[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 130 (Tuesday, July 8, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 36582-36585]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-17750]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-160]


Georgia Institute of Technology, Georgia Tech Research Reactor; 
Issuance of Final Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206

    Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued a Final 
Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206 regarding the Georgia Tech 
Research Reactor at the Georgia Institute of Technology in response to 
a Petition received from Ms. Pamela Blockey-O'Brien (Petitioner), dated 
October 23, 1994. In issuing the Final Director's Decision, the NRC 
also considered subsequent letters from the Petitioner dated November 
12 and December 4, 1994; and February 21, February 23, March 6, March 
28, April 19, May 18, June 27, July 18, August 18, August 21, August 
28, August 31, September 17, and October 27, 1995; and January 10, 
January 27, March 14, and May 24, 1996.
    On October 23, 1994, the Petitioner requested (1) the shutdown and 
decontamination of the Georgia Tech Research Reactor, (2) the 
revocation of liquid radioactive material release authority to all 
licensees, (3) the revocation of licenses that use the principle of 
``as low as reasonably achievable,'' (4) the termination of 
transportation of radioactive material by mail, and (5) the 
modification to posting requirements for radioactive material. A 
``Partial Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206'' (DD-95-15) dated 
July 31, 1995, addressed requests (2) through (5) and all the issues 
concerning request (1) except those management and security issues, 
which were related to issues pending in an ongoing licensing proceeding 
for the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. The Partial Director's Decision 
denied the requested actions based on the evaluation to that time. See 
DD-95-15, 42 NRC 20-45 (1995).
    This Final Director's Decision addresses the issues related to 
management and security, which are the remaining bases for Petitioner's 
request for the shutdown and decontamination of the Georgia Tech 
Research Reactor. The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation has determined that these concerns do not provide a basis 
for taking the requested actions. Accordingly, the remaining request of 
the Petition has been denied for the reasons stated in the ``Final 
Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206'' (DD-97-16), the complete text 
of which follows this notice. The Final Director's Decision is 
available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document 
Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW, Washington, DC.
    A copy of this Final Director's Decision will be filed with the 
Secretary of the Commission for review in accordance with 10 CFR 
2.206(c). As provided by that regulation, the Decision will constitute 
the final action of the Commission 25 days after the date of the 
issuance of the Decision, unless the Commission, on its own motion, 
institutes a review of the Decision within that time.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 27th day of June 1997.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Frank J. Miraglia,
Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

Final Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206

I. Introduction

    On October 23, 1994, Ms. Pamela Blockey-O'Brien (the Petitioner) 
filed a Petition with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
staff pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206. This Petition requested that the NRC 
staff revoke the license for the Georgia Tech Research Reactor (GTRR), 
shut down this research reactor and its support facilities, and remove 
all radioactive material and contamination offsite to a government-
created ``National Sacrifice [A]rea'' such as the Savannah River or Oak 
Ridge facilities. In addition, the Petitioner requested that the NRC 
staff withdraw all license authority nationwide involving the 
discharging or dumping of any quantity of radioactive material into all 
the sewers or waters in the United States or oceans of the world, and 
withdraw all licenses to all nuclear facilities, including nuclear 
power plants (NPPs), that operate under ``as low as reasonably 
achievable'' (ALARA) principles. Finally, the Petitioner requested that 
the NRC staff prohibit the transportation of radioactive material by 
mail and modify every license issued to transporters of radioactive 
materials and builders of NPPs to require these parties to put, in 2 
foot high letters, on everything they transport or build, the words 
``DANGER--RADIOACTIVE'' and, in smaller letters, ``there is no safe 
level of radiation, any exposure can effect health.''
    As bases for the request to shut down and decontaminate Georgia 
Tech Research Reactor, the Petitioner asserted that (1) a water flume 
comes out of the ground ``destabilizing the reactor and the ground in 
some way;'' (2) ``[r]adiation levels in soil and vegetation climb 
markedly in GA EPD [Georgia Environmental Protection Division] 
documents'' around the reactor; (3) there is no record of air 
monitoring ever having been done; (4) heavy rainfall causes water to 
back up in the sewer and drainage lines causing flooding of the reactor 
parking lot and campus, as well as causing sinkholes, ``puff-ups'' on 
campus ground, and welded-shut manhole covers to be blown off; (5) 
radioactive contaminants have been routinely discharged into the 
sanitary sewer from the reactor's waste water holding tank and 
contamination spread by backup of the sewage system; (6) should the 
reactor be further destabilized, the reactor and the tank holding 
cobalt-60 could ``break apart,'' causing radioactive contaminants to 
``drain into groundwater/down sewers/into the runoff ditch;'' (7) the 
reactor is in an earthquake zone; (8) there is absolutely no reason to 
keep the reactor operating; (9) security at the reactor is extremely 
lax; and (10) in case of an accident or terrorist attack, evacuation of 
the campus and downtown Atlanta would be impossible, especially during 
the 1996 Olympics.
    In a Partial Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206 dated July 31, 
1995 (DD-

