted, an individual cannot carry a deadly or 
dangerous weapon on board an aircraft. This restriction would not apply 
to law enforcement personnel of the U.S., or a State or political 
subdivision of a State, or of a municipality, who are authorized by his 
or her agency to have the weapon in connection with his or her duties, 
have completed the training program required by the FAA, and have 
notified the air carrier of the intent to fly armed prior to boarding 
the flight.
    The FAA believes that a person flying with a weapon should not be 
under the influence of alcoholic beverages which could impair his or 
her judgment. Accordingly, this notice, in Sec. 108.213(c), proposes to 
require that no person who has consumed an alcoholic beverage during 
the previous 8 hours may fly with a weapon accessible to that person. 
Similarly, the air carrier would not be permitted to serve alcohol to 
the person and the armed person would not be permitted to consume it on 
board.
    The notice proposes, in Sec. 108.213(d), that armed individuals 
would be required to keep their weapon concealed and out of view, 
either on their person or in their immediate reach if carried in any 
type of case, pouch, or container. A weapon may not be placed in 
overhead storage bins. This would ensure that the armed individual 
would remain in control of the weapon, and keep it out of the hands of 
unauthorized persons.
    This notice also proposes, in Sec. 108.213(f), that firearms 
tendered for transport in checked baggage shall be carried in a locked 
container that is hard-sided. The use of a hard-sided container to 
transport a firearm will protect the firearm from being damaged, 
inhibit the identification of baggage carrying firearms, and reduce the 
opportunity for unauthorized access to the firearm.
    Proposed paragraphs (e) and (g) are not new and reflect regulatory 
requirements found under existing Sec. 108.11(f) and (c), respectively.

Section 108.215  Carriage of Passengers Under the Control of Armed Law 
Enforcement Escorts

    Under this proposal, existing Sec. 108.21 entitled ``Carriage of 
passengers under the control of armed law enforcement escorts'' would 
be renumbered as new Sec. 108.215 under new Subpart C, Operations.
    Some confusion has arisen from the existing regulations about 
escorting prisoners. Air carriers have established their own policies 
on prisoner transport. Some air carriers require the prisoner to be 
restrained during the flight; others will not permit this practice. 
While these varying policies have complied with the requirements of 
this part, law enforcement officers have not been sure about the 
various air carrier procedures. The FAA proposes to provide more 
detailed requirements in part 108. Proposed Sec. 108.213 would apply to 
armed escorts, of course. Proposed Sec. 108.215 would provide 
additional requirements for the escort of prisoners.
    The number of escorts required for prisoner transport is determined 
by the risk presented by the person being escorted. Currently, a 
prisoner considered a ``maximum risk'' by the agency directing the 
transportation of the prisoner, requires two escorts. ``Maximum risk'' 
has no standard definition. The FAA proposes, in Sec. 108.215(a)(2), to 
adopt the ASAC's recommendations and replace the term ``maximum risk'' 
with the term ``high risk.'' A prisoner is considered a ``high risk'' 
if the prisoner is an escape risk, or is charged with, or convicted of, 
a violent crime. The determination that a prisoner is ``high risk'' is 
made by the agency directing the transportation of the prisoner. The 
FAA believes that this change of definition will lead to consistent 
interpretation by the law enforcement community.
    This section proposes that a person who is a ``high risk'' shall be 
under the control of at least two armed escorts. In addition, such 
individuals' use of hands would be restrained by an appropriate device 
which is attached to a separately locked waist restraint device. To 
provide for emergency egress, leg irons would not be permitted.
    This section proposes that prisoners not considered ``high risk'' 
would be termed ``low risk.'' A ``low risk'' prisoner would be under 
the control of at least one armed law enforcement escort. No more than 
two of these prisoners would be escorted by a single armed law 
enforcement officer.
    Moreover, this section proposes, in paragraph (a)(11)(i), that, as 
with ``high risk'' prisoners, ``low risk'' prisoners'

[[Page 41741]]

hands would also be restrained with an appropriate device attached to a 
separately locked waist restraint device, allowing minimum movement of 
the prisoners' hands. The FAA believes that this type of a restraint, 
and not leg irons, for the ``low risk'' prisoner would not compromise 
the safety of all other passengers on the flight or the requirements of 
the air carrier to be able to conduct an emergency evacuation without 
undue interference.
    Currently, part 108 requires that the seating of each prisoner 
under the control of law enforcement personnel must be placed in the 
rear-most passenger seat when boarding at the airport where the flight 
originates. Air carrier representatives to the ASAC have noted that, 
under part 108 requirements, passenger seating assignment problems 
continue to occur for flights involving the full itinerary of a person 
under law enforcement escort.
    Accordingly, in paragraph (a)(11)(iii), the FAA proposes to change 
the seating requirement for prisoners under escort and provide for 
seating the prisoner in the rear-most seat available. This will permit 
the air carrier latitude in assigning seats to escorts and prisoners 
under their control throughout the flight itinerary of the escorted 
prisoner.
    To further ease the implementation of the air carrier logistics for 
the transport of escorted prisoners, and minimize the opportunity or 
occasion for the prisoner to create a security risk to other 
passengers, paragraph (a)(4) proposes that the armed law enforcement 
escorts(s) notify the air carrier at least 24 hours before the 
scheduled departure, or as far in advance as possible, and notify the 
air carrier of any preexisting medical conditions of the prisoner 
generating unusual behavior that could pose a threat to the security of 
the flight.

Section 108.217  Transportation of Federal Air Marshals

    Under this proposal, existing Sec. 108.14 entitled ``Transportation 
of Federal Air Marshals'' would be renumbered as new Sec. 108.217 and 
included under new Subpart C, Operations.
    Existing Sec. 108.14 provides authority for the transportation of 
Federal Air Marshals (FMA's) on designated flights. This has been a 
requirement since 1985 following the terrorist attack on TWA flight 
847. This notice proposes to prohibit divulging the identify, seating, 
and purpose of FAM's to any person who does not have an operational 
need to know.
    The FAA believes that the active flight crew should be informed of 
the presence of FAM's on a designated flight. Moreover, FAM's are made 
aware of all other law enforcement personnel flying armed on a 
designated FAM flight. Proposed Sec. 108.213 (a)(6) and (a)(7) would 
not require that persons flying armed be informed of the FAM's 
presence, although FAM's would be informed of the presence of other 
armed persons. The FAA strongly believes that the protection offered by 
FAM's is greatly reduced when their presence and location aboard the 
aircraft is revealed to those who do not have a need to know.
    Under the existing authority of the Administrator and consistent 
with current practice, this notice proposes to require, under 
Sec. 108.217(b), the transportation of FAM's on another flight 
designated by the FAA when a previously designated flight is canceled.
    To ensure the effectiveness of FAM missions, the proposal would 
make clear that the FAM's would be permitted to observe the preflight 
searches of aircraft for weapons and explosives.

Section 108.219  Security of Aircraft and Facilities

    Under this proposal, existing Sec. 108.13 entitled ``Security of 
Airplanes and Facilities'' would be renumbered as new Sec. 108.219 and 
included under new Subpart C, Operations.
    Controlling access to proposed critical security areas is essential 
to security. Under existing Sec. 108.13, the air carrier is required to 
prohibit unauthorized access to its airplanes. This section proposes to 
require the air carrier to prevent access to any area it controls for 
security purposes, in addition to its aircraft.
    This notice proposes incorporating in part 108 several requirements 
previously implemented in air carrier security programs. Accordingly, 
it is proposed that the air carrier must prevent, rather than prohibit, 
access to areas controlled by the air carrier under an approved airport 
security program.
    The proposed rule includes language requiring the air carrier to 
prevent access by unauthorized persons to baggage or cargo tendered for 
transport aboard a passenger aircraft. Security measures applicable to 
cargo transported on passenger aircraft are currently contained in the 
air carrier's approved security program. This proposed requirement to 
include security measures in air carrier's procedures for the 
acceptance and transport of cargo reflects current practices and 
requirements implemented in air carrier security programs in 1994.
    The proposed rule would add a new paragraph (g) to proposed 
Sec. 108.219 to require air carriers to comply with the vehicle 
identification procedures contained in the airport operator's approved 
security program. Vehicle identification procedures are integral to 
controlling the movement in the restricted operations area. The 
proposed language in this section will require the air carrier to be in 
compliance with proposed Sec. 107.211 which regulates the issuance and 
control of airport operator-approved personnel and vehicle 
identification systems.

Section 108.221  Employement History, Verification, and Criminal 
History Records Checks

    The White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security 
recommended, and the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 
required, that the FAA adopt rules to provide for expanded background 
checks and criminal history records checks of person with 
responsibilities for screening passengers and property. On March 14, 
1997, the FAA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to respond to 
these mandates (62 FR 13262, March 19, 1997). The comments received in 
response to that notice will be considered in developing a final rule. 
However, while that notice refers to unescorted access to the SIDA, 
under this proposal the term SIDA would no longer be used. It is 
proposed instead that the rule would refer to unescorted access to 
critical security areas.

Section 108.223  Personnel Identification System

    This new section to part 108 proposes that air carriers establish 
and implement a personnel identification system.
    The problem centers on the lack of standard specific audit and loss 
control procedures for the identification media used by employees of 
the air carriers. ASAC members offering comment on the FAA discussion 
paper agreed that differing methods for control of identification media 
issued by the air carriers to their employees has the potential to 
create a security problem. Accordingly, the ASAC members expressed the 
belief that regulations should require standard and specific audit/loss 
control procedures for identification issued by the air carrier.
    This notice proposes that air carriers establish a personnel 
identification system mirroring the standards for accountability of 
airport-issued identification media. This new section to part 108 would 
require the air carrier to use a personnel identification system for 
its flight and cabin crewmembers that provides for the following: 
Issuance of the identification media only after satisfactory completion 
of background

[[Page 41742]]

checks; control and accountability standards for an identification 
media established in a FAA-approved security program; accurate 
identification and expiration dating of the identification media which 
can be readily recognized as current; and the periodic review and 
recertification of the identification media to determine its status for 
renewal or forfeiture.
    The FAA believes that these proposed requirements for air carrier-
issued identification media will meet the same standards as those 
identification control procedures currently being implemented for 
airport operators and will minimize the opportunity for a breach of air 
carrier security procedures.

Section 108.225  Security Coordinators and Crewmembers, Training

    This new section proposes to consolidate into new Subpart C, 
Operations, elements of existing training requirements for security 
coordinators and crewmembers found under current Secs. 108.23 and 
108.29. Sections 108.23 and 108.29 currently govern security training 
and knowledge of provisions of security-related information and are 
directed toward flight crewmembers and security coordinators. Proposed 
Sec. 108.225 would incorporate the regulatory requirements for flight 
crewmembers and security coordinators currently contained in 
Secs. 108.23 and 108.29 and would not otherwise change the regulatory 
requirements for security coordinator and crewmember training.

Section 108.227  Training and Knowledge of Persons With Security-
related Duties

    The FAA requires extensive training directed in air carrier 
security programs for personnel who conduct screening, perform 
extraordinary security procedures, or who supervise screening and 
extraordinary measures.
    This notice proposes to consolidate the training elements for 
security personnel of existing Secs. 108.23 and 108.29 into new Subpart 
C, Operations, under proposed Sec. 108.227. This new section would 
expand personnel training requirements in part 108 to require air 
carriers to train any person performing security functions in 
accordance with their approved security programs. Any individual 
performing a security function should have the ability and knowledge to 
perform that function properly and effective training programs require 
qualified instructors with thorough knowledge of the subject matter. 
This notice proposed that required security training be approved by the 
Administrator.
    The FAA proposes to give air carriers some flexibility in 
establishing security training schedules to facilitate the integration 
of security training with other required training. A 1-calendar-month 
grace period would be established to facilitate the scheduling of 
training. This would permit the air carrier to provide training from 1 
month before to 1 month after the calendar month in which that training 
was due, and the trainee would receive credit for the training as if it 
has been provided during the month due.

Subpart D--Threat and Threat Response

Section 108.301  Security Coordinators

    Under this proposal, current Secs. 108.10 and 108.29 would be 
consolidated into new Subpart D, Threat and Threat Response, under 
proposed Sec. 108.301. This proposed section would consolidate the 
duties and responsibilities of the Ground Security Coordinator and the 
In-flight Coordinator from existing Secs. 108.10 and 108.29. This 
section also would require the air carrier to designate an Air Carrier 
Security Coordinator to ensure that the FAA can contact a responsible 
security official at the corporate level whenever the need arise.
    Currently, Sec. 108.29 (a)(2)(ii) provides for the Ground Security 
Coordinator to immediately initiate corrective action for 
noncompliance. At foreign airports, the air carrier may not be 
performing all security measures and may be unable to achieve 
corrective action. Under this proposal, where security measures are 
provided by a host government agency or contractor, the air carrier 
shall notify the Administrator for assistance in resolving 
noncompliance issues. The Administrator could then work with the host 
government to address the issues.
    Section 108.29(b) states that the requirements of Sec. 108.29(a), 
regarding the duties of the Ground Security Coordinator, apply to 
security functions performed by both direct employees and contract 
employees of the air carrier. The proposed section would omit this as 
unnecessary. The air carrier is responsible for carrying out various 
security duties, and is responsible for managing the employees who do 
so whether they are direct or contract employees.

