[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 114 (Friday, June 13, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 32292-32294]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-15605]



[[Page 32292]]

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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration
[A-485-801]


Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and 
Parts Thereof From Romania; Final Results of Antidumping Duty 
Administrative Review

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration, 
Department of Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative 
Review.

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SUMMARY: On November 29, 1996, the Department of Commerce (the 
Department) published the preliminary results of its administrative 
review of the antidumping duty order on antifriction bearings (other 
than tapered roller bearings) and parts thereof (AFBs), from Romania. 
The period of review (POR) is May 1, 1993 through April 30, 1994. This 
review covers one class or kind of merchandise, ball bearings (BBs), 
and one respondent, Tehnoimportexport S.A. (TIE).
    Based on our analysis of comments received, we have made changes to 
the margin calculations. The final weighted-average dumping margin is 
in the section titled Final Results of Review below.

EFFECTIVE DATE: July 13, 1997.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Charles Riggle or Thomas O. Barlow, 
Import Administration, International Trade Administration, U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 14th Street and Constitution Avenue, N.W., 
Washington D.C. 20230; telephone: (202) 482-4733.
    Applicable Statute and Regulations: Unless otherwise indicated, all 
citations to the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, (the Act) and to the 
Department's regulations are references to the provisions as they 
existed on December 31, 1994.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    On November 29, 1996, we published in the Federal Register the 
preliminary results of administrative review of the antidumping duty 
order on BBs and parts thereof from Romania. See Antifriction Bearings 
(Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof from Romania; 
Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 61 FR 
60679. We gave interested parties an opportunity to comment on our 
preliminary results. Only TIE submitted comments.
    We have conducted this administrative review in accordance with 
section 751(a)(1) of the Act and 19 CFR 353.22.

Scope of this Review

    Imports covered by this review are shipments of BBs from Romania. 
This merchandise is currently classifiable under Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule (HTS) item numbers 3926.90.45, 4016.93.00, 4016.93.10, 
4016.93.50, 6909.19.5010, 8431.20.00, 8431.39.010, 8482.10.10, 
8482.10.50, 8482.80.00, 8482.91.00, 8482.99.05, 8482.99.10, 8482.99.35, 
8482.99.6590, 8482.99.70, 8483.20.40, 8483.20.80, 8483.50.8040, 
8483.50.90, 8483.90.20, 8483.90.30, 8483.90.70, 8708.50.50, 8708.60.50, 
8708.60.80, 8708.70.6060, 8708.70.8050, 8708.93.30, 8708.93.5000, 
8708.93.6000, 8708.93.75, 8708.99.06, 8708.99.31, 8708.99.4960, 
8708.99.50, 8708.99.5800, 8708.99.8080, 8803.10.00, 8803.20.00, 
8803.30.00, 8803.90.30, 8803.90.90.
    The size or precision grade of a bearing does not influence whether 
the bearing is covered by the order. For a further discussion on the 
scope of the order being reviewed, including recent scope decisions, 
see Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and 
Parts Thereof from France, et al.; Final Results of Antidumping Duty 
Administrative Reviews, and Revocation in Part of Antidumping Duty 
Orders, 60 FR 10900 (February 28, 1995). The HTS item numbers are 
provided for convenience and Customs purposes. The written description 
of the scope of this order remains dispositive.

Analysis of Comments Received

    Comment 1: TIE argues that it is entitled to a separate rate, and 
that, in refusing to provide a separate rate for TIE, the Department 
overlooked significant changes that occurred both in Romania and at TIE 
over the past several years. TIE points out that in 1993, pursuant to 
Romanian law, it was a joint stock company with 70 percent of the stock 
held by the State Ownership Fund (SOF) and 30 percent held by the 
Private Ownership Fund (POF). TIE claims that there is no evidence that 
the government had any theoretical control over TIE's daily activities. 
Even if the shareholders, i.e., the SOF and the POF had some rights 
with respect to the selection of the Council of Administration, which 
had the right to select certain management personnel, TIE states that 
this should not negate a finding that there was no government control 
with respect to TIE's exports. TIE argues that shareholders of 
government-owned companies in any country have certain rights, 
including the right to select certain company officials.
    TIE states that exporters in non-market economy (NME) countries are 
entitled to separate, company-specific margins when they can 
demonstrate an absence of government control, both in law and in fact, 
with respect to exports, and it further claims that separate rate 
determinations are rendered on a case-by-case basis, citing Final 
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Sparklers from the 
People's Republic of China (Sparklers), 56 FR 20588 (May 6, 1991), and 
Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Silicon Carbide 
from the People's Republic of China (Silicon Carbide), 59 FR 22585 (May 
2, 1994). TIE argues that the Department failed to supply any causal 
connection between government selection of management and actual 
control of export prices, and TIE claims that there is no record 
evidence to support the Department's assumption of such a connection.
    TIE also argues that, in response to the Polish government's 
request that the Department revoke Poland's status as a NME country, 
the Department did not determine that ``government ownership'' of 
state-owned enterprises, or the selection of management by the owner, 
precludes a commercial entity's independence, referring to Department 
Memorandum, Respondent's Request for Revocation of Poland's NME Status 
(June 21, 1993) at 18-19.
    Finally, TIE argues, the Department has determined, in other cases 
involving Romania, that former state-owned Romanian trading companies 
which have undergone partial privatization were entitled to separate 
rates, citing, e.g., Circular Welded Non-Alloy Steel Pipe from Romania: 
Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 61 FR 24274, 
24283 (May 14, 1996) (Steel Pipe). While TIE acknowledges that it was 
not privatized during the POR, TIE claims that its management, and not 
the government, controlled all aspects of the export process. 
Accordingly, TIE asserts, the Department should provide TIE with a 
separate rate for the final results.
    Department's Position: We disagree with TIE. To determine whether a 
company is sufficiently independent of government control to be 
entitled to a separate rate we analyze the exporting entity under the 
test established in Sparklers, as amplified by Silicon Carbide. We test 
the absence of both de jure and de facto government control with 
respect to the following criteria: (1) the respondent's export prices 
are not set by, nor subject to the approval of, a

