[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 115 (Monday, June 16, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 32658-32663]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-15641]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration
[Docket No. 95-43]


Dennis Robert Howard, M.D. Grant of Restricted Registration

    On May 24, 1995, the Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of 
Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), issued an 
Order to Show Cause to Dennis Robert Howard, M.D., (Respondent) of 
Macon, Georgia, notifying him of an opportunity to show cause as to why 
DEA should not deny his applications for registration as a practitioner 
under 21 U.S.C. 823(f), for reason that such registration would be 
inconsistent with the public interest.
    By letter dated June 21, 1995, Respondent, through counsel, timely 
filed a request for a hearing, and following prehearing procedures, a 
hearing was held in Atlanta, Georgia on April 23 and 24, 1996, before 
Administrative Law Judge Mary Ellen Bittner. At the hearing, both 
parties

[[Page 32659]]

called witnesses to testify and introduce documentary evidence. After 
the hearing, both sides submitted proposed findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and argument and reply briefs. On February 28, 1997, 
Judge Bittner issued her Opinion and Recommended Ruling, Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision, recommending that Respondent be 
granted a DEA Certificate of Registration subject to several 
restrictions that would remain in effect for three years from the 
issuance of the registration. On March 20, 1997, Government counsel 
filed exceptions to the Recommended Ruling of the Administrative Law 
Judge, and on April 7, 1997, Judge Bittner transmitted the record of 
these proceedings to the Acting Deputy Administrator.
    The Acting Deputy Administrator has considered the record in its 
entirety, and pursuant to 21 CFR 1316.67, hereby issues his final order 
based upon findings of fact and conclusions of law as hereinafter set 
forth. The Acting Deputy Administrator adopts, except as specifically 
noted, the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended ruling 
of the Administrative Law Judge. His adoption is in no manner 
diminished by any recitation of facts, issues and conclusions herein, 
or of any failure to mention a matter of fact or law.
    The Acting Deputy Administrator finds that Respondent received his 
Doctor of Medicine degree from the University of Wisconsin in 1962. In 
1983, he moved to Georgia and became licensed to practice medicine in 
that state. He was served on the faculty of several universities and is 
board-certified in family medicine. In addition, he has held offices in 
various professional organizations, has served on numerous boards, and 
has published several articles and portions of books. Respondent 
testified that he treats many patients for chronic pain.
    In November 1992, an agent for the Georgia Secretary of State, in 
conjunction with DEA and the Georgia Drugs and Narcotics Agency, 
investigated Respondent's prescribing practices. The investigation 
included surveying prescriptions at local pharmacies, subpoenaing 
medical records, and interviewing Respondent. The results of the 
investigation were submitted to the Georgia Composite State Board of 
Medical Examiners (Board), which then met on Novebmer 4 and 5, 1992, 
and unanimously voted to ``issue an Emergency Suspension of 
[Respondent's] DEA permit and cite for a Formal Hearing.'' It was not 
until May 10, 1993, that the Board issued an Order of Summary 
Suspension of Privileges for the Prescribing of Controlled Substances 
and a Notice of Hearing. The Order specifically charged that 
``Respondent has prescribed controlled substances in such a manner as 
to constitute unprofessional conduct departing from or failing to 
conform to the minimal standards of acceptable and prevailing medical 
practice and prescribing for other than legitimate medical purpose. * * 
*'' The Board ordered the Respondent surrender his DEA registration 
within 48 hours of service of the Order.
    On May 11, 1993, state agents went to Respondent's office to serve 
the Board's Order. Initially, Respondent was not present, but came to 
the office at the agents' request. One of the agents at the hearing 