Section 108.303  Bomb or Air Piracy Threats

    Under this proposal, existing Sec. 108.19 entitled ``Security 
threats and procedures'' would be renumbered as new Sec. 108.303 under 
new Subpart D, Threat and Threat Response. The title of proposed 
Sec. 108.303 would be changed to ``Bomb or air piracy threats.''
    Air carriers are required to conduct a search after receiving a 
specific and credible bomb threat and the airport operator is 
responsible for law enforcement support. To ensure proper coordination, 
this notice would include the existing air carrier security program 
requirement that the air carrier notify the airport operator 
immediately of a specific and credible bomb threat to its aircraft or 
ground facilities.
    Additonally, the air carrier would be required, under this proposed 
section, to deplane all passengers from a specifically threatened 
aircraft to ensure their safety and a more effective search of the 
aircraft. The air carrier's security experts, generally in consultation 
with the FAA and other government entities, evaluate threat information 
against specific FAA-established criteria to determine specificity and 
credibility of the threat.
    Current rules do not address threats made against a ground facility 
(other than as part of a threat to a flight). Proposed paragraph (c) 
would also include requirements for responding to a specific and 
credible threat against a specific ground facility. This could include 
informing all other air carriers at the facility and conducting a 
security inspection.
    The FAA recognizes that local, municipal, or State ordinances may 
impose upon air carriers or airport operators other reporting 
requirements for dealing with bomb or air piracy threats. The proposed 
FAA requirement that the air carrier report to the airport operator 
only specific and credible bomb threats to its aircraft or its ground 
facility would not absolve any air carrier from its responsibilities 
regarding the reporting of bomb or air piracy threats under local, 
municipal, or State regulations or ordinances.

Section 108.305  Security Directives and Information Circulars

    Under this proposal, existing Sec. 108.18 entitled ``Security 
Directives and Information Circulars'' would be renumbered to new 
Sec. 108.305 under new Subpart D, Threat and Threat Response.
    The FAA has found that, in some instances, valuable time has been 
lost by air carriers not receiving Security Directives in a timely 
manner. Currently the FAA requires air carriers to acknowledge receipt 
of Security Directives within 24 hours. However, that leaves too large 
a time within which the FAA may not be aware that air carrier personnel 
have actually received the security Directive. To

[[Page 41743]]

assure that Security Directives are received promptly, the FAA proposes 
to require air carriers to verbally acknowledge receipt of Security 
Directives immediately and to follow up with written confirmation 
within 24 hours. This will ensure that the FAA knows that the timely 
delivery of critical security information to air carriers has occurred.
    Air carriers currently are required to specify the method by which 
they have implemented the measures in the Security Directive. The FAA 
proposes that the air carrier also submit to its Principal Security 
Inspectors copies of written measures/implementing procedures issued to 
their stations. This proposal will assist the FAA in determining that 
the air carrier fully understands the security requirements in the 
Security Directive and that the proposed implementation is correct.
    The proposed measures also would modify the existing Security 
Directive process. Existing part 108 provides that the air carrier 
shall specify, not later than 72 hours after delivery of a Security 
Directive, the method by which the measures in the Security Directive 
``have been implemented,'' unless the Security Directive provides a 
different time. This appears to assume that, within 72 hours after 
receipt of the Security Directive, procedures have, in fact, been 
implemented. However, if the Security Directive does not require 
implementation within 72 hours, it is not clear from the existing rule 
when the implementation methods must be provided to the FAA. The 
proposed rule would make clear that, unless the Security Directive 
provides otherwise, within 72 hours after receipt of the Security 
Directive, the air carrier would provide the FAA the implementation 
methods that are either in effect or will be in effect when the 
Security Directive is implemented. In response, the FAA would either 
approve the air carrier's proposed alternative measures or notify the 
airport operator to modify the alternative measures to comply with the 
requirements of the Security Directive within 48 hours after receiving 
proposed alternative measures.
    Moreover, language is proposed regarding those instances when the 
air carrier is compelled to submit, for approval by the Administrator, 
alternative measures for compliance with a Security Directive. Under 
the proposed language, the Administrator would either approve the air 
carrier's proposed alternative measures or notify the air carrier to 
modify the alternative measures to comply with the requirements of the 
Security Directive within 48 hours after receiving the air carrier's 
proposed alternative measures.

Section 108.307  Security Contingency Plan

    Contingency plans are an existing part of airport and air carrier 
security programs. They contain security measures that can be 
immediately and flexibly applied to counter threats that arise quickly. 
In the interest of security, the security-sensitive details of the 
contingency plan cannot be included in a public regulation, but 
proposed new Sec. 108.307 would include in the proposed rule a 1987 
security program amendment (amended in 1994) requiring air carriers and 
airport operators to have and implement a plan. An amendment to the 
approved air carrier standard security program (March 1994) required 
air carriers to also have and implement a plan.
    The application of contingency measures in response to the Persian 
Gulf War provided valuable lessons on contingency planning and the FAA 
used this information to make changes to air carrier and airport 
security programs. Recently, the FAA and the air carriers thoroughly 
reviewed these plans to incorporate changes and ``lessons learned'' 
from response to the elevated threat during the Persian Gulf War. The 
method for implementation of these was modified to allow for a greater 
degree of flexibility, and new test procedures also were adopted. The 
ASAC endorsed the final product of this effort and supported the 
codification of contingency plan requirements for this proposed 
revision of part 108.
    This proposed new section would require air carriers to implement 
FAA-issued contingency measures contained in their security programs 
when directed by the Administrator. It also proposes that air carriers 
test these contingency plans to ensure that all parties involved are 
aware of their responsibilities and that information contained in the 
plan is current. Air carriers also would be required to participate in 
airport operator's tests, to ensure that they understood how to respond 
to contingencies at each airport.

Cross Reference

    To identify where present regulations would be relocated in this 
proposed rulemaking, the following cross-reference list is provided:

                          Cross Reference Table                         
------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Old section citation                 New section citation    
------------------------------------------------------------------------
108.1....................................  108.1                        
108.3....................................  108.3                        
108.5....................................  108.101                      
108.7....................................  108.103                      
108.9....................................  108.201                      
108.10/.29...............................  108.301                      
108.11...................................  108.213                      
108.13...................................  108.219                      
108.14...................................  108.217                      
108.15...................................  108.211                      
108.17...................................  108.205                      
108.18...................................  108.305                      
108.19...................................  108.303                      
108.20...................................  108.207                      
108.21...................................  108.215                      
108.23/.29...............................  108.225/227                  
108.25...................................  108.105                      
108.27...................................  108.5                        
108.29/.23...............................  108.225                      
108.31...................................  108.209                      
108.33...................................  108.221                      
N/A......................................  108.203                      
N/A......................................  108.223                      
N/A......................................  108.7                        
N/A......................................  108.9                        
N/A......................................  108.307                      
------------------------------------------------------------------------

International Civil Aviation Organization and Joint Aviation 
Regulations

    In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to comply with ICAO 
Standards and Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. 
As mentioned in the section-by-section analysis of Sec. 108.101 above, 
this proposal is consistent with the ICAO security standards. As 
discussed above in the ``Section-by-Section analysis'' under 
Sec. 108.101, the ICAO standards do not differentiate security 
requirements by aircraft seating capacity and they require the 
screening of passengers for all international flights. The FAA is not 
aware of any diffences that this proposal would present if adopted. Any 
differences that may be presented in comments to this proposal, 
however, will be take into consideration.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    In this NPRM, Aircraft Operator Security/Part 108 Revision, 
proposed Secs. 108.5, 108.103, 108.105, 108.205, 108.227, 108.303, and 
108.305 contain information collection requirements. As required by the 
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d) ), the FAA has 
submitted a copy of these proposed sections to the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) for its review.
    The information to be collected is needed to allow air carriers 
with

[[Page 41744]]

approved security programs to check radiation leakage on X-ray 
equipment used for property security screening at least annually, to 
report aircraft piracy as part of the required security program, and to 
maintain security training records.
    The estimated annual reporting and recordkeeping burden hours is 
estimated to be 8121, and is broken down as follows:
    (1) Reporting and recordkeeping requirements for the training 
records for crewmembers, security coordinators, and individuals 
performing security-related function--24 hours for each part 108 air 
carrier operator.
    (2) Preparation of necessary air carrier standard security program 
implementing documentation--6 hours for each part 108 air carrier 
operator.
    (3) Maintaining copies and availability of the security programs 
for use by civil aviation security inspectors of the FAA upon request--
1 hour for each part 108 air carrier operator.
    (4) Air carrier preparation of request for security program 
amendment--1 hour for each part 108 air carrier operator.
    (5) Recordkeeping by the air carrier of each X-ray survey conducted 
for use by FAA officials upon request--.5 hours for each part 108 air 
carrier operator.
    (6) Recordkeeping by the air carriers showing self-evaluation of 
security functions performed at each air carrier station and training 
to all personnel performing security functions--.5 hours for each part 
108 air carrier operator.
    (7) Reporting of acts or suspected acts of aircraft piracy to the 
FAA. This report is not normally in written form and it determined to 
be a request for assistance--.2 hours for each part 108 air carrier 
operator.
    (8) Air carrier acknowledgment of receipt of Security Directives--
1.1 hours for each part 108 air carrier operator.
    It is estimated that this proposal will affect 266 part 108 
aircraft operators annually.
    Organizations and individuals desiring to submit comments on the 
information collection requirements should direct them to the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs, OMB, Room 1235, New Executive 
Office Building, Washington, DC 20503; Attention: Desk Officer for 
Federal Aviation Administration. These comments should reflect whether 
the proposed collection is necessary; whether the agency's estimate of 
the burden is accurate; how the equality, utility, and clarity of the 
information to be collected can be enhanced; and how the burden of the 
collection can be minimized. A copy of the comments also should be 
submitted to the FAA Rules Docket.
    OMB is required to make a decision concerning the collection of 
information contained in this NPRM between 30 and 60 days after 
publication in the Federal Register. Therefore, a comment to OMB is 
best assured of having its full effect if OMB receives it within 30 
days of publication. This does not affect the deadline for the public 
to comment to the NPRM.

Regulatory Evaluation Summary

    Proposed changes to Federal regulations must undergo several 
economic analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 directs that each 
Federal agency shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned 
determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its 
costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 requires agencies 
to analyze the economic effect of regulatory changes on small entities. 
Third, the Office of Management and Budget directs agencies to assess 
the effect of regulatory changes on international trade. In conducting 
these analyses, the FAA has determined that this Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (NPRM) would generate benefits that justify its costs and is 
``not a significant regulatory action'' as defined in the Executive 
Order. The FAA estimates that the NPRM would not have a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. No part of 
the proposed rule is expected to constitute a barrier to international 
trade. In addition, this proposed rule does not contain any Federal 
intergovernmental or private sector mandates. Therefore, the 
requirements of Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 do 
not apply. These analyses, available in the docket, are summarized 
below.

Costs

    The total cost of compliance of the proposed rule over the next 10 
years is estimated to be $42.8 million (1994 dollars). On a discounted 
basis (7 percent rate of interest), the proposed rule would impose a 
cost of $31.3 million. Of the 26 sections amended by the proposed rule, 
only five sections would result in cost impacts. The other 21 sections 
would not impose costs because they contain minor definitional, 
clarification, and procedural changes. They also would codify existing 
practices as contained in the air carrier standard security program 
(ACSSP). Those sections that would potentially impose costs are 
discussed below.

