[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 130 (Tuesday, July 8, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 36582-36585]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-17750]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-160]
Georgia Institute of Technology, Georgia Tech Research Reactor;
Issuance of Final Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206
Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued a Final
Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206 regarding the Georgia Tech
Research Reactor at the Georgia Institute of Technology in response to
a Petition received from Ms. Pamela Blockey-O'Brien (Petitioner), dated
October 23, 1994. In issuing the Final Director's Decision, the NRC
also considered subsequent letters from the Petitioner dated November
12 and December 4, 1994; and February 21, February 23, March 6, March
28, April 19, May 18, June 27, July 18, August 18, August 21, August
28, August 31, September 17, and October 27, 1995; and January 10,
January 27, March 14, and May 24, 1996.
On October 23, 1994, the Petitioner requested (1) the shutdown and
decontamination of the Georgia Tech Research Reactor, (2) the
revocation of liquid radioactive material release authority to all
licensees, (3) the revocation of licenses that use the principle of
``as low as reasonably achievable,'' (4) the termination of
transportation of radioactive material by mail, and (5) the
modification to posting requirements for radioactive material. A
``Partial Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206'' (DD-95-15) dated
July 31, 1995, addressed requests (2) through (5) and all the issues
concerning request (1) except those management and security issues,
which were related to issues pending in an ongoing licensing proceeding
for the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. The Partial Director's Decision
denied the requested actions based on the evaluation to that time. See
DD-95-15, 42 NRC 20-45 (1995).
This Final Director's Decision addresses the issues related to
management and security, which are the remaining bases for Petitioner's
request for the shutdown and decontamination of the Georgia Tech
Research Reactor. The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation has determined that these concerns do not provide a basis
for taking the requested actions. Accordingly, the remaining request of
the Petition has been denied for the reasons stated in the ``Final
Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206'' (DD-97-16), the complete text
of which follows this notice. The Final Director's Decision is
available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document
Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW, Washington, DC.
A copy of this Final Director's Decision will be filed with the
Secretary of the Commission for review in accordance with 10 CFR
2.206(c). As provided by that regulation, the Decision will constitute
the final action of the Commission 25 days after the date of the
issuance of the Decision, unless the Commission, on its own motion,
institutes a review of the Decision within that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 27th day of June 1997.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Frank J. Miraglia,
Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Final Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206
I. Introduction
On October 23, 1994, Ms. Pamela Blockey-O'Brien (the Petitioner)
filed a Petition with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
staff pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206. This Petition requested that the NRC
staff revoke the license for the Georgia Tech Research Reactor (GTRR),
shut down this research reactor and its support facilities, and remove
all radioactive material and contamination offsite to a government-
created ``National Sacrifice [A]rea'' such as the Savannah River or Oak
Ridge facilities. In addition, the Petitioner requested that the NRC
staff withdraw all license authority nationwide involving the
discharging or dumping of any quantity of radioactive material into all
the sewers or waters in the United States or oceans of the world, and
withdraw all licenses to all nuclear facilities, including nuclear
power plants (NPPs), that operate under ``as low as reasonably
achievable'' (ALARA) principles. Finally, the Petitioner requested that
the NRC staff prohibit the transportation of radioactive material by
mail and modify every license issued to transporters of radioactive
materials and builders of NPPs to require these parties to put, in 2
foot high letters, on everything they transport or build, the words
``DANGER--RADIOACTIVE'' and, in smaller letters, ``there is no safe
level of radiation, any exposure can effect health.''
As bases for the request to shut down and decontaminate Georgia
Tech Research Reactor, the Petitioner asserted that (1) a water flume
comes out of the ground ``destabilizing the reactor and the ground in
some way;'' (2) ``[r]adiation levels in soil and vegetation climb
markedly in GA EPD [Georgia Environmental Protection Division]
documents'' around the reactor; (3) there is no record of air
monitoring ever having been done; (4) heavy rainfall causes water to
back up in the sewer and drainage lines causing flooding of the reactor
parking lot and campus, as well as causing sinkholes, ``puff-ups'' on
campus ground, and welded-shut manhole covers to be blown off; (5)
radioactive contaminants have been routinely discharged into the
sanitary sewer from the reactor's waste water holding tank and
contamination spread by backup of the sewage system; (6) should the
reactor be further destabilized, the reactor and the tank holding
cobalt-60 could ``break apart,'' causing radioactive contaminants to
``drain into groundwater/down sewers/into the runoff ditch;'' (7) the
reactor is in an earthquake zone; (8) there is absolutely no reason to
keep the reactor operating; (9) security at the reactor is extremely
lax; and (10) in case of an accident or terrorist attack, evacuation of
the campus and downtown Atlanta would be impossible, especially during
the 1996 Olympics.