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government authority; (2) the respondent has the authority to negotiate 
and sign contracts and other agreements; (3) the respondent has 
autonomy from the government regarding the selection of management; and 
(4) the respondent retains the proceeds from its export sales and makes 
indepenent decisions regarding the disposition of profits.
    In applying this test to TIE we determined that, from a de facto 
perspective, TIE did not have autonomy in making decisions regarding 
the selection of management. See Memorandum For Director, Office of 
Antidumping Compliance, From Director, Division II, Office of 
Antidumping Compliance: Assignment of a Separate Rate for 
Tehnoimportexport S.A., in the 1993-94 Administrative Review of the 
Antidumping Duty Order on Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered 
Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof from Romania, January 31, 1996. 
During the POR, the Council of Administration, composed mostly of 
members of the government, was responsible for the hiring and firing of 
key personnel, including TIE's general director. The Council of 
Administration also selected the Executive Committee, which controlled 
day-to-day activities of TIE, indicating a significant degree of de 
facto government control. The fact that TIE did not have autonomy in 
the selection of management also suggested that TIE's export prices 
were subject to the approval of a government entity, and that TIE's 
authority to negotiate and sign contracts was similarly not free from 
government direction.
    We find TIE's citation to our decision regarding the Polish 
government's request that the Department revoke Poland's status as an 
NME country, to be inapposite. Our test for determining NME status is 
different from our separate-rates test. Additionally, as TIE 
acknowledges, separate-rates analyses are rendered on a case-by-case 
basis. Accordingly, we have made our determination as to TIE's 
eligibility for a separate rate based on the characteristics unique to 
TIE's situation.
    We also note certain differences between this case and Steel Pipe. 
Whereas in Steel Pipe we verified that respondents' Councils of 
Administration were sufficiently independent of the government (Steel 
Pipe at 24276), TIE's Council of Administration was, as explained 
above, composed mostly of members of the government during the POR. 
Accordingly, we have, for these final results, maintained our 
preliminary determination that TIE is not entitled to a separate rate.
    Comment 2: TIE argues that the Department's labor rate calculation, 
based on the labor rate in Poland, was erroneous in three respects. 
First, TIE challenges the monthly hours worked used to calculate 
surrogate wage rates in Poland, obtained from the International Labor 
Office (ILO) Yearbook of Labor Statistics. TIE claims that the monthly 
hours figure is illogical, and assumes Polish workers are working only 
31.65 hours per week. Further, TIE claims that the Department's use of 
the ILO data conflicts with more recent information used by the 
Department, citing Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished 
or Unfinished, from the Republic of Romania; Final Results of 
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 61 FR 51427, 51430 (October 2, 
1996) (TRBs from Romania). Likewise, TIE notes that the Department used 
the same data in Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished or 
Unfinished from Romania; Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty 
Administrative Review, 61 FR 63826, 63927 (December 2, 1996). TIE 
asserts that, assuming that wage statistics from the Polish Statistical 
Bulletin are used for the final results, the data should be amended to 
reflect a 42-hour work week consistent with the cited cases.
    Second, TIE argues that the Polish labor rates improperly included 
bonus payments. TIE claims that the Department typically uses a simple 
hourly wage as a surrogate value, and that use of a wage that includes 
bonus payments unfairly assumes profits were made by the Polish 
companies. Accordingly, TIE argues that the Department should modify 
the Polish labor data to exclude bonus payments from profit.
    Finally, TIE argues that Polish labor rates are not representative 
of labor rates in Romania, or in other potential surrogate countries. 
TIE claims that the labor rate used by the Department in the 
preliminary results, $1.46 per hour, exceeds the rate in Romania, 
presumably because, based on 1992 statistical data used by the 
Department, Poland's per capita GNP was roughly double that of Romania. 
TIE argues that it is unfair to use the labor rate from a country with 
such a disparate edge in per capita income without adjusting such labor 
rates to account for the income disparity. TIE points out that record 
evidence indicates that the labor rate for Ecuador, a potential 
surrogate country whose per capita GNP was almost identical to that of 
Romania, was $0.73 per hour.
    TIE states that the Department's proposed regulations direct the 
Department to use an average of the wage rates in market economy 
countries considered to be economically comparable to the NME country. 
TIE suggests that the Department adopt that policy for purposes of the 
final results and use an average of the Polish rate (as modified by 
TIE's other arguments explained above) and the Ecuadoran rate.
    Department's Position: We agree with TIE in part. The ILO data we 
used in the preliminary results represented actual hours worked as 
opposed to paid hours, including, e.g., paid holidays and paid 
vacations. The wage statistics from the Polish Statistical Bulletin are 
based on total paid hours. Therefore, consistent with TRBs from 
Romania, for these final results we have recalculated the wage rate 
using a 42-hour work week based on information from Investing, 
Licensing and Trading Conditions Abroad, Poland, published by the 
Economist Intelligence Unit.
    We disagree with TIE's second argument. Wage rates should be, as 
accurately as possible, a reflection of the actual costs to employers. 
Bonus payments represent a portion of the fabrication cost to the 
employer and are properly a part of our calculation.
    Finally, we disagree with TIE's suggestion that, in accordance with 
our proposed regulations, we use an average of the Polish wage rate and 
the Ecuadoran wage rate. Although our proposed regulations suggest the 
use of an alternative method for valuing labor, (61 FR 7308, 7345 
(February 27, 1996)), our current practice remains unchanged and we 
continue is to use wage data from a single surrogate country. 
Furthermore, of the two countries suggested by TIE with which to 
calculate an average wage rate, only Poland has a comparable industry. 
As such, Poland is the proper source for the surrogate wage rate.
    Comment 3: TIE argues that the Department should use the statutory 
minimum of 8 percent to calculate profit for foreign market value (FMV) 
purposes.
    Department's Position: We disagree with TIE. If the profit in the 
surrogate is higher than 8 percent, as here, we use the actual profit 
in the surrogate for our FMV calculation. We use the statutory minimum 
for profit only in cases for which the surrogate profit is below 8 
percent.