[[Page 36583]]

95-15), the Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 
(NRR), for the reasons stated in that decision, denied the Petitioner's 
requests except for the request that the NRC staff revoke the license 
of the GTRR, shut down this research reactor and its support 
facilities, and remove all radioactive material and contamination off 
site to a government created ``National Sacrifice [A]rea'' such as the 
Savannah River or Oak Ridge facilities, insofar as that request rested 
on bases numbers (8) and (9), and that portion of basis (10) that deals 
with potential terrorist attacks, as set forth above. See Georgia 
Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor), DD-95-15, 42 
NRC 20, 40 n.37 (1995). (The portion of basis (10) that relates to 
evacuation and emergency planning also is discussed in DD-95-15, 42 NRC 
at 40-43.)
    Basis (8) includes concerns that substantial management 
deficiencies persist. Basis (9) involves concerns about security. Basis 
(10) includes concerns about evacuation in case of a terrorist attack. 
Since these concerns were related to issues in an ongoing license 
renewal proceeding before an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB), 
they were not addressed in DD-95-15. The Commission ordinarily expects 
the staff to deny a petition filed pursuant to 10 CFR Sec. 2.206 that 
raises the same issues that are being considered in a pending 
adjudication on the basis of the pendency of the identical matters in a 
proceeding involving the same licensee or facility. Georgia Power Co. 
(Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, 
Units 1 and 2), CLI-93-15, 38 NRC 1, 2-3 (1993); see General Public 
Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Units 1 and 
2; Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-85-4, 21 NRC 561, 563-
65 (1985); Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power 
Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-81-6, 13 NRC 443, 446 (1981). (This general 
rule is not intended to bar a petitioner from seeking immediate 
enforcement action from the staff in circumstances in which the 
presiding officer is not empowered to grant such relief. Vogtle, 38 NRC 
at 3.) The same result can be achieved by the staff deferring 
consideration of issues raised in a petition filed pursuant to 10 CFR 
Sec. 2.206 that are being considered in a pending proceeding involving 
the same licensee and facility, as was done with regard to Petitioner's 
concern regarding the management of the GTRR.The NRC staff received 
additional letters dated November 12 and December 4, 1994, and February 
21, February 23, March 6, March 28, April 19, May 18, June 27, and July 
18, 1995, from the Petitioner and also considered these letters in DD-
95-15.
    This Final Director's Decision addresses the management concerns in 
issue (8) above and security concerns in issues (9) and (10) above for 
the request to shutdown and decontaminate the GTRR in the 10 CFR 2.206 
Petition of October 23, 1994. The NRC staff received additional letters 
from the Petitioner dated August 18, August 21, August 28, August 31, 
September 17, and October 27, 1995; and January 10, January 27, March 
14, and May 24, 1996. All letters related to this Petition were 
considered in this Final Director's Decision and have been placed in 
the Public Document Room and docketed under the GTRR Docket Number (50-
160). For the reasons set forth below, the Petitioner's remaining 
request is denied.