testified that when Respondent arrived at the office, he appeared to be 
under the influence of some type of substance. Respondent testified 
however that he was not under the influence of anything, but instead 
was in shock over the Board's actions. An insurance biller who worked 
with Respondent and was present on May 11th, testified that respondent 
did not appear intoxicated or under the influence when she saw him at 
the office that day.
    Respondent indicated to the agents that he ordered drugs from a 
wholesaler and then dispensed them to his patients so cost, rather than 
issuing them prescriptions. He further stated that he had used various 
controlled substances over the years and had smoke marijuana as 
recently as three days before the interview, and that his marijuana use 
was limited to three to four times a month. At the hearing in this 
matter, Respondent testified that he took aspirin with codeine (Empirin 
No. 4) twice a day for an ``irritable bowel problem'', and three or 
four diazepam tablets a week for leg muscle spasm, and that both of 
these drugs were originally prescribed for him by a physician. 
Respondent also testified that he had self-prescribed hydrocodone with 
APAP one to three times a week when he had back pain, and that he took 
other non-controlled drugs for his back problems and his plood 
pressure. Respondent further testified that he has not used marijuana 
since 1993, he has only taken medications that were prescribed for him 
by his physician.
    Following service of the Board's Order, on May 12, 1993, the 
Medical Coordinator for the Board advised Respondent that he must 
undergo a 96 hour in-patient medical and psychological evaluation. 
Thereafter, Respondent checked into an Atlanta hospital, and May 14, 
1993, DEA personnel went to the hospital and requested that Respondent 
surrender his DEA registration. Respondent signed the surrender of 
registration form, but testified that the surrender was not truly 
voluntary, since he felt pressured to sign because he was told that 
``it would show my good faith in cooperating with this investigation 
and that it would make it easier for me to get my DEA certification 
back once I was cleared of the charges.''
    On May 17, 1993, the Board issued an Order of Summary Suspension of 
Medical License stating that it ``has received reliable information 
that Respondent is unable to practice medicine with reasonable skill 
and safety'' as a result of his admitted use of marijuana, diazepam, 
aspirin with codeine and hydrocodone. At the hearing in this matter, 
Respondent testified that during the summer of 1993, he was evaluated 
by a psychiatrist and a family practitioner to determine whether or not 
he was addicted or impaired. Both doctors found that Respondent was fit 
to practice medicine.
    A hearing began on August 9, 1993, regarding the Board's charges 
against Respondent for the misprescribing of controlled substances. 
During the hearing, it was discovered that Board personnel had provided 
its expert witness with incomplete copies of Respondent's patient 
records. Subsequently, the Board's counsel agreed not to advise the 
expert, prior to his testimony, that the records were incomplete. 
However, the Hearing Officer found that the Board's counsel did not 
adhere to this agreement and therefore, the Hearing Officer dismissed 
the Notice of Hearing, noting that ``submission of incomplete records 
to the medical expert was patently unfair * * *.''
    On August 10, 1993, the Superior Court of Fulton County ordered the 
reinstatement of Respondent's license to practice medicine, finding 
that the Board had not provided Respondent with a prompt hearing on the 
charges which led to the suspension. Thereafter, on September 10, 1993, 
the court ordered that Respondent's license to practice medicine remain 
in effect until a final determination was made on his alleged 
impairment Respondent testified that eventually the charges of 
misprescribing were ``dropped'' by the Board.
    On August 16, 1993, Respondent filed his first application for a 
CEA Certificate of Registration that is the subject of these 
proceedings. He affirmatively answered question 4(b) on the application 
which asks if the applicant has ``ever been convicted of a crime in 
connection with controlled substances