Section 108.101  Adoption and Implementation

    Depending on aircraft seating configuration, current regulations 
specify the requirements of a security program (full, modified, or 
none) that is required. The proposed changes to this section would 
increase the number of aircraft operators that must adopt and maintain 
security programs. It would also require any private charter operation 
deplaning or enplaning through a sterile area to adopt and implement a 
full security program. Specifically, section 108.101 would require that 
these aircraft operators adopt and implement security programs: (1) 
Scheduled U.S. passenger and public charter operations using an 
aircraft having passenger seating configuration of greater than 60 
seats; (2) Scheduled U.S. passenger and public charter operations using 
an aircraft having a passenger seating configuration of less than 61 
seats when passengers are enplaned or deplaned into a sterile area; and 
(3) A scheduled U.S. passenger, public charter, or private charter 
operation with an aircraft having a passenger seating configuration of 
less than 61 seats engaged in operations to, from, or outside the U.S. 
Section 108.101 would require these aircraft operators to adopt and 
implement modified security programs.
    Because these carriers are not currently required to maintain a 
security program, the incremental cost of this section would be the 
cost to adopt and maintain a security program. In addition, any 
operators seeking certification in these size categories in the future 
would bear the same incremental cost. Of the estimated 2,970 U.S. 
certificated air carriers, approximately 51 would be affected by the 
proposed rule change. Since the major and national air carriers and the 
large regional carriers already implement security programs, the major 
impact of this section would be on the small operators.
    As the result of this proposal, an estimated 51 existing operators 
would incur a potential cost of compliance of $145,503 (or $105,428, 
discounted) over the next 10 years. This cost estimate of $145,503 was 
derived by multiplying the one-time application cost of $273 and the 
recurring staff cost of $258 times the number of potentially impacted 
operators of 51 over the 10-year period. Similarly, new applicants 
would also be impacted. This evaluation assumes that three to four new 
applicants would file for certification in this carrier group annually. 
This action would result in an estimated potential

[[Page 41745]]

cost of compliance of $18,585 (or $13,116, discounter) over the next 10 
years. This cost estimate of $18,585 was derived by multiplying the 
one-time application cost of $273 and the recurring staff cost of $258 
times the number of potentially impacted new applicant operators of 35 
(or 3 to 4 annually) over the 10-year period. Thus, the total potential 
cost of compliance for this section is $164,088 (or $118,545, 
discounted).
    The cost estimate $164,000 does not take into account the cost of 
training associated with adopting and implementing a security program. 
This is because there is uncertainty about the number and magnitude of 
the impacted operators. Based primarily on the informed judgement of 
FAA technical personnel, there would be little or no training cost 
associated with implementing and adopting the security program for most 
of the impacted operators. For most of these small operators, only one 
person (who performs a multitude of functions) would develop and 
implement the security program. For this person, little or no training 
would be required. However, in those instances in which other persons 
have to become familiar with the security program, there would 
additional costs for training. It is not known as to how many of these 
other persons would have to be trained and the amount of training 
needed. As the result of this uncertainty, the FAA solicits comments 
from the aviation community as the full impact of the proposal on 
impacted part 108 operators.

Section 108.277  Training and Knowledge of Persons With Security-
Related Duties

    The regulation governing security training currently is directed 
toward flight crewmembers and Security Coordinators. The FAA requires 
extensive training for personnel who conduct screening, supervisors, 
and other persons performing extraordinary security procedures in air 
carriers to train any person performing security functions in 
accordance with their approved security programs. Security training 
would be conducted by an instructor trained and approved by the 
Administrator. The potential incremental cost for this proposed section 
is estimated to be $13.3 million, or $10.1 million (discounted), over 
the next 10 years. This estimate of $13.3 million was derived in four 
steps. First, the FAA Training cost estimate of $570,620 was derived by 
multiplying the FAA's Instructor Salary Cost per training session 
($1,030) times the number of training sessions (554) over the next 10 
years. Second, the Initial Air Carrier Training cost estimate of $4.7 
million was derived by adding the cost of training employees ($4.3 
million) to the cost for an instructor ($422,000) over the 10-year 
period. Third, the cost estimate of $8 million for annual air carrier 
training requirements was derived by combining the employee training 
cost estimate ($7.3 million) with that for an instructor ($700,000) 
over the 10-year period. And, last, all three of these cost components 
were summed.
    While this section of the evaluation has attempted to account for 
the potential cost that bomb threats would have on passengers, it does 
not address the potential impact on air carrier operators. This 
omission is due to the fact that the FAA has no data from which to 
reasonably estimate what the potential cost impact would be in the 
event of bomb threats. Because of this omission, there is uncertainty 
as to the impact, in the form of delays, bomb threats would have on 
aircraft operators and other entities. As the result of uncertainty 
associated with the potential cost of delays caused by bomb threats, 
the FAA solicits comments from the aviation community. Commenters are 
asked to focus on the potential cost of delays this proposed section 
would impose on aircraft operators and other entities (including 
passengers). The FAA requests that comments be as detailed as possible 
and cite or include supporting documentation.

Section 108.303  Bomb or Air Piracy Threats

    Air carrier operators follow a set of standard procedures, mandated 
by the FAA, in the event that an operation is threatened by an act of 
terrorism (bomb threat, hijacking, etc.). Currently, this does not 
always require that the aircraft be cleared. The FAA proposes to amend 
these procedures to require that an operator deplane all passengers on 
board a threatened aircraft so that the appropriate security personnel 
may conduct a security inspection.

Section 108.305  Security Directives and Information Circulars

    This revision proposes that all air carrier operators develop and 
implement standardized procedures to deal with security directives and 
information circulars issued by FAA. The FAA proposes that operators 
respond immediately to a directive by acknowledging its receipt by 
phone and, within 72 hours (unless otherwise specified), to provide a 
written summary of procedures implemented to the FAA. The potential 
incremental cost of this proposed rule change is estimated to be 
$665,300 (or $467,300, discounted). This estimate of $665,300 to Notify 
the Principal Security Inspector (PSI), including acknowledgment and 
forwarding of results, was derived by combining the cost estimates for 
Staff to Process Directives ($388,000) with that for phone calls and 
faxes ($277,000).

Section 108.307  Security Contingency Plan

    This section would require air carrier operators to adopt 
contingency plans developed by the FAA to test them periodically in 
coordination with the respective airport operator testing of 
contingency plans. Thus, based on the informed opinion of FAA security 
personnel, twelve hours would be required for each test of the 
contingency plan each year; the proposed revisions to this section 
would impose an incremental cost of $26.3 million to operators over 10 
years (or $19.0 million, discounted). This estimate of $26.3 million to 
ensure conformity with airport plans was derived by employing two 
steps. The first step estimated the one-time cost for ensuring 
conformity by conducting air carrier initial review of contingency 
plans. In the first year (1996) only, cost estimation for this step 
represents multiplying the number of impacted air carriers (185) times 
the number of airports involved (25) times the number of hours of work 
required to review plan (16) times the hourly salary of air carrier 
security personnel ($32.25). For example, this computation would result 
in an estimated one-time compliance cost of $2,386,500 
(185 x 25 x 16 x $32.25), over the 10-year period, for the initial 
review of contingency plans. And, the second step of ensuring 
conformity consists of testing the contingency plan. Over the next 10 
years, cost estimation for this step represents multiplying the number 
of impacted air carries (1,850=185 x 10) times the number of airports 
involved (25) times the number of hours of work required to test plan 
(16) times the hourly salary of air carrier security personnel 
($32.25). For example, this computation would result in an estimated 
one-time compliance cost of $23,865,000 (1,850 x 25 x 16 x $32.25), 
over the 10-year period, for testing of contingency plans. Thus, the 
total compliance cost for this section was derived by summing the two 
cost components ($26,251,500=$2,386,500+$23,885,000).

[[Page 41746]]

Benefits

    The proposed rules to amend parts 107 and 108 are intended to 
enhance aviation safety for U.S. airports and air carriers in ways that 
are not currently addressed. The potential benefits of the proposed 
rules would be a strengthening of both airport and air carrier security 
by adding to their effectiveness. Security for U.S. airlines is 
achieved through an intricate set of interdependent requirements.
    It would be difficult to separate out any one change or set of 
changes in the proposed rules to amend part 107 or part 108 and 
identify to what extent that change or set of changes, alone, would 
prevent a criminal or terrorist act in the future. Certainly, it would 
be difficult to show, for example, that air carrier contingency plans 
(proposed Sec. 108.307) or training procedures (proposed Sec. 108.227) 
would be solely responsible for preventing a future criminal or 
terrorist incident. Nevertheless, these changes in both proposed rules 
are an integral part of the total program needed by the airport 
operator and the FAA to thwart such incidents.
    I would also be extremely difficult to determine to what extent an 
averted terrorist incident could be credited to either airport operator 
security or to air carrier security. Accordingly, the benefits from the 
proposed rules for parts 107 (airport operators) and 108 (air carriers) 
have been combined in this benefit-cost analysis. These benefits are 
comprised of the criminal and terrorist incidents that these rules are 
intended to prevent; hence, these benefits will be contrasted against 
the costs of the proposed changes to parts 107 and 108.
    Since 1987, the FAA has initiated rulemaking and promulgated five 
security-related amendments that have amended both parts 107 and 108. 
These amendments added to the effectiveness of both parts in that they 
were designed to address certain aspects of the total security system 
to help prevent further criminal and terrorist activities. In 1996, 
both Congress and the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and 
Security (Gore Commission) recommended further specific actions to 
increase aviation security. President Clinton, in July 1996, declared 
that the threat of both foreign and domestic terrorism to aviation is a 
national threat.

Benefits of Preventing Criminal and Terrorist Incidents

    The requirements in parts 107 and 108 allow the FAA to combat 
criminal and terrorist incidents with a variety of actions. The primary 
incidents that recent rulemakings have addressed include bombings, 
hijackings, and sabotage. In order to increase the accuracy of the 
analysis, these criminal and terrorist incidents have been divided into 
classes.
    Bombing incidents involving explosive have been grouped into two 
main categories:
     Class I Explosion incidents include tragedies, such as the 
explosion of Pan Am Flight 103, that involve the loss of an entire 
aircraft and incur a large number of fatalities; and
     Class II Explosion incidents include terrorist attempts 
that were partially averted (explosions that only partially damaged an 
aircraft) or that occurred outside the aircraft (usually in the airport 
itself), and that included some injuries and/or fatalities. An example 
of such an incident is TWA Flight 840, which resulted in 4 fatalities 
and injuries.
    These two types of incidents differ significantly both in terms of 
costs and in terms of their predictability. Depending on the exact 
circumstances, the costs for a Class II Explosion can vary widely. The 
costs of a single Class I Explosion incident substantially exceed those 
of a Class II Explosion incident.
    Six explosions have taken place on U.S. air carriers between 1979 
and 1988; five of these were Class II Explosion incidents, while one 
(in 1988) was a Class I Explosion incident.
    Most hijackings do not involve any deaths or injuries, the cost is 
calculated based on operating costs (crew salaries, fuel, and 
maintenance), passenger time loss, and the loss of future revenues. 
However, a few hijackings over the last 15 years have involved 
fatalities or injuries. One incident resulted in a large number of 
fatalities and injuries. Hijacking incidents have been divided into 
three main categories:
     Class I Hijacking incidents are typified by the September 
5, 1986 hijacking of a Pan Am flight in Karachi, Pakistan that caused a 
large number of fatalities and injuries (this flight had 22 fatalities 
and 125 injuries);
     Class II Hijacking incidents include hijackings that are 
based on other casualty-related incidents when one or a few death(s) or 
injury(ies) occur. An example of an incident in this category would be 
the 1985 hijacking of a TWA flight en route from Athens to Rome that 
was hijacked to Lebanon.
     Class III Hijacking incidents involve the forcible 
diversion of an airplane with no loss of life or injuries. The majority 
of hijackings fall into this category; hijackings typical of this 
category include many in which the hijacker's destination was Havana, 
Cuba.
    Sabotage, in this evaluation, refers strictly to an incident like 
the PSA 1771 incident. Sabotage incidents have been subdivided into two 
categories:
     Class I Sabotage incidents involve a major loss of life, 
typified by the PSA 1771 incident; and
     Class II Sabotage incidents include a few injuries, such 
as the incident at National Airport in 1990 where a former employee of 
Ogden Allied Services gained access to the AOA.
    In order to estimate the magnitude of potential safety benefits 
that would be generated by the proposed rule, this evaluation employed 
two steps. First, the historical record was examined related to the 
number of criminal and terrorist incidents from 1985 to 1994. Those 
incidents were examined and summed for each of the seven categories 
shown in Table 1 (Column A). Second, each of those seven categories of 
incidents were assigned monetary values (as shown in Table 1, Column 
B). And last, the number of incidents in each of the seven categories 
were multiplied times their respective monetary values and summed. This 
last computation resulted in estimated potential benefits of $1.871 
billion (or $1.334 billion, discounted) over the next 10 years in 1994 
dollars. In this computation, the present value of each category of 
incident was calculated using the current discount rate of 7 percent. 
In order to provide the public and government officials with a 
benchmark comparison of the expected safety benefits of rulemaking 
actions over an extended period of time with estimated costs in 
dollars, the FAA currently uses a value of $2.7 million and $518,000 to 
statistically represent a human fatality and a major injury avoided, 
respectively.
    Table 1 shows the benefits of preventing potential Class I 
Explosion incidents, Class I through III Hijacking incidents, and Class 
I and Class II Sabotage incidents. The number of projected incidents 
are the same as the number of historical or past incidents.

