[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 93 (Wednesday, May 14, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 26576-26577]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-12591]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-302]


Florida Power Corporation; Crystal River Nuclear Generating Plant 
Unit 3; Exemption

I

    Florida Power Corporation (the licensee) is the holder of Facility 
Operating License No. DPR-72, which authorizes operation of the Crystal 
River Nuclear Generating Plant Unit 3. The license provides, among 
other things, that the licensee is subject to all rules, regulations, 
and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect.
    The facility is of a pressurized water reactor type and is located 
in Citrus County, Florida.

II

    Title 10 CFR 73.55, ``Requirements for physical protection of 
licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological 
sabotage,'' paragraph (a), in part, states that ``The licensee shall 
establish and maintain an onsite physical protection system and 
security organization which will have as its objective to provide high 
assurance that activities involving special nuclear material are not 
inimical to the common defense and security and do not constitute an 
unreasonable risk to the public health and safety.''
    10 CFR 73.55(d), ``Access Requirements,'' paragraph (1), specifies 
that ``The licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle 
access into a protected area.'' 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) requires that ``A 
numbered picture badge identification system shall be used for all 
individuals who are authorized access to protected areas without 
escort.'' 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) also states that an individual not 
employed by the licensee (i.e., contractors) may be authorized access 
to protected areas without escort provided the individual ``receives a 
picture badge upon entrance into the protected area which must be 
returned upon exit from the protected area * * *.''
    The licensee proposed to implement an alternative unescorted access 
control system which would eliminate the need to issue and retrieve 
badges at each entrance/exit location and would allow all individuals 
with unescorted access to keep their badge with them when departing the 
site.
    An exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) is required to allow 
contractors who have unescorted access to take their badges offsite 
instead of returning them when exiting the site.
    By letter dated June 22, 1995, as supplemented November 22, 1995 
and January 31, 1996, the licensee submitted its exemption request for 
this purpose.

III

    Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, ``Specific exemptions,'' the Commission 
may, upon application of any interested person or upon its own 
initiative, grant such exemptions in this part as it determines are 
authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common 
defense and security, and are otherwise in the public interest. 
Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, the Commission may authorize a licensee to 
provide alternative measures for protection against radiological 
sabotage provided the licensee demonstrates that the alternative 
measures have ``the same high assurance objective'' and meet ``the 
general performance requirements'' of the regulation, and ``the overall 
level of system performance provides protection against radiological 
sabotage equivalent'' to that which would be provided by the 
regulation.
    Currently, unescorted access into the protected areas of Crystal 
River Unit 3 is controlled through the use of a photograph on a badge 
and a separate keycard (hereafter, these are referred to as badge). The 
security officers at each entrance station use the photograph on the 
badge to visually identify the individual requesting access. The badges 
for both licensee employees and contract personnel, who have been 
granted unescorted access, are issued upon entrance at each entrance/
exit location and are returned upon exit. The badges are stored and are 
retrievable at each entrance/exit location. In accordance with 10 CFR 
73.55(d)(5), contractors are not allowed to take badges offsite. In 
accordance with the CR3 physical security plan, neither licensee 
employees nor contractors are allowed to take badges offsite.

[[Page 26577]]

    Under the proposed system, each individual who is authorized for 
unescorted entry into protected areas would have the physical 
characteristics of their hand (hand geometry) registered with their 
badge number in the access control computer system. When an individual 
enters the badge into the card reader and places the hand on the 
measuring surface, the system would record the individual's hand image. 
The unique characteristics of the extracted hand image would be 
compared with the previously stored template in the access control 
computer system to verify authorization for entry. Individuals, 
including licensee employees and contractors, would be allowed to keep 
their badges with them when they depart the site and thus eliminate the 
process to issue, retrieve and store badges at the entrance stations to 
the plants. Badges do not carry any information other than a unique 
identification number. All other access processes, including search 
function capability, would remain the same. This system would not be 
used for persons requiring escorted access, i.e. visitors.
    Based on a Sandia report entitled, ``A Performance Evaluation of 
Biometric Identification Devices'' (SAND91--0276 UC--906 Unlimited 
Release, printed June 1991), and on its experience with the current 
photo-identification system, the licensee demonstrated that the false-
acceptance rate for the hand geometry system will be better than is 
achieved by the current system. The biometric system has been in use 
for a number of years at several sensitive Department of Energy 
facilities. The licensee will implement a process for testing the 
proposed system to ensure continued overall level of performance 
equivalent to that specified in the regulation. The CR3 Physical 
Security Plan will be revised to include implementation and testing of 
the hand geometry access control system and to allow licensee employees 
and contractors to take their badges offsite.
    The licensee will control all points of personnel access into a 
protected area under the observation of security personnel through the 
use of a badge and verification of hand geometry. A numbered picture 
badge identification system will continue to be used for all 
individuals who are authorized unescorted access to protected areas. 
Badges will continue to be displayed by all individuals while inside 
the protected area.
    Since both the badge and hand geometry would be necessary for 
access into the protected area, the proposed system would provide for a 
positive verification process and potential loss of a badge by an 
individual, as a result of taking the badge offsite, would not enable 
an unauthorized entry into protected areas.

IV

    For the foregoing reasons, pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, the NRC staff 
has determined that the proposed alternative measures for protection 
against radiological sabotage meet ``the same high assurance 
objective,'' and ``the general performance requirements'' of the 
regulation and that ``the overall level of system performance provides 
protection against radiological sabotage equivalent'' to that which 
would be provided by the regulation.
    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
73.5, an exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or 
property or common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public 
interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants Florida Power 
Corporation an exemption from those requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) 
relating to the returning of picture badges upon exit from the 
protected area such that individuals not employed by the licensee 
(i.e., contractors, who are authorized unescorted access into the 
protected area) can take their badges offsite provided that the 
licensee implements a process testing of the proposed system and revise 
the CR3 Physical Security Plan as described in section III above.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the 
granting of this exemption will not result in any significant adverse 
environmental impact (62 FR 24982).
    This exemption is effective upon issuance.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day of May 1997.
    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Collins,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 97-12591 Filed 5-13-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P