[[Page 32660]]

* * * or ever surrendered or had a Federal controlled substance 
registration revoked, suspended, restricted or denied, or ever had a 
State professional license or controlled substance registration 
revoked, suspended, denied, restricted or placed on probation?'' In 
explaining his answer, Respondent indicated that he had ``voluntarily 
surrendered my controlled substances privileges on May 14, 1993 while 
cooperating with an investigation * * *.'' Respondent did not mention 
the Board's summary suspension orders.
    Respondent testified that in the midst of the hearing in the fall 
of 1993 regarding the allegations of his impairment, the Board entered 
into settlement negotiations with Respondent. On January 6, 1994, 
Respondent and the Board entered into a consent order reinstating his 
license to practice medicine and his authority to prescribe controlled 
substances. The consent order did not state that Respondent had 
committed any offenses, which according to the testimony of an attorney 
who had represented the Board and had served as a hearing officer for 
the Board is unusual for a consent order because it did not contain an 
``admission of any kind of allegations.'' The order directed that for 
five years, Respondent would (1) ``Attend and successfully complete the 
mini-residency'' on proper prescribing practices of controlled 
substances within six months of the order; (2) allow the Medical 
Coordinator to review and inspect his medical records; (3) ``abstain 
from the consumption of all mood altering substances except as 
prescribed by a duly licensed practitioner (other than Respondent) for 
a legitimate medical purpose''; (4) allow the Board to order him to 
submit to random urine, blood, fluid or hair analysis and/or a mental 
or physical evaluation; (5) comply with diagnosis, treatment and record 
keeping rules; (6) report any malpractice suits against him; (7) supply 
a copy of the Consent Order to any person he was associated with in 
practice; (8) not use a physician's assistant to perform any of the 
restricted tasks; (9) notify the Medical Board if he leaves the state 
for more than thirty days for the purpose practicing medicine; (10) 
abide by all State and Federal laws regulating the practice of 
medicine; and, (11) be evaluated by the Medical Board regarding his 
compliance with the Order sixty days prior to its expiration.
    On June 17, 1994, Respondent submitted a second application for a 
DEA registration. He again affirmatively answered question 4(b), with 
the following explanation: ``On May 14, 1993, I signed a Voluntary 
Surrender for my previous DEA certification to cooperate with and 
facilitate an investigation by the State of Georgia Composite Board of 
Medical Examines into allegations of misprescribing. My licence [sic] 
was reinstated on August 10, 1993, and all charges were subsequently 
dropped * * *.'' Respondent testified that he did not mention the 
consent order with the Board, because he did not believe that the term 
``probation'' in question 4(b) applied to the consent order. The 
consent order does not specifically state that Respondent's license was 
placed on probation. The former Board attorney and hearing officer 
testified that if the Board had intended to impose probation on 
Respondent, it would have set ``it forth right at the beginning of the 
order, you know, that a Respondent is placed on probation upon the 
following terms and conditions * * *.''
    On July 14, 1994, Respondent received DEA order forms for the 
ordering of Schedule I and II controlled substances. These forms were 
imprinted with a new DEA registration number. Respondent testified that 
he believed that order forms could not be issued except to holders of a 
valid registration number, and therefore he believed that his 
application had been approved. When approximately a week had passed and 
he had not received his Certificate of Registration, Respondent 
telephone a DEA supervisory registration specialist on July 22, 1994, 
and was told that the order forms had been issued in error, that his 
DEA registration was not valid, and that he should return the order 
forms. Respondent testified that he was told ``on the phone that it was 
not good, but I figured if they had issued it, then there was a more 
proper way that they could withdraw it.''
    Respondent then telephoned a member of Senator Sam Nunn's staff, 
asking for assistance in determining the validity of his DEA 
registration. Respondent had been working with this staff member for a 
number of months in trying to obtain a decision regarding his 
application for DEA registration. The staff member contacted DEA on 
July 25, 1994, and was told that Respondent did not possess a valid DEA 
registration. The staff member then left a message for Respondent on 
his answering machine on the evening of July 25th, but did not actually 
speak with Respondent until the following morning. Respondent testified 
that he had been hospitalized and was discharged on the 25th, but did 
not go into his office where his answering machine was located until 
the following day, and therefore did not get the message from the staff 
member until July 26th.
    A local pharmacist indicated to DEA that Respondent had telephoned 
in a prescription for an individual for Tylenol with codeine No. 3 on 
July 26, 1994, using the DEA number that was listed on the order forms. 
Respondent and the individual testified that the individual had been 
Respondent's patient from 1989 until 1992, when Respondent moved out of 
town. Both testified that the individual had back problems, and that 
she was under the care of a physician who was out of town when she 
began experiencing back pain. They testified that she called Respondent 
in the evening on July 25, 1994, requesting a prescription. Respondent 
called the prescription in to a local pharmacy, but when a co-worker 
went to pick up the medication, the pharmacist refused to fill the 
prescription until the pharmacist could verify Respondent's DEA 
registration number. The individual called Respondent later that 
evening and Respondent offered to write a prescription for Tylenol with 
codeine No. 3 for the individual that she could pick up the following 
day at office.
    Respondent testified that at the time that he wrote the 
prescription for the individual on the morning of July 26, 1994, he had 
not yet listened to the message from Senator Nunn's staff member, 
stating that his DEA registration was invalid. Respondent testified 
that after talking with the staff member later in the morning on July 
26th, he ceased writing any controlled substance prescriptions.
    The Government argues that Respondent's registration would be 
inconsistent with the public interest because he twice issued a 
prescription for a controlled substance to an individual even though he 
knew that his DEA number was invalid; he used marijuana; he repeatedly 
self-prescribed controlled substances; his medical license is currently 
subject to the terms of a consent order; and he was less than truthful 
in his explanation of his answers to question 4(b) on his applications 
for registration. Respondent argues that his application should not be 
denied because when he received the DEA order forms, he believed that 
he had been issued a valid DEA registration number; that although a DEA 
employee told him that the forms had been issued in error, he did not 
believe the registration number was invalid until the Senator's staff 
member instructed him not to use the number; and that he self-
prescribed controlled substances only for a legitimate medical purpose, 
and now only takes medication

