[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 104 (Friday, May 30, 1997)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 29320-29323]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-14119]



[[Page 29320]]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Part 51

[CC Docket No. 97-134; FCC 97-171]


Treatment of Guam Telephone Authority and Other Similarly 
Situated LECs as ILECs Under Section 251(h)(2) of the Communications 
Act

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for CC Docket No. 97-134 
tentatively concludes that, pursuant to section 251(h)(2) of the 
Communications Act, the Guam Telephone Authority (GTA) and similarly 
situated carriers, if any, can be treated as incumbent LECs for 
purposes of section 251(c) of the Communications Act, as amended, if 
three conditions are met: Under section 251(h)(2)(A), the LEC must 
``occup[y] a position in the market for telephone exchange service 
within an area that is comparable to the position occupied by a carrier 
described in (section 251(h)(1)).'' Under section 251(h)(2)(B), where 
the LEC at issue provides local exchange service to all or virtually 
all of the subscribers in an area that did not receive telephone 
exchange service from NECA member as of the date of enactment of the 
1996 Act. Under section 251(h)(2)(C), treating the LEC as an incumbent 
LEC must be ``consistent with the public interest, convenience and 
necessity and the purposes of (section 251).''

DATES: Comments are due July 7, 1997, and reply comments are due July 
28, 1997.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Alex Starr, Attorney, Common Carrier 
Bureau, Policy and Program Planning Division, (202) 418-1580.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Regulatory Flexibility Analysis: This is a 
summary of the Commission's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking adopted May 
16, 1997 and released May 19, 1997.

Synopsis of Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

I. Introduction

    1. In a Declaratory Ruling, CCB Pol 96-18, released simultaneously 
with this NPRM, the Commission determined that GTA is not an 
``incumbent local exchange carrier'' within the meaning of section 
251(h)(1). This determination means that, absent a Commission decision 
to provide for the treatment of GTA as an incumbent LEC for purposes of 
section 251, GTA will presently be under no legal mandate to comply 
with the obligations of section 251(c). See Local Competition Order, 61 
FR 45476 (August 29, 1996).
    2. IT&E and GCT suggest section 251(h)(2) as an alternative for 
applying the obligations of section 251(c) to GTA. IT&E asserts that 
section 251(h)(2) permits the application of the obligations of section 
251(c) to GTA because ``GTA meets the spirit, if not the letter, of the 
statutory definition of an `incumbent LEC.' '' GCT maintains that 
section 251(h)(2) permits the application of the obligations of section 
251(c) to GTA because GTA ``occupies a position `comparable' to the 
position occupied by an incumbent LEC (i.e., a quasi-monopoly 
position).'' The Guam Commission notes that ``the Commission may, by 
rule, provide that GTA is comparable to an incumbent LEC pursuant to 
section 251(h)(2),'' but ``section 251(h)(2) may not be applicable in 
this instance'' because ``GTA has not replaced an ILEC.''
    3. Section 251(h)(2) allows the Commission to treat a LEC (or class 
or category of LECs) as an incumbent LEC, for purposes of section 251, 
when the LEC ``occupies a position in the market for telephone exchange 
service within an area that is comparable to the position occupied by a 
carrier described in (section 251(h)(1))''; 47 U.S.C. section 251 
(h)(2)(A) the LEC has ``substantially replaced an incumbent local 
exchange carrier described in (section 251(h)(1))''; 47 U.S.C. section 
251(h)(2)(B) and ``such treatment is consistent with the public 
interest, convenience, and necessity and the purposes of (section 
251).'' 47 U.S.C. 251(h)(2)(C). In this NPRM, we tentatively conclude 
that each of these requirements is met with respect to GTA.
    4. Regarding the first requirement, we tentatively conclude that 
GTA occupies a position in the market for telephone exchange service in 
its service area that is comparable to an incumbent LEC's, because GTA 
appears to occupy a dominant position in that market. Regarding the 
second requirement, we tentatively reject an overly literal reading of 
the statutory language that would produce absurd results at odds with 
manifest Congressional intent. Instead, we tentatively conclude that 
the second requirement is satisfied where the LEC at issue provides 
local exchange service to all or virtually all of the subscribers in an 
area that did not receive telephone exchange service from a NECA member 
as of the date of enactment of the 1996 Act. Accordingly, we also 
tentatively conclude that GTA satisfies the second requirement, because 
GTA apparently provides all or virtually all of the telephone exchange 
service in Guam, and no NECA member provided telephone exchange service 
in Guam as of February 8, 1996. Regarding the third requirement, we 
tentatively conclude that treatment of GTA as an incumbent LEC would 
serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity and the purposes 
of section 251, because such treatment would foster the development of 
competitive telecommunications markets in Guam. In light of the 
foregoing tentative conclusions, we propose, pursuant to section 
251(h)(2), to adopt a rule providing for the treatment of GTA as an 
incumbent LEC for purposes of section 251. We also seek comment whether 
LECs situated similarly to GTA exist and, if so, whether we should 
adopt the same rule with respect to such class or category of LECs.