[[Page 41747]]



                           Table 1.--Monetary Value of Incidents by Type and Category                           
                                                 [1994 Dollars]                                                 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                (Column A)                                      
                                                                number of       (Column B)         (Column C)   
                Type of incidents by category                      past       monetary value     monetary value 
                                                                projected     (undiscounted)    (discounted) per
                                                                incidents      per incident         incident    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Class I Explosions...........................................            1      1,416,572,478       $994,941,230
Class II Explosions..........................................            2          7,731,000          5,429,931
Class I Hijackings...........................................            1        124,784,223         87,643,214
Class II Hijackings..........................................            1          3,467,403          2,435,357
Class III Hijackings.........................................           18            249,403            175,168
Class I Sabotage.............................................            1        304,915,169        234,083,083
Class II Sabotage............................................            1          1,035,000            727,642
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Summing the product of the projected incidents by their 
undiscounted and discounted values yield total benefits of $1.871 
billion and $1.334 billion, respectively.

Changing Dynamics of Aviation Security Activity

    In this evaluation, the potential safety benefits were estimated 
based on the historical record of 25 criminal and terrorist incidents 
from 1985 to 1994.
    Members of foreign terrorist groups and representatives from state 
sponsors of terrorism are present in the United States. There is 
evidence that a few foreign terrorist groups have well-established 
capability and infrastructures to support terrorism. In addition, the 
presence of international extremists in the Untied States is growing, 
and the potential threat from them is increasing. The activities of 
some of these individuals and groups go beyond fund-raising to 
recruiting other persons (both foreign and U.S.) for activities that 
include training with weapons and making bombs. Some of these 
extremists operate in small groups and act without guidance or support 
from state sponsors. This makes it difficult to identify them or to 
anticipate and counter their activities.
    Investigation into the February 1993 attack on the World Trade 
Center (WTC) uncovered a foreign terrorist threat in the U.S. more 
serious than previously known. The WTC investigation and the discovery 
in 1995 of Ramzi Yousef's plot to bomb U.S. air carriers operating in 
Asia have shown that: (1) Foreign terrorists conducting future attacks 
in the U.S. may choose civil aviation as a target despite the many more 
easily accessible targets that are equally symbolic of America, (2) 
foreign terrorists have demonstrated their ability to operate in the 
U.S., and (3) foreign terrorists are capable of building and artfully 
concealing improvised explosive devices that pose a serious challenge 
to aviation security. Civil aviation's prominence as a perspective 
target is clearly illustrated by the circumstances of the Asian 
conspiracy: The terrorists persisted in planning to attack aviation 
even when there were other targets identifiable with the U.S. in the 
area and even when they knew security measures protecting aviation were 
at a high level.
    In addition, the bombing of a federal office building in Oklahoma 
City shows the potential for terrorism from domestic groups. Civil 
aviation's prominence would also be evident to domestic groups. so the 
threat to civil aviation needs to be prevented and/or countered from 
both domestic and foreign sources and potential domestic sources.
    The agency recognizes that potential benefits could change as the 
result of the changing dynamics of aviation security. While the 
benefits estimate contained in this analysis is valid based on those 
incidents cited in the historical record, this baseline could change 
upon the future assessment of an increased credible security threat(s). 
Accordingly, the pool of potential safety benefits could increase and 
be applied to any future rulemaking actions related to such threats.

Recent Security-Related Rules--Updated Methodology

    Each of the other five security rule that the FAA has promulgated 
since 1987 has been updated from its respective base year dollars to 
1994 using the implicit price deflator for Gross Domestic Product. The 
present value of the costs was recalculated using the current discount 
rate of 7 percent. The FAA has developed new data that improved 
components of past analyses. Table 2 below summarizes the total updated 
costs, which total $727.1 million ($497.8 million, discounted).

  Table 2.--Summary of the Costs of Security-Related Rulemaking Actions 
                             [1994 Dollars]                             
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                          Costs              Costs      
     Rulemaking action (year)         (undiscounted)      (discounted)  
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Access to Secured Areas on                                              
 Airports (1988)..................       $667,577,115       $452,643,386
Security Directives (1989)........             56,050             39,367
Explosives Detection Systems                                            
 (1989)\1\........................                N/A                N/A
X-Ray Systems (1990)\2\...........            741,342            741,342
Employment Standards (1990).......         58,679,348         44,339,289
                                   -------------------------------------
    Total Cost: Existing Rules....        727,053,855        497,763,384
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See Appendix C to full regulatory evaluation.                       
\2\ For this rulemaking action, discounted and undiscounted costs are   
  the same. While this procedure is unusual, it is appropriate for the  
  rule. This assessment is based on the fact that the cost of compliance
  impact on U.S. airport operators represents the ``opportunity cost of 
  capital.'' In order to comply with this rule, impacted airport        
  operators were expected to purchase X-Ray systems from one to four    
  years sooner than they otherwise would have.                          


[[Page 41748]]

Comparison of Costs and Benefits

    The benefits sections of this analysis describes how the FAA 
calculated a single point value of benefits upon the prevention of the 
assumed mean number of each of seven categories of criminal or 
terrorist incidents during the next 10 years. As discussed, above, the 
undiscounted benefits of avoiding this particular combination of 
incidents is $1.871 billion (or $1.334 billion, discounted). A simple 
comparison of this single value benefit estimate to the combined 
estimated costs of the proposed amendments to parts 107 and 108 ($217.0 
million or $174.0 million discounted) suggests that expected benefits 
exceed estimated costs.
    The FAA performed a computer analysis calculating the probability 
and associated benefits of each possible combination of occurrences. 
The results of that analysis indicates that the probability exceeds 95% 
that obtaining combinations of occurrences where the benefits of 
avoiding any of these combinations of occurrence will exceed the 
estimated costs of these proposed rules. When the estimated cost of 
these two proposed rules ($217 million, undiscounted) are added to the 
cost of the five security rules ($727 million, undiscounted) already 
issues, the combined cost is $944 million ($727+$217), undiscounted. 
The probability of obtaining a combination of occurrence yielding 
benefits equal to or greater than $944 million is over 68%. The FAA, 
therefore, has determined that the benefits of these two proposed rules 
exceed their costs, even when the costs of these two rules are added to 
the cost of the previously issued rules.

Initial Regulatory Flexibility Determination

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) was enacted by 
Congress to ensure that small entities are not unnecessarily burdened 
by government regulations. the RFA requires agencies to review rules 
that may have a ``significant economic impact on a substantial number 
of small entities.''
    In accordance with FAA Order 2100.14A (Regulatory Flexibility and 
Guidance, dated July 15, 1983), The FAA's criterion for a ``substantial 
number'' is a number that is not less than 11 and that is more than one 
third of the small entities subject to the rule. For this evaluation, 
small entities refer to U.S. operators of aircraft for hire with nine 
or fewer aircraft owned, but not necessarily operated. These small 
entities include: (1) Schedules aircraft operators whose entire fleet 
has a seating capacity of over 60, (2) Other scheduled aircraft 
operators whose entire fleet has a seating capacity of less than 60 
(e.g., commuter operators and small majors/nationals types), and (3) 
Unscheduled aircraft operators. Unscheduled operators include air taxi 
and large charter types.
    The criterion for ``significant economic impact'' is defined as the 
FAA's assigned annualized net compliance cost threshold to that entity. 
When the cost of compliance for a small entity, as imposed by a 
proposed rule, is equal to or exceeds this annualized threshold level, 
it is considered to be significant. The annualized threshold amount for 
scheduled aircraft operators is $121,300. For other scheduled aircraft 
operators, this amounts to $67,800. For unscheduled aircraft operators, 
this amounts to $4,800. These cost estimates have been converted from 
1983 to 1994 dollars.
    The proposed rule would potentially impact small U.S. air carriers 
engaged in charter services and selected helicopter operators. These 
aircraft operators are engaged in services under parts 121 and 135. An 
examination of small entities under each of these parts, by size of 
aircraft, will be discussed by each proposed section as follows. (The 
non-annual costs of the proposed rule have been annualized by 
multiplying them by a capital recovery factor of .14238 (10 years, 7 
percent).)

Section 108.101  Security Program: Adoption and Implementation

    The proposed change to Sec. 108.101 would only affect an estimated 
51 operators. This estimate of 51 includes: 15 non-scheduled domestic 
service operators with greater than 60 seats, 11 scheduled 
international service operators with fewer than 31 seats, and 25 non-
scheduled international service operators (including air taxi 
operations). This proposed section would impose an annualized cost of 
compliance of $285 for each of the 51 aircraft operators.

Section 108.277  Training and Knowledge of Persons With Security-
Related Duties

    The proposed change to Sec. 108.227 would affect an estimated 2,930 
aircraft operators. This estimate of 2,930 includes: 74 scheduled 
operators with between 31 and 60 seats, 131 scheduled operators with 
less than 31 seats, 15 non-scheduled operators with greater than 60 
seats, and 2,710 non-scheduled operators with 60 or less seats. This 
proposed section would impose an annualized cost of compliance of $470 
for each of the 2,930 aircraft operators.

Section 108.303  Bomb or Piracy Threats

    The proposed change to Sec. 108.303 would affect all 2,970 U.S. 
aircraft operators. This proposed section would impose in annualized 
cost of compliance of $8 for each of the 2.970 aircraft operators.

Section 108.305  Information Circulars

    The proposed change to Sec. 108.305 would affect an estimated 185 
U.S. aircraft operators. This proposed section would impose an 
annualized cost of compliance of $360 for each of the 185 operators 
that would be affected by this section.

Section 108.307  Contingency Plans

    The proposed change to Sec. 108.307 would affect an estimated 185 
U.S. aircraft operators. This would impose an annualized cost of 
compliance of $14,600 for each of the 185 operators that would be 
affected by this section.
    The sum of the annualized costs of each section is approximately 
$16,000 (rounded). Of the total annualized cost of $16,000, an 
estimated $760 (proposed sections 108.101, 108.227, and 108.303) would 
potentially impact scheduled and unscheduled aircraft operators. Since 
unscheduled aircraft operators are potentially impacted, this 
assessment will include the lowest annualized threshold level of $4,800 
(from a worst cast standpoint). This cost estimate of $810 is less than 
the annualized threshold amount of $4,800. The remaining annualized 
cost of $15,240 would only potentially impact scheduled aircraft 
operators. This estimate of $15,240 is less than the annualized 
threshold estimates for scheduled and other scheduled operators 
($121,300 and $67,800 respectively). Thus, the proposed rule would not 
impose a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities (scheduled or unscheduled). For this reason, a regulatory 
flexibility analysis is not required.

International Trade Impact Assessment

    In accordance with the Office of Management and Budget memorandum 
dated March 1983, federal agencies engaged in rulemaking activities are 
required to assess the effects of regulatory changes on international 
trade.
    The proposed rule would have no impact on the competitive posture 
of either U.S. carriers doing business in foreign countries or foreign 
carriers doing business in the United States. This assessment is based 
on several factors. First, it would not have an

[[Page 41749]]

impact on most existing part 121 scheduled operators, since they are 
already in compliance. However, it would impact non-scheduled aircraft 
operators with more than 60 passenger seats (primarily, large charter 
types), non-scheduled aircraft operators with less than 60 seats 
(primarily, small air taxi types), some scheduled aircraft operators 
with more than 60 seats, and all scheduled aircraft operators with less 
than 31 passenger seats (commuter types). U.S. non-scheduled aircraft 
operators (regardless of the number of seats) generally do not compete 
with foreign non-scheduled aircraft operators. This assessment is also 
true for U.S. schedule aircraft operators with less than 31 seats. When 
engaged in foreign travel, these operators usually fly from the U.S. to 
a foreign destination and return. These operators do not have aircraft 
based in foreign countries for flights to the U.S. and other foreign 
countries. Thus, neither domestic nor foreign air carriers would be 
affected disproportionately by these proposed requirements. These 
proposed requirements, therefore, will not cause a competitive 
disadvantage for U.S. air carriers operating overseas or for foreign 
carriers operating in the United States.

Unfunded Mandates

    Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (the Act), 
enacted as Pub. L. 104-4 on March 22, 1995, requires each Federal 
agency, to the extent permitted by law, to prepare a written assessment 
of the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final agency 
rule that may result in the expenditure by State, local, and tribal 
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 
million or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year. 
Section 204(a) of the Act, 2 U.S.C. 1534(a), requires the Federal 
agency to develop an effective process to permit timely input by 
elected officers (or their designees) of State, local, and tribal 
governments on a proposed ``significant intergovernmental mandate.'' A 
``significant intergovernmental mandate'' under the Act is any 
provision in a Federal agency regulation that would impose an 
enforceable duty upon State, local, and tribal governments, in the 
aggregate, of $100 million (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one 
year. Section 203 of the Act, 2 U.S.C. 1533, which supplements section 
204(a), provides that before establishing any regulatory requirements 
that might significantly or uniquely affect small governments, the 
agency shall have developed a plan that, among other things, provides 
for notice to potentially affected small governments, if any, and for a 
meaningful and timely opportunity to provide input in the development 
of regulatory proposals or rules.
    This proposed rule does not contain any Federal intergovernmental 
or private sector mandate. Therefore, the requirements of Title II of 
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 do not apply.

