[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 125 (Monday, June 30, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 35330-35331]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-17132]



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Part V





Department of Transportation





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Federal Railroad Administration



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Notice of Safety Directive; Notice

  Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 125 / Monday, June 30, 1997 / 
Notices  

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration


Notice of Safety Directive

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of safety directive.

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SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Directive 97-1 addressing safety 
practices to evaluate the integrity of all railroads' programs of 
operational tests and inspections and to ensure that safety-critical 
information is accurately conveyed and acknowledged for operations in 
Direct Train Control 1 (DTC) territory.

    \1\ This is an umbrella term and refers to methods of operation 
known variously as Direct Traffic Control, Track Warrant Control 
(TWC), Track Permit Control Systems (TPCS), Form D control system 
(DCS), and similar methods of authorizing train movements.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Douglas H. Taylor, Staff Director, 
Operating Practices Division, Office of Safety Assurance and 
Compliance, FRA, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., RRS-11, Mail Stop 25, 
Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone 202-632-3346) or David H. Kasminoff, 
Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., RCC-
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12, Mail Stop 10, Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone 202-632-3191).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: FRA has determined that the safety of 
railroad employees and the general public compels the issuance of this 
safety directive. A review of FRA's accident/incident data demonstrates 
that the safety of rail transportation has continued to improve; 
however, two recent train accidents, one on CSX Transportation (CSX) in 
St. Albans, West Virginia, on June 7, 1997, and the other on the Union 
Pacific Railroad (UP) in Devine, Texas, on June 22, 1997, have claimed 
a total of five lives, and have caused FRA serious concern about the 
safety of certain aspects of rail transportation. Specifically, FRA is 
concerned about possible gaps in existing train control systems that, 
due to inadequate operational testing or deficient operational 
procedures, can lead to train collisions. In response, FRA has 
initiated an in-depth and comprehensive analysis of the operational 
tests and inspections programs and dispatching procedures employed by 
CSX and UP. FRA inspection teams are on those properties to conduct 
safety assurance reviews on all aspects of these issues.

Operational Tests and Inspections

    Subsequent to the CSX train accident, an initial analysis of CSX's 
operational tests and inspections program raised questions about the 
adequacy of the quality controls necessary to accomplish the objectives 
of 49 CFR 217.9. FRA's preliminary findings from an inspection of CSX's 
program of operational tests and inspections indicated that while the 
program itself was detailed and comprehensive, CSX's implementation of 
the program fell short of the intended objectives. While the program's 
provisions with respect to the number of tests supervisors are required 
to conduct each month are typically met, the quality of those tests 
performed is suspect. For example, FRA found that supervisors generally 
conduct testing at a single location, rather than at a variety of 
locations across the territory. Additionally, most of the required 
tests are typically conducted during one- or two-day periods rather 
than throughout the month. Consequently, FRA's initial findings 
indicate that the operational tests and inspections program appears to 
be a numbers-generating exercise that precludes any meaningful analysis 
of the results by CSX.
    Operational tests and inspections programs are intended to achieve 
the following objectives:
     Improve employee compliance with railroad operating rules;
     Measure rules proficiency, in order to isolate areas of 
non-compliance for corrective action;
     Reduce human factor accidents;
     Reduce personal injuries and incidents resulting from 
inattention to the requirements of the railroad's operating rules;
     Provide the railroad with information on rules requiring 
supplemental employee training;
     Provide the railroad supervisor with an immediate 
evaluation of an employee's application, comprehension, and compliance 
with the rules; and
     Improve and maintain employee alertness.
    However, without a sincere commitment from management to properly 
implement the railroad's program, the objectives as described above 
cannot be fully achieved. Therefore, in order to determine if the areas 
of concern identified on CSX are present on other railroads, and to 
evaluate compliance of individual railroads with their operational 
tests and inspections programs, FRA concludes that each railroad 
subject to 49 CFR part 217 should:
    Within three calendar days of the date of publication of this 
safety directive in the Federal Register, review its program of 
operational tests and inspections required by 49 CFR 217.9 to ensure 
that the recorded individual tests and inspections are conducted in 
accordance with all of the program's requirements. Specifically, the 
review should focus on the types of tests conducted, the means and 
procedures utilized to conduct the tests, and test frequency with the 
object of determining whether the program is effectively implemented. 
Within the same time frame of three calender days, each railroad shall 
advise FRA in writing as to what steps it has taken and what additional 
steps it intends to take to ensure that the program is effectively 
implemented.