A. Discussion

1. Section 251(h)(2)(A)
    5. Under section 251(h)(2)(A), in order for the Commission to treat 
GTA as an incumbent LEC, GTA must ``occup(y) a position in the market 
for telephone exchange service within an area that is comparable to the 
position occupied by a carrier described in (section 251(h)(1)).'' 47 
U.S.C. 251(h)(2)(A). Incumbent LECs typically occupy a dominant 
position in the market for telephone exchange service in their 
respective operating areas, and possess economies of density, 
connectivity, and scale that make efficient competitive entry quite 
difficult, if not impossible, absent compliance with the obligations of 
section 251(c). See Local Competition Order, 61 FR 45476 (August 29, 
1996).
    6. GTA seems to exercise such dominance in Guam. It apparently is 
the sole provider of local exchange and exchange access services on 
Guam. It therefore appears to control the bottleneck local exchange 
network on Guam and possess substantial economies of density, 
connectivity, and scale that, absent compliance with the obligations of 
section 251(c), can impede the development of telephone exchange 
service competition in Guam. Consequently, we tentatively conclude that 
GTA occupies a position in the market for telephone exchange service in 
Guam that is comparable to the position typically occupied by 
statutorily-defined incumbent LECs. Accordingly, we also tentatively 
conclude that GTA satisfies the requirement of section 251(h)(2)(A). We 
invite comment on these tentative conclusions.

[[Page 29321]]

2. Section 251(h)(2)(B)
    7. Under section 251(h)(2)(B), in order for the Commission to treat 
GTA as an incumbent LEC, GTA must have ``substantially replaced an 
incumbent local exchange carrier described in (section 251(h)(1)).'' 47 
U.S.C. 251(h)(2)(B) The word ``replace'' can mean ``to take the place 
of: serve as a substitute for or successor of: SUCCEED, SUPPLANT * * 
*'' Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English 
Language Unabridged (1993) at 1925. Consequently, if construed 
literally, section 251(h)(2)(B) would mean that GTA must have 
supplanted an incumbent LEC (as defined in section 251(h)(1)) in its 
service area in order to be treated as an incumbent LEC for purposes of 
section 251. GTA did not supplant such an incumbent LEC, because none 
existed as of the date of enactment of the 1996 Act.
    8. We invite comment on whether we should construe section 
251(h)(2)(B) so literally. The Supreme Court has long and consistently 
recognized that the ``plain meaning'' rule of statutory construction 
must give way when its application would result in an absurd outcome 
contrary to the clear intent of Congress:

    It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of 
the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its 
spirit, nor within the intention of its makers * * * If a literal 
construction of the words be absurd, the Act must be construed to 
avoid the absurdity.

    Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1898). 
See, e.g., Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice, 491 
U.S. 440, 454-455 (1989)(``Where the literal reading of a statutory 
term would compel an odd result, we must search for other evidence of 
congressional intent to lend the term its proper scope. The 
circumstances of the enactment of a particular legislation, for 
example, may persuade a court that Congress did not intend words of 
common meaning to have their literal effect''); United States v. Ron 
Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989)(where ``the literal 
application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odd with 
the intention of its drafter[,] * * * the intention of the drafters, 
rather than the strict language, controls''); United Steelworkers of 
America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201-04 (1979). Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has further instructed that ``even when the plain meaning [of 
statutory language] d[oes] not produce absurd results but merely an 
unreasonable one plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation 
as a whole this Court has followed that purpose, rather than the 
literal words.'' United States v. American Trucking Associations, 310 
U.S. 534, 543 (1967)(citations, footnote, and quotation marks omitted). 
Compare MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone and 
Telegraph Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994)(adhering to literal meaning of 
tariff provision of Communications Act partly because doing otherwise 
would frustrate purposes of complaint provisions of that Act).
    9. The United States Courts of Appeals have followed these 
precedents when necessary to avoid results that are clearly 
inconsistent with Congressional intent. See, e.g., Environmental 
Defense Fund v. Environmental Protection Agency, 82 F.3d 451, 468-469 
(D.C. Cir.), amended on other grounds, 92 F.3d 1209 (D.C. Cir 1996) 
(``Because this literal reading of the statute would actually frustrate 
the congressional intent supporting it, we look to the EPA for an 
interpretation of the statute more true to Congress's purpose''); In re 
Nofziger, 925 F.2d 428, 434-435 (D.C. Cir. 1991)(``In statutory 
interpretation it is a given that statutes must be construed reasonably 
so as to avoid absurdities--manifest intent prevails over the 
letter''); Quinn v. Butz, 510 F.2d 743, 753-54 (D.C. Cir. 1975)(``The 
Secretary's interpretation obviously rests upon a literal reading of 
the language, a technique which may well stifle true legislative 
intent''); Red River Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications 
Commission, 98 F.2d 282, 287 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 625 
(1938)(``A well-settled rule of statutory construction enjoins courts 
not to attribute to the Legislature a construction which leads to 
absurd results''). So, too, has the Commission. See Application of Fox 
Television Stations, Inc., Third Memorandum Opinion and Order, 10 FCC 
Rcd 8452, 8471 (1995), recon. denied, 11 FCC Rcd 7773 (1996)(rejecting 
literal ``count-the-shares'' methodology for determining whether 
foreign ownership ceiling in 47 U.S.C. 310(b)(4) is reached), petitions 
for review pending sub nom., Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches, et 
al. v. FCC, No. 95-1424 and consolidated case (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 21, 
1995).
    10. In keeping with this consistent precedent, we tentatively 
conclude that we should find section 251(h)(2)(B) satisfied where, as 
here, the LEC at issue provides local exchange service to all or 
virtually all of the subscribers in an area that did not receive 
telephone exchange service from a NECA member as of the date of 
enactment of the 1996 Act. In our tentative view, we must so construe 
section 251(h)(2)(B) in order to avoid absurd and unreasonable results 
clearly contradictory of Congressional intent. We seek comment on these 
tentative conclusions.
    11. These tentative conclusions are premised on Congress' clearly 
expressed purpose in the 1996 Act ``to provide for a pro-competitive, 
de-regulatory national policy framework designed to accelerate rapidly 
private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and 
information technologies and services to all Americans by opening all 
telecommunications markets to competition * * *'' Joint Explanatory 
Statement at 1 (emphasis added). See generally 47 U.S.C. 
160(b)(providing in the 1996 Act that ``forbearance is in the public 
interest'' if it ``will promote competitive market conditions'' and 
``enhance competition among providers of telecommunications 
services''); 47 U.S.C. 253(authorizing Commission to preempt state or 
local laws that ``may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the 
ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate 
telecommunications service''); 47 U.S.C. 257(b)(describing the 
``policies and purposes of this (1996) Act'' as ``favoring * * * 
vigorous economic competition''). To accomplish this purpose, Congress 
chose, inter alia, to impose on entities that are classified as 
incumbent LECs the duties of interconnection, access to unbundled 
network elements, resale of retail services, collocation, public 
notification of interoperability changes, and good faith negotiation 
specified in section 251(c). See 47 U.S.C. 251(c). These duties require 
incumbent LECs to share with competitors some of their inherent 
economic advantages--advantages that would otherwise render competitive 
entry very difficult, if not impossible. For example, the existing 
infrastructure of the incumbent LEC in an area enables the incumbent 
LEC to serve new customers therein at a much lower incremental cost 
than a facilities-based entrant that must install its own switches, 
trunking, and loops to serve its customers. Because the incumbent LEC 
is typically dominant in its service area, it has little economic 
incentive to assist new entrants. Prior to the enactment of section 
251(c), an incumbent LEC also had the ability to discourage entry and 
robust competition by refusing to interconnect its network with the new 
entrant's network or by insisting on supracompetitive prices or other 
unreasonable conditions for terminating calls from the entrant's 
customers to its customers. See Local