Federalism Implications

    The regulations proposed herein would not have substantial direct 
effects on the states, on the relationship between the national 
government and the states, or on the distribution of power and 
responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in 
accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this 
proposal would not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant 
the preparation of a Federalism statement.

Conclusion

    For the reasons discussed in the preamble, and based on the 
findings in the Regulatory Flexibility Determination and the 
International Trade Impact Analysis, the FAA has determined that this 
proposed regulation is significant under Executive Order 12866. In 
addition, the FAA certifies that this proposal, if adopted, will not 
have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a 
substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act. This proposal is considered significant 
under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 
1979).

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 108

    Air carriers, Aircraft, Airmen, Airports, Arms and munitions, 
Explosives, Law enforcement officers, Reporting and record keeping 
requirements, Security measures, X-rays.

The Proposed Amendment

    In consideration of the foregoing, the FAA proposes to revise 14 
CFR part 108 to read as follows:

PART 108--AIRCRAFT OPERATOR SECURITY

Subpart A--General

Sec.
108.1  Applicability.
108.3  Definitions.
108.5  Inspection Authority.
108.7  Falsification.
108.9  Security responsibilities of persons.

Subpart B--Security Program

108.101  Adoption and implementation.
108.103  Form, content, and availability.
108.105  Approval and amendments.

Subpart C--Operations

108.201  Screening of persons and property, and acceptance of cargo.
108.203  Use of metal detection devices.
108.205  Use of X-Ray systems.
108.207  Use of Explosives detection systems.
108.209  Employment standards for screening personnel.
108.211  Law enforcement personnel.
108.213  Carriage of weapons.
108.215  Carriage of passengers under the control of armed law 
enforcement escorts.
108.217  Transportation of Federal Air Marshals.
108.219  Security of aircraft and facilities.
108.221  Employment history, verification, and criminal history 
records checks.
108.223  Personnel identification system.
108.225  Security Coordinators and crewmembers, training.
108.227  Training and knowledge of persons with security-related 
duties.

Subpart D--Threat and Threat Response

108.301  Security Coordinators.
108.303  Bomb or air piracy threats.
108.305  Security Directives and Information Circulars.
108.307  Contingency plan.

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g); 5103, 40113, 40119, 44701-44702, 
44705, 44901-44905, 44907, 44913-44914, 44932, 44935-44936, 46105.

Subpart A--General


Sec. 108.1  Applicability.

    (a) This part prescribes aviation security rules governing:
    (1) The operations of holders of FAA air carrier operating 
certificates or holders of operating certificates for scheduled 
passenger operations, public charter passenger operations, private 
charter passenger operations, and other air carriers voluntarily 
adopting an aviation security program.
    (2) Each person aboard an aircraft operated by an air carrier 
described in paragraph (a)(1) of this section.
    (3) Each person at an airport at which the operations described in 
paragraph (a)(1) of this section are conducted.
    (4) In accordance with part 191 of this chapter, each air carrier 
that receives a Security Directive or Information Circular and each 
person who receives information from a Security Directive or 
Information Circular issued by the Assistant Administrator for Civil 
Aviation Security.
    (b) Except as provided in Sec. 108.105 of this part, the authority 
of the Administrator under this part is also exercised by the Assistant 
Administrator for Civil Aviation Security and the Deputy Assistant 
Administrator for Civil Aviation Security, and any individual formally 
designated to act in their capacity. The

[[Page 41750]]

authority of the Assistant Administrator, including matters under 
Sec. 108.105 of this part, may be further delegated.


Sec. 108.3  Definitions.

    Terms defined in part 107 of this chapter apply to this part. For 
purposes of this part, part 107 of this chapter, and security programs 
under these parts, the following definitions also apply:
    Accepted security program means a security program accepted by the 
Administrator for use by a foreign air carrier in accordance with 
Sec. 129.25 of this chapter.
    Approved security program means a security program approved by the 
Administrator for use by scheduled passenger operations, public charter 
passenger operations, private charter passenger operations, or all-
cargo carrier operations, in accordance with Sec. 108.105 of this part.
    Assistant Administrator means the FAA Assistant Administrator for 
Civil Aviation Security as described in 49 U.S.C. 44932.
    Passenger seating configuration means the total number of seats for 
which the aircraft is type certificated that can be made available for 
passenger use aboard a flight and includes that set in certain aircraft 
which may be used by a representative of the Administrator to conduct 
flight checks but is available for revenue purposes on other occasions.
    Principal Security Inspector means the civil aviation security 
special agent assigned by the Administrator to be the FAA's primary 
point of contact with the air carrier for all matters relating to 
aircraft operator security.
    Private chapter means any air carrier flight--
    (1) For which the charterer engages the total passenger capacity of 
the aircraft for the carriage of passengers; for which passengers are 
invited by the charterer, the cost of the flight is borne entirely by 
the charterer and not directly or indirectly by any individual 
passenger; and that is not advertised to the public, in any way, to 
solicit passengers.
    (2) Flights for which the total passenger capacity of the aircraft 
is used for the purpose of civilian or military air transportation 
conducted under contract with the Government of the U.S. or the 
Government of a foreign country also considered ``private charters.''
    Private charter means any charter which is not a private charter.
    Scheduled passenger operation means a public air transportation 
service (a flight) from identified air terminals at a set time which is 
held out to the public and announced by timetable or schedule published 
in a newspaper, magazine, or other advertising medium.
    Sterile area means a portion of an airport defined in the airport 
security program to which access is controlled by either the inspection 
of persons and property in accordance with an approved or accepted 
security program required under Secs. 108.105 of this part or 
Sec. 129.25 of this chapter, or an access control system meeting the 
requirements of Sec. 107.205 of this chapter.


Sec. 108.5  Inspection authority.

    (a) Each air carrier shall allow the Administrator, including FAA 
Special Agents, at any time or place, to make any inspections or tests 
to determine compliance of the airport operator, air carrier, foreign 
air carrier, and other airport tenants with--
    (1) The air carrier security program;
    (2) This part;
    (3) 49 CFR part 175, which relates to the carriage of hazardous 
materials by aircraft; and
    (4) 49 U.S.C. Subtitle VII, as amended.
    (b) At the request of the Administrator, each air carrier shall 
provide evidence of compliance with this part and its air carrier 
security program.
    (c) On request of any FAA Special Agent, and presentation of valid 
FAA-issued credentials, each air carrier shall issue to that agent 
access and identification media to provide the special agent with 
unescorted access to, and movement within, exclusive areas.


Sec. 108.7  Falsification.

    No person may make, or cause to be made, any of the following:
    (a) Any fraudulent or intentionally false statement in any 
application for any security program, access medium, or identification 
medium, or any amendment thereto, under this part.
    (b) Any fraudulent or intentionally false entry in any record or 
report that is kept, made, or used to show compliance with this part, 
or to exercise any privileges under this part.
    (c) Any reproduction or alteration, for fraudulent purpose, of any 
report, record, security program, access medium, or identification 
medium issued under this part.


Sec. 108.9  Security responsibilities of persons.

    (a) No person may:
    (1) Tamper or interfere with, compromise, modify, attempt to 
circumvent, or cause a person to tamper or interfere with, compromise, 
modify, or circumvent any security system, method, or procedure 
implemented under this part.
    (2) Enter, or be present within, a critical security area or 
restricted operations area without complying with the systems, methods, 
or procedures being applied to control access to, or presence in, such 
areas.
    (3) Use, allow to be used, or cause to be used any airport-approved 
access medium or identification medium that authorizes the access or 
presence of persons and vehicles in critical security areas or 
restricted operations areas in any other manner than that for which it 
was issued by the appropriate authority under this part, part 107, or 
part 129 of this chapter.
    (b) Except as provided in 49 U.S.C. Subtitle VII, and paragraphs 
(c) and (d) of this section, no individual may have any deadly or 
dangerous weapon, explosive, incendiary, or other destructive substance 
on or about the individual's person or accessible property when 
entering, or within, a critical security area or restricted operations 
area of an airport governed by part 107 of this chapter, or a sterile 
area governed under Sec. 108.201 of this part.
    (c) The provisions of this section with regard to paragraphs (a) 
and (b) of this section do not apply to persons authorized by the 
Federal government, airport operator, air carrier, or foreign air 
carrier to conduct inspections for compliance with this part, parts 107 
and 129 of this chapter, and 49 U.S.C. Subtitle VII, while they are 
conducting an inspection.
    (d) The provisions of this section with respect to firearms and 
weapons do no apply to the following:
    (1) Law enforcement personnel required under this part or part 107 
of this chapter to carry a firearm or other weapon while in the 
performance of their duties at the airport.
    (2) Persons authorized to carry a firearm under Sec. 108.213, 
Sec. 108.215,or Sec. 129.27 of this chapter.
    (3) Persons authorized to carry a firearm in a sterile area, 
critical security area, restricted operations area under this part, an 
approved airport security program, an approved air carrier security 
program, or a security program used in accordance with Sec. 129.25 of 
this chapter.
    (4) Properly declared firearms in checked baggage for transport 
under Sec. 108.213 of this part.
    (5) Transportation of hazardous materials under 49 CFR part 175.
    (6) Federal Air Marshals while on mission status.
    (7) Air carrier aircraft not subject to part 108 and part 129 of 
this chapter carrying firearms in accordance with state or local law.

[[Page 41751]]

Subpart B--Security Program


Sec. 108.101  Adoption and implementation.

    (a) Each air carrier shall adopt and carry out a security program 
that meets the requirements of Sec. 108.103 for any of the following 
operations:
    (1) A scheduled passenger or public charter passenger operation 
with an aircraft having a passenger seating configuration of more than 
60 seats.
    (2) A scheduled passenger or public charter operation using an 
aircraft having a passenger seating configuration of less than 61 seats 
when passengers are enplaned from or deplaned into a sterile area.
    (3) A private charter operation when passengers are enplaned from 
or deplaned into a sterile area.
    (4) An air carrier operation, other than that described in 
paragraphs (a) (1), (2), and (3) of this section, further identified 
below except that those parts of the program effecting compliance with 
the requirements listed in Sec. 108.103(b) (1), (2), (3), (4), (6), and 
(8) of this part need only be implemented when the Administrator 
notifies the air carrier in writing that a security threat exists 
concerning that operation:
    (i) A private charter operation with an aircraft having a 
passenger-seating configuration of more than 30 seats.
    (ii) A scheduled passenger or public charter operation with an 
aircraft having a passenger-seating configuration between 31 and 60 
seats inclusive.
    (iii) A scheduled passenger, public charter, or private charter 
operation with an aircraft having a passenger-seating configuration of 
less than 61 seats engaged in operations to, from, or outside the U.S.
    (b) Each air carrier that has obtained FAA approval of a security 
program for operations not listed in paragraph (a) of this section 
shall carry out the provisions of that program.


Sec. 108.103  Form, content, and availability.