[[Page 32661]]

that is prescribed for him by his physician. Respondent admits that his 
use of marijuana was illegal, but asserts that he stopped using it in 
May 1993.
    Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. Sec. 823(f), the Deputy Administrator may 
deny an application for a DEA Certificate of Registration if he 
determines that such registration would be inconsistent with the public 
interest. In determining the public interest, the following factors are 
considered:
    (1) The recommendation of the appropriate State licensing board or 
professional disciplinary authority.
    (2) The applicant's experience in dispensing, or conducting 
research with respect to controlled substances.
    (3) The applicant's conviction record under Federal or State laws 
relating to the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of controlled 
substances.
    (4) Compliance with applicable State, Federal, or local laws 
relating to controlled substances.
    (5) Such other conduct which may threaten the public health and 
safety. These factors are to be considered in the disjunctive; the 
Deputy Administrator may rely on any one or a combination of factors 
and may give each factor the weight he deems appropriate in determining 
whether a registration should be revoked or an application for 
registration be denied. See Henry J. Schwarz, Jr., M.D., Docket No. 88-
42, 54 FR 16,422 (1989).
    Regarding factor one, it is undisputed that on May 10, 1993, the 
Board summarily suspended Respondent's privileges for prescribing 
controlled substances based upon allegations of misprescribing, and on 
May 17, 1993, summarily suspended Respondent's license to practice 
medicine based upon allegations of impairment. However, it is also 
undisputed that ultimately there were no findings made by the Board or 
admissions made by Respondent regarding these allegations. Respondent 
did enter into a consent order with the Board on January 7, 1994. While 
the consent order imposed certain requirements on Respondent, for the 
most part, it merely restated powers that the Board already has by 
virtue of its laws and regulations that apply to all physicians.
    As to factors two and four, it is undisputed that Respondent issued 
two prescriptions for Tylenol with codeine No. 3 while not registered 
with DEA. The Government argues that Respondent had been verbally 
informed by a DEA registration specialist several days before he issued 
the prescriptions that he did not possess a valid registration. 
Respondent argues that he thought that he was registered when he issued 
the prescriptions because he had received DEA official order forms 
indicating a new registration number, and that although he had been 
orally advised by the registration specialist that his number was not 
valid, he received no written notification to that effect.
    Judge Bittner concluded that ``it would have been more prudent for 
Respondent to verify his status before issuing any controlled substance 
prescriptions. However, the agency's failure to notify Respondent in 
writing that he did not have a valid DEA registration contributed to 
the misunderstanding, and under these circumstances I cannot say that a 
preponderance of the evidence establishes that Respondent did not act 
in good faith in issuing these prescriptions.'' In her opinion, Judge 
Bittner did not find that Respondent violated provisions of the 
Controlled Substances Act by issuing controlled substance prescriptions 
without a valid DEA registration. The Government filed exceptions to 
Judge Bittner's conclusion arguing that there is no ``good faith '' 
exemption from liability in administrative proceedings. The Acting 
Deputy Administrator agrees with the Government. The Controlled 
Substances Act and its implementing regulations require that a 