II. Discussion

A. Management of the GTRR

    Petitioner stated that ``[t]here is no reason to keep the [GTRR] 
operating,'' and asserted that substantial management deficiencies 
persist. As stated above, DD-95-15 did not address the management issue 
since it had been admitted in a proceeding on the renewal of the 
license for the GTRR.
    The history of the license renewal proceeding is set forth in the 
ASLB's Initial Decision in that proceeding. Georgia Institute of 
Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor), 45 NRC ____________, LBP 
97-7, slip op. at 1-5 (April 3, 1997). A copy of that decision was sent 
to the Petitioner. In the Initial Decision, the ASLB concluded, in 
part, that:

    1. The Applicant's performance in the post-restart period, 
although not entirely satisfactory, has substantially improved since 
the shutdown of the reactor in 1988. Further, Georgia Tech's 
performance in the post-restart period does not support GANE's 
assertion that management of the GTRR is inadequate and that the 
license renewal application should therefore be denied. Nor has GANE 
met its burden of demonstrating that ``substantial management 
deficiencies persist.''
    2. . . . We conclude that GANE has not demonstrated ``management 
improprieties or poor `integrity' . . .[that] relate directly to the 
proposed licensing action,'' or that ``the GTRR as presently 
organized and staffed [fails to] provide reasonable assurance of 
candor and willingness to follow NRC regulations.'' Moreover, the 
evidence supports findings that ``the facility's current management 
encourages a safety-conscious attitude, and provides an environment 
in which employees feel they can freely voice safety concerns,'' and 
there is ``reasonable assurance that the GTRR facility can be safely 
operated'' in that ``the GTRR's current management [n]either is 
unfit [n]or structured unacceptably.''
    3. The Applicant's management of the Georgia Tech Research 
Reactor complies with all applicable regulatory requirements, and 
provides reasonable assurance that its management of the GTRR 
facility, upon the renewal of the License No. R-97, will not be 
inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and 
safety of the public. . .

Id. at 82-83 (citations omitted).
    The ASLB's Initial Decision considered all the evidence submitted 
on the record during the proceeding. The Petitioner did not submit any 
information to the NRC in support of its Petition that was 
significantly different from the evidence considered by the ASLB in the 
license renewal proceeding on the management issue.
    Since the ASLB proceeding record closed in June 1996, four 
additional NRC inspections of the GTRR facility have been conducted 
(NRC Inspection Reports No. 50-160/96-02, 50-160/96-03, 50-160/96-04 
and 50-160/96-05 which were sent to the Petitioner). Three of the 
inspections found no violations; the violations that were found and 
documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-160/96-02 do not provide a 
basis for changing the NRC staff's conclusion with regard to Georgia 
Tech's management of the facility.
    The NRC staff's inspection findings subsequent to the close of the 
ASLB record do not provide a basis for concluding that substantial 
management deficiencies have arisen with regard to the GTRR since the 
record in the license renewal proceeding closed. The Petitioner does 
not otherwise provide any information that would be a basis for the NRC 
staff to conclude at this time that the management and organization of 
the Georgia Tech Research Reactor fails to comply with the Atomic 
Energy Act and NRC regulations. Although the Petitioner in very broad 
terms opposes operation of the facility, the application makes clear 
that its intended purpose is in keeping with lawful uses authorized in 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. The proposed operation has 
been found to acceptably comply with all applicable NRC regulatory 
requirements. Based on the foregoing, the NRC staff concludes that no 
information has been provided on this issue to warrant the action 
requested by the Petitioner.