    (a) The security program required under Sec. 108.101 shall:
    (1) Provide for the safety of persons and property traveling on 
flights provided by the air carrier against acts of criminal violence 
and air piracy, and the introduction of explosives, incendiaries, 
deadly or dangerous weapons, or other destructive substances aboard an 
aircraft.
    (2) Provide that, upon receipt of an approved security program or 
security program amendment from the FAA, the air carrier shall 
acknowledge receipt of the approved security program to the Principal 
Security Inspector, in writing and signed by the air carrier or any 
person delegated authority in this matter within 72 hours.
    (3) Include the items listed in paragraph (6) of this section, as 
required by Sec. 108.101.
    (4) Be approved by the Administrator.
    (b) The security program shall include:
    (1) The procedures, and description of the facilities and equipment 
used to perform screening functions specified in Sec. 108.201 of this 
section, and used to perform the functions for each exclusive area 
under Sec. 107.207 of this chapter.
    (2) The procedures and a description of the equipment used to 
comply with the requirements of Sec. 108.203 of this part regarding the 
use of metal detection devices.
    (3) The procedures and a description of the equipment used to 
comply with the requirements of Sec. 108.205 of this part regarding the 
use of X-ray systems.
    (4) The procedures and descriptions of the facilities and equipment 
used to comply with the requirements of Sec. 108.207 of this part 
regarding explosives detection systems.
    (5) The procedures used to comply with the applicable requirements 
of Sec. 108.211 of this part regarding law enforcement personnel.
    (6) The procedures and a description of the facilities and 
equipment used to perform the aircraft and facilities control functions 
specified in Sec. 108.219 of this part.
    (7) The procedures used to comply with the requirements of 
Sec. 108.221 of this part regarding employee background investigations 
and personnel identification systems.
    (8) The procedures used to comply with the applicable requirements 
of Sec. 108.301 of this part regarding the responsibilities of security 
coordinators and the prevention and management of hijacking and 
sabotage attempts.
    (9) the procedures used to comply with the requirements of 
Sec. 108.303 of this part regarding bomb and air piracy threats.
    (10) The curriculum used to accomplish the training required under 
Sec. 108.225 of this part.
    (11) The procedures and curriculum of the training requirements 
under Sec. 108.227 of this part; and a security compliance program that 
specifies procedures the air carrier will implement to ensure that 
persons with authorized unescorted access to critical security areas 
and restricted operations areas comply with Sec. 108.7 and Sec. 108.9 
of this part, including revocation of unescorted access authority of 
persons that fail to comply with security requirements.
    (12) Designation of an Air Carrier Security Coordinator (ACSC). The 
designation shall include the name of the ACSC and a description of the 
means by which the ACSC can be contacted on a 24-hour basis.
    (13) A security contingency plan as specified under Sec. 108.307 of 
this part.
    (c) Each air carrier having an approved security program shall:
    (1) Maintain at least one complete copy of the security program at 
its principal business office.
    (2) Have available a complete copy, or the pertinent portions, of 
its approved security program, or appropriate implementing 
instructions, at each airport served.
    (3) Make a copy of the approved security program available for 
inspection upon request of an FAA Special Agent.
    (4) Restrict the distribution, disclosure and availability of 
information contained in the security program to persons with a need-
to-know as described in part 191 of this chapter.
    (5) Refer requests for such information by other persons to the 
Administrator.
    (6) Implement a program to ensure that its employees and employees 
of its contractors comply with paragraphs (a) and (b) of Sec. 108.103. 
The program's provisions shall include penalties to be imposed on 
individuals who fail to comply with paragraphs (a) and (b) of this 
section that are in accordance with the standards contained in its 
approved security program.


Sec. 108.105  Approval and amendments.

    (a) Approval of Security Program. Unless otherwise authorized by 
the Assistant Administrator, each air carrier required to have a 
security program under this part shall submit its proposed security 
program to the Assistant Administrator for approval at least 90 days 
before the date of intended passenger operations. Such request shall be 
processed as follows:
    (1) Within 30 days after receiving the proposed air carrier 
security program, the Assistant Administrator will either approve the 
program or give the air carrier written notice to modify the program to 
comply with the applicable requirements of this part.
    (2) Within 30 days of receiving a notice to modify, the air carrier 
may either submit a modified security program to the Assistant 
Administrator for approval, or petition the Administrator to reconsider 
the notice to modify. A petition for reconsideration must be filed with 
the Assistant Administrator. Except in the case of an emergency 
requiring immediate action in the interest of safety, the filing of the 
petition stays the notice pending a decision by the Administrator.

[[Page 41752]]

    (3) Upon receipt of a petition for reconsideration, the Assistant 
Administrator either amends or withdraws the notice, or transmits the 
petition, together with any pertinent information, to the Administrator 
for reconsideration. The Administrator disposes of the petition within 
30 days of receipt by either directing the Assistant administrator to 
withdraw or amend the notice to modify, or by affirming the notice to 
modify.
    (b) Amendment requested by an air carrier. An air carrier may 
submit a request to the Assistant Administrator to amend its approved 
or accepted security program as follows:
    (1) The application must be filed with the Assistant Administrator 
at least 45 days before the date it proposes for the amendment to 
become effective, unless a shorter period is allowed by the Assistant 
Administrator. However, in accordance with the procedures in this 
paragraph, it may take longer than 45 days for a final decision by the 
Administrator.
    (2) Within 30 days after receiving a proposed amendment, the 
Assistant administrator, in writing, either approves or denies the 
request to amend.
    (3) An amendment to an air carrier security program may be approved 
if the Assistant Administrator determines that safety and the public 
interest will allow it, and the proposed amendment provides the level 
of security required under this part.
    (4) Within 30 days after receiving a denial, the air carrier may 
petition the Administrator to reconsider the denial.
    (5) Upon receipt of a petition for reconsideration, the Assistant 
Administrator either approves the request to amend or transmits the 
petition, together with any pertinent information, to the Administrator 
for reconsideration. The Administrator disposes of the petition within 
30 days of receipt by either directing the Assistant Administrator to 
approve the amendment, or affirm the denial.
    (c) Amendment by the FAA. If the safety and the public interest 
require an amendment, the Assistant Administrator may amend an approved 
or accepted security program as follows:
    (1) The Assistant Administrator notifies the air carrier, in 
writing, of the proposed amendment, fixing a period of not less than 30 
days within which the air carrier may submit written information, 
views, and arguments on the amendment.
    (2) After considering all relevant material, the Assistant 
Administrator notifies the air carrier of any amendment adopted or 
rescinds the notice. If the amendment is adopted, it becomes effective 
not less than 30 days after the air carrier receives the notice of 
amendment, unless the air carrier petitions the administrator to 
reconsider no later than 15 days before the effective date of the 
amendment. The air carrier shall send the petition for reconsideration 
to the Assistant Administrator. A timely petition for reconsideration 
stays the effective date of the amendment.
    (3) Upon receipt of a petition for reconsideration, the Assistant 
Administrator either amends or withdraws the notice or transmits the 
petition, together with any pertinent information, to the Administrator 
for reconsideration. The Administrator disposes of the petition within 
30 days of receipt by either directing the Assistant Administrator to 
withdraw or amend the amendment, or by affirming the amendment.
    (d) Emergency amendments. Notwithstanding paragraphs (a), (b), and 
(c) of this section, if the Assistant Administrator finds that there is 
an emergency requiring immediate action with respect to safety in air 
transportation or in air commerce that makes procedures in this section 
contrary to the public interest, the Assistant Administrator may issue 
an amendment, effective without stay, on the date the airport operator 
receives notice of it. In such a case, the Assistant Administrator 
shall incorporate in the notice a brief statement of the reasons and 
findings for the amendment to be adopted. The air carrier may file a 
petition for reconsideration under paragraph (c) of this section, 
however, this does not stay the effectiveness of the emergency 
amendment.

Subpart C--Operations


Sec. 108.201  Screening of persons and property, and acceptance of 
cargo.

    (a) Each air carrier required to conduct screening under a security 
program shall use the procedures included, and the facilities and 
equipment described, in its approved security program to inspect each 
person entering a sterile area and to inspect each person's accessible 
property.
    (b) Each air carrier required to conduct screening under a security 
program shall detect and prevent the carriage aboard aircraft and 
introduction into a sterile area of any explosive, incendiary, deadly 
or dangerous weapon, or destructive substance on or about each person 
or the person's accessible property.
    (c) Each air carrier required to conduct screening under a security 
program shall deny entry into a sterile area and shall refuse to 
transport-
    (1) Any person who does not consent to a search of his or her 
person in accordance with the screening system prescribed in paragraph 
(a) of this section ; and
    (2) Any person property of any person who does not consent to a 
search or inspection of that property in accordance with the screening 
system prescribed by paragraph (a) of this section.
    (d) No person shall enter a sterile area without submitting to the 
screening of his or her person and property, or submitting to other 
procedures in accordance with Sec. 107.205(a) of this chapter, to 
control access to that area in accordance with an FAA-approved or FAA-
accepted program.
    (e) Except as provided in paragraph (f) of this section, no person 
shall have an explosive, incendiary, deadly or dangerous weapon, or 
destructive substance on or about the person or the person's accessible 
property-
    (1) When inspection has begun of the individual's person or 
accessible property before entering a sterile area;
    (2) When entering or in a sterile area; or
    (3) When attempting to board or onboard an aircraft.
    (f) The provisions of paragraphs (b) and (e) of this section with 
respect to firearms and weapons do not apply to the following:
    (1) Law enforcement personnel required to carry a firearm or other 
weapons while in the performance of their duty at the airport.
    (2) Persons authorized to carry a firearm in accordance with 
Sec. 108.213, Sec. 108.215, Sec. 108.217, of this part or Sec. 129.27 
of this chapter.
    (3) Persons authorized to carry a firearm in a sterile area under 
an FAA-approved or FAA-accepted security program.
    (g) Each air carrier shall staff its security screening checkpoints 
with supervisory and non-supervisory personnel in accordance with the 
standards specified in its security program.
    (h) Each air carrier required to conduct screening under a security 
program shall use the procedures include and the facilities and 
equipment described in its approved security program to prevent the 
carriage of explosives or incendiaries onboard a passenger aircraft.


Sec. 108.203  Use of metal detection devices.

    (a) No air carrier may use a metal detection devise to inspect 
passengers, carry-on baggage, or checked baggage

[[Page 41753]]

unless specifically authorized under a security program required under 
this part. No air carrier may use such device contrary to its approved 
security program.
    (b) Metal detection devices shall meet the calibration standards 
established by the Administrator in the air carrier's approved security 
program.


Sec. 108.205  Use of X-ray systems.

    (a) No air carrier may use any X-ray system within the United 
States or under the air carrier's operational control outside the 
United States to inspect carry-on or checked articles unless 
specifically authorized under a security program under this part. No 
air carrier many use such a system in a manner contrary to its approved 
security program. The Administrator authorized air carriers to use X-
ray systems for inspecting carry-on or checked articles under an 
approved security program if the air carrier shows that-
    (1) The system meets the standards for cabinet X-ray systems 
primarily for the inspection of baggage issued by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) and published in 21 CFR 1020.40;
    (2) A program for initial and recurrent training of operators of 
the system is established, which includes training in radiation safety, 
the efficient use of X-ray systems, and the identification of weapons 
and other dangerous articles; and
    (3) The system meets the imaging requirements set forth in its 
approved security program.
    (b) No air carrier may use any X-ray system unless, within the 
preceding 12 calendar months, a radiation survey is conducted which 
shows that the system meets the applicable performance standards in 21 
CFR 1020.40.
    (c) No air carrier may use any X-ray system after the system has 
been installed at a screening point or after the system has been moved 
unless a radiation survey is conducted which shows that the system 
meets the applicable performance standards in 21 CFR 1020.40. A 
radiation survey is not required for an X-ray system that is designed 
and constructed as a mobile unit and the air carrier shows that it can 
be moved without altering it performance.
    (d) No air carrier may use any X-ray system that is not in full 
compliance with any defect notice or modification order issued for that 
system by the FDA, unless the FDA has advised the FAA that the defect 
or failure to comply does not create a significant risk of injury, 
including genetic injury, to any person.
    (e) No air carrier may use any X-ray system to inspect carry-on or 
checked articles unless a sign is posted in a conspicuous place at the 
screening checkpoint or where checked articles are accepted which 
notifies individuals that such items are being inspected by an X-ray 
and advises them to remove all X-ray, scientific, and high-speed film 
from carry-on and checked articles before inspection. This sign shall 
also advise individuals that they may request that an inspection be 
made of their photographic equipment and film packages without exposure 
to an X-ray system. If the X-ray system exposes any carry-on or checked 
articles to more than one milliroentgen during the inspection the air 
carrier shall post a sign which advises individuals to remove film of 
all kinds from their articles before inspection. If requested by 
individuals, their photographic equipment and film packages shall be 
inspected without exposure to an X-ray system.
    (f) Each air carrier shall maintain at least one copy of the 
results of the most recent radiation survey conducted under paragraphs 
(b) or (c) of this section and shall make it available for inspection 
upon request by the Administrator at each of following locations--
    (1) The air carrier's principal business office; and
    (2) The place where the X-ray system is in operation.
    (g) The American Society for Testing and Materials Standard F792-
88, ``Design and Use of Ionizing Radiation Equipment for the Detection 
of Items Prohibited in Controlled Access Areas'', described in this 
section is incorporated by reference herein and made a part hereof 
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(l). All persons affected by these 
amendments may obtain copies of the standard from the American Society 
for Testing and Materials, 1916 Race Street, Philadelphia, PA 19103.
    (h) Each air carrier shall comply with the X-ray operator duty time 
limitations specified in its security program.


Sec. 108.207   Use of explosives detection systems.

    When the Administrator shall require by an amendment under 
Sec. 108.105 of this part, each air carrier required to conduct 
screening under a security program shall use an explosives detection 
system that has been approved by the Administrator to screen checked 
baggage on each international flight in accordance with the air 
carrier's security program.


Sec. 108.209   Employment standards for screening personnel.