Final Results of the Review

    As a result of our analysis of the comments we received, we 
determine the following weighted-average margin

[[Page 32294]]

exists for the period May 1, 1993 through April 30, 1994:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Margin  
                   Manufacturer/exporter                      (percent) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Romania Rate...............................................         0.00
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department shall determine, and the Customs Service shall 
assess, antidumping duties on all appropriate entries. The Department 
will issue appraisement instructions directly to the Customs Service.
    Furthermore, the following cash deposit requirements will be 
effective upon publication of these final results for all shipments of 
BBs and parts thereof from Romania entered, or withdrawn from 
warehouse, for consumption on or after the publication date, as 
provided for by section 751(a)(1) of the Act: (1) the cash deposit rate 
for TIE and for all other Romanian exporters will be zero percent; and 
(2) for non-Romanian exporters of BBs and parts thereof from Romania, 
the cash deposit rate will be the rate applicable to the Romanian 
supplier of that exporter. These deposit requirements shall remain in 
effect until publication of the final results of the next 
administrative review.
    This notice serves as a reminder to importers of their 
responsibility under 19 CFR 353.26 to file a certificate regarding the 
reimbursement of antidumping duties prior to liquidation of the 
relevant entries during this review period. Failure to comply with this 
requirement could result in the Secretary's presumption that 
reimbursement of antidumping duties occurred and the subsequent 
assessment of double antidumping duties.
    This notice also serves as a reminder to parties subject to 
administrative protective order (APO) of their responsibility 
concerning disposition of proprietary information disclosed under APO 
in accordance with 19 CFR 353.34(d). Timely written notification of the 
return/destruction of APO materials or conversion to judicial 
protective order is hereby requested. Failure to comply with the 
regulations and the terms of an APO is a sanctionable violation.
    This administrative review and notice are in accordance with 
section 751(a)(1) of the Act (19 U.S.C. 1675(a)(1)) and 19 CFR 353.22.

    Dated: May 27, 1997.
Robert S. LaRussa,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.
[FR Doc. 97-15605 Filed 6-12-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P