In a Partial Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206 dated July 31,
1995 (DD-
[[Page 36583]]
95-15), the Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
(NRR), for the reasons stated in that decision, denied the Petitioner's
requests except for the request that the NRC staff revoke the license
of the GTRR, shut down this research reactor and its support
facilities, and remove all radioactive material and contamination off
site to a government created ``National Sacrifice [A]rea'' such as the
Savannah River or Oak Ridge facilities, insofar as that request rested
on bases numbers (8) and (9), and that portion of basis (10) that deals
with potential terrorist attacks, as set forth above. See Georgia
Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor), DD-95-15, 42
NRC 20, 40 n.37 (1995). (The portion of basis (10) that relates to
evacuation and emergency planning also is discussed in DD-95-15, 42 NRC
at 40-43.)
Basis (8) includes concerns that substantial management
deficiencies persist. Basis (9) involves concerns about security. Basis
(10) includes concerns about evacuation in case of a terrorist attack.
Since these concerns were related to issues in an ongoing license
renewal proceeding before an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB),
they were not addressed in DD-95-15. The Commission ordinarily expects
the staff to deny a petition filed pursuant to 10 CFR Sec. 2.206 that
raises the same issues that are being considered in a pending
adjudication on the basis of the pendency of the identical matters in a
proceeding involving the same licensee or facility. Georgia Power Co.
(Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; Vogtle Electric Generating Plant,
Units 1 and 2), CLI-93-15, 38 NRC 1, 2-3 (1993); see General Public
Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Units 1 and
2; Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-85-4, 21 NRC 561, 563-
65 (1985); Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power
Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-81-6, 13 NRC 443, 446 (1981). (This general
rule is not intended to bar a petitioner from seeking immediate
enforcement action from the staff in circumstances in which the
presiding officer is not empowered to grant such relief. Vogtle, 38 NRC
at 3.) The same result can be achieved by the staff deferring
consideration of issues raised in a petition filed pursuant to 10 CFR
Sec. 2.206 that are being considered in a pending proceeding involving
the same licensee and facility, as was done with regard to Petitioner's
concern regarding the management of the GTRR.The NRC staff received
additional letters dated November 12 and December 4, 1994, and February
21, February 23, March 6, March 28, April 19, May 18, June 27, and July
18, 1995, from the Petitioner and also considered these letters in DD-
95-15.
This Final Director's Decision addresses the management concerns in
issue (8) above and security concerns in issues (9) and (10) above for
the request to shutdown and decontaminate the GTRR in the 10 CFR 2.206
Petition of October 23, 1994. The NRC staff received additional letters
from the Petitioner dated August 18, August 21, August 28, August 31,
September 17, and October 27, 1995; and January 10, January 27, March
14, and May 24, 1996. All letters related to this Petition were
considered in this Final Director's Decision and have been placed in
the Public Document Room and docketed under the GTRR Docket Number (50-
160). For the reasons set forth below, the Petitioner's remaining
request is denied.
II. Discussion
A. Management of the GTRR
Petitioner stated that ``[t]here is no reason to keep the [GTRR]
operating,'' and asserted that substantial management deficiencies
persist. As stated above, DD-95-15 did not address the management issue
since it had been admitted in a proceeding on the renewal of the
license for the GTRR.
The history of the license renewal proceeding is set forth in the
ASLB's Initial Decision in that proceeding. Georgia Institute of
Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor), 45 NRC ____________, LBP
97-7, slip op. at 1-5 (April 3, 1997). A copy of that decision was sent
to the Petitioner. In the Initial Decision, the ASLB concluded, in
part, that:
1. The Applicant's performance in the post-restart period,
although not entirely satisfactory, has substantially improved since
the shutdown of the reactor in 1988. Further, Georgia Tech's
performance in the post-restart period does not support GANE's
assertion that management of the GTRR is inadequate and that the
license renewal application should therefore be denied. Nor has GANE
met its burden of demonstrating that ``substantial management
deficiencies persist.''
2. . . . We conclude that GANE has not demonstrated ``management
improprieties or poor `integrity' . . .[that] relate directly to the
proposed licensing action,'' or that ``the GTRR as presently
organized and staffed [fails to] provide reasonable assurance of
candor and willingness to follow NRC regulations.'' Moreover, the
evidence supports findings that ``the facility's current management
encourages a safety-conscious attitude, and provides an environment
in which employees feel they can freely voice safety concerns,'' and
there is ``reasonable assurance that the GTRR facility can be safely
operated'' in that ``the GTRR's current management [n]either is
unfit [n]or structured unacceptably.''