    (a) No air carrier shall use any person to perform any screening 
function, unless that person has:
    (1) A high school diploma, a General Equivalency Diploma, or a 
combination of education and experience which the air carrier has 
determined to have equipped the person to perform the duties of the 
position.
    (2) Basic aptitudes and physical abilities including color 
perception, visual and aural acuity, physical coordination, and motor 
skills to the following standards:
    (i) Screeners operating X-ray equipment must be able to distinguish 
on the X-ray monitor the appropriate imaging standard specified in the 
air carrier's security program. Wherever the X-ray system displays 
colors, the operator must be able to perceive each color;
    (ii) Screeners operating any screening equipment must be able to 
distinguish each color displayed on every type of screening equipment 
and explain what each color signifies;
    (iii) Screeners must be able to hear and respond to the spoken 
voice and to audible alarms generated by screening equipment in an 
active checkpoint environment;
    (iv) Screeners performing physical searches or other related 
operations must be able to efficiently and thoroughly manipulate and 
handle such baggage, containers, and other objects subject to security 
processing; and
    (v) Screeners who perform pat-downs or hand-held metal detector 
searches of persons must have sufficient dexterity and capability to 
thoroughly conduct those procedures over a person's entire body.
    (3) The ability to read, speak, and write English well enough to--
    (i) Carry out written and oral instructions regarding the proper 
performance of screening duties;
    (ii) Read English language identification media, credentials, 
airline tickets, and labels on items normally encountered in the 
screening process;
    (iii) Provide direction to and understand and answer questions from 
English-speaking persons undergoing screening; and
    (iv) Write incident reports and statements and log entries into 
security records in the English language.
    (4) Satisfactorily completed all initial, recurrent, and 
appropriate specialized training required by the air carrier's security 
program.
    (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a)(4) of this 
section, the air carrier may use a person during the on-

[[Page 41754]]

 the-job portion of training to perform security functions provided 
that the person is closely supervised and does not make independent 
judgments as to whether persons or property may enter a sterile area or 
aircraft without further inspection.
    (c) No air carrier shall use a person to perform a screening 
function after that person has failed an operational test related to 
that function until that person has successfully completed the remedial 
training specified in the air carrier's security program.
    (d) Each air carrier shall ensure that a Ground Security 
Coordinator conducts and documents an annual evaluation of each person 
assigned screening duties and may continue that person's employment in 
a screening capacity only upon the determination by the Ground Security 
Coordinator that the person:
    (1) Has not suffered a significant diminution of any physical 
ability required to perform a screening function since the last 
evaluation of those abilities;
    (2) Has a satisfactory record of performance and attention to duty 
based on the standards and requirements in its approved security 
program; and
    (3) Demonstrates the current knowledge and skills necessary to 
courteously, vigilantly, and effectively perform screening functions.
    (e) Paragraphs (a) through (d) of this section do not apply to 
those screening functions conducted outside the United States over 
which the air carrier does not have operational control. In the event 
the air carrier is unable to implement paragraphs (a) through (d) of 
this section for screening functions outside the United States, the air 
carrier shall notify the Administrator of those air carrier stations so 
affected.
    (f) At locations outside the United States where the air carrier 
has operational control over a screening function, the air carrier may 
use screeners who do not meet the requirements of paragraph (a)(3) of 
this section, provided that at least one representative of the air 
carrier who has the ability to functionally read and speak English is 
present while the air carrier's passengers are undergoing security 
screening.


Sec. 108.211  Law enforcement personnel.

    (a) At airports within the United States not required to hold a 
security program under part 107 of this chapter, each air carrier 
shall--
    (1) For operations described in Sec. 108.101(a) (1), (2), and (3), 
provide for law enforcement personnel meeting the qualifications and 
standards specified in Secs. 107.213 and 107.215 of this chapter; and
    (2) For operations described in Sec. 108.101(a)(4) of this part for 
which screening is not required shall--
    (i) Arrange for law enforcement personnel meeting the 
qualifications and standards specified in Sec. 107.215 of this chapter 
to be available to respond to an incident; and
    (ii) Provide its employees, including crewmembers, current 
information regarding procedures for obtaining law enforcement 
assistance at that airport.
    (b) At airports required to hold a security program under part 107 
under this chapter, each air carrier conducting operations described in 
Sec. 108.101(a)(4) of this part shall:
    (1) Arrange with the airport operator for law enforcement personnel 
meeting the qualifications and standards specified in Sec. 107.215 of 
this chapter to be available to respond to an incident; and
    (2) Provide its employees, including crewmembers, current 
information regarding procedures for obtaining law enforcement 
assistance at that airport.


Sec. 108.213  Carriage of weapons.

    (a) Accessible weapon: Screening conducted. Notwithstanding 
Sec. 108.201, a person may have a deadly or dangerous weapon accessible 
to him or her while aboard an aircraft for which screening is required, 
if the following are met:
    (1) The person in possession of the weapon--
    (i) Is a Federal law enforcement officer or a full-time municipal, 
county, or state law enforcement officer receiving remuneration for his 
or her services;
    (ii) Is sworn and commissioned to enforce criminal statutes;
    (iii) Is currently trained and certified as a law enforcement 
officer and is armed in the performance of these duties;
    (iv) Is authorized by the employing agency to have the weapon in 
connection with assigned duties; and
    (v) Has completed the training program ``Law Enforcement Officers 
Flying Armed'' as required by the FAA.
    (2) The person having the weapon needs to have the weapon 
accessible in connection with the performance of his or her duties from 
the time he or she would otherwise check the weapon in accordance with 
paragraph (f) of this section until the time it would be claimed after 
deplaning. The need to have the weapon accessible during the period of 
time set forth in this paragraph shall be based on one of the 
following:
    (i) The provision of protective escort (assigned to principle or 
advance team),
    (ii) The conduct of a hazardous surveillance operation.
    (iii) Prisoner escort, in accordance with Sec. 108.215 of this 
part.
    (iv) Status as an FBI Special Agent.
    (v) FAA Federal Air Marshal on mission status.
    (vi) Law enforcement personnel on official travel required to 
report to another location, armed and immediately prepared for duty.
    (3) The air carrier is notified of the flight(s) on which the armed 
person needs to have the weapon accessible at least 1 hour, or in an 
emergency as soon as practicable, before departure.
    (4) If the armed person is a State, County, or municipal law 
enforcement personnel, the person must present an original letter of 
authority, signed by an authorizing official from his or her employing 
agency, confirming the need to travel armed and detailing the itinerary 
of the travel while armed, and stating that the person has completed 
the training program ``Law Enforcement Officers Flying Armed'' as 
required by the FAA.
    (5) The armed person identifies himself or herself to the air 
carrier by presenting bona fide credentials that include clear, full-
face picture, signature, and the signature of the authorizing official 
of service or the official seal of service. A badge, shield, or similar 
device may not be used as the sole means of identification.
    (6) The armed person identifies himself or herself and presents a 
copy of the form required by the air carrier to a crewmember prior to 
departure.
    (7) The air carrier--
    (i) Verifies that the armed person is familiar with its procedures 
for carrying a firearm aboard its aircraft before the time the person 
boards the aircraft;
    (ii) Ensures that the armed person has fully completed and signed a 
form required by the air carrier prior to boarding or entering a 
sterile area which states that the person has completed the training 
program ``Law Enforcement Officers Flying Armed'' as required by the 
FAA;
    (iii) Ensures that the identity of the armed person is known to 
each law enforcement personnel and each employee of the air carrier 
responsible for security during the boarding of the aircraft;
    (iv) Notifies the pilot in command, other appropriate crewmembers, 
and any other person authorized to have a weapon accessible to him or 
her aboard the aircraft, of the location of each authorized armed 
person aboard the aircraft; and
    (v) Ensures that the information required in paragraphs (a) (3) and 
(4) of

[[Page 41755]]

this section is furnished to the flight crew of each additional 
connecting flight by the Ground Security Coordinator or other 
designated agent at each location.
    (b) Accessible weapon: Screening not conducted. No person may, 
while on board an aircraft operated by an air carrier for which 
screening is not conducted, carry on or about his or her person a 
deadly or dangerous weapon, either concealed or unconcealed. This 
paragraph does not apply to Federal and full-time municipal, county, or 
state law enforcement officers receiving remuneration for their 
services, who--
    (1) Are sworn and commissioned to enforce criminal statutes;
    (2) Are currently trained and certified as law enforcement officers 
and armed in the performance of these duties;
    (3) Are authorized by the employing agency to have the weapon in 
connection with assigned duties; and
    (4) Have completed the training program ``Law Enforcement Officers 
Flying Armed'' as required by the FAA, and have notified the air 
carrier prior to boarding the flight.
    (c) Alcohol, No air carrier may serve any alcoholic beverage to a 
person having a weapon accessible to him or her nor may such person 
consume any alcoholic beverage while aboard an aircraft operated by the 
air carrier. No person may have a weapon accessible if that person has 
consumed an alcoholic beverage within the previous 8 hours.
    (d) Location of weapon. Any person traveling aboard an aircraft 
while armed must keep their weapon concealed and out of view, either on 
their person or in immediate reach if carried in any other type of 
cases, pouch, or container. No person shall place a weapon in an 
overhead storage bin.
    (e) Checked baggage. No air carrier may knowingly permit any person 
to transport, nor may an person transport or offer for transport, any 
explosive, incendiary, destructive substance, or a loaded firearm in 
checked baggage aboard an aircraft. For the purpose of this section, a 
loaded firearm means a firearm which has a live round of ammunition, or 
any component thereof, in the chamber or in a magazine or cylinder 
inserted in the firearm.
    (f) Firearms in checked baggage. No air carrier may knowingly 
permit any person to transport, nor may any person transport or offer 
for transport, any unloaded firearm(s) in checked baggage aboard an 
aircraft unless--
    (1) The passenger declares to the air carrier, either orally or in 
writing before checking the baggage, that any firearm carried in the 
baggage is unloaded;
    (2) The firearm is carried in a container that is hard-sided 
appropriate for air transportation;
    (3) The container in which it is carried is locked, and only the 
passenger checking the baggage retains the key or combination; and
    (4) The baggage containing the firearm is carried in an area other 
than the flightcrew compartment, that is inaccessible to passengers.
    (g) Military. Paragraphs (a), (b), (d), and (f) of this section do 
not apply to the carriage of firearms aboard air carrier flights 
conducted for the military forces of the Government of the United 
States when the total cabin load of the aircraft is under exclusive use 
by those military forces when the following conditions are met--
    (1) No firearm is loaded and all bolts to such firearms are locked 
in the safe position; and
    (2) The air carrier is notified by the unit commander or officer in 
charge of the flight before boarding that weapons will be carried 
aboard the aircraft.
    (h) Federal Air Marshals. The requirements of paragraphs (a)(6) and 
(a)(7) of this section do not apply to Federal Air Marshals performing 
official duties on a flight.


Sec. 108.215  Carriage of passengers under the control of armed law 
enforcement escorts.

    (a) Except as provided in paragraph (e) of this section, no air 
carrier required to conduct screening under a security program may 
carry a passenger in the custody of an armed law enforcement escort 
aboard an aircraft for which screening is required unless, in addition 
to the requirements in Sec. 108.213 of this part, the following 
requirements are met:
    (1) The armed law enforcement escort is required by appropriate 
authority to maintain custody and control over an individual aboard an 
aircraft.
    (2) The agency responsible for control of the prisoner determines 
whether the prisoner is considered a high risk, that is, an escape risk 
or charged with, or convicted of, a violent crime, or a law risk.
    (3) The armed law enforcement escort(s) notifies the air carrier at 
least 24 hours before the scheduled departure, or, if that is not 
possible, as far in advance as possible of the following--
    (i) The identity of the passenger to be carried and the flight on 
which it is proposed to carry the passenger;
    (ii) Any pre-existing medical conditions of the prisoner generating 
unusual behavior which may create a security risk to other passengers; 
and
    (iii) Whether or not the passenger is considered to be a high risk 
or a low risk.
    (4) The armed law enforcement escort(s) arrive at the check-in 
counter at least 1 hour prior to the schedule departure.
    (5) A high risk prisoner shall be under the control of at least two 
armed law enforcement escorts and no other prisoners shall be under the 
control of those two armed law enforcement escorts.
    (6) No more than one high risk prisoner shall be carried on the 
aircraft.
    (7) Except as stated in paragraph (a)(9) this section, a low risk 
prisoner shall be under the control of at least one armed law 
enforcement escort, and no more than two low risk prisoners shall be 
carried under the control of any one armed law enforcement escort.
    (8) For a flight exceeding 4 hours' duration, each two risk 
prisoners shall be under the control of at least two armed law 
enforcement escorts, and no more than two low risk prisoners shall be 
under the control of any two armed law enforcement escorts.
    (9) The air carrier is assured, prior to departure, by each law 
enforcement escort that each passenger under the control of the escort 
has been searched and does not have on or about his or her person or 
property anything that can be used as a deadly or dangerous weapon.
    (10) For each passenger under the control of an armed law 
enforcement escort, the following requirements shall be met:
    (i) The passenger under escort shall be restrained from full use of 
hands by an appropriate device which is then attached to a separately 
locked waist restraint device that provides for minimum movement of the 
person's hands. Leg irons shall not be used;
    (ii) The passenger under escort shall be boarded before any other 
passengers when boarding at the airport where the flight originates, 
and deplaned at the destination after all other deplaning passengers 
have deplaned; and
    (iii) The passenger under escort shall be seated in a seat that is 
neither located in any passenger lounge area nor located next to or 
directly across from any exit and, when practicable, the air carrier 
should seat the prisoner in the rearmost seat of the passenger cabin.
    (11) An armed law enforcement escort having control of a passenger 
shall be seated between the passenger and any aisle.
    (b) No air carrier operating an aircraft under paragraph (a) of 
this section shall--
    (1) Serve food or beverage or provide metal eating utensils to a 
passenger

[[Page 41756]]

under the control of a law enforcement escort while aboard the aircraft 
unless authorized to do so by the armed law enforcement escort.
    (2) Serve the passenger under the control of an armed law 
enforcement escort any alcoholic beverage while aboard the aircraft.
    (c) Each armed law enforcement escort under the provisions of 
paragraph (a) of this section shall, at all times, accompany the 
passenger under the control of the escort and keep the passenger under 
surveillance while aboard the aircraft.
    (d) No passenger under the control of an armed law enforcement 
escort shall drink alcoholic beverages while aboard the aircraft.
    (e) This section does not apply to the carriage of passengers under 
voluntary protective escort, or under escort by unarmed law enforcement 
officers.