[[Page 29322]]

Competition Order, 61 FR 45476 (August 29, 1996).
    12. An unduly literal construction of section 251(h)(2)(B) would 
mean that these statutory objectives would be thwarted in Guam unless 
GTA were to comply voluntarily with each of the obligations of section 
251(c). Indeed, GTA appears to possess all of the advantages of 
incumbency characteristic of the incumbent LECs described in section 
251(h)(1), advantages that can impede the development of competitive 
markets. For example, GTA apparently has substantial financial 
resources, significant economies of density, connectivity, and scale, 
and, most importantly, control of the bottleneck local exchange network 
in Guam. Thus, the seemingly dominant market presence of GTA in Guam 
appears to be precisely the type of non-competitive situation that 
Congress intended section 251(c) to redress.
    13. Moreover, we note that Congress left intact several provisions 
of the Communications Act that led the Commission in 1992 to conclude 
that ``the Communications Act was intended by Congress to apply, * * * 
in every respect, to all radio and wire communications originating or 
terminating on the Territory of Guam.'' Guam Jurisdictional Order, 7 
FCC Rcd at 4024. First, in the 1996 Act, Congress incorporated by 
reference the definitions in the 1934 Act. 47 U.S.C. 153(b). Those 
definitions define the ``United States'' as including ``the several 
States and Territories * * * and the possessions of the United States * 
* *;'' 47 U.S.C. 153(50) (emphasis added) define ``State'' as including 
``the Territories''; 47 U.S.C. 153(40) and define ``interstate 
communication'' as including ``communication or transmission * * * from 
any State, Territory, or possession of the United States * * * to any 
other State, Territory, or possession of the United States * * * .'' 47 
U.S.C. 153(22) (emphasis added). Furthermore, despite amending section 
1 of the 1934 Act in other respects, Congress left unchanged that 
section's command to the Commission ``to make available, so far as 
possible, to all the people of the United States * * * a rapid, 
efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication 
service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges * * * .'' 47 
U.S.C. 151 (emphasis added). See Joint Explanatory Statement at 32. 
These provisions appear to make clear that Congress believed that ``the 
residents of Guam are just as entitled to the benefits of competition 
in telecommunications as any other Americans,'' Guam Jurisdictional 
Order, 7 FCC Rcd at 4024, 4026. See Policy and Rules Concerning the 
Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace, Implementation of Section 254(g) 
of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, Report and Order, 61 FR 
42558 (August 16, 1996) (applying rate integration requirements of 
section 254(g) to Guam because section 153(40) defines ``State'' to 
include ``the Territories''). and suggest that Congress did not intend 
to exclude GTA from treatment as an incumbent LEC for purposes of 
section 251(c).
    14. Of course, under section 251(f), our holding in the Declaratory 
Ruling issued simultaneously with this NPRM that GTA is a ``rural 
telephone company'' within the meaning of section 3(37) would entitle 
GTA to an exemption, at least initially, from the obligations of 
section 251(c), should GTA be treated as an incumbent LEC in the 
future. Congress included within section 251(f), however, a procedure 
for terminating such an exemption under appropriate circumstances. 
Construing section 251(h)(2)(B) to foreclose the possibility of 
classifying GTA as an incumbent LEC would thwart that procedure, 
substituting a permanent exemption for the potentially temporary 
exemption expressly set forth in section 251(f).