3. The Applicant's management of the Georgia Tech Research
Reactor complies with all applicable regulatory requirements, and
provides reasonable assurance that its management of the GTRR
facility, upon the renewal of the License No. R-97, will not be
inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and
safety of the public. . .
Id. at 82-83 (citations omitted).
The ASLB's Initial Decision considered all the evidence submitted
on the record during the proceeding. The Petitioner did not submit any
information to the NRC in support of its Petition that was
significantly different from the evidence considered by the ASLB in the
license renewal proceeding on the management issue.
Since the ASLB proceeding record closed in June 1996, four
additional NRC inspections of the GTRR facility have been conducted
(NRC Inspection Reports No. 50-160/96-02, 50-160/96-03, 50-160/96-04
and 50-160/96-05 which were sent to the Petitioner). Three of the
inspections found no violations; the violations that were found and
documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-160/96-02 do not provide a
basis for changing the NRC staff's conclusion with regard to Georgia
Tech's management of the facility.
The NRC staff's inspection findings subsequent to the close of the
ASLB record do not provide a basis for concluding that substantial
management deficiencies have arisen with regard to the GTRR since the
record in the license renewal proceeding closed. The Petitioner does
not otherwise provide any information that would be a basis for the NRC
staff to conclude at this time that the management and organization of
the Georgia Tech Research Reactor fails to comply with the Atomic
Energy Act and NRC regulations. Although the Petitioner in very broad
terms opposes operation of the facility, the application makes clear
that its intended purpose is in keeping with lawful uses authorized in
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. The proposed operation has
been found to acceptably comply with all applicable NRC regulatory
requirements. Based on the foregoing, the NRC staff concludes that no
information has been provided on this issue to warrant the action
requested by the Petitioner.
B. Security Issues
Petitioner raised two issues regarding security, asserting that (1)
security at the GTRR is extremely lax and (2) in case of accident or
terrorist attack,
[[Page 36584]]
evacuation of the campus and downtown Atlanta would be impossible,
especially during the 1996 Olympics. These two issues are discussed
below.
Georgia Tech has implemented a security plan for the research
reactor that is consistent with the applicable requirements of 10 CFR
Part 73, ``Physical Protection of Plants and Materials.'' This has been
confirmed through the relatively recent NRC safeguards and security
related inspection activities in NRC Inspection Reports No. 50-160/95-
02, 50-160/95-04, 50-160/95-05, 50-160/96-01, 50-160/96-03, and 50-160/
96-04. (Inspection Reports No. 50-160/95-02, 50-160/95-04, and 50-160/
96-01 were admitted into evidence in the license renewal proceeding.)
Inspection Report No. 50-160/95-02 identified a violation for a
failure to submit material status reports in a timely manner. Otherwise
the inspection found that the safeguards and security activities were
acceptable.
On October 26, 1995, a television news media crew entered the Neely
Nuclear Research Center, which houses the GTRR, and explored and filmed
portions of the center. In response, the NRC conducted an inspection of
the GTRR from October 3 to November 3, 1995, as documented in NRC
Inspection Report No. 50-160/95-04, which states:
This Special announced safeguards inspection was conducted to
review the circumstances surrounding an uninvited tour of portions
of the Neely Nuclear Research Center by a television news media crew
which occurred, apparently, on the morning of October 26, 1995. . .
Neither the licensee nor the inspector could find any evidence of a
security breach of the protected area. One licensee employee was
identified who had seen parts of the video made by the television
crew supposedly on October 26, 1995; according to that employee, the
video shows two security doors being challenged by the television
crew which remained locked. This employee stated that the video
shows the crew touring interior and exterior areas of the Center
which are open to the public or students and staff. On November 10,
the inspector viewed the television showing of the video taken
during this event and could find no indication that the television
crew had unauthorized access to the protected/radiation controlled
area. . . No violations or deviations were identified.
In view of these inspection findings, the television media
crew's tour is not a basis for granting the Petitioner's request.
The ASLB discussed these events in the context of the contention
regarding management deficiencies, and made findings of fact consistent
with this conclusion. LBP 97-7, slip op. at 51-57. It stated:
Upon review of the evidence of this event, we agree with the
[s]taff that the Fox Television film crew's intrusion into the
reactor complex does not reflect inadequate management by the
[a]pplicant. To the contrary, the security plan appears to have
worked as intended, in compliance with applicable regulatory
requirements. Further, as observed by the [s]taff, the [a]pplicant's
subsequent decision to upgrade its security measures beyond the
requirements of the security plan may be viewed as demonstrating
good managerial judgment. Thus, this matter does not provide grounds
for denying or conditioning the license.
Id. at 56-57 (Citation omitted).