Sec. 108.217  Transportation of Federal Air Marshals.

    (a) Each air carrier shall carry Federal Air Marshals, in the 
number and manner specified by the Administrator, on each scheduled 
passenger operation, public charter passenger operation, and private 
charter passenger operation designated by the Administrator.
    (b) Each Federal Air Marshal shall be carried on a first priority 
basis and without charge while on official duty, including positioning 
and repositioning flights. When a Federal Air Marshal is assigned to a 
scheduled flight that is canceled for any reason, the air carrier shall 
carry that Marshal without charge on another flight as designated by 
the Administrator.
    (c) Each air carrier shall assign the specific seat requested by a 
Federal Air Marshal who is on official mission status.
    (d) Each air carrier shall restrict any information concerning the 
presence, seating, names, and purpose of Federal Air Marshals at any 
station or on any flight to those persons within operational need to 
know.
    (e) Each air carrier shall permit any FAA Special Agent, including 
Federal Air Marshals, to observe the search of the aircraft prior to 
the departure.


Sec. 108.219  Security of aircraft and facilities

    Each air carrier required to conduct screening under a security 
program shall use the procedures included, and the facilities and 
equipment described, in its approved security program to perform the 
following control functions with respect to each aircraft passenger 
operation for which screening is required:
    (a) Prevent unauthorized access to areas controlled by the air 
carrier under an exclusive area agreement in accordance with 
Sec. 107.111 of this chapter.
    (b) Prevent unauthorized access to each aircraft.
    (c) Ensure that checked baggage carried in the aircraft is received 
by a responsible air carrier agent.
    (d) Ensure that proper identification and, where appropriate, 
proper certification is obtained by a responsible air carrier agent 
from each entity shipping cargo prior to the acceptance of these items 
for transport aboard the passenger aircraft.
    (e) Ensure that cargo and checked baggage carried aboard the 
aircraft, after being accepted for transport by the air carrier, are 
safeguarded in a manner that prevents the unauthorized introduction of 
any explosive, incendiary, deadly or dangerous weapon, or destructive 
substance aboard the aircraft, or access to the tendered cargo or 
checked baggage by any person other than an air carrier employee or its 
agent.
    (f) Conduct a security inspection of each aircraft before placing 
it in service.
    (g) Each air carrier shall comply with the procedures for 
identifying vehicles set forth in the FAA-approved airport security 
program required by Sec. 107.211 of this chapter.


Sec. 108.221  Employment history, verification, and criminal history 
records checks.

    (There is a separate rulemaking action that will result in new text 
for this section. To avoid confusion, the section is not repeated here. 
See the preamble for further explanation.)


Sec. 108.223  Personnel Identification System.

    Each air carrier shall establish and implement a personnel 
identification system for its flight and cabin crewmembers to include:
    (a) Positive, accurate identification and expiration dates that can 
be readily recognized as accurate and current.
    (b) Issuance only after satisfactory completion of the required 
access investigation.
    (c) Control and accountability standards in accordance with an FAA-
approved security program.
    (d) Periodic review, recertification, and renewal or forfeiture.


Sec. 108.225  Security coordinators and crewmembers, training.

    (a) No air carrier may use any person as a Ground Security 
Coordinator unless, within the preceding 12-calendar months, that 
person has satisfactorily completed the security training as specified 
in the air carrier's approved security program.
    (b) No air carrier may use any person as an In-Flight Security 
Coordinator or crewmember on any domestic or international flight 
unless, within the preceding 12-calendar months or within the time 
period specified in an Advanced Qualifications Program approved under 
SFAR 58, that person has satisfactorily completed the security training 
required by Sec. 121.417(b)(3)(v) or Sec. 135.331(b)(3)(v) of this 
chapter and as specified in the air carrier's approved security 
program.
    (c) The requirements prescribed in paragraph (a) of this section 
apply to all security-related functions performed for the air carrier 
whether by a direct employee or a contractor employee.
    (d) With respect to training conducted under this section, whenever 
a person completes recurrent training 1 month earlier, or 1 month after 
the date of original security certification, that person is considered 
to have completed the training in the calendar month in which it was 
required.


Sec. 108.227  Training and knowledge of persons with security-related 
duties.

    (a) No air carrier may use any person to perform any security-
related duties unless that person has received training as specified in 
its approved security program including their responsibilities in 
Sec. 108.9 and Sec. 108.103 of this part.
    (b) Each air carrier shall ensure that individuals performing 
security-related functions for the air carrier have knowledge of the 
provisions of part 108, applicable Security Directives and Information 
Circulars promulgated pursuant to Sec. 108.305 of this part, the 
approved airport security program, and the air carrier's security 
program to the extent that such individuals need to know in order to 
perform their duties.
    (c) With respect to training conducted under this section, whenever 
a person completes recurrent training in the calendar month before or 
the calendar month after the calendar month in which that training is 
required, that person is considered to have completed the training in 
the calendar month in which it was required.
    (d) All training prescribed in paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this 
section must be approved by the Administrator.
    (e) The requirements prescribed in paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of 
this section apply to all security-related functions performed for the 
air carrier whether by a direct employee or a contractor employee.

[[Page 41757]]

Subpart D--Threat and Threat Response


Sec. 108.301   Security Coordinators.

    (a) Air Carrier Security Coordinator. Each air carrier shall 
designate and use an Air Carrier Security Coordinator (ACSC). The ACSC 
shall serve as the air carrier's primary contact for security-related 
activities and communications with the FAA, as set forth in the 
security program.
    (b) Ground Security Coordinator. Each air carrier shall designate 
and use a Ground Security Coordinator for each domestic and 
international flight to carry out the Ground Security Coordinator 
duties specified in the air carrier's approved security program. The 
Ground Security Coordinator at each airport shall conduct the following 
daily:
    (1) A review of all security-related functions for effectiveness 
and compliance with the part, the air carrier's security program, and 
applicable Security Directives.
    (2) Immediate initiation of corrective action for each instance of 
noncompliance with this part, the air carrier's security program, and 
applicable Security Directives. At foreign airports where such security 
measures are provided by an agency or contractor of a host government, 
the air carrier shall notify the Administrator for assistance in 
resolving noncompliance issues.
    (c) In-flight Security Coordinator. Each air carrier shall 
designate and use the pilot in command as the In-flight Security 
Coordinator for each domestic and international flight to perform 
duties specified in the air carrier's approved security program.


Sec. 108.303   Bomb or air piracy threats.

    (a) Flight: Notification. Upon receipt of a specific and credible 
threat to the security of a flight, the air carrier shall--
    (1) Immediately notify the ground and in-flight security 
coordinators of the threat, any evaluation thereof, and any measures to 
be applied; and
    (2) Ensure that the in-flight security coordinator notifies all 
crewmembers of the threat, any evaluation thereof, and any measures to 
be applied.
    (3) Immediately notify the appropriate airport operator.
    (b) Flight: Inspection. Upon receipt of a specific and credible 
threat to the security of a flight, each air carrier shall attempt to 
determine whether or not any explosive or incendiary is present by 
doing the following:
    (1) Conduct a security inspection on the ground before the next 
flight or, if the aircraft is in flight, immediately after its next 
landing.
    (2) If the aircraft is on the ground, immediately deplane all 
passengers and submit that aircraft to a security search.
    (3) If the aircraft is in flight, immediately advise the pilot in 
command of all pertinent information available so that necessary 
emergency action can be taken.
    (c) Ground Facility. Upon receipt of a specific and credible threat 
to a specific ground facility at the airport, the air carrier shall:
    (1) Immediately notify the appropriate airport operator.
    (2) Inform all other air carriers at the threatened facility.
    (3) Conduct a security inspection.
    (d) Notification. Upon receipt of any bomb threat against the 
security or a flight or facility, or upon receiving information that an 
act or suspected act of air piracy has been committed, the air carrier 
also shall notify the Administrator. If the aircraft is in airspace 
under other than U.S. jurisdiction, the air carrier shall also notify 
the appropriate authorities of the State in whose territory the 
aircraft is located and, if the aircraft is in flight, the appropriate 
authorities of the State in whose territory the aircraft is to land. 
Notification of the appropriate air traffic controlling authority is 
sufficient action to meet this requirement.


Sec. 108.305  Security Directives and Information Circulars.

    (a) When a threat against civil aviation becomes known, the 
Assistant Administrator may issue an information circular to notify air 
carriers of the general situation or a Security Directive setting forth 
mandatory countermeasures to an assessed threat.
    (b) Each air carrier required to have an approved air carrier 
security program shall comply with each Security Directive issued to 
the air carrier by the Administrator, within the time prescribed in the 
Security Directive for compliance.
    (c) Each air carrier that receives a Security Directive shall-
    (1) Immediately upon receipt from the FAA, or within the time 
prescribed in the Security Directive, verbally acknowledge receipt of 
the Security Directive to the Principal Security Inspector, followed by 
written acknowledgment of receipt within 24 hours;
    (2) Not later than 72 hours after delivery by the FAA, or within 
the time prescribed in the Security Directive, specify the method by 
which the measures in the Security Directive have been implemented (or 
will be implemented, if the Security Directive is not yet effective) by 
providing the FAA a copy of the written measures and implementation 
procedures issued to (or that will be issued to) each affected air 
carrier station; and
    (3) Ensure that information regarding the Security Directive and 
measures implemented in response to the Security Directive are 
distributed to specified personnel, as prescribed in the Security 
Directive, and to other personnel with an operational need-to-know.
    (d) In the event that the air carrier is unable to implement 
paragraph (b)(2) of this section, the air carrier shall submit, within 
72 hours after receipt of the Security Directive, proposed alternative 
measures and the basis for submitting the alternative measures to the 
Administrator for approval. Within 48 hours after receiving the air 
carrier's proposed alternative measures, the Administrator either 
approves the proposed alternative measures or notifies the air carrier 
to modify the alternative measures to comply with the requirements of 
the Security Directive. The air carrier shall implement any alternative 
measures approved by the Administrator within 72 hours of receipt of 
notification of the Administrator's determination.
    (e) Each air carrier that receives a Security Directive or 
Information Circular and each person who receives information from a 
Security Directive or Information Circular shall:
    (1) Restrict the availability of the Security Directive or 
Information Circular, and information contained in either document, to 
those persons with an operational need to know.
    (2) Refuse to release the Security Directive or Information 
Circular, and information contained in either document, to persons 
other than those with an operational need-to-know without the prior 
written consent of the Administrator.
    (f) The air carrier security coordinator, or an individual 
designated by the air carrier, may receive classified information 
related to national security if the air carrier security coordinator, 
or designee, has applied to the Administrator and received the 
appropriate security clearances.


Sec. 108.307  Contingency plan.

    Each air carrier shall adopt a contingency plan and shall:
    (a) Implement its contingency plan when directed by the 
Administrator.
    (b) Conduct reviews and exercises of its contingency plan, and 
participate in each airport operator's test of the airport's 
contingency plan.


[[Page 41758]]


    Issued in Washington, DC on July 21, 1997.
Anthony Fainberg,
Director, Office of Civil Aviation Security Policy and Planning.
[FR Doc. 97-19697 Filed 7-31-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-M