    15. An overly literal interpretation of section 251(h)(2)(B) would 
also exalt form over substance. As indicated previously, on May 12, 
1997, the Commission granted NECA's petition to become a member of 
NECA. GTA apparently could have filed that petition at any time after 
the release of the Guam Jurisdictional Order on June 2, 1992. Thus, it 
appears that only the date of initial NECA membership will distinguish 
GTA from LECs that are incumbent LECs under section 251(h)(1).
    16. In sum, the circumstances with respect to GTA and Guam appear 
to counsel against an overly literal construction of statutory 
language. See, e.g., EDF v. EPA, 82 F. 3d at 468-69. Construed so 
literally, the language of section 251(h)(2)(B) would produce absurd 
results ``demonstrably at odds with the intention of its drafters.'' 
U.S. v. Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 242. The most immediate absurdity would 
be a permanent exemption of a seemingly dominant provider of local 
exchange and exchange access services--GTA--from the very requirements 
that Congress designed specifically to end such dominance and foster 
competition in local exchange and exchange access markets. Furthermore, 
this result would not be benign; rather, it apparently would conflict 
with Congress' pro-competitive objectives with respect to the twenty-
ninth largest local telephone network in the United States. We seek 
comment, therefore, on whether the outcome suggested by an unduly 
literal reading of the statute's language would be an ``unreasonable 
one `plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a 
whole.'' ' Quinn v. Butz, 510 F.2d at 753 (quoting U.S. v. A.T.A., 310 
U.S. at 543).
    17. To avoid these absurd results and to construe the statute 
consistently with Congress' obvious pro-competitive purpose, we propose 
to interpret section 251(h)(2)(B) to include any LEC that provides 
telephone exchange service to all or virtually all of the subscribers 
in its service area, where, as here, no NECA member served the area at 
issue as of the date of enactment of the 1996 Act. Accordingly, we also 
propose to find that GTA satisfies section 251(h)(2)(B) as construed in 
this manner. We invite comment on these proposals.
    18. We also seek comment whether reading section 251(h)(2) in 
conjunction with other provisions of the Communications Act creates 
ambiguity in Section 251(h)(2)'s meaning and intended application such 
that we may reasonably exercise our discretion to construe the statute 
to permit treating GTA as an incumbent LEC. Applying section 251(h)(2) 
so as to exempt GTA permanently from the statutory responsibilities of 
an incumbent LEC would, as described above, arguably conflict with 
sections 251(c) and 251(f), among other Communications Act provisions. 
Cf. Lyons v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority, 105 F.3d 1063, 1067-68 (6th 
Cir. 1997) (holding that two statutory provisions were in direct 
conflict, creating ``a rare but difficult form of ambiguity'').
3. Section 251(h)(2)(C)
    19. Under section 251(h)(2)(C), in order for the Commission to 
treat GTA as an incumbent LEC for purposes of section 251, ``such 
treatment (must be) consistent with the public interest, convenience, 
and necessity and the purposes of (section 251).'' 47 U.S.C. 
251(h)(2)(C). As described above, Congress has declared unequivocally 
that promoting competition in local exchange and exchange access 
markets serves the public interest, convenience, and necessity. 
Treating GTA as an incumbent LEC would promote competition in the local 
exchange and exchange access markets in Guam, because such treatment 
would require GTA to comply with the pro-competitive obligations of 
section 251(c), absent an exemption,