Inspection Report No. 50-160/95-05 refers to the inspection
conducted December 5-7, 1995:
The special inspection addressed the facility's reactor status,
physical inventory determinations, and other activities associated
with maintaining a material control and accounting program within
regulatory requirements, the licensed possession limit, and
authorized uses of special nuclear material. . . Within the scope of
the inspection, no non-compliance issues were identified. The
inspector determined that the licensee had implemented adequate
controls for special nuclear material (SNM), and that accurate SNM
accounting records were being maintained.
Inspection Report No. 50-160/96-01 refers to the inspection
conducted on January 17 and 18, 24 and 25, 29 and 30, and February 5-7,
9, 15-18, and March 15, 1996. This inspection examined security
provisions for fuel processing and shipment offsite. As an additional
precaution in regards to security during the Olympic Games, the
licensee had determined to remove all GTRR fuel from the facility prior
to the Games and not to replace it until after the Games. The
inspection found that in addition to meeting regulatory requirements
the licensee provided additional measures (e.g., a guard was assigned
to various observed activities).
Inspection Report No. 50-160/96-03 refers to the inspection
conducted on June 17, 18, and 27, and July 3, 5, and 11, 1996. This
inspection included onsite and offsite review of security preparations
for the Olympic Games. The inspection concluded: ``The controls
implemented by the licensee and the precautions taken are adequate to
protect licensee personnel and the public.''
The inspection documented in Inspection Report No. 50-160/96-04 was
conducted on July 17 and 29, 1996. This inspection reviewed the
preparation for the Summer Olympic Games and found that:
[T]he university had taken additional safeguards measures to
control access to the Campus and to the Research Control Area. The
licensee had taken additional safeguards measures to control access
to the Neely Nuclear Research Center (NNRC). The additional security
measures taken as a result of the 1996 Olympic Games were reviewed
and/or observed by the inspectors. . . On July 17 and 29, 1996, the
inspectors visited the Neely Nuclear Research Center, met with the
Director of the Center, toured the facility and verified continued
compliance with the Physical Security Plan (PSP). The inspectors
were granted unfettered access to the Research Control Area as well
as to the Center and emergency access during the Olympics was
assured because the inspectors and selected management of Region II
had been provided with special picture badges to facilitate NRC
response. The presence of military police, Campus police and
additional State and Federal law enforcement officers in the
immediate vicinity of the Center was observed by the inspectors. The
access controls, barriers, assessment capabilities, communication
capabilities and detection equipment required by the NRC were in
place. Additional exterior lights had been installed by the licensee
to assist patrolling officers. Additional fencing around the Center
was also noted by the inspectors. . . The inspector concluded that
the licensee was meeting NRC requirements and had effectively
imposed proactive security measures.
With regard to the contention on the physical security of the site
during the 1996 Summer Olympic Games held in Atlanta, Georgia, the ASLB
decision observed that ``the Applicant, responding to several
Commission inquiries relative to security at the Olympic Games,
determined to remove all nuclear fuel from the site prior to the
Olympic Games and not to replace it until after the Games. The
Commission accordingly remanded the security contention to us for
appropriate action * * * and we issued a Partial Initial Decision
dismissing the contention as moot.'' LBP-97-7, slip. op. at 4. See
Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor), LBP-
95-19, 42 NRC 191 (1995).
In summary, the physical security plan was verified to provide
acceptable procedures for event response and access control, and the
security preparations for the Olympics were acceptable. Observations of
the facility and activities confirmed the use of security-related
equipment and controls as required by the physical security plan and
consistent with the special nuclear material that is present at the
facility. The Petitioner asserted that security at the research reactor
was lax; however, access is controlled and monitored as required.
Further, this evaluation confirmed the continued acceptability of the
security provisions to deal with potential terrorists attacks. The
findings do not provide a basis for changing the
[[Page 36585]]
conclusion reached in DD-95-15 on the adequacy of emergency plans for
the facility. DD-95-15, 42 NRC at 40-43. The NRC staff has found no
reason to conclude that the security at the reactor is not acceptable.
The Petitioner provided no facts to conclude otherwise.
III. Conclusion
With regard to the requests made by the Petitioner discussed
herein, the NRC staff finds no basis for taking such actions.
Accordingly, the Petitioner's requests for action, pursuant to Section
2.206 on the Georgia Tech Research Reactor, are denied.
A copy of this Decision will be filed with the Secretary for the
Commission as provided by 10 CFR 2.206(c) of the Commission's
regulations. As provided by this regulation, the Decision will
constitute the final action of the Commission 25 days after issuance
unless the Commission, on its own motion, institutes review of the
Decision in that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 27th day of June 1997.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Frank J. Miraglia,
Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 97-17750 Filed 7-7-97; 8:45 am]
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