[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 137 (Thursday, July 17, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 38329-38330]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-18830]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-346]


In the Matter of Toledo Edison Company, Centerior Service Company 
The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power 
Station, Unit 1); Exemption

I

    The Toledo Edison Company, Centerior Service Company, and The 
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (the licensees) are the holders 
of Facility Operating License No. NPF-3, which authorizes operation of 
the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS), Unit 1 (the facility). 
The license provides, among other things, that the facility is subject 
to all the rules, regulations, and orders of the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (the Commission) now or hereafter in effect.
    The facility is a pressurized-water reactor located at the 
licensees' site in Ottawa County, Ohio.

II

    In 10 CFR 73.55, ``Requirements for Physical Protection of Licensed 
Activities in Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiological Sabotage,'' 
paragraph (a) states, in part, that ``The licensee shall establish and 
maintain an onsite physical protection system and security organization 
which will have as its objective to provide high assurance that 
activities involving special nuclear material are not inimical to the 
common defense and security and do not constitute an unreasonable risk 
to the public health and safety.''
    In 10 CFR 73.55(d), ``Access Requirements,'' paragraph (1), it is 
specified that ``The licensee shall control all points of personnel and 
vehicle access into a protected area.'' Also, 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) 
requires that ``A numbered picture badge identification system shall be 
used for all individuals who are authorized access to protected areas 
without escort.'' It further states that individuals not employed by 
the licensees (for example, contractors) may be authorized access to 
protected areas without escort provided that the individual ``receives 
a picture badge upon entrance into the protected area which must be 
returned upon exit from the protected area * * *''
    By letter dated January 20, 1997, the licensees requested an 
exemption from certain requirements of 10 CFR 73.55. The licensees 
propose to implement an alternative unescorted access system that would 
eliminate the need to issue and retrieve picture badges at the entrance 
location to the protected area and would allow all individuals 
authorized for unescorted access, including contractors, to keep their 
picture badges in their possession when departing DBNPS.

III

    Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, ``Specific Exemptions,'' the Commission 
may, upon application of any interested person or upon its own 
initiative, grant such exemptions from the requirements of the 
regulations in this part as it determines are authorized by law and 
will not endanger life or property or the

[[Page 38330]]

common defense and security, and are otherwise in the public interest.
    Currently, unescorted access into the protected area of DBNPS for 
both employee and contractor personnel is controlled through the use of 
picture badges. Positive identification of personnel who are authorized 
and request access into the protected area is established by security 
personnel making a visual comparison of the individual requesting 
access and that individual's picture badge. In accordance with 10 CFR 
73.55(d)(5), contractor personnel are not allowed to take their picture 
badges offsite. In accordance with the plant's physical security plan, 
the licensees' employees are also not allowed to take their picture 
badges offsite.
    The proposed system will require that all individuals with 
authorized unescorted access have the physical characteristics of their 
hand (hand geometry) registered with their picture badge number in a 
computerized access control system. Therefore, all authorized 
individuals must not only have their picture badge to gain access to 
the protected area, they must also have their hand geometry confirmed. 
All individuals, including contractors, who have authorized unescorted 
access into the protected area will be allowed to keep their picture 
badges in their possession when departing DBNPS.
    All other access processes, including search function capability 
and access revocation, will remain the same. A security officer 
responsible for access control will continue to be positioned within a 
bullet-resistant structure. It should also be noted that the proposed 
system is only for individuals with authorized unescorted access and 
will not be used for those individuals requiring escorts.
    Sandia National Laboratories conducted testing which demonstrated 
that the hand geometry equipment possesses strong performance 
characteristics. Details of the testing performed are in the Sandia 
report, ``A Performance Evaluation of Biometric Identification 
Devices,'' SAND91--0276 UC--906, Unlimited Release, June 1991. On the 
basis of the Sandia report and the licensees' experience using the 
current photo picture identification system, the false acceptance rate 
for the proposed hand geometry system would be at least equivalent to 
that of the current system. To ensure that the proposed system will 
continue to meet the general performance requirements of 10 CFR 73.55, 
the licensees will implement a process for testing the system. The site 
security plans will also be revised to allow implementation of the hand 
geometry system and to allow employees and contractors with unescorted 
access to keep their picture badges in their possession when leaving 
DBNPS.

IV

    For the foregoing reasons, the NRC staff has determined that the 
proposed alternative measures for protection against radiological 
sabotage meet the high assurance objective and the general performance 
requirements of 10 CFR 73.55. In addition, the staff has determined 
that the overall level of the proposed system's performance will 
provide protection against radiological sabotage equivalent to that 
which is provided by the current system in accordance with 10 CFR 
73.55.
    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
73.5, this exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or 
property or common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public 
interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants the following 
exemption:

    The requirement of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) that individuals who have 
been granted unescorted access and are not employed by the licensees 
are to return their picture badges upon exit from the protected area 
is no longer necessary. Thus, these individuals may keep their 
picture badges in their possession upon leaving Davis-Besse Nuclear 
Power Station. This exemption is granted on the condition that the 
licensee implements a system testing process and revises the site 
security plan as discussed in Section III above.

    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the 
granting of this exemption will not result in any significant adverse 
environmental impact (62 FR 30627).

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 10th day of July 1997.

    For The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Collins,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 97-18830 Filed 7-16-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P