Train Dispatcher Procedures

    Preliminary investigatory findings following the head-on collision 
of two UP freight trains at Devine, Texas, on June 22, 1997, indicate 
that existing DTC procedures of carriers pertaining to the issuance of 
movement authorities need to be modified in order to reduce the risk of 
similar collisions.
    The UP accident occurred in single track, non-signaled TWC 
territory; timetable direction is northward and southward. A planned 
meet of a northward train (UP 5981 North) and a southward train (UP 
9186 South), was to have occurred at a passing siding identified in 
UP's operating timetable as Gessner. UP 5981 North was authorized by 
track warrant to operate to, and take the siding at, Gessner. UP 5981 
North was also in possession of a second track warrant that authorized 
movement north of Gessner after the arrival of UP 9186 South. UP 9186 
South was authorized by track warrant to operate to, and hold the main 
track at, Gessner. UP 9186 South was also in possession of a second 
track warrant that authorized movement south of Gessner, but the track 
warrant in possession of the train crew omitted a requirement to wait 
at Gessner until after the arrival of UP 5981 North. Consequently, UP 
9186 South passed Gessner and approximately 13 miles south of Gessner, 
struck UP 5981 North head-on. The track warrants entered by the 
dispatcher into the computer dispatching system established that UP 
9186 South was required to wait at Gessner until after the arrival of 
UP 5981 North. However, the transcript of the dispatcher's radio 
communications established that the dispatcher authorized UP 9186 South 
to operate south of Gessner without instructions to wait at Gessner for 
the arrival of UP 5981 North.

[[Page 35331]]

    Therefore, in order to avoid a recurrence of such an event, FRA 
believes that, unless a railroad utilizes a computer-aided dispatching 
system that employs hard coded safety-edit procedures (such as those 
already in place at The Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway 
Company's National Operations Center in Fort Worth, Texas), the 
following procedures are necessary to ensure the safe operation of 
trains in non-signaled DTC territory:
    1. After the contents of a movement authority have been transmitted 
by the train dispatcher, and before the movement authority is repeated 
by the receiving employee(s), the train dispatcher should observe the 
computer monitor and state the total number of boxes (lines) marked on 
the movement authority and identify the individual box (line) numbers 
(e.g., ``There are four boxes (lines) marked. They are box (line) 
numbers 2, 7, 8, and 15.'') For railroads that do not utilize computer-
aided dispatching systems, the train dispatcher should reexamine the 
office copy of the movement authority document, state the total number 
of boxes (lines) marked on the movement authority, and identify the 
individual box (line) numbers. In those instances in which a train meet 
is included in the movement authority, the train dispatcher should 
specifically so state, e.g., ``this track warrant includes a 
requirement to meet another train.'' The train dispatcher should then 
instruct the receiving employee(s) to repeat the movement authority.
    2. After the receiving employee(s) repeats the movement authority 
back to the train dispatcher, the employee(s) should also state the 
total number of boxes (lines) marked on the movement authority and 
identify the individual box (line) numbers (e.g., ``There are four 
boxes (lines) marked. They are box (line) numbers 2, 7, 8, and 15.'')
    3. Before the train dispatcher issues the time effective (``OK'' 
time), the train dispatcher should confirm the total number of boxes 
(lines) marked on the movement authority and identify the individual 
box (line) numbers in the appropriate manner described above.
    4. Within five calendar days of the date of publication of this 
safety directive in the Federal Register, a railroad operating 
supervisor should personally contact each train dispatcher responsible 
for controlling train movements in non-signaled territory and inform 
the train dispatchers in face-to-face meetings of the circumstances 
surrounding the UP accident described above and the requirements of 
this safety directive. The occurrence of these meetings should be 
documented in writing and be made available for review by FRA upon 
request during normal business hours. FRA expects that each railroad 
should conduct regular observations of train dispatchers to ensure 
compliance with the train dispatcher procedures specified in this 
directive.
    5. Within three calendar days of the date of publication of this 
safety directive in the Federal Register, each railroad should:
    (a) Review its operating rules and practices pertaining to 
operations in non-signaled territory to determine what further 
enhancements in its rules and practices are warranted, including the 
possibility of eliminating the use of ``after arrival of'' orders, to 
improve safety; and
    (b) Submit in writing to FRA the following:
     A description of the current train dispatching procedures 
used in non-signaled territory and the safeguards built into the system 
to prevent human error from causing accidents;
     A description of the steps that the railroad is taking to 
implement the train dispatcher procedure provisions of this safety 
directive; and
     What additional steps the railroad intends to take to 
enhance the level of safety.
    FRA recognizes that all collisions are avoidable, and the most 
effective way to accomplish this objective is with Positive Train 
Control (PTC). PTC holds the promise of achieving a level of railroad 
safety not available through conventional practices. PTC systems 
improve safety by preventing collisions, overspeed derailments and 
other types of accidents. These systems can precisely transmit and 
receive critical safety information for the movement of trains, and 
eliminate problems associated with voice transmissions. However, until 
these PTC systems come on line, FRA believes that all railroads should 
implement intense interim measures to maximize the level of safety 
available utilizing existing technology. Based on the information 
obtained from FRA's two ongoing safety initiatives on CSX and UP, 
subsequent audits on all other railroads, and information gathered in 
response to this safety directive, FRA may modify Safety Directive 97-
1, issue additional safety directives, or take other appropriate 
necessary action to ensure the highest level of safety on the Nation's 
railroads.

    Issued in Washington, D.C. on June 25, 1997.
James T. Schultz,
Associate Administrator for Safety.
[FR Doc. 97-17132 Filed 6-27-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P