[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 130 (Tuesday, July 8, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 36579-36580]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-17748]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-334]


Duquesne Light Company, Ohio Edison Company, Pennsylvania Power 
Company (Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1); Exemption

I

    Duquesne Light Company (DLC), Ohio Edison Company (OEC), and 
Pennsylvania Power Company (PPC), the licensees, are holders of 
Facility Operating License No. DPR-66, which authorizes operation of 
the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 (BVPS-1). The license 
provides that the licensee is subject to all rules, regulations, and 
orders of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) now or 
hereafter in effect.
    The facility consists of a pressurized water reactor at the 
licensee's site located in Beaver County, Pennsylvania.

II

    The Code of Federal Regulations, 10 CFR 70.24, ``Criticality 
Accident Requirements,'' requires that each licensee authorized to 
possess special nuclear material shall maintain a criticality accident 
monitoring system in each area where such material is handled, used, or 
stored. Subsection a(2) of 10 CFR 70.24 specifies detection and 
sensitivity requirements that these monitors must meet. Subsection 
(a)(3) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to maintain emergency 
procedures for each area in which this licensed special nuclear 
material is handled, used, or stored and provides (1) that the 
procedures ensure that all personnel withdraw to an area of safety upon 
the sounding of a criticality accident monitor alarm, (2) that the 
procedures must include drills to familiarize personnel with the 
evacuation plan, and (3) that the procedures designate responsible 
individuals for determining the cause of the alarm and placement of 
radiation survey instruments in accessible locations for use in such an 
emergency. Subsection (b)(1) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to have 
a means to identify quickly personnel who have received a dose of 10 
rads or more. Subsection (b)(2) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to 
maintain personnel decontamination facilities, to maintain arrangements 
for a physician and other medical personnel qualified to handle 
radiation emergencies, and to maintain arrangements for the 
transportation of contaminated individuals to treatment facilities 
outside the site boundary. Paragraph (c) of 10 CFR 70.24 exempts Part 
50 licensees from the requirements of paragraph (b) of 10 CFR 70.24 for 
special nuclear material used or to be used in the reactor. Subsection 
(d) of 10 CFR 70.24 states that any licensee who believes that there is 
good cause why he should be granted an exemption from all or part of 10 
CFR 70.24 may apply to the Commission for such an exemption and shall 
specify the reasons for the relief requested.

III

    The special nuclear material that could be assembled into a 
critical mass at BVPS-1 is in the form of nuclear fuel; the quantity of 
special nuclear material other than fuel that is stored on site is 
small enough to preclude achieving a critical mass. The Commission's 
technical staff has evaluated the possibility of an inadvertent 
criticality of the nuclear fuel at BVPS-1 and has determined that such 
an accident is unlikely to occur if the licensee meets the following 
seven criteria:
    1. Only 1 pressurized water reactor fuel assembly is allowed out of 
a shipping cask or storage rack at one time.
    2. With the fresh fuel storage racks filled with fuel of the 
maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and flooded with pure water, the 
maximum k-effective shall not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% 
confidence level.
    3. With the fresh fuel storage racks filled with fuel of the 
maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and flooded with moderator at the 
(low) density corresponding to optimum moderation, the maximum k-
effective shall not exceed 0.98, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence 
level.
    4. With the spent fuel storage racks filled with fuel of the 
maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and flooded with pure water, the 
maximum k-effective shall not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% 
confidence level.
    5. The quantity of other forms of special nuclear material, such as 
sources, detectors, etc., that are stored on site is small enough to 
preclude achieving a critical mass.
    6. Radiation monitors, as required by General Design Criterion 63, 
are provided in fuel storage and handling areas to detect excessive 
radiation levels and to initiate appropriate safety actions.
    7. The maximum nominal U-235 enrichment is limited to 5 weight 
percent.
    By letter dated December 18, 1996, as supplemented April 10 and 
June 11, 1997, DLC requested an exemption from 10 CFR 70.24. In this 
exemption request, DLC addressed the seven criteria given above. The 
Commission's technical staff has reviewed DLC's submittal and has 
determined that BVPS-1 meets the criteria for prevention of inadvertent 
criticality; therefore, the staff has determined that an inadvertent 
criticality in special nuclear materials handling or storage areas at 
BVPS-1 is highly unlikely.
    The purpose of the criticality monitors required by 10 CFR 70.24 is 
to ensure that if a criticality were to occur during the handling of 
special nuclear material, personnel would be alerted to that fact and 
would take appropriate action. Although the staff has determined that 
an inadvertent criticality event is highly unlikely, the licensee has 
radiation monitors, as required by General Design Criterion 63 (GDC 
63), in fuel storage and handling areas. These monitors will alert 
personnel to excessive radiation levels and allow them to initiate 
appropriate safety actions. The low probability of an inadvertent 
criticality together with the licensee's adherence to GDC 63 
constitutes good cause for granting an exemption to the requirements of 
10 CFR 70.24.

IV

    The Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 70.14, this 
exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or 
the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public 
interest; herefore, the Commission hereby grants the following 
exemption: DLC, OEC, and PPC are exempt from the requirements of 10 CFR 
70.24 for BVPS-1.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the

[[Page 36580]]

granting of this exemption will have no significant impact on the 
quality of the human environment (62 FR 34320).
    This exemption is effective upon issuance.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 26th day of June 1997.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Frank J. Miraglia,
Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 97-17748 Filed 7-7-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P