B. Security Issues

    Petitioner raised two issues regarding security, asserting that (1) 
security at the GTRR is extremely lax and (2) in case of accident or 
terrorist attack,

[[Page 36584]]

evacuation of the campus and downtown Atlanta would be impossible, 
especially during the 1996 Olympics. These two issues are discussed 
below.
    Georgia Tech has implemented a security plan for the research 
reactor that is consistent with the applicable requirements of 10 CFR 
Part 73, ``Physical Protection of Plants and Materials.'' This has been 
confirmed through the relatively recent NRC safeguards and security 
related inspection activities in NRC Inspection Reports No. 50-160/95-
02, 50-160/95-04, 50-160/95-05, 50-160/96-01, 50-160/96-03, and 50-160/
96-04. (Inspection Reports No. 50-160/95-02, 50-160/95-04, and 50-160/
96-01 were admitted into evidence in the license renewal proceeding.)
    Inspection Report No. 50-160/95-02 identified a violation for a 
failure to submit material status reports in a timely manner. Otherwise 
the inspection found that the safeguards and security activities were 
acceptable.
    On October 26, 1995, a television news media crew entered the Neely 
Nuclear Research Center, which houses the GTRR, and explored and filmed 
portions of the center. In response, the NRC conducted an inspection of 
the GTRR from October 3 to November 3, 1995, as documented in NRC 
Inspection Report No. 50-160/95-04, which states:

    This Special announced safeguards inspection was conducted to 
review the circumstances surrounding an uninvited tour of portions 
of the Neely Nuclear Research Center by a television news media crew 
which occurred, apparently, on the morning of October 26, 1995. . . 
Neither the licensee nor the inspector could find any evidence of a 
security breach of the protected area. One licensee employee was 
identified who had seen parts of the video made by the television 
crew supposedly on October 26, 1995; according to that employee, the 
video shows two security doors being challenged by the television 
crew which remained locked. This employee stated that the video 
shows the crew touring interior and exterior areas of the Center 
which are open to the public or students and staff. On November 10, 
the inspector viewed the television showing of the video taken 
during this event and could find no indication that the television 
crew had unauthorized access to the protected/radiation controlled 
area. . . No violations or deviations were identified.
    In view of these inspection findings, the television media 
crew's tour is not a basis for granting the Petitioner's request.

    The ASLB discussed these events in the context of the contention 
regarding management deficiencies, and made findings of fact consistent 
with this conclusion. LBP 97-7, slip op. at 51-57. It stated:

    Upon review of the evidence of this event, we agree with the 
[s]taff that the Fox Television film crew's intrusion into the 
reactor complex does not reflect inadequate management by the 
[a]pplicant. To the contrary, the security plan appears to have 
worked as intended, in compliance with applicable regulatory 
requirements. Further, as observed by the [s]taff, the [a]pplicant's 
subsequent decision to upgrade its security measures beyond the 
requirements of the security plan may be viewed as demonstrating 
good managerial judgment. Thus, this matter does not provide grounds 
for denying or conditioning the license.

Id. at 56-57 (Citation omitted).
    Inspection Report No. 50-160/95-05 refers to the inspection 
conducted December 5-7, 1995:

    The special inspection addressed the facility's reactor status, 
physical inventory determinations, and other activities associated 
with maintaining a material control and accounting program within 
regulatory requirements, the licensed possession limit, and 
authorized uses of special nuclear material. . . Within the scope of 
the inspection, no non-compliance issues were identified. The 
inspector determined that the licensee had implemented adequate 
controls for special nuclear material (SNM), and that accurate SNM 
accounting records were being maintained.