physician possess a valid DEA registration in order to legally 
prescribe controlled substances. See, 21 U.S.C. 822(a), and 21 CFR 
1301.31(a) and 1306.03(a)(2). Respondent was not exempt from this 
requirement when he issued the two prescriptions for Tylenol with 
codeine No. 3 on July 25 and 26, 1994. However, as DEA has previously 
held, if Respondent issued these prescriptions with the good faith 
belief that he was properly registered with DEA, that certainly is a 
mitigating factor in determining the public interest. See, Stanley Alan 
Azen, M.D., FR 57,893 (1996).
    Next the Government argues in its exceptions that ``to the extent 
any purported `good faith' on the part of Respondent might be 
considered as a mitigating factor in this proceeding, the Government 
takes exception to the Administrative Law Judge's funding that a 
preponderance of the evidence did not establish a lack of good faith on 
the part of the Respondent in issuing the two prescriptions.'' The 
Government argues that Respondent knew that he did not have a valid DEA 
registration when he issued the prescriptions. The Acting Deputy 
Administrator concludes that Respondent's belief that he was validly 
registered with DEA when he issued the prescriptions is not 
unreasonable. Respondent received DEA official order forms that 
indicated a new DEA registration. While as a result of his inquiry, he 
was verbally told by a DEA registration specialist that he did not 
possess a valid registration, he never received anything in writing 
from DEA notifying him of this fact, and he had no idea whether the 
individual he spoke to was in a position to declare a registration 
invalid. Like Judge Bittner, the Acting Deputy Administrator notes that 
it probably would have been more prudent for Respondent to not issue 
any prescriptions until he received clarification from Senator Nunn's 
staff member. However, upon learning from the staff member that he was 
not properly registered, Respondent ceased issuing controlled substance 
prescriptions.
    The Acting Deputy Administrator concludes that while Respondent 
issued two controlled substance prescriptions when he was not 
authorized to do so, this is not so egregious as to warrant the denial 
of his application for registration. The prescriptions were issued to a 
former patient who suffered from back pain and whose regular physician 
was out of town. In addition, Respondent possessed a good faith belief 
that he was in fact properly registered with DEA.
    As to Respondent's other experience in dispensing controlled 
substances and compliance with applicable laws and regulations, 
Respondent admitted that he self-prescribed various controlled 
substances which is a violation of the Board's rules and regulations. 
Respondent admitted that he self-prescribed hydrocodone with APAP for 
back pain. He also admitted to taking aspirin with codeine for an 
irritable bowel and diazepam for leg spasms, but that these drugs were 
originally prescribed for him by his physician. Judge Bittner found 
that while Respondent's self-prescribing was in violation of state 
rules and regulations, Respondent ceased this practice over three years 
before the hearing in this matter, there is no evidence that he is 
likely to resume the practice, and there is no evidence contrary to 
Respondent's testimony that he now only takes medications prescribed to 
him by another physician.
    The Government argued in its exceptions that Respondent in fact 
violated state rules and regulations by self-prescribing controlled 
substances; that the fact that he has not self-prescribed in over three 
years ``should be considered only in the context of a mitigating 
factor''; and that the Administrative Law Judge failed to consider that 
Respondent ceased self-prescribing only after his state medical license 
and controlled substance