[[Page 29323]]

suspension, or modification under section 251(f). Moreover, because GTA 
appears to be the sole provider of local exchange and exchange access 
services in Guam, we tentatively conclude that GTA has market power, 
economies of density, connectivity, and scale, and control of the local 
network comparable to that possessed by entities that are incumbent 
LECs under section 251(h)(1). Consequently, treating GTA as an 
incumbent LEC may well be a prerequisite for the development of 
competition in the local exchange and exchange access markets in Guam. 
Thus, we tentatively conclude that treating GTA as an incumbent LEC for 
purposes of section 251 would be consistent with the public interest, 
convenience, and necessity.
    20. For similar reasons, we also tentatively conclude that treating 
GTA as an incumbent LEC would be consistent with the purposes of 
section 251. Section 251's primary purpose is to foster competition 
that otherwise would not likely develop in local exchange and exchange 
access markets. It is possible that failing to treat GTA as an 
incumbent LEC would stifle competition in Guam.
    21. Having tentatively concluded that GTA has market power, 
economies of density, connectivity, and scale, and control of the local 
network, and that treating GTA as an incumbent LEC would be consistent 
with the public interest, convenience, and necessity and the purposes 
of section 251, we further conclude tentatively that the circumstances 
here satisfy the requirements of section 251(h)(2)(C). We invite 
comment regarding these tentative conclusions.
4. Proposal to Treat GTA--and Possibly Others--as an Incumbent LEC
    22. For all of the reasons explained above, we tentatively conclude 
that the relevant facts and circumstances meet the requirements of 
section 251(h)(2) for treating GTA as an incumbent LEC for purposes of 
section 251. Accordingly, we propose to provide for the treatment of 
GTA as an incumbent LEC for purposes of section 251. We seek comment 
regarding this tentative conclusion and proposal. We also seek comment 
whether LECs situated similarly to GTA exist and, if so, whether we 
should adopt the same rule with respect to such class or category of 
LECs.

B. Procedural Matters

1. Ex Parte Presentations
    23. With respect to the rulemaking proposal in Part IV, supra, to 
treat GTA as an incumbent local exchange carrier pursuant to section 
251(h)(2), this is a non-restricted notice-and-comment rulemaking 
proceeding. Ex parte presentations are permitted, except during the 
Sunshine Agenda period, provided that they are disclosed as required by 
the Commission's rules. See generally 47 CFR 1.1201, 1.1203, and 
1.1206.
2. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
    24. Section 603 of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, as amended, 5 
U.S.C. 603, requires an initial regulatory flexibility analysis in NPRM 
and comment rulemaking proceedings, unless we certify that ``the rule 
will not, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities.'' 5 U.S.C. section 605(b). Our 
proposal in Part IV, supra, to treat GTA as an incumbent local exchange 
carrier pursuant to section 251(h)(2) will affect only GTA and the 
limited number of entities that seek to interconnect with GTA's network 
or resell GTA's services. Even if all of these entities can be 
classified as small entities, we do not believe that they constitute a 
``significant number of small entities'' for purposes of the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act. Therefore, we certify that the proposed rule will not, 
if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities. The Secretary shall send a copy of this 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, including this certification and 
statement, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business 
Administration. See 5 U.S.C. 605(b). A copy of this certification also 
will be published in the Federal Register.
3. Comment Filing Procedures
    25. Pursuant to applicable procedures set forth in sections 1.415 
and 1.419 of the Commission's rules, 47 CFR 1.415, 1.419, interested 
parties may file comments on or before July 7, 1997 and reply comments 
on or before July 28, 1997. To file formally in this proceeding, you 
must file an original and six copies of all comments, reply comments, 
and supporting comments. If you would like each Commissioner to receive 
a personal copy of your comments, you must file an original and eleven 
copies. Comments and reply comments should be sent to Office of the 
Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, 1919 M Street, NW, Room 
222, Washington, DC 20554. Parties should also file copies of any 
documents filed in this docket with Janice Myles of the Common Carrier 
Bureau, 1919 M Street, NW, Room 544, Washington, DC 20554, and with the 
Commission's copy contractor, International Transcription Services, 
Inc., 2100 M Street, NW, Suite 140, Washington, DC 20037. Comments and 
reply comments will be available for public inspection during regular 
business hours in the FCC Reference Center, 1919 M Street, NW, Room 
239, Washington, DC 20554.

II. Ordering Clauses

    26. It is ordered That, pursuant to sections 1, 2, 4, 251, and 
303(r) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 
152, 154, 251, and 303(r), the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking contained 
herein, is hereby adopted.
    27. It is further ordered That the Secretary shall send a copy of 
this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, including the regulatory 
flexibility certification, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the 
Small Business Administration, in accordance with paragraph 603(a) of 
the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. (1981).

Federal Communications Commission.
William F. Caton,
Acting Secretary.
[FR Doc. 97-14119 Filed 5-29-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-U