    Inspection Report No. 50-160/96-01 refers to the inspection 
conducted on January 17 and 18, 24 and 25, 29 and 30, and February 5-7, 
9, 15-18, and March 15, 1996. This inspection examined security 
provisions for fuel processing and shipment offsite. As an additional 
precaution in regards to security during the Olympic Games, the 
licensee had determined to remove all GTRR fuel from the facility prior 
to the Games and not to replace it until after the Games. The 
inspection found that in addition to meeting regulatory requirements 
the licensee provided additional measures (e.g., a guard was assigned 
to various observed activities).
    Inspection Report No. 50-160/96-03 refers to the inspection 
conducted on June 17, 18, and 27, and July 3, 5, and 11, 1996. This 
inspection included onsite and offsite review of security preparations 
for the Olympic Games. The inspection concluded: ``The controls 
implemented by the licensee and the precautions taken are adequate to 
protect licensee personnel and the public.''
    The inspection documented in Inspection Report No. 50-160/96-04 was 
conducted on July 17 and 29, 1996. This inspection reviewed the 
preparation for the Summer Olympic Games and found that:

    [T]he university had taken additional safeguards measures to 
control access to the Campus and to the Research Control Area. The 
licensee had taken additional safeguards measures to control access 
to the Neely Nuclear Research Center (NNRC). The additional security 
measures taken as a result of the 1996 Olympic Games were reviewed 
and/or observed by the inspectors. . . On July 17 and 29, 1996, the 
inspectors visited the Neely Nuclear Research Center, met with the 
Director of the Center, toured the facility and verified continued 
compliance with the Physical Security Plan (PSP). The inspectors 
were granted unfettered access to the Research Control Area as well 
as to the Center and emergency access during the Olympics was 
assured because the inspectors and selected management of Region II 
had been provided with special picture badges to facilitate NRC 
response. The presence of military police, Campus police and 
additional State and Federal law enforcement officers in the 
immediate vicinity of the Center was observed by the inspectors. The 
access controls, barriers, assessment capabilities, communication 
capabilities and detection equipment required by the NRC were in 
place. Additional exterior lights had been installed by the licensee 
to assist patrolling officers. Additional fencing around the Center 
was also noted by the inspectors. . . The inspector concluded that 
the licensee was meeting NRC requirements and had effectively 
imposed proactive security measures.

    With regard to the contention on the physical security of the site 
during the 1996 Summer Olympic Games held in Atlanta, Georgia, the ASLB 
decision observed that ``the Applicant, responding to several 
Commission inquiries relative to security at the Olympic Games, 
determined to remove all nuclear fuel from the site prior to the 
Olympic Games and not to replace it until after the Games. The 
Commission accordingly remanded the security contention to us for 
appropriate action * * * and we issued a Partial Initial Decision 
dismissing the contention as moot.'' LBP-97-7, slip. op. at 4. See 
Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor), LBP-
95-19, 42 NRC 191 (1995).
    In summary, the physical security plan was verified to provide 
acceptable procedures for event response and access control, and the 
security preparations for the Olympics were acceptable. Observations of 
the facility and activities confirmed the use of security-related 
equipment and controls as required by the physical security plan and 
consistent with the special nuclear material that is present at the 
facility. The Petitioner asserted that security at the research reactor 
was lax; however, access is controlled and monitored as required. 
Further, this evaluation confirmed the continued acceptability of the 
security provisions to deal with potential terrorists attacks. The 
findings do not provide a basis for changing the

[[Page 36585]]

conclusion reached in DD-95-15 on the adequacy of emergency plans for 
the facility. DD-95-15, 42 NRC at 40-43. The NRC staff has found no 
reason to conclude that the security at the reactor is not acceptable. 
The Petitioner provided no facts to conclude otherwise.

III. Conclusion

    With regard to the requests made by the Petitioner discussed 
herein, the NRC staff finds no basis for taking such actions. 
Accordingly, the Petitioner's requests for action, pursuant to Section 
2.206 on the Georgia Tech Research Reactor, are denied.
    A copy of this Decision will be filed with the Secretary for the 
Commission as provided by 10 CFR 2.206(c) of the Commission's 
regulations. As provided by this regulation, the Decision will 
constitute the final action of the Commission 25 days after issuance 
unless the Commission, on its own motion, institutes review of the 
Decision in that time.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 27th day of June 1997.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Frank J. Miraglia,
Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 97-17750 Filed 7-7-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P