[[Page 32662]]

privileges were summarily suspended and he had surrendered his previous 
DEA registration. The Acting Deputy Administrator concludes that 
Respondent violated state rules and regulations by self-prescribing 
controlled substances. The Acting Deputy Administrator notes that it is 
quite possible that the only reason that Respondent has ceased self-
prescribing is because he does not have the authority to prescribe 
controlled substances. However, with proper restrictions placed on his 
registration, the Acting Deputy Administrator agrees with Judge Bittner 
that such conduct is not likely to recur. At least two of the drugs 
that Respondent had self-prescribed were originally prescribed by 
another physician. There is no evidence in the record that any of the 
drugs were taken for other than a legitimate medical purpose. Also, 
there is no evidence that Respondent has since taken any medication 
that was not prescribed for him by another physician. Finally, two 
physicians independently evaluated Respondent and determined that he 
was not impaired.
    The Acting Deputy Administrator also concludes that Respondent's 
admitted use of marijuana violated both state and Federal law. As the 
Government noted, Respondent's use of marijuana was not restricted to a 
one-time activity. In May 1993, Respondent admitted to smoking 
marijuana three to four times a month. The Acting Deputy Administrator 
is extremely troubled by his behavior. However, Respondent testified 
that he has not smoked marijuana since May 1993, and there is no 
evidence in the record to the contrary.
    Regarding factor three, Respondent has not been convicted of any 
violations of Federal or state laws relating to the manufacture, 
distribution or dispensing of controlled substances.
    As to factor five, the Government argues that Respondent has been 
misleading, or at least less than candid, by failing to completely 
explain his affirmative response to question 4(b) on his applications. 
He failed to state that his state medical license and controlled 
substance privileges had been suspended or that he was subject to a 
consent order. Like Judge Bittner, the acting Deputy Administrator 
finds Respondent's incomplete explanation troubling. In responding to 
the questions on an application, truthful answers and complete 
disclosure are necessary for DEA to be able to adequately evaluate 
whether it is in the public interest to issue a registration. However, 
given the circumstances in this case, Respondent's failure to provide a 
complete explanation on the applications does not warrant denial of the 
applications. Respondent did in fact answer the question affirmatively, 
and DEA was well aware of the state suspensions since that was the 
basis for seeking Respondent's voluntary surrender of his DEA 
registration. In addition, it is understandable that Respondent did not 
believe that the consent order placed him on probation within the 
meaning of the phrase in the application. An earlier draft of the 
consent order included probationary language but the final version did 
not contain such language. The former Board attorney and hearing 
officer testified that if the Board intended to place Respondent on 
probation, the consent order would have specifically so stated.
    The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Government had not 
met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that 
Respondent's registration would be inconsistent with the public 
interest. Nonetheless, Judge Bittner stated that she is ``troubled by 
Respondent's attitude towards regulation and [has] some question as to 
whether he appreciates the responsibility that accompanies a DEA 
registration.'' Accordingly, Judge Bittner recommended that 
Respondent's application be granted subject to the following 
restrictions to remain in effect for three years after Respondent's 
Certificate of Registration is issued:
    (1) Respondent must agree to periodic inspections of his records 
based on a Notice of Inspection rather than an Administrative 
Inspection Warrant.
    (2) Respondent is prohibited from self-administering or self-
prescribing controlled substances under any circumstances.
    (3) Respondent shall maintain a log of all controlled substance 
prescriptions that he issues and shall send the log quarterly to the 
local DEA Special Agent in Charge or his or her designee.
    (4) Respondent shall not maintain any controlled substances in his 
office.
    The Government filed exceptions to Judge Bittner's recommended 
ruling arguing that the Government established, at the very least, a 
prima facie case under 21 U.S.C. 823(f)(2), (4) and (5), and that the 
record as a whole supports the denial of Respondent's applications for 
registration as inconsistent with the public interest. The Acting 
Deputy Administrator agrees with the Government that it established a 
prima facie case for denial of Respondent's applications. Respondent 
issued prescriptions for controlled substances while not properly 
registered with DEA. He self-prescribed controlled substances in 
violation of state rules and regulations. Up until May 1993, he smoked 
marijuana three to four times a month. He is currently subject to a 
consent order with the Board. Finally, he did not give complete 
explanations on his applications for registration.
    However, the Acting Deputy Administrator concludes that in light of 
the previously discussed mitigating circumstances present in this case, 
denial of Respondent's applications is not warranted. The Acting Deputy 
Administrator agrees with Judge Bittner that some restrictions on 
Respondent's registration are appropriate in light of Respondent's 
previous violations of Federal and state laws and regulations relating 
to controlled substances. Therefore,the Acting Deputy Administrator 
concludes that Respondent should be granted a DEA Certificate of 
Registration subject to the following conditions for three years from 
the date of issuance of the registration:
    (1) Respondent must agree to periodic inspections by DEA personnel 
based on a Notice of Inspection rather than an Administrative 
Inspection Warrant.
    (2) Respondent shall not dispense or prescribe controlled 
substances to himself, and shall only administer to himself those 
controlled substances legitimately dispensed or prescribed to him by 
another duly authorized practitioner.
    (3) Respondent shall not order or maintain any controlled 
substances for his practice. He shall only prescribe controlled 
substances and shall not administer or dispense any controlled 
substances.
    (4) Respondent shall maintain a log of all controlled substances 
that he prescribes, and shall send the log quarterly to the Special 
Agent in Charge of the nearest DEA office or his designee. The log 
shall include, the name of the patient, the date that the controlled 
substance was prescribed, and the name, dosage and quantity of the 
controlled substance prescribed. If no controlled substances are 
prescribed during a given quarter, Respondent shall indicate that fact 
in writing, in lieu of submission of the log.
    Accordingly, the Acting Deputy Administrator of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration, pursuant to the authority vested in him by 
21 U.S.C. 823 and 824, and 28 CFR 0.100(b) and 0.104, hereby orders 
that the application for a DEA Certificate of Registration submitted by 
Dennis Robert Howard, M.D., be, and it hereby is granted, subject to 
the above described restrictions. This order is effective July 16, 
1997.


[[Page 32663]]


    Dated: June 5, 1997.
James S. Milford,
Acting Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. 97-15641 Filed 6-13-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-M